ARTICLE II SECTION 1. PHILIPPINES AS A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATEIN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO, 210 SCRA 588

FACTS: THE ASCENDANCY TO PRESIDENCY OF THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A VIOLATION OF THE PREVIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. THOUGH ACHIEVED THROUGH VIOLATION, THE NEWLY-INSTITUTED GOVERNMENT MET LITTLE RESISTANCE EVIDENCED THROUGH AQUINOS DESIGNATION OF CABINET MEMBERS. THUS, THE OBEDIENCE OF THE PEOPLE TO THE PREVIOUS CONSTITUTION CEASED TO EXIST.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION IS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT.HELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IS VALID AND LEGITIMATE. IT IS CLASSIFIED AS A DE JURE AS IT IS ESTABLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF THE LEGITIMATE SOVEREIGN THROUGH PRACTICE OF A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION OF THE PEOPLE. THE AQUINOS GOVERNMENT IS TAKEN FROM A DIRECT EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE. THUS, THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION IS LEGITIMATE AND THAT IT IS A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT CLASSIFIED AS DE JURE.

ARTICLE II SECTION 1. PHILIPPINES AS A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATECO KIM CHAM V. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 PHIL 113 (1945)

FACTS: PRIOR TO THE LIBERATION OF MANILA, CO KIM CHAM HAS A PENDING CIVIL CASE. AFTER THE LIBERATION AND DURING THE OCCUPATION OF THE AMERICANS, THE JUDGE OF THE LOWER COURT IGNORED OF THE CASE AND REFUSED ITS CONTINUATION. THE GROUND ASSERTED BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IS THAT A PROCLAMATION OF GEN. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR PERTAINING TO THE NULLIFICATION OF ALL JUDICIAL JUDGMENT ON COURTS OF THE JAPANESE-ESTABLISHED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES MAKES SUCH COMPLAINT VOID. IN CONTENTION, THE RESPONDENT JUDGE STATED THAT GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS.ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION ARE DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS.HELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION, NAMELY THE PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ARE BOTH DE FACTO GOVERNMENT OF THE SECOND KIND. BOTH GOVERNMENTS WERE AUTHORIZED BY THE JAPANESE MILITARY AND WERE GOVERNMENT IMPOSED BY LAWS OF WAR.

ARTICLE II SECTION 2. GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAWJBL REYES V. BAGATSING, GR NO. 65366, OCTOBER 25, 1983

FACTS: PETITIONER JBL REYES, IN BEHALF OF THE ANTI-BASES COALITION, APPLIED FOR A PERMIT TO A PEACEFUL RALLY IN A PUBLIC PARK NEAR THE US EMBASSY IN THE OFFICE OF THE CITY OF MANILA. SUCH PERMIT WAS DENIED BY THE CITY OF MANILA. STATED BY THE MAYOR OF THE CITY, SUCH ASSEMBLY WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF ORDINANCE 7295, WHICH PROHIBITS THE STAGING OF RALLIES WITHIN 500 FEET OF FOREIGN EMBASSIES. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SUCH CITY ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CLAUSE ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BY THE CONSTITUTION.ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT SUCH CITY ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CLAUSE ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BY THE CONSTITUTION.HELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT SUCH ORDINANCE IS OF RELEVANT RELATION TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND DOES NOT VIOLATE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. THE PHILIPPINES IS A SIGNATORY OF THE SAID CONVENTION AND THE ADOPTION OF WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SECOND SECTION OF ARTICLE 2 IN WHICH THE PHILIPPINES ADOPT GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS RULE OF THE LAND. THUS, THE CITY ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BUT ADHERES TO GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

ARTICLE II SECTION 2. GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMIJARES V. RANADA, GR 139325, APRIL 12, 2005

FACTS:INVOKING THE ALIEN TORT ACT, PETITIONERS MIJARES, ET AL., ALL OF WHOM SUFFERED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE MARCOS ERA, OBTAINED A FINAL JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FERDINAND MARCOS AMOUNTING TO ROUGHLY $1.9B IN COMPENSATORY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR TORTUOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE US DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII. THIS FINAL JUDGMENT WAS AFFIRMED BY THE US COURT OF APPEALS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, PETITIONERS FILED A COMPLAINT WITH THE RTC MAKATI FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT, PAYING P410 AS DOCKET AND FILING FEES BASED ON RULE 141, PAR. 7(B) WHERE THE VALUE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER IS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION. THE ESTATE OF MARCOS HOWEVER, FILED A MTD ALLEGING THE NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT FILING FEES. RTC MAKATI DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT STATING THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER WAS CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION AS IT INVOLVED A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY A FOREIGN COURT ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF A DEFINITE SUM OF MONEY ALLOWING FOR THE EASY DETERMINATION OF THE VALUE OF THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT. AS SUCH, THE PROPER FILING FEE WAS P472M, WHICH PETITIONERS HAD NOT PAID.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY A FOREIGN STATE CAN BE RECOGNIZED AND ENFORCED IN THE PHILIPPINES.HELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT IT CAN BE ENFORCED IN OUR COUNTRY. THERE IS NO OBLIGATORY RULE DERIVED FROM TREATIES OR CONVENTIONS THAT REQUIRES THE PHILIPPINES TO RECOGNIZE FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, OR ALLOW A PROCEDURE FOR THE ENFORCEMENT THEREOF. HOWEVER, GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BY VIRTUE OF THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, FORM PART OF THE LAWS OF THE LAND EVEN IF THEY DO NOT DERIVE FROM TREATY OBLIGATIONS. THE CLASSICAL FORMULATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW SEES THOSE CUSTOMARY RULES ACCEPTED AS BINDING RESULT FROM THE COMBINATION OF TWO ELEMENTS: THE ESTABLISHED, WIDESPREAD, AND CONSISTENT PRACTICE ON THE PART OF STATES; AND A PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENT KNOWN AS THE OPINION JURIS SIVE NECESSITATES (OPINION AS TO LAW OR NECESSITY). IMPLICIT IN THE LATTER ELEMENT IS A BELIEF THAT THE PRACTICE IN QUESTION IS RENDERED OBLIGATORY BY THE EXISTENCE OF A RULE OF LAW REQUIRING IT.

ARTICLE II SECTION 2. GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAWSHANGRI-LA V. DEVELOPERS, GR 159938, MARCH 31, 2006

FACTS: THE PETITIONERS SEEK THE NULLIFICATION OF THE PREVIOUS COURT DECISION. THE CASE STARTED WHEN THE DEFENDANT FILED A COMPLAINT FOR THE USE OF SHARGRI-LA OF THE REGISTERED LOGO OF DGCI IN THE PHILIPPINES. DGCI ACCORDINGLY PATENTED THE DESIGN WITH THE BUREAU OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ON 1982. HOWEVER, THE PETITIONERS CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE BEEN USING THE TRADEMARK SINCE 1962, WHICH WAS EVEN BEFORE THEY HAVE ENTERED BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES. THE PETITIONER NOW USES THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY WHICH IS THE PARIS CONVENTION AS A DEFENSE. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTYHELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT EVEN THOUGH THE PHILIPPINES IS A SIGNATORY OF THE SAID CONVENTION, THE PETITIONERS CANNOT SEEK DEFENSE FROM IT. THE SUPREME COURT STATED THAT OUR MUNICIPAL LAW ON TRADEMARKS REGARDING THE REQUIREMENT OF ACTUAL USE IN THE PHILIPPINES MUST SUBORDINATE AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WITH VIOLATIONS TO THE LOCAL LAWS OF TRADEMARK BY THE DEFENDANT, THE PETITION FOR NULLIFICATION IS GRANTED.

ARTICLE II SECTION 8. FREEDOM FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONSBAYAN V. ZAMORA, GR 138570, OCTOBER 10, 2000

FACTS: WITH THE DENIAL OF THE EXTENSION OF THE MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES, FORMER PRESIDENT RAMOS APPROVED OF THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT. SUCH AGREEMENT STATES THAT THE PHILIPPINES AND UNITED STATES WOULD EXCHANGE MILITARY STRATEGIES ON COMPLEMENTING AREAS BETWEEN THE TWO. A FEW MONTHS LATER, THE NEW PRESIDENT ESTRADA, THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MOVED FOR THE RATIFICATION OF THE VFA. THE PETITIONERS ARGUE THAT THE AGREEMENT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION.ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE VFA IS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.WHETHER OR NOT THE VFA VIOLATES THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATED IN THE CONSTITUTION.HELD: THE COURT HOLDS THAT SINCE THE AGREEMENT IS CONSIDERED TO BE A TREATY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, IT SHOULD BE ADHERED AS A LAW OF THE LAND. AS THE COURT RECOGNIZES THE PHRASE RECOGNIZED AS A TREATY AS STATED BY THE US AMBASSADOR, MEANS THAT THE OTHER PARTY ACKNOWLEDGES SUCH AGREEMENT AS A TREATY. WITH THIS, WE APPLY THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON LAWS OF TREATIES, IN WHICH THE STATE IS A SIGNATORY TO.

ARTICLE II SECTION 12. FAMILY LIFE; MOTHER; UNBORNROE V. WADE, 410 US 113 (1973)

FACTS: PETITIONERS ARGUE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TEXAN ABORTION LAWS. THE SAID LAWS ONLY ALLOW ABORTION AT A PRESCRIPTION OF A MEDICAL AUTHORITY IF THE MOTHERS LIFE IS ENDANGERED BY THE PREGNANCY AND DOES NOT GIVE THE RIGHT TO FOR THE MOTHER TO PURSUE ABORTION.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TEXAN ABORTION LAWS VIOLATES THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONHELD: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HELD THAT A STATE CRIMINAL ABORTION STATUTE OF THE CURRENT TEXAS TYPE THAT EXEMPTS FROM CRIMINALITY ONLY A LIFESAVING PROCEDURE ON BEHALF OF THE MOTHER, WITHOUT REGARD TO PREGNANCY STAGE AND WITHOUT RECOGNITION OF THE INTERESTS INVOLVED (SUCH AS LIBERTY INTERESTS), IS VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

ARTICLE II SECTION 16. RIGHT TO HEALTHFUL ECOLOGYLLDA VS CA 231 SCRA 292 (1994)

FACTS: THIS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DECLARING THAT THE LLDA HAS NO POWER AND AUTHORITY TO ISSUE AN EX-PARTE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER ENJOINING THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN CITY FROM DUMPING GARBAGE IN AN OPEN DUMPSITE IN BARANGAY CAMARIN OF SAID CITY.IN 1991, THE TASK FORCE CAMARIN DUMPSITE OF BARANGAY CAMARIN, CALOOCAN CITY, FILED A LETTER-COMPLAINT WITH THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) SEEKING TO STOP THE OPERATION OF THE OPEN GARBAGE DUMPSITE IN THE SAID AREA DUE TO ITS HARMFUL EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH OF THE RESIDENTS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF POLLUTION OF THE WATER CONTENT OF THE SURROUNDING AREA. ACTING ON THE COMPLAINT, THE LLDA CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION AND FOUND OUT THAT THE DUMPSITE OPERATION DID NOT PROCURE ANY CLEARANCE FROM THE FORMER, AMONG OTHERS. FURTHER, THE WATER CONTENT OF THE SURROUNDING AREA INDICATES THE PRESENCE OF BACTERIA.THE LLDA THEN ISSUED A CEASE AND DESIST ORDER ORDERING THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN AND OTHER ENTITIES TO COMPLETELY STOP FROM DUMPING GARBAGE AT THE DUMPSITE. THE DUMPING OPERATION WAS FORTHWITH STOPPED BUT WAS RESUMED SHORTLY THEREAFTER WHEN A MEETING AMONG THE PARTIES FAILED TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM. THE LLDA THEN ISSUED ANOTHER CEASE AND DESIST ORDER ENJOINING THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN FROM CONTINUING ITS DUMPING OPERATIONS AT THE SAID AREA.THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN FILED WITH THE RTC OF CALOOCAN CITY AN ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER. THE LLDA FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT THE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER IT ISSUED IS REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CA) AND NOT BY THE RTC. THE RTC DENIED LLDA S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ENJOINED THE LLDA FROM ENFORCING ITS CEASE AND DESIST ORDER. ON PETITION TO THE CA, THE LATTER HELD THAT THE RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION ON THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF LLDA'S CEASE AND DESIST ORDER SINCE THIS IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE CA. HOWEVER, THE CA ALSO RULED THAT THE LLDA HAS NO POWER AND AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A CEASE AND DESIST ORDER. HENCE, LLDA APPEALED TO THE SUPREME COURT. WHILE BOTH PARTIES AGREE ON THE NEED TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND TO MAINTAIN THE ECOLOGICAL BALANCE OF THE SURROUNDING AREAS OF THE CAMARIN OPEN DUMPSITE, THE QUESTION IS WHICH AGENCY CAN LAWFULLY EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER.THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN CLAIMS THAT IT IS WITHIN ITS POWER, AS A LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT, PURSUANT TO THE GENERAL WELFARE PROVISION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS OF THE OPERATION OF THE DUMPSITE ON THE ECOLOGICAL BALANCE AND TO SEE THAT SUCH BALANCE IS MAINTAINED. IT ARGUES THAT AUTHORITY TO ISSUE AN CEASE AND DESIST ORDER WAS NOT INCORPORATED IN REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4850 (THE ACT CREATING THE LLDA) AND ITS AMENDATORY LAWS (PD 813 AND EO 927). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LLDA CONTENDS THAT, AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WHICH WAS GRANTED REGULATORY AND ADJUDICATORY POWERS AND FUNCTIONS BY RA 4850 AND ITS AMENDATORY LAWS, IT IS INVESTED WITH THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A CEASE AND DESIST ORDER.ISSUES: 1) WHETHER OR NOT THE LLDA HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ENTERTAIN THE COMPLAINT OF TASK FORCE CAMARIN DUMPSITE ON THE DUMPSITE OPERATIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN. 2) WHETHER OR NOT THE LLDA HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A "CEASE AND DESIST" ENJOINING THE DUMPSITE OPERATIONS OF THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN.HELD: ON THE FIRST ISSUE: THE LLDA HAS THAT AUTHORITY. THE LLDA, AS A SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, IS SPECIFICALLY MANDATED UNDER RA 4850 AND ITS AMENDATORY LAWS TO CARRY OUT AND MAKE EFFECTIVE THE DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY OF PROMOTING AND ACCELERATING THE DEVELOPMENT AND BALANCED GROWTH OF THE LAGUNA LAKE AREA AND THE SURROUNDING PROVINCES WITH DUE REGARD AND ADEQUATE PROVISIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL, PRESERVATION OF THE QUALITY OF HUMAN LIFE AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, AND THE PREVENTION OF UNDUE ECOLOGICAL DISTURBANCES, DETERIORATION AND POLLUTION. UNDER SUCH A BROAD GRANT OF POWER AND AUTHORITY, THE LLDA OBVIOUSLY HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE INHABITANTS OF THE LAGUNA LAKE REGION FROM THE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF POLLUTANTS EMANATING FROM THE DISCHARGE OF WASTES FROM THE SURROUNDING AREAS. THUS, TO CARRY OUT THIS RESPONSIBILITY, THE LLDA IS MANDATED TO PASS UPON AND APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE ALL RELATED PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND PROJECTS PROPOSED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICES/AGENCIES WITHIN THE REGION, PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, AND PRIVATE PERSONS OR ENTERPRISES.WHEN TASK FORCE CAMARIN DUMPSITE FILED ITS COMPLAINT BEFORE THE LLDA, THE LATTER'S JURISDICTION WAS VALIDLY INVOKED ON THE BASIS OF ITS ALLEGATION THAT THE DUMPSITE OPERATIONS WAS UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT A CLEARANCE FROM THE LLDA.ON THE SECOND ISSUE:THE LLDA HAS THAT AUTHORITY. RA 4850 AND ITS AMENDATORY LAWS DID NOT EXPRESSLY STATE THAT THE LLDA HAS POWER TO ISSUE A CEASE AND DESIST ORDER. HOWEVER, RA 4850 AND ITS AMENDATORY LAWS AUTHORIZES THE LLDA TO "MAKE, ALTER OR MODIFY ORDER REQUIRING THE DISCONTINUANCE OR POLLUTION." WHILE IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL RULE THAT AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS ONLY SUCH POWERS AS ARE EXPRESSLY GRANTED TO IT BY LAW, IT IS LIKEWISE A SETTLED RULE THAT AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS ALSO SUCH POWERS AS ARE NECESSARILY IMPLIED IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS EXPRESS POWERS. IN THE EXERCISE, THEREFORE, OF ITS EXPRESS POWERS AS A REGULATORY AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY WITH RESPECT TO POLLUTION CASES IN THE LAGUNA LAKE REGION, THE AUTHORITY OF THE LLDA TO ISSUE A "CEASE AND DESIST ORDER" IS NECESSARILY IMPLIED. OTHERWISE, IT MAY WELL BE REDUCED TO A "TOOTHLESS" PAPER AGENCY. THE POWER TO ISSUE A CEASE AND DESIST ORDER IS GRANTED WHEN THERE IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF AN ESTABLISHMENT EXCEEDING THE ALLOWABLE STANDARDS SET BY THE ANTI-POLLUTION LAWS OF THE COUNTRY BECAUSE STOPPING THE CONTINUOUS DISCHARGE OF POLLUTIVE AND UNTREATED EFFLUENTS INTO THE RIVERS AND OTHER INLAND WATERS OF THE PHILIPPINES CANNOT BE MADE TO WAIT UNTIL PROTRACTED LITIGATION OVER THE ULTIMATE CORRECTNESS OR PROPRIETY OF SUCH ORDERS HAS RUN ITS FULL COURSE. IT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMONPLACE THAT THE ORDINARY REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS YIELD TO THE NECESSITIES OF PROTECTING VITAL PUBLIC INTERESTS. THIS IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE DEMANDS OF "THE NECESSITIES OF PROTECTING VITAL PUBLIC INTERESTS" GIVES VITALITY TO THE STATEMENT ON ECOLOGY EMBODIED IN ART. 2 SEC.16 OF 1987 CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT, "THE STATE SHALL PROTECT AND ADVANCE THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY IN ACCORD WITH THE RHYTHM AND HARMONY OF NATURE."

ARTICLE II SECTION 16. RIGHT TO HEALTHFUL ECOLOGYLLDA VS CA 251 SCRA 42 (1995)

FACTS: THIS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW BY CERTIORARI ON A JUDGMENT MADE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERING THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY HAS NO AUTHORITY OVER THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS FOR FISHERY PRIVILEGES IN LAGUNA LAKE AND ITS ENVIRONS.RA 4850 CREATED THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA), A GOVERNMENT AGENCY TASKED WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECOLOGY, NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAGUNA LAKE AREA AND THE SURROUNDING PROVINCES, CITIES AND TOWNS. IN VIEW OF THE RAPID EXPANSION OF THE AREAS SURROUNDING THE LAGUNA LAKE AND THE RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF SUCH DEVELOPMENT ON THE LAKE, PD 813 WAS ISSUED AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF RA 4850. AMONG THE AMENDMENTS MADE WERE THE GRANTING OF THE LLDA EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE NEW PERMIT FOR THE USE OF THE LAKE WATERS FOR ANY PROJECTS OR ACTIVITIES IN OR AFFECTING THE SAID LAKE INCLUDING NAVIGATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATION OF FISHPENS, FISH ENCLOSURES, FISH CORRALS AND THE LIKE. SUBSEQUENTLY, EO 927 FURTHER DEFINED AND ENLARGED THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE LLDA AND NAMED THE TOWNS, CITIES AND PROVINCES ENCOMPASSED BY THE TERM "LAGUNA DE BAY REGION". IT ALSO PROVIDED THAT THE LLDA SHALL HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE PERMIT FOR THE USE OF ALL SURFACE WATER FOR ANY PROJECTS OR ACTIVITIES IN OR AFFECTING THE SAID REGION INCLUDING NAVIGATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATION OF FISHPENS, FISH ENCLOSURES, FISH CORRALS AND THE LIKE.THEN CAME RA 7160 OR THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 WHICH PROVIDES THAT MUNICIPALITIES SHALL HAVE THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO GRANT FISHERY PRIVILEGES IN THE MUNICIPAL WATERS AND IMPOSE RENTAL FEES OR CHARGES THEREFOR. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS THEREUPON ASSUMED THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE FISHING PRIVILEGES AND FISHPEN PERMITS. BIG FISHPEN OPERATORS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE OCCASION TO ESTABLISH FISHPENS AND FISHCAGES, WITH UNREGULATED FISHPENS AND FISHCAGES OCCUPYING ALMOST ONE-THIRD OF THE ENTIRE LAKE WATER SURFACE AREA AS OF 1995. THE MAYOR'S PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT THESE WERE ALL UNDERTAKEN IN VIOLATION OF THE POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE LLDA ON FISHPEN ZONING AND THE LAGUNA LAKE CARRYING CAPACITY. THIS AGGRAVATED THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND ECOLOGICAL STRESS OF LAGUNA LAKE. THUS, THE LLDA SERVED NOTICE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC THAT ALL SUCH FISHPENS, FISHCAGES AND OTHER AQUA-CULTURE STRUCTURES NOT REGISTERED OR TO WHICH NO APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION HAS BEEN FILED WITH LLDA ARE DECLARED OUTRIGHTLY AS ILLEGAL AND SUBJECT TO DEMOLITION BY THE LLDA IF NOT DISMANTLED BY THE OWNERS THEMSELVES WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE NOTICE.REACTING THERETO, THE AFFECTED FISHPEN OWNERS FILED INJUNCTION CASES AGAINST THE LLDA BEFORE VARIOUS REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, TO WHICH THE LLDA FILED MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS. THE RTCS DISMISSED LLDAS MOTIONS AND ORDERED TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ENJOINING THE LLDA FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE DEMOLITION.ON PETITION, THE COURT OF APPEALS (CA) DISMISSED THE LLDAS PETITIONS AND HELD THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE LLDA CHARTER HAD BEEN REPEALED BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND THAT THE POWER TO GRANT PERMITS IS NOW VESTED WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED. HENCE, LLDA APPEALED TO THE SUPREME COURT.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LLDA, INSTEAD OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THE LAGUNA LAKE AND ITS ENVIRONS IN THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS FOR FISHERY PRIVILEGES HELD: THE LLDA HAS THE JURISDICTION.FIRST, THE PROVISIONS OF RA 7160 DO NOT NECESSARILY REPEAL RA 4850 CREATING THE LLDA AND ITS AMENDATORY LAWS.RA 4850 IS A SPECIAL LAW. RA 7160 IS A GENERAL LAW. IT IS BASIC IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT THE ENACTMENT OF A LATER LEGISLATION WHICH IS A GENERAL LAW CANNOT BE CONSTRUED TO HAVE REPEALED A SPECIAL LAW. A SPECIAL STATUTE, PROVIDED FOR A PARTICULAR CASE OR CLASS OF CASES, IS NOT REPEALED BY A SUBSEQUENT STATUTE, GENERAL IN ITS TERMS, PROVISIONS AND APPLICATION, UNLESS THE INTENT TO REPEAL OR ALTER IS MANIFEST, ALTHOUGH THE TERMS OF THE GENERAL LAW ARE BROAD ENOUGH TO INCLUDE THE CASES EMBRACED IN THE SPECIAL LAW.RA 7160 DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY EXPRESS PROVISION REPEALING THE CHARTER OF THE LLDA. IMPLIED REPEALS ARE NOT FAVORED AND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO ALL ENACTMENTS OF THE LEGISLATURE. A SPECIAL LAW CANNOT BE REPEALED, AMENDED OR ALTERED BY A SUBSEQUENT GENERAL LAW BY MERE IMPLICATION. SECOND, CONSIDERING THAT THE REASON BEHIND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LLDA IS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS FOR THE LLDA TO PROCEED WITH ITS MISSION. A COHESIVE AND INTEGRATED LAKE WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT POLICY LIKE THAT OF LLDA IS NECESSARY TO CONSERVE, PROTECT AND SUSTAINABLY DEVELOP LAGUNA DE BAY RATHER THAN FRAGMENTED CONCEPTS OF MANAGEMENT POLICIES WHERE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS EXERCISE EXCLUSIVE DOMINION OVER SPECIFIC PORTIONS OF THE LAKE WATER. THE FORMER IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROMOTION OF A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY AS PROVIDED IN ART. II, SEC. 16 OF THE CONSTITUTION.THIRD, THE POWER OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO ISSUE FISHING PRIVILEGES WAS CLEARLY GRANTED FOR REVENUE PURPOSES, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE PROVISION ON ISSUANCE OF FISHING PERMITS IS EMBODIED UNDER THE HEADING, "SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON THE TAXING AND OTHER REVENUE RAISING POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS." ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POWER OF THE LLDA TO GRANT PERMITS FOR SUCH PRIVILEGES IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EFFECTIVELY REGULATING AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES IN THE LAGUNA DE BAY REGION AND DOES PARTAKE OF THE NATURE OF POLICE POWER WHICH IS THE MOST PERVASIVE, THE LEAST LIMITABLE AND THE MOST DEMANDING OF ALL STATE POWERS.ACCORDINGLY, THE CHARTER OF THE LLDA WHICH EMBODIES A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER SHOULD PREVAIL OVER THAT OF RA 7160 ON MATTERS AFFECTING LAGUNA DE BAY.

ARTICLE II SECTION 26. EQUAL ACCESS TO POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND POLITICAL DYNASTIESPAMATONG V. COMELEC, 427 SCRA 96 (2004)

FACTS: REV. ELLY VELEZ PAMATONG FILED HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT ON DECEMBER 17, 2003. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) REFUSED TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO PAMATONGS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY IN ITS RESOLUTION 6558 DATED JANUARY 17, 2004. THE DECISION, HOWEVER, WAS NOT UNANIMOUS SINCE COMMISSIONERS LUZVIMINDA G. TANCANGCO AND MEHOL K. SADAIN VOTED TO INCLUDE PAMATONG AS THEY BELIEVED HE HAD PARTIES OR MOVEMENTS TO BACK UP HIS CANDIDACY. ON 15 JANUARY 2004, PAMATONG MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESOLUTION6558. THE COMELEC, ACTING ON PAMATONGS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ON SIMILAR MOTIONS FILED BY OTHER ASPIRANTS FOR NATIONAL ELECTIVE POSITIONS, DENIED THE SAME UNDER THE AEGIS OF OMNIBUS RESOLUTION 6604 DATED 11 FEBRUARY 2004.THE COMELEC DECLARED PAMATONG AND 35 OTHERS NUISANCE CANDIDATES WHO COULD NOT WAGE A NATIONWIDE CAMPAIGN AND/OR ARE NOT NOMINATED BY A POLITICAL PARTY OR ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY A REGISTERED POLITICAL PARTY WITH A NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY. COMMISSIONER SADAIN MAINTAINED HIS VOTE FOR PAMATONG. BY THEN, COMMISSIONER TANCANGCO HAD RETIRED. PAMATONG FILED THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, SEEKING TO REVERSE THE RESOLUTIONS WHICH WERE ALLEGEDLY RENDERED IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO "EQUAL ACCESS TO OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC SERVICE" UNDER SECTION 26, ARTICLE II OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, BY LIMITING THE NUMBER OF QUALIFIED CANDIDATES ONLY TO THOSE WHO CAN AFFORD TO WAGE A NATIONWIDE CAMPAIGN AND/OR ARE NOMINATED BY POLITICAL PARTIES. PAMATONG ARGUED THAT COMELEC INDIRECTLY AMENDED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND LIMITED THE POWER OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR LEADERS. COMELEC SUPPOSEDLY ERRED IN DISQUALIFYING HIM SINCE HE IS THE MOST QUALIFIED AMONG ALL THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, I.E., HE POSSESSES ALL THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HE IS CAPABLE OF WAGING A NATIONAL CAMPAIGN SINCE HE HAS NUMEROUS NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, HE ALSO HAS THE CAPACITY TO WAGE AN INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN SINCE HE HAS PRACTICED LAW IN OTHER COUNTRIES, AND HE HAS A PLATFORM OF GOVERNMENT. PAMATONG ALSO ATTACKED THE VALIDITY OF THE FORM FOR THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY PREPARED BY THE COMELEC. HE CLAIMED THAT THE FORM DID NOT PROVIDE CLEAR AND REASONABLE GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING THE QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES SINCE IT DID NOT ASK FOR THE CANDIDATES BIO-DATA AND HIS PROGRAM OF GOVERNMENT.ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT ELLY PAMATONG HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RUN FOR, OR HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE, OR TO BE A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENCY PHILIPPINES.HELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT ELLY PAMATONG HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RUN FOR OR HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE AND, PARTICULARLY, TO SEEK THE PRESIDENCY. WHAT IS RECOGNIZED IS MERELY A PRIVILEGE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY LAW. SECTION 26, ARTICLE II OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, NEITHER BESTOWS SUCH A RIGHT NOR ELEVATES THE PRIVILEGE TO THE LEVEL OF AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE PROVISION WHICH SUGGESTS SUCH A THRUST OR JUSTIFIES AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SORT. THE "EQUAL ACCESS" PROVISION IS A SUBSUMED PART OF ARTICLE II OF THE CONSTITUTION, ENTITLED "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES." THE PROVISIONS UNDER THE ARTICLE ARE GENERALLY CONSIDERED NOT SELF-EXECUTING, AND THERE IS NO PLAUSIBLE REASON FOR ACCORDING A DIFFERENT TREATMENT TO THE "EQUAL ACCESS" PROVISION. LIKE THE REST OF THE POLICIES ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE II, THE PROVISION DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BUT MERELY SPECIFIES A GUIDELINE FOR LEGISLATIVE OR EXECUTIVE ACTION. THE DISREGARD OF THE PROVISION DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY CAUSE OF ACTION BEFORE THE COURTS. AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS PRODUCES THE SAME DETERMINATION THAT THE PROVISION IS NOT SELF-EXECUTORY.THE PRIVILEGE OF EQUAL ACCESS TO OPPORTUNITIES TO PUBLIC OFFICE MAY BE SUBJECTED TO LIMITATIONS. SOME VALID LIMITATIONS SPECIFICALLY ON THE PRIVILEGE TO SEEK ELECTIVE OFFICE ARE FOUND IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE ON "NUISANCE CANDIDATES" AND COMELEC RESOLUTION 645210 DATED DECEMBER 10, 2002, OUTLINING THE INSTANCES WHEREIN THE COMELEC MAY REFUSE TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. AS LONG AS THE LIMITATIONS APPLY TO EVERYBODY EQUALLY WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION, HOWEVER, THE EQUAL ACCESS CLAUSE IS NOT VIOLATED. EQUALITY IS NOT SACRIFICED AS LONG AS THE BURDENS ENGENDERED BY THE LIMITATIONS ARE MEANT TO BE BORNE BY ANYONE WHO IS MINDED TO FILE A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. IN THE CASE AT BAR, THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT ANY PERSON IS EXEMPT FROM THE LIMITATIONS OR THE BURDENS WHICH THEY CREATE.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATIONCEBU OXYGEN ACETYLENE CO. V. DRILON, 176 SCRA 24 (1989)

FACTS:PETITIONER AND THE UNION OF ITS RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES, CEBU OXYGEN, ACETYLENE AND CENTRAL VISAYAS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (COAVEA) ENTERED INTO A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA) COVERING THE YEARS 1986 TO 1988. PURSUANT THERETO, THE MANAGEMENT GAVE SALARY INCREASES, AMONG OTHERS.IN SUM, SECTION 8 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES PROHIBITS THE EMPLOYER FROM CREDITING ANNIVERSARY WAGE INCREASES NEGOTIATED UNDER A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AGAINST SUCH WAGE INCREASES MANDATED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6640. ACCORDINGLY, PETITIONER CREDITED THE FIRST YEAR INCREASE OF P200.00 UNDER THE CBA AND ADDED THE DIFFERENCE OF P61.66 (ROUNDED TO P62.00) AND P31.00 TO THE MONTHLY SALARY AND THE 13TH MONTH PAY, RESPECTIVELY, OF ITS EMPLOYEES FROM THE EFFECTIVITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6640 ON DECEMBER 14,1987 TO FEBRUARY 15, 1988 . ON FEBRUARY 22, 1988 , A LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, PURSUANT TO INSPECTION AUTHORITY NO. 058-88, COMMENCED A ROUTINE INSPECTION OF PETITIONER'S ESTABLISHMENT. UPON COMPLETION OF THE INSPECTION ON MARCH 10, 1988 , AND BASED ON PAYROLLS AND OTHER RECORDS, HE FOUND THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW LIKE UNDER PAYMENT OF BASIC WAGE PER R.A. NO. 6640 COVERING THE PERIOD OF TWO (2) MONTHS REPRESENTING 208 EMPLOYEES, AMONG OTHERS. IN SUM, THE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR ORDERED PETITIONER TO PAY THE DEFICIENCY OF P200.00 IN THE MONTHLY SALARY AND P 231.00 IN THE 13TH MONTH PAY OF ITS EMPLOYEES FOR THE PERIOD STATED. PETITIONER PROTESTED THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR ON THE GROUND THAT THE ANNIVERSARY WAGE INCREASES UNDER THE CBA CAN BE CREDITED AGAINST THE WAGE INCREASE MANDATED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6640. HENCE, PETITIONER CONTENDED THAT INASMUCH AS IT HAD CREDITED THE FIRST YEAR INCREASE NEGOTIATED UNDER THE CBA, IT WAS LIABLE ONLY FOR A SALARY DIFFERENTIAL OF P 62.00 AND A 13TH MONTH PAY DIFFERENTIAL OF P31.00. PETITIONER ARGUED THAT THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENTIALS CONSTITUTES FULL COMPLIANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6640. APPARENTLY, THE PROTEST WAS NOT ENTERTAINED. PETITIONER BROUGHT THE CASE IMMEDIATELY TO THIS COURT WITHOUT APPEALING THE MATTER TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. ON MAY 9, 1988 , THE COURT ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ENJOINING THE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR FROM ENFORCING HIS ORDER DATED APRIL 7, 1988.ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT, SECTION 8 OF THE RULES IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6640 IS NULL AND VOID.HELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT IMPLEMENTING RULES CANNOT PROVIDE FOR A PROHIBITION NOT CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS MUST HARMONIZE WITH THE LAW AND NOT UNDULY EXPAND IT. AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CANNOT AMEND AN ACT OF CONGRESS.PETITIONER ENTERED INTO A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA) WITH ITS EMPLOYEES, INCREASING THE SALARIES BY P200 FOR THE YEARS 1986 AND 1987 AND P300 FOR 1989. IT WAS STIPULATED IN THE CONTRACT THAT IF EVER THERE WERE LEGISLATIONS PASSED THAT WOULD INCREASE SALARIES GREATER THAN THE ONE IN THE CBA, THE COMPANY WOULD PAY THE DIFFERENCE. RA 6640 WAS PASSED WHICH DIRECTS MINIMUM DAILY WAGE TO BE INCREASED BY P10 PER DAY. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) DRILON PROMULGATED IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR RA 6640, SECTION 8 OF WHICH PROVIDES THAT INCREASES BY COMPANIES WILL NOT BE CREDITED AS COMPLIANCE IF THESE WERENT STATED IN THE CBA IN ANTICIPATION OF RA 6640. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS (IRR) PROMULGATED BY DOLE IS NOT IN HARMONY WITH THE LAW SINCE RA 6640 DID NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PROHIBITIONS SET IN SECTION 8 OF THE ASSAILED IRR. THEREFORE, SECTION 8 IS NULL AND VOID

ARTICLE VI SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATIONRODRIGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 309 SCRA 661

FACTS:THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NICOLAS, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR CONRADO RODRIGO, ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH PHILWOOD CONSTRUCTION, REPRESENTED BY LARRY LU, FOR THE ELECTRIFICATION OF BARANGAY CABOLOAN, SAN NICOLAS, FOR THESUM OF P486,386.18. ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1992, REYNALDO MEJICA, THE PLANNINGAND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR OF SAN NICOLAS, PREPARED AN ACCOMPLISHMENTREPORT STATING THAT THE CABOLOAN POWER GENERATION PROJECT WAS 97.5%ACCOMPLISHED. SAID REPORT WAS SUPPOSEDLY APPROVED BY MAYOR RODRIGO ANDCONFIRMED BY LARRY LU. ON THE BASIS OF SAID REPORT, PAYMENT OF P452, 825.53WAS EFFECTED BY THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, PETITIONER ALEJANDRO FACUNDO, TO PHILWOOD CONSTRUCTION. ON 14 AUGUST 1993, PETITIONERS RECEIVED A NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCEDATED 21 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR OF PANGASINAN, ATTY. AGUSTINCHAN, JR., WHO FOUND THAT AS PER EVALUATION OF THEELECTRIFICATION PROJECT, ONLY 60.0171% OF THE PROJECT (EQUIVALENT TOP291,915.07) WAS ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED. THE OMBUDSMAN APPROVED THEFILING OF AN INFORMATION AGAINST RODRIGO ET. AL, FOR VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN. PETITIONERS QUESTIONED THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN. THEY CONTEND THAT MAYOR RODRIGOOCCUPIES A POSITION OF GRADE 24 UNDER RA 6758 AND IS, THEREFORE, BEYOND THE ORIGINAL ANDEXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE DELEGATED POWERS TO THE OMBUDSMAN IS DELEGABLE.HELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THERE WAS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWERS. THE SAID LAW, RA 6758, IS IN ITSELF, COMPLETE OF THE NECESSARY STANDARDS AND ADEQUATE GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS AND THE PROPER DELEGATED AUTHORITY. THUS, THE GRADING IN SALARY IS VALID AND IS COVERED UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATIONPEOPLE V. ROSENTHAL, 68 PHIL 328

FACTS:

OSMENA AND ROSENTHAL ARE ORGANIZERS OF THE ORO OIL COMPANY WHICH WAS ENGAGED IN MINING ACTIVITIES.THEY ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE VIOLATED THE ACT 2581: BLUE SKY LAW BY SELLING SPECULATIVE SECURITIES WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING THE WRITTEN PERMIT OR LICENSE FROM THE INSULAR TREASURER. THE SHARES ARE SAID TO BE SPECULATIVE BECAUSE THEIR VALUE MATERIALLY DEPENDED UPON A PROMISE OF FUTURE PROMOTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL BUSINESS, RATHER THAN BASED ON ACTUAL TANGIBLE ASSETS.THE RTC FOUND THEM GUILTY. ON APPEAL, THEY ASSAIL THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW, THAT IT CONTRAVENES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE JONES ACT BECAUSE THE LAW CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE INSULAR TREASURER. UNDER THE BSL, ALL PERSONS WHO OFFER TO SELL SECURITIES TO THE PUBLIC MUST OBTAIN LICENSE FROM THE IT. THE LICENSE TO SELL IS ISSUED ONLY WHENEVER THE IT IS SATISFIED THAT THE APPLICANT HAS COMPLIED WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE BSL. FURTHERMORE, THE BSL PROVIDES THAT THE IT SHALL HAVE AUTHORITY, WHENEVER IN HIS JUDGMENT IT IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, TO CANCEL SAID LICENSE OR PERMIT. OSMENA AND ROSENTHAL ARGUE HOWEVER THAT THE BSL PROVIDES NO STANDARD OR RULE WHICH CAN GUIDE THE IT IN DETERMINING THE CASES IN WHICH A CERTIFICATE OR PERMIT OUGHT TO BE ISSUED OR CANCELLED, THEREBY MAKING HIS OPINION THE SOLE CRITERION. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY ARGUE, LEGISLATIVE POWERS HAVE BEEN UNDULY DELEGATED TO THE INSULAR TREASURER.

ISSUES:WHETHER THE BLUE SKY LAW (BSL), PROVIDES A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR THE INTERNAL TREASURER IN REACHING A DECISION REGARDING THE ISSUANCE OR CANCELLATION OF A LICENSE OR PERMIT.

WHETHER THERE WAS UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT LAW IS VALID AND WITH SUFFICIENT STANDARD.

IN VIEW OF THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE BSL TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC AGAINST SPECULATIVE SCHEMES WHICH HAVE NO MORE BASIS THAN SO MANY FEET OF BLUE SKY, AND AGAINST THE SALE OF STOCK BY FLY-BY-NIGHT CONCERNS, VISIONARY OIL WELLS, DISTANT GOLD MINES, AND OTHER LIKE FRAUDULENT EXPLOITATIONS.

WE INCLINE TO HOLD THAT PUBLIC INTEREST IN THIS CASE IS A SUFFICIENT STANDARD TO GUIDE THE INSULAR TREASURER. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY SINCE THERE IS A STATED CRITERION PUBLIC INTEREST. IT IS A MISTAKEN ASSUMPTION THAT THIS IS A MERE GENERAL REFERENCE TO PUBLIC WELFARE WITHOUT ANY STANDARD TO GUIDE DETERMINATIONS.

1. THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT2. THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED3. THE CONTEXT OF THE PROVISIONS

ALL SHOW THAT THERE IS A STATED CRITERION.

ALSO, THE DECISIONS OF THE IT IS APPEALABLE TO THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, HENCE THE IT DOES NOT ACT AND DECIDE WITHOUT ANY RESTRAINING INFLUENCE.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATIONYNOT V. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

FACTS:

EO 626 WAS ENACTED PROHIBITING THE INTERPROVINCIAL MOVEMENT OF CARABAOS. THOSE FOUND VIOLATING THE LAW SHALL BE SUBJECT TO CONFISCATION AND FORFEITURE BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE LAW FURTHER PROVIDES THAT THE CONFISCATED BEEF SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, AND OTHER SIMILAR INSTITUTIONS AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NMIC MAY SEE FIT. YNOT WAS FOUND TO HAVE VIOLATED THE LAW, TRANSPORTING 6 CARABAOS IN A PUMP BOAT FROM MASBATE TO ILOILO. YNOT ASSAILS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EO 626, CLAIMING THAT THERE IS UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NMIC, WITH RESPECT TO THE MANNER OF DISPOSITION OF THE CONFISCATED BEEF. YNOT ARGUES THAT THE TERM, AS MAY SEE FIT IS EXTREMELY GENEROUS AND DANGEROUS, AND WITH AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PARTIALITY AND ABUSE.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE PHRASE AS MAY SEE FIT IS A SUFFICIENT STANDARD.

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE LAW IS INVALID AND WITH NO SUFFICIENT STANDARD. THERE ARE NO LIMITATIONS OR REASONABLE GUIDELINES WHICH SAID OFFICERS OF THE NMIC MUST OBSERVE WHEN THEY MAKE THEIR DISTRIBUTION OR DISPOSITION OF THE CONFISCATED BEEF. THERE IS INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE OFFICERS WHO ARE GRANTED UNLIMITED DISCRETION IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTIES ARBITRARILY TAKEN. THEIR OPTIONS ARE APPARENTLY BOUNDLESS. WHO SHALL BE THE FORTUNATE BENEFICIARIES OF THE BEEF AND BY WHAT CRITERIA SHALL THEY BE CHOSEN? ONLY THE OFFICERS NAMED CAN SUPPLY THE ANSWERS, AND THEY ALONE MAY CHOOSE THE GRANTEE AS THEY SEE FIT, IN THE OWN EXECUTIVE DISCRETION. DEFINITELY THERE IS HERE A ROVING COMMISSION, A WIDE AND SWEEPING AUTHORITY THAT IS NOT CANALIZED WITHIN THE BANKS THAT KEEP IT FROM OVERFLOWING. IN SHORT, A CLEARLY PROFILGATE AND INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATIONSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, 567 SCRA 354

FACTS:ON 6 AUGUST 1994, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF IRC APPROVED A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH GANDA HOLDINGS BERHAD (GHB). UNDER THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, IRC ACQUIRED 100% OR THE ENTIRE CAPITAL STOCK OF GANDA ENERGY HOLDINGS, INC. (GEHI) WHICH WOULD OWN AND OPERATE A 102 MEGAWATT (MW) GAS TURBINE POWER-GENERATING BARGE. THE AGREEMENT ALSO STIPULATES THAT GEHI WOULD ASSUME A FIVE-YEAR POWER PURCHASE CONTRACT WITH NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION. AT THAT TIME, GEHIS POWER-GENERATING BARGE WAS 97% COMPLETE AND WOULD GO ON-LINE BY MID-SEPTEMBER OF 1994. IN EXCHANGE, IRC WILL ISSUE TO GHB 55% OF THE EXPANDED CAPITAL STOCK OF IRC AMOUNTING TO 40.88 BILLION SHARES WHICH HAD A TOTAL PAR VALUE OF P488.44 MILLION.IRC ALLEGED THAT ON 8 AUGUST 1994, A PRESS RELEASE ANNOUNCING THE APPROVAL OF THE AGREEMENT WAS SENT THROUGH FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE AND THE SEC, BUT THAT THE FACSIMILE MACHINE OF THE SEC COULD NOT RECEIVE IT. UPON THE ADVICE OF THE SEC, THE IRC SENT THE PRESS RELEASE ON THE MORNING OF 9 AUGUST 1994. THE SEC AVERRED THAT IT RECEIVED REPORTS THAT IRC FAILED TO MAKE TIMELY PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH GHB AND THAT SOME OF ITS DIRECTORS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, HEAVILY TRADED IRC SHARES UTILIZING THIS MATERIAL INSIDER INFORMATION. ON 16 AUGUST 1994, THE SEC CHAIRMAN ISSUED A DIRECTIVE REQUIRING IRC TO SUBMIT TO THE SEC A COPY OF ITS AFORESAID MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH GHB. ON 19 SEPTEMBER 1994, THE SEC CHAIRMAN ISSUED AN ORDER FINDING THAT IRC VIOLATED THE RULES ON DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL FACTS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE OLD SECURITIES ACT OF 1936, WHEN IT FAILED TO MAKE TIMELY DISCLOSURE OF ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH GHB.ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE SEC HAS AUTHORITY TO FILE SUIT AGAINST RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT (RSA).HELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE THE ENACTMENT OF IMPLEMENTINGRULES TO MAKE IT BINDING AND EFFECTIVE. THE PROVISIONS OF THE RSA ARESUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AND COMPLETE BY THEMSELVES. THE REQUIREMENTS ARESPECIFICALLY SET OUT AND THE ACTS WHICH ARE ENJOINED ARE DETERMINABLE.TO RULE THAT ABSENCE OF IMPLEMENTING RULES CAN RENDER INEFFECTIVE AN ACT OF CONGRESS WOULD EMPOWER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES TO DEFEAT THE LEGISLATIVE WILL BY DELAYING THEIMPLEMENTING RULES. WHERE THE STATUTE CONTAINS SUFFICIENT STANDARDS AND ANUNMISTAKABLE INTENT (AS IN THIS CASE, THE RSA) THERE SHOULD BE NO IMPEDIMENT AS TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THE COURT DOES NOT DISCERN ANY VAGUENESS OR AMBIGUITY IN THE RSA SUCH THAT THE ACTS PROSCRIBED AND/OR REQUIRED WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY A PERSON OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATIONGEROCHI V. DENR, GR NO. 159796, JULY 17, 2007

FACTS:

PETITIONERS ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB), AND ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), COME BEFORE THIS COURT IN THIS ORIGINAL ACTION PRAYING THAT SECTION 34 OF REPUBLIC ACT (RA) 9136, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY REFORM ACT OF 2001 (EPIRA), IMPOSING THE UNIVERSAL CHARGE, AND RULE 18 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS (IRR) WHICH SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT THE SAID IMPOSITION, BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE DELEGATION OF SAID POWER TO TAX BY ANY EXECUTIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY LIKE THE ERC, SINCE THE POWER TO TAX IS STRICTLY A LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION . PETITIONERS ALSO PRAY THAT THE UNIVERSAL CHARGE IMPOSED UPON THE CONSUMERS BE REFUNDED AND THAT A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) BE ISSUED DIRECTING THE RESPONDENTS TO REFRAIN FROM IMPLEMENTING, CHARGING, AND COLLECTING THE SAID CHARGE. CONGRESS ENACTED THE EPIRA ON JUNE 8, 2001, AND ON JUNE 26, 2001, IT TOOK EFFECT. ON APRIL 5, 2002, RESPONDENT NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION-STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (NPC-SPUG) FILED WITH RESPONDENT ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC) A PETITION FOR THE AVAILMENT FROM THE UNIVERSAL CHARGE OF ITS SHARE FOR MISSIONARY ELECTRIFICATION. ON MAY 7, 2002, NPC FILED ANOTHER PETITION WITH ERC, PRAYING THAT THE PROPOSED SHARE FROM THE UNIVERSAL CHARGE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHARGE BE APPROVED FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SPECIAL TRUST FUND (STF) MANAGED BY RESPONDENT POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM) FOR THE REHABILITATION AND MANAGEMENT OF WATERSHED AREAS. ON DECEMBER 20, 2002, THE ERC ISSUED AN ORDER PROVISIONALLY APPROVING THE COMPUTED AMOUNT AS THE SHARE OF THE NPC-SPUG FROM THE UNIVERSAL CHARGE FOR MISSIONARY ELECTRIFICATION AND AUTHORIZING THE NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION (TRANSCO) AND DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES TO COLLECT THE SAME FROM ITS END-USERS ON A MONTHLY BASIS.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO TAX ON THE PART OF THE ERC.

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THATPROVISIONS OF THE EPIRA SUCH AS, AMONG OTHERS, TO ENSURE THE TOTAL ELECTRIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THEQUALITY, RELIABILITY, SECURITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF THE SUPPLY OF ELECTRIC POWER AND WATERSHED REHABILITATION AND MANAGEMENT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID DELEGATION, AS THEY PROVIDE THE LIMITATIONS ON THE ERC'S POWER TO FORMULATE THE IRR. THESE ARE SUFFICIENT STANDARDS.FROM THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, WE THEREFORE HOLD THAT THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE ERC.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATIONPSL INC., V. LLDA 608 SCRA 442

FACTS:

PETITIONER PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. (PETITIONER) IS A COMPANY ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF LAUNDRY SERVICES. ON 5 SEPTEMBER 2001, THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT DIVISION OF LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) CONDUCTED WASTEWATER SAMPLING OF PETITIONERS EFFLUENT WHICH SHOWED NON-COMPLIANCE. AFTER A SERIES OF SUBSEQUENT WATER SAMPLING, PSL STILL FAILED TO CONFORM TOTHE REGULATORY STANDARDS. ANOTHER WASTEWATER SAMPLING WHICH WAS CONDUCTED ON 5 JUNE 2002, INRESPONSE TO THE 17 MAY 2002 REQUEST FOR RE-SAMPLING RECEIVED BY LLDA, FINALLY SHOWED COMPLIANCEWITH THE EFFLUENT STANDARD IN ALL PARAMETERS. ON 16 SEPTEMBER 2002, LLDA ISSUED AN ORDER TO PAYINDICATING THEREIN THAT THE PENALTY SHOULD BE IMPOSED FROM THE DATE OF INITIAL SAMPLING TO THE DATE THEREQUEST FOR RE-SAMPLING WAS RECEIVED BY THE AUTHORITY.PETITIONER FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHICH THE LLDA DENIED.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF IMPLIED POWER TO LLDA TO IMPOSE PENALTIES VIOLATE THE RULE ON NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE LLDAS POWER TO IMPOSE FINES IS NOT UNRESTRICTED. IT WAS ONLY AFTER THE INVESTIGATION FINDING THE PETITIONER FAILING TO MEET THE ESTABLISHED WATER AND EFFLUENT QUALITY STANDARDS THAT THE LLDAIMPOSED THE PENALTY OF P 1,000.00 PER DAY. THE P 1,000 PENALTY PER DAY IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AMOUNT OF PENALTY PRESCRIBED UNDER PD 984.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATIONPEOPLE V. DACUYCUY, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)

FACTS: SEVERAL PUBIC SCHOOL OFFICIALS OF LEYTE WERE CHARGED FOR VIOLATION OF RA 4670 (MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS).THESE OFFICIALS MOTIONED TO QUASH THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM FOR (1)LACK OF JURISDICTION (2) UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 32. THIS MOTION WAS DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT. THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LEYTE.THEY ADDED TO THE GROUNDS OF UNCONSTTUTIONALITY OF SECTION 32 THE FOLLOWING REASONS: (1) IT IMPOSES A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (2) IT CONSTITUTES AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, FOR THE DURATION OF PENALTY OF THE IMPRISONMENT IS LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT. JUDGE DACUYCUY, THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DENIED THE MOTION SAYING THAT RA 4670 PARTICULARLY SECTION 32 IS VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL. ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 32 OF RA 4670 IS CONSTITUTIONALHELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. SECTION 32 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL SINCE IT PROVIDES AN INDETERMINABLE PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT. TOO MUCH DISCRETION WAS LEFT BY THE LEGISLATURE TO THE COURT, MAKING IT UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE. SECTION 32 DID NOT PASS THE TEST OF SUFFICIENT STANDARD. IF SECTION 32 WILL BE ALLOWED, IT WILL VIOLATE NOT JUST THE RULES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BUT ALSO THE DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.NOTE: THE CHARGE AGAINST THE PUBLIC SCHOOL OFFICIALS WILL STILL BE REMANDED TO THE MUNICIPAL COURT WHERE IT WAS FIRST FILED. RA 4670 CONTAINS A SEPARABILITY CLAUSE IN SECTION 34. ALTHOUGH SEC 32 WAS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL, OTHER PARTS ARE STILL VALID

ARTICLE VI SECTION 5. COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; APPORTIONMENT; PARTY LISTBAGABUYO V. COMELEC, GR NO. 176970, DECEMBER 8, 2008

FACTS: IN 2006, REP. JARAULA OF CAGAYAN DE ORO (CDO) SPONSORED A BILL INCREASING THE CITYS LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT FROM ONE TO TWO. IT EVENTUALLY BECAME A LAW CAUSING COMELEC TO PROMULGATE A RESOLUTION THAT FOR THE ELECTION OF MAY 2007, CAGAYAN DE ORO'S VOTERS WOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS BELONGING TO EITHER THE FIRST OR THE SECOND DISTRICT, DEPENDING ON THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE. BAGABUYO FILED A PETITION AND ARGUED THAT COMELEC CANNOT IMPLEMENT THE ACT WITHOUT PROVIDING FOR THE RULES, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF A PLEBISCITE WHICH IS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE DIVISION OR CONVERSION OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A PLEBISCITE IS REQUIRED IN THE CASE AT BAR.HELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT IT IS NOT REQUIRED. THE COURT UPHELD COMELECS ARGUMENTS THAT THE LAW MERELY INCREASED THE REPRESENTATION OF CDO IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD PURSUANT TO SECTION 5, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THAT THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED UNDER SECTION 10, ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ONLY APPLY WHEN THERE IS A CREATION, DIVISION, MERGER, ABOLITION OR SUBSTANTIAL ALTERATION OF BOUNDARIES OF A PROVINCE, CITY, MUNICIPALITY, OR BARANGAY. IN THIS CASE, NO SUCH CREATION, DIVISION, MERGER, ABOLITION OR ALTERATION OF BOUNDARIES OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT TOOK PLACE. FURTHER, THE LAW DID NOT BRING ABOUT ANY CHANGE IN CDOS TERRITORY, POPULATION AND INCOME CLASSIFICATION; HENCE, NO PLEBISCITE IS REQUIRED.

PARTY LISTVC CADANGEN, ET AL V. COMELEC, GR NO. 177179, JUNE 5, 2009

FACTS: ON SEPTEMBER 13, 2006, PETITIONER ALLIANCE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, INC. (CIVILSERVANTS), FILED A PETITION FOR REGISTRATION AS A SECTORAL ORGANIZATION. IT CLAIMED THATIT HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE SINCE DECEMBER 2004 AND TO REPRESENT PAST AND PRESENTGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. THE COMELEC ISSUED ANORDER REQUIRING CIVIL SERVANTS TO FILE A MEMORANDUM THAT WOULD PROVE ITS PRESENCEOR EXISTENCE NATIONWIDE, TRACK RECORD, FINANCIAL CAPABILITY TO WAGE A NATIONWIDECAMPAIGN, PLATFORM OF GOVERNMENT, OFFICERS AND MEMBERSHIP, AND COMPLIANCE WITHTHE PROVISIONS OF THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT AND THE EIGHT-POINT GUIDELINE LAID DOWN BY THIS COURT. CIVIL SERVANTS CONSEQUENTLY FILED THE REQUIRED MEMORANDUMATTACHING VITAL DOCUMENTS, WITH MANIFESTATION OF INTENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MAY14, 2007 ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, THE COMELEC ISSUED A RESOLUTION DENYING CIVIL SERVANTS PETITION FOR REGISTRATION BECAUSE CIVIL SERVANT EXISTS ONLY IN PARAAQU AND QUEZON CITY. CIVIL SERVANTS MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION, ARGUING IN THE MAINTHAT THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE A SECTORAL ORGANIZATION TO HAVE A NATIONWIDE PRESENCEOR EXISTENCE FOR IT TO BE REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. SUBSEQUENTLY, IT WASDENIED BY THE COMELEC. THE PETITIONER FILED THE INSTANT CASE PRAYING FOR THE WRITOF MANDAMUS TO COMMAND THE LATTER TO REGISTER THE FORMER AS A SECTORALORGANIZATION.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELECS DENIAL OF THE REGISTRATION AS A SECTORAL ORGANIZATION IS VALID.

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE COMELEC DENIED THE LATTERS PLEA FOR REGISTRATION AS A SECTORAL PARTY, BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SHOW THAT IT REPRESENTS AND SEEKS TO UPLIFT MARGINALIZED ANDUNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. THE COURTS FUNCTION, AS MANDATED BY SECTION 1,ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION, IS MERELY TO CHECK WHETHER OR NOT THE GOVERNMENTAL BRANCH OR AGENCY WENT BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF ITS JURISDICTION, NOTTHAT IT ERRED OR HAS A DIFFERENT VIEW. THE SUPREME COURT WILL HAVE NO OCCASION TOEXERCISE ITS CORRECTIVE POWER. IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO INQUIRE INTO WHAT IT THINKS IS APPARENT ERROR. THE COURT CANNOT GRANT THE PRAYER OF PETITIONER FOR REGISTRATION AS ASECTORAL PARTY, BECAUSE TO DO SO WILL ENTAIL AN EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE TODETERMINE WHETHER INDEED PETITIONER QUALIFIES AS A PARTY-LIST ORGANIZATION AND WHETHER IT HAS MADE UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN ITS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.

PARTY LISTVETERANS FEDERATION PARTY V. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244 (2000)

FACTS:

COMELEC PROCLAIMED 14 PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES FROM 13 PARTIES WHICH OBTAINED AT LEAST 2% OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST AS MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP. UPON PETITION BY OTHER PARTY-LIST ORGANIZATION, IT PROCLAIMED ANOTHER 38 ADDITIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES ALTHOUGH THEY RECEIVED LESS THAN 2% OF THE VOTES ON THE GROUND THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION IT IS MANDATORY THAT AT LEAST 20% OF THE MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MUST COME FROM THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 5(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS MANDATORY.

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT IT IS NOT, AS IT MERELY PROVIDES A CEILING FOR PARTY LIST SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. THE CONGRESS IS VESTED WITH POWER TO DEFINE AND PRESCRIBE THE MECHANICS OF THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION. IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE, CONGRESS DEEMED IT NECESSARY THAT PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE SYSTEM TO OBTAIN AT LEAST 2% OF THE TOTAL VOTES CAST TO BE ENTITLED TO A PARTY-LIST SEAT. THIS IS TO ENSURE THAT ONLY PARTIES WITH SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF CONSTITUENTS ARE ACTUALLY REPRESENTED IN CONGRESS.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 6. QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVESAQUINO V. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400 (1995)

FACTS:ON 20 MARCH 1995, AGAPITO A. AQUINO FILED HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE POSITION OF REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE NEW SECOND LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF MAKATI CITY. IN HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, AQUINO STATED THAT HE WAS ARESIDENT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED DISTRICT FOR 10 MONTHS. FACED WITH A PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION, HE AMENDED THEENTRY ON HIS RESIDENCY IN HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY TO 1 YEAR AND 13 DAYS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSDISMISSED THE PETITION ON 6 MAY AND ALLOWED AQUINO TO RUN IN THE ELECTION OF 8 MAY. AQUINO WON. ACTING ON AMOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE DISMISSAL, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION LATER ISSUED AN ORDER SUSPENDINGTHE PROCLAMATION OF AQUINO UNTIL THE COMMISSION RESOLVED THE ISSUE. ON JUNE 2, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSFOUND AQUINO INELIGIBLE AND DISQUALIFIED FOR THE ELECTIVE OFFICE FOR LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUALIFICATION OF RESIDENCE.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESIDENCY IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY ACTUALLY CONNOTES DOMICILE TO WARRANT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF AQUINO FROM THE POSITION IN THE ELECTORAL DISTRICT.HELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE PLACE WHERE A PARTY ACTUALLY OR CONSTRUCTIVELY HAS HIS PERMANENT HOME, WHERE HE, NO MATTERWHERE HE MAY BE FOUND AT ANY GIVEN TIME, EVENTUALLY INTENDS TO RETURN AND REMAIN, I.E., HIS DOMICILE, IS THAT TOWHICH THE CONSTITUTION REFERS WHEN IT SPEAKS OF RESIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSES OF ELECTION LAW. THE PURPOSE IS TOEXCLUDE STRANGERS OR NEWCOMERS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CONDITIONS AND NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY FROM TAKINGADVANTAGE OF FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTING IN THAT COMMUNITY FOR ELECTORAL GAIN. AQUINOS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY IN A PREVIOUS (1992) ELECTION INDICATES THAT HE WAS A RESIDENT AND A REGISTERED VOTER OF SAN JOSE,CONCEPCION, TARLAC FOR MORE THAN 52 YEARS PRIOR TO THAT ELECTION. AQUINOS CONNECTION TO THE SECOND DISTRICT OF MAKATI CITY IS AN ALLEGED LEASE AGREEMENT OF A CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE AREA. THE INTENTION NOT TO ESTABLISH APERMANENT HOME IN MAKATI CITY IS EVIDENT IN HIS LEASING A CONDOMINIUM UNIT INSTEAD OF BUYING ONE. THE SHORTLENGTH OF TIME HE CLAIMS TO BE A RESIDENT OF MAKATI (AND THE FACT OF HIS STATED DOMICILE IN TARLAC AND HIS CLAIMS OF OTHER RESIDENCES IN METRO MANILA) INDICATE THAT HIS SOLE PURPOSE IN TRANSFERRING HIS PHYSICAL RESIDENCE IS NOT TOACQUIRE A NEW, RESIDENCE OR DOMICILE BUT ONLY TO QUALIFY AS A CANDIDATE FOR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECOND DISTRICTOF MAKATI CITY. AQUINO WAS THUS RIGHTFULLY DISQUALIFIED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

ARTICLE VI SECTION 6. QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVESMARCOS V. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995)

FACTS:

PETITIONER IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS FILED HER CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE POSITION OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF LEYTE. PRIVATE RESPONDENT CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, A CANDIDATE FOR THE SAME POSITION, FILED A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND DISQUALIFICATION WITH THE COMELEC ALLEGING THAT PETITIONER DID NOT MEET THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR RESIDENCY. PRIVATE RESPONDENT CONTENDED THAT PETITIONER LACKED THE CONSTITUTIONS ONE-YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR CANDIDATES FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATEMENT IN THE COC DETERMINES WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL SATISFIED THE CONSTITUTIONS RESIDENCY QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENT, TO WARRANT HEREIN PETITIONERS DISQUALIFICATION.

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT IT IS NOT. HAVING DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER POSSESSES THE NECESSARY RESIDENCE QUALIFICATIONS TO RUN FOR A SEAT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST DISTRICT OF LEYTE, THE COMELEC'S QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS DATED APRIL 24, MAY 7, MAY 11, AND MAY 25, 1995 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE. RESPONDENT COMELEC IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO ORDER THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO PROCLAIM PETITIONER AS THE DULY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF LEYTE.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 6. QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVESDOMINO V. COMELEC, GR 134015 (JULY 19, 1999)

FACTS: ON 25 MARCH 1998, JUAN DOMINO FILED HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE POSITION OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LONE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF SARANGANI INDICATING IN ITEM NO. 9 OF HIS CERTIFICATE THAT HE HAD RESIDED IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE HE SEEKS TO BE ELECTED FOR ONE (1) YEAR AND TWO (2) MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION. ON 30 MARCH 1998, NARCISO RA. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR.,ROSARIO SAMSON AND DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., FILED WITH THE COMELEC A PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, WHICH WAS DOCKETED AS SPA NO. 98-022 AND ASSIGNED TO THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE COMELEC. THEY ALLEGED THAT DOMINO, CONTRARY TO HIS DECLARATION IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, IS NOT A RESIDENT, MUCH LESS A REGISTERED VOTER, OF THE PROVINCE OF SARANGANI WHERE HE SEEKS ELECTION .FOR HIS DEFENSE, DOMINO MAINTAINS THAT HE HAD COMPLIED WITH THE ONE-YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT AND THAT HE HAS BEEN RESIDING IN SARANGANI SINCE JANUARY 1997.ON 6 MAY 1998, THE COMELEC 2ND DIVISION PROMULGATED A RESOLUTION DECLARING DOMINO DISQUALIFIED AS CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LONE DISTRICT OF SARANGANI FOR LACK OF THE ONE-YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT. ON 11 MAY 1998, THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, THE COMELEC ISSUED SUPPLEMENTAL OMNIBUS RESOLUTION NO. 3046, ORDERING THAT THE VOTES CAST FOR DOMINO BE COUNTED BUT TO SUSPEND THE PROCLAMATION IF WINNING, CONSIDERING THAT THE RESOLUTION DISQUALIFYING HIM AS CANDIDATE HAD NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTOR. DOMINO RECEIVED THE HIGHEST VOTES IN THE ELECTION THAT IS WHY HE FILED AN MR OF HIS DISQUALIFICATION BUT WAS DENIED. HENCE THIS PETITION.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER HAS RESIDED IN SARANGANI PROVINCE FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTIONSHELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE TERM RESIDENCE, AS USED IN THE LAW PRESCRIBING THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR SUFFRAGE AND FOR ELECTIVE OFFICE, MEANS THE SAME THING AS DOMICILE, WHICH IMPORTS NOT ONLY AN INTENTION TO RESIDE IN A FIXED PLACE BUT ALSO PERSONAL PRESENCE IN THAT PLACE, COUPLED WITH CONDUCT INDICATIVE OF SUCH INTENTION. DOMICILE DENOTES A FIXED PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO WHICH, WHENEVER ABSENT FOR BUSINESS, PLEASURE, OR SOME OTHER REASONS, ONE INTENDS TO RETURN.RECORDS SHOW THAT PETITIONERS DOMICILE OF ORIGIN WAS CANDON, ILOCOS SUR AND THAT SOMETIME IN 1991, HE ACQUIRED A NEW DOMICILE OF CHOICE IN QUEZON CITY, AS SHOWN BY HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE POSITION OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE THIRD DISTRICT OF QUEZON CITY IN THE MAY 1995 ELECTION. PETITIONER IS NOW CLAIMING THAT HE HAD EFFECTIVELY ABANDONED HIS RESIDENCE IN QUEZON CITY AND HAS ESTABLISHED A NEW DOMICILE OF CHOICE IN THE PROVINCE OF SARANGANI.A PERSONS DOMICILE, ONCE ESTABLISHED, IS CONSIDERED TO CONTINUE AND WILL NOT BE DEEMED LOST UNTIL A NEW ONE IS ESTABLISHED. TO SUCCESSFULLY EFFECT A CHANGE OF DOMICILE, ONE MUST DEMONSTRATE AN ACTUAL REMOVAL OR AN ACTUAL CHANGE OF DOMICILE, A BONA FIDE INTENTION OF ABANDONING THE FORMER PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHING A NEW ONE AND DEFINITE ACTS WHICH CORRESPOND WITH THE PURPOSE. THE CONTRACT OF LEASE OF A HOUSE AND LOT ENTERED INTO SOMETIME IN JANUARY 1997 DOES NOT ADEQUATELY SUPPORT A CHANGE OF DOMICILE. THE LEASE CONTRACT MAY BE INDICATIVE OF DOMINOS INTENTION TO RESIDE IN SARANGANI, BUT IT DOES NOT ENGENDER THE KIND OF PERMANENCY REQUIRED TO PROVE ABANDONMENT OF ONES ORIGINAL DOMICILE. THE MERE ABSENCE OF INDIVIDUAL FROM HIS PERMANENT RESIDENCE, NO MATTER HOW LONG, WITHOUT THE INTENTION TO ABANDON IT DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OR CHANGE OF DOMICILE. THUS, THE DATE OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE OF A HOUSE AND LOT IN SARANGANI CANNOT BE USED, IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, AS THE RECKONING PERIOD OF THE ONE-YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT. FURTHER, DOMINOS LACK OF INTENTION TO ABANDON HIS RESIDENCE IN QUEZON CITY IS STRENGTHENED BY HIS ACT OF REGISTERING AS VOTER IN QUEZON CITY. WHILE VOTING IS NOT CONCLUSIVE OF RESIDENCE, IT DOES GIVE RISE TO A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF RESIDENCE ESPECIALLY IN THIS CASE WHERE DOMINO REGISTERED IN HIS FORMER BARANGAY.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 6. QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVESMAQUERA V. BORAA, 15 SCRA 7

FACTS: PETITIONER LEON MAQUERA SEEKS TO ASK THAT RA 4421 WHICH REQUIRES "ALL CANDIDATES FOR NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, CITY AND MUNICIPAL OFFICES" TO POST A SURETY BOND EQUIVALENT TO THE ONE-YEAR SALARY OR EMOLUMENTS OF THE POSITION TO WHICH HE IS A CANDIDATE, WHICH BOND SHALL BE FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, CITY OR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT CONCERNED IF THE CANDIDATE, EXCEPT WHEN DECLARED WINNER, FAILS TO OBTAIN AT LEAST 10% OF THE VOTES CAST FOR THE OFFICE TO WHICH HE HAS FILED HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, THERE BEING NOT MORE THAN FOUR (4) CANDIDATES FOR THE SAME OFFICE, AS UNCONSTIUTIONAL.ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT RA NO. 4421 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.HELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NATUREAND ESSENCE OF THE REPUBLICAN SYSTEM ORDAINED IN OUR CONSTITUTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE UNDERLYING THE SAME. THE COURT REASONED OUT THATSOVEREIGNTY RESIDES IN THE PEOPLE AND ALL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY EMANATES FROMTHEM, AND THIS, IN TURN, IMPLIES NECESSARILY THAT THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND TO BE VOTEDSHALL NOT BE DEPENDENT UPON THE WEALTH OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED. SOCIAL JUSTICE PRESUPPOSES EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL, RICH AND POOR ALIKE, AND THAT, ACCORDINGLY, NO PERSON SHALL, BY REASON OF POVERTY, BE DENIED THE CHANCE TO BE ELECTED TO PUBLICOFFICE.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 6. QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVESSOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD, GR NO. 157870, NOVEMBER 3, 2008

FACTS: IN 2002, RA 9165 OR THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002 WAS IMPLEMENTED. SEC 36 THEREOF REQUIRES MANDATORY DRUG TESTING OF CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE, STUDENTS OF SECONDARY AND TERTIARY SCHOOLS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFICES, AND PERSONS CHARGED BEFORE THE PROSECUTORS OFFICE WITH CERTAIN OFFENSES. ON 23 DEC 2003, COMELEC ISSUED RESOLUTION NO. 6486, PRESCRIBING THE RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE MANDATORY DRUG TESTING OF CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH THE MAY 10, 2004 SYNCHRONIZED NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS. PIMENTEL, JR., A SENATOR AND A CANDIDATE FOR RE-ELECTION IN THE MAY ELECTIONS, FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION UNDER RULE 65. IN IT, HE SEEKS (1) TO NULLIFY SEC. 36(G) OF RA 9165 AND COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 6486 DATED DECEMBER 23, 2003 FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT THEY IMPOSE A QUALIFICATION FOR CANDIDATES FOR SENATORS IN ADDITION TO THOSE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND (2) TO ENJOIN THE COMELEC FROM IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION NO. 6486. ACCORDING TO PIMENTEL, THE CONSTITUTION ONLY PRESCRIBES A MAXIMUM OF FIVE (5) QUALIFICATIONS FOR ONE TO BE A CANDIDATE FOR, ELECTED TO, AND BE A MEMBER OF THE SENATE. HE SAYS THAT BOTH THE CONGRESS AND COMELEC, BY REQUIRING, VIA RA 9165 AND RESOLUTION NO. 6486, A SENATORIAL ASPIRANT, AMONG OTHER CANDIDATES, TO UNDERGO A MANDATORY DRUG TEST, CREATE AN ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION THAT ALL CANDIDATES FOR SENATOR MUST FIRST BE CERTIFIED AS DRUG FREE. HE ADDS THAT THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE CONSTITUTION AUTHORIZING THE CONGRESS OR COMELEC TO EXPAND THE QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF CANDIDATES FOR SENATOR.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SEC 36 OF RA 9165 IS AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION ON THE QUALIFICATIONS OF SENATORS AND AS SUCH, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.HELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT PIMENTELS CONTENTION IS VALID. ACCORDINGLY, SEC. 36 OF RA 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. IT IS BASIC THAT IF A LAW OR AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE VIOLATES ANY NORM OF THE CONSTITUTION, THAT ISSUANCE IS NULL AND VOID AND HAS NO EFFECT. THE CONSTITUTION IS THE BASIC LAW TO WHICH ALL LAWS MUST CONFORM; NO ACT SHALL BE VALID IF IT CONFLICTS WITH THE CONSTITUTION. IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR DEFINED FUNCTIONS, THE THREE DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO YIELD OBEDIENCE TO THE COMMANDS OF THE CONSTITUTION. WHATEVER LIMITS IT IMPOSES MUST BE OBSERVED. THE PROVISION NO PERSON ELECTED TO ANY PUBLIC OFFICE SHALL ENTER UPON THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE UNTIL HE HAS UNDERGONE MANDATORY DRUG TEST, IS NOT TENABLEAS IT ENLARGES THE QUALIFICATIONS. COMELEC CANNOT, IN THE GUISE OF ENFORCING AND ADMINISTERING ELECTION LAWS OR PROMULGATING RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT SEC. 36, VALIDLY IMPOSE QUALIFICATIONS ON CANDIDATES FOR SENATOR IN ADDITION TO WHAT THE CONSTITUTION PRESCRIBES. IF CONGRESS CANNOT REQUIRE A CANDIDATE FOR SENATOR TO MEET SUCH ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION, THE COMELEC, TO BE SURE, IS ALSO WITHOUT SUCH POWER. THE RIGHT OF A CITIZEN IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OF ELECTION SHOULD NOT BE DEFEATED BY UNWARRANTED IMPOSITIONS OF REQUIREMENT NOT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED IN THE CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 7. TERM OF REPRESENTATIVESDIMAPORO V. MITRA, 202 SCRA 779

FACTS:PETITIONER MOHAMAD ALI DIMAPORO WAS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE SECOND LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF LANAO DEL SUR DURING THE 1987 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS. ON 15 JANUARY 1990, PETITIONER FILED WITH THE COMELEC A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE POSITION OF REGIONAL GOVERNOR OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO IN THE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ELECTIONS. UPON BEING INFORMED OF THIS DEVELOPMENT BY THE COMELEC, RESPONDENTS SPEAKER AND SECRETARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EXCLUDED PETITIONER'S NAME FROM THE ROLL OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE WHICH STATES: "ANY ELECTIVE OFFICIAL WHETHER NATIONAL OR LOCAL RUNNING FOR ANY OFFICE OTHER THAN THE ONE WHICH HE IS HOLDING IN A PERMANENT CAPACITY EXCEPT FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS OFFICE UPON THE FILING OF HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY."HAVING LOST IN THE AUTONOMOUS REGION ELECTIONS, PETITIONER, IN A LETTER ADDRESSED TO RESPONDENT SPEAKER, EXPRESSED HIS INTENTION "TO RESUME PERFORMING MY DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS AS ELECTED MEMBER OF CONGRESS. HE MAINTAINS THAT HE DID NOT THEREBY LOSE HIS SEAT AS CONGRESSMAN BECAUSE SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX OF B.P. BLG. 881 IS NOT OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION, BEING CONTRARY THERETO, AND THEREFORE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.ISSUE:1. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 IS OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION.HELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT IT IS STILL OPERATIVE. AS A VOLUNTARY ACT OF RESIGNATION CONTEMPLATED IN SAID SECTION FALLS WITHIN THE TERM OF VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF OFFICE ENUNCIATED IN PAR. 2, SEC. 7, ART. VI, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. THE GROUNDS UNDER SECTION 6 , ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881, IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CONSTITUTION, DOES NOT AFFECT ITS VALIDITY AS THESE GROUNDS ARE NOT EXCLUSIVE. THE FILING OF COC BY PETITIONER IS AN ACT OF RESIGNATION WHICH ESTOPS HIM FROM CLAIMING, OTHERWISE IS PRESUMED TO BE AWARE OF EXISING LAWS.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 7. TERM OF REPRESENTATIVESFARINAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR 147387 (DEC. 10, 2003)

FACTS:THE PETITIONERS ASSERT THAT SECTION 14 OF REP. ACT NO. 9006 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT REPEALS SECTION 67 ONLY OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, LEAVING INTACT SECTION 66 THEREOF WHICH IMPOSES A SIMILAR LIMITATION TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS, THUS:SECTION 66.CANDIDATES HOLDING APPOINTIVE OFFICE OR POSITION ANY PERSON HOLDING A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE OFFICE OR POSITION, INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS OFFICE UPON THE FILING OF HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.RESPONDENTS CONTEND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. SECTION 67 PERTAINS TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS WHILE SECTION 66 PERTAINS TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS. A SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION EXISTS BETWEEN THESE TWO SETS OF OFFICIALS; ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OCCUPY THEIR OFFICE BY VIRTUE OF THEIR MANDATE BASED UPON THE POPULAR WILL, WHILE THE APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS ARE NOT ELECTED BY POPULAR WILL. EQUAL PROTECTION SIMPLY REQUIRES THAT ALL PERSONS OR THINGS SIMILARLY SITUATED ARE TREATED ALIKE, BOTH AS TO RIGHTS CONFERRED AND RESPONSIBILITIES IMPOSED.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE REPEAL OF SECTION 67 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE PERTAINING TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS, GIVES UNDUE BENEFIT TO SUCH OFFICIALS AS AGAINST THE APPOINTIVE AND CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.HELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT, SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS CLEARLY EXIST BETWEEN ELECTIVE OFFICIALS AND APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS. THE FORMER OCCUPY THEIR OFFICE BY VIRTUE OF THE MANDATE OF THE ELECTORATE. THEY ARE ELECTED TO AN OFFICE FOR A DEFINITE TERM AND MAY BE REMOVED THEREFROM ONLY UPON STRINGENT CONDITIONS.ON THE OTHER HAND, APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS HOLD THEIR OFFICE BY VIRTUE OF THEIR DESIGNATION THERETO BY AN APPOINTING AUTHORITY. SOME APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS HOLD THEIR OFFICE IN A PERMANENT CAPACITY AND ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE WHILE OTHERS SERVE AT THE PLEASURE OF THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY.ANOTHER SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO SETS OF OFFICIALS IS THAT UNDER SECTION 55, CHAPTER 8, TITLE I, SUBSECTION A. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, BOOK V OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987 (EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292), APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS, AS OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, ARE STRICTLY PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN ANY PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY OR TAKE PART IN ANY ELECTION EXCEPT TO VOTE. UNDER THE SAME PROVISION, ELECTIVE OFFICIALS, OR OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES HOLDING POLITICAL OFFICES, ARE OBVIOUSLY EXPRESSLY ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES.MOREOVER, IT IS NOT WITHIN THE POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON OR LOOK INTO THE WISDOM OF THIS CLASSIFICATION. HENCE, EQUAL PROTECTION IS NOT INFRINGED.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 8.REGULAR ELECTIONSCODILLA V. DE VENECIA GR NO. 150605, DECEMBER 10, 2002

FACTS:CODILLA, THEN SITTING AS MAYOR OF ORMOC CITY, AND LOCSIN, THE INCUMBENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 4TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF LEYTE, WERE CANDIDATES FOR THE POSITION OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 4TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF LEYTE. A PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WAS FILED AGAINST CODILLA FOR VIOLATING SEC. 68(A) OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, ALLEGING THAT HE USED THE EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES OWNED BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF ORMOC TO EXTRACT, HAUL AND DISTRIBUTE GRAVEL AND SAND TO THE RESIDENTS OF KANANGA AND MATAG-OB, LEYTE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING, INFLUENCING OR CORRUPTING THEM TO VOTE FOR HIM. AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTIONS ON MAY 14, 2001, THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE WAS STILL PENDING SO CODILLAS NAME REMAINED IN THE LIST OF CANDIDATES AND WAS VOTED FOR. HE GARNERED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES. HOWEVER, HIS PROCLAMATION AS WINNER WAS SUSPENDED BY ORDER OF THE COMELEC. AFTER HEARING OF HIS DISQUALIFICATION CASE, HE WAS FOUND GUILTY AND ORDERED DISQUALIFIED. CODILLAS VOTES BEING CONSIDERED STRAY, LOCSIN WAS THUS PROCLAIMED AS THE DULY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE AND SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK HER OATH OF OFFICE. CODILLA THEN FILED A TIMELY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH THE COMELEC AND ALSO SOUGHT THE ANNULMENTOFLOCSINS PROCLAMATION.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION TO ANNUL THE PROCLAMATION OF A REPRESENTATIVE

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT: FIRST, THE VALIDITY OF THE RESPONDENTS PROCLAMATION WAS A CORE ISSUE IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER. HOWEVER, THE COMELEC EN BANC WAS NOT DIVESTED OF ITS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE VALIDITY OF THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER OF THE SECOND DIVISION. THE SAID ORDER OF THE SECOND DIVISION WAS YET UNENFORCEABLE AS IT HAS NOT ATTAINED FINALITY. THE TIMELY FILING OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SUSPENDS ITS EXECUTION. IT CANNOT BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR THE ASSUMPTION IN OFFICE OF THE RESPONDENT AS THE DULY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 4TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF LEYTE; AND

SECOND, IT IS THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION IN THE INSTANT CASE.

THE ISSUE ON THE VALIDITY OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC SECOND DIVISION HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED BY THE COMELEC EN BANC. AT THE TIME OF THE PROCLAMATION OF RESPONDENT LOCSIN, THE VALIDITY OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC SECOND DIVISION WAS CHALLENGED BY THE PETITIONER IN HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. THE ISSUE WAS STILL WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COMELEC EN BANC TO RESOLVE. HENCE, THE HRET CANNOT ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER.

THE ISSUE OF WHO IS THE RIGHTFUL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 4TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF LEYTE HAS BEEN FINALLY SETTLED BY THE COMELEC EN BANC, THE CONSTITUTIONAL BODY WITH JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER. THE RULE OF LAW DEMANDS THAT ITS DECISION BE OBEYED BY ALL OFFICIALS OF THE LAND. THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE RULE OF LAW EXCEPT THE REIGN OF CHAOS AND CONFUSION.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 9. SPECIAL ELECTIONSTOLENTINO V. COMELEC, GR 148334, JANUARY 21, 2004

FACTS: SHORTLY AFTER HER SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY IN JANUARY 2001, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO NOMINATED THEN SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE-PRESIDENT. CONGRESS CONFIRMED THE NOMINATION OF SENATOR GUINGONA WHO TOOK HIS OATH AS VICE-PRESIDENT ON 9 FEBRUARY 2001. FOLLOWING SENATOR GUINGONAS CONFIRMATION, THE SENATE, ON 8 FEBRUARY 2001, PASSED RESOLUTION 84 CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE SENATE. RESOLUTION 84 CALLED ON COMELEC TO FILL THE VACANCY THROUGH A SPECIAL ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTIONS ON 14 MAY 2001. TWELVE SENATORS, WITH A 6-YEAR TERM EACH, WERE DUE TO BE ELECTED IN THAT ELECTION. RESOLUTION 84 FURTHER PROVIDED THAT THE SENATORIAL CANDIDATE GARNERING THE 13TH HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF FORMER SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., WHICH ENDS ON 30 JUNE 2004. ON 5 JUNE 2001, AFTER COMELEC HAD CANVASSED THE ELECTION RESULTS FROM ALL THE PROVINCES BUT ONE (LANAO DEL NORTE), COMELEC ISSUED RESOLUTION 01-005 PROVISIONALLY PROCLAIMING 13 CANDIDATES AS THE ELECTED SENATORS. RESOLUTION 01-005 ALSO PROVIDED THAT THE FIRST TWELVE (12) SENATORS SHALL SERVE FOR A TERM OF SIX (6) YEARS AND THE THIRTEENTH (13TH) SENATOR SHALL SERVE THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THREE (3) YEARS OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. WHO WAS APPOINTED VICE-PRESIDENT. ON 20 JUNE 2001, ARTURO TOLENTINO AND ARTURO MOJICA, AS VOTERS AND TAXPAYERS, FILED THE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION, IMPLEADING ONLY COMELEC AS RESPONDENT. TOLENTINO AND MOJICA SOUGHT TO ENJOIN COMELEC FROM PROCLAIMING WITH FINALITY THE CANDIDATE FOR SENATOR RECEIVING THE 13TH HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES AS THE WINNER IN THE SPECIAL ELECTION FOR A SINGLE THREE-YEAR TERM SEAT. THEY CONTEND THAT COMELEC ISSUED RESOLUTION 01-005 WITHOUT JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 2 OF RA 6645, SECTION 73 OF BP 881, AND SECTION 4, PAR. 4 OF RA 6646. ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT A SPECIAL ELECTION TO FILL A VACANT THREE-YEAR TERM SENATE SEAT WAS VALIDLY HELD.HELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT A SPECIAL ELECTION TO FILL A VACANT THREE-YEAR TERM SENATE SEAT WAS VALIDLY HELD. ALTHOUGH COMELEC DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 6645, EITHER STRICTLY OR SUBSTANTIALLY, IT DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE SPECIAL ELECTION. SECTION 2, RA 6645 AS AMENDED BY RA 7166 PROVIDES THAT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL FIX THE DATE OF THE SPECIAL ELECTION, WHICH SHALL NOT BE EARLIER THAN FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS NOR LATER THAN NINETY (90) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF SUCH RESOLUTION OR COMMUNICATION, STATING AMONG OTHER THINGS THE OFFICE OR OFFICES TO BE VOTED FOR: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT IF WITHIN THE SAID PERIOD A GENERAL ELECTION IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD, THE SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH SUCH GENERAL ELECTION.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 13. PROHIBITIONS ON MEMBERS OF CONGRESSLIBAN V. GORDON, GR NO. 175352, JULY 15, 2009

FACTSDANTE V. LIBAN, TOGETHER WITH OTHER PETITIONERS, PETITIONED IN COURT TO DECLARE RICHARD J. GORDON AS HAVING FORFEITED HIS SEAT IN THE SENATE. THE PETITIONERS WERE OFFICERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE QUEZON CITY RED CROSS CHAPTER, WHILE RESPONDENT IS CHAIRMAN OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS (PNRC) BOARD OF GOVERNORS.DURING GORDONS INCUMBENCY AS A SENATOR, HE WAS ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF THE PNRC DURING THE FEBRUARY 23, 2006 MEETING OF THE PNRC BOARD OF GOVERNORS, IN WHICH THE PETITIONERS ALLEGED THAT BY ACCEPTING THE RESPONSIBILITY, GORDON DEEMED CEASED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE SENATE AS PROVIDED IN SEC. 13, ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION:SEC. 13. NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES, DURING HIS TERM WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS SEAT.RESPONDENT CONTESTED THAT THE PETITIONERS CITATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION HAS NO BASIS, SINCE PNRC IS NOT A GOCC. THUS, THE PROHIBITION UNDER SEC. 13, ART. VI, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, DOES NOT APPLY TO HIS CASE. FURTHERMORE, SERVICE RENDERED IN PNRC IS A VOLUNTEER SERVICE TO WHICH IS NEITHER AN OFFICE NOR AN EMPLOYMENT.ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT BY ACCEPTING THE PNRC CHAIR, GORDON FORFEITED HIS SENATE SEAT.HELDTHE SUPREME COURT HELD THATHE DID NOT FORFEITED HIS SEAT. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS IS A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION PERFORMING PUBLIC FUNCTIONS. IT DOES NOT HAVE GOVERNMENT ASSETS AND DOES NOT RECEIVE ANY APPROPRIATION FROM THE PHILIPPINE CONGRESS. THE PNRC IS FINANCED PRIMARILY BY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND PRIVATE ENTITIES OBTAINED THROUGH SOLICITATION CAMPAIGNS ORGANIZED BY ITS BOARD OF GOVERNORS. APART FROM THAT, PNRC MUST NOT ONLY BE, BUT MUST ALSO BE SEEN TO BE, AUTONOMOUS, NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT TO BE ABLE TO CONDUCT ITS ACTIVITIES IN ACCORD TO THEIR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITY, IMPARTIALITY, NEUTRALITY, INDEPENDENCE, VOLUNTARY SERVICE, UNITY, AND UNIVERSALITY. HENCE, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 13 COULD NOT APPLY TO GORDONS CASE, IN ACCEPTING THE POSITION IN THE PNRC. THE PETITION WAS DEEMED TO HAVE NO MERIT.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 16. OFFICERS OF CONGRESS; QUOROM; DISCIPLINE; JOURNAL/RECORDS(PAR. 1) DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA, GR 134577 NOVEMBER 18, 1998

THE SENATE CONVENED AS FOLLOWS:10 MEMBERS = LAMP7 MEMBERS = LAKAS NUCD1 MEMBER = LP1 MEMBER = AKSYON DEMOCRATICO1 MEMBER = PRP1 MEMBER GABAY-BAYAN2 MEMBERS = INDEPENDENTTOTAL = 23 (*ONE POSITION WAS VACANT BECAUSE GMA BECAME VICE PRESIDENT)

THERE WAS AN ELECTION FOR SENATE PRESIDENT. THERE WERE 2 CONTENDERS, SENATOR FERNAN AND SENATOR TATAD. BY A VOTE OF 20 TO 2, FERNAN WON AS SENATE PRESIDENT. SENATOR TATAD THEREAFTER MANIFESTED THAT HE WAS ASSUMING THE POST AS MINORITY LEADER SINCE ACCORDING TO HIM, ONLY THOSE WHO HAD VOTED FOR HIM, BELONGED TO THE MINORITY.THIS WAS OPPOSED BY SENATOR JOHNNY FLAVIER. HE MANIFESTED THAT 7 LAKAS NUCD SENATORS ARE ALSO PART OF THE MINORITY AND THEY CHOSE SENATOR GUINGONA AS MINORITY LEADER.SENATOR GUINGONA WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT AS MINORITY LEADER. SENATORS SANTIAGO AND TATAD INSTITUTED QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS TO OUST SENATOR GUINGONA AS MINORITY LEADER, AND TO DECLARE TATAD AS THE RIGHTFUL MINORITY LEADER.TATAD ARGUES THAT THE TERM MAJORITY REFERS TO THE GROUP OF SENATORS WHO VOTED FOR THE WINNING SENATE PRESIDENT AND ACCEPTED COMMITTEE CHAIRMANSHIPS. ACCORDINGLY, THE SAY, THAT THOSE WHO VOTED FOR THE LOSING NOMINEE AND ACCEPTED NO COMMITTEE CHAIRMANSHIPS COMPRISE THE MINORITY.

ISSUES:1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION.2. WHETHER OR NOT PAR. 1, SEC. 16, ART. VI, OF THE CONSTITUTION, WAS NOT OBSERVED IN THE SELECTION OF MINORITY LEADER.HELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION. THE COURT HAS JUDICIAL POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDCTION.WHILE THE CONSTITUTION IS EXPLICIT ON THE MANNER OF ELECTING THE SENATE PRESIDENT AND THE HOUSE SPEAKER, IT IS HOWEVER, SILENT ON THE MANNER OF SELECTING THE OTHER OFFICERS OF CONGRESS. THE CONSTITUTION MERELY SAYS THAT EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY. HENCE, THE METHOD OF CHOOSING WHO WILL BE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS IS MERELY A DERIVATIVE OF THE EXERCISE OF PREROGATIVE CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION. SUCH METHOD MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY THE SENATE ITSELF, NOT BY THE COURTS. THE RULES OF SENATE DO NOT PROVIDE FOR THE POSITIONS OF MAJORITY/ MINORITY LEADERS. IN THE ABSENCE OF AND SPECIFIC RULES, THIS COURT HAS NO BASIS UPON WHICH TO DETERMINE THE LEGALITY OF THE ACTS OF THE SENATE. THE COURTS CANNOT INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE LEGISLATURE.

ARTICLE VI SECTION 16. OFFICERS OF CONGRESS; QUOROM; DISCIPLINE; JOURNAL/RECORDS(PAR. 2) PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS, 324 SCRA 689

FACTS:CONGRESSMAN JALOSJOS (FIRST DISTRICT ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE) WAS CONFINED AT THE NATIONAL PENITENTIARY WHILE HIS CASE FOR STATUTORY RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS IS PENDING APPEAL.HE FILED A MOTION THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO FULLY DISCHARGE THE DUTIES OF A CONGRESSMAN, INCLUDING ATTENDANCE AT SESSIONS AND COMMITTEE HEARINGS, DESPITE HIS CONVICTION FOR A NON-BAILABLE OFFENSE.HE CLAIMS THAT HIS RE-ELECTION AS CONGRESSMAN PROVES AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL, AND CANNOT BE RENDERED INUTILE. HE CLAIMS HE HAS THE MANDATE OF THE SOVEREIGN WILL. HE FURTHER ARGUES THAT UNDER SEC 16(2), A CONGRESSMANS FUNCTION IS TO ATTEND SESSIONS. HE ALSO RELIES ON THE CASE OF AGUINALDO, WERE THE COURT SAID THAT A PUBLIC OFFICER SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE FOR ACTS DONE PRIOR TO HIS PRESENT TERM OF OFFICE. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD BE DEPRIVING THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO ELECT THEIR OFFICERS. ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT JALOSJOS BE ALLOWED TO ATTEND THE SESSIONS OF CONGRESS.HELD:THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, PRIVILEGE TO BE FREE FROM ARREST APPLIES ONLY IF THE OFFENSE IS PUNISHABLE BY LESS THAN 6 YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT. THE ACCUSED HAS NOT SHOWN ANY REASON WHY HE SHOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM THIS. THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CANNOT COMPEL ABSENT MEMBERS TO ATTEND SESSIONS IF THE REASON FOR THE ABSENCE IS A LEGITIMATE ONE. THE CONFINEMENT OF A CONGRESSMAN CHARGED WITH A NON-BAILABLE OFFENSE (MORE THAN 6 YEARS), IS CERTAINLY AUTHORIZED BY LAW, AND HAS CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS.

ARTICLE VISECTION 16. OFFICERS OF CONGRESS; QUOROM; DISCIPLINE; JOURNAL/RECORDS(PAR. 3) SANTIAGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 356 SCRA 636

FACTS:

THE PETITIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE COMMISSIONER OF THE COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, WILLFULLY, UNLAWFULLY AND CRIMINALLY APPROVE THE APPLICATION FOR LEGALIZATION OF THE STAY OF ALIENS IN VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 324 WHICH PROHIBITS THE LEGALIZATION OF SAID DISQUALIFIED ALIENS KNOWING FULLY WELL THAT SAID ALIENS ARE DISQUALIFIED, THEREBY GIVING UNWARRANTED BENEFITS TO SAID ALIENS WHOSE STAY IN THE PHILIPPINES WAS UNLAWFULLY LEGALIZED BY SAID ACCUSED. THE COURT IS CALLED UPON TO REVIEW THE ACT OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IN ORDERING THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF PETITIONER, MME. SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, IN CONNECTION WITH PENDING CRIMINAL CASES FILED AGAINST HER FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPTION PRACTICES ACT. THE INSTANT CASE AROSE FROM THE COMPLAINTS FILED BY A GROUP OF EMPLOYEES OF THE COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (CID) AGAINST PETITIONER. THE INVESTIGATING PANEL TOOK OVER THE CASE. THE PETITIONER FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH PROHIBITION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BEFORE THE COURT AND A MOTION BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO DEFER HER ARRAIGNMENT.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF AN INCUMBENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL.

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF AN INCUMBENT PUBLIC OFFICIAL. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION PRESCRIBED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 IS DISTINCT FROM THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DISCIPLINE ITS OWN RANKS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. UNDER SECTION 16 (3), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES THAT EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUNISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR, AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, SUSPEND OR EXPEL A MEMBER. THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ITSELF MAY NOT BE DEEMED TO HAVE EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FROM REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019. EACH BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT HAS EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVES AND COGNIZANCE WITHIN ITS OWN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND EFFECTIVELY PREVENTS ONE BRANCH FROM UNDULY INTRUDING INTO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF EITHER BRANCH. THE PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE PROPRIETY OF HIS PROSECUTION ON THE GROUND THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH HE IS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 3019. THE CHALLENGE IS BY WAY OF MOTION TO QUASH. IN MOTION TO QUASH, THE ACCUSED ADMITS HYPOTHETICALLY THE ALLEGATIONS OF FACT IN THE INFORMATION. REPUBLICACT NO. 3019 DOES NOT EXCLUDE FROM ITS COVERAGE THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ERR IN THUS DECREEING THE ASSAILED PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER. THE PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED. THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS DISMISSED.

ARTICLE VISECTION 16. OFFICERS OF CONGRESS; QUOROM; DISCIPLINE; JOURNAL/RECORDS(PAR. 4) US V. PONS, 34 PHIL 729 (1916)

FACTS:

PONS AND GABINO BELISO WERE TRADING PARTNERS. ON 5 APR 1914, THE STEAMER LOPEZ Y LOPEZ ARRIVED AT MANILA FROM SPAIN AND IT CONTAINED 25 BARRELS OF WINE. THE SAID BARRELS OF WINE WERE DELIVERED TO BELISO. BELISO SUBSEQUENTLY DELIVERED 5 BARRELS TO PONS HOUSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES NOTICED THAT THE SAID 25 BARRELS LISTED AS WINE ON RECORD WERE NOT DELIVERED TO ANY LISTED MERCHANT (BELISO NOT BEING ONE). AND SO THE CUSTOMS OFFICERS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION THEREBY DISCOVERING THAT THE 25 BARRELS OF WINE ACTUALLY CONTAINED TINS OF OPIUM. SINCE THE ACT OF TRADING AND DEALING OPIUM IS AGAINST ACT 2381, PONS AND BELISO WERE CHARGED FOR ILLEGALLY AND FRAUDULENTLY IMPORTING AND INTRODUCING SUCH CONTRABAND MATERIAL TO THE PHILIPPINES. PONS APPEALED THE SENTENCE ARGUING THAT ACT 2381 WAS NOT APPROVED WHILE THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION (CONGRESS) WAS NOT IN SESSION. HE SAID THAT HIS WITNESSES CLAIM THAT THE SAID LAW WAS PASSED/APPROVED ON 01 MARCH 1914 WHILE THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMISSION WAS ADJOURNED AT 12MN ON 28 FEB 1914. SINCE THIS IS THE CASE, ACT 2381 SHOULD BE NULL AND VOID.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT MUST GO BEYOND THE RECITALS OF THE JOURNALS TO DETERMINE IF ACT 2381 WAS INDEED MADE AS A LAW ON FEBRUARY 28, 1914

HELD:

THE SUPREME COURT HELD AND LOOKED INTO THE JOURNALS TO CERTAIN THE DATE OF ADJOURNMENT BUT IT REFUSED TO GO BEYOND THE RECITALS IN THE LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS. THE SAID JOURNALS ARE CONCLUSIVE ON THE COURT AND TO INQUIRE INTO THE VERACITY OF THE JOURNALS OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE, WHEN THEY ARE, AS THE SC HAVE SAID, CLEAR AND EXPLICIT, WOULD BE TO VIOLATE BOTH THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE ORGANIC LAWS BY WHICH THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT WAS BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE, TO INVADE A COORDINATE AND INDEPENDENT DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND TO INTERFERE WITH THE LEGITIMATE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE. PONS WITNESSES CANNOT BE GIVEN DUE WEIGHT AGAINST THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE JOURNALS WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE. THE JOURNALS SAY THAT THE LEGISLATURE ADJOURNED AT 12 MIDNIGHT ON FEBRUARY 28, 1914. THIS SETTLES THE QUESTION, AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO GO BEHIND THESE JOURNALS. THE SC PASSED UPON THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE ENROLLED BILL IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE.

ARTICLE VISECTION 16. OFFICERS OF CONGRESS; QUOROM; DISCIPLINE; JOURNAL/RECORDS(PAR. 4) ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V. ERMITA, 469 SCRA 1

FACTS: ON MAY 24, 2005, THE PRESIDENT SIGNED INTO LAW REPUBLIC ACT 9337 OR THE VAT REFORM ACT. BEFORE THE LAW TOOK EFFECT ON JULY 1, 2005, THE COURT ISSUED A TRO ENJOINING GOVERNMENT FROM IMPLEMENTING THE LAW IN RESPONSE TO A SLEW OF PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW LAW. THE CHALLENGED SECTION OF RA NO. 9337 IS THE COMMON PROVISO IN SECTIONS 4, 5 AND 6: THAT THE PRESIDENT, UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SHALL, EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2006, RAISE THE RATE OF VALUE-ADDED TAX TO 12%, AFTER ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS HAS BEEN SATISFIED: (I) VALUE-ADDED TAX COLLECTION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR EXCEEDS TWO AND FOUR-FIFTH PERCENT (2 4/5%); OR (II) NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR EXCEEDS ONE AND ONE-HALF PERCENT (1%) PETITIONERS ALLEGE THAT THE GRANT OF STAND-BY AUTHORITY TO THE PRESIDENT TO INCREASE THE VAT RATE IS AN ABDICATION BY CONGRESS OF ITS EXCLUSIVE POWER TO TAX BECAUSE SUCH DELEGATION IS NOT COVERED BY SECTION 28 (2), ARTICLE VI CONSTITUTION. THEY ARGUE THAT VAT IS A TAX LEVIED ON THE SALE OR EXCHANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES WHICH CANT BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF TARIFFS UNDER THE EXEMPTION DELEGATION SINCE THIS REFERS TO CUSTOMS DUTIES, TOLLS OR TRIBUTE PAYABLE UPON MERCHANDISE TO THE GOVERNMENT AND USUALLY IMPOSED ON IMPORTED/EXPORTED GOODS. THEY ALSO SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS POWERS TO CAUSE, INFLUENCE OR CREATE THE CONDITIONS PROVIDED BY LAW TO BRING ABOUT THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT. MOREOVER, THEY ALLEGE THAT NO GUIDING STANDARDS ARE MADE BY LAW AS TO HOW THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE WILL MAKE THE RECOMMENDATION. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.HELD: THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE POWERS WHICH CONGRESS IS PROHIBITED FROM DELEGATING ARE THOSE WHICH ARE STRICTLY, OR INHERENTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY, LEGISLATIVE. PURELY LEGISLATIVE POWER WHICH CAN NEVER BE DELEGATED IS THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE A COMPLETE LAW- COMPLETE AS TO THE TIME WHEN IT SHALL TAKE EFFECT AND AS TO WHOM IT SHALL BE APPLICABLE, AND TO DETERMINE THE EXPEDIENCY OF ITS ENACTMENT. IT IS THE NATURE OF THE POWER AND NOT THE LIABILITY OF ITS USE OR THE MANNER OF ITS EXERCISE WHICH DETERMINES THE VALIDITY OF ITS DELEGATION. THE EXCEPTIONS ARE: (A) DELEGATION OF TARIFF POWERS TO PRESIDENT UNDER CONSTITUTION(B) DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS TO PRESIDENT UNDER CONSTITUTION(C) DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE AT LARGE (D) DELEGATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (E) DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

FOR THE DELEGATION TO BE VALID, IT MUST BE COMPLETE AND IT MUST FIX A STANDARD. A SUFFICIENT STANDARD IS ONE WHICH DEFINES LEGISLATIVE POLICY, MARKS ITS LIMITS, MAPS OUT ITS BOUNDARIES AND SPECIFIES THE PUBLIC AGENCY TO APPLY IT. IN THIS CASE, IT IS NOT A DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BUT A DELEGATION OF ASCERTAINMENT OF FACTS UPON WHICH ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE INCREASED RATE UNDER THE LAW IS CONTINGENT. THE LEGISLATURE HAS MADE THE OPERATION OF THE 12% RATE EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2006, CONTINGENT UPON A SPECIFIED FACT OR CONDITION. IT LEAVES THE ENTIRE OPERATION OR NON-OPERATION OF THE 12% RATE UPON FACTUAL MATTERS OUTSIDE OF THE CONTROL OF T