cases for arrest (full text)

8/22/2019 Cases for Arrest (Full Text)

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Ejercito

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154130 August 20, 2004

BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming petitioners conviction by the

Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner now seeks a reconsideration of ourDecision.

The facts are briefly restated as follows:

Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante andCrisanto Pelias are members of the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3

Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police Regional

Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence

operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boatsmeasuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob.

There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the

boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called forreinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at

the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioners house i n Daram, where they had dinner

and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Arbitrary Detention

by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986. On petition for review, we rendered judgment asfollows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of theSandiganbayan in Criminal Case No., dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO

ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing

him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to

one (1) year and eight (8) months ofprision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in

toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality on January 12, 2004.1

Petitioner then filed an "Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration"2with

attached "Motion for Reconsideration,"3wherein he makes the following submissions:
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1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE

OF DETAINING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES;

2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS INSISTED ON LEAVING

THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DETAINED;

3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED THE INNOCENCE OFTHE PETITIONER;

4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEARLY WANTING IN

THE INSTANT CASE.4

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration.5

The prosecution was required to comment on petitioners second Motion for Reconsideration and the

Supplement thereto.

We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration well-taken.

6

While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the

sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever

substantive justice may be better served thereby.

The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They

were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice.Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering

justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that

on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way

around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice,it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its

operation.7

The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.8

The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear.

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the

minds of the private offended parties.

Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police

officer who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. On the contrary, what appears is thatpetitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR

Team in his house. SPO1 Capoquian testified thus:

ATTY. JUMAMIL:

q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in Daram?

a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way we saw a boat beingconstructed there so we proceeded to Barangay Lucodlucod (sic).

q And you arrived at 5:00 oclock?

a Yes sir.
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q And you left at 2:00 oclock in the morning of September 2?

a Yes sir.

q And you ate dinner between 5:00 oclock to 2:00 oclock in the morning of September 2,is that correct?

a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner.

q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had dinner?

a Yes sir.

q And of course you also partook of wine?

a I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ NARIO:

q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 oclock Mayor Astorga was with you

having dinner?

a Yes Your Honor.

q You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the foresters, the complainants

here?

a I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ PALATTAO:

q And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of this laughter?

a Probably they were talking of something humorous.9

The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint imposed on the privateoffended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam

around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that

petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.

ATTY. JUMAMIL:

q It was raining at that time, is that correct?

a Yes sir it was raining.

q And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular time that you were inLucoblucob, Daram?

a I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.

q What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in Lucoblucob?

a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves at that time.
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q But it was raining the whole day?

a It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.

q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 oclock in the morning is thatcorrect?

a A little bit hard I dont know when the rain stopped, sir.

q It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00 oclock in the morning of September 2?

a I dont remember sir.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ PALATTAO:

q Were you told not to go away from the place?

a No Your Honor.

q Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented to go somewhere?

a They did not say anything sir.

q Where did you go after that?

a Just down until it rained.

q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your part, was there

somebody prevented you to go to another place?

a I dont know Your Honor.

q But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will prevent you to go

somewhere else?

a What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told not to leave the

barangay.

q In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not supposed to leave that

barangay, is this Barangay Daram?

a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.

q On your part according to you you can go places if you want although in your impression

you cannot leave the barangay. How about the other companions like Mr. Simon, Cruz and

Maniscan, can they leave the place?

a No Your Honor.

q Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the case of those I have

enumerated they cannot, why?

a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.10

Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness stand on August 16,

2000 but did not complete his testimony-in-chief due to lack of material time. His testimony
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only covered preliminary matters and did not touch on the circumstances of the alleged

detention.11

On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E. Simon, Moises de la Cruz,

Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and Wenefredo Maniscan, executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance

stating, in pertinent part:

xxx xxx xxx;

6. That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation aggravated by the

exhaustion of the team in scouring the shores of the small islands of Samar for several days.Mayor Benito Astorga may have also been confronted with the same predicament, hence our

confrontation resulted to a heated argument and the eventual misunderstanding;

7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality of Daram, Samar our

respect for him prevailed when he ordered us to take dinner with him and other local residents

thereat, so we capitulated whose invitation was misinterpreted by us;

8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the team and the group of

Mayor Astorga during the dinner and we were eventually allowed to leave Daram, Samar;

9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported the incident to our

supervisors who required us to submit our affidavit;

10. That at present our differences had already been reconciled and both parties had alreadyexpress apologies and are personally no longer interested to pursue the case against the Mayor,hence, this affidavit of desistance;

xxx xxx xxx.

12

Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court to testify. Thisnotwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the

basis of the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the police escorts of the DENR Team.

The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquians testimony negate the element of detention. More

importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective.13

Addressed to the mind of the victim,

its presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the

perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the crime.14

As such, SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3Cinco, not being victims, were not competent to testify on whether or not fear existed in the minds of

the private offended parties herein. It was thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their

testimonies in convicting petitioner.

Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether

petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure,capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties

were taken to petitioners house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is

equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinksto the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was

rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with the private offended parties and even laughed

with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation

between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at allunusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.15

Heis entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable

doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute

certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in anunprejudiced mind.

16
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As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the

presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter

of right. For the prosecutions evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed todraw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

17Furthermore, where the evidence

for the prosecution is concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must

be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence that

an accused enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, oneof which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the

presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man

than to convict an innocent man.18

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1, 2003 is RECONSIDERED

and SET ASIDE. The appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 is

REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the

ground of reasonable doubt.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna,JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Rollo, p. 197.

2

Id., pp. 198-199.3Id., pp. 202-216.

4Id., pp. 204-213.

5Id., pp. 217-223.

6The Court En Banc resolved to allow the Special First Division to consider and resolve the

Second Motion for Reconsideration.

7

Fulgencio, et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141600, 12 September 2003.8Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, 1 October 2003.

9TSN, 15 August 2000, pp. 6-7, 9-10, 21.

10Id., pp. 8-9, 22-23.

11TSN, 16 August 2000, pp. 6-13.

12Record, p. 158.

13People v. Servano,G.R. Nos. 143002-03, 17 July 2003.

14People v. Lustre,G.R. No. 134562, 6 April 2000, 330 SCRA 189, 196.

15Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).

16Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 2.
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17People v. Sodsod, G.R. Nos. 141280-81, 16 June 2003.

18People v. Batoctoy,G.R. Nos. 137458-59, 24 April 2003.
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SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1501. September 3, 2003]

ROMEO E. EJERCITO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ILDEFONSO B. SUERTE, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:

Before us is the administrative complaint filed by Romeo E. Ejercito against Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu (Branch 60) for abuse of authority, oppression and

harassment.

In his Petition dated June 2, 1998, complainant alleges that respondent Judge is guilty of violating

the law and the Constitution by committing the following acts: rendering of an unjust and illegal

or unlawful order to arrest him on December 12, 1997;

usurpation of a case already decided by another court; ignorance of the law and/or willful

defiance of the law (Art. 92 of the Revised Penal Code);

culpable violation of the constitutional mandate of due process; falsification of public document bypurporting that the warrant of arrest dated May 31, 1991 is still valid although he knows that it has

been invalidated in an Order of the Court dated March 9, 1992;

culpable violation of the Bill of Rights that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same

offense; grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a public official.

Complainant prays that respondent Judge be dismissed from the Judiciary, perpetuallydisqualified to hold public office in the Philippines and disbarred from the Roll of Attorneys to

practice law in the Philippines and the forfeiture of all emoluments due him from the

government service.1[1]

In his Answer dated August 10, 1998, respondent Judge emphatically denies the allegations of the

complainant claiming that his charges are not only baseless, whimsical and preposterous but

absurd. He further claims that complainant is a litigation addict having developed the propensity

of filing various cases against several people; that the instant administrative case was filed to

harass and molest respondent judge and is intended to destroy his image and reputation as an

officer of the court.2[2]

In a Memorandum addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) recommended that the instant complaint be docketed as a regular

administrative matter and that it be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for

investigation, report and recommendation.3[3]

In a Resolution issued by this Court dated October 20, 1999, the instant case was docketed as a regularadministrative matter and was referred to then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-

Morales (now a member of this Court) for investigation, report and recommendation.4[4]

1[1]Rollo, pp. 6-8.

2[2]Id., p. 17.

3[3]Id., pp. 61-63.

4[4]Id., p. 64.


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Justice Morales conducted hearings for the parties to present their respective evidence. However,

pending resolution of the instant administrative matter, Justice Morales was appointed as an Associate

Justice of this Court. Hence, in a Resolution dated December 9, 2002, the case was reassigned toAssociate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador of the Court of Appeals directing her to continue the

proceedings until terminated and to submit to this Court her report and recommendation.5[5]

In her Report and Recommendation dated June 30, 2003, the Investigating Justice summarized theestablished facts of the case, as follows:

Charged with and convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents in Criminal Case No.

CU-13 before Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, complainant was sentenced to

suffer the penalty of imprisonment for one year and one day to three years, six months and twenty-onedays as well as to pay the fine of P500.00. The affirmance of the said judgment of conviction on

August 12, 1980 by the Court of Appeals caused the issuance of a warrant of arrest which complainant

was, however, able to evade. An alias warrant of arrest was consequently issued on March 31, 1991 by

Judge Jose P. Burgos, then the presiding judge of the trial court.

The record further shows that upon complainants February 17, 1992 motion, Judge Burgossubsequently set aside the execution of the aforesaid judgment and ordered the quashal of the self-

same alias warrant of arrest . . . in an order dated March 19, 1992. . . .

On October 16, 1997, complainants picture was published in a local newspaper together with a newsitem regarding his conviction and the warrants earlier issued for his arrest. On December 12, 1997, he

was further arrested by SPO3 Andres Alpas and SPO1 Renato Vergara, both operatives of the BariliPolice Station, on the strength of the March 31, 1991 alias warrant of arrest issued by Judge Burgos.

Turned over to Branch 17 of Cebu City Regional Trial Court upon respondents verbal instruction,

complainant was, however, ordered released on the same day by Judge Jesus de la Pena, the said

courts presiding judge, on the ground that the warrant thus implemented had already been invalidated.

On the belief that the newspaper publication as aforesaid and his erroneous arrest were engineered by

respondent, complainant filed the instant complaint alongside several others singly and/or collectivelyagainst respondent, SPO3 Andres Alpas and SPO1 Renato Vergara. Docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-

0206 before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), the complaint against respondent for violations

of Articles 171, 177, 204, 205, 267 and 269 of the Revised Penal Code and for grave abuse of authoritywas dismissed in the said offices resolution dated May 18, 1998. Another complaint against

respondent and said policementhis time for arbitrary detentionwas dismissed by the Office of the

Cebu Provincial Prosecutor in the resolution dated August 18, 1998 issued in I.S. No. 98-13840.

On the other hand, although the administrative aspect of the case had already been declared closed and

terminated in the April 28, 1999 resolution issued by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the

Military in OMB-Vis-98-1020, SPO3 Andres Alpas and SPO1 Renato Vergara were criminallycharged for perjury and were subsequently ordered arrested in the warrant of arrest dated July 12, 1999

issued by Judge Leopoldo Canete, presiding judge of Branch 4 of the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu

City, in Criminal Case No. 99039-R.

Also confronted with a complaint for perjury docketed as I.S. No. 98-16398, respondent was further

charged by complainant with estafa thru falsification of public documents and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for acts he allegedly committed while he was the COMELEC

Registrar of Badian, Cebu from 1964-1971.

Both the criminal and administrative aspects of the case were respectively dismissed in the October 16,

1997 resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-0835 and

the March 22, 1999 resolution issued by the Third Division of the Supreme Court in AdministrativeMatter OCA IPI No. 98-514-RTJ.

5[5] Id., p. 210.


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In his June 17, 1999 amended complaint-petition, complainant gave a detailed account of the long-

standing conflict between his family and that of the respondent which purportedly motivated the latter

to perpetrate the acts complained of. Having earlier denied the imputations against him and called theCourts attention to the various cases commenced by complainant, respondent for his part , filed a

motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. Despite due notice, he likewise repeatedly failed

to appear at the hearings conducted in the case, hence, this evaluation solely on the basis of the oral

and documentary evidence adduced by complainant.6[6]

After evaluation of the evidence presented, the Investigating Justice concluded that complainantscharges are not supported by sufficient and competent evidence. The Investigating Justice ruled:

Aside from the apparent insufficiency of the evidence adduced by complainant, the record is repletewith ample showing that the complaint is just another episode in what appears to be the acrimonious

(unfriendly)history between the parties families. More than the multiple complaints he commenced

against respondent, complainant himself lent credence to this observation by dredging up the political

differences between him and respondents father as well as the political rivalry between their siblings.Going well beyond the allegations in his complaint and virtually throwing the proverbial kitchen sink

against respondent, complainant even facetiously tried to attribute his arrest to the formers proprietaryinterest over his familys property which was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Barili(Cebu), Inc.

That complainants cause is more apparent than real is, however, readily evident from the record.

It bears emphasizing that, in addition to the publication of complainants picture and arrest in the localnewspaper, one Ernesto Sandalo has already claimed responsibility for causing the arrest of

complainant. Attached as Annex J to complainants amended complaint-petition, the November 19,

1998 affidavit the said Ernesto Sandalo executed contained the following categorical admissions:

. . . . . . . . .

That I was able to obtain a copy of the alias warrant of arrest for convict Romeo Ejercito for execution

of judgment from Branch 17 sometime in 1992;

That as soon as I noticed that the convict was already roaming around, I went to Barili, Cebu to refer

the said warrant;

That I approached Judge Suerte and showed to him the copy of the alias warrant and he instructed one

of this subordinates or members of his staff to accompany me to the PNP, Barili, Cebu and so I went to

the PNP Office and gave the said warrant to the one (he was alone) sitting beside a table and after thatI went home.

. . . . . . . . .

The foregoing circumstances are obviously the reasons why the respondents name is mentioned in the

December 23, 1997 Extract Copy from the Barili Police Station submitted in evidence as Exhibit B.

By and of themselves, the following entries from the self-same extract from the Barili Police Blotter donot prove respondents supposed responsibility for complainants arrest, viz:

At abt 121010H December 1997, one Romeo Ejercito, accused in Criminal Case No. CBU-CU 13 forFalsification of Public Documents was arrested by PO3 Andres Alpas and PO1 Renato Vergara by

virtue (sic) of an order of arrest issued by Judge Jose P. Burgos, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 17 for

Execution of Judgment dated May 31, 1992. Subject person was turnover to Judge Jose Burgos, RTC,

Branch 17 per verbal order of Judge Suerte of RTC Branch 60 of Barili, Cebu.

6[6] Report and Recommendation, pp. 1-4.


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Rather than the concrete evidence of respondents abuse of authority which complainant represents

them to be, the foregoing entries indicate that complainants arrest was effected not so much because

respondent ordered the same but because the policemen were ill-informed about the subsequentdevelopments in Criminal Case No. CU-13. While it may be conceded that the verbal directive from

respondent smacked of irregularitymore so, in view of the apparent bad blood which exists between

the partiesthe same, having been given after complainant had been arrested, cannot serve as

sufficient basis for holding him liable for oppression and harassment.

. . . . . . . . .

Even without the benefit of a cross-examination from respondent, the falsity of complainants

testimony is, however, evident from the fact that the March 31, 1991 alias warrant issued for his arrestwas only quashed on March 19, 1992 or roughly five months after his supposed arrest by operatives of

the Cebu City Police on October 16, 1991. This material discrepancy as to dates belies complainants

claim that as early as his first arrest, Judge Jesus dela Pena ordered his release on the ground that the

alias warrant being enforced had already been quashed.7[7]

. . . . . . . . .

. . . Viewed alongside the categorical denial by SPO3 Andres Alpas and SPO1 Renato Vergara of

respondents complicity in the arrest, the inconsistencies in and the inconclusiveness of complainantsevidence, in fine, bolster confidence in Ernesto Sandalos acknowledgement of his direct involvementin respondents arrest.

The veracity of respondents complicity in the arrest thus discounted, it matters little that Angel

Cang testified regarding the prior threats the former supposedly made to have complainant

arrested. Even if accorded precipitate credibility on its face, said testimony is insufficient to holdrespondent liable for the charges imputed against him in the complaint. Together with a reminder that

forum shopping exists only when the elements oflitis pendentia are present or where a final judgment

in one case will amount to res judicata in another, respondent may, at most, be sternly warned to be

more circumspect in his official and personal deportment. A judge is the visible representation

of the law and the embodiment of the peoples sense of justice. Accordingly, he should constantly

keep himself away from any act of impropriety, not only in the performance of his official duties

but also in his everyday actuations.

Not having been supported by substantial evidence which is the quantum of proof required in

administrative cases such as this, the complaint against respondent judge must correspondingly fail.8[8](Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the Investigating Justice recommends that the complaint against respondent judge bedismissed.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Justice.

In administrative proceeedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the acts complained ofrests on the complainant.9[9] In the present case, complainant contends that respondent judge caused his

arrest on December 12, 1997 on the basis of the already invalidated warrant of arrest dated May 31,

1991 as the case against him had already been dismissed. However, we find a dearth of evidence to

support this allegation. None of the documentary evidence presented by complainant directly linksrespondent to his arrest. Neither did the testimonies of complainants witnesses, Philip Medel, Jr.10[10]

7[7]Id., pp. 4-7.

8[8]Id., p. 10.

9[9]Cea vs. Paguio, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1479, February 17, 2003.

10[10] TSN, April 25, 2000.
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and Angel Cang11[11] prove that respondent is the one responsible for said arrest. Complainant simply

relies on the alleged statements made by the arresting officers that they were acting on the strength of

the verbal order made by respondent judge directing them to arrest complainant. However, in theirsworn Joint Counter-Affidavits, arresting officers SPO3 Andres Alpas and SPO1 Renato Vergara

categorically denied that it was respondent Judge who instructed them to arrest complainant.12[12]

Ernesto Sandalo, in a sworn affidavit, admitted responsibility in causing the complainants arrest.13[13]Sandalo asserts however that after obtaining a copy of the alias warrant of arrest, he approached

respondent judge and showed him a copy of the said warrant. Upon instructions of respondent Judge,he was accompanied by a member of respondent Judges staff when he referred the warrant to the

PNP, Barili, Cebu.

Complainants evidence further shows that after his arrest, he was initially brought before the sala of

respondent Judge and it was the latter who verbally ordered that complainant be turned over to Judge

Jose Burgos, the judge who issued the warrant of arrest.

InErmelyn A. Limbona vs. Judge Casan Ali Limbona, we held that even in an administrative case, the

Rules of Court require that if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or anygraver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct

knowledge. The judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members

could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented, especially since the charge is penal in

character.14[14]

Moreover we have held inDe Guzman vs. Dy15[15] that:

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt.

Such is the rule where the charges upon which the removal is sought is misconduct in office,

willful neglect, corruption or incompetence. The general rules in regards to admissibility of

evidence in criminal trials apply.

In the present case, we find that complainant failed to discharge the burden of proving the

allegations in his complaint by the required quantum of evidence.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Justice that respondent, under

the facts and circumstances of the case, should be admonished to be more circumspect in his official

and personal deportment.

Upon being shown a copy of the alias warrant of arrest, he should have advised Sandalo to go to the

sala of Judge Burgos who had issued the same so as to avoid any misapprehension against him(respondent) as what happened in this case.

WHEREFORE, the present administrative complaint against respondent Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte isDISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, respondent is admonished to be more

circumspect in his official and personal deportment.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

11[11] TSN, June 9, 2003.

12[12]Annex A,Rollo, p. 19.

13[13]Annex J,Rollo, p. 55.

14[14] A.M. No. SCC-03-08, June 16, 2003.

15[15] A.M. No. RTJ-03-1755, July 3, 2003.
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners,vs.

SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT.

REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,petitioner,vs.

ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001

RONALDO A. LUMBAO,petitioner,vs.

SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTORLEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001

THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO,petitioner,vs.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA,respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

MELO, J.:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with

explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting andattempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of

rebellion in the National Capital Region.

She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the

Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests

of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave

a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court


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(1) G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent

application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed

by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao;

(2) G. R. No. 147781 formandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the

privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, with prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago;

(3) G. R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction

and/or restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and

(4) G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political partyLaban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino.

All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact

and in law.

Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a

"state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot andacademic. (unsettled,theoretical)

As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the

authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a

particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion." He states that what

is extant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement

Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments:

[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities toobtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and

until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary investigations will henceforth be

conducted.

(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p. 16;

G.R. No. 147810, p. 24)

With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.

In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of

persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if thecircumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the

declaration of a "state of rebellion."

Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-SantiagoPetition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested

without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies ofmandamusandprohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies

in the ordinary course of law.

Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to

determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.

Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities

within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer

could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal

ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is withoutprejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil

Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby


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making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Section 2 and 3, Rule 65,

Rules of Court).1wphi1.nt

Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of

the petitions at bar.

G.R. No. 147780

In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and mancao

pray that the "appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed

to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finallyresolved."

This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have beenfiled against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed, this

Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that

time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly issued warrant.

As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and

void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject holddeparture orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the

near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that

purpose.

Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support oftheir application for the issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifestthat the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relievepetitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which

remains speculative up to this very day.

G.R. No. 147781

The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one formandamus. It is basic inmatters relating to petitions formandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a

particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamuswill not issueunless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Upto the present time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being

arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will

not be arrested without a warrant.

G.R. No. 147799

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues thatthe declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an

encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or

interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be anexception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.

We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he

President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it

becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,

invasion or rebellion" Thus, we held inIntegrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000):

x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannotbe objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of

several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual

standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at suchjudgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be

difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon


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which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a

nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to

gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the

security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be

imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and massdestruction of property. x x x

(at pp.22-23)

The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this

power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.

G.R. No. 147810

PetitionerLaban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a

party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can beredressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify

the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the

Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a

warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with

warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name ofthe party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat

of invasion or infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming

that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a"state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this

Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of theConstitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, and over petitions forcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and

habeas corpus.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No.

147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlieradverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf,

are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts

committed in relation to or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, separate opinion.

Kapunan, dissenting opinion.

Pardo, join the dissent of J. Kapunan.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., on leave.


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G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO,petitioners,

vs.SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT.REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,petitioner,

vs.


SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

I concur insofar as the resolution enjoins any continued warrantless arrests for acts related to, or

connected with, the May 1st

incident but respectfully dissent from the order of dismissal of the

petitions for being said to be moot and academic. The petitions have raised important

constitutional issues that, in my view, must likewise be fully addressed.

G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners,

vs.

SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT.

REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.


----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001

RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR

LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001


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THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,

vs.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA,

respondents.

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been characterized as belonging "in the catalog

of indispensable freedoms."

Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of

the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the

first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need

only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people know that the human personalitydeteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are

subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.1

Invoking the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, petitioners Panfilo Lacson, Michael Ray

Aquino and Cezar O. Mancao II now seek a temporary restraining order and/or injunction from the

Court against their impending warrantless arrests upon order of the Secretary of Justice.2

PetitionerLaban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), likewise, seeks to enjoin the arrests of its senatorial

candidates, namely, Senator Juan Ponce-Enrile, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Senator Gregorio

B. Honasan and General Panfilo Lacson.3

Separate petitioners were also filed by Senator Juan PonceEnrile.

4Former Ambassador Ernesto M. Maceda,

5Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago,

6Senator

Gregorio B. Honasan,7

and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8

Briefly, the order for the arrests of these political opposition leaders and police officers stems from the

following facts:

On April 25, 2001, former President Joseph Estrada was arrested upon the warrant issued by the

Sandiganbayan in connection with the criminal case for plunder filed against him. Several hundreds of

policemen were deployed to effect his arrest. At the time, a number of Mr. Estrada's supporters, whowere then holding camp outside his residence in Greenhills Subdivision, sought to prevent his arrest. A

skirmish ensued between them and the police. The police had to employ batons and water hoses to

control the rock-throwing pro-Estrada rallyists and allow the sheriffs to serve the warrant. Mr. Estrada

and his son and co-accused, Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, were then brought to Camp Crame where, withfull media coverage, their fingerprints were obtained and their mug shots taken.

Later that day, and on the succeeding days, a huge gathered at the EDSA Shrine to show its support forthe deposed President. Senators Enrile, Santiago, Honasan, opposition senatorial candidates including

petitioner Lacson, as well as other political personalities, spoke before the crowd during these rallies.

In the meantime, on April 28, 2001, Mr. Estrada and his son were brought to the Veterans memorial

Medical Center for a medical check-up. It was announced that from there, they would be transferred to

Fort Sto. Domingo in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

In the early morning of May 1, 2001, the crowd at EDSA decided to march to Malacaang Palace. The

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was called to reinforce the Philippine National Police (PNP) toguard the premises of the presidential residence. The marchers were able to penetrate the barricades

put up by the police at various points leading to Mendiola and were able to reach Gate 7 of Malacaan.

As they were being dispersed with warning shots, tear gas and water canons, the rallyists hurled stonesat the police authorities. A melee erupted. Scores of people, including some policemen, were hurt.

At noon of the same day, after the crowd in Mendiola had been dispersed, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila:


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Presidential Proclamation No. 38

DECLARING STATE OF REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,clubs, stones and other deadly weapons, in great part coming from the mass gathering at the

EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated and incited and, acting upon theinstigation and under the command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have andcontinue to assault and attempt to break into Malacaang with the avowed purpose of

overthrowing the duly constituted Government and forcibly seize power, and have and continue

to rise publicly, shown open hostility, and take up arms against the duly constituted

Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government certain bodiesof the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and to deprive the

President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and partially, of her powers and

prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of

the Revised Penal Code;

WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and plottershave continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted

Government and seize political power;

WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, thePresident as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such

armed forces to suppress the rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested

in me by law hereby recognize and confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellioncompelling me to declare a state of rebellion;

In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order NO. 1 in accordance with Section 18,Article VII of the Constitution calling upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the

Philippine National police to suppress and quell the rebellion.

City of Manila, May 1, 2001.

The President likewise issued General Order No. 1 which reads:

GENERAL ORDER NO. 1

DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPIENS AND THE PHILIPPINE

NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL

REGION

WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,clubs, stones and other deadly weapons, in great part coming from the mass gathering at the

EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated and incited and, acting upon the

instigation and under the command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have andcontinue to assault and attempt to break into Malacaang with the avowed purpose of

overthrowing the duly constituted Government and forcibly seize political power, and have and

continue to rise publicly, show open hostility, and take up arms against the duly constituted

Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine NationalPolice, and to deprive the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and partially, of

her powers and prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable

under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code;

WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and plotters

have continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constitutedGovernment and seize political power;


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WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, the

President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such

armed forces to suppress the rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested

in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-

in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 38, dated May1, 2001, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine national

police to suppress and quell the rebellion.

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the

Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines andthe Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions

and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.

City of Manila, May 1, 2001.

Pursuant to the proclamation, several key leaders of the opposition were ordered arrested.

Senator Enrile was arrested without warrant in his residence at around 4:00 in the afternoon.

Likewise arrested without warrant the following day was former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda.

Senator Honasan and Gen. Lacson were also ordered arrested but the authorities have so far failed to

apprehend them.

Ambassador Maceda was temporarily released upon recognizance while Senator Ponce Enrile was

ordered released by the Court on cash bond.

The basic issue raised by the consolidated petitions is whether the arrest or impending arrest

without warrant, pursuant to a declaration of "state of rebellion" by the President of the above-

mentioned persons and unnamed other persons similarly situated suspected of having committed

rebellion is illegal, being unquestionably a deprivation of liberty and violative of the Bill of

Rights under the Constitution.

The declaration of a "state of rebellion" is supposedly based on Section 18, Article VII of the

Constitution which reads:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and

whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppresslawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safetyrequires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight

hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ ofhabeas corpus, thePresident shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting

jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may

revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by thePresident. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend

such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress if the invasion

or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or

suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the

privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon withinthirty days from its filing.


22/102

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the

functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of

jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able tofunction, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for

rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be

judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to call out the armed forces in

cases of

(1) lawless violence,

(2) rebellion and

(3) invasion.9

In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public safety requires, also

(a) suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, or

(b) place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

However, in the exercise of this calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the

Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a "state of rebellion" (or, for that

matter, of lawless violence or invasion).

The term "state of rebellion" has no legal significance. It is vague and amorphous and does not give the

President more power than what the Constitution says, i. e, whenever it becomes necessary, he maycall out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As Justice

Mendoza observed during the hearing of this case, such a declaration is "legal surplusage." But

whatever the term means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected rights, such as theright to due process,

10the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for

redress of grievances,11

and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,12

among others.

InIntegrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al.,13

the Court held that:

x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on one hand, and the power to suspendthe privilege of the write ofhabeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the other hand) places

the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the

power to suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of theConstitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their

revocation and review without any qualification.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

x x x

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights theintent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the "calling out"

power because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to

suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of

which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individualfreedoms, and thus necessitating affirmation by Congress and, in appropriate cases, review by

this Court.

On the other hand, if the motive behind the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is to arrest persons

without warrant and detain them without bail and, thus, skirt the Constitutional safeguards for thecitizens' civil liberties, the so-called "state of rebellion" partakes the nature of martial law without


23/102

declaring on its face, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye so as to

practically make it unjust and oppressive, it is within the prohibition of the Constitution.14

In an ironic

sense, a "state of rebellion" declared as a subterfuge to effect warrantless arrest and detention for anunbailable offense places a heavier burden on the people's civil liberties than the suspension of the

privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus the declaration of martial law because in the latter case, built-in

safeguards are automatically set on motion: (1) The period for martial law or suspension is limited to a

period not exceeding sixty day; (2) The President is mandated to submit a report to Congress withinforty-eight hours from the proclamation or suspension; (3) The proclamation or suspension is subject

to review by Congress, which may revoke such proclamation or suspension. If Congress is not in

session, it shall convene in 24 hours without need for call; and (4) The sufficiency of the factual basisthereof or its extension is subject to review by the Supreme Court in an appropriate proceeding.

15

No right is more fundamental than the right to life and liberty. Without these rights, all other individual

rights may not exist. Thus, the very first section in our Constitution's Bill of Rights, Article III, reads:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

And to assure the fullest protection of the right, more especially against government impairment,

Section 2 thereof provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,

and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the President or any person acting under her

direction to make unwarranted arrests. The existence of "lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" only

authorizes the President to call out the "armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasionor rebellion."

Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus or the declaration of martial law

authorizes the President to order the arrest of any person. The only significant consequence of the

suspension of the writ ofhabeas corpus is to divest the courts of the power to issue the writ whereby

the detention of the person is put in issue. It does not by itself authorize the President to order the arrestof a person. And even then, the Constitution in Section 18, Article VII makes the following

qualifications:

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for

rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be

judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ ofhabeas corpus. Nor did she declare martial

law. A declaration of a "state of rebellion," at most, only gives notice to the nation that it exists, and

that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it, as in fact she did. Such declaration doesnot justify any deviation from the Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and

seizures.

As a general rule, an arrest may be made only upon a warrant issued by a court. In very circumscribed

instances, however, the Rules of Court allow warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 provides:

SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A police officer or a private person may,

without a warrant, arrest a person:


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(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on

personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;

and

xxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall

be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against inaccordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

It must be noted that the above are exceptions to the constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rightsthat a person may only be arrested on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by a "judge" after

determining "personally" the existence of "probable cause" after examination under oath or affirmation

of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Its requirements should, therefore, be

scrupulously met:

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and anydeprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows

exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrests is strictly construed. Any exception must

clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly

unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests withoutwarrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would

infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of

full protection.16

A warrantless arrest may be justified only if the police officer had facts and circumstances before himwhich, had they been before a judge, would constitute adequate basis for a finding of probable cause ofthe commission of an offense and that the person arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense.

That is why the Rules of Criminal Procedure require that when arrested, the person "arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" in the presence of thearresting officer. Or if it be a case of an offense which had "just been committed," that the police

officer making the arrest "has personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be

arrested has committed it."

Petitioners were arrested or sought to be arrested without warrant for acts of rebellion ostensibly under

Section 5 of Rule 113. Respondents' theory is based on Umil vs. Ramos,17

where this Court held:

The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes

or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assault

against the State and are in the nature ofcontinuing crimes.18

Following this theory, it is argued that under Section 5(a), a person who "has committed, is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit" rebellion and may be arrested without a warrant at any time so

long as the rebellion persists.

Reliance on Umilis misplaced. The warrantless arrests therein, although effected a day or days after

the commission of the violent acts of petitioners therein, were upheld by the Court because at the time

of their respective arrests, they were members of organizations such as the Communist Party of the

Philippines, the New Peoples Army and the National United Front Commission, then outlawed groupsunder the Anti-Subversion Act. Their mere membership in said illegal organizations amounted to

committing the offense of subversion19

which justified their arrests without warrants.

In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to be arrested for their alleged participation in the

"rebellion" on May 1, 2001 are members of an outlawed organization intending to overthrow the

government. Therefore, to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), there must be a showing thatthe persons arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit


25/102

the offense of rebellion.20

In other words, there must be an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking

place in the presence of the arresting officer. In United States vs. Samonte,21

the term" in his [the

arresting officer's] presence" was defined thus:

An offense is said to be committed in the presence or within the view of an arresting officer or

private citizen when such officer or person sees the offense, even though at a distance, or hears

the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof; or the offense iscontinuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made.22

This requirement was not complied with particularly in the arrest of Senator Enrile. In the Court's

Resolution of May 5, 2001 in the petition forhabeas corpus filed by Senator Enrile, the Court noted

that the sworn statements of the policemen who purportedly arrested him were hearsay.23

SenatorEnrile was arrested two (2) days after he delivered allegedly seditious speeches. Consequently, his

arrest without warrant cannot be justified under Section 5(b) which states that an arrest without a

warrant is lawful when made after an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer or

private person has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstancesthat the person arrested has committed the offense.

At this point, it must be stressed that apart from being inapplicable to the cases at bar, Umilis not

without any strong dissents. It merely re-affirmed Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,24

a case decided during

the Marcos martial law regime.25

It cannot apply when the country is supposed to be under the regime

of freedom and democracy. The separate opinions of the following Justices in the motion forreconsideration of said case

26are apropos:

FERNAN C.J., concurring and dissenting:

Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officers are not sure whatparticular provision of law had been violated by the person arrested. True it is that law

enforcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at the law. However, erroneous

perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it would result in the

violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated. That the arrested person has the "rightto insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution, p. 18) that he was exercising a

right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No person

should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived hisaction.

27(Underscoring supplied)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting opinion

Insofar as G.R. NO. 81567 is concerned, I joint the other dissenting Justices in their

observations regarding "continuing offenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine ofcontinuing offense is to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion.

Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and

simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused

of rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person is provedguilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a

rebel and must be picked up