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“WHERE THE LAW SPEAKS IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION, VACILLATION, OR EQUIVOCATION, THERE IS ROOM ONLY FOR APPLICATION”

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997)

FACTS

Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. It was found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory.

HELD: It is mandatory.

The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process.

The application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

* CHAPTER 1*

“WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR, IT IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE OF INTERPRETATION. IT MUST BE APPLIED REGARDLESS OF WHO MAY BE AFFECTED, EVEN IF THE LAW MAY BE HARSH OR ERRONEOUS”

OLIVIA AND HERMES PASCUAL VS. ESPERANZA PASCUAL -BAUTISTA, ET.AL

G.R. No. 84240 (March 25, 1992)

FACTS

Don Andres Pascual died intestate (without a will) He was survived by Adela Pascual - spouse, 6 children of Wenceslao Pascual, 7 children of Pedro Pascual both full brother of the deceased and the petitioners. Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the deceased Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. Petitioner’s motion and motion for reconsideration manifesting their hereditary rights was denied by RTC Pasig and likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:

Petitioners do not fall within the purview of Art. 992 of the Civil Code. Being acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, their illegitimacy is

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not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children where under conception. Illegitimate children in Art. 992 refer to both natural and spurious child.Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child”

* CHAPTER 1*

”THE FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTY OF THE COURTS IS TO APPLY THE LAW”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAPA

G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)

FACTS

Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.

HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions.

No provision is made for a secret agent.

* CHAPTER 1*

“THE DUTY OF THE COURTS IS TO APPLY THE LAW DISREGARDING THEIR FEELING OF SYMPATHY OR PITY FOR THE ACCUSED”

PEOPLE VS. PATRICIO AMIGO

G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996)

FACTS

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Patricio Amigo - Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

According to the Accused-Appellant reclusion perpetua is too cruel or harsh to be his punishment He pleads for sympathy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.

HELD:

Courts are not the forum for sympathy “DURA LEX SED LEX” applies. The only remedy to change or alter the penalty lies upon the clemency from the executive or through an amendment of the law to be done by the legislative. Decision Affirmed.

*CASES - CHAPTER 1*

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“LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS DETERMINED PRINCIPALLY FROM THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE”

SOCORRO RAMIREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS & ESTER GARCIA G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962)

FACTS A civil case was filed by Petitioner (Socorro Ramirez) alleging that Private Respondent (Ester Garcia), in a confrontation in the latter’s office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her. “contrary to morals, public policy and good customs” Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. The respondent filed a criminal case for violation of R.A. 4200 “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and other Related Violations of Private Communications, and Other Purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the facts charged against him constituted an offense. HELD: Yes. The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties in any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".

* CHAPTER 3* “PLAIN MEANING RULE OR VERBA LEGIS”

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO COMMUNICATIONS VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMMISSION AND IMELDA SALAZAR G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992)

FACTS Petitioner placed Respondent Imelda Salazar under preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited backwages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages.

ISSUE 1. Whether or not the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar.

2. Whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. An exception to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations between the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities.

* CHAPTER 3* “WHEN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW IS CLEAR, IT SHOULD BE GIVEN IN NATURAL MEANING”

FELICITO BASBACIO VS. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)

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FACTS Petitioner filed a claim on RA 7309, which provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-in-law was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. HELD: No, he is not. For one to be “unjustly accused” one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309. judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309.

“IN INTERPRETING A STATUTE, CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN THAT EVERY PART BE GIVEN EFFECT”

JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT INC. VS. NLRC AND ULPIANO L. DELOS SANTOS G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)

FACTS JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cash bond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules. When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA, the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it has already posted a cash bond and surety bond, as required by the POEA?

HELD: Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the POEA Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. * CHAPTER 3*

RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILS. INC. V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991) FACTS The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. The insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment.

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Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.

ISSUE: Whether or not the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. HELD: No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period – one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.

* CHAPTER 3*

“A CONSTRUCTION THAT GIVES TO THE LANGUAGE USED IN A STATUTE A MEANING THAT DOES NOT ACCOMPLISH THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE STATUTE WAS ENACTED, SHOULD BE REJECTED”

MANUEL T. DE GUIA VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992) Petitioner Manuel De Guia is an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paranaque having been elected in January 1988 local election De Guia prays for reversal of the position of the respodent Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.

HELD: No. paragraph (d) Sec.3 of the RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. The court realized that the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 1992 elections.

* CHAPTER 3* “BETWEEN TWO STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS, THAT WHICH BETTER SERVES THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW SHOULD PREVAIL”

SPS. SALENILLAS V. COURT OF APPEALS & WILLIAM GUERA G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989)

FACTS On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified.Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. 2. Whether or not the prescription period had already prescribed.

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HELD: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Petitioners’ contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. For foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed. The five year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.

* CHAPTER 3* “WHEN THE REASON OF THE LAW CEASES, THE LAW ITSELF CEASES”

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR ET.AL VS. B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMERA ET.AL G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991)

FACTS The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d’etat on December l to 9, l989.

In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial was formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their right to peremptory challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial investigation. 2. Whether or not there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. 3. Whether or not there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners. HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to peremptory challenge was effectively revived. The reason being, the right was suspended due to the creation of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may bereferred to them, so when martial law was lifted.

Petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Art. 18 of the Articles of War.

* CHAPTER 3* “DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATIONS. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN A STATUTE IS AS MUCH A PART THEREOF AS THAT WHICH IS EXPRESSED”

LYDIA CHUA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)

FACTS RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified:

Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…”

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). HELD: The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case. Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

* CHAPTER 3* CITY OF MANILA & CITY TREASURER VS. JUDGE AMADOR GOMEZ OF THE CFI OF MANILA AND ESSO PHILIPPINES G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)

FACTS The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447), which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125, effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. ISSUE: Whether or not the tax ordinance is valid. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision

of the Special Education Fund Law that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum”. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent, the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance.

* CHAPTER 3*

“THE RULE OF “CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST CAN OPERATE AND APPLY ONLY IF AND WHEN THE OMISSION HAS BEEN CLEARLY ESTABLISHED”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO MANANTAN G.R. No. L-14129 (July 31, 1962)

FACTS Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged of violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in the province of Pangasinan.

SECTION 54, ELECTION CODE: “No justice, judge, fiscal. Treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer”

CFI of Pangasinan ordered the dismissal of the case, Solicitor General appealed.

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ISSUE: Whether or not a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code HELD: Yes. Justice of Peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. There was no necessity anymore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge”.

It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges.

Order of dismissal is set aside. Case remanded for trial on the merits.

* CHAPTER 3*

“STARE DECISIS. FOLLOW PAST PRECEDENTS AND DO NOT DISTURB WHAT HAS BEEN SETTLED. MATTERS ALREADY DECIDED ON THE MERITS CANNOT BE RELITIGATED AGAIN AND AGAIN” J.M. TUASON AND CO. INC., ET AL. VS. HON. HERMINIO MARIANO, MANUELA AQUIAL & SPS. JOSE AND SATURNINA CORDOVA G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978)

FACTS Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. The Tuason’s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, improper venue,

prescription, laches and prior judgment. Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials.

ISSUE: Whether or not OCT No. and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova HELD: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735.

Considering the principles of Stare Decisis, it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

Trial Court directed to dismiss Civil Case No.8943 with prejudice. *CASES - CHAPTER 3* LEGISLATIVE INTENT For construction purposes does not mean the collection of the subjective wishes, hopes and prejudices of each and every member of the legislature, but rather the objective footprints left on the trail of legislative enactment.

VERBA LEGIS If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite and sensible meaning which the legislature intended to convey.

CASUS OMISSUS When a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any provision for a case or object which is analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason, and is therefore within the general scope of the statute, and it

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appears that such case or object was omitted by inadvertence or because it was overlooked or unforeseen.

STARE DECISIS A point of law already established will, generally, be followed by the same determining court and by all courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised. (Settled point)

CHAPTER 4

“WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH. THE RULE, FOUNDED ON LOGIC, IS A COROLLARY OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT GENERAL WORDS AND PHRASES OF A STATUTE SHOULD ORDINARILY BE ACCORDED THEIR NATURAL AND GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE”

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987)

FACTS Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the counter bond issued was valid.

HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It applies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond.

The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal.

* CHAPTER 4*

“THE RULE IS WELL-RECOGNIZED THAT WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHALL NOT DISTINGUISH” JUANITO PILAR VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995)

FACTS On March 2, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. He withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos

for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a “non-

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candidate”, having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. HELD: Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy”.

* CHAPTER 4* “IF THE LAW MAKES NO DISTINCTION< NEITHER SHOULD THE COURT”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE ANTONIO EVANGELISTA AND GUILDO S. TUGONON G.R. No. 84332-33 (May 8, 1996)

FACTS Private Respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. Sentenced with prision correccional (CA-Affirmed)

Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. However, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isaias Valdehueza recommended denial of Private respondent’s application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his application for probation. Judge Antonio Evangelista set the case for repromulgation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation and granted Private Respondent’s application on April 23, 1993.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent’s application for probation. HELD: Yes. Private Respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.” Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction; Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.

* CHAPTER 4*

“WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY EXCEPTION, COURTS MAY NOT EXCEPT SOMETHING UNLESS COMPELLING REASONS EXIST TO JUSTIFY IT”

CECILIO DE VILLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)

FACTS Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a

dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the

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records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. * CHAPTER 4*

“GENERAL TERMS MAY BE RESTRICTED BY SPECIFIC WORDS, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE GENERAL LANGUAGE WHICH INDICATES THE STATUTE’S OBJECT AND PURPOSE. THE RULE IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO CASES WHEREIN, EXCEPT FOR ONE GENERAL TERM, ALL THE ITEMS IN AN ENUMERATION BELONG TO OR FALL UNDER ONE SPECIFIC CLASS”

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. PEDRO JIMENEZ G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961)

FACTS Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is among those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the Central Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that:

“Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.”

The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: Whether or not the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law.

HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely: food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The “stabilizers and flavors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption.

Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though “stabilizers and flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch. Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and categorizations posited by the respondent.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINIO AND TROADIO TECSON G.R. No. 89483 (August 30, 1990)

FACTS Acting on information received, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment, together with his supporting evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to produce his supporting evidence, despite several postponements, because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to “investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379.

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HELD: No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term “subordinate” as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2. * CHAPTER 4*

“RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS MERELY A TOOL OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION RESORTED TO WHEN LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS UNCERTAIN”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980)

FACTS The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court, thus bringing the case at hand.

ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.” But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain.”

* CHAPTER 4* “THE FAMILIAR RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS”

MISAEL VERA VS. HON. SERAFIN CUEVAS, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., AND CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY PHILIPPINES INC., AND MILK INDUSTRIES, INC. G.R. Nos. L-33693-94 (May 31, 1979)

FACTS Commissioner of Internal Revenue is requiring the plaintiffs-private respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Sec. 169 of the tax code within 15 days from receipt of the order. Section 169 – Inscription to be placed in SKIMMED MILK

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 169 of the tax code applies to filled milk HELD: No. Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. Skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from which fatty part has been removed. Filled milk on the other hand, is any milk, whether or not condensed, to which had been added or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat. It cannot be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk or filled milk.

* CHAPTER 4* “THE EXPRESS MENTION OF ONE PERSON, THING, ACT OR CONSEQUENCE EXCLUDES ALL OTHERS” EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. 147749 (June 22, 2006)

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FACTS SPMC domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed and ordered SPMC to pay P8,182,182.85 representing the deficiency miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax. SPMC opposed the assessments but the commissioner denied its protest

ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC is exempted from the payment of 3% miller’s tax. HELD: Court of Tax Appeals correctly ruled that SMCP’s sale of crude coconut oil of UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller’s tax. Sec. 168 of the 1987 Tax Code provides: Percentage tax upon proprietors operators of rope factories, sugar central and mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories shall pay a tax equivalent to three percent (3%)

* CHAPTER 4* “WHERE A PARTICULAR WORD IS EQUALLY SUSCEPTIBLE OF VARIOUS MEANINGS, ITS CORRECT CONSTRUCTION MAY BE MADE SPECIFIC BY CONSIDERING THE COMPANY OF TERMS IN WHICH IT IS FOUND OR WITH WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED”

DRA. BRIGIDA BUENASEDA VS. SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993)

FACTS The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987

Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

* CHAPTER 4*

“NEGATIVE WORDS AND PHRASES REGARDED AS MANDATORY WHILE THOSE IN THE AFFIRMATIVE ARE MERE DIRECTORY”

MANOLO P. FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988) FACTS Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts.

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He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the Appellate Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner or his counsel. HELD: The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Sec. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, “No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel”. Because of the word “shall”, in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely

directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. * CHAPTER 4* “USE OF WORD ‘MAY’ IN THE STATUTE GENERALLY CONNOTES A PERMISSIBLE THING WHILE THE WORD ‘SHALL’ IS IMPERATIVE”

PURITA BERSABAL VS. HON. JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978)

FACTS Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that “… counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court.” After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge

issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that “Courts shall decide cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city courts: Provided, parties may submit memoranda if so requested. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.

* CHAPTER 4*

JENETTE MARIE CRISOLOGO VS. GLOBE TELECOM AND CESAR MAUREAL G.R. No. 167631 (December 16, 2005)

FACTS Jenette Crisologo was an employee of Globe Telecom Petitioner was promoted as Director of Corporate Affairs and Regulatory matters. She separated from the company. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and reinstatement at the National Labor Relations Commission.

Respondent company filed an action for the recovery of the executive car issued to Ms. Crisologo and other company’s possessions. ISSUE: Whether or not despite the wrong remedy resorted by the appellant, such as a petition for review on certiorari, the Supreme Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals. HELD: It is on score that the court is inclined to concur with petitioner’s argfument that even the remedy resorted was wrong, the

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Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals under rule 56, Section 6 paragraph 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Motion for reconsideration granted, Petition reinstated, Case referred to Court of Appeals.

* CHAPTER 4* “THE WORD ‘MUST’ IN A STATUTE LIKE ‘SHALL’ IS NOT ALWAYS IMPERATIVE AND MAY BE CONSISTENT WITH AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION”

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997)

FACTS The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance

and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate bylaws.

Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. HELD: No. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word “must” or “shall”.

“A ‘WEEK’ MEANS A PERIOD OF SEVEN CONSECUTIVE DAYS WITHOUT REGARD TO THE DAY OF THE WEEK ON WHICH IT BEGINS”

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) FACTS To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale. A final deed of sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party.

The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction

sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is “week”. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting

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of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication. * CHAPTER 4* ALU-TUCP VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS AND NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994)

FACTS Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year expansion program. The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is necessary for the business, and that would have been more than enough to consider them as regular employees. Petitioners’ contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners should be considered regular employees. HELD: No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since Petitioners were considered project employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that “project” is done, their services will no longer be needed.)

* CHAPTER 4* THE TERM ‘INSULATING OIL’ COMES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TERM ‘INSULATOR’ AND QUALIFIES THE MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY FOR TAX EXEMPTION”

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977)

FACTS RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes.

ISSUE: Whether or not insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxes. HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court looked into the definition of “insulating oils” under Materials Handbook by George J. Brady, 8th Edition. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns on exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris.

* CHAPTER 4* “SK ELECTION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A ‘REGULAR ELECTION’ FOR PURPOSES OF RECALL UNDER SEC. 74 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991”

DANILO E. PARAS VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SK election is a local election.

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HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. In interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

* CASES - CHAPTER 4* EJUSDEM GENERIS General rule of statutory construction that where the general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular or specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS Express mention and Implied exclusion. General rule of statutory construction (to be applied under proper conditions and with important limitations) that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS Associated Words. When a word used in a statute is ambiguous or vague, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found and the meaning of the terms which are associated with them.

AND Conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with the first.

OR Disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of among two or more things.

PROVISO Clause or part of a clause in the statute, the office of which or which is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of its extent.

CHAPTER 5

ARIS (PHIL.) INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 90501 (August 5, 1991)

FACTS

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws, respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendments introduced by Sec. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. HELD: Yes on both counts. The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and the contested provision “is then police legislation”. The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character.

* CHAPTER 5* “ALL LAWS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL OR UNLESS OTHERWISE RULED BY THE COURT”

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HON. ALFREDO S. LIM VS. FELIPE G. PACQUING G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)

FACTS Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate Jai-Alai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then President Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0. No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai. 2. Whether or not the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. HELD: R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions. * CHAPTER 5*

“IN CASE OF DOUBT IN THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF LAWS, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE LAWMAKING BODY INTENDED RIGHT AND JUSTICE TO PREVAIL”

KAREN SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997)

FACTS An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the American’s bank account to pay the fees. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other process of any court. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood firm on the policy.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner. HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic crisis, where foreign investments were minimal. As, some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice would be undermined, stating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

* CHAPTER 5* “A LAW SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED SO AS TO CAUSE AN INJUSTICE”

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CARLOS & CASIMIRA ALONZO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND TECLE PADUA G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987)

FACTS

Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales, 2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there was a valid notice. 2. Whether or not Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. HELD: Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them.

* CHAPTER 5* “IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS REPEAL, A SUBSEQUENT LAW CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS REPEALING A PRIOR LAW UNLESS

AN IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCY AND REPUGNANCY EXISTS IN THE TERMS OF THE NEW AND OLD LAWS”

ACHILLES BERCES VS. SEC. TEOFISTO GUINGONA JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. 112099 (February 21, 1995)

FACTS Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi, Albay for 1) abuse of authority; and 2) dishonesty, with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly, suspended in both cases. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay of execution under Sec. 67(b) of the LGC. The Office of the President stayed execution, citing Sec. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. 6 of A.O. No. 18. According to Petitioner, the governing law is RA 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. Petitioner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was repealed by RA 7160. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 7160 repealed A.O. No. 18. HELD: No. Sec. 530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. 6, A.O. No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intended to be repealed. If there was any repeal, it was by implication which is not favored. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the two. There is none in this case. The first sentence of Sec. 68 provides that “an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.” It gives discretion to reviewing appeals to stay execution. The term “shall” may be read mandatory or directory, depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found. * CHAPTER 5* ANTONIO A. MECANO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992)

FACTS

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Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioner can claim from the COA. 2. Whether or not Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. HELD: Petition was granted. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. The Court finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal, and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. The second sentence of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC , whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.” * CHAPTER 5*

DANILO E. PARAS VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996) (LAST CASE – CHAPTER 4)

* CHAPTER 5* COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS

G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989)

FACTS Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964. Respondent’s payment for 1960 was found to be short. Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax together with interest for the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964. On August 10, 1964, Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. It protested the computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properly due, claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent’s overpayment.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367, 994 with interest. 2. Whether or not Respondent is entitled to a refund. HELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221, 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. Having been paid and received by mistake, the sum belonged to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such amount, which arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. Since the amount of P221, 033 was already in the hands of the government as of July, 1960, whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged.

It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. Moreover, a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the

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legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.

* CHAPTER 5* “PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES WERE NEVER INTENDED BY A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE” CESARIO URSUA V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996)

FACTS Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman because the law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal matters. At the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as “Oscar Perez.” Petitioner’s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombudsman. He was charged and convicted for violation of C.A. No. 142. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied by C.A. No. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The court may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity. Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed strictly against the state, and in favor of the accused. *CASES - CHAPTER 5* PRESUMPTION The Courts will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible and just law, and one should change the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALITY Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE Interpret and apply the law independently of, but in consonance with, justice.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS Legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart its enactments such a meaning as will render them operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the legislative intention so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

“SUBTITLE OF THE STATUTE AS INTRINSIC AID IN DETERMINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT”

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA AND LORNA PEDROSA G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997)

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FACTS On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2, Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: No. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

*CHAPTER 6* “THE INTENT OF THE LAW AS CULLED FROM ITS PREAMBLE AND FROM THE SITUATION, CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS IT SOUGHT TO REMEDY, MUST BE ENFORCED”

FLORENCIO EUGENIO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN DRILON AND PROSPERO PALMIANO G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)

FACTS Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “ The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.”

*CHAPTER 6* “PREAMBLE USED AS A GUIDE IN DETREMINING THE INTENT OF THE LAWMAKER” – PEOPLE VS. ECHAVEZ (Chapter 4)

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INTRINSIC AIDS Those aids within the statute. Resorted only if there is ambiguity in the statute.

SAMPLE OF INTRINSIC AIDS Title Preamble Context or Body of the Statute Chapter & Section headings Punctuation Interpretation Clause

“IT IS A WELL-ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT WHERE A STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS, COURTS MAY EXAMINE BOTH THE PRINTED PAGES OF THE PUBLISHED ACT AS WELL AS THOSE EXTRINSIC MATTERS THAT MAY AID IN CONSTRUING THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE, SUCH AS THE HISTORY OF ITS ENACTMENT, THE REASONS FOR THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL AND PURPOSES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MEASURE”

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN INC. G.R. No. L-28329 (August 17, 1975)

FACTS Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law. HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law

intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.

Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. The Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394.

*CHAPTER 7* “CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON A STATUTE BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS CHARGED WITH IMPLEMENTING AND ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTES SHOULD BE GIVEN CONTROLLING WEIGHT< UNLESS SUCH INTERPRETATION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS”

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976)

FACTS Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote, which is 432.)

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Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace Act, which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. CIR. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code. Also, the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar.

*CHAPTER 7* “INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON THE FLOOR DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT”

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. INC., VS. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963)

FACTS Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea

formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.”

ISSUE: Whether r not “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee. HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee.

*CHAPTER 7* KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS. MORATO G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)

FACTS Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42.

ISSUE: Whether or not under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. HELD: No. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase “by itself.” What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes,

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races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration, association or joint venture” with others or “by itself.” *CASES - CHAPTER 7*

EXTRINSIC AIDS Existing aids from outside sources. Resorted after exhausting all the available intrinsic aids and still there remain some ambiguity in the statute.

SAMPLE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS History of the enactment of statutes Opinions and rulings of government officials Actual proceedings of the legislative body Reports and recommendations of legislative committees Public policy Judicial construction Construction by the