OPOSA VS FACTORAN

Facts:

Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' classsuit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

Held:

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

CASE: Velarde v Social Justice Society (SJS)

DATE: April 28, 2004

PONENTE: Panganiban, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 49.

FACTS:

January 28, 2003, Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila against Mariano Mike Velarde, His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Bro. Eliseo Soriano. SJS sought the interpretation of certain constitutional provisions, specifically concerning the separation of Church and State, as well as a petition for declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of religious leaders endorsing certain candidates and asking members of their flock to vote for a specific candidate. All respondents of the initial case sought for the dismissal of the petition on the common ground that aforesaid petition by the SJS did not state a cause of action and had no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement which was followed closely by another Order that denied all Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. The Motions for Reconsideration were denied as well. Main contents of assailed Decision: Aforementioned actions of respondents in the initial case That the trial court had jurisdiction over the Petition because "in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law." A lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition separation of Church and State followed. A quo, it also mentioned that"[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive in its Decision. Petition for Review thus filed by respondent Velarde.ISSUES:

Procedural Issue:

1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the SJS with the RTC of Manila have the necessary requisites?

Justiciable controversy?

Cause of action?

Legal standing?

Substantive Issues:

1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? (MAIN ISSUE in connection with the syllabus topic)2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?RULING:

The Petition of Bro. Mike Velarde is meritorious.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde isGRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are herebyDECLARED NULL AND VOIDand thusSET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief isDISMISSEDfor failure to state a cause of action.

REASONING:

Petition for Declaratory Relief, Sec. 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court"Section 1.Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." Procedural Issue:

Requisites for Petition for Declaratory Relief

Justiciable Controversy Refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory SJS failed to show an existing controversy in their Petition, as well as the legal right of petitioners being violated by the respondents therein Elections had not even started yet ( SJS was questioning a mere possibility Premise was highly speculative and theoretical, thus insufficient No factual allegation that SJS rights were being subjected to any threatening, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought Judicial power and duty of court cannot be exercised when there is actual or threatened violation of right All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved," seeking an opinion of court more than anything else Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering advisory opinions Cause of Action An act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter Essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter HOWEVER, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply, only that a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened Petition of SJS, however, discloses no specific allegation. Interest can only be inferred in so far as the SJS has thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone. General averment ( not enough to constitute a legal right or interest In the whole Petition, there is no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief and even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it wanted to protect, there was no certainty that such right would be invaded by said respondents Legal Standing Defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In SJSs Petition, there is no indication, whether implied or explicit, of taxpayers money being wrongfully disbursed There was also no showing that as a political party or with members as voters, they would be adversely affected by the alleged acts if issue were not resolved. No allegation that they had suffered or would be losing votes through the actions of the therein respondents. The allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too generaland beyond the contemplation of the standards set by Philippine jurisprudence Sans legal standing, SJS insisted that the Court take cognizance of the Petition as it raised issues of paramount public interest. This had already been done in a prior case, that of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, where the Court entertained IBPs petition despite a lack in locus standi. In this case, however, despite being given the opportunity to substantiate otherwise barren allegations concerning the supposed constitutional issue, counsels for both sides particularly respondent SJS made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications. Assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.

COMELEC vs CRUZ

We resolve in this Decision the constitutional challenge, originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC), against the following highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991):

Sec. 2.Term of Office. The term of office of allbarangayandsangguniangkabataanofficials after theeffectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

Nobarangayelective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position:Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994barangayelections.Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. The present petition, filed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC decision.[1]THE ANTECEDENTSBefore the October 29, 2007 SynchronizedBarangayandSangguniangKabataan(SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of severalbarangaysof Caloocan City[2]filed with the RTC apetition for declaratory reliefto challenge the constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments:I.The term limit ofBarangayofficials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.The RTC agreed with the respondents contention that the challenged provisoretroactivelyapplied the three-term limit forbarangayofficials.The COMELEC moved to reconsider this decision but the RTC denied the motion.Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law.The PetitionThe COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional.RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 orLGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered anex post facto law.The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation.It further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights.As there is no vested right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164.The COMELEC also argues that the RTCs invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially involves the wisdom of the law the aspect of the law that the RTC has no right to inquire into under the constitutional separation of powers principle.The COMELEC lastly argues that there is no violation of the one subject-one title rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the assailed provision is actually embraced within the title of the law.THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious.The RTC legally erred when it declared the challenged proviso unconstitutional.Congress Plenary Power to Legislate Term Limits for Barangay Officials and Judicial PowerIn passing upon the issues posed to us, we clarify at the outset the parameters of our powers.As reflected in the above-quoted deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the duration of the term ofbarangayofficials, but also the application to them of a consecutive term limit.Congress invariably exercised this authority when it enacted no less than six (6)barangay-related laws since 1987.Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of the term of office ofbarangayofficials and their term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the term duration andlimition ofbarangayofficials under the Constitution, we consider it established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters arepolitical questionsbeyond the pale of judicial scrutiny,[11]subject only to thecertiorarijurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution.[12]Politicalquestions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to bedecided by the peoplein their sovereign capacity, or in regard to whichfull discretionary authorityhas been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent upon thewisdom, notlegalityof a particular measure.[13]These questions, previously impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be inquired into under the limited window provided by Section 1, Article VIII.Estrada v. Desierto[14]best describes this constitutional development, and we quote:

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the powerof judicial review of this courtnot only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable butalso todeterminewhetherornottherehas been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing.In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. xxxx

Thus, we can inquire into a congressional enactment despite the political question doctrine, although the window provided us is narrow; the challenge must show grave abuse of discretion to justify our intervention.Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid when it is contrary to any provision of the Constitution.This requires the appraisal of the challenged law against the legal standards provided by the Constitution, not on the basis of the wisdom of the enactment.To justify its nullification, the breach of the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful or equivocal one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality.[15]These are the hurdles that those challenging the constitutional validity of a law must overcome.The present case, as framed by the respondents, poses no challenge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion.The legal issues posed relate strictly to compliance with constitutional standards.It is from this prism that we shall therefore resolve this case.b.No Involvement of AnyConstitutional StandardSeparately from the above reason, the constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental reason the respondents retroactivity objection does not involve a violation of any constitutional standard.Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code,[16]not the Constitution.Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.The application of the Civil Code is of course self-explanatory laws enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive effect.The Civil Code established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive application will impair vested rights.Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process issue may arise.What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or property, as these are the ones that may be considered protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue.But even assuming that they did, the respondents themselves concede that there is no vested right to public office.[17]As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post in view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises.Aware of this legal reality, the respondents theorized instead that they had a right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by a law that effectively rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions.Again, the RTC agreed with this contention.We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no such right under the Constitution; if at all, this claimed right is merely a restatement of a claim of vested right to a public office. What the Constitution clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for elective local posts;[18]thus, the question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress, not for the courts, to decide.To recapitulate, we find no merit in the respondents retroactivity arguments because: (1) the challenged proviso did not provide for the retroactive application tobarangayofficials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164 simply continued what had been there before; and(2) the constitutional challenge based on retroactivity was not anchored on a constitutional standard but on a mere statutory norm.WHEREFORE,premises considered, weGRANTthe petition and accordinglyAFFIRMthe constitutionality of the challenged proviso under Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164.Costs against the respondents.VINUYA VS ROMULOFACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

IDEALS vs PSALM

Facts:

PSALM is a GOCC created by virtue of the EPIRA law. Said law mandated PSALM to manage privatization of NPC. When PSALM commenced the privatization an invitation to bid was published and the highest bidder K-Water was identified. The sale to K-Water was sought to be enjoined by petitioners who contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it violated the peoples right to information without having previously released to the public critical information about the sale

In its Comment With Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo Ante Order, respondent PSALM prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the following procedural grounds: (a) a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy because PSALM was not acting as a tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions when it commenced the privatization of AHEPP; (b) the present petition is rendered moot by the issuance of a Notice of Award in favor of K-Water; (c) assuming the petition is not mooted by such contract award, this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy involving a political question, and also because if it were the intent of Congress to exclude the AHEPP in the privatization of NPC assets, it should have clearly expressed such intent as it did with the Agus and Pulangui power plants under Sec. 47 of the EPIRA;

IV.

THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A POLITICAL QUESTION.

Contrary to PSALMs claims, the instant case does not pose a political question.

As early as Taada v. Cuenco, this Honorable Court defined political questions as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.54

In the case at bar, petitioners have amply argued in their Petition that PSALMs exercise of its power is limited by the Constitution, the EPIRA and other laws as well as binding norms of international law. It is obvious that PSALM has no carte blanche discretionary authority in the conduct of the bidding process and privatization of the Angat HEPP.

In Osmea v. COMELEC, this Court ruled:

And even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us is political in nature, We would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers in proper cases even political questions (Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496), provided naturally, that the question is not solely and exclusively political (as when the Executive extends recognition to a foreign government) but one which really necessitates a forthright determination of constitutionality, involving as it does a question ofnational importance.

The issues raised by petitioners herein unmistakably calls for the exercise of this Honorable Courts expanded jurisdiction in determining whether or not grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed by PSALM in its conduct of the bidding process and/or the privatization of the Angat HEPP.COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS CAMPUS ROEDA

FACTS

- Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P 161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955.

- Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption. However, respondent denied this request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section122 of our Tax Code.

ISSUE

Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code

HELD- Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals Ruling.

- If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law.- it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.- State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood.- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt category.