PERSONS CASE DIGESTS – ART 1-17 of Civil Code

136 SCRA 27 (1985) Tañada v. Tuvera

Lorenzo Tañada and co-petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders, invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution*.

*The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Important People:

Lorenzo M. Tañada – petitioner; Hon. Juan C. Tuvera – respondent, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President

FACTS: (In order of chronological events)

1. Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders, in accordance with Commonwealth Act 638, which provides:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette all (1) important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines; (2) all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; (3) decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; (4) such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published

by law; and (5) such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.

2. Through the Solicitor General, respondents argued for the dismissal of the case on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They claim that petitioners are not considered “aggrieved parties” as provided in Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court**.

**SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus – When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office to which such other is entitled, and there s no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

3. Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Citing Article 2 of the Civil Code***, they claim that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication is not indispensible for their effectivity.

***Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

ISSUE(s):

1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing in seeking for a writ of mandamus

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2. Whether or not the publication in the Official Gazette is necessary for the enforcement of the law

HOLDING:

1. YES, the petitioners have legal standing. The Court states that when the question is one of public right, the people are regarded as the real party in interest. There is no need to show that the petitioners have any special interest in the result, given that they are citizens and are therefore interested in the execution of the laws.

2. YES, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary for the enforcement of the law. Although the respondents are right in claiming that Article 2 of the Civil Code recognizes special provisions as to the date of effectivity of the laws, the said article does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette. /// The objective of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 is to give the general public adequiate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. It would be unjust to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever. This is especially significant in the context of the present case as the President enjoys the power given to the legislature. /// Therefore, all presidential issuance “of a public nature” is mandated by law. Before any person may be bound by the law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not yet been published shall have no force and effect.

Note: From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published, only PD Nos. 1019 to 1030, 1278, and 1937 to 1939 have not been published.

VERDICT:

The Court thereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

De Roy v. CA

Facts:

1. Petitioners owned a firewall of a burned-out building which collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop the family of private respondents occupied. Because of the collapse, the private respondents were injured and Marissa Bernal died. Petitioners warned the respondents to vacate their shop in view of its nearness to the weakened wall.

2. However, the respondents failed to do so. With the case in fact, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding the petitioners guilty of gross negligence and liable of awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987.

3. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. Nonetheless, the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was again denied in the Resolution because the same was not filed within the grace period as inscribed in the present jurisprudence.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the denied the motion and let the petitioner be bound by the negligence of their counsel

Held: No. The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. In the instant case, petitioners' motion for extension of time was more than a year after the expiration of the grace period. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.

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Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglamentary period. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

People v. Que Po Lay

Facts:

1. Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20.

2. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said appellant.

3. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect.

Held:

Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

People vs. Que Po Lay

FACTS

Que Po Lay (Que) was charged of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 for failing to sell foreign exchange in his possession consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks, and U.S. money orders amounting to $7,000 to the Central Bank within one day from the receipt of such foreign exchange.

The trial court found him guilty. Hence, this appeal where Que contends that Circular No. 20 had no

force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette, prior to the act or omission imputed to him.

ISSUES/HELD

Should the circular have been published to produce legal effects? – YES. JUDGMENT REVERSED.

RATIONALE

It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.

Thus, it has to comply with the requirements of publication of a statute before it may take effect as mandated by Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code and Art. 2 of the Civil Code.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for their violation should be published before becoming effective; this is on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation, or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

It is clear that Circular No. 20 did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or after November 1951.

Thus, Que could not be held liable for its violation for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in

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his possession within one day following his taking possession thereof. Although this issue was only raised for the first time on appeal, it may

still be considered because the court may be said to have had no jurisdiction when it rendered a judgment finding Que guilty of violating Circular No. 20 which, in the eyes of the law, was not in existence for not having been published.

NPC v. Pinatubo

G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010

FACT:

The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for violating substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as for restraining competitive free trade and commerce.

ISSUE(S):

WON items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 -

(a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution; and

(b) restrained free trade and competition.

RULING:

No. The equal protection clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.

The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed

by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.

Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction.

Neri v. Senate Committee

G.R. No. 180643 25 March 2008

Facts:

On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php 6B and was to be financed by the Republic of China.

Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate.

Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Neri can invoke executive privilege;2. Whether or not the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28,

Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and

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3. Whether or not the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.

Held:

(1) The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege. Despite the revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide “the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.” Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the said information may impair the country’s diplomatic as well as economic relations with China.

(2) The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information and full public disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is subject to limitation. These include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential. The information subject to this case belongs to such kind.

(3) The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.” Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

Petition for Certiorari assailing the Show Cause Letter (Nov. 22, 2007) and Contempt Order (Jan. 30, 2008) issued by respondent Senate Committee against petitioner Neri (former Director General of NEDA)

April 21, 2007 – DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project amounting to P16 Billion. The project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China

Petitioner was summoned by respondents to appear and testify in the investigation on the NBN Project on a number of dates, however, he attended only on the Sept. 26 hearing.

Sept. 18, 2007 – businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the Project initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer project, but on March 29, 2007, NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project to be financed through a loan from the Chinese government.

Sept. 26, 2007 – petitioner testified before respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the project, and he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt. When probed further on what they discussed, petitioner refused to answer 3 questions, invoking “executive privilege”:

- WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project- WON she directed him to prioritize it- WON she directed him to approve

Respondents issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, requiring petitioner to appear and testify on Nov. 20, 2007. However, a Letter (Nov. 15, 2007) by Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondents to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of “executive privilege” that covers above questions, maintaining that the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision

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making process and for the protection of the public interest – disclosure of information might impair our diplomatic and economic relations with China.

Nov. 22, 2007 – respondents issued the Show Cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.

On Nov. 29, petitioner replied that it was not his intention to ignore the hearing and he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He further requested to be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify. In a letter by his counsel, it was stated that it was upon the order of the President that he did not appear, and that the conversation with the president dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal.

Jan. 30, 2008 – respondents found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory, and without responding to his reply, issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he gives his testimony.

The parties were directed to manifest to the Court if they were amenable to the Court’s proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony before the respondents to answer other questions without prejudice to the decisions on the merits of this petition Senate disagreed.

OSG – Motion for Leave to Intervene:

- Communications between petitioner and President are covered by the executive privilege.

- Petitioner was not summoned by respondent in accordance with the power to inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in Sec. 21, Art. 6, Constitution and Senate v. Ermita

March 6, 2008 – President Arroyo issued Memorandum Ciruclar No. 151, revoking EO 464 and Memorandum Circular N. 108, advising officials and employees to abide by the Consitution, existing laws and jurisprudence (Senate v. Ermita) when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

*Sec. 21, Art. 6 of Constitution – Legislative powers of Congress – relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation – aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation – can compel the appearance of executive officials

*Sec. 22, Art. 6 of Constitution – Oversight powers of Congress – relates to the power to conduct a question hour – to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function – cannot compel the appearance of executive officials

*Principle of Separation of Powers

- executive branch cannot frustrate power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands of information

- power of judicial review is available – right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is susceptible to abuse subject to certiorari (Sec. 1, Art. 8, Constitution)

Issues and Ratio:

1. WON the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by Executive Privilege. (YES. 2 reasons)

*Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation – broad – legislative cannot legislate wisely/effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect/change compulsory process to enforce it – limitations – validity: done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and the rights of persons appearing/affected be respected. Such power extends to executive officials and exemption can only be through a valid claim of executive privilege.

a. There is a recognized claim of executive privilege despite revocation of EO 464.

Concept of executive privilege has constitutional underpinnings.

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US v. Nixon – public interest: preserve confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President’s performance of his official duties (presidential communications privilege) – President’s generalized interest in confidentiality – provide him and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions.

In Re: Sealed Case – 2 kinds of executive privilege: (1) Presidential communications privilege – communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations which President believes should remain confidential – decision making of the President (separation of powers) (2) Deliberative process privilege – advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated – decision-making of the Executive Officials (common law privilege). The officials covered by the former are those functions that form the core of presidential authority that are “quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power” (commander in chief power, appointment/removal power, power to grant pardons/reprieves, etc)

Courts ruled that Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military/state secrets, identity of government informers, information related to pending information and foreign relations. Chavez v. PCGG – secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. Chavez v. PEA – Presidential conversations, correspondences in closed-door Cabinet meetings

SC: Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the 3 questions fall under the conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process – disclosure might impair diplomatic & economic relations with People’s Republic of China (Presidential Communications Privilege and Executive Privilege on matters relating to Diplomacy or Foreign Relations)

- communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power (enter into an executive agreement w/ other countries w/o concurrence w/ Legislature)

- communications are received by a close advisor of the President (operational proximity test – petitioner is a member of the cabinet)

- no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege. No categorical explanation from respondents to show a compelling need for the answers to the questions, and veer more towards exercise of legislative oversight function (Sec. 22, Art. 6)

Respondents: a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime/wrongdoing (US v Nixon – specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs President’s interest in confidentiality)

SC: information in this case is elicited not in a criminal proceeding but a legislative inquiry. The validity of exectuve privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but also on the procedural setting/context which the claim is made.

Respondent: the grant of executive privilege violates constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern (Sec. 7, Art. 3, Constitution)

SC: Petitioner made himself available to them during the Sept. 26 hearing, questioned for 11 hours, and expressly manifested willingness to answer more questions except the 3 covered by executive privilege. People’s right to information is limited by law (RA 6713, Sec. 7; RPC, Art. 229; RA 3019, Sec. 3(k); and Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 24 (e)). The information in this case is classified as confidential wherein there is public interest in its confidentiality. Not every legislative inquiry is an exercise of people’s right to information.

b. The claim of executive privilege is properly invoked.

The letter (Nov. 17, 2007) of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement for a formal claim of executive privilege (a precise and certain reason for preserving confidentiality). It serves as the formal claim of privilege: “this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of

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executive privilege (Secretary v. Ermita), and the Office of the President has advised Sec. Neri accordingly… The information if disclosed might impair diplomatic and economic relations with People’s Republic of China.” The grounds were specific enough so as not to leave respondent in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of information which the privilege sought to protect – respect to a co-equal department.

2. WON respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Contempt Order.

YES. 5 reasons:

- There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege therefore the Order suffers from constitutional infirmity

- Committees did not comply with the requirement (Senate v. Ermita) that the invitations should contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry”, “the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof”. Compliance is imperative, both under Sec. 21 and 22 of Art. 6 of Constitution, to ensure rights of persons appearing and affected by the inquiry are respected.

- It is revealed in the transcript that the proceeding on Jan. 30, 2008 had only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee present during the deliberation (7 only). Sec. 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that a vote of majority of its members may punish any witness for contempt. Members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order, and its validity is doubted. Sen. Pimentel insisted that the quorum of the committee was only 2 and that the will of the lead committee prevails over all the other.

- The Court finds merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent violated Sec. 21, Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure”, which the

respondents failed to meet therefore its hearings were procedurally infirm.

- Respondents’ issuance of the contempt Order were arbitrary and precipitate because it did not pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform the petitioner of their ruling, curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order. Petitioner was not an unwilling witness and manifested his willingness to testify. Respondents denied him due process of law.

Court was also accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required parties to consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise it was only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar cases to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the questions for review. Much of this spirit of compromise is reflected in the generality of language foundi n the Constitution (US v. American Tel. & Tel Co.).

Judgment: Petition Granted. Contempt Order Nullified.

Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole

G.R. No. 187714: March 8, 2011.

FACTS:

On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the

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hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.

HELD:

YES. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO, respondent

October 2, 2001

Facts:

The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on

the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

Held:

The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”.

In this case, Recio’s Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However in this case, Recio did not procure an absolute divorce. Even if he did, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree issued “a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy” which shows that marriage might have been restricted. Respondent also has insufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Clearly, he fails to establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.

Art. 4 - VALEROSO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 164815 February 22, 2008

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(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)

FACTS:

1. On, July 10, 1996, petitioner was roused from his slumber when 4 heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. They trained their guns at him and pulled him out of the room. Eventually, while the petitioner’s hands were tied, they searched and ransacked he room. Moments later, an operative exclaimed that he got a gun from the room. He was told that there’s a shoot to kill order against him but he was not shown of any warrant for his arrest.

2. Because of such, petitioner alleged that the search done in the boarding house was illegal. (They forcibly opened his locker and took his firearm)

3. On May 6, 1998 trial court found Valeroso guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine (15,000).

4. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion but was denied. 5. He appealed to the CA. 6. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition

but modified penalty imposed (removed the fine).

ISSUE:

Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that the commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866 which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. So, the imprisonment is lowered to prision correctional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity). Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.

VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 164815 February 22, 2008

(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)

Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO

Respondent: The People of the Philippines

FACTS:

1. On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Section Division, Central Police District Command received a dispatch order which directed him and three (3) other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom.

2. After briefing, team conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle.

3. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition.

Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to the petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.

On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.

SC affirmed CAs decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that the commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein

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the governing law was PD 1866 which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

(1) YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws).

PNB v. Office of the President

Facts:

1. Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots2. Subdivision developers (Marikina Village, Inc.) mortgaged the lots in

favor of PNB3. Unaware of such mortgage, respondents complied with their

obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots4. Subdivision developers defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the

mortgage. As highest bidder, PNB became owner of lots5. Office of Appeals rendered judgment ruling that PNB may collect

only from respondents the remaining amortizations and cannot compel them to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from the subdivision developers

6. Regulatory board affirmed decision and Office of the Pres. Concurred. Hence, the recourse to the SC.

ISSUE:

WON the Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 (compelling respondents to pay only remaining amortizations) because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976 while the subject mortgage was executed on Dec. 18, 1975.

HELD:

While PD 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, such application can be inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. PNB could not have been unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers. Respondents were powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely for such purpose that PD 957 was enacted. It was in order to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to such schemes. Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective application of the law.

Petition was denied. There was no reversible error/grave abuse of discretion in the assailed decision.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CTA

G.R. No. L-52306. October 12, 1981

Facts:

1. ABS-CBN was engaged in the business of telecasting local and foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines.

2. For which, ABS-CBN paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30% of one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued General Circular V-334.

3. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of ½ of the film rentals it paid to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines.

4. The last year, the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968.

5. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from “such amount” referring to rents, etc. to “gross income.”

6. In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and demanded for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968.

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7. The company requested for reconsideration in which the Commissioner did not act upon.

Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334 may be applied retroactively.

Held:

Revenue Memo. Circular 4-71 cannot be applied retroactively. Herein, the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.

Art. 6 – Waiver of rights

EMETRIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

Facts:

1. Cui was a law scholar at the Arellano University; he paid the tuition fees but it was returned to him at the end of every semester.

2. Before Arellano awarded the scholarship grant, Cui was made to sign a contract covenant and agreement saying that he waives his right to transfer to another school in consideration of the scholarship grant and if he transfers, he shall pay the tuition fees awarded to him while being a scholar.

3. He transferred to another school to finish his last term in law school.

4. When he was about to take the Bar, his TOR at Arellano was not issued unless he pays the amount of the tuition fees that were

returned to him when he was still their scholar. He paid under protest.

Issue:

Whether or not the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship grants in cash, is valid or not.

Held:

The waiver signed by Cui was void as it was contrary to public policy; it was null and void.

Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition of merit and not to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value. To look at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent with sound public policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver signed by the student, waiving his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the university the equivalent of his scholarship grants, is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reverse and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim. It is so ordered.

Sec. 6 – Waiver of rights

PNB v. Nepomuceno Productions G.R. No. 139479 27 December

Facts:

1. PNB granted respondents 4M pesos of credit line to finance a movie project, which was later on finally increased to 7.5M. The loan was

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secured by mortgages on respondents’ real and personal properties. Nepomuceno Productions defaulted in their obligation.

2. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The auction sale was re-scheduled several times without need of republication of the notice of sale.

3. Subsequently, the respondents filed an action before the RTC of Pasig for annulment of the foreclosure sale claiming that such was void because, among others, there was lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure sale.

4. The trial court ordered the annulment and set aside the foreclosure proceedings. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court.

5. Hence, the petition for review filed before the SC.

Issue:

WON CA erred in declaring PNB’s foreclosure sale of respondent’s properties null and void for lack of republication despite the parties agreement to waive the republication and reposting of sheriff’s sale.

Held:

Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication requirements of Act No. 3135.

While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.

Sec. 6; People vs. Serzo Jr.

Facts:

1. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former.

2. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.

3. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without counsel,so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so he can engage the services of his own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de officio.

4. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.

Issue: Whether or not appellant’s right to counsel de parte can be waived.

Held: Yes. Though the right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution, the right of the accused to counsel de parte is not absolute. Thus, the court may restrict the accused’s option to retain a counsel de parte. Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable so long as the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law and the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made. Since moral damages were not discussed at all in Plaintiff’s testimony, without evidence award of moral damages is not justified. Wherefore, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED but the award of moral damages deleted instead appellant is ordered to pay P50,000 as civil indemnity and actual damages of P2,000 as burial expenses. SO ORDERED.

Art. 6 – Waiver of rights; Gongon v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

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1. A lot, which was part of the Tambobong Estate, used to belong to the Roman Catholic Church. Such lot was originally leased to Amada Aquino who in turn sublet it to Matias Gongon for a term of 15 years. Gongon constructed his residential house on the lot and since then has been living there together with his family.

2. Meanwhile, the Government purchased from the Roman Catholic Church the whole estate under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act. No. 539 (through purchase or expropriation)

3. Gongon filed an application to defunct the purchase, claiming preferential right as bona fide occupant.

4. Aquino opposed it, who filed her own application, alleging the same right.

5. After investigation, Bureau of Lands approved Gongon’s application, he being the actual occupant. On appeal though, they gave due course to Amada Aquino’s application.

6. Matias moved for reconsideration… until it moved to the Office of the President, which affirmed decision of Land Tenure Administration in favor of Aquino.

7. Gongon filed case in the CFI of Manila to annul such decision and cancel registration of Aquino and have his name registered instad

8. CFI dismissed the complaint because Gongon accordingly had waived whatever right he might have had over the lot in question was factual in nature and could not be reviewed by the courts.

9. Gongon’s motion for reconsideration have been denied by the CA and therefore filing the case before the SC

ISSUE:

WON the alleged waiver of whatever right he might have had over said lot is valid.

HELD: No. Such waiver of right is against public policy and shall be considered null and void. Commonwealth Act No. 539 lays down a public policy.

Art. 7 – Repeal of Laws; Mecano v. Commission on Audit

1. Petitioner, who was a director at NBI, was hospitalized for cholecystitis, which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. He is claiming for the total amount from the COA.

2. He requested reimbursement from Director Lim for his expenses on ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Sec. 699 of RAC

3. Director Lim forwarded petitioner’s claim4. Undersecretary of Justice Bello returned petitioner’s claim to

Director Lim, having considered that the Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by Admin Code of 1987.

5. Petitioner re-submitted claim to Director Lim stating that Admin Code of 1987 did not repeal Sec. 699 of RAC

6. Again, petitioner was denied of his claim for the same reason alleged by Undersecretary of Justice Bello and that same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Admin Code of 1987

7. Petitioner elevated the case to the SC

ISSUE: WON Admin Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Sec. 699 of RAC.

HELD: No. There is no implied repeal. Before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest. Otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from controversy. Implied repeals are not favored.

Art. 8; People v. Licera

1. The Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicted Rafael Licera for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and was sentenced to imprisonment of five (5) years.

2. In his appeal before the Court of Appeals, Licera reasoned that Gov. Feliciano Leviste of Batangas had appointed him as his secret agent and justified that as such, he was a "peace officer." He invoked the decision of the court in People v. Macarandang (Dec. 23, 1959) and, thus, in pursuant thereof, that he was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms.

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3. He further alleged that the court erred in relying in the latter case of People v. Mapa (Aug. 30, 1967) which held that Sec. 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearms.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial decision in People v. Macarandang have the force and effect of law.

RULING: YES. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that "Judicial decisions applying interpreting the law or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines."

It must be noted however that where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule. This holds more especially true in the application or interpretation in the field of penal law.

In the case in fact, the appointment given to Licera bears the date Dec. 11, 1961 and includes the grant of possessing the firearm with the terms which are in accordance to the decision made in the case of People v. Macarandang. Furthermore, People v. Mapa only revoked People v. Macarandang only in 1967. Therefore, the court's decision in People v. Macarandang must have the force and effect of law regarding this matter.

Art. 8 – Judicial decisions form part of the law of the land

People v. Jabinal

Facts:

1. The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.

2. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit.

3. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

4. Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. Mapa.

Issue: WON the appellant should be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa

Ruling: The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

Reason:

The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Art. 9 – Duty of Judges; Chuayan v. Bernas

Facts:

1. A match was held in the cockpit of municipality between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and defendant. Each of them put up a wager of 160.

2. The referee announced the defendant’s cock as the winner.

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3. Plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant and asked the justice of peace court to declare his cock the winner

4. The justice of peace court declared the cockfight a draw. The plaintiff appealed, filed his complaint and prayed to the same court to render judgment ordering the defendant to abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing cockfights

5. CFI dismissed the appeal. Thus, the proceeding went the SC.

ISSUE: WON the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to render judgment on the ground that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights etc. and knows no law whatever that governs the rights of the parties.

HELD: YES. Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable or the rules applicable to the subject are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable. The second paragraph of Art. 6 provides that the customs of the place shall be observed and in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

Art. 9 – Duty of Judges; People v. Veneracion

1. In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide committed against a seven year old girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo Veneracion.

2. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide, the penalty imposable shall be death.

3. However, Judge Veneracion refused to impose the death penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion perpetua.

4. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused but the judge refused to act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty than that imposed by law.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof) which provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

Art. 9; Case 23; Duty of Judges

Caltex Inc. Palomar 18 SCRA 247

FACTS:

1. In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”, which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.

2. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing.

3. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master General, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the “The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law”.

4. Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltex’s request stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatex’s request for clearance.

5. Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery.

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6. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as “Gift Enterprise”, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.

HELD:

No. The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is lacking (no consideration).

The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under prevailing jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries, there is no explicit definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the term “gift enterprise” was used in association with the term “lottery”. As such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal service.

Art. 10 – Doubtful statutes; PEOPLE v. PURISIMA

Facts:Petitioners: City Fiscal of Manila, Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and the Solicitor GeneralPublic Respondents: CFI of Manila-branches VII & XVIII, CFI of Samar Par. 3, PD#9 provides: It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt

weapon such as “fan knife,’ ‘spear,’ ‘dagger,’ ‘bolo,’ ‘balisong,’ ‘barong,’ ‘kris,’ or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary

tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 5 to 10 years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct

Petitioners-fiscals filed before the respective respondent courts several & separate informations for illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Par. 3 of PD#9. (For illustration, one of the similarly written infos. alleged: That…accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon…the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.)

Respondent courts, upon motions to quash filed by the defense counsels, issued their respective orders quashing the informations on common ground that the said informations did not allege facts constituting an offense penalized under PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime: that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. They said that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.#1081 which seeks to attain the maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. They added that the non-inclusion of the aforementioned element of the offense leads to confusion as the same act punished as an offense under par. 3 of PD#9 is also the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance:

Sec. 26, Act#1780: It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: x x x. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding P500, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 6 months, or both…Ordinance#3820—penalizes with a fine not more than P200 or imprisonment for not more than one month, or both…anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon…in any public place.

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Thus, the 26 petitions for review assailing the respective orders of the respondent courts. The petitions, having similar issues, were consolidated by the Supreme Court.

The argument of the petitioners:1. A perusal of par.3 of PD#9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy2. The City Fiscal of Manila adds that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial; it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuatedISSUE: W/N the informations filed are sufficient form and substance to constitute the offense penalized under PD#9HELD: NO. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal

prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. This is especially in the case at bar where the acts being punished are covered by 2 penal statutes and a city ordinance. The right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, otherwise such act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under any of the 3 punitive laws and thus expose the accused to oppression and harassment.

The elements of the offense under par. 3, PD#9 are: 1) the carrying outside one’s residence of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and 2) that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of Act#1780 and Ord#3820. Thus, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described under PD#9 is not a crime in itself. What makes the act criminal under the decree is the motivation behind it.

Without such motivation, the act falls under the Act or the Ordinance. Consequently, the informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective and quashal is proper.

The filing of the petitions were unnecessary because the petitioners could have availed itself of other remedies based on Rule 117, Sec.7. (Effect of sustaining the motion to quash); Rule 110, Sec.13 (Amendment of Info or complaint):

1. If the evidence so warranted, the People could have filed an amended info to include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondents. The SC has previously ruled that if the facts alleged in the info do not constitute an offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the info.2. If the facts so justified, the petitioners could have filed a complaint either under Sec. 26 of Act#1780 or Manila city ordinance#3820, especially since the dismissal of the cases were made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash. Under Sec. 8, Rule 117, an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on extinguishment of criminal liability or double jeopardy.PETITIONS DENIED.

Art. 11-12 – Customs; Martinez v. Van Buskirk

Facts:

1. On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came along the street in the opposite direction at great speed.

2. The horses ran into the carromata and wounded Martinez servely. 3. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero was a good

servant and a reliable and safe cochero. 4. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the

horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered.

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5. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and made some noises which frightened the horses and which made it ran away.

6. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable to stop the horses.

7. The horses collided with the carromata.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.

Art. 11-12 – Customs; Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales

Facts:

1. Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth about P300,000.

2. Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration and alleged that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him.

3. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al who alleged that she is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee.

4. Probate court ruled that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and the other oppositors were legitimate children of Sy Mat.

5. On appeal, CA simply modified probate court’s judgment and stated that Aida Sy-Gonzales et al are natural children of Sy Mat.

6. They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.

HELD: For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Art. 11-12 – Customs

Case 29

I. In the Matter of Petition for Authority to Continue the Use of the Firm name “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo”

FACTS:

The case involves two petitions. The first was filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip who died on May 5, 1975 and the other by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta who died on February 14, 1976 praying that they be allowed to continue using in the name of their firms the names of their deceased partners who had passed away.

The petitioner anchored their petitions on the following:

1) that under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner;

2) that in regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner;

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3) that the Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use;

4) that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name

5) US Courts allow the continued use of deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world

Issue: WON the petitioners should be allowed to use in their firm names the names of their deceased partners

Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court cited the following reasons. First is that Article. 1815 of the Civil Code provides that “Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners. Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner” thus it is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners’ and in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability.

And lastly while the court admits that it is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships.

Art. 13 – Computation of Period; CIR v. Primetown

Facts:

1. Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which Primetown paid in 1997.

2. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc.

3. However, despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund.

4. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown complied with.

5. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000.

6. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC.

7. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC.

8. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary period.

9. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.

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Art. 15-17 - Miciano v. Brimo

Facts:

1. Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition.

2. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance.

3. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.

HELD: Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

Art. 15 – 17; Van Dorn v. Romillo

Facts:

1. Petitioner is a Filipino citizen while respondent is an American. They were married in Hong Kong. After their marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines.

2. On Dec. 18, 1975, the parties were divorced in Nevada, US. Petitioner also re-married in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

3. Respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that Van Dorn’s business is conjugal property of the parties and asking that Van

Dorn be ordered, among others, to declare Romillo with right to manage conjugal property.

4. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that cause of action is barred by the divorce proceedings wherein respondent acknowledged that Van Dorn had “no community property”.

5. RTC Pasay denied Motion to Dismiss on the ground that property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

6. Denial is now the subject of the Certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: WON the divorce is valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy

HELD: YES. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the CC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondents from the marriage the standards of American law, under which divorce decree dissolves the marriage.

Art. 15-17; Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

FACTS:

1. Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

2. Conjugal disharmony eventuated and private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983.

3. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

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4. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

5. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: WON Geiling has the legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, taking into consideration that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree

HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Art. 15-17 – Civil laws; Govt. v. Frank

1. In the city of Chicago, defendant entered into a contract for a period of 2 years with the plaintiff, by which defendant was to receive a salary per year as a stenographer. They also agreed that Frank was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila

2. According to the contract, in case of violation of its terms on the defendant’s part, he should be liable for the expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during that period

3. Frank arrived in the Philippines and was paid half-salary

4. Frank left the service and refused to make further compliance with the terms of the contract

5. Insular Gov. commenced an action in the CFI claiming that it is entitled to recover the expenses incurred by Frank

6. Frank, now plaintiff before the SC, claims, among others, that under the laws of the Philippines at the time the contract was made, male persons in said country did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years. Therefore, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippines governed.

ISSUE: WON Frank is not liable under said contract because accordingly, the laws of the Philippines apply

HELD: No. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation, and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Remedies, such as the brining of suit, admissibility of evidence, and the statute of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the action is brought.

In this case, the plaintiff being qualified to enter into contract at the place and time the contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is enforced.

Art. 15 – 17; Barnuevo v. Fuster

BARNUEVO V. FUSTER (1913)

Short summary: Spanish subjects get married in Spain, but wanted to divorce in RP. Wife further claims the refund of the 30k Spanish dollars which is allegedly her paraphernal property. Court held that even if divorce is not allowed in RP, the court could still exercise jurisdiction over the parties who are domiciled in RP and it is not divested jurisdiction by the subject matter.

Facts:

Gabriel FUSTER and Constanza Yanez were22

>married in Spain 1875

>1899: made an agreement in public document that they resolved to separate and live apart

>1909: Constanza commenced DIVORCE proceedings vs. Gabriel for Adultery, praying for:

Decree of divorce

Conjugal society liquidated

Share adjudicated to her

Payment of support

(probably the property of the spouses belonging to the conjugal property are all located in RP)

TC: for CONSTANZA

suspension of life in common between plaintiff and defendant

Payment of support

Division of communal property

>>>BOTH Parties appealed: Alleged dowry: WON it should be returned to CONSTANZA

WON RP courts are competent to decree the divorce? YES

Authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is NOT COMPRISED W/n the personal status of the husband and wife

-whole theory of the statutes and the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law

-authority and jurisdiction of courts are matters of public or political law

-jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to PROCEDURE are considered to be of a public nature, submitted to the TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE

All persons have to demand justice in a court which would have coercive means to enforce any decision they may render

Justice should be administered WITHOUT TAKING INTO ANY ACCOUNT THE STATE TO WHICH THE LITIGANTS BELONG

-all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their people, but to those foreigners who contract w/n the country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner affect their sovereignty

HERE

CFI had jurisdiction over the person of the litigants: residents of Manila, had domicile in Manila

THEREFORE: CFI had power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. Not divested of jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation

Testate Estate of Bohanan v. Bohanan

Doctrine: As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator provided that the law be evidenced in the court.

FACTS: Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922.

Decedent in this case gave out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.

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Lower Court Ruling: Dismissed the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.

The testator permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid NO.

RATIO: The court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.

Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the

testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is whether the testementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

Art. 15-17; Bellis v. Bellis

1. Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.

2. 6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two (2) wills (one which shall be governed by properties located in Philippines and the other for those covered under Texas), apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children.

3. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law.

4. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights

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RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

Art. 15-17; Aznar v. Garcia

Facts:

1. Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913.

2. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.

3. In his will, executed in the Philippines, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his.

4. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws.

5. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter.

6. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law, the will of the deceased giving the bulk of the property to Maria Lucy must remain undisturbed.

ISSUE: Whether the Philippine law or the California law should apply

HELD: Since the conflicts rule of California refers back the matter to the Philippines (place of domicile), our courts have no alternative but to accept the referring back to us. If our courts will to do otherwise and throw back the matter to California, the problem would be tossed back and forth between states concerned, resulting in an “international football.”

Art. 15-17; Roehr v. Rodriguez

1. Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

2. Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

3. Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.

4. Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.

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5. Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially setting aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.

ISSUE: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.

HELD: YES. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.

Art. 15-17; Eugenio v. Velez

Facts:

1. Petition of habeas corpus was filed before RTC of Misamis Oriental by the siblings of Vitaliana. They alleged that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence despite her desire to escape from Tomas Eugenio, whom she was living with.

2. Eugenio reasoned that a corpse cannot be subject of habeas corpus proceedings and that he had already obtained the papers for her burial. As her common law husband, he claimed legal custody of her body.

3. Defendants contend, however, that Eugenio is in no anyway related to Vitaliana and therefore, wrong with the Vargases’ duty to bury her body being the next of kin in the Philippines, they are legal custodians of the dead body of their sister under the CC (305 and 308).

4. Petitioner claims that he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294, the term “spouse” used therein not being preceded by any qualification. Hence, it may be concluded that he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana’s body.

5. Vitaliana’s brothers and sister contend otherwise.

ISSUE: WON Philippine Law recognizes common law marriages

HELD: No. A man and woman legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, etc. may be considered legally married in common law jurisdiction but not in the Philippines. In addition, Eugenio has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. Art. 332 of RPC cannot be used in view of the application in the case at bar. The provisions of the CC must be contemplated unless expressly providing to the contrary that “spouse” means that a lawfully wedded spouse. Eugenio was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her. In fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters.

Art. 15-17; Republic v. Iyoy

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1. The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.

2. On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, in the same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers.

3. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an American and had a child.

4. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children in which she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.

5. March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity.

6. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusband’s last name as evidence.

7. Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.

ISSUE: WON the divorce decree obtained by Fely can be recognized under Philippine laws

Held: No. Art. 26, par. 2 refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although exact date was not established, Fely herfself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus after she left for US in 1984, afterwhich she married her American husband in 1985. In the same

Answer she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen and pursuant to the NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from Crasus.

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