case digests- impartial courts and jurisdiction

7/28/2019 Case Digests- Impartial Courts and Jurisdiction

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Marcos vs Sandiganbayan

Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984 while theywere officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st Division of theSandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate

justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas innocence.Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members.

Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request,Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J

Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue beraised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores manifesta tion granted that a majorityhas already decided on Imeldas favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.

HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing o f Imeldas guilt. TheSC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amoresmanifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of itsdecision convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of

the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to beheard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who mayhave a different view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadiamay change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprivepetitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice delRosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant butas aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied theopinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

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Rivera vs. CSC, Land Bank of the Philippines (January 4, 1995)

Facts: Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and was charged with dishonesty, receiving

for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties, committing acts punishable under

the Anti-Graft Laws, and pursuit of private business vocation or profession without permission required by CSC.Rivera allegedly told Perez that he would facilitate the processing, approval and release of his loan if he would be

given 10% commission. Rivera was further charged having served and acted, without prior authority required by

CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao and consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. LBP held

Rivers guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from

a client of the bank. The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon

imposed on Rivera.

Issue: Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the capital penalty of dismissal on the

basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions

Rul ing : Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit

herself totally from any participation in resolving Riveras appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence to a

fundamental aspect of due process.

CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans the participationof CSC Commissioner Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus appealed.

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El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca


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Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amountedto P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make hispayments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and henever returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to suehim by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracioa copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engraciosproperty. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulmentof the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. Therequisites are;

There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter beforeit.

Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the

proceedings. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.

Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

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NON VS. DAMES

Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowedto re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actionsagainst the school in the preceding semester.The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in thepleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial courtdismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied

in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondentcollege when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form forthe first semester of school year 1988-89, whichstates that: TheMabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendanceare unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whoseactivities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required tobehave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.

Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.

Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarlyavailable tostudents is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation onStudent Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct bythe student, in class or out ofit, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classworkor must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

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Goldberg v. Kelly

Facts. This case was brought by residents of New York City who received financial aid under the federally assistedprogram of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York States Home Relief Program. Theircomplaint alleged that City officials administering these programs terminated such aid without prior notice and
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hearing, denying them due process of law. After the suit was filed, the City adopted procedures for notice andhearing, which the plaintiff-appellees then challenged as constitutionally inadequate. The procedure allowed therecipient to challenge the proposed termination of benefits within seven days and submit a written statement for thereviewing official to make a final determination. Appellees challenged the procedures lack of an opportunity topersonally appear before the reviewing officer for oral testimony and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. Theprocedure did allow for a post-termination fair hearing, however. The District Court held that only a pre -terminationhearing would satisfy the constitutional due process requirement.

Issue. Does a State that terminates public assistance benefits to a particular recipient without affording him anopportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination deny the recipient due process of law?

Held. Yes. Affirmed. Where welfare is concerned, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient

with procedural due process. For qualified recipients, welfare provides the only means to obtain essential food,clothing, housing and medical care. The crucial factor is that the termination of aid pending resolution of acontroversy might deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Dissent. Noprovision in the Constitution should paralyze the governments efforts to protect itself against making payments topeople who are not entitled to them. There are large numbers of undeserving welfare recipients, and States shouldbe able to fight back against them. Concurrence. None.

Discussion. The interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with theStates interest that payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweigh the States competing interest to

prevent administrative and fiscal burdens. The pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial, as the fair hearing will afford full administrative review later on. It need only produce an initialdetermination that the welfares grounds for termination of benefits are valid.

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Bell v. Burson

Facts. The Act provided that the registration and license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident should be

suspended unless he posted a security to cover the damages claimed in the accident reports. The administrativehearing to be conducted prior to the suspension excluded any evidence of fault or liability for the accident. Petitionerwas a clergyman who was involved in an accident when a five-year-old child rode her bike into the side of his car. Inthe administrative hearing, Petitioner was not permitted to present any evidence that he was not at fault for theaccident, or that his ministry would be severely handicapped if he lost his license. Petitioner appealed to SuperiorCourt, which found him free from fault for the accident and ordered that his license not be suspended. The Georgia

Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting Petitioners contention that the States statutory scheme denied him due processof law.

Issue.Did the revocation of Petitioners license without affording him an opportunity to contest liability violate dueprocess?

Held.Yes. Reversed. Once issued, licenses may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood, as in the Petitioners

case. Suspension of issued licenses involves state action that adjudicates important interests of licensees, and dueprocess is required. The procedure set forth by the Act violated due process. Dissent. None. Concurrence. None.

Discussion. It is fundamental that, except for in emergency situations, States afford notice and opportunity forhearing appropriate to the nature of a case before terminating an interest. This case did not involve an emergencysituation, and due process was violated.

RE: IMPARTIAL COURT:

The inquiry into fault or liability requisite to afford the licensee due process need not take the form of a fulladjudication of the question of liability. That adjudication can only be made in litigation between the parties involved inthe accident. Since the only purpose of the provision before us is to obtain security from which to pay any judgmentsagainst the licensee resulting from the accident, we hold that procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry


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limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed beingrendered against the licensee.

We hold, then, that under Georgia's present statutory scheme, before the State may deprive petitioner of his driver'slicense and vehicle registration, it must provide a forum for the determination of the question whether there is areasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result of the accident. We deem it inappropriatein this case to do more than lay down this requirement. The alternative methods of compliance are several. Georgiamay decide merely to include consideration of the question at the administrative hearing now provided, or it may electto postpone such a consideration to the de novojudicial proceedings in the Superior Court. Georgia may decide towithhold suspension until adjudication of an action for damages brought by the injured party. Indeed, Georgia mayelect to abandon its present scheme completely and pursue one of the various alternatives in force in other States.Finally, Georgia may reject all of the above and devise an entirely new regulatory scheme. The area of choice iswide: we hold only that the failure of the present Georgia scheme to afford the petitioner a prior hearing on liability ofthe nature we have defined denied him procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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U.P. vs Ligot Telan(227 SCRA 342)

Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the University of the People, U.P.

administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the SocializedTuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broadconsultations with the various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regentsissued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition whenthe Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of the program. Inthe interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefitswhich include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduatestudents the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University.

Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of theannual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the Universitymay evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To furtherinsure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student'sapplication form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon

P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.

A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence ofNadal. Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. ConsolacionUrbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith,she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to theDiliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's directive,Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only thefact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of hismother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the DilimanCommittee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit"proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interestbased on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registrationprivileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be

referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation.

commercial rates." Failure to settle his accountwould mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records.He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation.

Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 butbecause her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-payingemployment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which findhim guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad andthat he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion fromthe University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily makereimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action.


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The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for reviewpursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified the penalty fromExpulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from theSTFAP, with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moralcharacter. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent

Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was abeneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the

"certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was madethrough a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records tosubstantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he received suchfinancial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty ofexpulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter.U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchoredsolely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of therespondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and thereviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed arecipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting, accordingto Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty."

However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus withpreliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M.

Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision findingNadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.

Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for lackof due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of sanctions on studentsrequires "observance of procedural due process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of themeeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with thesending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendancein BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusiveof students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At notime did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetingswhere his case was up for deliberation.

Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given due process in the March 29 meetingbecause the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge. Obviously, he wasreferring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when heclaimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that thecharge considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. Itshould be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholarat the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, hesought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the AdeMU.

The Court in this regard find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certificationaforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable,regular, well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of anotherson. The court constitutes this as a sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the income, howevermeasly and irregular, of his mother. The court also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the

professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in theirstudent days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of hisprofession. With this the court ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty inwithholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rulesand Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authorityto impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised. Therefore deciding that the BOR did notviolate Nadals right of due process.

The lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition formandamus.


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A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons ofordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. A statute or act may be said to bevague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at itsmeaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects

it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of whatconduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes anarbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possiblechilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to gounpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceivedgrievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the lawcannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. Theyare inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and thereforeviolates the rights of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not benecessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy toamass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern ofovert or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the

presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proofbeyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life tothe Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt ofevery fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be provedbeyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense.

Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is avery important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidenceand a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder

We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled andunderstood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe arule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 doesnot define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.

What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted

by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power ofCongress to so classify it.

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes aremala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amendedinformation alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guiltyknowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mensrea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada madeduring the deliberation on S.B. No.733Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need notprove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyondreasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far asthe acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisitemens rea must be shown.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutionsunder the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree ofresponsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in theaffirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusionperpetua to death.


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The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, eitherbecause life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completelydisrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being.There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminalacts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling todevelop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when

the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that suchacts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amendedby RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED forlack of merit

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YNOT vs IAC Case Digest

FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive OrderNo. 626-A which provides that the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended

shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and othersimilar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case ofcarabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case ofcarabaos.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of asupersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of thecarabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declinedto rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for itspresumed validity.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and hehas now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power, violation of

due process, and undue delegation of legislative power?

HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and isrestrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate libertyand property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justifyExecutive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter ofcarabaos except under certain conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, itmust appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requiresuch interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, andnot unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning the slaughterof these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuanceof the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventingtheir improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, wecannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. Wenote that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physicalcondition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of theprohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to beachieved by the questioned measure is missing.


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We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminateslaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving themto another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it asotherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, itshould follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon withthe sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of thecarabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In theToribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposedby the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial isprescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measureitself, as forfeited to the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by theConstitution.

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was feltnecessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down animplacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of theguaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlargingor constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confinethemselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of theclause whenever indicated.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensedwith because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our

judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty tothe rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed withnotwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded thatsummary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily

judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to aprevious hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct

it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment.The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was noreason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, withthe accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held inPesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have beenpronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose theprescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the methodemployed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is undulyoppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard inhis defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of thepower to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militatesagainst the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to theofficers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

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EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on grounds of nationalsecurity. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were
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denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure ofthe radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issueraised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of thestation were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite thecase becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case)the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts andadministrative tribunals in matters as this case.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing is aviolation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of

Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before anybroadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence presented.

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented(3) The decision must have something to support itself.(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply acceptsubordinates views(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued involved andreasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidablestandard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression.The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Althoughthe government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it.

The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule. If in the circumstances thatthe media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right toprevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespreaduprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. Thepeople continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have thepervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve thethe special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of theConstitution.

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TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of thePresidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No.3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" intheoffice of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had afalling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaintwas resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complainton April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos byreferring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980,the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices
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against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavitswerein the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolutionwas approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985,all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporationcontrolled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his officialfunctions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,President/General Manager of AmityTrading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00

to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violationof Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecutiondeprived accusedof due process of law and of the right to a speedydisposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence theappeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy dispositionof trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint cameto life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing fromestablished procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavitsandcounter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaintto the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-

day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While weagree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not bedisregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemedreasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

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