FERNANDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:November 7, 1975:Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao whereinBascon wonNovember 22, 1975:bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.The bodies were removed by a fireman.The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there.The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned theyenteredthe septic tank withoutclearancefrom it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master.Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from"asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body andintake of toxic gasNovember 26, 1975: Basconsigned the purchase orderRTC: Dismissed the caseCA: Reversed -law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and theindigentISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?If not, then he is guilty of negligencestandard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreetpater familiasof the Roman lawConduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in thepositionof the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequencesThe question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and inviewof the facts involved in the particular caseReasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to existDistinction must be made between the accident and the injuryWhere he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recoverWhere, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudenceToilets and septic tanks are not nuisancesper seas defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitatewarning signsfor the protection of the publicWhile the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up ofwarning signsis not one of those requirementsaccident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its coversConsidering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence.Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.

CAEDO vs YU KHE THAI and BERNARDOFACTS: Caedo and family were traveling Highway 54 on the way to the airport. Private respondents were traveling on the opposite direction. Bernardo was the personalriverofYu. Both vehicles were running at moderate speeds when a carritela was traveling the same direction as Bernardos. The latter overtook the caritella and took the lane Caedos were traveling and caused multiple injuries and damage to the Caedos. Bernardo was held liable.ISSUE:Whether or not the owner of the vehicle who was riding with the driver at the time of the accident be held solidarily liable.RULING:The court ruled that if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the existence of due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is notrespondent superiorbut rather the relationship ofpaterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage

MENDOZA VS. SORIANOFACTS:

Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon Avenue, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Soriano was thrown five meters away, while the vehicle stopped some 25 meters from the point of impact. Gerard Villaspin, one of Sorianos companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but the first flee. Respondents wife and daughter filed a complaint for damages against Macasasa and petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza, the registered owner of the vehicle.Petitioner Mendoza contends that she was not liable since as owner of the vehicle, she had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family over her employee. Macasas. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Macasasa and Mendoza. It found Soriano negligent for crossing not in the pedestrian overpass. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, reversed the assailed decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages.

RULING:

While the appellate court agreed that Soriano was negligent, it also found Macasasa negligent for speeding, such that he was unable to avoid hitting the victim. It observed that Sorianos own negligence did not preclude recovery for damages from Macasasas negligence. It further held that since petitioner failed to present evidenced to the contrary and conformably with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection and supervision of employees stood.The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation and Office Code. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations. Further, under Article 2180, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In this case petitioner is held primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused by Macasasa.However, Article 2179 states that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the court shall mitigate the damages awarded. Ruling that Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass, 20% reduction of the amount of the damages awarded was awarded to petitioner.

FGU INSURANCE CORP. VS. GP SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORP.,ET AL.

FACTS:G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on June 18, 1994, 30 units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard its Isuzu truck driven by Lambert Eroles, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While traversing the North Diversion Road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes (P204,450.00) to Concepcion Industries, Inc.,. Being subrogee of CIIs rights & interests, FGU, in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of carriage against GPS and Eroles with the RTC. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was only the exclusive hauler of CII since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely accidental.GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It subsequently dismissed the complaint holding that GPS was not a common carrier defined under the law & existing jurisprudence. The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, FGU interposed an appeal to the CA. The CA rejected the FGUs appeal & ruled in favor of GPS. It also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.ISSUES:1. WON GPS may be considered a common carrier as defined under the law & existing jurisprudence.2. WON GPS, either as a common carrier or a private carrier, may be presumed to have been negligent when the goods it undertook to transport safely were subsequently damaged while in its protective custody & possession.3. Whether the doctrine ofRes ipsa loquituris applicable in the instant case.HELD:1. The SC finds the conclusion of the RTC and the CA to be amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor & hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering/offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers/goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term common carrier.2. GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract & the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost/suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his:1. Expectation interest interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed;2. Reliance interest interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made;3. Restitution interest interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.Agreements can accomplish little unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, or to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care & corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.Eroles, on the other hand, may not be ordered to pay petitioner without concrete proof of his negligence/fault. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their personality/juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioners civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which would require the claimant for damages to prove the defendants negligence/fault.3.Res ipsa loquiturholds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the latters management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management/control use proper care. In the absence of the defendants explanation, it affords reasonable evidence that the accident arose from want of care. It is not a rule of substantive law and does not create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply places the burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant.However, resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when:(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence;(b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence (includes the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons); and(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendants duty to the plaintiff.Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless,for the doctrine to apply, the requirement that responsible causes (other than those due to defendants conduct) must first be eliminated should be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.On the other hand, while the truck driver, whose civil liability is predicated on culpa acquiliana, can be said to have been in control & management of the vehicle, it is not equally shown that the accident has been exclusively due to his negligence. If it were so, the negligence could allow res ipsa loquitur to properly work against him. However, clearly this is not the case.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Roberto ReyesOne evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The party was being held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the party.Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he was invited by another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he wasqueuing to get his food, Lim approached him and ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling for Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party like a common criminal.The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it respectfully.ISSUE:Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.HELD:No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by the hotel for more than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is very unlikely for her to makea scene in the party she was managing. That would only make her look bad.Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very close to him so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only Reyes shall hear whatever is it that shes going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from hearing.Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known ascontra bonus mores:Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes. They do not know each other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself is a prominent person.On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine ofvolenti non fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence to support any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages

AFIALDA VS. HISOLE AND HISOLELoreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947, without any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him thereby causing his death. Afialdas sister,MargaritaAfialda, sued Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code,The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise fromforce majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.ISSUE:Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed Afialda.HELD:No. The law uses the term possessor and user of the animal. Afialda was the caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, is the possessor and the user of the carabao and therefore he is the one who had custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent the animal from causing damage. It would have been different had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act as the risk involve was one of occupational hazards.

PICART VS. SMITHIn December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse and while they were on a 75 meter long bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.scarapproaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while he was still at a distance away because Picart and his horse were on Smiths lane. But Picart did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart without slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the bridge; the horse struck thecarand its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which required several days of medical attention while the horse eventually died.ISSUE:Whether or not Smith is negligent.HELD:Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But Smiths negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have steered hiscarto the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smithscarhas approached the horse at such proximity it left no chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover damages from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his contributory negligence.The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

PLDT vs CAFacts:A jeep driven by private respondent Esteban fell into an open trench, the excavation wasdue to the installation of an underground conduit system by PLDT, the said open trench waswithout cover and any warning signs.As a result the private respondent and his wife sustained injuries, and their vehicle was also damaged. PLDT in its defense, imputes the injuries to the private respondents own negligence. Also, italleges that L.R. Barte and company acting as an independent contractor, should beresponsible for the excavation was performed by them.As for Barte, they alleged that they have complied with the due standards in performingtheir work, and that it was not aware of the accident involving the Estebans.Court of Appeals held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequentlyabsolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.Upon respondents second motion to reconsideration, CA reversed its decision, following hedecision of Trial Court and held PLDT liable for damages.Issue:Whether or not PLDT is liableHeld:NOWe find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that theaccident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondentAntonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the onlypurpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations onthe site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It wasnot the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fallinto the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lanetowards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty,such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximatecause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It isbasic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failureto exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm andnecessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoidthe accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson st., he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed hum and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative therof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.