SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESSEstrada v. Sandiganbayan [GR 148560, 19 November 2001] En Banc, Bellosillo (J) : 2 concur, 2 filed separate concurring opinions, 6 joined the concurring opinion ofMendoza, 3 dissented in a separate opinion, 1 took no part

Facts: On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separateInformations, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for violation of Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Criminal Cases 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Sections 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7, paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for reconsideration /reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. The grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001, Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

Issue: Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear to inform Estrada of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Held: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder Law. Herein, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which Estrada is alleged to have committed. There was nothing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in his defense. Factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, Estrada is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable himto prepare for an intelligent defense.

There is no basis for Estrada's claim that the Supreme Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from theirvery existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. "On its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.

David v ArroyoGR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Facts:

As the nation celebrated EDSAs 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant.

A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review.Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue.

Ratio Decidendi:

The Solicitor Generals refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situations exceptional character and paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection.

However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.

The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress.

The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where acts of terrorism has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional.

Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials.

PHILIPPINES vs. DELA PIEDRAG.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down.

They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore.

Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.

Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed.

Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment.Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.

The provision in question reads:

ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.(b)Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated

HELD: (1)For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.

In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court criticized the definition of recruitment and placement.

The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced.

The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.

That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.

A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.

(2)Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.

The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit.

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.

In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.

Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.