case digest

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MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000] FACTS: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers. HELD: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare 1

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Page 1: Case Digest

MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]

FACTS:Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.

HELD: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, people’sorganizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

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Acebedo Optical vs. Court of Appeals

Municipal Corporation – Proprietary Functions – Police Power

FACTS:Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo’s dependent uponprescriptions to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practice optometry within the city. Acebedohowever acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege – estoppels does not apply.

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Republic vs. Meralco G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002.

FACTS:On 23 December 1993, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of P0.21/kwh in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order 172. On 28 January 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184/kwh, subject to the condition that in the event that the Board finds that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicant’s customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions. Subsequent to an audit by the Commission on Audit (COA), the ERB rendered its decision adopting COA’s recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that “the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184/kwh granted under the Board’s Order dated 28 January 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to MERALCO’s customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.” The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be “borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business” hence, should not be passed on to the consumers. Further, in applying the net average investment method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of the property should be included, determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually used in service during the test year.

On appeal (CA GR SP 46888), the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167/ kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCO’s customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court granted the petitions and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. MERALCO was authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decision of the ERB dated 16 February 1998, the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with the applicant’s billing cycles beginning February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCO’s customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.

1. Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the State’s police powers

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The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.

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Moday vs Court of AppealsMunicipal Corporation – Eminent Domain – Disapproval by SP of SB Resolution

FACTS:Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SBresolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC[289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998]

FACTS:Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

ISSUES:(1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

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HELD:Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

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BENGZON VS. HRET

[357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001]

FACTS:Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

ISSUE: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

HELD:Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

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MERCADO VS. MANZANO[307 SCRA 630; G.R. NO. 135083; 26 MAY 1999]

FACTS:Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

ISSUE:Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

HELD:Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such

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certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS[267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]

FACTS:The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

HELD:The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and

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protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

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Angara v. Electoral CommissionG.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

D E C I S I O N(En Banc)

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUE:Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

RULING:[The Court DENIED the petition.]NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ensue against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.

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The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

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Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-ArroyoG.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

ISSUES:1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

RULING:[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

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1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; andNeither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

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Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 782

July 1993

FACTS: Plaintiffs, who are minors represented by their parents, alleged that the then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.’s continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country will work great damage and injury to the plaintiffs and their successors. Defendant, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the plaintiffs failed to state a specific right violated by the defendant and that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question and cannot be tried in the Courts. The RTC of Makati, Branch 66, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case at bar subject to the judicial power of the Court

RULING: Being impressed with merit, the Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the Order of the RTC which dismissed the case.

The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

Although concurring in the result, Justice Feliciano penned his separate opinions on a number of topics pointed by Justice Davide, Jr. in this Court decision. Justice Feliciano said that the concept of the word “class” is too broad to cover the plaintiffs and their representatives alone, and that the Court may be deemed recognizing anyone’s right to file action as against both the public administrative agency and the private entities of the sector involved in the case at bar, to wit:

“Neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provisions of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.”

Justice Feliciano further stated that the Court in the case at bar in effect made Sections 15 and 16 of Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution to be self-executing and judicially enforceable even in its present form, and that these implications are too large and far reaching in nature ever to be hinted in this instant case.

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Tolentino vs. Secretary of FinanceG.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

HELD: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

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People vs. JalosjosG.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

HELD: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Senate vs. Ermita

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GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

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MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989

FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused

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by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

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RUFINO V. ENDRIGA

July 21, 2006

FACTS:

Article VII, Section 16

- Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines. PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, increased further the trustees to 11.

- Eventually, during the term of Ramos, the CCP Board included the Endriga Group- Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to

replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The Rufino group took their oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties.

- the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. They claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.

o The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive terms.

o The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa's term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees. They maintained that under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in the Board.

o The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."

- Rufino Group: that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being

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repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing power.

- CA: Endriga group entitled to the office.-

ISSUE: w/n Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that:

A. [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution;

B. [it] effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision over the CCP

HELD: UNCONSTITIONAL

POWER TO APPOINT

- The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: “the President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards….The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)”

- The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.

- Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers.

1. heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. w/ the Commission of Appointment’s consent

2. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. consent not required

3. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. consent not required

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appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.

o * there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

- The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board.

- This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.28 The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc29 and on the Constitutional Commissions30 is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.

- The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion — the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint.

- Also, the power to appoint can only be vested in the HEADS of the named offices. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and NOT TO THEIR MEMBERS, for several reasons:

o a plain reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word "heads" refers to all the offices succeeding that term, namely, the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. This plain reading is consistent with other related provisions of the Constitution.

o agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but have only chief executives or heads of agencies. Thus, the word "heads" applies to agencies. Any other interpretation is untenable.

o all commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads. Since the Constitution speaks of "heads" of offices, and all commissions or boards have chief executives or heads, the word "heads" could only refer to the chief executives or heads of the commissions or boards.

o the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions uniformly refer to "heads" of offices. The 1935

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Constitution limited the grant of the appointment power only to "heads of departments."32 The 1973 Constitution expanded such grant to other officers, namely, "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards x x x."33 If the 1973 Constitution intended to extend the grant to members of commissions or boards, it could have followed the same language used for "members of the Cabinet" so as to state "members of commissions or boards." Alternatively, the 1973 Constitution could have placed the words commissions and boards after the word "courts" so as to state "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and boards." Instead, the 1973 Constitution used "heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."

o the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the power to appoint lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of that collegial body. Thus, the 1935 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the heads of departments." Similarly, the 1973 Constitution speaks of "members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."

o As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the enumeration also applies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the enumeration. Since the words "in the heads of" refer to "departments," the same words "in the heads of" also refer to the other offices listed in the enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards."

- Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.

- the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

- ** Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

o It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis.

- Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent

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appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.

POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

- The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35 This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the Executive branch.36

- The CCP falls under the Executive branch. Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive x x x offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office — one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies — from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.

- The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over "all the executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.

- Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the President.44

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.

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SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004

FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

(2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

HELD: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of

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Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

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Bayan v. Zamora

G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

D E C I S I O N

(En Banc)

BUENA, J.:

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . .

ISSUE:

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

RULING:

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

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There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

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Drilon vs Lim

GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994

FACTS:Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,” while the second is “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.”

ISSUES:The issues in this case are

(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and

(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government

HELD:The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.

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An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.

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Tañada, et al., vs. Angara, et al

G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

D E C I S I O N

(En Banc)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

ISSUE:

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

RULING:

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

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[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does

not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy

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that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

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Gudani vs. Senga

G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006

(Political Law, Constitutional Law, E.O. 464)

FACTS:Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon.

Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.

However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. `

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee “in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;” that such directive was “in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command;” and that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x” Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.

On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. “enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.

Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and

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other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive.

The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff.

ISSUE:Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional?

RULING:The Petition is dismissed.

Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?

Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.

We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that “[t]he

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President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.

Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under “house arrest” by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:

“… to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.”

As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldier’s speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldier’s ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.

Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Judicial relief as remedy:

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The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts.

Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,” is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branch’s assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.

Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others,

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“all officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP],” and points out that he is no longer in the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.

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Neri v. Senate CAPO, et alG.R. 180643

September 4, 2008

FACTS:The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290 (approx. P16 Billion). This was financed by the People's Republic of China. Respondent Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (CAPO), Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, initiated an investigation to respective personalities and cabinet officials in the NBN Project, of which petitioner Romulo Neri was included. The petitioner testified and mentioned that he was offered P200 Billion for his approval for the NBN Project. But when asked further to divulge what was discussed about the project, he refused to answer and invoked "executive privilege," especially with matters relating to the involvement of Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He then refused to appear in further hearings of the Committees. With this, the Committees issued an Order, citing him in contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms. Neri petitioned to the Court for citiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show cause Letter and contempt Order. His petition was granted and the in contempt Order of the respondents and the instruction for his arrest and detention were nullified. The respondent Committees filed for a motion for reconsideration regarding the decision. They persisted in knowing the petitioner's answers to the questions not answered regarding the matters which involved the President.

ISSUE:Can a cabinet member invoke executive privilege on matters discussed with the President before legislative investigations?

HELD:No. The phrase "executive privilege" involves considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution, and may be claimed by one executive official, the President. But in the case of Senate v. Ermita, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the 3 questions propounded by petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees' investigation. Ermita requested the Committees to dispense with Neri's testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Thus, petitioner, an executive official under the direct control and supervision of the Chief Executive, only acted by the order of his superior, hence cannot be held in contempt. The respondent Committees' Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED.

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AKBAYAN vs. AquinoG.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

JPEPA Diplomatic Negotiations are Privileged Executive Privilege, an Exception to Congress' Power of Inquiry Treaty-making Power Executive Privilege vs. People's Right to Information

FACTS:This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, etc.

Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation is completed.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are

privileged Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of

inquiry and power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process

RULING:Standing

In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in

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jurisprudence.

JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern

To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.

Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that “information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.”

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.

A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.

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Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve national security?

While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the “informer’s privilege,” or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.

Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.

In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national security.

It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.

Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news,” the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the

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confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not identical.

The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.” And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest, must be presumed confidential.

Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged character of the deliberative process.

Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process?

In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose “definite propositions of the government,” such duty does not include recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.

Treaty-making power of the President

they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.

The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII – the article on the Executive Department.

While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power

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already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.

Did the respondent’s alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such privilege?

That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioner’s position presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it.

xxx (but) Respondent’s failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.

The privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondent’s failure to invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not amount to waiver thereof.

“Showing of Need” Test

In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of need” only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure

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sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights.

However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is a matter of public concern.

Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege

the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.

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28. G.R. NO. 152574, NOVEMBER 17, 2004FRANCISCO ABELLA JR., PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.

[PANGANIBAN.]

FACTS:Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone

Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility for said position.

On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994 with Section 4 enumerating the positions covered by the Career Executive Service (CES). These positions require Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent appointment. But, this provides that incumbents to CES shall retain their permanent appointment but upon promotion or transfer to other CES positions, they shall be under temporary status until they qualify.

Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999. Petitioner appealed the disapproval of his permanent appointment by respondent to the Civil Service Commission, which issued Resolution No. 000059, dated January 10, 2000, affirming the action taken by respondent. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the CSC in Resolution No. 001143 dated May 11, 2000.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but it ruled that he did not have legal standing to question the disapproval and was not the real party in interest.

ISSUES:A. Whether the petitioner has the personality and the real party in interest to question the disapproval of his appointment.B. Whether the issuance of Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994, which deprived petitioner his property right without due process of law, is constitutional.C. Whether the CSC correctly denied his appointment.

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RULING:A. Personality and real party in interest.

The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority’s discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. While there is justification to allow the appointing authority to challenge the CSC disapproval, there is none to preclude the appointee from taking the same course of action. Aggrieved parties, including the CSC, should be given the right to file motions for reconsideration or to appeal. On this point, the concepts of “legal standing” and “real party in interest” become relevant.

The question in legal standing is whether such parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ If legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger’s part, then more so should petitioner be allowed to contest the CSC Order disapproving his appointment. Clearly, the petitioner was prejudiced by the disapproval, since he could not continue his office. Although petitioner had no vested right to the position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he should be granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He had a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC act that denied his permanent appointment.

A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. “Interest” within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.

Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is adversely affected by the CSC’s Order and is a real party in interest, the appointee is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.

B. Due ProcessCivil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and

regulations to carry out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify positions covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.

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The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioner’s ELM eligibility. He was appointed to a CES position; however, his eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility must necessarily conform to the requirements of the position, which in petitioner’s case was a Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE). The challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as they remain in the positions to which they were previously appointed. They are allowed to retain their positions in a permanent capacity, notwithstanding the lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular recognizes the rule of prospectively of regulations; hence, it is not an post facto law or a bill of attainder.

In the present case, the government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus, his right to remain in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment years later as department manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply with the eligibility prescribed at the time for that position.

On petitioner’s averment that he was not afforded due process for CSC’s alleged failure to notify him of a hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular, is not convincing. The issuance of the circular was an exercise of a quasi-legislative function as such, prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.

C. Whether CSC correctly denied his appointmentSince petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment.

The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee’s possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification. In sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the position he was appointed to.

The Petition was GRANTED insofar as it seeks legal standing for petitioner, but DENIED insofar as it prays for the reversal of the CSC Resolutions disapproving his appointment as department manager III of the Labor andEmployment Center, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.

CA vs. Department of Budget and ManagementJuly 22, 2005

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A motion for reconsideration of respondent DBM, praying that this court reconsider its decision;

FACTS: Civil service Commission filed a suit against DBM for not releasing the whole amount appropriated for them.

DBM alleges that, they cannot release the funds due to revenue collection shortfall and that DBM is also just complying with the no report, no release policy.

ISSUE:Whether or not the allegations of the DBM are tenable.

RULING:Given a revenue shortfall, it is still very possible for the DBM to release the full amount appropriated for the agencies w/ fiscal autonomy especially since, as noted in the decision, the total appropriation for such agencies in recent years does not even reach 3% of the national budget.

Under the no report, no release policy, DBM requires for the timely submission of the financial reports. However, CSC and all other agencies with fiscal autonomy are not required since they are under the release .agencies which no agency performance review is needed. However, this is not to say that agencies vested with fiscal autonomy have no reporting responsibility at all to the DBM.They may submit reports relative to its appropriation for records purposes only

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