cartesian intuitions, humean puzzles, & the buddhist conception of the self

7/28/2019 Cartesian Intuitions, Humean Puzzles, & the Buddhist Conception of the Self

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CARTESIAN INTUITIONS, HUMEAN PUZZLES, AND THE

BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF THE SELF

Alan TomhaveDepartment of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Youngstown State University

Introduction

The utilization of Western canonical thinkers to inform and understand thinkers fromIndia and China is nothing new. More specifically, it is very tempting for a Western-trained philosopher to explain the Buddhist conception of the self by reference toDavid Hume; both seem to be bundle theories. Moreover, in making such a com-

parison we seem to get a solution to the puzzle that Hume leaves at the end of ATreatise of Human Nature concerning personal identity. Briefly, Hume holds that weare simply bundles of perceptions. He then admits that he has nothing to hold theperceptions together. The Buddhist conception of the self is as a bundle of five ag-gregates (skandhas) that are continually changing. In the Buddhist context it is thewill that provides the energy to bind the aggregates together. This very rough sketchwill be expanded below.

There is another classic philosopher in the Western canon who is also helpful inattempting to understand the Buddhist conception of the self, René Descartes. Des-cartes, rather than denying the self, actually has a rather robust conception of theself as the explanation of what our nature is. He holds that we are essentially “think-ing things.” This position is open to a criticism that seems to lead to the Humean/ Buddhist notions that we are simply an aggregate or bundle of aggregates. A simpleway of phrasing the criticism is that Descartes assumes the existence of a thinkerfrom the existence of thought. Below I will refer to this criticism as the “BuddhistCriticism.” Though Descartes is usually seen as antithetical to the Buddhist concep-tion (and in many ways is), he works from an intuition that is correct and can behelpful in clarifying the Buddhist conception of the self.

In what follows I will begin by explaining the Cartesian picture and presenting

the Buddhist criticism of that view. I will then clarify the Cartesian Intuition. It is thisintuition that will serve as a kind of litmus test for the Humean and Buddhist notionsof the self. In the third section below I will offer Hume’s conception of the self andhis own criticism against his view. Finally, I will explain the Buddhist conception andshow that it solves the Humean Puzzle and maintains the Cartesian Intuition.Throughout this essay I will periodically point out differences between Buddhismand the two other views at hand, though I shall try to keep distractions to a minimum.I hope that the appeal to both Descartes and Hume will help clarify the Buddhistconception of the self for Western thinkers.



Descartes

In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes famously engages in a process of radical doubt. In so doing he attempts to doubt everything, no matter how obvious a

particular piece of knowledge may appear. Through this process of radical doubt re-garding what he believes, he thinks that he has found something that is indubitable.He makes a metaphysical claim about his own nature. This differs greatly from whatwe will see in Hume below. Hume’s claim will be primarily epistemic while leavingthe metaphysical claim as an open book. Descartes moves through an epistemic process and through that process finds a metaphysical claim.

In the midst of his doubting Descartes hits upon something that he thinks is indu-bitable, and that becomes the bedrock principle upon which the rest of his knowledgewill ultimately be built — if he is being deceived, then he exists. There cannot be anact of deception without some agent to deceive. Deception as an action analytically

entails a victim of said deception. Thus, no matter what, if he thinks, he is —cogito ergo sum.1

Let us slow down a bit. Descartes’ process is well known, yet it is helpful toreview it. He begins by pointing out some things that he thinks he knows. Heknows, for example, that he is sitting at his desk and that in his hands there is a pieceof paper. Moreover, he points out that to not admit such things seems to put himin the category of a madman, one who would see himself as a king rather thana beggar. However, he quickly follows these assertions of knowledge with thefollowing:

A brilliant piece of reasoning! As if I were not a man who sleeps at night, and regularlyhas all the same experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake — indeed some-

times even more improbable ones. How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just

such familiar events — that I am here in my dressing gown sitting by the fire — when in fact

I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I

look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out and feel

my hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am doing. All this would not happen with

such distinctness to someone asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occasions

when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep!2

This dreaming objection to what Descartes knows for certain loosens much of whathe knows from the anchor of certainty. He can no longer be sure that he is wakingrather than sleeping.3 This means that he loses all certainty regarding any specificobject or any physical characteristic about himself. He no longer knows with cer-tainty that he is in fact sitting at his desk and holding a piece of paper. In short, cer-tainty regarding most empirical claims has been lost.

There is much, though, that the dreaming objection cannot shake loose from therock of certainty. For this reason, Descartes considers another possibility to help himdoubt what he knows: the evil demon objection (sometimes called the evil genius).The possibility that he is dreaming does not do much to shake loose mathematical



propositions or conceptual sciences that do not depend on empirical verification.After realizing this he makes the following statement about God:

How do I know that he has not brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, no ex-

tended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while at the same time ensuring that all these

things appear to me to exist just as they do now? What is more, since I sometimes believethat others go astray in cases where they think they have the most perfect knowledge, may

I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three or count the sides of a square, or

in some even simpler matter, if that is imaginable?4

Now this is, of course, inconsistent with an all-good God, which is the conception of God that is assumed by Descartes. However, it is not the case that God has madeDescartes such that he will never be deceived, so where is the line? It seems that Godwould at least try to minimize deception of this sort; thus, we can be sure that thereis no such systemic trickery originating from God. In any case, Descartes later makes

the switch from God to a “malicious demon.” This demon may exist and be capableof such deception as was described above. Thus, there is no ground for holding ascertain any proposition that he previously held as true.

At the start of the Second Meditation, Descartes hits on something that, evengiven these radical possibilities for doubt, must be true. Imagine that he is being de-ceived. Can he be deceived if he does not exist? It seems rather obvious that he can-not. Thus, Descartes concludes that “this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily truewhenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.”5 Thus, he has restoredsome certainty to his knowledge claims. He can now assert his own existence —something to be celebrated indeed!

This is not the end, however. The issue at hand is the conception of the self; thus,we have a bit further to go. Descartes still wants to know what he is, that is, what hisessence is. He considers a few standard views, a body, a soul. Everything of this na-ture, however, is subject to the skeptical theses of dreaming and the evil demon. Hecannot essentially be a body, for example, because it could be that he is being de-ceived about the fact that he has a body. The only thing that he cannot be deceivedabout is the existence of thought. This is the only aspect about himself that cannotbe challenged by any skeptical thesis (or so he thinks). Thus, he must essentially be athinking thing.

This is, as it stands, a bit nebulous. Thus, Descartes seeks to further his under-standing about what exactly this means. A thinking thing is something “that doubts,understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sen-sory perception.”6 Thus, the “I” of Descartes is rather robust. The “I” that wills is thesame as the “I” that doubts and is potentially deceived. Descartes admits that this isa rather robust conception, but of course it seems correct at first glance.

We will here consider a criticism of Descartes. First, let us admit that it is intuitiveto posit the existence of something being deceived if there is deception.7 But even if this is the case, it does not follow that each of these aspects of Descartes’ robust “I”is the same “I.” We can easily think about each of the features of thought that he



presents as being part of different subjects rather than all part of the same subject.Thus, while he may be justified in asserting the existence of a subject that wills anda subject that doubts, he is not justified in asserting the existence of a subject thatboth wills and doubts.

In an idea that is similar to a criticism of Hume’s, consider a corporation.

8

Thereare multiple positions in the corporation that need to be filled by different individuals,for example CEO, CFO, COO, and Chairman of the Board. Each of these does a dif-ferent job, yet contributes to the overall functioning of the whole. Why is it that therobust “I” cannot be made up in the same way? It may turn out to be an aggregate of more simplistic I’s, each of them contributing their part to the overall functioning of the whole.9

We can take this a step further as well. We could think of the following as theBuddhist objection. Why assume the necessity of a subject in which these actions aretaking place? If there is thinking, then there is certainly thought. But Descartes would

have us accept the following:I think. Therefore, I am.10

However, it could be that all he has licensed is the following:

Thinking. Therefore, thought exists.

Thus, Descartes does seem to make a valid metaphysical claim: thought does exist.However, he cannot move so quickly from the existence of thought to the existenceof his robust “I.” Consider the following from a Buddhist source: “In other words,there is no thinker behind the thought. Thought itself is the thinker. If you remove the

thought, there is no thinker to be found.”11 The thought may exist, but to move fromthe existence of the thought to the existence of the thinker is an invalid move.

In Descartes’ defense it should be stressed that there does seem to be a self thatis doing all these different activities. Of course, the Buddhist would respond that thisis the reason why it is so difficult to attain nirvana in Buddhism. If it were easy torealize that there is no self, then we would all attain nirvana in our lifetimes. How-ever, there does seem to be a phenomenological argument in favor of a self. Thismakes it seem acceptable to infer the actual existence of the robust “I.” It just seems as though there is an actor that is at the heart of everything we do.12 Moreover, itseems as though it is the same actor for all the aspects that Descartes admits as be-longing to the self.13

Regardless of whether or not Descartes’ robust “I” can be maintained, I suggestthat the intuition that there must be something that is doing the acting is correct. Thisis what I will call the Cartesian Intuition. The claim that there is a particular actionhappening analytically entails that there is a thing of some sort doing the action. Asa consequence of this, any theory that admits to events taking place must also admitthe existence of something taking part in these events. If there is an arm moving,then the fact of action, movement, analytically entails the existence of somethingdoing the moving. The intuition that there is something that is doing the acting is an

intuition that will be lost by Hume. Even though it appears to be lost for Buddhism



as well, the intuition can be maintained in this context. This will be shown below,where I will also comment more on the Cartesian Intuition. Let us now move on toHume’s conception of the self.

Hume

Hume is not making a metaphysical claim when talking about the self. That is, he isnot claiming that the self does not exist. He is making an epistemic claim. Strictlyspeaking, Hume denies that we have an idea of the self. He offers a bundle theory asan attempt at what we do have. More properly, Hume denies that we have any real idea of the self. This is because there is no impression that we can point to fromwhence we derive the idea. Consider the following:

When we talk of self or substance, we must have an idea annex’d to these terms, other-

wise they are altogether unintelligible. Every idea is derived from preceding impressions;

and we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. Wehave, therefore, no idea of them in that sense.14

This is simply an instance of what seems to be Hume’s most common weapon againstcertain sorts of ideas:

1. To have an idea we must have a corresponding impression.2. We don’t have an impression of X.3. Therefore, we have no idea of X.

This raises the question of where we get the idea of the self that we seem to have.Hume’s contention is that this is a mistake. What we have is a bundle of perceptions:“I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle orcollection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivablerapidity, and are in constant flux and motion.”15

It is important in the current context (that of comparing Hume to Buddhism), thatwe be clear that Hume is not making a positive claim to a self when he speaks of abundle of perceptions (as opposed to Buddhism, which does make a positive claimto such a theory). The claim that all we have is a bundle of perceptions is an attemptto show what exactly it is that we are referring to when we talk about the self. Con-

sider the following comment from James Giles:The only reason one might think that Hume is making positive statements about the ac-

tual identity of things is if one fails to notice the structure of his overall argument and to

focus on specific remarks. If we view the section “Of Personal Identity” as a whole we

will see that in the first four paragraphs Hume discusses the actual identity of the self

and categorically rejects the notion as untenable. He does, however, feel that we have a

natural propensity to ascribe identity to ourselves, and it is to an explanation of this pro-

pensity that Hume devotes the rest of his discussion.16

It is easy to forget the fact that Hume denies the idea of a self and that the bundle

theory is an attempt to explain what it is that we do have. In this way Hume is very



similar to Buddhism. For Buddhism too, there is no actual self, but merely a bundle.Buddhism, however, is making a metaphysical claim, not merely an epistemic one.We will return to this below. Let us move on to what exactly it is that initially holdsthe bundle together for Hume.

It is memory that is the active principle that brings these together as a self. Thememory “not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, byproducing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions.”17 There is some re-semblance that is recognized by the memory that serves to link these ideas together.Causation among ideas, as they move from one to another sparked by some link,serves to enforce this idea of the self. It appears that our ideas are linked; thus, thisaids in the mistaken assertion that we are a self.

Thus, the idea of the self comes about through memory, which recognizes resem-blance among our ideas, and is buttressed by the seeming causal connections thatexist between our ideas. The binding element for the bundle is the resemblance and

causal connection among ideas. This nice explanation is short-lived, however. Aproblem arises because Hume has explicitly argued for the distinctness of ideas;thus, the glue that holds the ideas together cannot be some relation between them.Consider the following argument based on Hume’s Separability Principle:

1. “Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable.”2. “Whatever is distinguishable is separable by the thought or imagination.”3. “All perceptions are distinct.” 4. All perceptions are, therefore, “distinguishable, and separable, and may be

conceiv’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any contra-

diction or absurdity.”18

The end result here is that there is no contradiction in asserting that these perceptionsexist independently of each other. Because ideas are based on perceptions there is nocontradiction when applying the same principle to ideas. If all ideas can be thoughtof separately, there is no connection between them. This is a problem, because it isthese very connections that serve as the glue holding everything together for Hume.He simply lost what limited conception of the self that he had. Thus, the Humeanpuzzle emerges: Hume has argued that we are nothing but a bundle of perceptions,but then has no way to explain the bundling. Consider Hume’s own phrasing: “[A]llmy hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successiveperceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, whichgives me satisfaction on this head.”19

Hume initially rejects that we have any real idea of the self because he assumesthat the self must be something unchanging and constant. He finds no impression of such a thing, so there can be no idea of such a thing. When considered in this lightthere seems to be something very correct about Hume’s contention that we have noimpression of the self. There does not seem to be some unchanging underlying sub-stance that we can point to and assert that “that thing” is the self that binds our per-



ceptions together. Terence Penelhum locates the claim that the self must beunchanging as the source of Hume’s problem. Penelhum argues that it is in the na-ture of some things that they change and are made up of parts; thus, Hume couldcontend that the self changes and is made up of parts yet is still one thing: the self.

Penelhum uses the example of a song to illustrate this point. A song is composed of individual parts, each of which can be considered on its own. The song also changesas it progresses. These two facts do not preempt the claim that the self exists.20 How-ever, as the current task is not to explain attempts to provide Hume with a self in theWestern philosophical tradition, let us set this issue aside.

Recall the discussion of Descartes above. There we saw that it may be possibleto reduce Descartes’ robust “I” to a bundle of more anemic I’s. This is similar to whathas just occurred for Hume. Though the goals are different between the two, Humeis making an epistemic point while Descartes is primarily making a metaphysicalclaim. It is through an epistemic process of doubting that he arrives at the conclu-

sion that there exists a metaphysical “I.” Notice, though, that Descartes, as he viewshimself, has an advantage over Hume when it comes to the Cartesian Intuition.Descartes, possibly even with the criticism leveled against him, seems to preservethe idea that there is some thing doing the acting when there is thinking or willinggoing on. Hume has lost the ability to point to what it is that is taking actions. Hehas only a bundle of perceptions and is not free simply to infer a perceiver. This free-dom is lost because by Hume’s own view we have no idea of things that do notoriginate in the senses. To assert a self we would need an impression that we couldpoint to, yet no such impression exists (according to Hume). To make mattersworse for Hume, he has no glue with which to hold together his bundle. Yet, unless

he is also willing to claim that there is no action, a claim I do not see him making,then he also violates the Cartesian Intuition that there must be something performingthe action. Let us now move on to focus specifically on the Buddhist conception of the self.

The Buddha

The Buddha proposes a metaphysical view of the self that is very similar to the ideathat Hume thinks (or at least initially thought) we have of the self. That is to say, theBuddhist conception of the self consists of the idea that we are bundles of five skandhas. These five skandhas , when arranged in a certain way, make up individuals. It istricky even to claim that there is an idea of the self at all in Buddhism. After all, oneof the main teachings of Buddha is that of anatta, or no-Soul. It is important to beclear about just what this amounts to.

Hume argues that the idea of the self is simply a bundle of perceptions. Thesimilarity lies in the claim that the self is a bundle. However, in Buddhism the self isnot merely perceptions. The five skandhas are: matter, sensations, perceptions, men-tal formations (which includes all volition), and consciousness.21 Each of these com-ponents is constantly changing — though it is not correct to say that they are changing,



but rather that they are change. Change is an essential component of them. This issimilar to the idea put forth by Heraclitus and his claim that you can never step intothe same river twice. The self is made up of component parts that constantly change.Thus, any component taken at two different times is different.

The doctrine of anatta is sometimes translated as “no-self” rather than “no-soul.”I think that the second translation is more correct and I will now take some time toshow why. This is important because if we simply deny the existence of a self andmove on, then we get some extremely counterintuitive claims from Buddhism. Forthe Western thinker there are numerous ideas in Buddhism that seem problematic.Why compound the problems by being unclear on the doctrine of anatta? We caneasily clarify the issue.

The Buddha is not claiming that there is nothing in the world. Nor is he claimingthat we are not pointing at something when we point to each other. What the Buddhadenies is the claim that there is a Soul that underlies the thing that we point to when

we point to each other. He is denying the existence of Atman. Consider the followingfrom Rahula:

According to the Buddha’s teaching, it is as wrong to hold the opinion “I have no self”

(which is the annihilationist theory) as to hold the opinion “I have self” (which is the eter-

nalist theory), because both are fetters, both arising out of the false “I AM,” . . . [W]hat we

call “I,” or “being,” is only a combination of physical and mental aggregates, which are

working together independently in a flux of momentary change within the law of cause

and effect, and that there is nothing permanent, everlasting, unchanging and eternal in

the whole of existence.22

Notice that this is not a denial of all existence; it is merely a denial of a constant,unchanging existence. Consider also the following well-known story about Nagasenaand a king. After questioning Nagasena about himself, the king concludes that thereis no Nagasena, even though he is conversing with him. Thus, the following is meantto show the truth of the claim that Nagasena is not present:

“Your majesty, you are a delicate prince, an exceedingly delicate prince. . . . Pray, did youcome afoot, or riding?”

“Bhante, I do not go afoot: I came in a chariot.”

“Your majesty, if you came in a chariot, declare to me the chariot. Pray, your majesty, is

the pole the chariot?”

“Nay, verily, bhante.”“Is the axle the chariot?”

“Nay, verily, bhante.”

“Are the wheels the chariot?”


“Is the chariot-body . . . [,] banner-staff . . . [,] yoke . . . [,] reins . . . [,] goading-stick the

chariot?”


“Pray, your majesty, are pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, banner-staff, yoke, reins, and

goad unitedly the chariot?”

“Nay, verily, bhante,”



“Is it, then, your majesty, something else besides pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body,

banner-staff, yoke, reins, and goad which is the chariot?”

“Nay, verily, bhante . . . [,] the word ‘chariot’ is but a way of counting, term, appella-

tion, convenient designation, and name for pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, and banner-

staff.”

“Thoroughly well, your majesty, do you understand a chariot. In exactly the same way,your majesty, in respect of me, Nagasena is but a way of counting, term, appellation,

convenient designation. . . .”23

There is no denial of the items in the list as things existing; it is simply denied thatthere is any one thing that we can point to that is the essence of the chariot, or,analogously, the self. The word “chariot” is simply a name of those items arranged insuch and such a fashion. In the same way, the word “Nagasena” is simply an easyway to refer to the skandhas arranged in thus and such a fashion.

Thus, if we understand the concept of anatta as being the concept of no-soul,

then we can still preserve the idea that we are in fact pointing at something when wepoint at one another. We are simply not pointing to Atman when we do so. “Whatwe call a ‘being,’ or an ‘individual,’ or ‘I,’ according to Buddhist philosophy, is onlya combination of ever-changing physical and mental forces or energies, which maybe divided into five groups or aggregates.”24 There is something, just no unchanging and essential S omething.

Let us return to the Humean puzzle. Recall that the problem for Hume was thatthere is no impression of the self, and hence, strictly speaking, there is no idea of theself. What we appear to have is a bundle of perceptions. The problem with this viewis that for Hume anything that can be thought of as distinct is distinct. Each of these

impressions can be thought of distinctly; thus, they are each distinct. So what is it thatis holding the bundle together? It is tempting simply to infer the existence of a sub-stance that serves the purpose. However, to do so would violate the rules that Humehas laid out for himself. We have no impression of such a substance; hence, we haveno idea of such a thing that can serve the purpose of holding together the i mpressions.

Before attempting to determine whether or not the Humean puzzle is also aproblem for Buddhism, allow me to say a bit about the differing projects betweenHume and the Buddha. There is a large distinction between the underlying goals thatHume and the Buddha are seeking to achieve. Hume is attempting to make progressalong epistemic lines. That is, he is trying to explain all human knowledge. He is afterthe source of ideas. He is attempting to apply empirical science to human under-standing. He thus takes great pains to be rigorous in applying certain standards. Heholds that all knowledge begins in the senses and hence that this is the place to turnin any attempt to understand human knowledge.

The Buddha is attempting a quite different project. Hume’s drive is primarilycuriosity. The Buddha has a very practical goal. He seeks to explain the truth to othersso that they may attain nirvana. This is a state that he, the Buddha, has alreadyreached. Moreover, it is obvious to any who view him that he has attained such astate (or so Buddhist literature would have us believe). He speaks with authority,

while Hume has no special status that allows him simply to make metaphysical



claims without backing them up. Hume’s position binds him to giving epistemic justification for any claim that he chooses to make. The Buddha’s position is quitedifferent. He is an authority. Thus, when he makes a metaphysical claim, he need notgive an epistemic justification for the claim.

The view that he need not give epistemic justification is also consistent withclaims that the Buddha makes elsewhere regarding metaphysics. He refuses to an-swer certain questions because they are irrelevant to the goal of attaining nirvana. Heis essentially playing the role of field surgeon. Consider the following response madeby the Buddha when questioned about those who would refuse to follow his teach-ings unless he answers certain metaphysical questions:25

Malunkyaputta, if anyone says: “I will not lead the holy life under the Blessed One until

he explains these questions,” he may die with these questions unanswered by the Tatha-

gata. Suppose Malunkyaputta, a man is wounded by a poisoned arrow, and his friends

and relatives bring him to a surgeon. Suppose the man should then say: “I will not let thisarrow be taken out until I know who shot me; whether he is Ksatriya (of the warrior caste)

or a Brahmana (of the priestly caste) or a Vaisya (of the trading and agricultural caste) or a

Sudra (of the low caste); what his name and family may be; whether he is tall, short, or of

medium stature; whether his complexion is black, brown, or golden; from which village,

town, or city he comes . . . [;] the type of bow with which it was shot; the kind of bow-

string used; the type of arrow; what sort of feather was used on the arrow and with what

kind of material the point of the arrow was made.” Malunkyaputta, that man would die

without knowing any of these things.26

In the same way, anyone refusing to follow the Buddha because of certain unan-

swered questions would die without having attained nirvana.In a similar fashion we can imagine the Buddha asserting that it is also unimport-

ant how he knows what he knows. The important aspect of his teaching is what he isteaching, not how he knows it. The truth of his teachings would be evidenced by thefact that he has already attained nirvana. Consider the words of Bina Gupta: “Thechief aim of Buddha was to free people from sorrows and delusions of life. . . . Hume’saim was to analyze different ways of knowing and to discover the principles whichwould meet the most critical examination.”27

Thus, the Buddha has no need for the restrictions that Hume places on himself regarding what claims he can make. The Humean puzzle could remain, though. Asyet we have seen no way that the skandhas are held together. If there is no bindingelement here, then we seem to be left in no better state than Hume regarding a trueconception of what the self amounts to. Along with losing the self, we lose the Car-tesian Intuition. How does Buddha claim that the self is held together?

There are times when the bundle of skandhas is referred to as a river. Considerthe following: “O Brahmana, it is just like a mountain river, flowing far and swift,taking everything along with it; there is no moment, no instant, no second, when itstops flowing, but it goes on flowing and continuing. So Brahmana, is human life,like a mountain river.”28 However, after considering this idea it is tempting to ask

what exactly it is that constitutes the banks of the river. This is close to wondering if



it is the Soul that is binding the skandhas. Thus, it would be helpful to consider a dif-ferent possibility for the bundling agent.

Recall that one of the skandhas is that of mental formations, which includes allvolition. Volition would include will on the part of agents. Moreover, if we consider

the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination, the causal chain the recurrence of which is the source of our continued suffering, we find that there are two links to thechain that seem to fit in here nicely: craving and clinging. These two links on thecausal chain of dependent origination are also the only place where we can concen-trate action to interrupt the chain and hence stop the causal chain and reach nirvana. Thus, volition plays a major role in the continuation of the causal chain. Volitioncauses the continuation of the chain and binds the skandhas together. “Will, volition,desire, thirst to exist, to continue, to become more and more, is a tremendous forcethat moves whole lives, whole existences, that even moves the whole world.”29 Con-sider also the following explanation from Gupta: “Although Hume’s conception of

the self resembles Buddha’s conception of the self, the latter’s conception goes fur-ther than the former’s by explaining the continuity of seemingly separate percep-tions. . . . Each dhamma [event of consciousness] rises from the preceding perception,develops and then passes its links to the succeeding perception. Every phase of per-ception has within itself the potentialities of its predecessor.”30 It is the will of theprevious moments that carries forward and continues the binding of the skandhas inlater moments. Thus, the Buddhist conception of the self does not fall victim to theHumean puzzle. Both are bundles, but the Buddhist conception has a way to actu-ally do the binding.

Buddhism does not suffer the same fate as Hume. Recall, though, the earlier

claim regarding the Cartesian Intuition. This was the intuition that there must be someactor behind every action. Recall also the supposition that any conception of the self that fails to preserve this intuition is flawed. Can the Buddhist conception of the self preserve this intuition? If not, then even though it may resolve the Humean puzzle, itmay still need to be rejected. I think, however, that it can preserve the intuition.

At first it may appear that the Buddhist conception of the self is clearly contradic-tory to that conception offered by Descartes. It is true that Descartes wants to offer aview of the self as a mind at the center of the body that is doing the acting. In this wayit is a similar view to that of the Hindu conception of the Self. In Hinduism it is Atman that is at the center of the self and playing the role of perceiver. Just so, the robust “I”of Descartes plays the role of some sort of homunculus that sits within the body andperceives and interacts with the world. So it would seem that the Cartesian view hasmore in common with the Hindu conception of the self than the Buddhist concep-tion of the self.

Consider also the following: “So for Buddhists as well as for Hume there is nothinker, but only thought; no perceiver, but only perception.”31 As well as: “we can-not fail to notice how this Buddhist view is diametrically opposed to the Cartesiancogito ergo sum : ‘I think, therefore I am.’”32 If simply taken at face value, then itseems there can be no hope for maintaining the Cartesian Intuition. However, I think

that by taking a closer look we can preserve the intuition.



The benefit of the Cartesian view of the self was that it preserved the intuition thatthere must be something that is doing the acting every time there is action. Hume hasno way to preserve this intuition. If it were the case that it must be some soul or mindindependent of the body that is doing the action, then it would be true that Buddhism

also loses this intuition. It does not seem important, however, to preserving the Car-tesian intuition that the something taking action be a non-changing Soul. Recall thatpart of the Buddhist bundle of the self is the material skandha. Thus, action can takeplace because there is a body (or some material subject) performing said action.

It may be objected that there must be some kind of intent behind action in orderfor there to be an action. If there is no consciousness then there is only cause andeffect. Thus, there may be what appears to be action undertaken by the Buddhist self,but this is merely an illusion. What we think of as actions are merely the results of previous events. There are two comments I will make in response to this concern.First, recall that one of the skandhas is consciousness. Thus, the actions that we

undertake may be a result of intention on the part of agents.33

It must simply bespecified what these agents are. There is no reason to assume that agents must havea Soul or permanent substance serving as the self. I certainly experience intention inmy own being. Moreover, it certainly seems to stem from my own consciousness.This claim is independent of the claim that this consciousness is distinct from thebody. Thus, if there must be consciousness for action, the Buddhist conception of theself can still maintain action and an actor, just not an unchanging, permanent actor.Thus, the Cartesian Intuition is preserved. However, I think that even if this appeal tothe consciousness skandha fails, the Cartesian Intuition can still be preserved. It isthis which leads to the second comment regarding the worry over intent.

The second comment is a clarification regarding what exactly the Cartesian Intu-ition is. The Cartesian Intuition is the idea that when we say that some event is takingplace there is something to which we can point. The Intuition is silent on the natureof that thing at which we point. Thus, as long as Buddhism allows that we point atsomething — however impermanent it is — the Cartesian Intuition is preserved. Thereis no substance that contains the action or performs it. This does not mean that thereis no thing at which to point when an event takes place. Thus, the Cartesian Intuitionis again preserved, even if my discussion of consciousness is insufficient.

Conclusion

Just as it is a skandha that resolves the Humean puzzle for the Buddhist conceptionof the self, it is an individual skandha (possibly two) that preserves the Cartesian In-tuition. The Humean puzzle does not exist for the Buddhist conception of the self.Though it, too, is a bundle theory of constantly changing elements, one of thosechanging elements is capable of binding the others together. Moreover, the Buddhistconception of the self, while denying that there is a permanent Soul (Atman), canmaintain the Cartesian Intuition. This is because while there is no Soul, there remainsa subject to do the acting. The Buddhist conception of the self both resolves the Hu-

mean puzzle and maintains the Cartesian Intuition.



Notes

I would like to thank Bina Gupta, Robert Johnson, Don Seivert, Eric Roark, and par-ticipants of the SACP conference in Asilomar (2007), as well as two anonymous re-

viewers for helpful comments.1 – It is a debatable claim that this is the bedrock on which he bases all other

knowledge. The challenger is the claim that God exists. This comes from com-peting readings about certain passages in the Meditations, namely Meditation3, where he seems to imply that he can know nothing with certainty until heknows for sure that God exists. For a brief discussion on this issue see note 16in Peter Markie’s “The Cogito and its Importance,” in The Cambridge Compan- ion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge University Press, 1992).

2 – Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings

of Descartes, vol. 2, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Mur-doch (Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 13. All references to Descartes willrefer to this translation and edition of this work.

3 – This is reminiscent of a passage by the Taoist philosopher Chuang-Tzu, whofamously claimed that after dreaming that he was a butterfly he was no longersure whether or not he was Chuang-Tzu and had dreamt that he was a butterfly,or if he was the butterfly now dreaming that he was Chuang-Tzu. See the finalparagraph of chapter 2 in the Palmer/Breuilly translation, The Book of Chuang- Tzu (Penguin), p. 20.

4 – Descartes, Meditations, p. 14.

5 – Ibid., p. 17.

6 – Ibid., p. 19.

7 – Though this intuition may quickly weaken if we require the deceived to be anagent. For example, a dog is not an agent, yet is capable of being deceived, aswhen a participant in a game of fetch “fakes the throw.”

8 – Hume uses the example of a political community, though he uses the exampleto different ends.

9 – This entire discussion is parasitic on Anscombe’s criticism of Descartes foundin “The First Person,” in Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, ed. S. Guttenplan (Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 45–65. For this reason,the criticism offered here could be called the Anscombean objection, as well asthe Buddhist objection.

10 – The current discussion is not to imply that this argument is invalid, but is m erelybegging the question. If we think of the premise as being a claim of “I” and of “thinking,” then Descartes gets himself as existing rather trivially. Thus, the

question at issue here is whether or not he is entitled to assume the “I” in the



first place. See also Hintikka’s “Cogito ergo Sum: Inference or Performance,”Philosophical Review 72 (1963).

11 – Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (Grove Press, 1959), p. 26.

12 – Admittedly, it would be difficult to give a stronger argument than one based onphenomenological experience. However, it would also be difficult to think of anyone denying the phenomenological experience. If someone did, it seems asthough the only appropriate response might simply be to put a great deal of stress in one’s voice and say “Oh, come on!” Though this is not an argument, itwould seem to be an appropriate expression of disbelief. Of course, the Bud-dhist would probably admit such an experience, citing it as one of the primarydifficulties regarding reaching nirvana.

13 – This is the same idea as the Ewing intuition arguments for dualism in philosophyof mind. There is an intuition that the pain in my leg is not simply some neuro-

logical event occurring in my head, but some kind of pain occurring in my leg. Just so, Descartes’ self seems phenomenologically to exist.

14 – David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition (Ox-ford University Press, 1978), p. 631. All quotes from Hume refer to this edition.

15 – Ibid., p. 252.

16 – James Giles, No Self to Be Found (University Press of America, 1997), p. 123.

17 – Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 261.

18 – Ibid., p. 634.

19 – Ibid., pp. 635–636.

20 – For more of this discussion by Penelhum, please see his Themes in Hume (Ox-ford University Press, 2000), most specifically, chapter 2, “Hume on PersonalIdentity.”

21 – These are the English translations for the skandhas as provided by Rahula in hisWhat the Buddha Taught, pp. 20–23. A change in how they are translated mayaffect what is said below regarding Descartes and what I am calling the Carte-sian Intuition. The effects of a change regarding the discussion of Hume should

be minimal if there are any changes at all.22 – Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, p. 66.

23 – Milindapanha, as translated in A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, ed. Sarva-palli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore (Princeton University Press, 1957),pp. 283–284.

24 – Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, p. 20.

25 – There are specifically ten questions that he will not answer; Rahula lists them asfollows: “(1) is the universe eternal or (2) is it not eternal, (3) is the universe fi-

nite or (4) is it infinite, (5) is soul the same as body or (6) is soul one thing and



body another thing, (7) does Tathagata exist after death, or (8) does he not existafter death, or (9) does he both (at the same time) exist and not exist after death,or (10) does he both (at the same time) not exist and not not-exist”? (Rahula,What the Buddha Taught, p. 13).

26 – Ibid., p. 14.27 – Bina Gupta, “Hume and Buddha,” International Philosophical Quarterly 17 (2)

( June 1977): 142–143.

28 – Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, pp. 25–26.

29 – Ibid., p. 33.

30 – Gupta, “Hume and Buddha,” p. 145.

31 – Ibid., p. 138.

32 – Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, p. 26.

33 – Buddhist consciousness is actually very complicated, and I hesitate to makewhat appears to be such a simplistic claim about it. However, a deeper expla-nation would be a very large detour from the goal of the present work. Thus,though important, I will set the issue aside for another time and place.



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cartesian intuitions, humean puzzles, & the buddhist conception of the self

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