carnegie centennial...transcript not checked against delivery mr. giordano: you’re welcome....

CARNEGIE CENTENNIAL

CAN THE UNITED STATES AFFORD TO LEAD THE WORLD? CAN IT AFFORD NOT TO?

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2011

9:15 A.M. ET

WASHINGTON, D.C.

MODERATOR:

Robin Lustig,

Presenter,

BBC “The World Tonight”

SPEAKERS:

Jessica T. Mathews,

President,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Chas W. Freeman, Jr.,

Chairman of the Board,

Projects International Associates

Dmitri Trenin,

Director,

Carnegie Moscow Center

Ashley Tellis,

Senior Associate,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Transcript by Federal News Service

Washington, D.C.

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery

RICHARD GIORDANO: Good morning, and welcome. Thank you for coming to what promises to be a very stimulating day. As you know, this is the hundredth year of the existence of the Carnegie Endowment. We were founded by the steel magnate, Andrew Carnegie, in 1910 with a grant of $10 million – which, by the way, in that era was not an insignificant sum. His purpose in setting up the institution was, and I quote, “To hasten the abolition of war, the foulest blot upon our civilization.” Then he went on and urged that we consider that we would remove, I quote, “The next most degrading of the remaining evil or evils whose banishment would most advance the progress, elevation and happiness of man, and so on from century to century without end.” [00:02:16] One can only marvel at Mr. Carnegie’s optimism and, of course, his confidence in the powers of future Carnegie scholars and leaders. But in truth, looking back over the bloody 20th century, one could conclude that his goal was unattainable. Perhaps another even more famous quotation will guide us in the future, which is: It is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness. Hence, over the intervening decades, the endowment had steadily and diligently promoted alternatives – strong diplomacy, deterrence, defense; active, peaceful engagement; and not least, positive, constructive American leadership. You will find in the foyer the history of the Carnegie endowment over the last hundred years. I encourage you to take a copy and read it. The book does not attempt a comprehensive history, but rather investigates the elusive question of impact. The various stories illustrate how the Carnegie Endowment has influenced the making of policy by the United States and other governments, by multilateral institutions, NGOs and businesses as well. It’s a remarkable tale. Today, as you know, Carnegie is in the middle of implementing its global vision of becoming through the creation of centers in Brussels, Beirut, Moscow and Beijing a truly globalized think tank and approaches the problems of the world not solely from the point of view of Washington but from many, many other perspectives. [00:04:17] The breadth of our work today will be on display in the two panels that we are going to have this morning. The first will examine America’s future role in this changing world. The second will look at the economic and political challenges facing the world due to the explosion of middle classes in countries such as China, India and Brazil. This will be followed by lunch and a conversation with His Excellency Husain Haqqani, the ambassador of Pakistan, who has just returned and returned in the wake of bin Laden’s capture. And then finally this afternoon, we will have a BBC TV debate on the subject of the Arab Spring and where it’s heading. It promises to be a riveting day, so please stay with us. And now I’d like to turn it over to Mr. Lustig. ROBIN LUSTIG: Thank you so much.


MR. GIORDANO: You’re welcome. [00:05:12] MR. LUSTIG: Good morning, everybody. My name’s Robin Lustig. I work for the BBC. First I would like to say thank you to the Carnegie for having invited us to be part of this day. Second, I would like to thank you for coming and helping us and to warn you that although you may not have understood this when you decided to come here, that you are going to form part of a radio program, which is going to be broadcast later on today in the U.K. on BBC Radio 4, which is the main speech and news channel of BBC Radio, which will air at 10:00 p.m. London time, 5:00 p.m. Eastern, available online to you either live or as a podcast or online in the days to come. Because of that, during the course of the next hour or so, I will say one or two things which will make no sense of all in the context of the Carnegie conference, but which make a kind of sense in the context of a radio show. So just forgive me when I do that. I need also to ask you to switch off your cellphones, please – not just put them on “silent,” because unfortunately if they’re on “silent” and they receive an incoming signal, we hear it, and our listeners will hear it, and they will be puzzled. Secondly, there will, of course, be an opportunity for you to participate in the discussion, question and answers. I would ask you, as always, first to wait until a microphone reaches you; secondly, to identify yourself both by name and institution, nation, embassy, think tank, wherever it is you come from and whoever it is pays your salary. I’m most grateful to our panelists who are going to join us up here. We hope to have a lively and interesting exchange of ideas. I’ve already told them that they are allowed to interrupt each other. I hope they will do so, but of course always with immense politeness and courtesy. I’m going to ask each of them just to say a few words so we can check that all the microphones are working. Jessica, a couple of words? [00:07:11] JESSICA T. MATHEWS: Well, good morning, Robin. Mine seems to be working. ASHLEY TELLIS: Good morning, Robin. MR. LUSTIG: Say that again. MR. TELLIS: Good morning, Robin. MR. LUSTIG: That worked. Chas? CHAS W. FREEMAN, JR.: Good morning, Robin. How are you? MR. LUSTIG: Dmitri. DMITRI TRENIN: Good morning, Robin. [00:07:23]


MR. LUSTIG: All the microphones are working. OK, should we go? Let’s go. You’re listening to a special recorded edition of – I’ll do that again. You’re listening to a special recorded edition of “The World Tonight” with Robin Lustig in Washington. Whenever an American president turns up in London, he’s treated as the most powerful man in the world. But the world has changed a lot over the past decade, and it may well be that the U.S. is no longer the power that it once was. What about China or India; what about Brazil, Turkey – all of them rapidly emerging as increasingly powerful on the world stage? So tonight, we’re going to discuss America and power. Does it still have it? Does it still want it? Can it still afford it? We’re at one of Washington’s grandest and most historic hotels, the Willard, where presidents down the ages have held court, sitting in the lobby listening to representations from all and sundry. This is where the word lobbyist was first used. We’re the guests of the foreign policy think tank, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which is marking its centennial this year. With me are a panel of distinguished Carnegie analysts and an audience of diplomats, scholars, and I suspect, a few lobbyists. So let me introduce our panel. They are Jessica Mathews, who is the president of the Carnegie Endowment; Dmitri Trenin, who is the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center; Ashley Tellis, a former State Department official who was closely involved in negotiating the nuclear agreement between the U.S. and India; and Chas Freeman, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who was President Nixon’s main interpreter when he visited China in 1972. [00:09:05] I want to start by – I want to start by asking each one of you a simple question. And I just want to get a couple of sentences from you as an answer. Starting with you, Jessica Mathews, do you think that the U.S. still wants to be the world’s most powerful nation? MS. MATHEWS: It’s not a simple answer. I think it’s a – it’s a little bit schizophrenic about it. It expects to be, but it doesn’t always want to pay the price anymore. MR. LUSTIG: Now, when you say “pay the price,” do you mean the financial price? MS. MATHEWS: I mean in part that, but I also mean the responsibility price that goes with attempting to both shape policy and enlist followers. That – I think there’s a lot more ambivalence in the American public. MR. LUSTIG: Ashley, tell us, what do you think? MR. TELLIS: I think on the level of intentionality, there is clearly a desire to stay the world’s preeminent power, but when that comes to constructing a set of policies internally to support that objective, I think it becomes a lot more diffuse. [00:10:12] MR. LUSTIG: Chas Freeman?


MR. FREEMAN: We’ve come to specialize in military power. Our political and economic power has ebbed. There’s nobody in charge in the world now, but we are the only country with the military prowess to reach every corner of the globe. So there’s a natural tendency by Americans to want to hold onto that military predominance. MR. LUSTIG: Dmitri Trenin, you usually watch these people from your perch in Moscow. As you watch them, do they give you the impression that they still want to be the dominant power? MR. TRENIN: Well, I think that there’s no question that the United States is the most powerful nation in the world, by far more powerful than anyone else. MR. LUSTIG: Militarily or more than militarily? MR. TRENIN: Globally it’s military that’s – in terms of economic power, in terms of soft power, the United States is still the predominant nation. However, the unipolar moment, as it was known some time ago, was a moment. And – MR. LUSTIG: And that moment has passed? MR. TRENIN: It is passing, which is a good thing, I believe, for the world and for the United States itself. [00:11:22] MR. LUSTIG: Let’s explore some of – let’s explore some of those ideas in just a couple of moments, but I thought it might be useful if we heard from a place where U.S. military power has been very much in action over recent weeks – not perhaps in the same way as it has been in Afghanistan or Iraq. The U.S. has, of course, been playing an essential role in the NATO-led military intervention in Libya. But it’s been an intervention in which Washington has looked as if, at least, it wanted to take a backseat. So what do they make of that in Libya? “The World Tonight’s” Paul Moss has been talking to anti-Gadhafi fighters in eastern Libya. [00:12:03] (Audio clip begins.) PAUL MOSS (reporter, BBC Radio’s “The World Tonight”): We met the rebel soldier in the front-line town of Ajdabiya. He was preparing for an assault on Colonel Gadhafi’s troops, an assault which had been made possible only because NATO had destroyed Gadhafi’s tanks. So who did the soldier thank for NATO’s help? MR. : (In a foreign language.) MR. MOSS: It was President Sarkozy, he said, who had pushed NATO into action in Libya. I mentioned the contribution of the United States, Britain and others. But it was only the French president who seemed to have made an impression. MR. : (In a foreign language.) MR. MOSS: When President Sarkozy took charge, he said, that’s when we saw some serious bombing. Sarkozy is the one behind NATO. It was the same story when I talked to a group of pro-democracy activists camped out in the center of Benghazi. They were all, it seemed, newfound Francophiles.


Which country do you think has been helping the most in the battle against Colonel Gadhafi? MR. : I think it’s France. They are really helping. This is what most of the Libyans think that is the country which is giving the most help. MR. MOSS: What about the United States? MR. : Their role has been reduced, you know. [00:13:17] MR. MOSS: You could argue that was the idea. President Obama has always said that he wanted the U.S. to lead from behind in Libya. Having been burned by the experience of Iraq, America’s intervention here has been based on consensus and coalition, but the cost perhaps of that stance is that America doesn’t seem to be winning too much credit for helping Libya’s revolution. People here are very cautious anyway about Uncle Sam’s assistance. MR. : The Libyan people want the American help, but they don’t want the troops, the bases and killing. They don’t want what’s happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. MR. MOSS: Idris Abidir (ph) is editor of the new Libyan newspaper Al Saud (ph). He believes the U.S. has been forced to take the multilateral route in Libya. MR. : There’s more powers rise up in the world right now. We can see the Russia, India, China – they have to cooperate with those countries because if United States stay in the corner and the whole war stay in a corner this is going to be a big mistake and a big problem for American government. [00:14:21] MR. MOSS: You can already see signs of China’s influence in Libya. In the biggest indoor market, Suug Jareed (ph), many of the goods are now Chinese-made. In fact, in the last year, Chinese direct investment in Libya has soared. And it turned out that one of the shop owners here – (name inaudible) – had actually been to China to buy up stock. But right now – (name inaudible) – is rather angry with China because China refused to support the Libyan rebels at the United Nations. When it came to the U.N. resolution which authorized NATO intervention in Libya, China abstained. And for – (name inaudible) – that was a betrayal. MR. : China – they had a lot of projects, a lot of construction, a lot of work. And now all of a sudden we have a problem in Libya, a revolution is going on, and all of a sudden they don’t want to support that. I don’t understand why. I think it’s crazy on their part not to support it. Does that mean they want Gadhafi to take over again, or what is the deal? I definitely don’t like it. MR. : (In a foreign language.) MR. MOSS: And neither, it seems, do the people who hope to form Libya’s first democratic government. The National Transitional Council is the outfit now effectively running the east of the country. After one of the council’s meetings, I found council spokesman Mahmoud Tarsan (ph) in relatively undiplomatic mood. China’s behavior, he said, would be remembered.


MR. : I strongly feel disappointment, because I think China, they stand beside Gadhafi. And I think once the revolution achieve its optimum end and we would get rid of Gadhafi, I think there would be recalculation of the status of the relationship with China. [00:16:07] MR. MOSS: It might be tempting to see this as being to America’s advantage. If a new democratic Libya does emerge and if it does bear a grudge against China, perhaps it would turn instead to the U.S. for support and allegiance. But international relations is rarely a zero-sum game. One nation’s loss does not necessarily mean another benefits. And among those political activists camped out in the center of Benghazi, it was hard to find any real affection for American influence. Instead, there was more a cold calculation of what was in Libya’s interest. MR. : To finish Gadhafi, we don’t care. If we have to bargain with the devil to finish him, we are willing. And then afterwards, we can do what we want. MR. MOSS: Do you think the United States will remain the strong country it is? MR. : I don’t think so. Whatever goes up must come down. I mean, if I told you 20 years ago that Russia will collapse, it (had been no way ?). So America, I don’t think – (inaudible) – stay big power in the world. MR. MOSS: So who do you think is going to be the next big power? MR. : Libya. (Chuckles.) (Audio clip ends.) [00:17:09] MR. LUSTIG: So that report there from Paul Moss in eastern Libya. The question then that many people are asking is whether the way that the U.S. has been dealing with the Libya crisis is an example of how it intends to deal with other crises in the years to come. Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter is professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. Until just a few months ago, she was at the heart of the U.S. foreign policymaking process as director of policy planning at the State Department. I asked her, is the Obama strategy now to lead from behind? (Audio clip begins.) MS. SLAUGHTER: No. I don’t think you could say this was leading from behind. Until the United States threw its weight behind an intervention, an intervention wasn’t going to happen. What the president said in his speech, I think, has got it exactly right. He said we created the coalitions and the conditions for others to step up. Once we did that, we stepped back and let others take the lead in the sense of the day-to-day responsibility. That’s a good thing. The United States doesn’t have the resources, either political or financial, to be out front in every case. But we played a critical role, and it wasn’t from behind, in enabling others to be able to do what they’re doing. [00:18:32]


MR. LUSTIG: When people talk about power on the world stage, they tend to think in the first place of military power, but of course, economic power is also of enormous importance. And in that respect, China becomes increasingly important. Does the U.S. genuinely believe that it can find some way to coexist as a major economic power with China, or does it still see China as a potential threat? MS. SLAUGHTER: Oh, we can certainly coexist with China, but I do have to say the largest economy in the world, the larger -- largest investor and the largest donor is the EU. In total numbers, in terms of trillions of dollars, the size of economy, the amount of foreign assistance given, the amount of investment around the world -- indeed the EU is China’s largest trading partner. So from my point of view, there’s the EU, the U.S. – China is still well down below that, but as China rises and as India rises and other countries, there’s absolutely the possibility of a positive-sum solution rather than outright or destructive competition. [00:19:35] MR. LUSTIG: So should American voters then not be concerned that in this new global environment, the U.S. actually has less power than it used to have? MS. SLAUGHTER: I think the United States has more power but of a different kind of power. I think we are the most connected nation in a networked world. We’re the most connected economically. We’re the most connected by population flows in terms of all of our immigrants and their connections to the world. We are the most connected via social media. We are increasingly the most connected politically. So the kinds of power and the way you exercise power are changing for the better in many ways. And in that world, as long as we’re conscious of what we can do and what we can’t, we’re actually extremely well placed. (Audio clip ends.) MR. LUSTIG: That was Anne-Marie Slaughter, former director of policy planning at the U.S. State Department. Let’s go back now to our panel here in Washington. Chas Freeman, do you subscribe to this idea that there is a new kind of power in which the U.S. is still preeminent? [00:20:36] MR. FREEMAN: No, I don’t think so. I think the dominant feature of the emerging world order is that there is no center. There is a crisis of global governance at every level. Institutions that have been central to world affairs, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization to the IMF, the IBRD, NATO – all of these institutions are failing to deliver the public goods that were once expected of them. And the striking thing to me is that this is a crisis of global governance, in many ways similar to or at least as great as that which followed World War II, when these institutions were created. And they were created by American vision and leadership. There has been no such vision and no leadership in evidence in recent years. MR. LUSTIG: Jessica Mathews, do you think there is a new type of power, what’s sometimes called “soft power,” to do the spread of knowledge and information into connectedness, in which the U.S. is still dominant?


MS. MATHEWS: I’ve always thought power is the – is the capacity to determine outcomes. And I’ve never really – I’ve never liked the phrase “soft power.” To me it doesn’t mean very much. It’s – because it – among other things, it emerges seamlessly in the economic clout. But in terms of the – certainly countries feel able to say no to the U.S. in ways they did not 10 years ago. But Dmitri was absolutely right and, I think, sees it more clearly from outside the U.S. that we are the preeminent nation still. And you see it in Libya. Sarkozy may be getting the credit among the Libyan opposition, but there isn’t one day of NATO activity, one hour that can hour without U.S. contribution – military contribution, which absolutely – the U.S. is providing 75 percent of NATO’s budget. [00:22:42] MR. LUSTIG: Well, perhaps, Ashley Tellis, one of the things that has changed is the U.S. doesn’t shout about it as much as it used to. MR. TELLIS: And that’s perfectly fine. It’s all a function of what the issues are, what the stakes are, and what the circumstances are. And there will be moments where the United States has to be preeminent, seem to be preeminent and seem to be leading to the charge. And there will be other circumstances where the U.S. can achieve exactly the outcomes it wants without having to be front and center. I think Libya is one of those cases. MR. LUSTIG: But isn’t one of the points about power that people, A, should know that you have it; and B, that you’re prepared to use it? MR. TELLIS: Well, I don’t think Mr. Gadhafi at this point has any doubts about who has the power, because everything that NATO has been able to do in the last several weeks was really because of the military contribution the U.S. made in the first 48 hours. And if it wasn’t for those first 48 hours, which essentially cleared the field for all second-tier NATO militaries to operate, we would simply not be seeing the success that they currently have in the field. [00:23:44] MR. LUSTIG: Dmitri Trenin, there was a time when the world appeared to be dominated by two superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR. Looking now at the successor to the USSR, Russia, and the way in which the U.S., for what, a decade or so, had sole superpower status, does the U.S. look now as if it’s not prepared to use as much power as it still possesses? MR. TRENIN: Well, I think that it’s not so much the question of power but rather the questions of goals, objectives, why to use power. What’s the point of using power? And that’s – it – quite frankly, studied from the outside, you sometimes wonder what are the goals, what are the objectives? And sometimes you don’t have a question to that – an answer to that question. MR. LUSTIG: Let me see from the audience what questions you have, what thoughts you have. Raise your hand if there’s something you would like to ask. Wait for a microphone to come to you. This is your show. Yes, sir. Just wait for the mic. [00:24:58]


Q: Thank you. Paul Hanley. I’m the director of the Carnegie Center in Beijing, China. And so I’d like to continue on the question of China. In terms of where the world is changing, of course, there’s no greater place than China. But I think that in terms of this question, they are, as Jessica says, a little bit schizophrenic, whereas they would agree with Ambassador Freeman, I think, there’s a crisis in global governance. But yet at this point, they don’t appear willing to step out and play a larger role. But at the – on the other hand, they want a greater role in international organizations like the IMF, the World Bank; and I think you could even say that they see a need for significant change in terms of the international political order. So I guess my question would be to Ambassador Freeman and anyone else on the panel, how do you see this develop over the next few decades, and where will this create tension with the United States and the international community? And where might we be able to find some sort of accommodation for China’s changing role in this regard? MR. LUSTIG: Chas Freeman. MR. FREEMAN: I think the example of Libya that was cited and the Libyan complaints about China are very interesting, because they seem to imply that to be taken seriously, China must emulate the United States and become a global military power with the capacity to project the use of force everywhere on the planet. I don’t know that that is the Chinese ambition. I certainly think there are many in the world who would not welcome that. And I wonder why we see China as somehow deficient when it is not doing things that we probably would regret if it did. [00:26:43] MR. LUSTIG: Do you not think that China is beginning to come to the view that in order to safeguard its own interests most effectively, it does have to start doing some of the things that the U.S. used to do, which is to project its power globally? MR. TELLIS: I think in the case of Libya, again, 37,000 Chinese were evacuated from Libya. And this was the first time that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army/Navy had been deployed for that purpose so far afield. The Chinese air force actually flew as well to fields in Libya. So world events are obviously drawing the Chinese into a role that they may not have aspired to and which raises questions of the sort that I mentioned earlier. MR. LUSTIG: Jessica Mathews. MS. MATHEWS: But apart from military force, I mean, isn’t the – wasn’t the issue that we heard in that report China’s unwillingness to vote at the U.N. in support of the opposition to wield political power rather than military power? [00:27:45] MR. FREEMAN: Yes, that’s actually rather typical of the new era. The problem is the U.S. does not lead, although we are preeminent in most respects still. No one else wishes to step forward to lead. And on the issue of Libya, it wasn’t just China that abstained. It was Brazil and India and Germany. And so I – and Russia. I think the issue is, in the case of these countries, that they have a strong respect for sovereignty and do not wish to intrude in the way that Western Europeans sometimes want.


MR. LUSTIG: If we look, though, for a moment at what the American people think about China, as well as what the American government thinks about China, there was an opinion poll published quite recently which suggested that two-thirds of Americans believe that America is in decline. More than half believe that China is the nation that the world now looks to in terms of the future. And a rather extraordinary 63 percent according to these findings believe that the Chinese economy is actually more powerful than the U.S. economy, which of course is not yet the case. Ashley Tellis, do you see an inevitable tension between a rising China and a no-longer-rising United States? MR. TELLIS: Well, I think it’s possible. It’s not necessarily inevitable for two reasons. One, there is no reason to believe that the United States is in secular decline. We have been through periods where we have been in remission, as it were, historically and bounced back within a generation. [00:29:32] The second reason is there are real questions about whether China can sustain its ascendancy uninterrupted. I mean, there are fundamental questions of national power at the material level. Can China sustain its labor-force growth over time? Will China be able to emulate the United States in terms of technological change? If you don’t have these two building blocks of the puzzle that come together in virtuous ways, we could be faced with a situation where you have some continuation of what we know to be the current status quo. MR. LUSTIG: OK, but there have been signs, haven’t there, over the last two to three years of China beginning to play certainly a more overt regional role? Many of China’s neighbors have certainly noticed that. There was also a report just yesterday in a British newspaper suggesting that Pakistan is now inviting the Chinese navy to set up a military base in Pakistan, which if indeed it happens would be something quite huge. MR. FREEMAN: I think that report, by the way, was garbled. What the Pakistanis asked the Chinese to do was to build a naval base for Pakistan. MR. LUSTIG: Not for the Chinese navy? MR. FREEMAN: Not for the Chinese navy. MR. LUSTIG: OK. All right. [00:30:46] MR. FREEMAN: But it’s interesting. Of course, the world immediately leaps to the conclusion that you just – you just did and assumes that this is somehow evidence of a grand design by China to play a dominant role in a region around India, which I think is probably not true. MR. LUSTIG: But Jessica Mathews, do you think there is a popular suspicion of China here in the U.S., quite apart from what might be thought in think tanks and in government? MS. MATHEWS: Oh, absolutely, and not surprisingly. I mean, this – just as there was so in the 1980s about Japan when it seemed to Americans as though Japan was taking over the world economically and buying the Empire State building and all these iconic American –


MR. LUSTIG: And it’s jobs, isn’t it? Jobs go. MS. MATHEWS: Sure. And it’s economic – it’s economic growth, but Ashley points out things go up and things go down. And there’s a very long path before China becomes a preeminent world power. And I think there’s the very big question whether China wants to. Certainly, there was a year when we saw much more aggressive posture in the region, and then it pulled back. [00:31:54] I think what China’s evolution – the path it follows will depend heavily on whether the United States chooses to make it an enemy, a necessary enemy. But I think we make a big mistake in looking at temporary American weaknesses and extrapolating them and not paying attention to Chinese weaknesses of governmental legitimacy, of the economic issues, of being able to develop domestic consumption – lots and lots of things. MR. LUSTIG: Dmitri Trenin, these are issues, aren’t they, which Russia has to think quite carefully about, because looking to the future, sitting in Moscow, there are people who have to decide, is China the coming power, is America in decline; or is it, as Jessica Mathews suggests, a temporary blip? How do you think Russia is evaluating the – these trends? MR. TRENIN: Well, Robin, the change of fortunes between Russia and China has – over the last 20 years has been more dramatic than anything that has transpired in U.S.-Russian relations. Back in 1979 when China was starting its reforms, the GDP of China was 40 percent of the GDP of the Russian Soviet Republic, or then the Soviet Union. Today it’s four times larger. That’s one thing. [00:33:36] Another thing is that the Soviet Union waged two cold wars, one against the United States and its allies, and the other one against China. It’s one of the miracles of international relations that the passage from the cold war between Beijing and Moscow has been as smooth as it has been; that the relationship has been steady, stable and outwardly friendly. I don’t think that there is a fear of China that has seized the thinking of the Russian leadership. Someone told me a story recently when he talked to someone in India. That Indian person asked the question – asked the question of that very respected American, former American diplomat – and the question was, why is it that everyone in this part of the world seems to be afraid of China except for one country? Are they stupid? Are they oblivious? Or are they too focused on the United States? It’s an interesting way of putting that, but I think the answer is different. It’s not one of the answers suggested. I think that the Russians have – are learning to live for the first time ever with a China that is stronger than they are, more dynamic than they are, more – better connected in the world than Russia is, and they’re taking that little by little, incrementally. And this is, I would say, to the credit of the Russian political class. MR. LUSTIG: But the other point here, I guess, might be that Russia is becoming less and less obsessed with America and more interested in other potentially powerful nations. MR. TRENIN: Well, you know, if you’re a Russian, you’re not readily accustomed to dealing with stronger powers. The United States has been a given. China is something that’s only sinking in. And there’s no doubt that more and more Russians regard China as a country in a category which is above that of Russia. There was a recent, very interesting forecast prepared by the Russian Academy of Sciences, which had countries ranged in several tiers. At


the very top, there’s a country called the United States in a class of its own. The second tier is essentially shared by the European Union in economic terms and China in all other terms, in economic as well. Russia finds itself – according to those Russians – finds itself in a third tier of countries alongside Brazil, Japan, India, Turkey and a few others. [00:36:36] MR. LUSTIG: Let’s take another question. Yes, down here in the front. Just wait for the microphone. There you go. MARWAN MUASHER: I’m Marwan Muasher, vice president at Carnegie in charge of the Middle East program. One issue – one area of the world in which everybody agrees, acknowledges, even demands a leading role for the United States is the Arab-Israeli conflict. And yet the president gave two speeches last week on the conflict in which he laid out the general principles for a solution, explained the urgency of a solution to a pro-Israeli crowd at AIPAC and offered no steps. Should the U.S., you know, do more on the Middle East, or should – can the U.S. afford such a role in which it is expected it is the only party probably able to bring about a solution and yet offers no movement forward? [00:37:37] MR. LUSTIG: Jessica Mathews. MS. MATHEWS: (Chuckles.) I think the – I think that the right answer is no, it can’t afford just to wait, because, Marwan, as you’ve said on many occasions, when the dust settles from everything that’s happening in the Arab world now, the dust may very well settle in a much more dangerous arrangement than it begins from. But I think that the American body politic has reached the conclusion – has broken its sword on this conflict once too often and that President Obama in particular, having come to office determined to try to say to Israel, your current policies are not serving either your interest or ours, and reaching a point where domestic politics beat him back, has reached the conclusion that he has nothing more he can do. MR. LUSTIG: So the appetite isn’t there anymore, the appetite to get stuck in? MS. MATHEWS: I think that’s – I think that’s right. MR. FREEMAN: It’s one way – MR. LUSTIG: Chas Freeman. MR. FREEMAN: – one way that you could interpret the president’s audacious aspirations and cowardly failure to engage on this issue is that the issue is now beyond American control. The stakes are huge. And yet, the principal actors on this issue in the future are probably not going to be American diplomats, as in the past. [00:39:37] The issue is going to the U.N. General Assembly in September as a follow-on as what can only be regarded as a vote of no confidence in American leadership in the Middle East in February when the U.S. was obliged to veto a


resolution composed entirely of language drawn from previous American policy statements – (inaudible) – opposition of all 14 other members of the Security Council. And that resolution had been sponsored by (138 ?) member states. So the question – this question of the Middle East, which Marwan has raised, is in fact a signal, illustration of the ebb of American leadership. MR. LUSTIG: It’s quite a profound shift, isn’t it, particularly for those nations in the region if the U.S. no longer has the appetite that it once had to be a leader, to take diplomatic initiatives, to try to bring people together, then they have to come to terms with that, they have to reassess how they behave in the years to come. They have to get used to the idea perhaps that they’re going to have to sort this out without American help. [00:40:45] MR. FREEMAN: Well, I think that’s the implication of what has just happened. We have now got a position in the Middle East. We heard the lack of interest in American positions from the Libyan street. But I think it’s true that the conservative monarchs looked at the failure to back our protégé, Mr. Mubarak, to the end and saw an America that was both a faithless friend and an impotent protector. And they have, in fact, decoupled much of their policy now from the United States. I suspect Saudi Arabia is going to be a rival of the United States rather than an accomplice in American policy in the future. We also failed to convince the Arab street of our sincere devotion to democracy, since we ran around to the front of the parade rather late to pretend that we were leading it. And so I think we’re in a position now – and I’m just back from the region – in which we’ve made no new friends, and we’ve lost some old ones. MS. MATHEWS: I think it’s not so bleak. I – there’s a – there’s a lot that’s very good in the fact that America is not at the center of what’s – of what’s going on and it’s not even really almost at the periphery of what’s happening, of what’s convulsing the region. It’s about them and those countries. And the fact that it’s not about the U.S. also means it’s not about Israel. And that’s a good thing. But the – MR. FREEMAN: Whether it’s good or bad is – remains to be seen. [00:42:28] MR. LUSTIG: One of the givens used to be that the U.S. was involved in the Middle East because it needed Arab oil. It still needs Arab oil, doesn’t it? MS. MATHEWS: It does. It sure does. That’s why we’re being very quiet about Bahrain and not to mention Saudi Arabia. But that remains. Maybe this is the only way we’ll ever deal with climate change. (Laughter.) MR. LUSTIG: Well, there’s a thought. But Ashley Tellis, what do you make of this idea? I mean, Chas Freeman used the phrase the U.S. is an impotent friend. If that’s an impression that gains ground, what does that do to U.S. national interests if it is seen as impotent? MR. TELLIS: Well, I don’t think that is a universal judgment. I mean, it may be – MR. LUSTIG: You mean you disagree fundamentally with what he said?


MR. TELLIS: Well, I would disagree if Chas meant that as a universal description of the United States – MR. LUSTIG: I think he did. MR. TELLIS: – which I’m not sure he did. [00:43:20] MR. FREEMAN: No, no, I – in – I was describing the attitudes of monarchs in the region. MR. TELLIS: Right. Right. MR. FREEMAN: I was not describing my own view of the United States at all. MR. TELLIS: Then I think that is certainly, if you look at Asia, I don’t think any of the major Asian powers look at the United States as either impotent or disinterested. From China and all the countries radiating around China on the periphery, there’s a very clear view that the United States is powerful, that it ought to stay engaged, and that its presence in – on the Asian landmass is actually desirable for stability all around. And I would wager that the Chinese still have that view, at least at this point in time. MR. FREEMAN: I think so. MS. MATHEWS: And what about India? MR. TELLIS: I – oh, for India it’s actually important. It was quite interesting that when the prime minister came here during his last state visit, he launched into this (veneration ?) about the importance of the United States and its economic strength for India’s interests. And so from their point of view, as long as there is a tacit rivalry with China, they see the United States as playing this critical role of providing a nation balance. And so the view from New Delhi is very much that the U.S. has not left and should not. [00:44:39] MR. LUSTIG: Another question? Yes. Just wait for a microphone to reach you. Q: Well, thank you. I’m Anna Palacio, and I’m here as member of the board of the sister organization of Carnegie Endowment, which is Carnegie Corporation. And my question follows off on – follows up on Marwan’s. And, well, I think that we all hope that, Jessica, you are right, that the United States will bounce back. But do we have time to wait for a generation? And I link with Marwan’s question, because I think you all have said that the big challenge today is the international – I mean, the global governance, the international institutions and multilateral institutions. And you are absolutely right that in – after World War II, just United Nations and Bretton Woods, it was U.S. leadership. But now what is going to do the – what is the U.S. going to do? Do we have to wait for this generation? Are you really this generation? Are you going European? Are you self-doubting, self-deprecating? Can we afford – can the world afford to have U.S. just – elites just waiting for a generation? [00:45:58]


MR. LUSTIG: There is an interesting question there, isn’t there, for the rest of the world. I mean, do they come to terms with the world in which the U.S. perhaps plays a less assertive role, or do they come begging to Washington saying, please, please, please, go back to how you were because we liked it better that way? MS. MATHEWS: Well – MR. LUSTIG: Jessica. Jessica first. MS. MATHEWS: All right. I’ll – let me take a stab at it. I think the core strength of the United States that we will forget at our peril is that this country is the best at adapting to change of any country on the planet. Whether it’s political or economic, technological, this is a – we are fantastically good at adaptation to change at – and at fundamental change. On the other hand, I do think that we are living right now in a time when our politics has never been as broken as it is. I worked on Capitol Hill in the 1970s, and I don’t even recognize it as a place where – you know, where I spent some very productive time. MS. LUSTIG: Because? [00:47:12] MS. MATHEWS: Its capacity to do constructive work is just about gone. And, you know, when you – when you listen, for example, to the – to thinking about the coming debate over the U.S. debt limit, the assumption is that the best case will be that they will get up to midnight on the night before the deadline and then cobble something together. That’s not what we had as a Congress in the 1970s. Or in the 1960s, when you go back and read what the Congress of the United States did – fundamental change in civil rights and women’s rights and environment and a whole range of issues in the – and in fundamental economic policymaking in the 1960s and ’70s, you can’t recognize these as the same two institutions – just totally polarized, used to playing political gamesmanship up to the brink of the point of no return, totally lacking in a – in a(n) expectation that they themselves are constructive makers of deep government policy, as opposed to just, you know, political games players. I think it’s – it’s not broken; it’s sure in a very, very bad state. And – but I don’t think it’s a – it’s a generational time. I think we’re living through a time of tremendous transition where everybody – the Chinese, the French who are starting things they can’t finish, the U.S. – are all trying to figure out a new – a modus operandi, and we’re not there yet. But I wouldn’t ever bet against the United States. [00:49:12] MR. LUSTIG: Chas Freeman, can we just talk about cost for one second? Because one of the questions I asked at the beginning was, can the U.S. afford – MR. FREEMAN: Yeah. MR. LUSTIG: Still to be a dominant power? It’s a debate; isn’t it?


MR. FREEMAN: There is, in fact, no serious debate about a path to affordable security. It’s a debate we need to have. I agree: One should never discount the resilience of the United States. And we have many, many advantages which have not gone away. But the fact is, at the moment, we are fiscally hollow. Here are the figures. Federal government’s revenue from all sources, income tax, corporate tax, excise tax, Social Security, Medicare: $2.2 trillion. Federal government transfer payments to individuals, unemployment, pensions, health: $2.4 trillion. Before we even get out of that transfer box, we have to borrow $200 billion; $1.3 trillion, which is what it costs us to operate our government, much of it – most of it, in fact, devoted to military purposes – must all be borrowed, increasingly from foreigners. This is not a tenable situation. As Herb Stein’s mother famously remarked: If something can’t go on forever, sooner or later it will stop. (Laughter.) And so we are living with – in a state of denial which imperils our future. We will have a future, but we first have to deal with the crisis that is here in the present. And I agree: Our politics are infantile and incompetent, and that is not encouraging. [00:50:56] MR. LUSTIG: I think one of the things we do need to talk about is the relationship between the U.S. and Europe. Coming from where I come from, you’ll not be surprised to hear that. Is there anybody here who has any questions on that, any thoughts on that? Anne-Marie Slaughter was talking about the European Union as a major economic power, certainly not a major foreign policy power. Yes. Here and then at the back. Coming to your left. Q: Yes, Uri Dadush with the Carnegie Endowment, director of international economics. On Europe, in 20 or 30 years from now, no European country will be among the largest economies of the world, the seven largest economies of the world. This poses an enormous challenge, of course, for countries used to having a lot of weight in the world. And my question is for the panel: How does the United States navigate waters in which its historical traditional ally is sort of fading into insignificance relative to the rising emerging powers, the developing countries? MR. LUSTIG: Thank you. And there was a gentleman just to your left as well, I think, who – yeah. Pass the microphone there. Thank you. [00:52:14] Q: Thank you. Mike Castellano with Senator Reid. Under any circumstances it makes sense for the United States and the EU and EU member countries to work together, and obviously that happens to a certain extent now. But also, at least at the rhetorical level, over the past 10 years or so, it seems the focus has been a lot on the areas of conflict and tension, different approaches to Iraq and terrorism, climate change, trade issues, Iran. And so question is, do you all think that we are doing enough to work with the European Union and EU member countries, and what could (we ?) be doing to really enhance that relationship? MR. LUSTIG: OK, thanks.


There was one more question on Europe, I think, towards the back there. Yes, gentleman in the middle. Q: Good morning. My name is David (last name inaudible), and I’m the Carnegie director in The Hague of the Peace Palace, which is the host of the International Court of Justice. My question is on the U.S. and Europe, especially related to the public opinion. I think if you talk about the leadership issue in Europe, we are very much held back by developments in public opinion. In my country, the Netherlands, for instance, that was very visible, whether the debate was about Afghanistan, a third term of a period of action there. I just wonder what the views are in the panel on the role of public opinion in the U.S. Is that going to become bigger and bigger and maybe be an even stronger factor in leadership issues? Thank you. MR. LUSTIG: Thank you. Dmitri Trenin, would you like to just give us your thoughts on the U.S. and Europe, how it’s changing, how it might change? [00:53:54] MR. TRENIN: Well, I think it’s changed tremendously. Part of what we are talking about when we discuss global governance is that the global governance that is not – the global governance that was established in the wake of the Second World War was governance with a very clear leadership from the United States in a situation in which the Soviet Union and communism tremendously concentrated the minds in the United States and in Western Europe. So basically we’re talking about a period of the – that we call the Cold War, and we must realize that it was a war. And it did require tremendous concentration, also concentration in a very intellectual sense. This concentration is no more. And this is one of the causes, in my view, of the current crisis of governance, crisis of leadership, and that relates very much to the situation between the United States and Europe. There were many in the world at the end of the Cold War who thought that Europe would emerge as a pole, a center of power commensurate with that of the United States of America, that there would be “two Wests” in a way. But this did not happen. [00:55:27] And I think that part of the problem in the – as I see from very much, you know, a safe distance from all that, is that the relationship is extremely asymmetrical. People talk about Europe, but what is Europe? When people from Europe come to Moscow and complain about the Russian government tactics of dividing the European countries, it’s strange to hear that, because if the countries are divided in principle on so many issues, their foreign partners or their foreign interlocutors would only be exploiting those divisions. That’s the oldest rule in the book. And things are not changing. And this Libya war is yet another pretty graphic example of how disunited Europe is. People are having second thoughts about NATO. People have not seen the European Union playing a major role in all that, the European Union in terms of the European – the European institutions. So – MR. LUSTIG: But might one of the reasons – sorry to interrupt you – but might one of the reasons for that be that in an era where there is less dominant U.S. presence, let’s say within NATO, some of the intrinsic divisions become more evident because the U.S. is no longer setting a line and everybody just has to fall in behind them?


MR. TRENIN: That’s one reason. But then no one is – no one needs the United States the way they used to need the United States. The war – the Cold War was a very real thing. I spent a lot of time on both sides of the – of the Iron Curtain, and it was a very real thing. This is no longer there. And this – I think this has a cost, and the cost is that the relationship is what it is now. MR. LUSTIG: Chas Freeman. [00:57:27] MR. FREEMAN: I think there does need to be a recrafting of the European-American partnership. A great deal of what we demand from the Europeans is military in nature, and that is not their strength. I’ve just returned from Turkey, and I have – I’ve watched the transformation of Turkey through the accession process to the EU. It’s been a very powerful force for transformation on its periphery, and that’s relevant because now, on the southern side of the Mediterranean, we have societies like Egypt which are struggling to transform themselves. The Europeans probably are much better at that than Americans. And it would be appropriate for us to leave them behind with the Europeans as we assist the Arabs to realize the – their aspirations for self-determination. So I think we need to rethink this partnership, and the division of labor in it, to be less insistent that the Europeans do what we can do best and look to them to do what they can do best. MS. MATHEWS: Wouldn’t you think, though, that it has to become more balanced? I mean, do you see NATO as sustainable with the United States providing 75 percent of its budget? MR. FREEMAN: I think NATO is – well, first of all, NATO is of course operating in a sense in Libya, which has to be the most confused set of objectives and the least – the most incompetent military operation since the British performance in the Crimean War. It is not bringing – (laughter) – great credit – MR. LUSTIG: Kind of you to bring that up. Thanks. Mr. FREEMAN: Well (laughter). It is not bringing credit on NATO. Mr. Sarkozy may have convinced some Libyans that he is the reincarnation of Napoleon, but I don’t think the French voters have yet bought into that thesis. (Laughter.) And so we have a coalition of the willing within NATO. NATO is demonstrating its utility as a coordinating mechanism, as a facilitative organizational device for multinational military action. That’s very important. But it’s – we need to recognize that in most respects now, NATO is a cooperative security organization. It is not a collective security operation. Afghanistan is very likely to be the last major foreign expedition for NATO. MS. MATHEWS: My point was just, well, I think we’re overspending on defense – MR. FREEMAN: Oh, I agree. MS. MATHEWS: – demonstrably; Europe is under spending and needs to spend more. MR. FREEMAN: Probably. [01:00:10]


MR. LUSTIG: Ashley Tellis, let’s just pick up the Turkey idea for a moment, because there you have another country that is emerging as a diplomatic player. We saw Turkey get together with Brazil to put together an initiative to try to resolve the Iran nuclear issue. MR. TELLIS: Right. MR. LUSTIG: Washington stamped on that pretty hard. Now was that an example of a moment when the U.S. said, OK, we may not be throwing our weight around in the way that we used to, but we sure don’t want other people throwing their weight around? [01:00:40] MR. TELLIS: I don’t think it was exactly that. Where Iran is concerned with the nuclear program that’s specifically at issue, the U.S. has very critical national interests in how the Iranian problem works itself out. And when you have something that is so central to the security of the United States and important allies in the region, it’s very obvious that the U.S. will set the stage for trying to define the parameters of the solution. It’s natural, and it ought to do it. I mean, there are many players on the periphery who will seek solutions that they think may solve the problem but don’t. And so when there are important stakes, the U.S. simply has to set the boundaries. And this was one situation where I think the purported solution was no solution at all. MR. LUSTIG: Do you see a potential for future similar tensions as other powers try to become more active diplomatically but the U.S. says, that’s not exactly the way we want things to go; stop there? MR. TELLIS: Oh, absolutely. I would see this to be an increasing feature of the emerging international system. As states rise in preeminence, they will attempt to implement their own preferences. But this is where you see actually, to my mind, the real power of the United States. States are powerful to the degree that they can exercise their autonomy to shape certain outcomes. There is no other state in the international system with the margins of autonomy that the United States has. And so while people can contest out preeminence and can kind of cause us grief on the margins, they don’t have the capacity to produce outcomes against American opposition, and that to my mind, at the end of the day, is the measure of American autonomy. [01:02:28] MR. LUSTIG: The power to say no. MR. TELLIS: The power to say no. Another question? Yes, gentleman around here. Coming to your right. Q: I’m Moisés Naím, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. I wanted to ask the panel for examples of the positive consequences of a declining U.S. power. Are there moments, are there circumstances which is a good thing that the United States is more constrained or inhibited in its role in the world? MR. LUSTIG: A good thing for the U.S., or a good thing for the rest of the world? Q: For the world.


MR. LUSTIG: For the world. Chas Freeman. [01:03:06] MR. FREEMAN: Well, I think we were talking earlier about the Middle East. One of the consequences of a U.S. recession into the background in the Middle East may be that countries like Israel which have suffered from moral hazard, not having to weigh the long-term consequences of doing things in the present, will now have to face up to those consequences, and they may well make wiser decisions. Similarly, I don’t think it’s anything but good in the case of, let’s say, Latin America, where there’s been an obvious decoupling from American hegemony. I don’t think it’s a bad thing that countries have to take responsibility for their own affairs and can’t look any longer to North America to manage them, or blame North America for fail – for their own failures. So I see a world in which regions, as Ashley said, in the absence of a central hegemonic power, the regions are going to have to become more accountable for the – for what goes on in their own – in their own places. And I see that as a good thing, not a bad one. MR. LUSTIG: Dmitri Trenin. [01:04:24] MR. TRENIN: Well, I think it’s not so much the decline of the United States that we’re talking about; it’s the rise of other international players. There was a void created by the downfall of the Soviet Union, and at that time China has not yet risen, India has not yet risen. So there was an impression that the United States – an impression that was also the reality – that the United States was the hegemonic power in the world. But now a more normal state of affairs is becoming the reality. You have more countries taking responsibility in their own national interests. MR. LUSTIG: But do you see that as a good thing? MR. TRENIN: Well, I see that as a good thing. I see that as a good thing for several reasons. One is that some things are better resolved at regional levels. And regional powers, regional actors have more to say, more to contribute than the United States; second, because there’s a degree of collaboration between the United States and other countries which leads to less hostility toward the United States. The United States is seen more as a country that takes other people’s interests into account, that it’s prepared to collaborate on a more or less coequal basis. And lastly, I think it’s very important for the United States to spend more of its resources to strengthen its domestic base, because American power is not out there in the world. American power is concentrated in the United States of America. [01:06:03] MR. LUSTIG: So I wonder, Jessica Mathews, whether Iraq actually was a watershed, whether the way in which the U.S. dealt with the Iraq issue, and the way in which many countries around the world reacted to that, has led to this new U.S. posture of being less assertive, more consensual, more interested in letting other people go out in front. MS. MATHEWS: I think that’s a – judging whether that was a turning point of some kind is probably something we can only do with more distance. But it seems to me that the changes we’ve been talking about have very little to


do with Iraq and – but rather with, you know, underlying forces, both economic and political in the world that are much broader and much deeper than that terribly misguided adventure. MR. LUSTIG: And do you see those as positive things, the changes that you observe? MS. MATHEWS: Not all of them. I would agree with what both Dmitri and Chas Freeman said, that when more and more issues are seen without this shadow that somehow either the U.S. is responsible for their solution or responsible for making them unsolvable, but rather as issues that the players have to grapple with on their own, the better – some of them, anyway – will be. MR. LUSTIG: Ashley Tellis, do you see positive outcomes as a result of these changes that we’re discussing? [01:07:47] MR. TELLIS: I think there are positive outcomes in some constrained fashion. But from my point of view, they’re not preferred outcomes. I would much prefer to see the United States protect its strength, and with a double share of wisdom, use that strength to produce outcomes that are to our advantage, rather than have to reconcile itself to a reality where you have positive outcomes produced simply because we are weak. I think, over the long term, the latter may have some transient benefits, but it’s not in the long-term interests of the United States. MR. LUSTIG: Let me just ask each of you about an event that we haven’t discussed yet, the killing of Osama bin Laden, because in many places around the world, that was seen as a moment, to some people’s surprise, when, gosh, look at that: The U.S. can still hit hard. Was that – was that a really significant moment, Jessica Mathews? MS. MATHEWS: If there were people surprised by it, if you’re right, there were people – then, yes, it was very significant. I don’t think they should have been surprised. MR. LUSTIG: Was it seen here as a significant event? MR. MATHEWS: Absolutely. I mean, it was seen at least as a tremendously vindicating event; that we don’t give up on things that we see as central to our interests, and that we have the military capacity. But that should not surprise anybody either. [01:09:10] MR. LUSTIG: Dmitri Trenin, how did it look to you? MR. TRENIN: Well, if people were surprised in Russia, they were surprised that Osama bin Laden had not been killed by the United States before. (Laughter.) MR. LUSTIG: Chas? MR. FREEMAN: Well, I think it vindicated our military power, the capabilities of our intelligence apparatus. It took quite a while. But I don’t think it vindicated our values. There was no color of due process to this extrajudicial execution of a man unarmed in his bedroom. So while I feel emotionally very satisfied and I think he deserved to die and I’m glad after 10 years we managed to pull that off, I am disturbed by the context in which it


occurred, because it suggests to me that he not only transformed the world by forcing us all to walk through metal detectors at airports, but in more fundamental ways. MR. LUSTIG: Ashley Tellis, do you think it had a significant effect on the way in which people look at the U.S. and its use of power? MR. TELLIS: Well, I think it was – it was – it was a confirmation that the U.S. could do things when it sets its mind to it. MR. LUSTIG: And was prepared to do it. MR. TELLIS: And was prepared to do it. But this was a very special case, I mean. Osama bin Laden had kind of – had etched himself on our consciousness in ways that we could not have been expected to do any different. But I agree with Jessica completely that if anyone thought that American special forces could not pull this off eventually, then they need to go back to the books and take a closer look at what they could do. [01:10:51] MR. LUSTIG: I need to hear from somebody at the back of the room. You’ve been very quiet. Yes, there’s a gentleman there and just to his right. Q: Bill Goodfellow, Center for International Policy. I think one of the tests – Jessica talks about the lessons of Iraq – one of the tests will be Iran. Israel and Israel’s friends in this country, people like John Bolton, seem quite eager to attack Iran, and Iran on the other hand seems eager to become a nuclear power. I guess the question is, how likely is a confrontation, and is there a mediating role that Europe can play? MR. LUSTIG: Thank you. And if you’d just pass the microphone to your right; I think there was a gentleman just to your right. Yeah. [01:11:30] Q: Robert Pearson. I’m the president of the International Research and Exchanges Board. A comment on Turkey. I think that it is obvious that in a nonbipolar world, countries, especially emerging countries, will play the game according to their own basic interests. And in the long run, an example like Turkey is a very positive one, although in the short term and medium term, there are likely to be very sharp differences over fundamental interests. In the 19th century, the public dialogue between Britain and the U.S. was often quite hostile, but the fundamental interests of the two countries, over the long term, were aimed in the same direction. So I would hope that when we’re talking about how the U.S. plays its role in the world, the more the U.S. creates a common space in which common interests can be dealt with, it will pursue its role of leadership. Thank you. MR. LUSTIG: Thank you. Ashley Tellis, on Iran, first of all. MR. TELLIS: I fear that the time for easy solutions has passed. Unless there are fundamental changes in the domestic politics of Iran, I just don’t see this as having a happy ending because the consequences of a gradual


Iranian evolution towards real nuclear capabilities is going to rile the gulf in ways that would really complicate the security environment, and both force this president or his successors to do something to prevent that outcome. MR. LUSTIG: In other words, use U.S. power. MR. TELLIS: Use U.S. power and possibly even use force. I don’t like the idea. I think it would be enormously costly for all the entities concerned. But I simply don’t see how on the current trajectory we are likely to be able to convince the Iranians that they ought to buy into the solutions that we’ve (been tabling ?) for the last few years. [01:13:29] MR. LUSTIG: Jessica Mathews. MS. MATHEWS: I think if there was ever an American administration that would have – that would go to war with Iran, it was the Bush administration. They tried desperately to produce a war plan that the U.S. military found – had any reasonable chance of success. And after years and years and years of trying, they couldn’t. And so I think it’s highly unlikely we’re going to go to war with Iran. On the other hand, I do think that the moment probably passed many years ago when, absent fundamental political change in Iran and Iran’s choice to change, that this could be reversed. I think there are possible ways to turn or – to change the balance of cost and benefits as Iran sees them to going nuclear in a face-saving way, but only if the Iranian government wants to do that. This government has made it very clear that it doesn’t. And we’ve been negotiating with ourselves for almost 10 years. So it’s political change that’s the key. [01:14:50] MR. LUSTIG: But if you’re right, Ashley Tellis, that it is indeed a fundamental U.S. national interest that Iran should not be nuclear-capable, then the question becomes: Is the U.S. prepared to use what power it has in order to safeguard that national interest? MR. TELLIS: I think that is the question that will confront this president and his successors, because the alternatives are simply to rely on a system of deterrence, to accept that the Iranians will one day down the line become a nuclear power, and that the system of deterrence will be robust enough; that is, it will not only prevent Iranian misbehavior, but it will also deter Iran’s neighbors from seeking to develop their own capabilities to deal with the Iranian challenge. MR. LUSTIG: Let’s move on to Turkey, then. Chas Freeman, you were talking about Turkey earlier as something – the – a country that needs to be taken seriously. MR. FREEMAN: Oh, indeed. I don’t know of another country whose cooperation or acquiescence is as essential to so many important strategic issues. MR. LUSTIG: Why? [01:15:55]


MR. FREEMAN: You basically can’t run policies toward the Caucasus, the Black Sea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, the eastern , the Balkans, Russia, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, the Islamic countries, the Mediterranean – MR. LUSTIG: That’s quite a list. (Laughter.) MR. FREEMAN: – unless you have the Turks. So, the Turks – I think Ambassador Pearson is absolutely correct; there are going to be some confrontations as the Turks assert their own specific interests in these contexts. But in the end, the importance of Turkey to Europe, to the United States, to Russia, to China, to India, to Brazil, even, is undeniable. MR. LUSTIG: Dmitri Trenin, do you see Turkey as important? MR. TRENIN: Well, I see Turkey as very important, and I think that for the reasons that Chas has just mentioned. It’s a country which if you look at that part of the world from Moscow, that’s your – that’s your geopolitical partner. That’s a country that you would want to engage if you wanted to have peace in the Caucasus; that’s the country that you would want to engage to keep the Black Sea to its lateral powers; that’s the country you would want to engage if something happens with regard to Iran and the Middle East more broadly. So it’s a very important country. It’s very interesting, again, how the relationship has changed. I always argue with my Turkish friends how many wars Russia and Turkey had waged. They say 14; I say 11. It’s – it may not matter for the Russians that much, because we think we won them all. (Laughter.) But from a relationship of historical rivalry, and I would even say enmity – and again, Turkey was a Cold War ally of the United States against the Soviet Union – but now when you look at Turkey, this is – this is what, you know, the beaches of the Black Sea used to be. That’s a country that draws 2 ½ million Russia holidaymakers per year. That’s a country that does not require you a visa when you travel there. That’s a country that, you know, builds things in your own country; that’s a – that’s a partner of choice. And this is how much the relationship has changed in the last 20 years, for the better. MR. LUSTIG: I want to raise one other issue, which is often discussed in Europe, and that is whether a U.S. which becomes less assertive internationally is also a U.S. which becomes more isolationist, a U.S. which turns its back on the rest of the world. Do any of you see that as part of what’s happening now? Chas Freeman? [01:18:46] MR. FREEMAN: I think the fundamental issue facing Americans and the one that will determine our relationship with the world is not any of the things we’ve been talking about, but whether we can achieve domestic renewal, whether can – we can rediscover the values of our republic, the civil liberties that distinguished us and the aspiration to higher standards that caused many in the world to look with admiration on the United States. So we will have great economic power regardless of whether we have some bad times before us. We are a very large society with dynamic politics, at the moment dysfunctional, but we have shown in the past that we can be decisive. And we will have great military power, perhaps less than we do now, but still great military power for as far as the eye can see. So it’s not these things that will determine whether we play a leadership role. It’s whether we rediscover ourselves. MR. LUSTIG: Jessica Mathews, do you detect an isolationist wind?


MS. MATHEWS: I don’t; I think that – happily, I think that period in our history is over. I think too many Americans see their lives, their economic lives and even their cultural lives in a global framework for that ever to be a defining characteristic of the U.S. again. MR. LUSTIG: Ashley Tellis, was 9/11 the moment that foreign policy became a domestic issue, a security issue? [01:20:25] MR. TELLIS: Well, it was one of many moments. I mean, foreign policy has been a domestic issue, I think, ever since the Second World War, in different ways. But on the question that you asked, I just don’t see isolationism today as a viable option. Necessity forces us. MR. LUSTIG: But is it a political – is there – is there a political momentum? MR. TELLIS: No, I don’t see that. I don’t see that. And if anything, I think our deepening engagement and interdependence with the global economy is going to put us in a position where we have to engage abroad. The terms of engagement have changed, but I certainly don’t see us having the option to opt out. I think those days are gone. MR. LUSTIG: It’s interesting, Dmitri Trenin, because in Russia, it would be possible to argue that there is much less of a – of an interest in the globe than perhaps was the case during the Cold War. Now – is Russia more interested now in its own domestic affairs than perhaps its immediate neighbors? MR. TRENIN: Well, I think that Russia has come home. Russia has an enormous homework to do before it emerges, if it does, as a major international player. It’s so much more important to improve the conditions in Khabarovsk than to have influence in Hanoi. And that’s a sea change. Russia is increasingly looking inward; it’s looking at itself, at how it manages its own affairs. And that, I think, is a healthy thing. And let me say on the previous question that the United States is, as I understand it, primarily respected not so much for the prowess of the U.S. military, but rather for the stability of American institutions, for the values that – enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and are practiced in the United States. That moral leadership is more important to the people around the world than the power of the U.S. military. [01:21:23] MR. LUSTIG: Let me just ask you one last question. To what extent do you think all of these changes that we’ve been discussing are permanent? To what extent do you think they are a function of the fact that you had a change of administration after the presidential election of 2008; George W. Bush was followed by Barack Obama? After the next presidential election or the one after that, when you get another president, could things all change again? Jessica Mathews. MS. MATHEWS: How come I always have to go first? MR. LUSTIG: You don’t always have to go first, but just this time. (Laughter.) [01:22:54]


MS. MATHEWS: No, I think our current situation is dominated by the economic crash of 2008, 2009, and the unprecedentedly difficult task of climbing out of it without a housing sector to lead the way and – complicated by the European crisis and our inability to fix the financial wrongdoings that we’re so heavily responsible. That shadow, that reality, is what shapes the whole American outlook on the world, on everything . We haven’t been through for half a – for a very, very long time a period of unemployment anywhere near the scale that we are now. We have what I think are drastic but not as fundamental short-term fiscal imbalances that Chas talked about. And that shaped the 2008 election completely. It brought to Washington a set of people who’ve – who have a very twisted view of what government is for and what it can do and what it has done – you know, the classic “keep the government’s hands off my Medicare.” And, you know, that – to me, that’s the bumper sticker of the 2008 elections. That’s what shapes the American outlook in the world, American behavior in the world. And that will change not so much with the – with an election as with the repair of that economic damage. MR. LUSTIG: So, Ashley Tellis, if and when America regains its economic strength, will it then regain its appetite for global power? MR. TELLIS: Oh, I think so. I think we’ve always had that appetite. And what you see now is a slight dip in the way it’s expressed. MR. LUSTIG: But a temporary dip. [01:25:19] MR. TELLIS: A temporary dip. And I think when American confidence comes back – and that will be a function of how well we manage the economic crises – you will begin to see the United States doing what I think is the permanent task ahead of it, which is to protect the American order which has served our interests well since at least the end of the Second World War. And we will have to protect that order in more challenging circumstances today, because there are new powers rising. But the fundamental task of protecting that order is not going to disappear. And we have to do it smartly. We have to do it by a renewal of our values. I agree with Chas completely. But we also have to pay attention to the material foundations. And I think that is the task that will occupy this country once we come out of the present crisis. MR. LUSTIG: Dmitri Trenin, temporary or permanent? MR. TRENIN: Well, I think it’s temporary. The question that I have in mind and so many others have in mind is: a power to do what? There’s clearly a lot of power in this country, and this country is going to exercise that power beyond its borders. But the question is still hanging: What for? And that will be the most important question. MR. LUSTIG: Chas Freeman. [01:26:33] MR. FREEMAN: Well, I think we are in a crisis borne of massive self-indulgence. We are not the only society to have gone through this. As a student of Chinese history, one sees many examples of changes in governance in China. But China endures. And the United States will endure, and we will come back. If we can’t live by our wallets, we will learn to live by our wits. And we will do so in a world, however, that is changing in, I think, fundamental, long-term ways, that is to say that the period of European ascendancy which we were created in is


passing. China, India are returning to wealth and power – new powers to ourselves, Brazil for example arising. I think China and India are returning. Brazil is rising. But we will have, therefore, a very different global landscape in which to exercise our wits, but we will do so. MR. LUSTIG: It’s a good note to end on. Thank you all very much, though we must end it, I’m afraid. So my thanks to all of the panelists (applause) to Jessica Mathews, to Dmitri Trenin, to Ashley Tellis, to Chas Freeman, to the Carnegie Endowment of course. That’s “The World Tonight.” This is Robin Lustig in Washington (inaudible). Good night. (Applause.) (END)

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