COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Carmelita Solomon : State Civil Service Commission

:

v. :

:

Department of Health : Appeal No. 29842

Carmelita Solomon Jonathan D. Koltash

Pro Se Attorney for Appointing Authority

ADJUDICATION

This is an appeal by Carmelita Solomon challenging a five-day

suspension from regular Administrative Officer 1 employment with the Department

of Health. A hearing was held April 26, 2018, at the Strawberry Square Complex in

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania before Commissioner Gregory M. Lane.

The Commissioners have reviewed the Notes of Testimony and

exhibits introduced at the hearing, as well as the parties’ post-hearing submissions.

The issue before the Commission is whether the appointing authority had cause

sufficient, under the Civil Service Act, to suspend appellant from her position.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. By letter dated January 16, 2018, appellant was

advised that she would be suspended for a period of

five days from her regular status Administrative

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Officer 1 position with the appointing authority,

effective January 17 to January 23, 2018. Comm.

Ex. A.

2. The January 16 letter included the following

statement:

This suspension is being issued for the

following: 1) Falsifying comp-time

records; 2) Theft, or attempted theft, of

time; 3) Misappropriation of travel

funds; and 4) Misuse of your

Commonwealth credit card.

Comm. Ex. A, p. 1.

3. The appeal was properly raised before this

Commission and was heard under Section 951(a) of

the Civil Service Act, as amended.

4. Appellant’s duties involve performing field reviews

auditing expenditures of Commonwealth funds.

N.T. pp. 112-113, 181-182. Appellant reviews the

transactions of the sub recipients to ensure

appropriate use of funds. N.T. pp. 116-117, 118.

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5. Appellant’s Administrative Officer 1 position is

assigned to the appointing authority’s Bureau of

Communicable Diseases and is sited in Harrisburg,

Pennsylvania. N.T. p. 18.

6. By email sent October 31, 2017, appellant advised

her immediate supervisor (George Hindson) that her

tardiness that morning should be excused as comp

time.1 N.T. p. 21; AA Ex. 1, p. 1. Hindson

requested that appellant advise him on the amount

of comp time she had accrued on a recent trip. AA

Ex. 1, p. 1.

7. Appellant responded by sending Hindson a

spreadsheet maintained by appellant as a record of

her accrual and use of comp leave; the spreadsheet

recorded appellant’s October 19, 2017 drive, on her

return from a trip to Pittsburgh, as extending from

4:45 to 9:30. N.T. p. 35; AA Ex. 1, p. 3.

8. An E-Z Pass record stated that appellant on

October 19, 2017 exited the turnpike in Carlisle at

6:08 p.m. AA Ex. 3, p. 2. A receipt submitted by

appellant for her October 19, 2017 travel stated

1 The phrase “comp time” refers to a compensatory time system whereby staff members ineligible for overtime pay

would be permitted to track excess hours and use those hours in lieu of formal leave. N.T. pp. 24-26. Appellant as a

management employee is not entitled to compensatory time. N.T. pp. 135, 184.

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6:42 p.m. as the time she obtained gas at a service

station in the Harrisburg area. N.T. pp. 35-36, 163;

AA Ex. 2, p. 1.

9. On November 2 and November 3, 2017, appellant

was assigned to conduct the fiscal monitoring

portion of the annual monitoring session of a grant-

funded program sited in Wilkes-Barre,

Pennsylvania. N.T. pp. 141-142; AA Ex. 4, p. 2.

The two-day assignment included authorization for

a hotel and rental car for use by appellant.

10. An itinerary for the monitoring sessions included

delayed starts on both days:

a. the first workday began at 10:30 a.m.

to allow time for travel from

Harrisburg by participating staff;

b. the second workday began at 9:00 a.m.

to allow time for participating staff to

check out of a hotel.

N.T. pp. 143-145; AA Ex. 4, p. 2.

11. Appellant did not check out of her hotel prior to

beginning the second workday. N.T. p. 199.

12. The second workday concluded by 2:20 p.m.;

appellant at that time called Hindson to inform him

that she was done. N.T. pp. 56-57, 100, 199.

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Although she could have returned to Harrisburg

before the end of her scheduled workday, appellant

did not do so. N.T. pp. 87, 134, 146, 148, 169, 185.

13. During her call, appellant did not advise Hindson

that she would not be returning from Wilkes-Barre

before the end of her workday; appellant did not

advise Hindson that she would be staying an

additional night in Wilkes-Barre; Hindson did not

authorize appellant to stay an extra night in Wilkes-

Barre. N.T. p. 116.

14. Appellant used her Commonwealth-issued credit

card to pay expenses related to her second night’s

stay. AA Ex. 4, pp. 1, 3.

15. A pre-disciplinary conference (hereinafter “PDC”)

was conducted on December 8, 2017 by Hindson

and a representative of the appointing authority’s

Labor Relations Unit (Shawn Kupchella). N.T. p.

105. Appellant attended the PDC. N.T. p. 106.

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DISCUSSION

The current action was brought under Section 951(a) of the Civil

Service Act (71 P.S. § 741.951(a)), as a challenge to the suspension of appellant

from regular status Administrative Officer 1 employment. Comm. Ex. B. In an

appeal brought under Section 951(a), the burden lies with the appointing authority

to present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the decision to impose the adverse

personnel action was made for cause sufficient under the Civil Service Act; under

Section 803 of the Act, a regular status employee may only be suspended for “good”

cause. Hargrove v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission (Department of

Corrections), 851 A.2d 257, 260 (Pa. Commw. 2004); 71 P.S. § 741.803; 4 Pa. Code

§§ 101.21, 105.15(a). Accordingly, the matter before the Commission is to

determine whether the suspension of appellant was for good cause.

In presenting its case, an appointing authority is expected to introduce

evidence sufficient to prove the charges stated, in the written notice provided the

appellant, as bases for its action. Long v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Liquor

Control Board, 112 Pa. Commw. 572, 535 A.2d 1233 (1988). The written notice

received by the current appellant states:

This suspension is being issued for the following:

1) Falsifying comp-time records; 2) Theft, or attempted

theft, of time; 3) Misappropriation of travel funds; and

4) Misuse of your Commonwealth credit card.

Specifically, you reported false travel time(s) on your

October 17-19, 2017 trip to Pittsburgh and indicated a

false amount of comp-time earned.

You also spent an extra night in a hotel room without

authorization on Friday, November 3, 2017 in Wilkes

Barre, Pa while your work assignment for that day ended

at approximately 2:20 p.m. You then submitted the

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unauthorized hotel stay for reimbursement. You also

submitted a reimbursement request for an additional day

of rental car usage.

Comm. Ex. A, p. 1. In support of its charges, the appointing authority introduced

three witnesses—George Hindson, Christine Quimby and Shawn Kupchella;

appellant was the only witness testifying on her behalf.

George Hindson, an Administrative Officer 3, is appellant’s immediate

supervisor. N.T. p. 19. Hindson testified that one day when appellant was late, she

submitted an email indicating that she would use accumulated compensatory time to

excuse her tardiness. N.T. p. 21. At his request, appellant advised Hindson that she

had recorded five hours of comp on a recent trip to Pittsburgh and an additional six

hours on her return. N.T. p. 21. The stated hours triggered his concern and led him

to review receipts related to the trip; he found inconsistencies. N.T. pp. 21-22.

At his request, appellant provided Hindson a copy of the spreadsheet

she was using to track her comp time accrual and use (AA Ex. 1, pp. 2-3). N.T.

pp. 21, 26-28. For the Pittsburgh trip, the spreadsheet recorded:

Date Start End Accumulated Time

10/17/2017 4:45 10:30 6.25

10/19/2017 4:15 9:30 5.50

N.T. pp. 29-30; AA Ex. 1, p. 3. Hindson testified that, “on initial review it was the

travel time that made [him] question.” N.T. pp. 29-30. He noted that in his

experience, it normally took 3.5 to 4.5 hours to drive between Pittsburgh and the

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Harrisburg area. N.T. p. 30. Hindson consulted with his supervisor who agreed that

the time seemed excessive and directed that he “review the receipts submitted [by

appellant] for travel reimbursement.” N.T. p. 31.

Hindson obtained the receipts for appellant’s Pittsburgh trip and noted

that while the spreadsheet stated 9:30 as the time she arrived back in Harrisburg on

October 19, 2017, appellant had also submitted a receipt indicating that she had

obtained gas at a service station in the Harrisburg area at 6:42 p.m. on the same date.

N.T. pp. 35-36; AA Ex. 1, p. 3; AA Ex. 2, p. 1. Hindson reported his concerns to

his supervisor, who directed that he contact the appointing authority’s Labor

Relations Unit. N.T. p. 37.

Hindson subsequently met with Shawn Kupchella. Based on their

conversation, Hindson continued to investigate appellant’s comp claims. N.T.

pp. 39-40. Hindson reviewed appellant’s October 17, 2017 trip to Pittsburgh, noting

receipts for a rental car and turnpike E-Z Pass. N.T. pp. 40-41; AA Ex. 3. Appellant

claimed that she accrued comp time from 4:45 to 10:30, a total of 6.25 hours on that

date; the E-Z Pass receipt recorded 6:12 p.m. to 9:02 p.m. as the turnpike entry and

exit times, and a car rental receipt stated 5:41 p.m. as the time she obtained the

vehicle. N.T. pp. 41-42; AA Ex. 3. Hindson viewed 4:45 to 5:41 as an extra hour

before she left and 9:02 to 10:30 as an extra 1.5 hours at the end. N.T. pp. 42, 44-

45.

While Hindson was reviewing appellant’s Pittsburgh claims, appellant

also made a trip to Wilkes-Barre, which Hindson chose to review. N.T. p. 47. In

particular, Hindson noted that appellant “stayed overnight on a Friday . . . when . . .

the job was already done for the day.” N.T. p. 47. Hindson testified that appellant,

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at approximately 2:20 on Friday, November 3, 2017, called and told him “that she

was wrapped up at the site visit . . .” N.T. p. 51. She further “said that she was going

to take a rest and then head back.” N.T. p. 51. Hindson indicated that he assumed

appellant would be returning that date; the receipts however state “that she returned

back from the trip on the Saturday of November 04 at noon.” N.T. pp. 51-53;

AA Ex. 4. Hindson noted that his expectation was that appellant would have

returned on Friday. N.T. p. 60.

At Kupchella’s suggestion, Hindson conducted a fact-finding meeting2

with appellant. N.T. p. 65. Hindson testified that, when asked why she recorded

4:45 (as the start time for her 10/17 trip to Pittsburgh) while the receipt for the car

indicated that it was taken at 5:41, appellant explained that she had had to wait

because the car was not ready. N.T. pp. 76-77. Appellant was unable to explain the

discrepancy between her claim on the spreadsheet that she returned from Pittsburgh

at 9:30 on October 19. N.T. pp. 77-78. Hindson noted an on-line estimate (AA Ex.

12) that the drive to Pittsburgh should take approximately three hours and twelve

minutes; appellant offered no explanation why her trip on October 17, 2017 took

nearly twice as long. N.T. pp. 81-82. Appellant similarly was unable to answer why

the October 19 gas receipt indicated that she was there at 6:42 p.m. while she had

recorded 9:30 as the time of return. N.T. p. 83. According to Hindson, appellant

offered no other explanations for the discrepancies regarding the Pittsburgh trip.

N.T. p. 83.

2 According to Hindson, the fact-finding was to allow appellant to review the information obtained by the appointing

authority and give her any opportunity to explain any discrepancies. N.T. p. 65.

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Hindson next asked appellant why she obtained a car the night before

her travel to Wilkes-Barre; he testified that she responded, “any time I travel, before

my start time, I rent a car the night before.” N.T. p. 85. Hindson noted that there is

nothing that would have barred appellant from picking the car up on the day she left.

N.T. p. 86. Hindson testified that when asked why she stayed over an additional

night in Wilkes-Barre, appellant stated that the site visit was completed after 2:00

and that she was unable to retrieve her bags from the hotel until after that time. N.T.

pp. 89-90.

Hindson testified that after the fact-finding, he compiled the

information and provided it to Kupchella in Labor Relations. N.T. pp. 95-96.

Hindson noted that, in his opinion, appellant had “grossly over-inflated” her comp

time record. N.T. p. 96. Hindson stated that he felt appellant should receive an

official written warning; Kupchella however advised him that “he didn’t think that

was appropriate enough.” N.T. p. 97. By memorandum dated December 8, 2017,

Hindson informed appellant that a pre-disciplinary conference would be conducted

that day. N.T. p. 102; AA Ex. 9.

According to Hindson, during the PDC when asked to explain why the

October 17 trip to Pittsburgh required an hour and a half for her to drive from the

turnpike exit to downtown Pittsburgh, appellant “stated that there was traffic and

some other issues.” N.T. p. 106. Appellant, he recalled, also noted parking issues,

which he believes involved appellant searching for parking because the valet parking

area was full. N.T. p. 107. Hindson noted that the hotel receipt submitted by

appellant relative to that trip, however included valet parking for both nights of

appellant’s stay. N.T. pp. 108-109.

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Hindson, recalling the explanation given by appellant at the PDC for

her decision to stay an extra night in Wilkes-Barre, testified as follows:

[appellant] did mention along the lines of what goes in my

fact-finding about not knowing what to do with her bags

and she also stated that she didn’t want to drive home that

night because it was getting dark or she was concerned

about driving at - - - in the dark.

N.T. p. 110. Hindson testified that following the PDC, he and Kupchella concluded

that a five-day suspension would be appropriate—appellant’s overstatements call

into question her veracity. N.T. pp. 112-113.

On cross-examination, Hindson specifically noted that when appellant

told him she planned to rest before returning from Wilkes-Barre, she did not state

that she was returning to the hotel to do so. N.T. pp. 122-123. He also acknowledged

that he did not contact the car rental site to verify appellant’s claimed reason for

leaving later on October 17. N.T. p. 124. He also did not contact the Pittsburgh

hotel to verify her time of arrival or the availability of valet parking. N.T. p. 124.

Christine Quimby, a Public Health Program Administrator with the

appointing authority, testified:

As the program administrator, I coordinate the annual

monitoring of our seven regional subrecipients and I also

supervise two staff who conduct the program monitoring

portion.

* * *

[Appellant] has in her role conducted the fiscal monitoring

portion of the annual monitoring.

N.T. p. 141. Quimby indicated that appellant on the November 2017 trip to Wilkes-

Barre was performing that duty. N.T. p. 142.

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Quimby noted that the itinerary for the Wilkes-Barre monitoring

session (AA Ex. 4, p. 2) included a 10:30 a.m. start time for the first day of the

review. N.T. p. 143. She explained:

[The review site] is in Wilkes-Barre and it’s about two and

a half hours [from Harrisburg] and so we started at that

time in order to give staff time to drive up to Wilkes-Barre

that morning.

N.T. pp. 143-144. She explained that the second day’s 9:00 a.m. start time was set

“in order to give the employees time to check out of their hotel rooms and travel to

the site.” N.T. p. 145. Her expectation is that when employees finish at that location,

they drive home that day; if the employees finish early, her expectation would be

that they would then drive back to Harrisburg. N.T. pp. 146-148.

Shawn Kupchella testified as follows regarding his duties:

I assist supervisors in dealing with employee issues ranging from

performance to time and attendance issues, to things like we’re

discussing today. I investigate grievances. I investigate all kinds

of things. You know, monitor employees’ emails. I issue

discipline, I recommend discipline. I’m involved in

recommending terminations and sometimes I do termination

letters or suspension letters, things of that nature.

N.T. p. 156. Kupchella corroborated Hindson’s earlier testimony regarding their

initial contacts and discussions regarding appellant. N.T. p. 157. He agreed that the

comp accrual times stated by appellant for her October 17 and October 19 travel to,

and return from, Pittsburgh were “gross overstatements.” N.T. p. 164. He

acknowledged that he advised Hindson “to look further into” appellant’s

Wilkes-Barre trip. N.T. p. 172.

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At hearing, appellant testified that the comp time system that was discussed

in this matter:

was not comp time as to what the Commonwealth refers to as

comp time that we had developed a hybrid flex time scenario in

which I would work the hours, tracking those hours that I worked.

And then when I wanted to use those hours, . . . Hindson would

review those hours and we would agree on what the hours actually

looked like. . . . I would not consider it a comp time scenario.

N.T. p. 196.

With regard to her trip to Pittsburgh, appellant testified that valet

parking was not available when she arrived. N.T. p. 197. According to appellant,

she arrived on the seventeenth, but the car was not placed in the valet lot until the

next day. N.T. p. 198. Appellant states that she was charged for using the valet lot

on both the eighteenth and the 19th. N.T. p. 198.

Appellant testified that the Wilkes-Barre trip was preapproved by

Hindson and that because she received no notification otherwise, she assumed the

hotel rental was appropriate. N.T. pp. 198-199. Appellant acknowledged that: “[o]n

the final day of the site visit I did conclude around 2:20ish . . .” N.T. p. 199.

Regarding her telephone conversation with Hindson, she testified:

I explained to him that I was tired, that I was going to take

my meal period and a nap before returning. It was my

intent to wake up later that evening, pack my - - - pack up

my belongings and return to Harrisburg.

It did not work out that way.

N.T. p. 199. She further explained:

I do not feel like it was fiscally unsound because the hotel

room was already encumbered, we were already

encumbered for that hotel room and it was my

understanding from reading the travel policy that as long

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as you are not incurring any additional cost, you’re able to

stay in that room.

So that’s what prompted - - - that’s what made me feel that

I was okay in doing what I did.

To my understanding, what I believe the credit card and

travel policy speaks also to intent and there was no intent

here to defy the Commonwealth in any way.

N.T. pp. 199-200. Appellant testified that due to either the lack of notice or short

notice, she was unable to have documentation with her during either the fact-finding

or the PDC. N.T. pp. 201, 205.

Appellant acknowledged making an error on her record of her return

trip from Pittsburgh. N.T. p. 202. She testified:

I did leave Pittsburgh earlier, but because when I do my

comp - - - when I track my flex time I usually look at my

travel receipts to get those start and end times, or my phone

or I keep notes or in the notes of the site of itself.

So for that particular trip, I went to the approved travel

receipt and saw that the trip ended at that time so I just

calculated the time into my spreadsheet. I agreed with

[Hindson] at the time that I made a mistake.

I looked at that the time that was the result time on the SAP

screen and just converted it to military time. It was

inadvertent and was a mistake on my part and I agree, I

did return early.

N.T. p. 202. Appellant noted that she had acknowledged her error at the PDC. N.T.

p. 203.

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On cross-examination, appellant explained that the phrase “comp time”

is what people in her office use to refer to its flex time process. N.T. pp. 206-207.

When asked “what is flex time,” appellant responded:

Flex time is something that we created because the other

areas were complaining about them working - - - when we

go on site visits we have to meet prior to the scheduled

itinerary time, she wants us to meet probably 15 minutes

to a half an hour before the meeting actually starts.

We had several complaints from people on these trips that

they were meeting off around work hours and it was

required time. So when [Hindson] and I discussed it, we

came up with flex time to which when that occurs we

should track the hours and I could possibly access them

and leverage them against other time.

N.T. pp. 208-209. Appellant disputed the appointing authority’s depiction of her

spreadsheet, recording her accrual and use, as an official document; according to

appellant “it does not become official until [Hindson] reviews it and agrees . . .”

N.T. p. 210.

When asked on cross-examination whether she had any documentation

to support her statement that the October 17 travel to Pittsburgh was delayed because

she had to wait for the car, appellant responded, “No. . . . They don’t give me

documentation for the fact that you’re waiting for the car.” N.T. p. 211. Appellant

similarly noted that the hotel receipt failed to include the time she checked in. N.T.

p. 212. She disagreed with Kupchella’s assertion that the drive from the turnpike

exit to the hotel should have taken about fifteen minutes. N.T. p. 212. She also

disagreed with his claims regarding the way the hotel bills its valet parking. N.T. p.

213. Appellant acknowledged that regardless of her interpretation of travel policy

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as permitting her to stay an extra night, the concomitant extra night of rental car use

on the Wilkes-Barre trip did incur an extra cost. N.T. pp. 229, 233-234.

When recalled for further testimony, Hindson testified that he had never

been in a discussion with appellant about flex time; he further testified that he did

not consider the “comp time” used by appellant as flex time. N.T. pp. 257-258.

Hindson explained that flex time allows an employee to “move their normally

assigned time around in certain parameters.” N.T. p. 258. Hindson considers the

phrase “flex time” to be a “union term of art.” N.T. p. 262.

Section 803 of the Civil Service Act states that to be acceptable under

the Act, a suspension must be based on “good cause.” 71 P.S. § 741.803. The Courts

have additionally noted:

Good cause is not defined in the Act itself, but a rule of the

Commission at 4 Pa. Code § 101.213 provides a guide for

what would constitute good cause for a suspension. In

addition, the case law has interpreted “good cause” to

mean that any personnel action carried out by the state

must be scrutinized in the light of merit criteria, such as

has the party failed to properly execute his duties, or has

he done an act which hampers or frustrates the execution

of same. In addition, the criteria must be job-related and

in some rational and logical manner touch upon

competence and ability.

3 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, in Woods v. State Civil Service Commission (New Castle Youth

Development Center, Department of Public Welfare), 865 A.2d 272 (Pa. Commw. 2004), affirmed in part in Woods

v. State Civil Service Commission (New Castle Youth Development Center, Department of Public Welfare), 590 Pa.

337, 912 A.2d 803 (2006), observed:

the Commission has promulgated regulations which specifically state that good cause for suspension

is one of the following: (1) insubordination; (2) habitual lateness reporting for work; (3) misconduct

amounting to violation of law, rule or lawful and reasonable departmental orders; (4) intoxication

while on duty; (5) conduct either on or off duty which may bring the service of the Commonwealth

into disrepute; and (6) similar substantial reasons.

865 A.2d at 274, n. 2.

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Shade v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission (Pennsylvania Department

of Transportation) 749 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa. Commw. 2000) citing Toland v. State

Correctional Institution at Graterford, Bureau of Correction, 95 Pa. Commw. 634,

638-639, 506 A.2d 504, 506 (1986) and McCain v. Commonwealth, Department of

Education, East Stroudsburg State College, 71 Pa. Commw. 165, 454 A.2d 667

(1983). Having fully reviewed the record compiled in this appeal, we find that the

appointing authority has presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had

good cause to suspend appellant.

In support of our conclusion, we note that the appointing authority has

presented evidence sufficient as prima facie support of each of the three incidents

upon which the four charges have been based. Hindson introduced the record of

comp leave accrual given to him in support of her October 31 late arrival. AA Ex. 1.

He also introduced documentation submitted by appellant for reimbursement of

expenditures related to her October 17 and 19 travel to and from Pittsburgh (AA

Exs. 2, 3) and testified to what he perceived to be discrepancies between those

documents and her recorded travel times. N.T. pp. 29-30. His testimony regarding

appellant’s decision to remain an additional night rather than immediately return

following the conclusion of a November trip to Wilkes-Barre, similarly establishes

conduct asserted in the written notice of suspension.

October 17, 2017

In response to the appointing authority’s prima facie presentation,

appellant testified that on her October 17 trip to Pittsburgh, she was delayed, from

4:45 to 5:41, “because of [her] inability to receive a rental car.” N.T. p. 197.

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Appellant indicates that she had to wait. N.T. p. 214. She contends that “the time

was appropriate because [she] was in a work status.” N.T. p. 197. Appellant

similarly argues that her travel from the turnpike exit to the hotel was delayed by the

fact that “valet parking was not available because the lot was full . . .” N.T. p. 197.

Appellant testified that she used free street parking overnight and moved the rental

car to the valet the next morning. N.T. p. 216. Appellant noted that the time recorded

was not for her arrival in Pittsburgh but referred to the time she actually got into her

room. N.T. pp. 218, 227.

The appointing authority counter-argues that appellant has failed to

offer “any proof to corroborate . . .” her claims; the appointing authority particularly

notes that appellant failed to “obtain a witness or records from the rental place . . .”

AA Bf. p. 14. The appointing authority disputes appellant’s claim of delayed arrival,

noting that the hotel receipt contains two parking charges, which it argues indicates

two nights of parking. AA Bf. p. 14. In support of its arguments, the appointing

authority notes Kupchella’s testimony of his own times making the same drive to

Pittsburgh and his experience of valet parking at the same hotel. AA Bf. p. 14.

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the appointing

authority has failed to present evidence sufficient to support its conclusions relative

to October 17. The appointing authority has presented no evidence that Kupchella’s

testimony regarding his experiences and understandings address the same

October 2017 period as is being assessed against appellant. More importantly, we

note that the appointing authority—the burdened party in this appeal—presented

nothing beyond the suspicions of Hindson and Kupchella; that appellant, an

unrepresented individual who was not assigned the burden at hearing, similarly

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failed to present documents or witnesses to buttress her testimony is not dispositive.

Appellant having presented the only relevant testimony regarding the events of that

day, we find that the appointing authority has failed to meet its burden.

October 19, 2017

At hearing, appellant admitted that the 9:30 notated on her comp leave

spreadsheet as the time she arrived back in the Harrisburg area was not correct. N.T.

p. 202. Appellant characterized the notation as a “mistake” acknowledged during

both the “fact-finding” with Hindson and during the PDC. N.T. pp. 202-203; Ap.

Bf. Accordingly, we find that the appointing authority has met its burden of showing

that the information recorded by appellant was not accurate. Further, we do not find

appellant’s testimony that she simply made a mistake to be credible. Given that she

exited the turnpike in Carlisle at 6:08 p.m. and bought gas in Lemoyne at 6:42 p.m.,

we find her record of a return time of 9:30 p.m. to be a deliberately false entry.

November 3-4, 2017

In response to the appointing authority’s assertion that she sought

reimbursement for an unauthorized hotel stay and unauthorized additional day of

rental car use, appellant acknowledged that at approximately 2:20 p.m. she contacted

Hindson to advise him that she was done. N.T. p. 199. Appellant argued that, to her

understanding, the Commonwealth’s travel policy permitted her to remain that extra

night, so long as no additional cost was incurred; appellant contends:

[b]ased on my conversation with Hindson and

Management Directive 230, I did not feel returning the

following day would be an issue.

N.T. p. 199; Ap. Bf. The appointing authority argues:

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[b]ased on when her workday ended on November 3,

2017, appellant had no reason not to return to Harrisburg

upon completion of her task in Wilkes-Barre. Her

decision to incur an additional night hotel stay, as well as

the additional expense of the rental car, in light of the fact

that she had ample time to check out in the morning, as

well as return to Harrisburg, without other justification or

authorization constitutes good cause to suspend her.

AA Bf. p. 16. We agree.

In support of our conclusion, we note the unrefuted testimony of

Quimby, explaining that the itinerary for the Wilkes-Barre travel included ample

time for travel to Wilkes-Barre at the beginning of the first day and for hotel check-

out at the beginning of the second. N.T. pp. 143-145; AA Ex. 4, p. 2. That appellant

intended to stay a second is evident because she failed to check-out on the morning

of the second day. Appellant’s conversation with Hindson did not inform him of her

plan. She advised Hindson of her intent to rest before returning to Harrisburg

without noting her intent to return to the hotel to do so. Her testimony that her

decision to stay a second night was based, in part, on her conversation with Hindson

is not credible.

Appellant’s questions, on cross-examination of Quimby, comparing a

previous trip which included an additional night, fails to include any basis for us to

believe that appellant reasonably assumed that the Wilkes-Barre trip would have also

involved an additional night. Accordingly, we find that the appointing authority has

presented sufficient credible evidence in support of its claims of unauthorized hotel

and rental car use.

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The Commission agrees with the appointing authority’s interpretation

of appellant’s actions as a misuse of travel funds and rules that this infraction alone

is sufficient to justify her suspension. When coupled with testimony that appellant’s

duties involve auditing expenditures of Commonwealth funds and that her

assignment on the Wilkes-Barre trip was to conduct fiscal monitoring, we believe

her misuse of funds to have been job-related and contrary to her employment; her

offense was therefore sufficient to justify a five-day suspension. Accordingly, we

enter the following

CONCLUSION OF LAW

The appointing authority has presented credible evidence

to establish that the suspension of appellant was for good

cause sufficient under Section 803 of the Civil Service

Act, as amended.

ORDER

AND NOW, the State Civil Service Commission, by agreement of two

of its members, dismisses the appeal of Carmelita Solomon challenging her

suspension from regular status Administrative Officer 1 employment with the

Department of Health and sustains the action of the Department of Health in the

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suspension of Carmelita Solomon from regular Administrative Officer 1

employment for a period of five days effective from January 17, 2018 to January 23,

2018.

State Civil Service Commission

_

Teresa Osborne

Chairman

Gregory M. Lane

Commissioner

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