carlos pereira · ¨ lula and pt will keep his candidacy as long as they can. ... mensalão trial)....
TRANSCRIPT
The 2018 Presidential Election in Brazil dynamics and scenarios
FGV EESP, São Paulo, April 03, 2018
Carlos Pereira
Rules and schedule
q Two round elections q First round on October 07 and runoff on October 28
q No independent candidates are allowed (April 07 is deadline for candidate party affiliation).
q Party conventions (July 20 - August 05) q Enrolling official candidacies (August 15) q Electoral campaign (August 16) q Electoral justice approves/rejects candidacies
(September 17) q Campaign on radio and TV (August 26 - September
29)
The context
¨ For the first time the incumbent is not competitive ¨ For the first time there is a viable outsider ¨ Weakened polarization: PT x PSDB but without their
main actors ¨ Exclusive public funding of campaigns
The exceptionalism of the 2018 election
How corruption affects the electoral game?
¨ Do corruption charges affect electoral odds?
¨ Do voters refrain from voting in corrupt candidates who share their ideology/party?
¨ Do court convictions affect electoral odds?
How corruption affects the presidential race?
Latinobarometro 2017 (Corruption as the main concern)
31 20
19 15
13 12
11 10
6 6 6
5 4
3 3
2 1 1
10
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Brazil Colombia
Peru Dom. Rep.
Mexico Chile
Bolivia Paraguay
Ecuador Argentina
Costa Rica Guatemala
Panama Nicaragua Honduras
El Salvador Venezuela
Uruguay Latinoamerica
The Paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians:
¨ Former President of Brazil (2003-2006 and 2007-2010).
¨ He was accused by Public Prosecutors as the main leader of a criminal organization (Petrobras Scandal)
¨ He has convicted for 9 years and a half for passive corruption and money laundry.
¨ The sentence was confirmed by the second instance of the justice with an increase in jail time (12 years and one month).
¨ He is still ahead in the pools for the 2018 presidential election.
I n B r a z i l a s w e l l …
• Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva
The Paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians:
¨ Ehud Olmert (Israel)
¨ Jacques Chirac (França)
¨ Asif Ali Zadari (Paquistão)
¨ Silvio Berlusconi (Itália)
¨ Edwin Edwards (Louisiana)
¨ Paulo Maluf (São Paulo)
E x a m p l e s f l o u r i s h e v e r y w h e r e
What explains this paradox?
q Lack of information about candidates’ involvement in corruption
q Public spending (public goods) moderates the negative impact of corruption on the probability of reelection
q Even informed voters may vote for allegedly
corrupt incumbents if they expect to receive material benefits
Why information is not enough to curb corruption?
−.6−.4
−.20
.2Ma
rgina
l Effe
ct of C
orrup
tion on
Reele
ction
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500Public Spending
Although corruption decreases the probability of mayors’ reelection (29%), this negative effect vanishes when public goods increase.
Does corruption trumps ideology ?
q Cognitive trade-off (tolerance): one should purposely choose a corrupt candidate when the benefits of sharing ideological views are preferred
q Change in perception (misperception): Ideology may change the perception of corruption, in such a way that voters may see corrupt candidates as honest.. q ideology may facilitate seeing someone else as similar to oneself and,
for this reason, discounting corrupt information
W h a t p s y c h o l o g i c a l m e c h a n i s m s ?
Does corruption trumps ideology?
q While some citizens may see liberalism and conservatism as primarily about social issues, others in terms of economics, while others as relevant to ideological categorizations.
q higher tolerance to a dishonest candidate ideologically preferred in both economic and social dimensions (sophisticated ideologues) than in one of these two dimensions (inconsistent ideologues).
Traditionally ideology has been understood as a position on left-right continuum
Ideology trumps rejection of corruption!
There exist significant differences between subjects in which ideology matched compared to when they did not match, both in economic and social ideological dimensions
Effect of cost-benefit tradeoff on the probability of vote change for different levels of perception of corruption
Sum-up of the main findings
q Voters are more likely to choose a dishonest candidate when they share the same ideology, even if corrupt. q This effect is stronger when both economic and social ideological
dimensions match;
q People are less likely to perceive as corrupt politicians who share their ideology
q The way corruption is perceived affects choice: q the ideologically preferred candidate is corrupt, people are
motivated to search for other reasons to support him. q motivated reasoning can manifest in both misperception of
corruption and a biased cost-benefit tradeoff
Do convictions affect voters’ choice?
• The majority of respondents voted on candidate A, who had no record related to corruption and voted more often in the candidate B when suspect of corruption (33% on average) than when convicted for corruption (11% on average, χ² (1) = 58.0; p < 0.001).
• The effect of ideology is significant for the suspect candidate (χ² (8) = 19.8; p = 0.01) but not for the convicted candidate (χ² (1) = 8.52; p < 0.385).
34%
41%
24%
47%43%
19%
33%
27%
14%
4%6%
12% 11%
20%
10% 11% 12%14%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%Soc
ialCo
ntrol
Social
Match
ing
Social
Mism
atchin
g
Social
Contr
ol
Social
Match
ing
Social
Mism
atchin
g
Social
Contr
ol
Social
Match
ing
Social
Mism
atchin
g
EconomicControl EconomicMatching EconomicMismatching
votef
orcan
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B
Suspect Convicted
Do convictions affect voters’ choices? q Judicial punishment works not only curbing
deviant behavior but also it has an effect on voters’ perception and their electoral choice
q Judicial conviction and the imposition of penalties may discourage future misconduct and free voters from the spell of corrupt politicians.
Any evidence that conviction matter? DataFolha Pool (31/01/2018)
q Still shows Lula ahead with 36%
q Above average among elementary education (47%)
q Family income of two minimal wage (47%)
q North (46%) q Northeast (60%)
Lula 36%
Bolsonaro 18%
Marina 8%
Alckimin 6%
Ciro 6%
Álvaro Dias 4%
Manuela 2%
Collor 2%
Meireles 1%
Blanks/Nulls 19%
Results First round
Any evidence that conviction matter? DataFolha Pool (31/01/2018)
q The number of undecided, blanks and nulls has reached 46% of the electorate. q It suggests that a portion of Lula’s voters has already started to
consider voting in alternative candidates q The number of voters that no longer considers voting in
candidates supported by Lula increased from 48 to 53%.
q Lula should not rum: 51% q Lula will not run: 43% q Rejection of Lula: 40% (Temer 60%; Collor 44%;
Bolsonaro 29%; Alckmin 26%)
After the confirmation of Lula’s conviction in the second instance of the justice (TRF-4)
Lula and PT’s electoral strategies
¨ Lula and PT will keep his candidacy as long as they can.
¨ This strategy may lead the PT and the entire left to be out of the runoff.
J u d i c i a l s u r v i v a l
¨ How could the PT get rid of Lula, who is ahead in the race, and start
betting in an alternative candidate?
q The sooner Lula’s judicial penalties are implemented, the more unified and
competitive would be the left
T h e b e s t f o r t h e l e f t
D i l e m m a
Is the PSDB (center-right) vs. PT (center-left) fight over?
¨ Without Lula in the electoral race, will the left be fragmented? ¨ PT will have an alternative candidate no matter what. ¨ Will PT lose its capacity to nuclearize the left? ¨ Would the left no longer be competitive in 2018? ¨ Who will be the “new PT” in the near future?
P u z z l e :
How will the center react and play?
q Macroeconomic stabilization
q Federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro
q There are costs for changes in the partisan trajectories (majoritarian vs. legislative)
¨ Temer is a toxic asset ¨ JBS Corruption scandal ¨ Two accusations from the
General Public Prosecutor
¨ Extremely low level of popularity (3%) and government approval
Positive Negative
Will the government launch a candidate?
Government Approval in Latin America
Latinobarometro 2017
67
66
57
52
50
47
41
38
36
33
32
30
30
22
21
20
17
6
36
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Nicaragua
Ecuador
Bolivia
Dom. Rep.
Costa Rica
Honduras
Uruguay
Guatemala
Argentina
Chile
Venezuela
Colombia
Peru
Panama
Paraguay
Mexico
El Salvador
Brazil
Latinoamerica
How will the center react and play?
How will the center react and play?
q PSDB plays the presidential game as protagonist since 1994 no matter if it is the winner or the loser.
q Current Governor of São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin q PSDB is a national party with high degree of local
connections. q It governs several cities and important states.
Will the PSDB launch a competitive candidate?
How will the right parties react and play?
q Bolsonaro will probably run for a small party. q He will have a smaller slot on TV and radio q Also a smaller portion of public funding q His main asset is social media
q It mostly works for converted voters
q He is a single issue player
Will Bolsonaro be a competitive candidate?
Distribution of electoral and partisan public funds (R$ million), about 2.4 billion
1.9 1.9 2 2.4 2.8 3.1 4.9 5 5.2 6.6 7.2
14.6 14.8 15.2
22.1 25.1
32.7 34.8
38.7 40.5 41.5 42.7
53.3 58.6
85 85.5
96.8 116.4
147.4 151.7
160.4 176.8
258.8 300.9
304.9
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
PMB NOVO
PCO PCB PPL
PSTU PRTB PMN PSDC
PRP PTC
REDE PSL PEN
AVANTE PHS
PSOL PROS
PV PPS
PODE PDdoB
PSC SD
PDT PTB PRB
DEM PR
PSD PSB PP
PSDB PT
MDB
Electoral funds and number of cities governed by the party
3 4 10 28 9 19 15 5 30 14
36 2
53 101 118
80 87 62
334
262
104
265 295
539
413
494
792
256
1026
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Electoral Funds Cities
Electoral funds and number of cities governed by a party
Dominant Beliefs in 2018’s Election
q Developmentalism (1964-1994) q Social inclusion without fiscal constraints
(1995-1994) q Fiscally sound social inclusion (1995-ut to now). q Intolerance to corruption (specially after the
Mensalão trial). q Corruption is the main issue, ahead of unemployment,
security, health
Mental molds about how the world should work
Fiscally Sound Social Inclusion
Dominant Belief
Discussion
q Two forces running in opposite directions q Social demand for the novelty vs. professionalism with
concentrated assets. q The Lula’s strategy of keeping his candidacy will
fragment the left and their candidates will not be electorally viable
q Candidates that deviate from the dominant belief will not be competitive
Take home lessons: