caribbean drug trafficking and the western hemisphere

8/3/2019 Caribbean Drug Trafficking and the Western Hemisphere

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COLEGIO INTERAMERICANO DE DEFENSAFuerte Lesley J. McNair

Washington D.C.

TRABAJO DE INVESTIGACION ACADEMICA

CARIBBEAN DRUG TRAFFICKINGAND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

by

LtCol J. Brooke TaylorUnited States Air Force

Washington D.C., May 2000


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CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW

The Caribbean lies where Jose Marti once called the Vortex ofthe Americas, making it a bridge or front between North and SouthAmerica. Geonarcotics is a concept developed that explains the multipledynamics of the narcotics phenomenon. The term captures four factors:drugs, geography, power, and politics.

Geography is a factor because of the global spatial dispersion ofdrug operations, and because certain geographic features facilitate

certain drug operations. Power involves the ability of an individual orgroup to secure compliant action. This power can be both state andnonstate in source. Politics revolve around the resource allocation.

Although the Caribbean drug phenomenon involves many facetsof drug production, consumption and abuse, trafficking, and moneylaundering, it is trafficking that best highlights the regions strategicvalue. Aspects of both the Caribbeans physical and social geographymake it very conducive to drug trafficking. Except for mainland Belize,French Guyana, Guyana, and Suriname, the Caribbean countries are allisland territories. Some are plural island territories, such as St Vincentand the Grenadines - which comprise close to 600 islands, and the VirginIslands - composed of about 100 islands and cays. The Bahamas is anarchipelago of 700 islands and 2,000 cays. This island character permitsentry into and use of Caribbean territories from hundreds of multiple


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places in the surrounding sea. The Caribbean countries do not have theability to provide adequate territorial policing and security, thus

producing an extreme vulnerability to trafficking. (2)

The most important location feature of the regions physicalgeography is its proximity. This proximity is dual: South America as amajor drug-supply source, and North America as a major drug-demandarea.

Illicit drugs typically move internationally from less developedareas of the world to the more developed countries, where most drugconsumption takes place. Just as the growth of legitimate global

businesses has been facilitated by the globalization of financial systemsand market relations, drug traffickers have additionally taken advantageof the opportunities presented by the changing macro-economicenvironment. They have organized themselves on a global scale and puta significant amount of their drug profits in financial centers offeringsecrecy and attractive investment returns. Their adoption of high-techcomputer and communication technology has facilitated expansion oftheir trade. Drug traffickers are now able to launder illicit profits bymoving money around the world electronically with nominal national

controls. They are aided by porous borders, due in part to policiesintended to encourage trade and investment. In other cases, it is due toweak governments and weak or unenforceable laws against moneylaundering, fraud or organized crime.

The trade of illicit drugs has quite a variety of adverse socio-economic and political effects. These activities can occasionallyundermine the legal economy by contributing to an overvalued exchangerate. They contribute to increased crime and social disruption on all

levels, and their adverse effects can be intensified by drug control laws.Most of the benefits and liabilities associated with the trade of drugsultimately derives from illegality, a condition which the drug controllaws establish. Illegality provides what has been called the crime tax -the difference between legal and illegal price markets. This tax isreaped principally by traffickers, but they pass on a sufficient proportion


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to peasant growers which creates incentives for drug crop production.(3)

Why do people traffic in illicit drugs, and how are they able to do

so on such a large scale? While one incentive is the money that is to bemade in servicing consumer demand for drugs, other factors are alsoinvolved. The structure of society, the nature of political power, theimpact of economic policy, and the resistance of the cultural fabric to

private drug consumption and public corruption are all factors thatinfluence how successfully illicit drugs can be traded.


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CHAPTER 2

TRAFFICKING HISTORY

Two or three decades ago, much of the illegal drug distributionconsisted of small-time traffickers, including tourists, who picked up a

few hundred grams of heroin or cocaine or a kilogram of marijuana froma producer and distributed the product directly to casual contacts and

personal friends. They would then pass along small amounts, some of itfor financial gain. Although a proportion of the trade in drugs is stillcarried out in this manner, trafficking is increasingly organized,

particularly at the wholesale and intermediary levels. A few large,vertically integrated, multinational illicit drug distribution organizationsexisted as early as the 1930s. Such trafficking is now increasingly

facilitated by sophisticated organization and distribution techniques ableto counter the technology currently available to law enforcementagencies. (3)

The presence and influence of Colombian traffickingorganizations in the Caribbean is overwhelming. The Caribbean has

been a long time favorite smuggling route used by the Cali and Medellincrime groups to smuggle thousands of tons of cocaine to the UnitedStates. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, drug lords from Medellin

and Cali, Colombia established a network of smuggling routesthroughout the central Caribbean, including Haiti, the DominicanRepublic and the Bahamian Island chain to South Florida, using avariety of techniques to smuggle their cocaine to U. S. markets.


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The nature of the international drug trade has changed a greatdeal over the past fifteen years. At the height of the cocaine epidemic,the manufacturing and importation of the product was controlled by thegroup of traffickers from Medellin, Colombia. The bold violence and

political fervor stunned the world. Beginning in the late 1970s, themajor cocaine trafficking organizations based in Colombia generallyrelied on the intricate smuggling network which facilitated shipment ofmulti-tons of cocaine through the Caribbean. These traffickers alsoaccumulated great wealth and they invested heavily in luxury productsand property within the United States. Until July 1991, when a newConstitution in Colombia was adopted, members of the Medellin cartelwere truly fearful of the threat of extradition to the United States. Thus,they successfully bribed and intimidated officials in the Government ofColombia to outlaw their extradition.

Three important changes in drug trafficking have had majornegative results on the Western Hemisphere. First is the orchestratedefforts by traffickers based in Mexico to saturate markets withmethamphetamine. Secondly, the Colombian traffickers aggressive

production and marketing of strong, pure heroin. Lastly, is the re-emergence of well established trafficking routes and methods in the

Caribbean. (1)


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CHAPTER 3

TRAFFICKING AND SECURITY

There is an obvious straightforward connection between drugtrafficking and crime. Traffickers activities are linked to what is termedsystemic violence. The drug syndicates, gangs and smugglers who

aptly secure, launder and guard money continue to attempt obtaining and preserving positions of power by whatever means are necessary.Traffickers, not consumers, commit most of the drug-related homicides.They are able to use the billions of dollars within their command toattempt to corrupt, subvert or eliminate institutions and people whostand in their way. (3)

Professor Ivelaw Griffith in his 1997 publication Drugs andSecurity in the Caribbean states that drugs present a clear danger to theCaribbean and that the illicit drug phenomenon cannot be viewedoutside the context of contemporary economic, social and politicaldevelopments. In ways very similar to their counterparts in legalenterprises, criminal organizations involved within illicit drugs respondto those opportunities created by a globalizing market economy. In fact,according to Griffith, traffickers in some countries have repeatedlyowned larger and more sophisticated resources than the police or themilitary.

Drug trafficking, with its related domestic and transnational

criminal activities, continues to place a great deal of pressure on variousinstitutions - including those responsible for security and lawenforcement. On several islands, the governments have invitedorganizations such as New Scotland Yard, the DEA and the FBI to assist


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them in dealing with the problem. In the Eastern Caribbean, the smallerislands are being used as stepping stones towards the bigger markets ofPuerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands - both designated by the DEA asHigh Density Trafficking Areas.

Corruption is another drug-related activity that impacts on the

security of the Caribbean region. It involves acts of commission andomission which breach the laws that deviate from accepted social,economic and political norms. Corruption has developed violence anduncertainty about the loyalty of forces of law and order. Furthermore,corruption at the highest levels, money laundering and related drugactivities are leading society dangerously close to the possible collapseof civil society. (4)


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CHAPTER 4

MONEY LAUNDERING

Money laundering is the process used by many drug traffickersto convert bulk amounts of drug profits into legitimate monies. The

need to launder conspicuously large amounts of small-denominationbills places the traffickers in a vulnerable situation with law enforcementinterdiction. Tracking and interpreting this illegal flow of drug money isan important tool for identifying and dismantling international drugtrafficking organizations.

As we know, the Caribbeans geography, political stability, socialtranquility, and development needs have made it vulnerable to narcoticsmoney laundering. Offshore banking developed as an industriousservice sector in some countries that lacked natural resources. But whilethese countries attempt to make themselves economically viable, thecriminal elements are exploiting the same mechanisms for moneylaundering. In fact, banking and non-banking institutions are being used

profusely. For example, travel agencies, fruit shops, finance companies,and casinos are amongst the profitable illegal businesses. It is stated inan article entitled The Illicit Drug Trade in the Caribbean that therevenue collected by the Cali drug cartel within the USA is calculated to

be $6 billion at least half of which is estimated to be laundered throughcountries in the Caribbean. (4)


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CHAPTER 5

TRAFFICKING OPERATIONS

The international drug trafficking syndicates that are operating

today are more powerful and sophisticated than most any criminalenterprise our nations have previously faced. They are well-organized,influential and extremely savvy - relying on a worldwide network of

personnel, technological assets and financial resources that handsomelyrival those held by international businesses.

Traffickers are highly mobile and basically unrestricted bynational boundaries. They often shift their laboratories and trade routesvirtually at will, preferring to go where national governments are least in

control. When the Colombian government cracked down on its drugoperators, they took up temporary residence in Bolivia, Miami, Panamaor Peru and directed their operations from there. (3)

Today, independent groups of traffickers from the Northern Valledal Cauca and splinter groups from the Cali syndicate have given rise to

prominence. These groups are responsible for huge volumes of cocaineand heroin being shipped to the United States through the Caribbean.

Trafficking groups based in Mexico normally will chargeColombian traffickers 50% of each shipment to transport their productthrough Mexico to the U.S. Meanwhile, groups from Puerto Rico andthe Dominican Republic offer the same service for as little as 20%.Thus, many groups from Colombia, particularly those who have risen to


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power since the Cali syndicates fall, have returned to the traditionalsmuggling routes in the Caribbean. This has resulted in larger shipmentsof cocaine transiting the Caribbean Sea. Seizures of 500 to 2,000kilograms of cocaine are common in and around Puerto Rico and the

Dominican Republic.

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are the United Statessouthern most points of entry, and thus provide an excellent gateway fordrugs destined for cities on the East Coast of the United States. Moreimportantly, Puerto Ricos commonwealth status means that once ashipment of cocaine reaches Puerto Rico, it may not be subjected tofurther United States Customs Service (USCS) inspection en route to thecontinental U.S. Today, Colombian cocaine and heroin traffickers havetransformed Puerto Rico into the largest staging area in the Caribbeanfor smuggling Colombian cocaine and heroin into the United States.

In the past, the role of traffickers from the Dominican Republicwas limited to being pick up crews and couriers who assisted thePuerto Rican smugglers in their drug smuggling ventures. Most of thishas changed with the evolution of drug trading over the last three years.The new breed of Dominican traffickers function as smuggler,

transporter, and wholesaler in many U.S. cities on the Eastern Coast. Inthe last year, criminals from the Dominican Republic have emerged asthe dominant force in the mid-level cocaine and heroin trade on the EastCoast of the U.S.

As in the case with the Dominican Republic, Haiti presents anideal location for the staging and transshipment of drugs. There iseffectively no border control between the two countries, allowing

essentially unimpeded drug traffic. The vast amount of the SouthAmerican drug traffic arriving in Haiti is transported across the porous border of the Dominican Republic, and then on to Puerto Rico byDominican transportation groups. Once the heroin and cocaine reachesthe Dominican Republic, the Dominican groups take control over bothsmuggling the drugs into the U.S. and carrying out an increasing

percentage of wholesale and retail distribution along the East Coast. (1)


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CHAPTER 6

TRAFFICKING PATTERNS

For more than two decades, the Bahamas, Belize, and Jamaicadominated the business of trafficking. The Bahamas has an excellentstrategic location in the airline flight path between Colombia and SouthFlorida. For a typical cocaine trafficking mission, aircraft depart from

the north coast of Colombia and arrive in the Bahamas 4 to 5 hours later.The cargo is dropped to waiting vessels, or for later collection and

placement on vessels, and then the final run is made to a U.S. point ofentry. However, this is not the only trafficking method. More recentlytraffickers have been using other tactics, including use of Cuban watersto evade OPBAT (Operation Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos)measures.

Drug law enforcement authorities from the Bahamas, the Turksand Caicos Islands, and the United States continue their successful 14-year operation conducting joint patrols in Bahamian and surroundingwaters. OPBAT enforcement teams include Bahamian officers who

provide local enforcement authority, plus U.S. Army and US CoastGuard personnel who provide helicopter support for the teams.Additionally, U.S.-Bahamian agreements allow U.S. authorities toengage patrols in and near Bahamian waters where they may exercise

jurisdiction over non-Bahamian vessels.

OPBAT successes have contributed to a shifting of trafficker

smuggling methods from aircraft delivery to a less detectable method maritime smuggling. Aircraft landing and unloading in the Bahamasremains rare. The only trafficker aircraft that continues to land in theBahamas are flights originating from Jamaica. Air traffic between


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Jamaica and the Bahamas is more difficult to detect because of the proximity of the islands and the ability of low-flying aircraft to avoidradar.

The Dominican Republic continues to be a transshipment areafor cocaine. A number of favorable factors contribute to the nations

popularity with cocaine traffickers. It lies 61 nautical miles from PuertoRico, making smuggling by fishing boat to Puerto Rico fairly simple.Additionally, the countrys long coastline and dense thickets ofmangroves are ideal areas for airdrops and noncommercial smugglingfrom Colombia and Venezuela. It also shares a long and sometimesdesolate border with Haiti. Despite US Coast Guard patrols off thenorthern coast of Haiti, maritime shipments of cocaine continue to reachHaitis shores. Drug traffickers exploit Haitis numerous uncontrolledairstrips, an unguarded coastline, and a remote interior.

Puerto Rico remains the primary eastern Caribbean destinationfor multi-ton cocaine shipments. Both Puerto Rico and the U.S. VirginIslands are attractive staging points, given the fact that domesticcommercial cargo shipments between these U.S. territories and thecontinental U.S. ordinarily are not subject to US Customs inspection.

Additionally, these Islands are destinations for cocaine air-droppedelsewhere in the eastern Caribbean primarily in the Sabra Bank area(St Martin, St Kitts, and Sabra), and near Anguilla and Antigua. Fromthese drop zones, cocaine is transported to Puerto Rico or the U.S.Virgin Islands by go-fast boats. (5)

The geography and topography of Belize also makes the countryideal for drug smuggling. Apart from a long coast line and contiguous

borders with Guatemala and Mexico, two major heroin and marijuana producers, there are dense unpopulated jungle areas and numerousinland waterways. Moreover, there are about 140 isolated airstrips andvirtually no radar coverage beyond a 30-mile radius of the internationalairport at Belize City.


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Jamaica has long been key to the drug trade, given its longcoastline, its proximity to the United States, its many ports, harbors, and

beaches, and its closeness to the Yucatan and Windward Passages.Jamaicas west and south coast are the most popular areas for air

trafficking. Apart from landings on strips designed or adapted for drugoperations, landings have been made on roads, in cane fields, and onlegal strips owned by bauxite and sugar companies. The JamaicaDefense Force has destroyed close to 100 illegal airstrips, but given theheavy limestone in many of the popular landing areas, operators areoften able to make fields serviceable within 10 days of destruction.

Most of the cocaine air operations using Jamaica over the lastfew years have involved San Andres and Bogota in Colombia, theBahamas, Panama, and Curacao. Traffickers do not rely only on illegalflights; legal commercial flights are also used. Particularly popular, and

problematic for Jamaican officials, was the commercial link betweenSan Andres and Montego Bay. That connection was severed inSeptember 1994, but there are still commercial flights linking Jamaicaand Bogota.

Although the Bahamas, Belize, and Jamaica are still important

drug trafficking centers, countermeasures there and in South and CentralAmerica have prompted traffickers to seek and develop alternativeroutes. This has brought eastern and southern Caribbean countries intogreater prominence since the early 1990s. The shifts are of such amagnitude that, in November 1994, Puerto Rico and the U.S. VirginIslands were designated by the United States as High-Intensity DrugTrafficking Areas (HIDTAs). Moreover, because of the increased drugactivity, in July 1995 the DEA upgraded its presence in Puerto Rico from

office to Field Division, thus increasing its staffing and assigning aspecial agent to oversee the Caribbean.

Several factors explain Haitis trafficking vulnerability andinvolvement: geographic location, poorly monitored coasts,mountainous interior, about 20 unpatrolled airstrips, inadequate lawenforcement resources, and corruption. In Haiti, the complicity of


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military and other officials has been well established. Haiti hasreportedly been used for a bridge to the United States, with both theflights and the cargo protected by the military.

Guyana has recently become an important center of operations.Like other Caribbean countries, Guyanas trafficking use saw itsgraduation from marijuana to cocaine and heroin. The air, sea and landroutes developed for smuggling contraband in Guyana from Brazil,Venezuela, and Suriname have now been adapted to narcoticstrafficking. A further complication is the fact that the borders with theseneighboring countries are very long. Moreover, traffickers are able totake advantage of the countrys large size, the coastal habitation, andabsence of adequate manpower and equipment to police the territory.For example, there are 92 legal airports (private and public), most ofthem in remote parts of the country where the physical and socialgeography provides clear advantages for traffickers.

Guyanas physical geography makes it also vulnerable tomaritime trafficking. Guyana, whose name is derived from anAmerindian word that means Land of Many Waters, has hundreds ofinland rivers and creeks. Moreover, there are 13 huge rivers that flow

into the Atlantic Ocean, and each of those rivers has a network oftributaries. The maritime traffic is also facilitated by the fact that thenetwork of rivers also runs into Brazil, Suriname, and Venezuela. Ineffect, the state lacks the power to exercise proper political and territorial

jurisdiction over the nation. Top army, coast guard, and police officialsin many parts of the region have expressed frustration at not only theinability to adequately protect their countries borders againsttrafficking, but also at being the pawns of traffickers who often create

successful small interdiction diversions in order to execute largeoperations. (6)


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CHAPTER 7

MODES OF TRANSPORTATION

Traffickers have continued to use intermodal means of transport,frequently concealing larger shipments in commercial maritimecontainerized or bulk cargo. They also use fishing vessels to conveymultimetric-ton shipments from Colombia to Mexico. Traffickers usespecially designed vessels to smuggle cocaine from Colombia to

northern Caribbean islands or Puerto Rico.

Cocaine is smuggled through the Caribbean by air and sea, oftenmoved in the direction of Puerto Rico where it is repackaged and stagedfor direct shipment to major U.S. east coast markets. Seabornesmuggling operations consist primarily of go-fast boats that depart fromColombias north coast and Venezuela, typically carrying between 800-and 1,200-kilogram shipments of cocaine. Sailing and fishing vessels

also are used, although to a more limited extent. These vessels departthe North Coast of Colombia, hug the Venezuelan coast, and either proceed directly to Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, or Haiti, orkeep close to the coasts of the eastern Caribbean islands until they reachtheir final destinations. Traveling up the island chains allows traffickersto blend with other vessel traffic, which minimizes opportunities fordetection. Vessels sometimes off-load to locally built open fishing boats(known as yolas) positioned from 40 to 150 nautical miles off thecoast of Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, or in the Leeward

Islands. The yolas proceed to Puerto Rico and off-load cocaine onPuerto Ricos east coast.

General aviation aircraft typically fly from airstrips in easternColombias Vichada Department, overflying Venezuela on the way todelivery sites in the vicinity of the northern Lesser Antilles, the Virgin


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Islands, Puerto Rico, or the Dominican Republic. Other aircraft flyingfrom Colombias North Coast reportedly air-drop waterproof bundles ofcocaine in the vicinity of the Bahamas. Airdrops typically are made towaiting boat crews, who then deliver the cocaine to shore. From staging

points in the Caribbean, smugglers then deliver the cocaine by sea tosouthern Florida.

Traffickers frequently attempt to circumvent inspection byaltering shipping documents at intermediate transshipment points, and

by using counterfeit customs seals. They also use a variety ofconcealment methods to ship cocaine within maritime cargo. Bulk cargoships frequently are used to smuggle cocaine to staging sites in thewestern Caribbean area. These vessels are typically coastal freightersthat carry an average cocaine load of approximately 2.5 metric tons. Themost common storage location for cocaine is in hidden compartmentswithin fuel or ballast tanks. Modifications sometimes are made to thestructure of the vessel, which makes access to hidden compartmentsimpossible without literally tearing the vessel apart. Additionally,compartments in some cases are mounted on the exterior of the ships.

Commercial fishing vessels also are well-suited for mother ship

operations because they typically have capacities for large shipmentsand are equipped with sophisticated navigation and communicationinstruments. Consequently, they do not require refitting that indicatesthe vessels roles in smuggling operations. Fishing vessels also are ableto stay at sea for long periods and travel long distances. Additionally,fishing vessels are difficult to monitor and tight-knit fishingcommunities make infiltration by drug law enforcement authoritiesdifficult.

Noncommercial maritime vessels used by traffickers tend to belocally available vessels that could blend into the local surroundings. Inareas with a high volume of recreational traffic, smugglers use the sametypes of boats as the local population, such as go-fast boats and yolas.Additionally, smugglers operate during weekends and at other times of

peak boating activity to blend in with local traffic.


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Smugglers also make attempts to avoid detection by operating at

night without navigation lights. Smugglers receive off-loads during at-sea transfers from mother ships that arrive from source countries, and

then land with the cocaine at marinas, isolated inlets, bays, bayous, beaches, or other areas that would hinder surveillance. Landing sitestypically are located near major roads that connect to interstate highwaysystems thus providing smugglers with easy access to escape routes.

Maritime craft known as low-profile vessels (LPVs) also areused to smuggle cocaine to Puerto Rico. LPVs are small, sleek vesselsthat ride low in the water and often have light gray camouflage paintschemes all factors that make LPVs difficult to spot at sea at distancesof over 1.5 nautical miles.

Aircraft are used to transport cocaine from South America bothto staging sites in Mexico, Puerto Rico, elsewhere in the Caribbean and,on occasion, directly to the United States. Aircraft used in flights toMexico and the Caribbean most commonly are dual-engine, generalaviation aircraft.

Traffickers continue to transship cocaine through Belize byairdrop and maritime vessel for further transshipment to the UnitedStates, either directly or through Mexico, Jamaica, or the CaymanIslands. The countrys 370-mile coastline, 100-plus unmonitoredairstrips, and 2 deep-water ports make Belize particularly accessible totraffickers. (5)

The Bahamas remains a central conduit for air and maritime

shipments of drugs moving through the Western and Central Caribbeanto the Southeast United States. Transportation groups located in theBahamas utilize a variety of methods to move cocaine from the islandsto the United States. Colombian traffickers air drop shipments ofcocaine off the coast of Jamaica, or utilize boat to boat transfers on openseas.


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Transportation groups from Jamaica and the Bahamas sometimesuse canoes to smuggle their payloads into the Bahama chain, frequentlyusing the territorial waters of Cuba to shield their movement. Thecocaine is then transferred to pleasure craft which disappear into the

inter-island boat traffic. Traffickers also use twin-engine turbo-propaircraft, with long range capability and Global Positioning Systems(GPS), which pinpoint drop zones and meeting spots in the middle of theocean. Cellular telephones are used to minimize their exposure tointerdiction assets and ensure the smooth transfer of their cocaine cargofor shipment into the United States. (1)


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CHAPTER 8

ALTERNATE TRAFFICKING METHODS

Drug trafficking brings out the creativity and ingenuity of drugoperators and the people who scheme with them. People have used

every possible orifice of the human anatomy, every possible piece ofclothing, all manner of fruits and vegetables, and a variety of craft,furniture, and other items for the conveyance of drugs. There are people

called swallowers or mules who specialize in the use of theirstomach and intestines.

Drugs have also been found in fish, rice, cake, pepper sauce,coconuts, yams, bananas, coffee beans, cheese, butter, beer, juice,

cigarettes, vegetables, detergent, furniture, lumber, piatas, mannequins,cloth, mail, ceramic tiles, ice cream, shampoo, mouthwash, video tapes,coat hangers, rum, and endless other objects.

People of all ages and sexes are involved in trafficking, and oldwomen are sometimes used, because they do not fit the traffickerprofile used by law enforcement agencies.

Some operations are very sophisticated, using digital encryption

devices, high-frequency transmitters, cellular telephones, beepers, radartracking devices, flares or sensors for air drops, and additionalequipment. Some trafficking is done individually, but most of it isconducted through networking. Most of the networks could not exist orsucceed without the collusion of people in government and privateagencies in various positions and at all hierarchical levels in


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organizations such as: shipping companies, customs and immigrationagencies, warehouses, police forces, the military, airlines, export andimport companies, stores, cruise ships, trucking companies, andfactories. (2)


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CHAPTER 9

COUNTERMEASURES

A wide range of coping strategies to counter drug trafficking isbeing adopted. Countermeasures are multi-dimensional, multi-level, andmulti-actor - a reflection of the nature and scope of the immense drug

phenomenon. They must be multidimensional because drug operationsand their impact are multidimensional; they must be multilevel national, regional, and international because drug operations and manyof the problems they precipitate are both national and transnational; andthey must be multi-actor for the two above reasons, plus the fact thatcountries lack the necessary individual capabilities to meet the threatsand challenges.

National countermeasures are wide-ranging in scope andsufficiently substantive in character. They include: law enforcement,education, interdiction, demand reduction, rehabilitation, intelligence,crop substitution, airport and seaport management, financial servicesregulation, and legislation. There is no region-wide standard for most ofthe countermeasures, although countries emulate other successfulmodels elsewhere and common practices do exist. The type and impactof the countermeasures introduced depend essentially on three things:

perceptions of the predicament, national capability, and foreign support.

Public sector resources may be insufficient to design and

implement narcotics countermeasures. This is more so due to the factthat countermeasures need to be both multidimensional andsimultaneous. Education, rehabilitation, interdiction, and other measuresshould be applied at the same time.


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Most countries have thus adopted an inclusive approach, actively

reaching out locally to Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) andcorporate agencies for partnership in countermeasures. Generally,

though, foreign state and non-state assistance is still necessary. In somecases the foreign support becomes so central to programs that itswithdrawal can result in the programs collapse.

Foreign assistance is not only bilateral, but also multilateral. Aidsometimes comes from places with generally little interest in theCaribbean, which suggests that the rationale behind the assistance maynot be for the specific country getting it.

Virtually all Caribbean countries have national drug councils thatare supposed to set policies on their countermeasures. They usually arecomposed of officials from multiple government bodies as well as

NGOs and the private sector. The National Council on Drug Abuse(NCDA) of Jamaica, the Programa para la Prevencion del Uso Indebidode Drogas (PROPUID) of the Dominican Republic, the NationalAdvisory Council on Drugs (NACD) of Guyana, the National Councilfor Drug Abuse Prevention (NaCoDAP) of the Netherlands Antilles, and

the National Drug Council (NDC) of the Bahamas are a few examples ofthese organizations.

Caribbean countries participate in various regional andinternational networks. Some of them, like the Inter-American DrugAction Task Force (CFATF), the OAS Money Laundering Expert Group(OAS-MLEG), and the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP)are solely devoted to combating drugs. For some of them, such as theAssociation of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP), drugs are

part of a much wider mandate. Like national efforts, regional andinternational initiatives are multidimensional, covering the very areasthat are dealt with nationally. But unlike the national level, regional andinternational operations see less INGO (International Non GovernmentalOrganizations) involvement, and more from the states and NGOs.

`As of May 1996, all Caribbean countries except Belize andCuba had ratified the 1988 Convention. This ratification is now viewed


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by the international community as a litmus test of commitment for battling drugs. Thus Caribbean countries are very good internationalcitizens. Yet this is but a part of the reality. There is a point beyondratification where Caribbean countries appear delinquent. More critical

than ratification of treaties is the execution of their provisions, and mostall Caribbean countries are remiss with this for various reasons. Thereasons include administrative lethargy, technical and financiallimitations, plus lack of other needed resources.

About 90 percent of the regional and internationalcountermeasures involve foreign support by states, NGOs, and INGOswithin various combinations. Because the regional and internationalagencies involved recognize the importance of coordinating theirassistance, the Bridgetown Group was formed. The Bridgetown Group,centered in the Barbados capital, includes representatives from theAmerican, British, Canadian, Dutch, and French diplomatic missions inBarbados, the OAS, and the UNDCP (UN Drug Control Program). Thesuccess of the Bridgetown Group has led to the creation of fouradditional groups: the Georgetown Group (in Guyana); the Port ofSpain Group (in Trinidad and Tobago); the Santo Domingo Group (inthe Dominican Republic); and the Kingston Group (in Jamaica).

Most Caribbean countries have also signed Mutual Legal

Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with the United States, among themAntigua-Barbuda, Jamaica, Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic,Grenada, Haiti, Suriname, St Kitts-Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago.MLATs provide for training, joint interdiction, asset sharing, extradition,intelligence, and material/technical support.

Some agreements provide for ship-rider arrangements, whichallows Caribbean military and police personnel to sail aboard U.S. CoastGuard ships. The agreements authorize the boarding of suspect vessels

in the Caribbean waters and allows the arrest of suspects andconfiscation of their drugs. It is useful to note that although no formalagreements exist between Cuba and the United States, occasionally therehas been some meaningful antidrug cooperation.

Other bilateral narcotics treaties also exist. Belize, for example,

has agreements with Mexico for exchange of intelligence. Bilateral


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agreements also exist between Suriname and Colombia, Cuba andGuyana, Suriname and Guyana, Venezuela and Guyana, Suriname andthe Netherlands, Cuba and Jamaica, Trinidad/Tobago and Venezuela,Jamaica and Mexico, and Cuba and Panama.

Caribbean countries also are a part of several internationalcounternarcotics regimes. Among these are the following: the 1961United Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; the 1971 Convention onPsychotropic Substances; the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961Convention and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in NarcoticDrugs and Psychotropic Substances. The Conventions include

provisions on drug trafficking, money laundering, organized crime, andrelated issues, such as arms trafficking. The Conventions require statesthat are a part of it to strengthen laws concerning financial reporting,extradition, asset forfeiture, and other subjects. It also urges adherentsto improve cooperation in intelligence, interdiction, eradication, andmany other areas.

The way the United States pursues some of its unilateral and joint countermeasures has often been a problem for some of theCaribbean countries. United States law enforcement officials are knownto have pursued suspects into the territorial waters of Caribbeancountries, making arrests in those countries jurisdictions - sometimes

without a courtesy notification of the arrest. There has often been basiccoercion by U.S. agencies in the selection of personnel for local drugenforcement operations, and in the design and implementation ofcountermeasures.

There is considerable muddling through in the design andimplementation of narcotics countermeasures in this region. Variousfactors account for this: capability limitations, administrative lethargy, arock-and-hard-place dilemma in which policy makers find themselves

(partly because drug operations have both negative and positive aspects),and the fact that decisions about many national programs are not madesolely by local elites. Also, there is a troubling sense of fatalism in some

places, which is dangerous for several reasons. It adversely affects the psychological buoyancy of people involved in combating drugs, itcontributes to greater cynicism in the general population of countries,


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and it emboldens drug operators with the possibility that they mightincrease the scope of their operations in the region.

National Master Plans are considered the ideal tools for

establishing national strategies and mechanisms for combating drugs.There are Master Plans in over 18 places, including Trinidad andTobago, Guyana, Grenada, the Netherlands Antilles, the DominicanRepublic, Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia, Antigua-Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, Haiti, Belize, Anguilla, Barbados,Turks and Caicos, Aruba, Bermuda, Dominica, and Cuba. However,there are problems with Master Plans, one of which the United NationsInternational Drug Control Program (UNDCP) notes: A severe lack ofconsistent, pertinent, reliable, and comprehensive data on drug abuseand trafficking seriously inhibits proper assessment of the actualsituation, and precludes planning of appropriate counter-measures. (2)


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CHAPTER 10

INTELLIGENCE AND INTERDICTIONIntelligence and interdiction measures are extremely costly and

involve considerable technology, which Caribbean countries lack. Thispartly explains the sustained and extensive United States role.

ROTHR Relocatable-Over-The-Horizon Radar originally wasdesigned to track Soviet bombers. It can scan many times further thanconventional radar. As a prototype, ROTHR was established in Virginiain April 1993. Then a second system in Texas underwent final testingduring September 1995. Puerto Rico is the site of a third ROTHR. ThePentagon explains that the first two sites can scan 2,000 miles on a clearday and 1,600 miles on a day with atmospheric disturbances. Thus, theycan usually sweep most of the Caribbean, Central America, northernColombia, and Venezuela.

ROTHR uses a technology different than the conventional line-of-site microwave radar. It works by bouncing signals off theionosphere (the outer region of the atmosphere that begins about 30miles from the earth). ROTHR costs $12 million for each system, withannual operating costs between $12 million and $14 million per facility.(2)

Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) are staging areas foraircraft involved in the international effort to combat area narco-

traffickers. FOLs use existing airport facilities owned and operated byLatin American and Caribbean countries. They are made available forthe international counter drug campaign. Aircraft operating out of FOLshave very sophisticated equipment onboard to detect, monitor, and trackaircraft or vessels engaged in illicit drug trafficking. Aircraft overflyingnational airspace have representatives onboard from those countries who


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serve as communication links between the aircraft and the countrys lawenforcement authorities. Either on the ground and in the air, theyinterdict and apprehend the targeted narco-trafficker. Aircraft that stageout of FOLs act upon information received in the operational plans

drawn up by a command and control center located in Key West, FL.The center is international in scope and concept with officers fromvarious Western Hemisphere nations integrated into the command. Theentire program is part of the international counternarcotics effort agreedto by all the presidents of the Western Hemisphere nations during theMiami and Santiago Summits in 1994 and 1998, and the United NationsGeneral Assembly Special Session on Counternarcotics held in June1998. There are currently three FOLs: Curacao, Aruba, and Manta,Ecuador. Other places will possibly be designated in the future afterappropriate diplomatic consultations.

Effective intelligence also supports law enforcement effortsagainst the independent cocaine and heroin trafficking organizations inColombia, and the splinter groups from the Cali organization, which areultimately supplying the majority of cocaine to the Eastern UnitedStates. While building cases against these criminal groups, the U.S.Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) will employ intelligence gained from

its investigation in coordination with the Coast Guard, TreasuryDepartment, and Department of Defense. This makes it possible tosubstantially step up interdiction of smuggled drugs at geographic andtransportation choke points along maritime routes and at ports of entry.(1)

Many Caribbean countries, including Jamaica, Trinidad andTobago, Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Guyana, already haveUnited States sponsored Joint Information Coordinating Centers

(JICCs). These are linked electronically with the DEA operational andanalysis center in Texas, called the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).However, several Caribbean officials have stressed the importance ofhaving a system within the region to serve the region since most of theJICC intelligence data flows are unidirectional from the CaribbeanJICCs to the EPIC. (2)


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CHAPTER 11

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

In 1995, the DEA established its Caribbean Division based inSan Juan, Puerto Rico as its 21st field division. As traffickers operating

in this area began to have a serious impact on the United States bycontrolling the sale of multi-hundred kilogram shipments of cocaine andheroin, it became clear that a re-invigorated strategy to attack all aspectsof the drug trade in this region needed to be instituted. The CaribbeanCorridor Initiative, now a major part of the Southern Frontier Initiative,was created to disrupt and ultimately dismantle criminal organizationsthat smuggle any illicit drugs into the United States through theCaribbean Corridor. This corridor consists of the islands of Hispaniola,Puerto Rico, and the Lesser Antilles (Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao). Ithad become increasingly more important as a smuggling route forColombia-based trafficking organizations as a result of U.S. lawenforcement success along its Southwest Border. Data also shows thatPuerto Rico has become a major transshipment point for Colombianheroin destined for the United States. Puerto Rico, the DominicanRepublic, and the Netherlands Antilles are, additionally, major moneylaundering centers. (1)

The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) maintains foreign officesin the Caribbean at Freeport, Bahamas; Nassau, Bahamas; Bridgetown,Barbados; Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; Port-au-Prince, Haiti;Kingston, Jamaica; Curacao, Netherlands Antilles; and Port of Spain,Trinidad & Tobago.


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DEA also has identified four major organizations based on thenorthern coast of Colombia that have deployed command and controlcells in the Caribbean Basin to funnel tons of cocaine to the UnitedStates every year. Colombian managers, who have been dispatched to

Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, operate these command andcontrol centers which are responsible for overseeing drug trafficking intheir region. These groups also direct networks of transporters thatoversee the importation, storage, exportation, and wholesale distributionof cocaine destined for the continental United States. (12)

The DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) supports its foreigncounterparts investigations by providing information such as whocontrols the drug trade; how the drugs are distributed; and how the

profits are being laundered. It also provides information as to how theentire worldwide drug system operates at the source level, transportationlevel, wholesale and retail levels. One major U.S. federal effort is theJoint Information Coordination Centers program. They providecomputer hardware and software, as well as training, to 20 host countrynationals overseas - primarily in Central America, South America andthe Caribbean. This program enables these countries to establishintelligence-gathering centers of their own and is modeled after the Drug

Enforcement Agencys El Paso Intelligence Center.

Additional resources have allowed DEA to increase theirtechnological edge and address some critical infrastructure needs thatsupport their international investigation. With the growingsophistication of todays internationally based and national drugtrafficking organizations, law enforcement (including DEA) reliesheavily on investigative tools such as Title III wiretaps to successfully

investigate the major drug trafficking organizations. DEA has alsodeveloped sophisticated methods to compile investigative informationwhich ensures all leads are properly followed up and coordinatedthrough their Special Operations Division (SOD). This mechanismallows all DEA field divisions and foreign offices to capitalize oninvestigative information from various sources as cases develop.

Numerous major cases have been developed with the assistance of the


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SOD, which increasingly is a central player in cocaine,methamphetamine and heroin investigations.

DEA has also provided a communication system, known as

Unicorn, which allows the island nations to exchange drug enforcementinformation amongst themselves. This same system is also linked to thelarger Information and Coordination Center, which is based in PuertoRico.

DEA special agents are assisting their foreign counterparts bydeveloping sources of information and interviewing witnesses. Agentswork undercover and assist in surveillance efforts on cases that involvedrug trafficking which affects the United States. They provideinformation about drug traffickers to their counterparts and pursueinvestigative leads by checking out hotel, airport, shipping, and passportrecords. In addition, when host country authorities need to know theorigin of seized illicit drugs, DEA agents ship the drugs back to DEAfacilities in the United States for laboratory analysis. Also, the DEA, incollaboration with federal prosecutors, seeks U.S. indictments againstmajor foreign traffickers who have committed crimes against Americancitizens.

The DEA actively participates in various international forums to

promote international law enforcement cooperation. One forum is theannual International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) that bringstogether upper-level drug law enforcement officials from South, Central,and North America, as well as the Caribbean. They share drug-relatedintelligence and develop operational strategies that can be used againstinternational drug traffickers. The yearly conferences focus on the areas

of common concern such as the growing sophistication of drugtrafficking organization and money laundering. (1)


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CHAPTER 12

ROLE OF THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM

The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)continues to play a key role in combating illicit drugs. The manycountries of the region have acknowledged the need to strengtheninternational cooperation and to constantly review and enhance national

policies, taking into account the particular problems in each individualcountry.

In 1996, the member states approved the Antidrug Strategy in the

Hemisphere, a multilateral instrument that represents the commitment toface the multiple facets and manifestations of the immense drug problemin the region. Similarly, the Second Summit of the Americas issued anappeal for the OAS to address the issue of a multilateral alliance againstdrugs from an integral perspective.

The OAS (Organization of American States) recognizes that the best way to strengthen multilateral efforts to combat drugs is by

integrating them with the many social objectives, given that the harmfuleffects of drug abuse and trafficking not only impact on one group ofcountries but definitely affect every sector of society. Phenomenon likeviolence, terrorism, or corruption, which are all exacerbated by drugtrafficking, constitute a threat to each society as a whole. Thestrengthening of judicial systems, education, and increased awareness


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about the destructive effects of drugs, the creation of developmentprograms, and the treatment and rehabilitation of users as an importantmeans of reducing demand, are all key pieces of the hemisphericstrategy to combat drugs.

As part of this new approach and by virtue of the mandate of the

Second Summit of the Americas, the OAS developed a single, objective process of multilateral government evaluation. This is to monitorindividual and collective progress of hemispheric efforts in the treatmentof the various manifestations of the problem.

In May 1998, with the backing of the member states, the OAS began negotiations to design and implement the mechanisms based onthe principles agreed to in the Hemispheric Strategy. The conceptualfoundation of the strategy was observance of the provisions of the OASCharter, mindful of the principles of shared responsibility, reciprocity,

balanced treatment of issues, and consensus among the states. This is all based on the sovereignty, national jurisdiction, and legal structure ofeach country.

These efforts are aimed at developing mutual trust and improving

dialogue and cooperation among the member countries. It also enabledthe countries to be more rigorous in their analysis, to have a number of

parameters for evaluating the quality and pertinence of policies, tostrengthen and adjust the policies periodically, to weigh the effectivenessof work methods, to learn more from successes and mistakes, and to

benefit from information and similar experiences in other countries.In the area of institutional strengthening, the OAS continues to

provide support to the national anti-drug commissions in organizing,

formulating, and coordinating integrated and long-term national plans tohelp combat drug trafficking and abuse. To improve the capacity ofthese commissions to communicate among themselves and with otherinternational organizations, and to maximize the use of existingtelecommunications systems in the hemisphere, the OAS implementedthe Inter-American Telecommunications Network for Drug Control/

National Commissions.


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In 1996 the OAS formed a Group of Experts to provide

assistance and facilitate cooperation among the countries of the WesternHemisphere for demand reduction. In recent years, they have also

conducted numerous activities - including drug use prevention programsfor street children, women, and youth; development of communicationstrategies; and projects related to drug education.

In relation to legal developments, the OAS has updated theModel Regulations on Laundering Offenses related to the IllicitTrafficking in Drugs and Related Offenses. The General Assembly hasapproved these regulations and agreed upon numerous amendments tothe Model Regulations to Control Chemical Substances. Thanks to thiswork, judicial systems, police, and other agencies combating drugtrafficking in the countries of the hemisphere are now cooperating moreclosely.

The OAS also has continued working on the dissemination ofmaterials on drugs and has set up the Inter-American System of UniformData On Drug Use (SIDUC) - which supplies member states withreliable, rapidly accessible, and comparable data on the use and illegal

trafficking of narcotics. (8)


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CHAPTER 13

SUCCESS STORIES

In 1982, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces program (OCDETF) was born to combine federal, state, and local lawenforcement efforts into a comprehensive attack against organized crimeand drug traffickers. OCDETF objectives are to target, investigate, and

prosecute individuals who organize, direct, finance, or are otherwiseengaged in high-level illegal drug trafficking enterprises including large-scale money laundering organizations. Their strategic plan is to promotea coordinated drug enforcement effort in each task force region; toencourage maximum cooperation among all drug enforcement agencies;and to make full use of financial investigative techniques.

By the late 1980s, the DEAs financial investigative skills had

evolved to such a high degree that the agency set up its own bank to luredrug traffickers into laundering their profits with them. In 1989, theinvestigative team created Trans America Ventures Associates (TARA)which established its credentials in the financial community. The resultwas so convincing that Hispanic Business Weekly listed TARA as one ofthe top 500 Hispanic Corporations in the Americas. Undercover agentsthen posed as money launderers and solicited to pick up funds anywherein the world. They used informants to identify the drug money brokersfrom Colombia who acted as middlemen between the Cali organization

kingpins and the money laundering operations in the United States.

Beginning in San Diego and Los Angeles, the investigations tookundercover agents to Houston, Ft Lauderdale, Miami, Chicago, and NewYork to pick up money and to establish business fronts, such as leathergoods shops. During the course of the extensive investigation, DEA


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agents laundered more than $20 million for the Colombian-based cartels.As the investigation developed, cartel operatives asked some of theundercover agents to provide money laundering services in Europe,Canada, and the Caribbean. Consequently, Operation Green Ice was

expanded into an immense international law enforcement effortinvolving Canada, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy,Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

In September 1992, undercover agents arranged a meeting withtop-ranking Cali financial managers at locations in the United States,Italy, Spain, and Costa Rica. The drug lords arrived, expecting todiscuss plans for their current criminal businesses, but instead werearrested. Operation Green Ice was an unprecedented collaboration oftalent and financial expertise that successfully formed the firstinternational task force to combat the monetary networks of the Caliorganization. Operation Green Ice led to the arrest of seven of the Caliorganizations top financial managers, the seizure of more than $50million in assets worldwide, and the arrest of 177 persons whichincluded 44 from the United States. (1)

The opportunity was taken at the CARICOM (Caribbean

Community) Georgetown, Guyana meeting on 25 Sep 1998 to reviewand assess progress on various drug projects and programs. They weredesigned to fight the trade in illicit drugs and associated crimes,including money-laundering and the regional justice protection program.Among these projects and programs were those agreed to at theBarbados Plan of Action for Drug Control Coordination and Cooperationin the Caribbean developed in 1996; at the Plan of Action arising out ofthe Caribbean/US Summit held in May 1997; and at the Second Summit

of the Americas in April 1998 as well as those funded by the EuropeanUnion (EU). The meeting also reviewed the programs andrecommendations placed forward by the Association of CaribbeanCommissioners of Police (ACCOP), the Caribbean Customs LawEnforcement Council (CCLEC) and the Caribbean Island NationsSecurity Conference (CINSEC). This meeting reaffirmed theircommitment to a unified position in dealing with drug trafficking where


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they agreed on a mechanism to be put in place with the CARICOMSecretariat to ensure coordination among the programs. (9)

The results of the Caribbean Corridor Initiative includes many

major multi-national operations. One - Operation Summer Storm -conducted in 1997, was a combined effort of all the Caribbean nations,the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and thenavies of Great Britain, Netherlands, France and the United States. Itsucceeded in closing down the eastern Caribbean to drug trafficking foralmost 60 days. Operation Summer Storm resulted in the seizure ofmega amounts of drugs, including 57 kilograms of cocaine, and thearrests of 828 people.

Operation Genesis, conducted in late 1998, was also a multi-national initiative, involving the United States, Haiti and the DominicanRepublic. Prior to this operation, Haiti and the Dominican Republic hadnever coordinated their anti-drug efforts with each other. The precedentset by Operation Genesis will, hopefully, aid in improving the ability tocoordinate anti-drug efforts on the island of Hispaniola. (1)


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CHAPTER 14

FUTURE CHALLENGES

The presence of the trafficking organizations surrogates incommunities now touched with violent crime will probably continue to

be problematic as rampant drug trafficking continues. As internationalorganized criminal groups grow stronger and diversify into various new

products, methods, and strategies, we must continue to meet thechallenges posed by these powerful international and domesticorganizations.

The Caribbean Sea acts as both a barrier and a bridge,functioning as the new internationalization of corruption and violence.The sea facilitates the flow of international commerce and transnationalactivities of some of the worlds great procedures and exports. It puts

many an international activity beyond the reach of nation states. Theresult is often an asymmetry in maneuvering capabilities between thenational and international actors. This asymmetry is augmented and

perpetuated by the technical and electronic revolution which gives even private parties enormous capacities of communication, including theelectronic transfer of capital in money laundering. The Caribbean notonly provides a bridge between the producer and the consumer in thistransnational industry, its modern banking system provides almostvirtually impenetrable shelter to its profits. The importance of all this isthat the drug trade both contributes to and is facilitated by widespreadand enduring corruption which permeates key elements thoughcertainly not all of the public and private sectors. (7)

The United States government, for quite a while, has soughtreassurances from the involved Caribbean countries that they would


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develop and maintain a unified effort to fight drug trafficking in theregion. March 4, 1996, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher andPrime Minister Basdeo Panday of Trinidad and Tobago signed threeagreements designed to combat drug trafficking through the twin-island

republic. These agreements are as follows: the Maritime DrugInterdiction Treaty, which permits US drug enforcement personnel towork aboard Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard boats and vice-versa; theMutual Assistance Treaty, which authorizes exchanges of information ondrug searches and seizures; and the Extradition Treaty, whichstreamlines existing extradition procedures between the two countries.

CARICOM states, because of their fragile economies,geographical location, and inadequate security-capabilities, arevulnerable to narco-trafficking. Generally, the regional states have beenattempting to respond to drug trafficking on an individual basis. Theyare using their very scarce resources primarily for interdiction and theeradication of marijuana, which is cultivated in a relatively largequantity in a number of Caribbean countries. The Inter-AmericanCommission for Drug Abuse Control (CICAD) and a number of otherinternational agencies also render assistance to the region in the fightagainst illicit trafficking and the use of narcotics. (11)

The DEA has used the majority of the Western Hemisphere fundsto continue installation of a classified computer infrastructure referred toas MERLIN which operates in association with their FIREBIRDcomputer system throughout DEA offices in the source and transitcountries. This system is the single most important enhancement toenable the flow of critical intelligence to and from these regions and theUnited States.

Drug traffickers are taking advantage of rapidly advancingtechnology, including encryption, which is used to disguise the contentof conversations by thwarting law enforcement attempts to interfere withtheir operations and ultimately bring them to justice. The WesternHemisphere funding is also being used for the purchase of wirelessintercept equipment to augment programs in the source and transit zonesof the Caribbean. The switch to digital communications, the


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sophistication of traffickers in their efforts to conceal theircommunications, as well as the expansion of DEAs intercept programsin all the source countries - has significantly increased the demand forthis technological equipment. (12)

The growing trend towards increased cooperation in the Western

Hemisphere is creating unprecedented drug-control opportunitiesthrough growing multilateral initiatives. The anti-drug action agendasigned at the 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas is beingimplemented. All member states of the Organization of American Statesendorsed the 1995 Buenos Aires Communique on Money Launderingand the 1996 Hemispheric Anti-Drug Strategy. The hemispheres thirty-four democratically elected heads of states agreed during the 1998Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile to an unprecedentedHemispheric Alliance Against Drugs. (13)


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CHAPTER 15

CONCLUSION

Drug trafficking in the Caribbean is overwhelmingly influencedby Colombian organized criminal groups. The Caribbean has long beena favorite smuggling route used by the Medellin and Cali crime groups.

Now, independent groups of traffickers from the Northern Valle dalCauca, and splinter groups from the Cali syndicate have risen to

prominence and are responsible for mega volumes of cocaine and heroin being shipped to the United States and other countries through theCaribbean. These groups, who have replaced the highly structured,centrally controlled business operations of the Cali group, tend to besmaller and less organized. However, they continue to rely on fear andviolence to expand and control their trafficking empires.

The illegal drug economy may, occasionally, act as a safety-valveto compensate for the shortcomings of the formal economy. Traffickersinfiltrate bureaucracies, buy public decisions, and conduct businessthrough threats of violence and intimidation. They create an anti-stateoutside any rule of law or central government control, which necessitatesthe expenditure of millions of dollars for law enforcement activities. Inthe social sphere, traffickers corrupt a significant proportion of the

population by attracting new generations to the drug trade. Theyglamorize gangs and glorify the role model of the conspicuouslyconsuming new rich, thereby contributing to social disorganizationand disintegration.

Drug traffickers use the opportunities presented by the changingglobal economic environment to enlarge their activities and expand theirmarkets. They are extremely mobile, employ the latest communication


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technology and move their money around the world electronically. Theconsequences of this type of organized trafficking are severe; systemiccrime and violence are becoming endemic in the countries worstaffected, while traffickers efforts to corrupt public officials and attract

new generations to the drug trade help protect them from attack.International narcotics control efforts will never adequately attack thetrafficking problem until official government corruption in the drugtrade is reduced or eliminated, so the efforts of the internationalcommunity can be focused solely on prosecuting the criminal syndicatesdirectly involved.

A comprehensive study of the drug dilemma in the Caribbeanreveals the severity of the threat that illegal drug trafficking poses tothese small countries of the region. It is a persistent problem for lawenforcement and threatens the very existence of the small countries inthe Caribbean. The increase in the production and flow of drugsundermines the political stability and economic development since itleads to crime, corruption, arms trafficking and decreased tourism.Although all these countries, except Cuba, are democracies, the need tocommit military and paramilitary forces in the war against drugs canseriously undermine democratic governance in these nations. Increased

military involvement in drug control operations has been relativelyunsuccessful where it has been attempted. Additionally, the adversesocial and political impacts of such a strategy are potentially severe.

The war on drugs cannot be fought by any one nation alone itmust be a unified effort. The fact that 144 States have become parties tothe 1998 Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs andPsychotropic Substances is evidence of the interest in quelling the

growth of this illicit trade and traffic. In June 1998, the world interestedcountries from all across the globe assembled at the United Nations tosend a message of unity and commitment to strengthen our effort againstdrug trafficking. Its success is yet to be observed.


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REFERENCES

1) Marshall, D. (1999). DEA Congressional Testimony:

International Drug Trade and its Impact on the US. WashingtonDC: U.S. Department of Justice.

2) Griffith, I. (1996). Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21stCentury. (McNair Paper 54). Washington DC: Institute for

National Strategic Studies.

3) Tullis, L. & Painter, J. (1994). Illicit Drugs: Social Impactsand Policy Responses: World Summit for Social Development.

New York: Oxford University Press.

4) Dillon, E. (1998). The Third Defence Ministerial of theAmericas Conference: Security of Caribbean States.

Washington DC: Trinidad and Tobago Delegation.

5) NNICC Committee (1996). The NNICC Report: The Supply ofIllicit Drugs to the United States. Washington DC: DEA

6) Griffith, I. (1998). Caribbean Geopolitics and Geonarcotics.

Available: http://www.nwc.navy.mil.7) Bagley, B. & Walker III, W. (1994). Drug Trafficking in the

Americas. Miami: Transaction Publishers.8) Gaviria, C. (1999). Toward the New Millennium: The Road

Traveled 1994-1999. Washington DC: OAS.

9) Caricom Secretariat. (1998). Region Gives Priority to Drug

Demand Reduction. Available: http://www.caricom.org.

10) DEA. (1998). Money Laundering. Available: http://

www.usdoj.gov11) Ishmael, O. (1996). Caribbean Daylight. Washington DC: OAS.

12) Marshall, D. (1999). DEA Congressional Testimony:International Organized Crime. Washington DC: U.S.

Department of Justice.

13) National Drug Control Strategy: 1999. Washington DC.

14) Thachuk, K. (1999). Transnational Trends: New Threats?

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15) Section 1004 and Section 124 Counterdrug Assistance. (1998).

Available: http://www.ciponline.org.16) Perl, R. (1994). Drug Control: International Policy and

Options. Washington DC: Library of Congress.

17) Nelson, B. (1996). Drug Control U.S. Interdiction Efforts inthe Caribbean Decline. Washington DC: U.S. General

Accounting Office.

18) Caribbean Nations Reviewing U.S. Drug Treaty. (1999).

Georgetown, Guyana: News Digital Media. Available: http://

www.foxmarketwire.com19) Coast Guard Reports Shift in Caribbean Drug Trafficking:

Seizure Value Nearly $1 Billion. (1997). San Juan, P.R:

USDOT. Available: http://www.dot.gov.20) Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere. (1998). Washington DC:

OAS. Available: http://www.cicad.oas.21) Ledwith, W. (1999). DEA Congressional Testimony: Nature and

Extent of the Drug Threat from Cuba. Washington DC: U.S.Department of Justice.

22) Marshall, D. (1998). DEA Congressional Testimony: National

Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice.Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

23) Milford, J. (1997). DEA Congressional Testimony: Caribbean/

South Florida. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

See: http://library.jid.org/en/mono39/taylor.htm
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