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Combatting Terrorism Recruitment in the West

Combatting Terrorism Recruitment in the WestBria Oneglia

Capstone – CRIM 7400Professor Zimmerman

30 November 2015


Combatting Terrorist Recruitment in the West

Introduction

Terrorism as a weapon can be traced as far back as the first century’s Sicarii, a part of the

Jewish resistance against Roman rule (Romaniuk, 2011). However, for much of the West, the

word terrorism is almost exclusively identified with Islam, the Middle East, and groups such as

al-Qaida and the newly emerged Islamic State. Terrorism is defined by the United Nations as

“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of

persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable,

whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or

any other nature that may be invoked to justify them” (General, 1995). Officially included in this

definition are over 60 organizations, the majority of which originated in and operate out of the

Middle East and Africa (Humund, Arieff, Blanchard, Blanchard, Sharp, & Katzman, 2014).

Terrorist organizations identified as Islamic vary in ideology, target, and recruitment

strategies. Key influencers include nationalistic perception of oppression, geographical position,

and economic conditions (Smelser, 2007). Generally, Islam can be identified as a pretext for

politically motivated activity, as highlighted in the identification of the Lebanese group

Hizballah as a political party that holds position in the Lebanese government. Along these lines,

the Palestinian organization Hamas functions as a political organization with nationalistic goals

and rests on Islam to retain support.

Arguably the most dangerous of Islamic terrorist organizations are those with a

transnational mission and an open ideology. A large number of these organizations have declared

an allegiance to the original al-Qaida, and because of this, they are considered al-Qaida affiliates

by the United States (Humund, et al., 2014). Among these are the well-known al-Qaida, al-Qaida

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in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Islamic State,

al-Shebab, and Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaida in Syria). al-Qaida affiliated groups share an

ideological agenda: elimination of influences that cause diversion from traditional Islamic

society and the creation of an Islamic state, modeled after the Qur’anic concept of Ummah.

These organizations call for variously interpreted measures to accomplish this agenda, namely

the fighting of western influence and control, elimination of those governments considered

apostates, and conducting terrorist attacks on the “far enemy,” the West (Humund, et al., 2014).

These trans-nationalistic groups rely on worldwide recruitment success, and because of their

broad ideology, they achieve this success. By tailoring their rhetoric to each specific audience,

recruiters are able to capitalize on those seeking an array of experiences or solutions.

It comes as no surprise that these groups have achieved relevance around the world.

While the majority of support remains in the Middle East, a significant influx of foreign backing

for transnational terrorist organizations has been recorded in recent years. According to a report

released by the United Nations, since 2014 over 25,000 foreign fighters from over 100 countries

have travelled to Iraq or Syria to join the Islamic State organization (Hagopian, 2015), while

countless others have joined al-Qaida and other groups in the past two decades, many of which

hold Western passports.

The recruitment of Westerners to these organizations poses a vast threat to national

security, as well as the disruption of society as a whole and the disintegration of families and

communities. In the past, recruitment was a local enterprise, but social media and the evolution

of the Internet as a ubiquitous tool has contributed to the radicalization of previously hard to

reach populations, notably the West.

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Counterterrorism policy on an individual level in the United States and other Western

countries has remained fairly reactive, creating a large window for domestic terrorism as well as

the opportunity to travel overseas with terroristic intentions while holding a valid passport for

return. Social institutions that are dedicated to learning and development, such as schools,

mosques, and community centers, become susceptible to infiltration and members may be

subject to radicalization. Aside from national security concerns, involvement in terrorism is

devastating not only to victims but also the families and communities from which these

individuals came. Disrupting a family or community’s structure can create anger and isolation,

contributing to deviance (Appleby, 2010), whether terroristic or otherwise, and creating a clear

burden on society.

While terrorism and foreign fighter increases have been widely discussed across Western

media outlets, there is a lack of research to identify key factors shared among Westerners who

have been successfully recruited by transnational terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida and the

Islamic State. The identification of common elements among these individuals can help

counteract the process and effectiveness of radicalization in the West, and intersect the wave of

foreign support for these organizations. In such context, this study will be conducted to address

the question what factors correspond with a Western Muslim joining an al-Qaida affiliated

terrorist organization? Anticipated findings for this study suggest that those susceptible to

radicalization efforts are recently converted or uneducated in Islam, and/or have experienced

social isolation from their communities and peers, and/or are disillusioned with their

government. If this hypothesis is supported, the results of the study would encourage

preventative measures in terms of policy and community outreach to target vulnerable

populations and work against radicalization on a social platform. This is a key step in reducing

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levels of isolation and alienation experienced by Muslim populations in Western countries, and

could contribute to decreased levels of support for terrorist organizations by introducing a higher

level of social concern among targeted populations and reducing the acceptance levels of

radicalization.

Literature Review

Westerners who have been successfully recruited to al-Qaida affiliated organizations

come from a wide selection of backgrounds, socioeconomic statuses, education levels, and

careers (Berger & Stern, 2015). Because it is impossible to identify a demographic based on

these factors, more in-depth social circumstances must be researched to isolate conditions that

increase susceptibility to recruitment efforts.

Prominently “Islamic” terrorist organizations diverge from Islam in many ways, most

notable in the recent actions of the Islamic State group. Drug use, decapitation and mass killings,

and the practice of takfir (declaring Muslims as apostates) are explicitly forbidden in the Qur’an,

but are among frequently observed terroristic activities performed by these organizations.

Because these organizations operate on the pretext of Islam, religious status as a Muslim is a

prerequisite for membership, but not for recruitment. In the absence of typical patterns among

recruits, one shared element stands out. Among those joining these organizations from Western

countries, a disproportionate amount are converts or secular Muslims (Berger & Stern, 2015).

While conducting interviews with imprisoned ISIS fighters, one reporter noted that “they are

woefully ignorant about Islam and have difficulty answering questions about Sharia law, militant

jihad, and the caliphate” (Wilson, 2015). Limited knowledge of the religion and lack of fluency

in the religion’s language provides a gateway for manipulation, including unwitting

radicalization through Imams and masjid communities with underground ties to terrorist

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organizations. Because of this pattern in Western foreign fighters, it is important to continue

monitoring the religious status of those traveling to join these organizations.

Theoretical Framework

Since September 11, 2001, Western governments have adopted a strong rhetoric against

Islamic extremism, introducing to the public a connection between Islam and terrorism. While

counter-terrorism is a necessary priority, the relationship between an unfamiliar religion and

terrorism has become perceived as causal. This leads to a dilemma that can be assessed through

the application of labeling theory, a criminological theory intended to understand deviance in a

social context (Appleby, 2010). While labeling theory generally claims that those labeled as a

deviant begin to perceive themselves as deviant, subsequently becoming deviant, it can be

applied at a different angle, in tandem with another criminological theory, subcultural theory.

By highlighting Islam as the primary cause of terrorism, at least in terms of public

perception, governments, and subsequently Western society, have created a deviance label that

can be and often is applied to Western Muslims. While individuals build an identity that includes

heritage, religion, education, and other social factors, the label ‘Muslim’ compromises those

factors, isolating an individual as a Muslim, rather than a mother, a professor, or a college

student. Additionally, referring to individuals as a “British Muslim” or an “American Muslim,”

rather than an American or a Briton, alienates them from the national population. As explained

by Nicolas Appleby in his evaluation of the U.K.’s Labour government’s counter-terrorism

approach, this labeling practice “constructed a tray in society entitled ‘Muslim’ that contained a

wide variety of individuals who have some connection to a religious doctrine, even though some

people labeled as ‘Muslim’ would not be practicing or even believers.” He then stipulates that by

creating this label of “sameness,” a label of “difference” is inevitable (Appleby, 2010).

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Through counter-terrorism rhetoric, this label has spread to negatively influence public

attitude towards Muslims in Western countries. After 9/11, the F.B.I. reported a 1,700% increase

in hate crimes targeting Muslim Americans between 2000 and 2001 (Khan & Ecklund, 2012).

Currently, Western voters are voicing outrage at the acceptance of Syrian refugees, exacerbated

by the Islamic State’s 11/13 terrorist attacks in Paris. These labels and attitudes inadvertently

lead to the isolation of a large percentage of the Western population, placing them in Appleby’s

“tray” of difference.

Through the lens of labeling theory, this population has been identified as deviant by

political rhetoric, and consequently shunned by the general population. The isolation that results

introduces the role of subcultural theory in radicalization. A subculture in this context can be

loosely defined as a group that shares ideologies and provides a sense of collectiveness, with

norms that deviate from society’s norms. Subcultural theory suggests that deviance is the result

of individuals aligning themselves to the values and norms of a subculture to which they belong,

and subsequently rejecting society’s norms (Pisoiu, 2014). Subcultural theory is frequently

applied to the analysis of gangs, in which deviant behavior is widely accepted and rewarded, but

can be effective in understanding the motivations behind terrorist organization alignment

(Decker & Pyrooz, 2011).

In the context of terrorism, social acceptance can play a large role in the likeliness of an

individual to reject violent ideologies (Cragin, Bradley, Robinson, & Steinberg, 2015). Isolation

as a result of labeling places a percentage of the Western population in a vulnerable position to

be targeted by radical groups. Individuals who seek to belong in alternative subcultures expose

their desire to belong and their vulnerability to recruitment efforts, whether from domestic gangs,

terrorist organizations, or other deviant subcultures. A report issued by the United States Institute

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of Peace identified key types of individuals most often recruited to al-Qaida, and each of these

includes an element of perceived victimization by society, a desire to belong, or a similar

element of social dissatisfaction or desire (Venhaus, 2010).

Responsibility for social isolation of a certain group can be placed on society as a whole,

but often is the result of political actions or rhetoric (Appleby, 2010). Disillusionment with

government and political actors and a lack of loyalty to this government is a logical sentiment

accompanying those experiencing isolation from their societies. One key type of individual

identified in the aforementioned United States Institute of Peace report is the “revenge seeker,”

compared to “someone who joins a local movement, whether political or militant, to try and

change the political conditions he lives in” (Venhaus, 2015). In this context, dissatisfaction with

government may reasonably accompany social isolation as a characteristic among those

radicalized by terrorist organizations like al-Qaida. This dissatisfaction can strengthen the desire

to live amongst likeminded individuals, and by advertising a utopian society in recruitment

propaganda, groups like the Islamic State capitalize on this desire.

Current Study

There has been substantial research on recruitment efforts of gangs and nationalistic

terrorism organizations, such as Hamas, P.K.K., and Hizbollah (Smelser, 2007), but due to the

recent emergence of trans-nationalistic groups like al-Qaida and the Islamic State, there is a gap

in data surrounding the recruitment of Westerners to organizations with elevated missions.

Through media and political rhetoric, an emphasis of blame has been placed on recruitment

outlets, such as recruiter presence on social media, ignoring the root of the issue. This study is

designed to illustrate the value of identifying social factors that influence recruitment

effectiveness, allowing proactive rather than reactive responses.

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Methodology

The research question “what factors correspond with a Western Muslim joining an al-

Qaida affiliated terrorist organization” presents a number of difficulties while designing a study

to accurately measure the factors identified in the hypothesis. By conducting this study using

qualitative methods, and measuring multiple effects that contribute to the independent variables

of recent conversion, social isolation, and disillusionment, and the dependent variable,

radicalization, it is possible to address this research question effectively.

Sample

The ideal target population of this study is that of western Muslims who accepted

radicalization attempts by al-Qaida affiliated terrorist organizations. Reaching this population,

however, is virtually impossible, due to geographical and legal limitations. Adjusting to these

limitations, this study will identify families of individuals known to belong in these organizations

or known to have attempted to join them and failed. Identifying this population consists of

gathering information through media research and records made public by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and other Western governmental agencies. Because the sample for this study will

be family members and close social contacts of these individuals, they will be identified through

additional research of public record. After their participation in the study, these individuals will

be asked to refer additional family members, friends, community leaders, or parties with a close

relationship to the recruited individual, utilizing a snowball sampling strategy. The sample would

be contacted through the mail, with a follow-up phone call.

Given the sensitive nature of the study’s topic and material, it is imperative to explain the

goals of the study in terms of preventative strategy, which can be done most effectively through

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a letter. It is reasonable to assume the families of those affiliated with terrorist organizations in

such a public way have experienced negative fallout, and in order to encourage participation they

must be aware that the study does not seek to single them out in a condemnatory manner. In

terms of confidentiality, there is a notable balance between maintaining confidentiality and

gaining additional participants through referrals, and therefore, this study will offer the option of

confidentiality in terms of referral sampling, with the initial participant aware that their influence

may be helpful to gain additional sample member participation, and leaving the choice to them.

In the context of this study, these individuals are the closest population to the population

of interest. By asking this population to participate in the study, we may be able to uncover

social circumstances that contributed to radicalization, as well as identify social connections that

were otherwise undetected. Social media accounts belonging to the radicalized individuals will

be used as a secondary data source, either supplementing or strengthening the information

collected from the sample.

Data Collection

Because of the nature of the study, the most effective data collection method is an in-

depth interview. Upon receiving consent from the sample and explaining the goal of the study,

each individual will participate in a semi-structured interview, conducted in the individual’s

home or location of choice. Given the variety of possible responses and interpretations, the

interview will consist of guiding questions, but allow minor divergences and spontaneous follow

up questions during the response. This structure will allow the interview to address the specific

factors in question, while allowing for the interpretations that come with general social

influences (Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003).

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Measurement

In this study, the primary independent variables are social isolation, disillusionment with

government, and whether or not the individual was a recently converted or secular Muslim.

These variables will be defined through smaller factors, identified through a series of questions.

In order to identify the presence of social isolation, questions will address social networks.

Questions addressing social networks will expand to size, proximity, and frequency of

interaction, participation in social activities, including community organizations, extracurricular

school activities, and masjid attendance. In addition to social networks, the size and relationship

of family will be addressed (Cornwell & Waite, 2009). According to a study conducted by the

RAND Corporation, family plays a strong role in the rejection of violence and radicalization,

often outweighing the influence of non-familial social networks (Cragin, et al., 2015). Family

demographics can highlight gaps in social circumstances that may have contributed to

radicalization.

Identifying the presence of government disillusionment is straightforward. Membership

to anti-government groups, subscriptions to anti-government publications, and verbal

expressions of dissatisfaction or frustration will be addressed in questions relating to this

variable. Additionally, social media accounts can provide attitudes that may have been

undetected by family or friends. Reviewing friend connections, posts, “likes,” social media

network group memberships, and online event attendances may uncover previously unknown

attitudes.

Identifying the religious status of the radicalized individuals is straightforward as well.

The initial question regarding this variable will identify the religious status of the family and the

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individual. If the individual does not fall into the category of recent convert or secular Muslim,

additional questions will not be asked. However, if they do qualify, subsequent questions will be

asked addressing the time of conversion, the masjid to which the individual converted, and

whether or not they belonged to another religion previous to the conversion. These questions can

identify if the conversion was part of a recruitment process and/or if the individual converted

into a known radical masjid community.

Each of the questions will be attributed to one of the main variables in order to measure

their presence. There will be a total of 20 directed questions, with additional follow up questions

dependent on the responses received. See Table 1.0 for example questions for each variable.

Table 1.0

Social Isolation Disillusionment with Government

Religious Status

Did the individual live alone?

Did the individual ever express dissatisfaction with the government to you?

Was the individual raised as an observant or secular Muslim? (Additional questions asked only if individual was not observant)

Did the individual belong to any social organizations?

Did the individual openly belong to any anti-government organizations or movements?

Did the individual convert to Islam from another religion?

Did the individual attend masjid regularly

To your knowledge, did the individual ever attend any anti-government events or protests?

When did the individual convert to Islam?

How many members belong to the individual’s family?

To which masjid did the individual belong post-conversion?

Did you meet friends of the individual?

How did the individual spend the majority of their time?

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Analysis

Analysis of the data collected in the interviews will involve multiple steps. After the

interviews are concluded, several broad descriptive categories will be identified by reading

through the transcripts. This will enable the identification of connections between varying

experiences reported by the sample. After the preliminary identification of categories, each

category will be placed with a suitable variable (Legard, et al., 2003). For example, experiences

surrounding masjid attendance would be separated into the correct category depending on its

context in the interview (religious status versus social isolation). In addition to clear statements

that contribute to a specific variable without question, the same themes need to be identified in

comments or indirect information given through context or attitude of the interviewee. Any

information that does not match lucidly with a variable will not be included, in order to avoid

forced interpretation. If data adheres to the hypothesis, a pattern of themes will emerge in the

information collected. By coding these themes to match the variables, it will be possible to see if

the variables have a significant influence on the acceptance of radicalization.

This study faces some difficulty in collecting information to accurately reflect a

hypothesis. Due to the nature of qualitative data collection, the results will provide an

understanding of human behavior in the context of radicalization and social conditions, rather

than a causal relationship between the variables, and generate motivation for continued in-depth

research of additional variables.

Discussion

The data gathered by this study would introduce an important element in proactively

fighting radicalization and terrorist recruitment. By identifying common social factors among the

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organizations’ target populations, researchers and policy makers can narrow down a large

populace to those most at risk for radicalization. Radicalization prevention is key to

strengthening public safety and security domestically and internationally (Rabasa, Pettyjohn,

Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). This study is only an introduction to the type of information that can

greatly impact recruitment efforts, and further research should address alternative social factors

and circumstances and their scale of effect. In identifying these factors and their relationship

with radicalization, the need to proactively address deeper social circumstances is underscored.

Combating organizations such as al-Qaida and its affiliates requires a war of oratory, and

discrediting the organizations’ messages and image is the first and most important step.

Assigning this responsibility to Western governments is difficult, based on their lack of

credibility among Muslim populations. The most important role of political actors is to adjust

their rhetoric and create a new dialogue. A relevant example of this is the current attitude toward

Syrian refugees entering the United States. By presenting an alternative to the fatigued pairing of

terrorist and Muslim, politicians can discourage the presence of labeling described previously,

and build credibility with a vulnerable percentage of the population.

The crucial weight of this approach rests on organizations and agencies that can create a

campaign against the image of success and credibility presented by recruitment material.

Encouraging an open dialogue and discussion by the Muslim population on this platform can

educate those seeking an outlet or alternatives to joining a terrorist organization, and by sharing

experiences and opinions, those contemplating radicalization can see that they are not alone. An

example of this strategy’s success is illustrated in the international NGO Search for Common

Ground, which works on different levels of society across the world to promote discussion and

solutions using a “toolbox of radio, television, film, print, facilitation, community organizing,

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sports, drama, and music” (Search for Common Ground, n.d.). Encouraging this type of dialogue

and discussion provides an important space for those showing support for terroristic movements

to find alternatives in expressing their frustration. Support for movements that encourage

violence does not correlate with willingness or desire to engage in violence on behalf of the

movement (Cragin, et al., 2015), and providing alternatives for these individuals to be heard is an

important component of combatting recruitment.

Religion plays a superficial yet convincing role in radicalization, and a solution to

discrediting recruiters and organizations’ religious messages can be found in reintegration

programs implemented in countries like the Netherlands and Singapore. These programs use

Islamic scholars to directly contest messages and interpretations of Islam spread by al-Qaida and

its affiliates when reintegrating ex-extremists (Venhaus, 2010), and this concept can be extended

to those who have not been exposed to radicalization efforts as a preventative method.

Additionally, families have been identified as the foremost deterrent to violence (Cragin, et al.,

2015), and programs educating parents on ways to discuss and discredit radical messages and

movements with their children can combat radicalization efforts proactively and reactively

(Venhaus, 2010).

These suggestions to combat recruitment efforts by al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist

networks require tailoring to varying audiences, but share qualities that make them effective

across the board. Creating a competing narrative is essential to discredit the messages spread by

radical organizations, and building credibility with Muslim populations, providing alternative

outlets for frustration, and combatting religious exploitation will create a strong foundation for

this process (Helmus, York, & Chalk, 2013).

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Terrorism recruitment in the West is a growing problem of national security and public

safety, demanding a response from government and society. Anticipated findings addressing the

question “what factors correspond with a Western Muslim joining an al-Qaida affiliated terrorist

organization” include a number of factors, notably religious ignorance, social isolation, and

disillusionment with government. The presence of these factors allows organizations like al-

Qaida to design recruitment materials and strategy to capitalize on these vulnerabilities, and

combatting these organizations as a whole requires more than superficial military action.

Treating this problem as a societal issue and intersecting a constant supply of recruits before they

are radicalized would be detrimental to these organizations. Dependent upon continuing research

to identify those at high risk of radicalization, this is a feasible reality in the ongoing fight against

terrorism.

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