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  Chapter 9 Theory of Capital Structure How do we want to finance our firm’s assets? Debt Preferred Equity

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Capital structure

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  • Chapter 9Theory of Capital StructureHow do we want to finance our firms assets?

  • Balance Sheet Current Current Assets Liabilities

    Debt and Fixed Preferred Assets Shareholders Equity

  • Balance Sheet Current Current Assets Liabilities

    Debt and Fixed Preferred Assets Shareholders Equity

  • Balance Sheet Current Current Assets Liabilities

    Debt and Fixed Preferred Assets Shareholders EquityFinancialStructure

  • Balance Sheet Current Current Assets Liabilities

    Debt and Fixed Preferred Assets Shareholders Equity

  • Balance Sheet Current Current Assets Liabilities

    Debt and Fixed Preferred Assets Shareholders EquityCapitalStructure

  • Why is Capital Structure Important?1) Leverage: higher financial leverage means higher returns to stockholders, but higher risk due to interest payments.2) Cost of Capital: Each source of financing has a different cost. Capital structure affects the cost of capital.3) The Optimal Capital Structure is the one that minimizes the firms cost of capital and maximizes firm value.

  • Introduction to the TheoryCapital structure is the proportions ofDebt Preferred stockCommon stockAssumptionsDefinitionsNOI approachTraditional approachMiller Modigliani Approach

  • AssumptionsNo taxes & no bankruptcy costsNo transaction costsPay all earnings in dividendsSame expected future operating earnings for all investorsNo growth of earnings

  • Definitionski is the yield on the companys debt

    ke is the earnings/price ratio Required rate of return for investors

    k0 is an overall capitalization rate for the firmWeighted average cost of capital (WACC)

  • Calculating NOI ApproachNOIXOverall capitalization rate=Total value of firmMarket value of debt=Market value of stock

  • NOI ApproachRequired return on equity increases linearly with leverage

    Total valuation of the firm unaffected by its capital structure

  • NOI ApproachCost ofCapitalke0% debt financial leverage 100%debt.ke = cost of equityki = cost of debtko = cost of capital

  • NOI Approach.

  • NOI Approach

  • NOI Approach

  • NOI Approach

  • NOI Approachkeki

  • NOI ApproachIf we have perfect capital markets, capital structure is irrelevant. In other words, changes in capital structure do not affect firm value.

  • Important Assumptions of NOI Approachk0 is constantRegardless of the degree of leverageBreakdown between debt and equity unimportantIf ki remains constant, ke is a constant linear function of the debt-to-equity ratiok0 cannot be altered through leverageNo one optimal capital leverage

  • Traditional ApproachThere is an optimal capital structure

    Increase the total value of the firm through leverage

    Cost of capital is dependent of the capital structureOptimal capital structure exists

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Traditional Approach

  • Modigliani-Miller (MM) PositionAssumptions are importantCapital structure is irrelevantTotal investment value of a corporation depends on profitability and riskValue is the same regardless of financing mixHomemade leverageArbitrage efficiency

  • Irrelevance in a CAPM Framework As leverage increasesExpected return and beta increase proportionallyThe change in expected return and beta offset each other with respect to share priceShare price is invariant with respect to leverage

  • Taxes and Capital StructureImportant market imperfectionsCorporate taxesComponents of overall value Value if levered + Value of tax shield Optimal strategy is to maximize leverageNot consistent with corporate behavior

  • Uncertainty of Tax ShieldIncome is consistently low or negativeBankruptcyChange in the corporate tax rateRedundancy

  • Remember this example?Tax effects of financing with debt with stock with debtEBIT 400,000 400,000- interest expense 0 (50,000)EBT 400,000 350,000- taxes (34%) (136,000) (119,000)EAT 264,000 231,000- dividends (50,000) 0Retained earnings 214,000 231,000

  • Remember this example?Tax effects of financing with debt with stock with debtEBIT 400,000 400,000- interest expense 0 (50,000)EBT 400,000 350,000- taxes (34%) (136,000) (119,000)EAT 264,000 231,000- dividends (50,000) 0Retained earnings 214,000 231,000

  • New Value Equation

    Value of Value if Pure value Value lost firm = Unlevered + of corporate through tax tax shield shield uncertainty

  • Corporate Plus Personal TaxesPersonal taxes can reduce the corporate tax advantage

    Dividends versus capital gains

    Debt or stock income

  • Merton Millers EquilibriumIn market equilibrium personal and corporate tax effects cancel outInvestor clienteles and market equilibriumCompleting the marketCounterargumentsZero personal tax on stock income is suspectDisturbing relationship betweenCorporate debt Stock returnsReturns on tax-exempt municipal bonds

  • RecapitulationTax advantage to borrowingModerate amounts of debtTax shield uncertainty is not greatSome lessening of the corporate tax effectOwing to personal taxesGreater the tax wedgeLower the overall tax shield

  • Effects of Bankruptcy CostsLess than perfect capital marketsAdministrative costs to bankruptcyAssets liquidated at < economic valueRelationship to leverageDeadweight loss to suppliers of capitalTaxes and bankruptcy costsTrade-off betweenTax effects of leverageBankruptcy costs associated with high leverageMost important imperfections

  • Other ImperfectionsCorporate and homemade leverage not being perfect substitutesAdvantage to corporation borrowingArbitrage processInstitutional restrictionsAdverse effects on market valueGreater the importance of imperfectionsLess effective MM arbitrage processGreater the case for an optimal capital structure

  • Incentive Issues and Agency CostsAgency costs Stakeholders monitoringEquity holdersDebt holdersManagementOther stakeholders

  • Debt Holders Versus Equity HoldersEquity of a firmCall option on the firms total value

    Debtholders are the writers of the option

  • Effect of Variance and the Riskiness of AssetsBy increasing the riskiness of the companyStockholders increase the value of their stockAt the direct expense of the debt holders

  • Changing the Proportion of DebtWill affect the relative valuationOf debtOf equityRelationship between the proportion of debt and valuationIncreasing the proportion of debtResults in a decline in the price of debtResults in an increase in share price

  • Protective CovenantsRestrict the stockholders abilityTo increase the assets riskinessTo increase leverage

    MM argument

    Me-first rules

  • The Underinvestment ProblemResult of equity holders not wishing to invest when the rewards favor debt holdersDisappears whenInvestors own both stocks and bondsBy contracting between debt holders and stockholders

  • Agency Costs More Broadly DefinedMonitoringCost is born by stockholdersDebt holders charge more interestMay limit the optimal amount of debtOptimal balance betweenMonitoring costsInterest rate charged on debt

  • Organizational Incentives to Manage EfficientlyLeveraged companies May be lean because management cuts the fatRunning scaredDebt brings capital-market discipline to managementCompany with little debtSignificant free cash flowHave a tendency to squander funds

  • Asymmetric InformationSignaling effectAssumes there is information asymmetryCredibility of a financial signal depends on asymmetric informationThe greater the asymmetry in information the greater the likely stock reaction to a financing announcementWhat is significant?The signal conveyed by a changed capital structure

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