Cape Gloucester:The Green Infernoby Bernard C. Nalty

n the early morningof 26 December 1943,Marines poised offthe coast of Japan-ese-held New Britain

could barely make out the mile-high bulk of Mount Talawe againsta sky growing light with the ap-proach of dawn. Flame billowedfrom the guns of American andAustralian cruisers and destroyers,shattering the early morning calm.The men of the 1st Marine Divi-sion, commanded by Major Gen-eral William H. Rupertus, a veteranof expeditionary duty in Haiti andChina and of the recently con-cluded Guadalcanal campaign,steeled themselves as they waitedfor daylight and the signal to as-sault the Yellow Beaches near CapeGloucester in the northwestern partof the island. For 90 minutes, thefire support ships blazed away, try-ing to neutralize whole areas ratherthan destroy pinpoint targets, sincedense jungle concealed most of theindividual fortifications and supplydumps. After the day dawned andH-Hour drew near, Army airmenjoined the preliminary bombard-ment. Four-engine ConsolidatedLiberator 13-24 bombers, flying sohigh that the Marines offshorecould barely see them, dropped

500-pound bombs inland of thebeaches, scoring a hit on a fueldump at the Cape Gloucester air-field complex and igniting a fierygeyser that leapt hundreds of feetinto the air. Twin-engine NorthAmerican Mitchell B-25 mediumbombers and Douglas Havoc A-20light bombers, attacking fromlower altitude, pounced on the onlyJapanese antiaircraft gun rashenough to open fire.

The warships then shifted theirattention to the assault beaches,and the landing craft carrying thetwo battalions of Colonel Julian N.Frisbie's 7th Marines started shore-ward. An LCI [Landing Craft, In-fantry] mounting multiple rocketlaunchers took position on theflank of the first wave bound foreach of the two beaches and un-leashed a barrage intended to keepthe enemy pinned down after thecruisers and destroyers shiftedtheir fire to avoid endangering theassault troops. At 0746, the LCVPs[Landing Craft, Vehicles and Per-sonnell of the first wave bound forYellow Beach I grounded on a nar-

row strip of black sand that mea-sured perhaps 500 yards from oneflank to the other, and the leadingelements of the 3d Battalion, com-manded by Lieutenant ColonelWilliam K. Williams, started in-land. Two minutes later, Lieu-tenant Colonel John E. Weber's 1stBattalion, on the left of the otherunit, emerged on Yellow Beach 2,separated from Yellow I by a thou-sand yards of jungle and embrac-ing 700 yard.s of shoreline. Neitherbattalion encountered organizedresistance. A smoke screen, whichlater drifted across the beaches andhampered the approach of laterwaves of landing craft, blinded theJapanese observers on Target Hilloverlooking the beachhead, and nodefenders manned the trenchesand log-and-earth bunkers thatmight have raked the assault forcewith fire.

The Yellow Beaches, on the eastcoast of the broad peninsula thatculminated at Cape Gloucester, pro-vided access to the main objective,the two airfields at the northern tipof the cape. By capturing this air-

On the Cover: A Marine patrol crosses aflooded stream and probes for the enemy in theforests of New Britain. Department of De-fense (LISMC) photo 72290At left: On 26 December 1943, Marineswade ashore from beached LSTs passingthrough a heavy surf to a narrow beach ofblack sand. Inland, beyond a curtain of under-growth, lie the swamp forest and the Japanesedefenders. Department of Defense (USMC)photo 68998

Major General William H. Rupertusajor General William H.Rupertus, who com-manded the 1st Marine

Division on New Britain, was bornat Washington, D.C., on 14 Novem-ber 1889 and in June 1913 gradu-ated from the U.S. Revenue CutterService School of instruction. In-stead of pursuing a career in thisprecursor of the U.S. Coast Guard,he accepted appointment as a sec-ond lieutenant in the Marine Corps.A vigorous advocate of rifle marks-manship throughout his career, hebecame a member of the MarineCorps Rifle Team in 1915, two yearsafter entering the service, and wontwo major matches. During WorldWar I, he commanded the Marinedetachment on the USS Florida, as-signed to the British Grand fleet.

Between the World Wars, heserved in a variety of assignments.In 1919, he joined the ProvisionalMarine Brigade at Port-au-Prince,

Haiti, subsequently becoming in-spector of constabulary with theMarine-trained gendarmerie and fi-nally chief of the Port-au-Prince po-lice force. Rupertus graduated inJune 1926 from the Army Com-mand and General Staff College atFort Leavenworth, Kansas, and inJanuary of the following year be-came Inspector of Target Practicefor the Marine Corps. He had twotours of duty in China and com-manded a battalion of the 4thMarines in Shanghai when theJapanese attacked the city's Chi-nese defenders in 1937.

During the Guadalcanal cam-paign, as a brigadier general, hewas assistant division commander,1st Marine Division, personally se-lected for the post by Major Gen-eral Alexander A. Vandegrift, thedivision commander, whom he suc-ceeded when Vandegrift left the di-vision in July 1943. Major General

Department of Defense (USMC) photo 69010

MajGen William H. Rupertus, Coin-tnanding General, 1st Marine Division,reads a message of congratulation afterthe capture of Airfield No. 2 at CapeGloucester, New Britain.

Rupertus led the division on NewBritain and at Peleliu. He died of aheart attack at Washington, D.C.,on 25 March 1945, and did not seethe surrender of Japan, which hehad done so much to bring about.

field complex, the reinforced 1stMarine Division, designated theBackhander Task Force, would en-able Allied airmen to intensify their

attack on the Japanese fortress ofRabaul, roughly 300 miles away atthe northeastern extremity of NewBritain. Although the caplure of the

Yellow Beaches held the key to theNew Britain campaign, two sub-sidiary landings also took place: thefirst on 15 December at CapeMerkus on Arawe Bay along thesouth coast; and the second on D-Day, 26 December, at Green Beachon the northwest coast opposite the

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main landing sites.

The first subsidiary landing tookplace on 15 December 1943 at dis-tant Cape Merkus, across theArawe channel from the islet ofArawe. Although it had a limitedpurpose—disrupting the movementof motorized barges and othersmall craft that moved men andsupplies along the southern coast ofNew Britain and diverting attentionfrom Cape Gloucester—it neverthe-

less encountered stiff resistance.Marine amphibian tractor crewsused both the new, armored Buffaloand the older, slower, and more vul-nerable Alligator to carry soldiers ofthe 112th Cavalry, who made themain landings on Orange Beach atthe western edge of Cape Merkus.Fire from the destroyer USS Con-ynghrnn, supplemented by rocket-equipped DUKWs and a submarinechaser that doubled as a controlcraft, and a last-minute bombing byB-25s silenced the beach defensesand enabled the Buffaloes to crushthe surviving Japanese machineguns that survived the naval andaerial bombardment. Less successfulwere two diversionary landings bysoldiers paddling ashore in rubberboats. Savage fire forced one groupto turn back short of its objectiveeast of Orange Beach, but the othergained a lodgment on Pilelo Islandand killed the handful of Japanese

found there. An enemy airman hadreported that the assault force wasapproaching Cape Merkus, andfighters and bombers from Rabaulattacked within two hours of thelanding. Sporadic air strikes contin-ued throughout December, althoughwith diminishing ferocity, and theJapanese shifted troops to meet thethreat in the south.

The other secondary landingtook place on the morning of 26 De-cember. The 1,500-man StonefaceGroup—designated Battalion Land-ing Team 21 and built around the2d Battalion, 1st Marines, underLieutenant Colonel James M. Mas-ters, Sr.—started toward GreenBeach, supported by 5-inch gunfirefrom the American destroyers Reidand Smith. LCMs [Landing Craft,Medium] carried DUKW amphib-ian trucks, driven by soldiers andfitted with rocket launchers. TheDUKWs opened fire from the land-

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ing craft as the assault force ap-proached the beach, performing thesame function as the rocket-firingLCIs at the Yellow Beaches on theopposite side of the peninsula. Thefirst wave landed at 0748, with twoothers following it ashore. TheMarines encountered no oppositionas they carved out a beachhead1,200 yards wide and extending 500yards inland. The Stoneface Grouphad the mission of severing thecoastal trail that passed just west ofMount Talawe, thus preventing thepassage of reinforcements to theCape Gloucester airfields.

The trail net proved difficult tofind and follow. Villagers clearedgarden plots, tilled them until thejungle reclaimed them, and thenabandoned the land and moved on,leaving a maze of trails, some faintand others fresh, that led nowhere.The Japanese were slow, however,to take advantage of the confusion

caused by the tangle of paths. Notuntil the early hours of 30 Decem-ber, did the enemy attack the GreenBeach force. Taking advantage ofheavy rain that muffled sounds andreduced visibility, the Japaneseclosed with the Marines, who calleddown mortar fire within 15 yards oftheir defensive wire. A battery ofthe 11th Marines, reorganized as aninfantry unit because the can-noneers could not find suitable po-sitions for their 75mm howitzers,shored up the defenses. One Marinein particular, Gunnery SergeantGuiseppe Guilano, Jr., seemed tomaterialize at critical moments, fir-ing a light machine gun from thehip; his heroism earned him theNavy Cross. Some of the Japanesesucceeded in penetrating the posi-tion, but a counterattack led by FirstLieutenant Jim G. Paulos of Com-pany G killed them or drove themoff. The savage fighting cost Com-bat Team 21 six Marines killed and17 wounded; at least 89 Japaneseperished, and five surrendered. On11 January 1944, the reinforced bat-talion set out to rejoin the division,the troops moving overland, theheavy equipment and the woundedtraveling in landing craft.

After the fierce battles at Guadal-canal in the South Pacific Area, the1st Marine Division underwent re-habilitation in Australia, which laywithin General MacArthur's South-west Pacific Area. Once the divisionhad recovered from the ordeal ofthe Solomon Islands fighting, itgave MacArthur a trained amphibi-ous unit that he desperately neededto fulfill his ambitions for the cap-ture of Rabaul. Theoretically, the 1stMarine Division was subordinate toGeneral Sir Thomas Blamey, theAustralian officer in command ofthe Allied Land Forces, andBlamey's nominal subordinate,Lieutenant General Walter Kreuger,

of maneuver involving Army airborne troops.

commanding the Sixth U.S. Army.But in actual practice, MacArthurbypassed Blamey and dealt directlywith Kreuger.

When the 1st Marine Division be-came available to MacArthur, hestill intended to seize Rabaul andbreak the back of Japanese resis-tance in the region. Always con-cerned about air cover for his am-phibious operations, MacArthurplanned to use the Marines to cap-

ture the airfields at Cape Gloucester.Aircraft based there would thensupport the division when, after abrief period of recuperation, it at-tacked Rabaul. The decision to by-pass Rabaul eliminated the landingsthere, but the Marines would never-theless seize the Cape Gloucesterairfields, which seemed essential forneutralizing the base.

The initial concept of operations,which called for the conquest of

Department of Defense (usMc) photo 75882

During the planning of the New Britain operation, Gen Douglas MacArthur, right, incommand of the Southwest Pacific Area, confers with LtGen Walter Kreuger, left, Ca,,,-manding General, Sixth U.S. Army, and MajGen Rupertus, whose Marines will assaultthe island. At such a meeting, Col Edwin A. Pollock, operations officer of the 1st MarineDivision, advised MacArthur of the opposition of the Marine leaders to a complex scheme

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western New Britain preliminary tostorming Rabaul, split the 1st Ma-rine Division, sending CombatTeam A (the 5th Marines, rein-forced, less one battalion in reserve)against Gasmata on the southerncoast of the island, while CombatTeam C (the 7th Marines, rein-forced) seized a beachhead near theprincipal objective, the airfields onCape Gloucester. The Army's 503dParachute Infantry would exploitthe Cape Gloucester beachhead,while Combat Team B (the rein-forced 1st Marines) provided a re-serve for the operation.

Revisions came swiftly, and bylate October 1943 the plan no longermentioned capturing Rabaul, tacitacceptance of the modified Alliedstrategy and also satisfied an objec-tion raised by General Rupertus. Thedivision commander had protestedsplitting Combat Team C, andKreuger agreed to employ all threebattalions for the main assault, sub-stituting a battalion from CombatTeam B, the 1st Marines, for thelanding on the west coast. The air-borne landing at Cape Gloucester re-mained in the plan, however, eventhough Rupertus had warned thatbad weather could delay the dropand jeopardize the Marine battalionsalready fighting ashore. The alteredversion earmarked Army troops forthe landing on the southern coast,which Kreuger's staff shifted fromGasmata to Arawe, a site closer toAllied airfields and farther fromRabaul with its troops and aircraft.Although Combat Team B wouldput one battalion ashore southwestof the airfields, the remaining twobattalions of the 1st Marines were tofollow up the assault on CapeGloucester by Combat Team C. Thedivision reserve, Combat Team A,might employ elements of the 5thMarines to reinforce the CapeGloucester landings or conduct op-erations against the offshore islandswest of New Britain.

During a routine briefing on 14December, just one day before thelandings at Arawe, MacArthur off-handedly asked how the Marinesfelt about the scheme of maneuverat Cape Gloucester. Colonel EdwinA. Pollock, the division's operationsofficer, seized the opportunity anddeclared that the Marines objectedto the plan because it depended on arapid advance inland by a single re-inforced regiment to prevent heavylosses among the lightly armedparatroops. Better, he believed, tostrengthen the amphibious forcesthan to try for an aerial envelop-ment that might fail or be delayedby the weather. Although he madeno comment at the lime, MacArthurmay well have heeded, what Poliocksaid; whatever the reason, Kreuger'sstaff eliminated the airborne por-tion, directed the two battalions ofthe 1st Marines still with CombatTeam B to land immediately afterthe assault waves, sustaining themomentum of their attack, andalerted the division reserve to pro-vide further reinforcement.

A mixture of combat and servicetroops operated in western NewBritain. The 1st and 8th ShippingRegiments used motorized barges toshuttle troops and cargo along thecoast from Rabaul to Cape Merkus,Cape Gloucester, and acrossDampier Strait to Rooke Island. Forlonger movements, for example toNew Guinea, the 5th Sea TransportBattalion manned a fleet of trawlersand schooners, supplemented bydestroyers of the Imperial JapaneseNavy when speed seemed essen-tial. The troops actually defendingwestern New Britain included theMatsuda Force, established in Sep-tember 1943 under the command ofMajor General Iwao Matsuda, aspecialist in military transportation,

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who nevertheless had commandedan infantry regiment in Manchuria.When he arrived on New Britain inFebruary of that year, Matsudatook over the 4th Shipping Com-mand, an administrative headquar-ters that provided staff officers forthe Matsuda Force. His principalcombat units were the under-strength 65th Infantry Brigade—con-sisting of the 141st Infantry, battle-tested in the conquest of thePhilippines, plus artillery and anti-aircraft units—and those compo-nents of the 51st Division not com-mitted to the unsuccessful, defenseof New Guinea. Matsuda estab-lished the headquarters for hisjury-rigged force near Kalingi,along the coastal trail northwest ofMount Talawe, within five miles ofthe Cape Gloucester airfields, butthe location would change to reflectthe tactical situation.

As the year 1943 wore on, the Al-lied threat to New Britain increased.Consequently, General Hitoshi Ima-mura, who commanded the EighthArea Army from a headquarters atRabaul, assigned the Matsuda Forceto the 17th Division, under Lieu-tenant General Yasushi Sakai, re-cently arrived from Shanghai. Fourconvoys were to have carriedSakai's division, but the second andthird lost one ship to submarine tor-pedoes and another to a mine, whileair attack damaged a third. Becauseof these losses, which claimed some1,200 lives, the last convoy did notsail, depriving the division of morethan 3,000 replacements and servicetroops. Sakai deployed the best ofhis forces to western New Britain,entrusting them to Matsuda's tacti-cal command.

The landings at Cape Merkus inmid-December caused Matsuda toshift his troops to meet the threat,but this redeployment did not ac-count for the lack of resistance at

the Yellow Beaches. The Japanesegeneral, familiar with the terrain ofwestern New Britain, did not be-lieve that the Americans wouldstorm these strips of sand extendingonly a few yards inland and backedby swamp. Matsuda might havethought differently had he seen theAmerican maps, which labeled thearea beyond the beaches as "dampflat," even though aerial pho-tographs taken after preliminary airstrikes had revealed no shadowwithin the bomb craters, evidenceof a water level high enough to fillthese depressions to the brim. Sincethe airfields were the obvious prize,Matsuda did not believe that theMarines would plunge into themuck and risk becoming boggeddown short of their goal.

Besides forfeiting the immediateadvantage of opposing the assaultforce at the water's edge, Matsuda'stroops suffered the long-term, indi-rect effects of the erosion of Japanesefortunes that began at Guadalcanaland on New Guinea and continuedat New Georgia and Bougainville.The Allies, in addition, dominatedthe skies over New Britain, bluntingthe air attacks on the Cape Merkusbeachhead and bombing almost atwill throughout the island. Althoughair strikes caused little measurabledamage, save at Rabaul, they de-moralized the defenders, who al-ready suffered shortages of suppliesand medicine because of air andsubmarine attacks on seagoing con-voys and coastal shipping. An inad-equate network of primitive trails,

which tended to hug the coastline,increased Matsuda.'s dependence onbarges, but this traffic, hampered bythe American capture of CapeMerkus, proved vulnerable to air-craft and later to torpedo craft andimprovised gunboats.

The two battalions that landedon the Yellow Beaches—Weber's onthe left and Williams's on theright—crossed the sands in a fewstrides, and plunged through a wallof undergrowth into the damp flat,where a Marine might be sloggingthrough knee-deep mud, step into ahole, and end up, as one on themsaid, "damp up to your neck." Acounterattack delivered as the as-sault waves wallowed through thedamp flat might have inflicted se-vere casualties, but Matsuda lackedthe vehicles or roads to shift histroops in time to exploit the terrain.Although immobile on the ground,the Japanese retaliated by air.American radar detected a flight ofenemy aircraft approaching fromRabaul; Army Air Forces P-38s in-tercepted, but a few Japanesebombers evaded the fighters, sankthe destroyer Brownson with two di-rect hits, and damaged another.

The first enemy bombers arrivedas a squadron of Army B-25s flewover the LSTs [Landing Ships, Tank]en route to attack targets at BorgenBay south of the Yellow Beaches.Gunners on board the ships openedfire at the aircraft milling overhead,mistaking friend for foe, downingtwo American bombers, and dam-aging two others. The survivors,shaken by the experience, droppedtheir bombs too soon, hitting theartillery positions of the 11thMarines at the left flank of YellowBeach 1, killing one and wounding14 others. A battalion commanderin the artillery regiment recalled"trying to dig a hole with mynose," as the bombs exploded, "try-ing to get down into the groundjust a little bit further."

Oepartrnent of Oefense (usMc) photo 72833

Marines, almost invisible amid the undergrowth, advance through the swamp forest ofNew Britain, optimistically called damp flat on the maps they used.

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By the time of the air action onthe afternoon of D-Day, the 1stMarine Division had already es-tablished a beachhead. The assaultbattalions of the 7th Marines ini-tially pushed ahead, capturingTarget Hill on the left flank, andthen paused to await reinforce-ments. During the day, two morebattalions arrived. The 3d Battal-ion, 1st Marines—designatedLanding Team 31 and led by Lieu-tenant Colonel Joseph E Hankins,a Reserve officer who also was acrack shooter—came ashore at0815 on Yellow Beach 1, passedthrough the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, and veered to the north-west to lead the way toward theairfields. By 0845, the 2d Battalion,

7th Marines, under LieutenantColonel Odell M. Conoley, landedand began wading through thedamp flat to take its place betweenthe regiment's 1st and 3d Battal-ions as the beachhead expanded.The next infantry unit, the 1st Bat-talion, 1st Marines, reached YellowBeach 1 at 1300 to join that regi-ment's 3d Battalion, commandedby Hankins, in advancing on theairfields. The 11th Marines, despitethe accidental bombing, set up itsartillery, an operation in which theamphibian tractor played a vitalpart. Some of the tractors broughtlightweight 75mm howitzers fromthe LSTs directly to the battery fir-ing positions; others broke trailthrough the undergrowth for trac-

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tors pulling the heavier 105mmweapons.

Meanwhile, Army trucks loadedwith supplies roiled ashore from theLSTs. Logistics plans called for thesevehicles to move forward and func-tion as mobile supply dumps, butthe damp flat proved impassable bywheeled vehicles, and the driverstended to abandon the trucks toavoid being left behind when theshipping moved out, hurried alongby the threat from Japanesebombers. Ultimately, Marines had tobuild roads, corduroying them withlogs when necessary, or shift thecargo to amphibian tractors. Despitecareful planning and hard work onD-Day, the convoy sailed with about100 tons of supplies still on board.

While reinforcements and cargocrossed the beach, the Marines ad-vancing inland encountered the firstserious Japanese resistance. Shortlyafter 1000 on 26 December, Hank-ins's 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,pushed ahead, advancing in a col-umn of companies because aswamp on the left narrowed thefrontage. Fire from camouflagedbunkers killed Captain Joseph A.Terzi, commander of Company K,posthumously awarded the NavyCross for heroism while leading theattack, and his executive officer,Captain Philip A. Wilheit. Thesturdy bunkers proved imperviousto bazooka rockets, which failed todetonate in the soft earth coveringthe structures, and to fire from37mm guns, which could not pene-trate the logs protecting the occu-pants. An Alligator that had deliv-ered supplies for Company K friedto crush one of the bunkers but be-came wedged between two trees.Japanese riflemen burst from cover

and killed the tractor's two machinegunners, neither of them protectedby armor, before the driver could

On fl-Day, among the shadows on the jungletreatment to a wounded Marine.

break free. Again lunging ahead, thetractor caved in one bunker, silenc-ing its fire and enabling Marine ri-flemen to isolate three others anddestroy them in succession, killing25 Japanese. A platoon of M4 Sher-man tanks joined the company intime to lead the advance beyondthis first strongpoint.

Japanese service troops—espe-cially the men of the 1st ShippingEngineers and the 1st DebarkationUnit—provided most of the initialopposition, but Matsuda hadalerted his nearby infantry units toconverge on the beachhead. Oneenemy battalion, under MajorShinichi Takabe, moved into posi-tion late on the afternoon of D-Day,opposite Conoley's 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, which clung to a crescent-shaped position, both of its flankssharply refused and resting on themarshland to the rear After sunset,the darkness beneath the forestcanopy became absolute, piercedonly by muzzle flashes as the inten-sity of the firing increased..

floor, Navy corpsmen administer emergency

Department of Defense (usMc) photo 69009

Department of Defense wsMc) photoAs the predicament of this truck and its Marine driver demonstrates, wheeled vehicles, likethose supplied by the Army for mobile supply dumps, bog down in the mud of Cape Gloucester.

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The Japanese clearly werepreparing to counterattack. Cono-ley's battalion had a dwindling sup-ply of ammunition, but amphibiantractors could not begin makingsupply runs until it became lightenough for the drivers to avoid treeroots and fallen trunks as they navi-gated the damp flat. To aid the bat-talion in the dangerous period be-fore the skies grew pale, LieutenantColonel Lewis B. Puller, the execu-tive officer of the 7th Marines, orga-nized the men of the regimentalHeadquarters and Service Com-pany into carrying parties to loadthemselves down with ammunitionand wade through the dangerousswamp. One misstep, and a Marineburdened with bandoliers of rifleammunition or containers of mortarshells could stumble and drown.When Colonel Frisbie, the regimen-tal commander, decided to reinforceConoley's Marines with Battery D,1st Special Weapons Battalion,Puller had the men leave their37mm guns behind and carry am-munition instead. A guide fromConoley's headquarters met the col-umn that Puller had pressed intoservice and began leading them for-ward, when a blinding downpour,driven by a monsoon gale, obscuredlandmarks and forced the heavilyladen Marines to wade blindly on-ward, each man clinging to the beltof the one ahead of him. Not until0805, some twelve hours after thecolumn started off , did the menreach their goal, put down theirloads, and take up their rifles.

Conoley's Marines had in themeantime been fighting for theirlives since the storm first struck. Acurtain of rain prevented mortarcrews from seeing their aimingstakes, indeed, the battalion com-mander described the men as firing"by guess and by God." Mud got onthe small-arms ammunition, at timesjamming rifles and machine guns.Although forced to abandon water-

stymie even an LVT.

filled foxholes, the defenders hungon. With the coming of dawn, Tak-abe's soldiers gravitated toward theright flank of Conoley's unit, per-haps in a conscious effort to outflankthe position, or possibly forced inthat direction by the fury of the bat-talion's defensive fire. An envelop-ment was in the making when Bat-tery D arrived and moved into thethreatened area, forcing the Japaneseto break off the action and regroup..

The 1st Marine Division's overallplan of maneuver called for ColonelFrisbie's Combat Team C, the rein-forced 7th Marines, to hold a beach-head anchored at Target Hill, whileCombat Team B, Colonel William A.Whaling's 1st Marines, reinforcedbut without the 2d Battalion ashoreat Green Beach, advanced on theairfields. Because of the buildup inpreparation for the attack on Cono-ley's battalion, General Rupertus re-quested that Kreuger release the di-

vision reserve, Combat Team A,Colonel John T. Selden's reinforced5th Marines. The Army generalagreed, sending the 1st and 2d Bat-talions, followed a day later by the3d Battalion. The division comman-der decided to land the team onBlue Beach, roughly three miles tothe right of the Yellow Beaches. Theuse of Blue Beach would haveplaced the 5th Marines closer toCape Gloucester and the airfields,but not every element of Selden'sCombat Team A got the word.Some units touched down on theYellow Beaches instead and had tomove on foot or in vehicles to theintended destination.

While Ru.pertus laid plans tocommit the reserve, Whaling's com-bat team advanced toward the CapeGloucester airfields. The Marinesencountered only sporadic resis-tance at first, but Army Air Forceslight bombers spotted danger intheir path—a maze of trenches andbunkers stretching inland from apromontory that soon earned the

Department of Defense (UsMc) photo 72599

The stumps of trees shattered by artillery and the seemingly bottomless mud can sometimes

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nickname Hell's Point. The Japan-ese had built these defenses to pro-tect the beaches where Matsuda ex-pected the Americans to land.Leading the advance, the 3d Battal-ion, 1st Marines, under LieutenantColonel Hankins, struck the Hell'sPoint position on the flank, ratherthan head-on, but overrunning thecomplex nevertheless would provea deadly task.

Rupertus delayed the attack byHankins to provide time for the di-vision reserve, Selden's 5thMarines, to come ashore. On themorning of 28 December, after abombardment by the 2d Battalion,11th Marines, and strikes by ArmyAir Forces A-20s, the assault troopsencountered another delay, waitingfor an hour so that an additionalplatoon of M4 Sherman mediumtanks could increase the weight ofthe attack. At 1100, Hankins's 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, movedahead, Company I and the support-ing tanks leading the way. Whaling,

at about the same time, sent his reg-iment's Company A throughswamp and jungle to seize the in-land point of the ridge extendingfrom Hell's Point. Despite the ob-stacles in its path, Company Aburst from the jungle at about 1145and advanced across a field of tallgrass until stopped by intenseJapanese fire. By late afternoon,Whaling abandoned the maneuver.Both Company A and the defenderswere exhausted and short of arnmu-nition; the Marines withdrew be-hind a barrage fired by the 2d Bat-talion, 11th Marines, and theJapanese abandoned their positionsafter dark.

Roughly 15 minutes after Com-pany A assaulted the inland termi-nus of the ridge, Company I and theattached tanks collided with themain defenses, which the Japanesehad modified since the 26 Decemberlandings, cutting new gunports inbunkers, hacking fire lanes in theundergrowth, and shifting men and

weapons to oppose an attack alongthe coastal trail parallel to shore in-stead of over the beach. Advancingin a drenching rain, the Marines en-countered a succession of jungle-covered, mutually supporting posi-tions protected by barbed wire andmines. The hour's wait for tankspaid dividends, as the Shermans,protected by riflemen, crushedbunkers and destroyed the weaponsinside. During the fight, Company Idrifted to its left, and Hankins usedCompany K, reinforced with a pla-toon of medium tanks, to close thegap between the coastal track andHell's Point itself. This unit em-ployed the same tactics as CompanyI. A rifle squad followed each of theM4 tanks, which cracked open thebunkers, twelve in all, and fired in-side; the accompanying riflementhen killed anyone attempting tofight or flee. More than 260 Japaneseperished in the fighting at Hell'sPoint, at the cost of 9 Marines killedand 36 wounded.

With the defenses of Hell's Pointshattered, the two battalions of the5th Marines, which came ashore onthe morning of 29 December,joined later that day in the advanceon the airfield. The 1st Battalion,commanded by Major WiUiam H.Barba, and the 2d Battalion, underLieutenant Colonel Lewis H. Walt,moved out in a column, Barba'sunit leading the way. In front of theMarines lay a swamp, described asonly a few inches deep, but thedepth, because of the continuingdownpour, proved as much as fivefeet, "making it quite hard," Seldenacknowledged, "for some of theyoungsters who were not muchmore than 5 feet in height." Thetime lost in wading through theswamp delayed the attack, and theleading elements chose a piece ofopen and comparatively dryground, where they established aperimeter while the rest of theforce caught up.

A 75mm pack howitzer of the 11th Marines fires in support of the advance on the CapeGloucester airfields.

Department of Defense (uSMc) photo 12203

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Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, attacking through that reg-iment's 3d Battalion, encounteredonly scattered resistance, mainlysniper fire, as it pushed along thecoast beyond Hell's Point. Half-tracks carrying 75mm guns,medium tanks, artillery, and even apair of rocket-firing DUKWs sup-ported the advance, which broughtthe battalion, commanded by Lieu-tenant Colonel Walker A. Reaves, tothe edge of Airfield No. 2. Whendaylight faded on 29 December, the1st Battalion, 1st Marines, held aline extending inland from thecoast; on its left were the 3d Battal-ion, 1st Marines, and the 2d Battal-ion, 5th Marines, forming a semicir-cle around the airfield.

The Japanese officer responsiblefor defending the airfields, ColonelKouki Sumiya of the 53d Infantry,had fallen back on 29 December,trading space for time as he gath-ered his surviving troops for the de-fense of Razorback Hifi, a ridge run-ning diagonally across thesouthwestern approaches to AirfieldNo. 2. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 5thMarines, attacked on 30 Decembersupported by tanks and artillery.Sumiya's troops had constructedsome sturdy bunkers, but the chest-high grass that covered RazorbackHill did not impede the attackerslike the jungle at Hell's Point. TheJapanese fought gallantly to holdthe position, at times stalling the ad-vancing Marines, but the defendershad neither the numbers nor thefirepower to prevail. Typical of theday's fighting, one platoon of Com-pany F from Selden's regiment beatback two separate banzai attacks, be-fore tanks enabled the Marines toshatter the bunkers in their path andkill the enemy within. By dusk on30 December, the landing force hadoiiermn the defenses of the airfields,and at noon of the following dayGeneral Rupertus had the Americanflag raised beside the wreckage of a

landed on New Britain.

Japanese bomber at Airfield No. 2,the larger of the airstrips.

The 1st Marine Division thusseized the principal objective of theCape Gloucester fighting, but theairstrips proved of marginal valueto the Allied forces. Indeed, theJapanese had already abandonedthe prewar facility, Airfield No. 1,which was thickly overgrown withtall, coarse kunai grass. Craters fromAmerican bombs pockmarked thesurface of Airfield No. 2, and afterits capture Japanese hit-and-runraiders added a few of their own,despite antiaircraft fire from the

12th Defense Battalion. Army avia-tion engineers worked around theclock to return Airfield No. 2 to op-eration, a task that took until theend of January 1944. Army aircraftbased here defended against air at-tacks for as long as Rabaul remainedan active air base and also sup-ported operations on the ground.

While General Rupertus person-ally directed the capture of the air-fields, the Assistant Division Com-

Department of Defense (usMc) photo 71589

On 31 December 1943, the American flag rises beside the wreckage of a Japanesebomber after the capture of Airfield No. 2, five days after the 1st Marine Division

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command of the 5th Marines.

mander, Brigadier General Lemuel C.Shepherd, Jr., came ashore onDay, 26 December, and took com-mand of the beachhead. Besides co-ordinating the logistics activity there,Shepherd assumed responsibility forexpanding the perimeter to the south-west and securing the shores of Bor-gen Bay. He had a variety of shoreparty, engineer, transportation, andother service troops to handle thelogistics chores. The ad Battalion ofColonel Selden's 5th Marines—theremaining component of the divisionreserve — arrived on 30 and 31 De-cember to help the 7th Marines en-

large the beachhead.Shepherd had sketchy knowledge

of Japanese deployment west andsouth of the Yellow Beaches. Densevegetation concealed streams,swamps, and even ridge lines, as wellas bunkers nd trenches. The progresstoward the airfields seemed to indi-cate Japanese weakness in that areaand possible strength in the vicinityof the Yellow Beaches and BorgenBay. To resolve the uncertainty aboutthe enemy's numbers and intentions,Shepherd issued orders on 1 January1944 to probe Japanese defenses be-ginning the following morning.

In the meantime, the Japanese de-fenders, under Colonel KenshiroKatayama, commander of the 141stInfantry, were preparing for an at-tack of their own. General Matsudaentrusted three reinforced battalionsto Katayama, who intended to hurlthem against Target Hill, which heconsidered the anchor of the beach-head line. Since Matsuda believedthat roughly 2,500 Marines wereashore on New Britain, 10 percent ofthe actual total, Katayama's forceseemed strong enough for the jobassigned it.

Katayama needed time to gatherhis strength, enabling Shepherd tomake the first move, beginning atmid-morning on 2 January to re-align his forces. The 1st Battalion,7th Marines, stood fast in the vicin-ity of Target Hill, the 2d Battalion re-mained in place along a stream al-ready known as Suicide Creek, andthe regiment's 3d Battalion beganpivoting to face generally south.Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, pushed into the jungle tocome abreast of the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, on the inland flank. As theunits pivoted, they had to cross Sui-cide Creek in order to squeeze outthe 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, whichwould become Shepherd's reserve.

The change of direction provedextremely difficult in vegetation sothick that, in the words of one Ma-rine: "You'd step from your line,take say ten paces, and turn aroundto guide on your buddy. And no-body there .... I can tell you, it was avery small war, and a very lonelybusiness." The Japanese defenders,moreover, had dug in south of Sui-cide Creek, and from these positionsthey repulsed every attempt to crossthe stream that day. A stalemate en-sued, as Seabees from Company C,17th Marines, built a corduroy roadthrough the damp fiat behind theYellow Beaches so that tanks couldmove forward to punch through thedefenses of Suicide Creek.

Department of Defense (USA) photo SC 188250

During operations to clear the enemy from the shores of Borgen Bay, BGen Lemuel C.Shepherd, Jr., (left) the assistant division commander, confers with Cot John 7'. Selden, in

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Department of Defense (IJSMC) photo 69013

While the Marine advance stalledat Suicide Creek, awaiting the arrivalof tanks, Katayama attacked TargetHill. On the night of 2 January tak-ing advantage of the darkness,Japanese infantry cut steps in thelower slopes so the troops couldclimb more easily. Instead of recon-noitering the thinly held lines ofCompany A, 7th Marines, and tryingto infiltrate, the enemy followed apreconceived plan to the letter, ad-vanced up the steps, and at midnightstormed the strongest of the com-pany's defenses. Japanese mortarbarrages fired to soften the defensesand screen the approach could notconceal the sound of the troopsworking their way up the hill, and

unceasing rain.

the Marines were ready. Althoughthe Japanese supporting fire provedgenerally inaccurate, one roundscored a direct hit on a machine-gunposition, killing two Marines andwounding the gunner, who kept fir-ing the weapon until someone elsecould take over. This gun fred some5,000 rounds and helped blunt theJapanese thrust, which ended bydawn of 3 January. Nowhere did theJapanese crack the lines of the 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, or loosen itsgrip on Target Hill.

The body of a Japanese officerkilled at Target Hill yielded docu-ments that cast new light on theJapanese defenses south of SuicideCreek. A crudely drawn map re-

vealed the existence of AogiriRidge, an enemy strongpoint un-known to General Shepherd's intel-ligence section. Observers on TargetHill tried to locate the ridge and thetrail network the enemy was using,but the jungle canopy frustratedtheir efforts.

While the Marines on Target Hilltabulated the results of the fightingthere—patrols discovered 40 bod-ies, and cap tured documents, whentranslated, listed 46 Japanese killed,54 wounded, and two missing—and used field glasses to scan thejungle south of Suicide Creek, the17th Marines completed the roadthat would enable medium tanks totest the defenses of that stream.

Marines and Sea bees struggle to build a corduroy road leadinginland from the beachhead. Without the log surface trucks and

tanks cannot advance over trails turned into quagmire by the

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