canache damarys and michael e. allison 2005 perceptions of political corruption in latin american...

Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies

Damarys Canache, Michael E. Allison

Latin American Politics & Society, Volume 47, Number 3, Fall 2005,pp. 91-111 (Article)

Published by University of MiamiDOI: 10.1353/lap.2005.0031

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Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies

Damarys CanacheMichael E.Allison

ABSTRACT

Political corruption poses a serious threat to the stability of devel-oping democracies by eroding the links between citizens and gov-ernments. Using data on national levels of corruption (TransparencyInternational 1997 CPI index) and individual opinion (1995–97World Values Survey), this study finds that Latin Americans are quiteaware of the seriousness of corruption in their countries. The ensu-ing question is whether citizens can connect their views about cor-ruption to appraisals of their authorities and institutions and ofdemocracy more generally. Collectively, the findings suggest thatthey can, and that the necessary ingredients for accountability arepresent in Latin America. The possible dark side of mass opinionon corruption is that pervasive misconduct may poison public sen-timent toward democratic politics. On this score, the analysis foundthat this attitude affected only support for specific administrationsand institutions.

Political corruption is a severe problem facing many democraticnations. At its most basic, political corruption involves the abuse of

public power for some private benefit. Its existence may distort gov-ernment outputs because actors involved in corrupt practices gain dis-proportionate benefits from government. This, in turn, may distort dem-ocratic procedures, because policies result not from an open clash ofideas in the marketplace but instead from back-alley deals.

Political corruption is an especially significant problem in Latin Amer-ica, where corruption scandals tarnished many Latin American govern-ments in the 1990s. In Brazil, President Fernando Collor de Mello wasforced to resign following a chain of scandals involving an influence-ped-dling ring during the electoral campaign, redirection of public funds byhis wife, and reports of a lavish private life. In Venezuela, Carlos AndrésPérez was suspended from the presidency in the midst of impeachmentproceedings that were initiated following news of his misappropriation ofpublic funds. In Ecuador, the media uncovered evidence that PresidentAbdalá Bucaram stashed away for himself money that had been raisedduring a Christmas telethon to help the poor. This triggered a politicalprocess ending with his removal by Congress for “mental incapacity”(Stapenhurst 2000). In Mexico, the reputation of former president Carlos

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Salinas de Gortari was severely tarnished largely by the actions of hisnow-imprisoned brother Raúl, who was accused of murdering a politicalopponent, playing a major role in drug trafficking, and stealing more than$100 million. Carlos Salinas has lived in exile in Ireland since he left theMexican presidency. In Nicaragua, former president Arnoldo Alemán hasfaced fraud, embezzlement, and money-laundering charges. In Argentina,President Carlos Menem left office in 1999 following a spate of scandals.Two years later, he was arrested on charges of illegal arms trafficking andaccepting millions of dollars in bribes.

Much of the research conducted on corruption and its politicalimpact thus far has examined matters such as the factors that induce cor-ruption to take root in a nation’s political system; its systemic negativeconsequences, such as clientelism and cronyism (see, for example, Ban-field 1958; Johnston 1979; Etzioni-Halevy 1985); its systemic positiveconsequences, such as political stability (Huntington 1969; Waterbury1976; Becquart-Leclerq 1989; Heidenheimer et al. 1989); and its conse-quences for policymaking, especially for economic policy (Tulchin andEspach 2000). The focus of this study, in contrast, is the link betweencorruption and the perceptions and attitudes of a nation’s citizens. Inexploring the significance of corruption for mass politics, this study fol-lows a path that so far has been traveled by only a relative handful ofscholars (for example, Morris 1991; Shin 1999; Camp et al. 2000; DellaPorta 2000; Pharr 2000; Seligson 2002).1

Political corruption raises several issues regarding the relationshipbetween citizens and their governments. At one level, when the highestauthorities are frequently implicated in electoral manipulation, financialscandals, or the abuse of public resources to achieve personal benefits,their bases of authority and legitimacy may be seriously undermined. Atanother level, corruption constitutes a violation of the unwritten contractbetween citizen and public official. Political corruption “distorts publicdemands, increases the cost, reduces quality, and delays the completionof public works, delays access to public administration for those peoplewho do not pay bribes and reduces the productivity” of all thoseinvolved with the state (Della Porta 2000). Thus it is no surprise thatsome scholars view corruption as a “common and profound obstacle tothe consolidation of new democracies” (Schedler et al. 1999, 1).

A vital step in combating political corruption is that citizens be ableto hold leaders accountable when they engage in malfeasance. For this“vertical accountability” (O’Donnell 1999) to exist, citizens need to beable to hold political leaders to some standard and punish them whenthey violate that standard. Accountability of this sort entails two addi-tional requirements. First, citizens must accurately perceive corruptionwhen it does exist. If citizens simply believe that all politicians are cor-rupt, this would most likely bode poorly for the fate of democracy, as

92 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 47: 3

none of the electoral alternatives would appeal to citizens. Additionally,there would be nothing left to explain if citizens from all countriesviewed their democratic leaders as either all being corrupt or not cor-rupt at all. We find that possibility unlikely.

Second, citizens need to adjust their opinions of the relevant lead-ers (or institutions) accordingly. Thus, when citizens accurately perceivecorruption and they adjust their opinions of the leader, they will bebetter able to hold that leader accountable through democraticprocesses (elections, judicial procedures, protest, and so on). Positiveconsequences can result when citizens identify certain leaders or polit-ical institutions as corrupt and they are able to hold them accountablethrough various forms of sanction. When political leaders are thought tobe corrupt and the legislature or citizens hold the leader accountable,this is an example of democracy in action. However, if citizens misplaceblame, it is possible that corruption can have a destabilizing affect ondemocratic political systems. For instance, if citizens believe that cor-ruption is an inherent component of a democratic regime and notmerely attributable to an individual political leader or institution, thismay weaken support for democracy as a form of governance, therebyincreasing the risk that an alternate regime will emerge. Therefore, it iscritically important to identify whether citizens can accurately assess thelevel of corruption in their nation and whether perceptions of corrup-tion affect their support for the incumbent government, the politicalsystem and democracy as a system of governance.

This article tries to disentangle the relationship between politicalcorruption and public opinion in several Latin American nations usingdata from the 1995–97 World Values Survey. The World Values Survey isa worldwide survey project that investigates social, cultural, and politi-cal attitudes. The third wave of this project, conducted from 1995through 1997, was performed in national representative samples of 54independent nations. Specifically, it assesses the characteristics of citi-zens’ perceptions of corruption and considers whether those percep-tions affect support for incumbent political officials, political institutions,and democracy itself, broadly speaking. The analyses begin with a briefreview of the nature of corruption in Latin America.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CORRUPTIONIN LATIN AMERICA

Over the last several years, political events in both North and South havebrought a renewed vigor to the study of political corruption. In theadvanced industrial democracies, corruption scandals have brought downseveral prominent political figures in Italy (the “clean hands” investiga-tion), Germany (Helmut Kohl), the United States (Rep. James Traficant, D-

CANACHE AND ALLISON: CORRUPTION 93

Ohio), and Great Britain (Peter Mandelson). Although these events haveundoubtedly undermined citizen trust and confidence in the government,they have not destroyed the democratic system in those countries. Accu-sations and incidents of political corruption in the global South, by con-trast, have shaken many new democratic regimes to their core.

Recent history in Latin America illustrates both the extent of cor-ruption at the national level and the difficulties of combating it. Sincethe early 1990s, nine Latin American presidents or former presidentshave faced judicial proceedings or have been dismissed on corruptioncharges.2 One indicator of the severity of corruption in Latin America isprovided by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index(CPI). Table 1 depicts CPI scores from 1997 and 2003 for all availableLatin American nations and advanced democracies. The 1997 data con-tributed to this study’s multivariate analyses involving the 1995–97World Values Survey. The 2003 data are the most recent indicators avail-able; and comparison of 1997 and 2003 scores reveals that CPI scoresfor a given nation typically vary little in the short run.

As coded here, scores on the CPI range from zero (least corrupt) to10 (most corrupt). In the advanced democracies, the mean CPI score inboth years is under 2.0.3 Although moderately high corruption is indi-cated in nations such as Belgium and Italy, the news in the advanceddemocracies is quite good overall. A starkly different story emerges inLatin America. Among Latin American nations, the mean CPI valueexceeds 6.0 in both 1997 and 2003, and only Chile receives CPI scoresthat would be inconspicuous in advanced democracies.

A few words are in order concerning the measure of corruptionused in table 1 and throughout the following analyses. The CPI is a jointinitiative of Göttingen University and Transparency International, andhas become a popular measure in cross-national statistical analyses overthe last several years. The CPI is an attempt to assess the level of cor-ruption in a country by compiling a “poll of polls” based on the per-ceptions of both national and foreign business leaders and risk analystsworking for multinational firms and institutions in each country. Trans-parency International defines corruption as the “misuse of public powerfor private benefits; for example, the bribing of public officials, takingkickbacks in public procurement, or embezzling public funds” (GrafLambsdorff 2003). It uses this definition of corruption to seek out pollsasking comparable questions in countries around the world. Trans-parency International calculates CPI scores for a nation if data from aminimum of four surveys are available.

Although there is no purely objective measure of corruption, theCPI scores provided by Transparency International offer a relativelyaccurate depiction of the level of corruption in each country. Theresponses of business people and risk analysts, whose job it is to take


into consideration the level of corruption in a country before decidingwhether and how much to invest in the country’s markets, yield a meas-ure that is mostly the result of informed elite–based surveys. The CPIindex is widely used by economists assessing the effect of corruption onmacroeconomic variables, and “it is no doubt the best overall indicatorof national levels of corruption worldwide” (Seligson 2002, 415).Indeed, we believe that this is a more accurate measure of corruptionthan other potential sources. Corruption measures based on news sto-ries or judicial proceedings are in many ways more a reflection of inves-tigative journalism, freedom of the press, and an effective and inde-pendent judiciary than an indication of the level of corruption. AlthoughCPI scores do retain an element of subjectivity, they are the best avail-able indicators for our purposes.4

The CPI data reported in table 1 reveal that political corruption iswidespread in most Latin American nations, particularly when thosenations are viewed in the context of advanced democracies. This claimwill be unsurprising for even casual observers of the region. But what


Table 1. Corruption Levels in Selected Democracies

Advanced Democracies Latin American Democracies_____________________________ _____________________________1997 2003 1997 2003

Austria 2.4 2.0 Argentina 7.2 7.5Australia 1.1 1.2 Bolivia 8.0 7.7Belgium 4.8 2.4 Brazil 6.4 6.1Canada 0.9 1.3 Chile 3.9 2.6Denmark 0.1 0.5 Colombia 7.8 6.3Finland 0.5 0.5 Costa Rica 3.5 5.7France 3.3 3.1 Ecuador –– 7.8Germany 1.8 2.3 El Salvador –– 6.3Italy 5.0 4.7 Guatemala –– 7.6Japan 3.4 3.0 Honduras –– 7.7Luxembourg 1.4 1.3 Mexico 7.3 6.4Netherlands 1.0 1.1 Nicaragua –– 7.4New Zealand 0.8 0.5 Panama –– 6.6Norway 1.1 1.2 Paraguay –– 8.5Sweden 0.6 0.3 Peru –– 6.3Switzerland 1.4 1.2 Uruguay 5.6 4.5United Kingdom 1.8 1.3 Venezuela 7.2 7.6United States 2.2 2.5

Average 1.9 1.8 Average 6.3 6.6

Source: Transparency International 1997, 2003.

connection exists between corruption in Latin America and citizens’political perceptions? Two central questions must be considered. First,do mass perceptions of corruption share the critical tone reflected in theCPI data? Second, to the extent that citizens do perceive some level ofcorruption in Latin America, whom do they hold accountable? Most sig-nificantly, do they blame the various institutions and leaders of the state,or do they blame democracy itself?

PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

If citizens are to hold leaders accountable for political corruption, theinitial step is to recognize the severity of the problem. Before citizensdecide to engage in popular protest or to punish corrupt leaders andinstitutions at the ballot box, they first must characterize the degree ofcorruption in their nation accurately.

CPI data indicate that the expert view holds that corruption is rela-tively high in most Latin American nations, although corruption is onlymoderately severe in Costa Rica and Uruguay and comparatively minorin Chile. In exploring the relationship between corruption and massopinion, this study initially looks at how much mass perceptions of cor-ruption mirror the elite view indicated by the CPI. It answers this ques-tion with data from the 1995–97 World Values Survey (WVS) and the1997 Transparency International CPI.5

The WVS includes data from seven Latin American nations: Argentina,Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Collectively,1997 CPI scores from these countries encompass nearly 40 percent of theCPI’s theoretical range. In 1997, corruption as reported on the CPI wasmoderately low in Chile (3.9), moderate to moderately high in Uruguayand Brazil, and high in Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, and especiallyColombia (7.8). Thus, if citizens’ perceptions resemble those of theexperts whose views contribute to CPI scores, then opinion regarding theseverity of corruption should vary noticeably across these nations.

We can assess the nature of citizens’ perceptions at both the aggre-gate level and the individual level using the CPI scores as the basis ofcomparison. At the aggregate level, we include CPI and WVS data fromboth the seven Latin American nations and eight advanced democracies.If aggregate mass perceptions are accurate, then the advanced democ-racies should have low mean levels of perceived corruption; mediumlevels of perceived corruption should be found in Chile and Uruguay;and high levels of perceived corruption should be found in the otherfive Latin American nations.

The WVS measures perceived corruption with data from the item“How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in thiscountry?” Respondents were presented with four choice options, rang-


ing from “almost no public officials are engaged in it” to “almost allpublic officials are engaged in it.” We retain the original coding scheme,with scale values ranging from 1 (low perceived corruption) to 4.

Figure 1 illustrates that aggregate perceived corruption does indeedalign closely with the expert view as represented by the CPI.6 The cor-relation between CPI values and mean perceived corruption scores is0.91, suggesting a high level of aggregate perceptual accuracy. Amongthe Latin American cases, those citizens living in the low to moderaterange of corruption according to the CPI (Chile and Uruguay) also col-lectively perceive the level of corruption to be in the same range. Onthe other hand, those countries that scored more poorly on the CPImeasure (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela) wereperceived as quite corrupt by the average citizen. These results provideevidence that there is a great deal of commonality between citizens’ per-ceptions of levels of corruption and the elite-level depiction of corrup-tion provided by the CPI scale.

We also can assess the distribution of individual-level responses onthe corruption item. Of interest is what portion of respondents makeswhat might be hesitantly labeled perceptual errors. For instance, wemight reasonably conclude that Chileans are off base if they report thatvirtually all officials in their nation are engaged in corrupt practices, and


Figure. 1. Correlation Between Country-level Corruption(Transparency International-CPI) and Perceived Corruption

Source: Transparency International; World Values Survey 1995–97

we might also look askance at Colombians who believe that few publicofficials there have experienced the taint of corruption. Table 2 depictsthe relevant data. Although few respondents see almost no corruption intheir respective nations, responses are divided relatively evenly amongthe other three response categories. In no country did the percentage ofrespondents who claimed that “almost no public officials are engaged init” rise above 5 percent, and only in Chile and Uruguay, two of theregion’s three most corruption-free states, did the percentage of respon-dents finding that few or no public officials are engaged in corruptionexceed 50 percent. On the other hand, over 70 percent of the citizens inArgentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela believe that most oralmost all public officials are corrupt. As for perceptual errors, only a rel-ative handful of respondents are too generous in their assessments. Onthe flip side, the question of whether respondents are too critical findsthat some people in Uruguay, and especially Chile, perceive the situationin their respective nations as being much worse than the CPI indicates.

What explains the variance in the range of perceived corruptionseen in table 2? Three paths warrant consideration. First, individual-levelcharacteristics of WVS respondents may be associated with the predis-position to view corruption as high or low. Variables are included toaccount for sex, age, education, social class, life satisfaction, interper-sonal trust, and interest in politics. Second, variance in the actual con-ditions in each nation may affect respondents’ perceptions. Thus, usingCPI data as a surrogate to capture cross-national variance in corruption,we are interested in whether Latin Americans’ individual-level judg-ments correspond with the CPI. Third, if a link between CPI scores andmass perceptions of corruption is identified at the individual level, weexpect that the strength of this connection will be variable. Given that


Table 2. Perception of the Extent of Corruptionin Seven Latin American Countries (percent)

Public Officials Engaged in Corruption

Almost Almostall Most A few none

Argentina (N = 1,032) 37.27 41.18 18.50 3.07Brazil (N = 1,096) 58.94 23.54 16.79 0.73Chile (N = 949) 17.24 27.47 50.91 4.38Colombia (N = 2,910) 44.40 32.96 19.79 2.85Mexico (N = 1,396) 44.13 30.87 20.63 4.37Uruguay (N = 906) 14.37 30.07 52.34 3.23Venezuela (N = 1,106) 44.03 30.74 22.88 2.85

Source: World Values Survey, 1995–97.

the CPI is an elite-level indicator, we surmise that the correspondencebetween CPI scores and mass perceptions will be greatest for thoserespondents who are highly interested in politics and who have thehighest levels of education.

Because our dependent variable is a four-category ordinal indicator,we assess the determinants of perceived corruption using ordered logis-tic regression. Two models are reported in table 3.7 The first includes allindividual-level predictors, along with the CPI scores for each nation.The second adds CPI � political interest and CPI � education interac-tion terms to test whether the similarity between CPI scores and massperceptions of corruption peaks for certain respondents. In pooled


Table 3. Factors Affecting Level of Perceived Corruption in Six Latin American Countries

(ordered logistic regression estimates)

InteractiveMain Effect Model Effect Model___________________ __________________

Robust RobustStandard Standard

Coefficient Errora Coefficient Errora

Sex 0.137* 0.064 0.137* 0.063Age –0.012** 0.004 –0.012** 0.004Education 0.033 0.028 0.050 0.127Social class –0.119** 0.044 –0.121** 0.043Satisfaction with life 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003Interpersonal trust –0.527** 0.154 –0.527** 0.171Political Interest –0.187*** 0.043 –0.692*** 0.192Transparency International

Score (nation’scorruption level) 0.423*** 0.055 0.292** 0.101

Transparency InternationalScore*Education –0.003 0.020

Transparency InternationalScore*Political Interest 0.079* 0.031

Number of Observations 5,967 5,967Model �2 679.7 691.46

***p < .001 **p <.01 *p < .05 #p < .10aAdjusted for clustering on country.Dependent variable: “level of perceived corruption,” a four-category ordinal measure.Notes: For tables 3–5, data from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, andVenezuela. See appendix for wording and descriptive statistics. Source: World Values Survey, 1995–97; Transparency International.

cross-national analyses such as this, data are inherently clustered bynation in that they are gathered in separate surveys conducted in eachof several countries. Failure to account for this clustering can result inunduly small standard errors and produce too liberal of significancetests for coefficient estimates. To avoid this problem, these and subse-quent models are estimated using robust standard errors that account forthe national-level clustering in these data.

Results in table 3’s initial model reveal that several individual-levelvariables correspond with the perception of corruption. Specifically,women, older respondents, and respondents who lack interpersonaltrust and political interest all tend to perceive higher rather than lowerlevels of political corruption. Even after controlling for the impact ofthese variables, though, an extremely strong effect is found for the CPIvariable. The coefficient on the Transparency International indicator isnearly eight times the size of its standard error, reaching the highestlevel of statistical significance. Citizens’ views of corruption in LatinAmerica apparently are neither unfocused nor unfounded. To the con-trary, there is a high degree of correspondence between expert judg-ments and the views of the person on the street.

To be clear, it is not our claim that the typical citizen learns of theCPI and uses those data to inform perceptions about levels of corrup-tion. Instead, we use CPI scores to approximate variance in actual levelsof corruption in the six nations under consideration. From this perspec-tive, the large and statistically significant coefficient on the CPI variablesuggests that the “reality” of political conditions (as captured by eliteperceptions) in these nations resonates with the mass public. Studentsof political behavior often are concerned about the consequences thatemerge when citizens are less than fully informed about politics.Although it is admittedly a stretch to argue that the CPI data measureactual levels of political corruption, these data do at least indicate cor-ruption as perceived by attentive, well-informed observers. From thisperspective, the significant effect for the CPI variable reveals that massopinion about corruption is neither haphazard nor baseless.

Although the initial model in table 3 demonstrates that mass judg-ments regarding levels of corruption vary in response to levels of cor-ruption as indicated by the CPI, a limitation of this specification is thatit fails to recognize possible variance among mass judgments. We havespeculated that the connection between CPI data and mass perceptionsshould be strongest for those citizens who have the resources andcapacity to monitor the political scene most closely. In other words,some citizens may be better positioned than others to perceive corrup-tion accurately. This hypothesis is tested by determining whether theimpact of corruption as indicated by CPI data is moderated by two fac-tors critical to political engagement: education and interest in politics.


Statistically significant positive coefficients on the interaction terms CPI� education and CPI � political interest would establish the existenceof the hypothesized conditional effects.

In column 3 of table 3, we see a strong and statistically significantinteraction for interest, although not for education. Consistent withexpectations, the interest effect suggests that citizens who are mostattuned to politics are most capable of gauging the extent to which cor-ruption pervades the political system. Figure 2 graphs the substantiveimpact of the political interest and CPI interaction. Specifically, thefigure displays the estimated likelihood that a respondent perceives allor most public officials, as opposed to only a few or almost none, to becorrupt; variables other than the CPI score and political interest are heldconstant. Where corruption is high, at least as indicated by high valueson the CPI, all respondents perceive it as such, irrespective of variancein their levels of interest in politics. This is a plausible result. In nationsthat are absolutely rife with political corruption, the signs will be visibleeven to citizens who follow politics only sporadically.

It is in Latin American nations where corruption is relatively light—nations such as Chile and Uruguay—that variance in political interest


Figure 2. Moderating Impact of Political Interest onPerception of Corruption

appears to matter the most. Respondents who are uninterested in poli-tics have a 50-50 chance of saying that all or most leaders are corrupt,versus a mark of less than 20 percent for respondents who are highlyinterested in politics. What this suggests is that political interest functionsto permit incumbent officials from standing falsely accused. To take oneexample, Chileans with high levels of political interest are much morelikely than their politically disinterested counterparts to recognize thatChile is not suffering from a widespread epidemic of political corruption.

Collectively, these results demonstrate that Latin Americans doindeed recognize corruption in their nations’ political systems. If any-thing, corruption is overstated by politically disinterested respondents innations where corruption is not so severe. The important point here isthat corrupt leaders aren’t fooling anyone. Citizens of these nations seethe problem. This is the first step toward accountability. The secondstep is for citizens to link their perceptions of corruption to appraisalsregarding incumbent officials and the political system. Whether thissecond step occurs is the next question.

PERCEIVED CORRUPTION AS A DETERMINANTOF SUPPORT FOR INCUMBENTS AND INSTITUTIONS

This study adopts a hierarchical approach to the study of political sup-port in which each level of support represents a higher level of gener-alization than its immediate predecessor (Canache 2002). Political sup-port is treated as a multidimensional construct incorporatingcomponents at three different levels of generalization. At the least gen-eral level, citizens assess the performance of incumbent officials,whereas at the most general level, evaluations center on the type ofregime operating in the nation—democracy, in the case of the nationscurrently under consideration. At the intermediate level, citizens formopinions regarding the political institutions of the regime, such as thecourts, the military, the police, and the bureaucracy.

Perceptions of corruption may influence any or all of the three levelsof political support. The wisdom of linking views on corruption to otherpolitical evaluations arguably varies, however, depending on the judg-ment at hand. If incumbent officials are corrupt, it makes perfect sensefor citizens to evaluate them negatively. Likewise, if a nation’s govern-ment institutions are riddled with corruption or if political proceduresfacilitate corrupt practices, citizens are right to take a critical view. Mat-ters differ, however, when we come to the question of regime support.High levels of political corruption are not endemic to democracy. Afterall, corruption is much less severe in Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay thanin Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, and corruption is virtually nonex-istent in nations such as Finland and New Zealand. If the perception of


high levels of corruption leads citizens to form negative views of democ-racy itself, then we would have something of a “baby with the bathwater” phenomenon. Corruption would impose a severe cost if it led cit-izens to view democratic governance with indifference or hostility.

The assessment of the political consequences of corruption beginsby exploring whether the perceptions discussed above influence levelsof support for incumbent officials and a nation’s political system. Someevidence already suggests that citizens do link corruption to opinionabout political actors. Specifically, Morris (1991) identified a strong tiebetween Mexicans’ perceptions of corruption and their levels of trust ingovernment. Seligson (2002), using a measure of actual experience withcorruption, reports strong relationships between the corruption variableand system support in Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.

In the analyses for this study, citizen support for the incumbent gov-ernment is measured with data from a four-category ordinal item thatasked respondents to indicate how satisfied they were with the way thenational government is addressing the country’s affairs. Citizen supportfor the political system is operationalized using a 15-point scale con-structed with data from a series of questions on which respondents wereasked to rate their confidence in several political institutions: the legalsystem, the government, the police, the parliament, and the civil service.Support for the incumbent government is modeled using ordered logis-tic regression, whereas an OLS model is estimated for system support.

The primary independent variable is the four-point indicator of per-ceived political corruption; but the models also include several addi-tional predictors. Among these are various sociodemographic indicators(sex, age, education, and social class), sociocultural orientations (life sat-isfaction and financial satisfaction), and political orientations (politicalinterest, views on paternalism and government liability). The items usedto construct these variables are reported in the appendix, along witheach variable’s descriptive statistics.

The regression results depicted in table 4 reveal that several of thecontrol variables exert significant effects on political support. Of primaryinterest, of course, is the impact of perceived corruption. Statisticallysignificant coefficients are obtained for the corruption variable in bothmodels. These results establish that the second half of the accountabil-ity equation is in place. When citizens in Latin America perceive ram-pant political corruption, those views translate directly into a down-grading of opinion for both incumbent officials and political institutions.When elected officials engage in corrupt practices, they do so at theirown political peril.

Again, it is all to the good if people correctly perceive corruptionand then transfer those perceptions into negative evaluations of incum-bent officials and even features of a nation’s political system, but it


would be troubling if views on corruption caused citizens to turn theirbacks on democracy. All the countries in our sample can be character-ized to a certain extent as “fragile democracies.” In such nations,although formal democratic procedures may have been installed, dem-ocratic roots are not well entrenched, and therefore significant levels ofuncertainty about the sustainability of democracy exist (Canache 2002,6). Although corruption in advanced democracies is unlikely severely toerode public support for democracy as the most desirable form of gov-


Table 4. Effects of Perceived Corruption on Political Support

Support forIncumbent Support for

Government Political(ordered logistic System (OLS

regression estimates) regression estimates)___________________ __________________Robust Robust

Standard StandardCoefficient Errora Coefficient Errora

Sex –0.058 0.087 0.057 0.063Age 0.009* 0.004 0.010 0.010Education –0.046# 0.026 –0.116* 0.033Social class 0.100 0.068 0.114 0.080Satisfaction with life 0.008# 0.004 0.007 0.006Satisfaction with financial

situation 0.083*** 0.023 0.150* 0.041Political interest 0.167* 0.075 0.543** 0.116Views on paternalism –0.051# 0.028 –0.046* 0.017Evaluation of poverty

situation –0.560*** 0.127 –0.335 0.170Evaluation of government

action toward poverty 0.819*** 0.164 1.023** 0.217Perceived corruption –0.344** 0.122 –0.816** 0.184Constant 10.996*** 0.694

Number of observations 5,203 5,127Model �2 1,203.33Model R2 0.146

***p < .001 **p <.01 *p <.05 #p < .10aAdjusted for clustering on country.Dependent variables: “support for the incumbent government,” a four-category ordi-nal measurement; and “support for the political system,” an interval measurement.See notes to table 3.Sources: World Values Survey 1995–97; Transparency International.

ernment, there is less reason to expect the same unwavering commit-ment to democracy in these Latin American countries. We know thatmore and more Latin Americans are ambivalent or genuinely hostile todemocracy as a form of government. For instance, data from the 2002Latinbarómetro show that support for democracy in the region as awhole was only 56 percent (Latinobarómetro 2002). We also know thatopposition to democracy as a form of government is associated withboth support for political violence and support for radical leadershipalternatives. Thus, the very real possibility exists that political corruptionin Latin America poses a tangible threat to democratic stability.

Data from two items are combined to form an indicator of supportfor democracy, yielding a scale with values ranging from 2 (low sup-port) to 8. This scale is the dependent variable in table 5. The OLSregression results reveal no evidence that perceptions of corruptionundermine support for democracy as a form of government. This impor-


Table 5. Effect of Perceived Corruption on Support for Democracy(OLS regression estimates)

RobustCoefficient Standard Errora

Sex –0.035 0.035Age –0.007# 0.003Education –0.048* 0.017Social class –0.024 0.051Satisfaction with life 0.001 0.008Satisfaction with financial situation 0.011 0.014Political interest –0.081 0.045Views on paternalism –0.003 0.008Evaluation of poverty situation in

the country –0.067 0.067Evaluation of government action

toward poverty 0.201* 0.054Perceived corruption 0.029 0.035

Constant 4.067*** 0.129

Number of observations 4,932Model R2 0.029

***p < .001 **p <.01 *p <.05 #p < .10aAdjusted for clustering on country.Dependent variable: “Support for democracy,” an interval measurement. See notes totable 3.Sources: World Values Survey 1995–97; Transparency International.

tant null result speaks to an element of rationality in citizens’ politicalappraisals, especially when viewed in the context of the significanteffects reported in table 4 for this same variable. In Latin America, citi-zens make a critical evaluative distinction. When they perceive politicalcorruption to be widespread, they lash out at both incumbent officialsand national political institutions, but, at least thus far, that is where theydraw the line. Perceptions of political corruption apparently do notundermine support for democracy as a form of government.

CONCLUSIONS

Mass opinion potentially offers one check on corruption in that anation’s citizens could demand higher standards of integrity from publicofficials. For this sort of accountability to occur, however, citizens mustrecognize corruption when it exists, and evidence of corruption mustinfluence citizens’ judgments regarding the culpable parties. The centralobjective in this article has been to determine whether accountability ofthis form does indeed take place in Latin America. A secondary objec-tive involved ascertaining whether perceptions of corruption cause citi-zens to look critically at all aspects of democratic politics, thereby con-tributing to an erosion in support for democracy in the region.

Drawing on Transparency International’s corruption index (CPI)and World Values Survey (WVS) data from several Latin Americannations, we have tested a series of empirical relationships regarding per-ceptions of corruption and political attitudes. Collectively, these findingssuggest that the necessary ingredients for accountability are present inLatin America. Citizens perceive corruption, and they connect those per-ceptions to their judgments of incumbent leaders and political institu-tions. Whether mass opinion alone can offer a sufficient check on cor-ruption is, of course, highly questionable. At a minimum, however, itsurely is better to have accountability of the sort identified here than tosee corruption flourish unhampered by public criticism.

The possible dark side of mass opinion regarding corruption is thatpervasive and often burgeoning misconduct may poison public senti-ment toward democratic politics in general. On this score, these analy-ses speak somewhat to the vitality of democracy in the region, at leastin the short term. Although many Latin American systems are rife withcorruption, this situation only seems to affect support for specific admin-istrations and institutions. This analysis identified no evidence that per-ceptions of corruption have soured mass opinion on democracy as aform of government. Unfortunately, it would be perilous to assume thatthis state of affairs can continue indefinitely. Like Seligson 2002, thisstudy found that corruption undermines the legitimacy of governmentsin Latin America; and like Seligson, we suspect that democracy in the


region, as a consequence, may be racing against the clock. Citizens inthe region apparently do not currently view corruption as an inherentfeature of democratic governance, but there is no guaranty that this per-ceptual link will not emerge in future years if corruption continuesunabated. Given that democracy already is on unsure footing in manyLatin American nations, concern is warranted that the persistence of cor-ruption eventually may add to the allure of nondemocratic regimes.

APPENDIX: WORDING AND DESCRIPTIVESTATISTICS


Table 6. Wording and Descriptive Statistics of Survey Questionnaire

Variable Scale (lowest–highest) Statistics

Sex 1 = male; 2 = female Mode = 2

Age Years (18–91) Mean = 39.01SD = 15.03

Education 1 = no formal Mean = 5.04“What is the highest educa- education SD = 2.26tional level you have attained?” 9 = university degree

Social Class 1 = lower class Mean = 2.55“People sometimes describe 5 = upper class SD = 0.88themselves as belonging to theworking class, the middle class,or the upper or lower class.To which would you describeyourself as belonging?”

Satisfaction with life 1 = completely Mean = 7.24“All things considered, how dissatisfied SD = 2.48satisfied are you with your 10 = completelylife as a whole these days?” satisfied

Satisfaction with financial 1 = completely Mean = 5.89situation dissatisfied SD = 2.77“How satisfied are you with 10 = completelythe financial situation in your satisfiedhousehold?”

Political Interest 1 = not at all Mean = 1.98“How interested would you interested SD = 0.98say you are in politics?” 4 = very interested

Table 6. (continued)


Interpersonal Trust 0 = Can’t be too Mode = 0“Generally speaking, would carefulyou say that most people can 1 = Most people be trusted or that you can’t be can be trustedtoo careful in dealing withpeople?”

Views on Paternalism 1 = People should Mean = 6.07take more responsi- SD = 3.13bility to provide forthemselves10 = The governmentshould take moreresponsibility toensure that everyoneis provided for

Evaluation of Poverty Situation 1 = a smaller share Mean = 2.62“Would you say that today a 3 = a larger share SD = 0.65larger share, about the same,or a smaller share of thepeople in this country areliving in poverty than wereten years ago?”

Evaluation of Government 1 = too little Mean = 1.29Action Toward Poverty 3 = too much SD = 0.54“Do you think that what thegovernment is doing forpeople in poverty in thiscountry is the right amount,too much, or too little?”

Transparency International 0 = low-level Mean = 6.54Score (CPI index) corruption SD = 1.21

10 = high-level ofcorruption

Perceived Corruption 1 = Almost no public Mean = 3.02“How widespread do you officials are engaged SD = 0.88think bribe taking and corrup- in ittion are in this country?” 4 = Almost all public

officials are engagedin it


Table 6. (continued)


Support for the Incumbent 1 = very dissatisfied Mean = 2.12Government 4 = very satisfied SD = 0.90“How satisfied are you withthe way the people in nationaloffice are handling thecountry’s affairs?

Support for the Political System 5 = low level of Mean = 10.99Scale combining items gauging confidence SD = 3.67the level of confidence in the 20 = high level offollowing institutions: legal confidencesystem, government, police,parliament, civil service

Support for Democracy 2 = low support Mean = 3.52Scale combining the following for democracy SD = 1.25items: 8 = high support

for democracy

“Having a democratic systemis a very good, fairly good,fairly bad, or very bad way ofgoverning this country?” (1 =very bad, 4 = very good)

“Democracy may have prob-lems but it’s better than anyother form of government.”(1 = disagree 4 = agree)

Sources: World Values Survey 1995–97; Transparency International.


NOTES

1. For an excellent review on the economic and political literature on cor-ruption, see Seligson 2002.

2. These include Alan García (1985–90) in Peru; Fernando Collor de Mello(1990–92) in Brazil; Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94) in Mexico; AbdaláBucaram (1996–97), Fabián Alarcón (1997–98), and Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000)in Ecuador; Ernesto Samper (1994–98) in Colombia; Carlos Menem (1989–99) inArgentina; and Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) in Peru.

3. The scale of the original CPI index ranges from (0) high corruption to(10) low corruption. Here the scale is inverted for the sake of comparability andinterpretation of the variable used in subsequent analyses. For further concep-

tual and methodological issues regarding the CPI index, see Graf Lambsforff2003.

4. For additional discussion of the strengths and limitations of the CPI, seeSeligson 2002. We share many of Seligson’s concerns regarding use of CPI datain individual-level analyses. Like Seligson, however, we also think these dataoffer a barometer against which to gauge the alternate measures we devise.

5. Another cross-national survey, the Latinbarómetro 1997, asked respon-dents to assess corruption in their nations. But the items did not directly meas-ure respondents’ perceptions regarding levels of corruption, and thus they arenot directly useful for the research questions examined here. In our view, theWorld Values Survey items provide a more straightforward way to capture howmuch corruption the respondents think exists in each country. In 2002, Trans-parency International launched the Global Corruption Barometer, a new initia-tive aiming to monitor attitudes and perceptions about corruption on a globalscale. This new effort promises to offer an important reference for futureresearch on mass perceptions of corruption.

6. Seligson (2002, 421) examines the relationship between TransparencyInternational data and survey data on corruption experienced by survey respon-dents in Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay and, as this study does,finds a very high level of correspondence between the CPI and survey-basedindicators.

7. These models include data from only six nations because the items usedfor two of the independent variables were not asked in Colombia.

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