camreta v. greene

8/6/2019 Camreta v. Greene

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CAMRETA v. GREENE(

Nos. 09-1454 and 09-1478

)

Web-accessible at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/09-1454.ZS.html

Argued:

March 1, 2011-- Decided:May 26, 2011*

Opinion author: Kagan===============================================================

Nearly a decade ago, petitioner Camreta, a statechildprotective services worker, and petitioner Alford, acountydeputy sheriff, interviewed then 9-year-old S. G. atherOregon elementary school about allegations that her

fatherhad sexually abused her. They did not have awarrant orparental consent to conduct the interview. S. G.eventually
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stated that she had been abused. Her father stoodtrialfor that abuse, but the jury failed to reach a verdict

and the charges were later dismissed. S. G.'smother, respondenthere (hereinafter S. G.), subsequently sued CamretaandAlford on S G.'s behalf for damages under 42 U. S.C. sec.1983,alleging that the in-school interview breached the

FourthAmendment's proscription on unreasonableseizures. TheDistrict Court granted summary judgment to theofficials.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals firstruled that seizing S. G. absent a warrant, courtorder,parental consent, or exigent circumstances violatedtheConstitution. But the court further held that theofficialswere entitled to qualified immunity from damagesliabilitybecause no clearly established law had warned

them of theillegality of their conduct. The court explained that ithad chosen to rule on the merits of the constitutionalclaim so that officials would be on notice that theycould


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not dispense with traditional Fourth Amendmentprotectionsin this context. Although the judgment entered was

in theirfavor, Camreta and Alford petitioned this Court toreviewthe Ninth Circuit's ruling that their conduct violatedthe Fourth Amendment. S. G. declined to cross-petitionfor review of the decision that the officials have

immunity.

Held :

1. This Court generally may review a lower court'sconstitutionalruling at the behest of government officials whohave wonfinal judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Pp. 4-14.

(a) The relevant statute confers unqualified poweron thisCourt to grant certiorari "upon the petition of anyparty."


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28 U. S. C. sec.1254(1). That language coverspetitionsbrought by litigants who have prevailed, as well as

thosewho have lost, in the courts below. Pp. 4-5.

(b) An appeal brought by a prevailing party maysatisfyArticle III's case-or-controversy requirement. To

complywith that requirement, litigants must demonstrate a"personalstake" in the suit. Summers v. Earth Island Institute ,555 U. S. 488 , ___. The petitioner has such a stakewhenhe has "suffered an 'injury in fact' " that is caused by"the conduct complained of" and that "will be'redressedby a favorable decision.' " Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U. S. 555 . And the opposing party also musthavean ongoing interest in the dispute, so that the casefeatures

" 'that concrete adverseness which sharpens thepresentationof issues.' " Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U. S. 95 .Theparties must have the necessary stake not only at


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the outsetof litigation, but throughout its course. Arizonans forOfficial English v. Arizona , 520 U. S. 43 . So long as

the litigants possess the requisite personal stake, anappeal presents a case or controversy, no matterthat theappealing party was the prevailing party below. SeeDepositGuaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper , 445 U. S. 326 ;Electrical

Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co. , 307 U. S. 241.

This Article III standard often will be met whenimmunizedofficials seek to challenge a determination that theirconduct violated the Constitution because that rulingmayhave prospective effect on the parties. So long as itremainsgood law, an official who regularly engages in thechallengedconduct as part of his job (as Camreta does) must

eitherchange the way he performs his duties or risk ameritoriousdamages action. The official thus can demonstrateinjury,


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causation, and redressability. And conversely, if thepersonwho initially brought the suit may again be subject to

the challenged conduct, she has a stake inpreserving thecourt's holding so that she will have ongoingprotectionfrom the practice. Pp. 5-7.

(c) This Court's prudential practice of declining tohearappeals by prevailing parties does not barconsiderationof immunized officials' petitions. The Court hasrecognizedexceptions to this prudential rule when there hasbeena "policy reaso[n] ... of sufficient importance to allowan appeal" by the winner below. Deposit Guaranty ,445U. S., at 336, n. 7. Just such a reason exists inqualifiedimmunity cases. The constitutional rulings thatprevailing

parties ask the Court to consider in these caseshave asignificant future effect on the conduct of publicofficialsand the policies of the government units to which


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theybelong. The rulings are self-consciously designed toproduce

this effect by establishing controlling law andpreventinginvocations of immunity in later cases. Moreover,theyare so designed with this Court's permission, topromoteclarity--and observance--of constitutional rules.

Takentogether, these features of qualified immunity casessupportbending the usual rule to permit consideration ofimmunizedofficials' petitions.

To begin with the nature of these suits: Undersec.1983and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents ,403 U.S. 388 , a plaintiff may seek money damages fromgovernmentofficials who have violated her constitutional or

statutoryrights. But if those officials are entitled to qualifiedimmunity, a court can dismiss the damages claimwithoutever deciding its merits--and so the qualified


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immunitysituation threatens to leave standards of officialconduct

permanently in limbo. To prevent that problem, thisCourthas permitted lower courts to determine whether arightexists before examining whether it was clearlyestablished.See, e.g., Pearson v.

Callahan,555 U. S. 223 . Here, the Ninth Circuit followedexactlythis two-step process so that it could settle aquestionof constitutional law and thereby guide the futureconductof officials.

Given its purpose and effect, such a decision isreviewablein this Court at an immunized official's behest. If theCourt's usual prevailing party rule applied, theofficial

would either have to acquiesce in a ruling he had noopportunityto contest in this Court, or defy the lower court'sview,adhere to what has been declared an illegal


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practice, andinvite further law suits and possible punitivedamages.

Id., at 240-241. And applying this Court's usual baronreview would undermine the purpose of the two-stepprocess,"which is to clarify constitutional rights without unduedelay." Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U. S. 1019 , 1024 (Scalia

, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Just as thatpurpose may justify an appellate court in reachingbeyondan immunity defense to decide a constitutionalissue, sotoo may it support this Court in reviewing thecorrectnessof the lower court's decision.

This holding is limited in two respects. First, itaddressesonly this Court's authority to review cases in thisproceduralposture. The Court need not decide if an appellate

courtcan also entertain an appeal from a party who hasprevailedon immunity grounds. Second, the holding concernsonly


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Floridaand is only months away from her 18th birthday and,presumably,

from her high school graduation. When "subsequenteventsma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongfulbehavior could not reasonably be expected torecur," thereis no live controversy to review. United States v.Concentrated

Phosphate Export Assn., Inc. , 393 U. S. 199 .

When a civil suit becomes moot pending appeal,this Courthas authority to "direct the entry of such appropriatejudgment, decree, or order, or require such furtherproceedings... as may be just under the circumstances." 28 U. S.C.sec.2106. The Court's "established" practice is tovacatethe judgment below, see, e.g., United States v.Munsingwear,Inc. , 340 U. S. 36 , to ensure that "those who have

beenprevented from obtaining the review to which theyare entitled[are] not ... treated as if there had been a review,"ibid.


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The point of vacatur is to prevent an unreviewabledecision"from spawning any legal consequences." Id., at 40-

41.A constitutional ruling in a qualified immunity case isa legally consequential decision. Whenhappenstance preventsthis Court's review of that ruling, the normal ruleshouldapply: Vacatur rightly "strips the decision below of its

binding effect," Deakins v. Monaghan , 484 U. S.193 ,and clears "the path for future relitigation,"Munsingwear, 340 U. S., at 40. Because mootness has frustratedCamreta'sability to challenge the Ninth Circuit's ruling that hemust obtain a warrant before interviewing asuspected childabuse victim at school, that part of the Ninth Circuit'sdecision must be vacated. Pp. 14-18.

588 F. 3d 1011, vacated in part and remanded.

Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, inwhichRoberts, C. J. , and Scalia, Ginsburg , and Alito , JJ.,joined. Scalia , J., filed a concurring opinion.


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Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, inwhich

Breyer , J., joined. Kennedy , J., filed a dissentingopinion,in which Thomas, J., joined.

Notes:

*

* Together with No. 09-1478, Alford, Deputy Sheriff,DeschutesCounty, Oregon v. Greene, Personally and as NextFriendof S. G., a Minor, et al., also on certiorari to thesamecourt.

camreta v. greene

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