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Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens:Beyond a State-Centric ApproachAurélie Campana a & Benjamin Ducol aa Université Laval, QuébecVersion of record first published: 19 Dec 2011.

To cite this article: Aurélie Campana & Benjamin Ducol (2011): Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens:Beyond a State-Centric Approach, Civil Wars, 13:4, 396-413

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Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens: Beyond aState-Centric Approach

AURELIE CAMPANA AND BENJAMIN DUCOL

Over the last decade, the term safe haven has stirred controversy both in the

political arena as well as in the academic literature. Several authors have

emphasised the imprecise and commonly ill-conceived use of this terminology.

This article intends to provide a fresh analytical framework to better

understand the notion of terrorist safe haven. Rejecting the orthodox

state-centric approach that envisions terrorist safe havens solely in their static

and territorial dimensions, we focus rather on the social dynamics that

characterise these spaces. We contend that although they might appear

socially fragmented, these geographical areas are ruled by alternative modes

of governance that impose a form of social order regulating interactions

among actors. We use the concept of ‘social space’ to capture the framework

in which social interactions between local actors are taking place. While we

recognise that the social order that governs a given social space imposes

constraints for actors, we contend that it can be subjected to internal

contestation, opening a series of opportunities for transnational terrorist

networks. We then try to highlight how terrorist groups might take advantage

of these internal dynamics and create new ones to ensnare some local actors

into forming alliances with them. This article addresses several case studies to

further illustrate the theoretical discussion. Finally, we conclude with a

discussion of the importance of interpersonal relationships between local and

transnational actors. While this article proposes a preliminary analysis of the

question, it opens up new research avenues in conceptualising why and how

some regions have come to attract transnational terrorist groups.

INTRODUCTION

While the administration of Barack Obama has renounced the use of the highly

contested expression ‘War on Terror’,1 it has retained the Bush-era obsession with

terrorist safe havens. This term continues to prevail in the discourse on Pakistan,

Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and the Trans-Sahara region.2 Over the last decade,

the terminology ‘terrorist safe haven’ has been relentlessly used to describe a region,

a geographical area or a state that is, supposedly, either ungoverned or ill-governed.

In this perspective, the weakness of the state apparatus is argued to provide terrorist

groups with opportunities to ‘organise, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train,

transit, and operate’.3

Civil Wars, Vol.13, No.4 (December 2011), pp.396–413ISSN 1369-8249 print/ISSN 1743-968X online

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The use of the term safe haven has stirred controversy in the political arena as

well as in the academic literature. Several authors have emphasised the imprecise

and commonly ill-conceived use of this terminology. In turn, they provide some

alternative explanations that account for potential linkages between terrorist groups

and geographical spaces in which these entities might operate.4 This article extends

this literature by proposing, in an interpretive perspective, a new conceptualisation

of these spaces as ‘alternatively governed’.5 In so doing, it intends to provide a

critical6 examination of the relationships that terrorist entities like Al-Qaeda seek to

establish with the local actors. In the same vein, while our purpose is not to define

the highly contested term ‘terrorism’,7 it certainly needs some clarifications.

Following most of the critical scholars of terrorism, we contend that achieving a

neutral and consensual definition of terrorism is difficult, not to say impossible for its

changing meaning is strongly contingent on the historical, political and cultural

contexts in which it is used.8 Terrorism should therefore be defined as a social

practice embedded in political, social and cultural contexts. More precisely, it may

be considered as an ‘asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against

enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely

operating within some current regime’.9

This article aims to neither discuss the necessity of such safe havens per se, nor

develop a new grand theory. Rather we propose a preliminary analysis that would

open up new avenues in conceptualizing why and how some regions in the world

have come to attract transnational terrorist groups. We reject the western state-

centric approach that solely accounts for the territorial dimensions of terrorist

sanctuary and concentrate our analysis on the social dynamics that are often left out

from these discussions. Therefore, we argue that there is a crucial need to go beyond

the territorial understandings of safe havens and to develop a new analytical

framework that would account for the penetration of transnational terrorist entities

into local contexts. The notion of ‘social space’ forms the starting point in building

our theoretical framework. It allows us to draw attention to the specificities of these

regions that are said to function as magnets for transnational terrorism. In so doing,

we focus on alternative forms of governance and diversity of the social structures

that compose them. The integration of sociological dimensions into the analysis

allows for a renewed theoretical conceptualisation of safe havens and gives us

insights into complex relational processes that regulate interactions between terrorist

networks and their close environments. In so doing, we intend to provide a

conceptual toolbox that would eventually pave the way for further theory-building.

This article is organised as follows. In the first part, we examine the term

‘terrorist safe haven’ and review the contemporary debates around its use. Then, we

move forward by discussing the notion of ‘social space’ and its conceptual value to

better grasp the micro-social dynamics that organise these spaces. Finally, we look

at the strategies developed by transnational terrorist organisations to compose with

these a priori closed spaces. In order to illustrate our main arguments, we will

address several case studies representing spaces that have been described as terrorist

safe havens in the current and past US official counterterrorism documents.10 In the

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last edition of Country Reports on Terrorism released by the US Department of

State, the list of terrorist safe havens includes: Somalia, the Trans-Sahara territory

(southern Algeria, several regions of Mali, Niger and Mauritania), regions bordering

the Sulu-Sulawesi sea, Malaysia, South-East of the Philippines, Iraq, Lebanon,

Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Venezuela, and the border between Argentina,

Brazil and Paraguay (Tri-Border area).11 Other regions have also been labelled as

terrorist sanctuaries in the past, including Bosnia, the Caucasus or Sudan. For the

sake of clarity, we will mainly concentrate our discussion on the geographical areas

where ‘radical pan-Islamist’12 groups have been or are currently active. Therefore,

we exclude Venezuela and the Tri-Border area from our analysis. If some of our

theoretical findings could be applied to these case studies, the present article does

not allow us to elaborate a carefully crafted comparison.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL AND ACADEMIC DISCOURSES ON SAFE

HAVEN SINCE 2001

Since 2001, the usage of the terminology ‘terrorist safe haven’ has become more

frequent in both the political and academic realms. In the 1970s and 1980s, the term

was mostly used to describe fully functional states that either actively supported

terrorist groups or passively sponsored them. In the new millennium, however, the

weak, failing and failed states are considered as the new providers of terrorist

sanctuaries. Therefore, the dominant academic and political discourses presuppose a

causal link between the weakness of state structures and the opportunities for

terrorist groups to take advantage of these ungoverned or under-governed areas to

push their agenda forward.13 The ‘War on Terror’ discourse that prevailed during the

Bush administration has clearly infused a one-dimensional perception of terrorist

sanctuaries, obsessively limited to a geopolitical perspective. As a result, the notion

of safe havens came to be conceived in a narrowly state-centric perspective14 that

justified political and even military interventions designed to prevent the

implantation of terrorist groups in these areas.15 In its moderate account, this

approach favoured a statebuilding perspective that sought to reconstruct institutional

structures in states in which they were considered to be failed or failing.16

While several academic studies hypothesise a strong causal mechanism between

the withering organisational structures of a state and the constitution of terrorist safe

havens,17 they neither provide a solid formulation of this concept nor contest

un-scrutinised definitions of terrorist safe havens used in both political and academic

fields. Consequently, as Innes contends, ‘there has been little scholarly attention to

defining terrorist sanctuaries’.18 Moreover, many of these studies encounter multiple

methodological weaknesses, such as the heterogeneity of terrorist entities to be

studied, the aggregation and the inconsistence of statistical indicators, and the

uncritical use of secondary sources and existing terrorism data sets.19

Nonetheless, certain authors have attempted to elucidate the key characteristics of

the term safe haven. For instance, Kittner identifies four factors that would contribute

to the emergence of terrorist safe havens. Aside from geographic factors – such as

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porous borders and inaccessibility of the area – low population density, weak

political governance, a history of corruption and violence, and endemic poverty

provide the backdrop for the development of terrorist activities in a given territory.20

Kortweg enlarges the analysis by proposing a comparison between a set of

geographical areas that are described as under-governed or ungoverned. He thus

proposes a descriptive framework that consists of seven elements – the absence of

government control, the presence of ethnic or religious communities, past

experiences, geographic characteristics, economic opportunities, economic under-

development and exterior influences. These components allow for identification of

areas that are particularly favourable for the creation of what the author refers to as

‘terrorist black holes’.21

The above attempts to define the notion of safe haven are all anchored in state-

centric and territorial conceptions of space. Such definitions in no way account for

the changing meaning of traditional state boundaries and the social consequences of

late globalisation. Therefore, they remain firmly Weberian in their definition of

power and sovereignty.22 The academic literature on safe havens, due to its state-

centric bias towards international security issues, has failed to envision this notion

other than in its physical manifestation. In systematically associating the

terminology ‘safe haven’ to a territory free of all forms of control – be it political,

social, economic or cultural – the orthodox perspectives overlook the much more

complex image of local power dynamics.

In the same vein, transnational terrorist networks are often conceived as

atomistic, de-rooted and under-socialised objects, strictly operating in a

geopolitically constrained world. Other factors (social, economic, religious and

cultural) that may influence the interactions between these clandestine entities and

their contiguous environment are too often ignored in the literature. Thus, even

though terrorist organisations are located at the margins of societies, these

movements cannot be analysed outside the social dynamics that contingently shape

their birth, transformation and survival.23 Moreover, the inability of certain groups to

profit from these supposedly chaotic areas – such as the failure of Al-Qaeda to

implant itself in Bosnia and Somalia in the 1990s24 – undermines the uncritical

acceptance of a static theorisation of terrorist safe havens. It also highlights, in the

context of contemporary terrorism studies, the limits of a theoretical conception of

safe havens that does not address the micro-social dynamics of these spaces. The

constant appeal to the state-centred model epitomises the limits of a western

perception of international relations that too frequently fails to remember that the

conception of a modern state is neither universal25 nor detached from its socio-

historical roots.26 Outside the western world, the failure to import the European

state-centric model27 draws attention to the enduring role played by traditional

power structures as well as the importance of horizontal group solidarities. This

logic is manifested in the clan life in Somalia, the tribal governance in Yemen,

Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the horizontal solidarities in Chechnya. In these

instances, the state does not monopolise the power structure, but appears to be a co-

source of the political authority parallel to alternative structures of governance.

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In the following paragraphs, we are proposing to reframe the concept of safe

haven through the notion of ‘social space’ and, hence, to analyse the possible

opportunities that are made available to international terrorist groups searching for a

territorial base for their activities. We seek to formulate a comprehensive alternative

conception of the term, in a socio-political perspective, that would allow us to better

understand the specificities of these under-governed or ungoverned areas as well as

their specific attractiveness for various terrorist groups. We will draw particular

emphasis on the malleability of these fragmented social spaces, rather than simply

their ‘ungoverned’ character.

CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORIST SAFE HAVEN AS A SOCIAL SPACE

Alternative Forms of Governance Beyond the State

We concur with the argument advanced by Cluman and Trinkunas, who attest to the

existence of alternative forms of governance in the territories previously perceived

as ungoverned or under-governed.28 We use the term ‘traditional’ or ‘alternative’ to

designate these forms of authority, which have defied the homogenisation policies of

the central powers. Three evolutions account for the perseverance of these modes of

governance.

First, some states have never established an extensive governmental structure

uniformly capable of imposing political control, moderating grievance through a

bureaucratic institutionalised legal system, and distributing public goods and

services throughout their whole territory. These shortcomings led to the emergence

of the so-called alternative forms of governance that take on the functions that would

traditionally be provided by the state. This is the case of the tribal system in Yemen

that extends over the majority of the country and supplements the absence of a

higher political authority.29 The recourse to this alternative structure of governance

reflects the pragmatism of local populations that are faced with a chronic

institutional deficiency notably in the realm of local conflict resolution.30 Alike, the

Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon – i.e. Burj al-Barajneh, Nahr al-Barid and

Ain al-Helweh – form, in fact, ‘hyper-localised’ wards over which the Lebanese

state does not exercise a full control. These marginal territories are home to various

armed Palestinian factions that try to run these camps in conformity with their own

style of governance.31

Second, certain primordial structures of governance have survived decades of

colonial rule as well as the attempt to impose a so-called ‘modern organisation of the

state’. This is the case of Somalia, where pre-colonial clan system continued to exist

throughout the period of both British and Italian domination, as well as after the

political unification of the country in the 1960s and the accession of the communist

regime of Said Barre.32 A quite similar dynamic is seen in Chechnya. Although

affiliation to teips33 garnered a symbolic significance in the 1960s, the customary

laws (adats) continued to provide a form of rule for the Chechens while relegating

the Soviet judicial system to a secondary role.34 To that effect, the Sufi congregations

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have played a central role in preserving the traditional social regulations. Before

1991, it was indeed not uncommon to witness Communist Party officials

participating in the illegal Friday prayers.35

Third, some states have introduced ‘mediated state strategies’36 that purposely

delegated political authority to local actors in the region in exchange for the

maintenance of certain stability. These initiatives, however, neither helped to evolve

the traditional structures of governance nor did they help the state to penetrate

substantially those social spaces. The tribal zones in Pakistan are perfect examples

of these areas that are not directly run by the state, but follow local customs of

governance.37 In legitimising these traditional forms of governance, the Pakistani

state sought to reinforce its own legitimacy and to better control the challenge posed

by the Pashtun particularism.38 On the other hand, the patronage strategy used by the

Yemeni government in its attempt to reign in the tribal chiefs similarly developed in

the 1990s following the country’s unification. It was meant essentially to negotiate a

social coexistence between the central and the local modes of governance.39

All these categories should be understood as ideal-types that account for the

different forms of ‘alternative’ governance. It does not mean that we consider these

regions or states to be uniform entities; on the contrary, we acknowledge the strong

contextual differences between all of them. Nevertheless, these different cases

provide relevant illustrations of the different forms of alternative governance.

Introducing Social Dimensions into the Analysis

Local actors, often sidelined in the analysis, play a central role in this variety of

social contexts. These include clans, tribes and all other forms of informal networks

that organise and govern micro-social interactions. In order to best account for this

malleable social reality, we need to expand the theoretical framework commonly

used to examine terrorist safe havens. The latter cannot be conceived in strictly static

territorial terms according to which terrorist organisations would operate outside all

social, political, economic and cultural realms. In fact, the term must be understood

in the context of a relational space with interactions between transnational terrorist

groups and local actors at its heart. In this sociological perspective, the term safe

haven constitutes a constraining universe for terrorist organisations not in terms of a

higher political authority, but by the existence of social regulations that dominate in

the alternatively governed entities.

The notion of social space, initially developed by scholars in the field of social

geography, has progressively been integrated into disciplines, such as history,

sociology and political science. This concept allows us to create a bridge between a

given territorial space and its social dimensions. The definition of social space used

in our analytical framework is similar to the ‘social system’ concept enunciated by

Giddens, who refers to it as ‘reproduced relations between actors or collectivities,

organized as regular social practices’.40 This notion emphasises the relational

strategies of actors, their inter-subjective perceptions of the social reality, and the

social links on both the normative and symbolic levels, which unite as well as divide

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them. Moreover, this conceptualisation focuses on the rules that govern these spaces

throughout the different modes of legitimisation and domination.41 Each type of

alternative governance is therefore a structuring mechanism that contributes to

define the social relations and social practices in a given territory.

We do not consider the social space as an environment constrained by its own

structures. Instead, we perceive it as the product of socio-historical processes rooted

in symbolic power struggles. The social space can thus be defined as the seat of a

constant negotiation between the different actors that compose it and as a ‘zone of

mutual evaluation’42 in which several games intercross. The notion of social space

also highlights the relational character of the resources, either material or symbolic,

mobilised by all the actors. The resources vary depending on the local context, the

internal and external influences, and the social connections maintained by

individuals and groups. Each actor can thus mobilise the resources in the hope of

either perpetuating or transforming the constraining structures that govern any given

social space.

Social space functions as an enabling zone with constraining but yet potentially

transformable frontiers. The borders delineating this space are not physical per se.

They can take on social, cultural and symbolic meanings by perpetuating a certain

number of codes, shared rules and regulations, as well as by the existence of specific

interdependencies between actors.43 If the social space is devoid of all instances of

formal regulation, it is not synonymous with general chaos since it remains governed

by a series of structures that can be attached to a particular social order. Thus, as

Elias argues, ‘even a situation that appears to be height of disorder to the people

involved in it forms part of a social order’.44

Here, social order is conceived as a categorisation of the world, a mechanism that

structures the practices of actors and their social interactions. It reflects the ‘meta-

rules’ that organise the space depending on a dominant system of legitimisation and

defines the nature of resources exchanged between the actors. Social order, as Elster

contends, is the ‘cement of a society’.45 Each space is ruled by its own social order,

which is determined by three main components: the control of the physical force that

guarantees the political authority, the distribution of economic resources, and the

production and preservation of symbolic–cultural patterns that shape behaviour and

provide an identity to a specific group.46 Social systems that administer these

functions favour seniority, experience and cumulative possession of political,

economic and symbolic capitals. They also shape the logics of behaviour and

constrict interactions between actors. The organising characteristic of social order

minimises the weight of incertitude. The order may nonetheless lead to

controversies if the actors adopt contentious strategies or if they indirectly

challenge the institutionalised hierarchy by introducing new social references that

would question the established order over time.

In definitive, we argue that the notion of social space, because it reflects

long-term social trends and accounts for different borders that intersect it, is a much

needed tool to better understand the complexities of the types of regulations and

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kinds of interactions that render alternative spaces of governance presented above

attractive to international terrorist groups.

INTEGRATING AND CHALLENGING THE SOCIAL SPACE: HOW

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS USE AND CREATE OPPORTUNITIES

We now turn to examine several dynamics of social interactions between terrorist

organisations and local actors existing through a vast range of geographical regions

commonly designated as terrorist safe havens (Yemen, North Caucasus, Somalia,

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia and Sahel). Terrorist movements can draw on a

vast repertoire of actions dependent on opportunity structures in a given space.

The strategies used by these organisations depend on the opportunity structure that

allows the transnational groups, a priori exogenous actors, to infiltrate the relational

dynamics of a given social space. First, we discuss the permeability of fragmented

social spaces, and then we direct our attention to the issue of strategic inducement

and resource mobilisation.

Structures of Opportunity and the Permeability of Fragmented Social Spaces

All social systems are asymmetric to a certain degree, which makes them potentially

vulnerable to contestation and emergence of small-scale conflicts.47 This is even

more likely since the social spaces of the aforementioned regions are marked by

particularly high degree of fragmentation.48 This social fragmentation is amplified

by the superposition of loyalties (to the family, the clan, the tribe, etc.) and by the

existence of potential zones of conflicts. Even though this organisation is relatively

rigid, it can be partially or totally questioned from inside as well as outside. Social

space and social order are indeed perpetually evolving because of their own internal

dynamics and external shocks. The disequilibria at the heart of any social space may

open up structures of opportunity for both local actors who are looking for external

support in local or regional infightings, and transnational terrorist group that are

looking to expand their networks and activities. While we fully acknowledge that

local actors may intentionally initiate relations with the transnational terrorist groups

and take some examples that illustrate these kinds of relationships, we will mainly

concentrate on the ways in which transnational terrorist groups take advantage of the

emergence of new opportunity structures. This does not mean that we strip agency

away from local groups; on the contrary, we contend that each party has its own

agenda that may converge or diverge at some points.

The structures of opportunity discussed in this paper do not address specific

moments or ruptures.49 However, they reflect the processes that can disturb an

existent social space or redefine its borders. Structures of opportunity expand or

restrict the ability of terrorist movements to penetrate the indigenous social

environments. These arrangements can produce endogenous factors that disrupt the

social cohesion (situational logic, internal conflicts, competition between actors for

the control and the preservation of political, economic, symbolic resources).

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Disturbances can also be caused by exogenous factors and shocks (external

interventions, infiltration strategies defined by transnational terrorist groups,

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities). We are particularly interested in

the ‘sensitivity’50 of these structures and the actors, which allows us to identify the

reasons why certain alternatively governed spaces are more sensitive to external

infiltration than others.

Endogenous Factors: Internal Disequilibria and Social Order Transformation

We argue the existence of multilevel disturbances that may have dissimilar

influences on social space and social order. On the one hand, the upheaval of internal

disequilibria of social space (relations between individuals–groups, distribution of

resources, etc.) varies depending on the partial – if not total – revision of the social

order and its structuring capacity. In the former case, the internal equilibrium of the

social space is questioned. The latter scenario, however, signals a progressive – yet

critical – decomposition of the social order and the possibility of a new social space

with its proper mechanisms of regulation to emerge. Innumerable possibilities of

transformation exist that depend on both the context and strategies of local and

foreign actors. We will focus on several cases that highlight the internal evolutions

of social space and/or the influence of external factors. Our aim is to illustrate our

argument with the examples of transformations mentioned above and not to present

an exhaustive typology of possible configurations.

Yemen provides a good example of long-term evolutions of the social order,

which ultimately introduced tensions in the social space creating a structure of

opportunity taken advantage of by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Since the 1990s, the modes of tribal governance in Yemen have been deeply

reconfigured. The evolution of relations between the tribes and the central state was

among the major changes that took place during the three-decade-long Saleh

presidency. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, in a quest for political survival, sought to

neutralise the threatening influence of tribal chefs through a whole range of co-

opting strategies.51 As the majority of tribal chiefs no longer resided in their native

territories but in the capital Sana’a, they became detached from local realities and

more involved in national politics.52 The ‘neo-patronism’53 established by the Saleh

regime has led to the re-tribalisation of the political space in the country and the in-

egalitarian distribution of economic and political resources among the sheiks.54

Tribes’ anger towards their chiefs as well as the latter’s contempt for central

authority greatly contributed to the destabilisation of tribal governance that had

historically mitigated relations between the tribes and the central authority. This

restructuring created multiple internal tensions within the Yemeni social space,

manifested by a conflict-prone atmosphere.55 This trend was exacerbated when each

tribe attempted to put pressure on the central government56 leading to an array of

incidental alliances.57 As a matter of fact, the reappearance of AQAP in Yemen in

2006 was one of the consequences of the transformation process of the Yemeni

social space.58

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The case of Yemen illustrates one of the possible dynamics that alter social space

without challenging its frontiers. Other transformations, like the exacerbation of

generational cleavages, can produce even greater destabilising effects as the claims

of the younger generations can sow the seeds of contestation of the entire social

order. The degree of contestation as well as the types of mobilisation and resources

vary and this question merits an in-depth study that this article is unable to provide.

However, we do witness in most of the above-mentioned regions a deepening gap

between old and the new generations. The latter takes on new discourses and

practices and proves to be more open to external influences. We will use three

different contextual examples to better illustrate the attractiveness of new discourses

to young generations and, in turn, how this variable may account for the

transformation of social order.

In Tajikistan, several reports have demonstrated that younger generations have

taken more quickly to religion than members of the older one after the breakup of the

Soviet Union. In the absence of other social markers, the young used Islam, which

witnessed a revival in the public sphere at the end of the 1980s, as an instrument of

social distinction.59 Some openly expressed their rejection of traditional Islam and

its dictates.60 This challenged the traditional authority of customary laws. This

generational gap was highlighted by a conflict over the dress code. Saudi inspired

dress (niqab among others), which was prohibited by the government that perceived

it as a direct reflection of the rise of radical Islam, generated a symbolic conflict

regarding the role of religion in society. This weakened the traditional social order

that was accused of being corrupted by the Soviet experience.61 Today, several

illegal Islamist organisations, like Hizb ut-Tahrir62 and the Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan, draw on this young generation.

Similarly, the infiltration of jihadist groups into the Palestinian refugee camps in

Lebanon is best explained by looking at the decomposition of traditional

mechanisms of political socialisation. As Rougier argues, ‘They [jihadist

movements] were able to do so because the usual means of socialization were no

longer working, whether in the framework of the family, or in the political and

strategic framework of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)’.63

The inability of the PLO to provide channels for mobilisation in turn led to the

re-politicisation of the younger Palestinian generation and their integration to

informal transnational jihadist networks.

The generational variable is also influential in Niger where Al-Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been taking advantages of the transformation of tribal

systems and the persistence of the Tuareg ‘problem’64 to attract socially

disadvantaged youth to its cause. In the last decades, the Tuareg social system

and consequently its traditional social order, at the family and the clan level, have

been profoundly transformed. The failed disarmament process and the absence of

economic integration led to the Tuareg rebellion of 2007, which subsequently

opened up opportunities for AQIM to present itself as a social alternative to former

rebels. The attractiveness of the AQIM discourse and its resources has encouraged

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some young Tuareg to take up ambush activity and kidnappings in the name of the

jihadist organisation.65

Exogenous Factors and Shocks

Internal tensions of a given social space can also be indirect consequences of

external shocks. The latter is a large category that includes both events located

outside the established social space and the disruptive intervention of external

actors. Two examples might help us to further illustrate the significance of these

external-threatening influences on the social order and on the social space as a

whole. The first one focuses on the detrimental effects of the decade-long war in

Afghanistan on the Pakistani tribal zones. These regions, mostly populated by

Pashtun people and benefiting from a great degree of autonomy, have been gradually

transformed into military strongholds for the Afghan Taliban fleeing the deployment

of international troops. The successive offensives of the Pakistani army and the

activity of what has become known as the ‘Pakistani Taliban’ have profoundly

altered the social organisation of these areas. Hence, these groups mostly made up of

youth that do not possess an elevated status among the traditional tribal hierarchy

have aligned themselves with the Afghan Taliban and have become more and more

active in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These fighters have

brought with them a whole new set of resources and social references, which have

challenged the dominant social order and thus revamped the power relations in the

social space.66 This process has led to integration of new norms and marginalisation

of traditional institutions.

External interventions – and even more counterterrorism and counterinsurgency

activities – can also be a strong determinant of social order disequilibria. Indeed,

they often bring a completely new set of moral and material resources that directly

affect the social equilibrium that had been prevailing until then. The Somalian

example highlights the detrimental impact that external military interventions

can have on local insurgencies and the ‘parasite opportunities’ that arise for

transnational terrorist groups. As a matter of fact, the 2006 Ethiopian military

intervention paradoxically led to the consolidation of a new Jihadi agenda in the

country. Following the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union, the Somalian uprising

formed around the growing influence of the jihadist agenda, which was marginal up

to this point.67 This re-composition was coupled with the arrival of dozens of foreign

combatants68 leading to the radicalisation of the al-Shabaab movement. This trend

has been visible in both the movement’s discourse and practice, particularly with the

introduction of the suicide-bombing strategy. Internally, the moderate figures of the

movement have been marginalised by the radical elements thereby confirming the

ascendancy of the ideologically exogenous Al-Qaeda thinking over the al-Shabaab

movement.69

Strategies of Inducement and Resource Mobilisation

Internal disequilibria and external shocks cannot solely account for the above-

mentioned infiltrations. In fact, terrorist groups not only benefit from tensions

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produced by endogenous and exogenous factors, but they also follow their own

agenda and can adopt proactive strategies to create an opportunity where the

structure of opportunity does not exist. Gamson and Meyer remind us that for social

movements, ‘opportunities may shape or constrain movements but movements can

create their own opportunities’.70 These strategies necessitate the mobilisation of

various resources. This prompts an argument that the pragmatism of terrorist

movements allows them to create or expand the already existent structures of

opportunity. Once again, this article does not allow us to exhaustively examine the

multiplicity of strategies of inducement and resource mobilisation. Nonetheless, we

would like to draw attention to the convergence of various configurations on two

factors that influence the inducement game, namely the intertwined contests of

legitimisation and reciprocal instrumentalisation.

The use of symbolic references fosters an illusion of community belonging that

transcends the frontiers of social space. The jihadist discourse of Al-Qaeda has

become the ideological link between groups with diverging objectives. The jihadist

promise, circulated by professional preachers of jihad, former combatants71 or even

the Internet, can be easily absorbed by local actors who may be attracted by this type

of discourse. Several transnational terrorist groups do not hesitate to manipulate

local reference points. The rhetoric of the AQPA perfectly illustrates the use of

symbolic discourses to facilitate integration into the tribal dynamics.72 In the

Yemeni context, hospitality, more than a stereotype, incorporate a sense of strong

moral obligations. Consequently, the multiplication of the AQPA references to

‘honour’ (sharaf) and to tribal ‘hospitality’ (diyafa) is part of an intentional

symbolic message crafted for local audiences.73

Such symbolic types of resources remain extremely dependant on the local

context and the receptivity of local actors.74 Several examples have demonstrated the

hesitancy and resistance of local population that external actors sometimes face.

Following the outbreak of the Bosnian war, a contingent of about 4,000 Afghan

jihadist veterans attempted to infiltrate the conflict zone in hopes of extending

‘global jihad’. While providing logistical and financial support to the Bosnian

fighters, these volunteer combatants were not operating under the authority of the

7th brigade of Bosnian army to which they belonged.75 The failure of the fighters to

integrate themselves into the conflict led to Bosnia’s rejection of jihad,76 a direct

consequence of a symbolic divergence between resources mobilised by Bosnian

Islam and the jihad fantasy of Afghan volunteers.

Although symbolic resources are influential in the creation of imagined shared

references, they cannot override the lure of offers of financial and logistical support.

In Lebanon, Salafist groups managed to establish themselves in the Palestinian

refugee camps, thanks to their capacity to provide material resources (money, goods,

etc.) as well as immaterial resources (education, security, etc.) to local populations.77

In Chechnya, the alliance between the military leader Shamil Basayev and al-

Khattab, the jihadist of Saudi origin, was a result of a convergence of interests. Al-

Khattab was well connected in the jihadist universe; he also possessed

organisational experience and fund-raising ability, all of which made him a central

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figure in the Russo–Chechen conflicts.78 As noted by Johnston: ‘For militia leaders,

a key motivation behind the adoption of radical Islam and alliances with foreign

Islamists was that they provided significant resources to wage battle against the

Russians’.79

The mobilisation of logistical and financial resources was coupled with a

reciprocal legitimisation strategy. Al-Kattab’s marriage to a young Dagestani

woman allowed him to reinforce his connection to the region and the locals.80

The union signalled the arrival of this foreigner in the group and opened a cycle of

reciprocity involving different protagonists. The Chechen case illustrates the weight

of interpersonal relations and the manipulation of symbols in the long-term

anchoring of initially exogenous actors to the conflict. This example also highlights

the indirect influence that the foreign actors can have on internal power struggles in a

given social space and the re-composition of social order in the context of persistent

social instability. The logistical and financial aid provided by exogenous terrorist

groups often results in an aggravation of the power in-equilibrium that prevails in

any social space.

Similarly, the use of more radical strategies may seek to disrupt power

in-equilibrium and impose a form of social control over a large territory. Violence

per se is not always the strategy used by transnational terrorist groups to create a safe

haven. Negotiation and inducement are often preferred to achieve a specific

objective. Nonetheless, exogenous terrorist elements can support the recourse to

violence by local actors when they are seeking to transform the existing social order.

Violence consequently sustains two converging strategies: one of a transnational

terrorist group seeking to cement an alliance and its implantation; and one of local

actors attempting to impose new outlooks and new types of transactions in a social

space. Violence becomes an instrument of contestation of an established social order

and a tool for its restructuring.81 In Somalia, the use of violence was exploited by

elements of the al-Shabaab movement to reconfigure the social space to its liking.

By imposing a series of religious decrees (prohibition of qat, local religious

practices, sporting events, etc.)82 and multiplying the use of public corporal

punishments (amputations and flogging),83 al-Shabaab secured its social control

over local populations who could have questioned the legitimacy of the movement’s

use of violence in the long term.

CONCLUSION

This article, while constituting a preliminary reflection, suggests that a rethinking of

the safe haven concept around dimensions of social spaces governed in alternative

ways is necessary. In rejecting the state-centric interpretation of the concept as well

as the idea that certain territories can escape all sorts of social control, we formulate

a conceptual proposition that integrates into the analysis, complexity, diversity and

fluidity of interactions. The development of a socio-political approach allows us to

develop not only a better understanding of micro-dynamics of these spaces, but also

of the strategies used by transnational terrorist organisations.

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The notion of social space constitutes a gateway for comprehending the

framework in which interactions between local and external actors take place and

the constraints that these outside forces face. The weight of social hierarchies, the

types of domination that constitute social order in each of the spaces provide as

many obstacles as opportunities for terrorist organisations. In fact, the high degree of

fragmentation that characterises these hierarchies multiplies the possible areas of

contestation in a social space from within as well as the possibilities of infiltration

for the groups. Mobilisation of inducement strategies based on common reference

points and the provision of symbolic and material resources possess an undoubtedly

significant power of attraction for local actors seeking to expand their struggle.

However, these strategies gain utility only if the external actors have access to an

intermediary or an audience among the tribal chiefs, the military chiefs or any other

authority figure. These exogenous forces have also demonstrated their ability to

infiltrate local dynamics. The interpersonal dimension is a central figure of this

process, which explains its surrounding incertitude. The relations between different

actors remain defined by the internal power relations governing social space.

These initial reflections on the subject discussed in this article need to be

empirically tested in a more systematic manner. Moreover this study left several

questions unexplored: the translation at the local levels of this articulation of ideas,

interests and roles; and the influence of resource redistribution in the evolution of

power relations, etc. They also open up other avenues for research: that of possible

re-compositions of social spaces (resistance vs. transformation), of conflicting

strategies within the social space and the hybridisation of terrorist groups torn

between their global frames of reference and the local realities.84 This first step,

nonetheless, allows us to draw several preliminary observations. In particular, it

attracts attention to the vague conception of regions labelled as safe havens and

frequently presented as ungoverned or under-governed. Even though the types of

social control vary from those in western societies, they are no less structuring. This

social component frequently ignored up to now in the formulation of

counterterrorism strategies deserves particular attention since it is one of the most

significant interconnected tactics used by transnational groups like Al-Qaeda. By

ignoring the constraining micro-dynamics that exogenous actors must face, today’s

practices envision terrorist tactics as an utter caricature of their modern fluid state.

This social component also accounts for the resilience of terrorist movements and

their adaptation capabilities to unexplored social realities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are tremendously grateful to Elena Mizrokhi who did a wonderful job of translating this paper fromFrench to English.

NOTES

1. ‘Obama Declared End to War on Terror’, AFP 23 Jan. 2009.

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2. See, for example, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation onthe Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, The White House, 1 Dec. 2009; Office of the Press

Secretary, ‘Remarks of John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and

Counterterrorism, on Ensuring al-Qa’ida’s Demise’, The White House, 29 Jun. 2010.3. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘Terrorist Safe Havens’, Country Reports on

Terrorism 2010 (Washington: US Department of State 2010), online at ,www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/

2010/170262.htm., accessed 13 Sep. 2011.4. Michael A. Innes, ‘Terrorist Sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Challenging Conventional

Assumptions’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28/4 (2005) pp.295–305; Richard Jackson,

‘Critical Reflections on Counter-Sanctuary Discourse’ in Michael A. Innes (ed.) Denial of Sanctuary:

Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (Westport, CT: Praeger 2007) pp.21–33; Michael A. Innes,‘Deconstructing Political Orthodoxies on Insurgent and Terrorist Sanctuaries’, Studies in Conflict &

Terrorism 31/3 (2008) pp.251–67.5. Our argument draws on work by Clunan and Trinkunas. Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas,

‘Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces’ in Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds) Ungoverned

Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford: Stanford UP2010) pp.17–33.

6. In the sense of Robert Cox for who the term ‘critical’ means ‘not tak(ing) institutions and socialpower relations for granted but call(ing) them into question. [. . .] Critical theory is directed to the

social and the political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts’ – Robert W. Cox, ‘SocialForces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of

International Studies 10/2 (1981) p.129.7. On these debates and on the multiple definitions on the term ‘terrorism’, see Alex Schmid (ed.),

The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge 2011) pp.39–157.8. Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen Smyth, Terrorism: A Critical

Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2011) p.113.9. Charles Tilly, ‘Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists’, Sociological Theory 22/1 (2004) pp.5–13.

10. Francis T. Miko, Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S.

Policy (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 2004); see alsoCountry Reports on Terrorism released every year by the US Department of State, online at ,www.

state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/index.htm., accessed 13 Sep. 2011.11. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (note 3).12. The term ‘radical pan-Islamism’ designates an ideological framework which makes the defence of the

Muslim ummah the main drivers of the armed struggle (jihad), be it local or global. See ThomasHegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979 (Cambridge: CUP 2010)

p.6.13. Chuck Hagel, ‘A Republican Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs 83/4 (2004) pp.64–76.14. Michael A. Innes, ‘Cracks in the System: Sanctuary and Terrorism after 9/11’ in Michael A. Innes

(ed.) Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (Westport, CT: Praeger 2007)pp.8–10.

15. National Security Council, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington

DC: The White House 2002), online at ,http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/

index.html., accessed 13 Sep. 2011; Francis T. Miko (note 10) pp.19–20.16. Stuart Eizenstat, John E. Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein, ‘Rebuilding Weak States’, Foreign Affairs

84/1 (2005) pp.134–46; Condoleezza Rice, ‘The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting

Freedom is the Only Realistic Path to Security’, Washington Post 11 Dec. 2005; Condoleezza Rice,‘Transformational Diplomacy’, Speech to Georgetown University, 18 Jan. 2006.

17. James A. Piazza, ‘Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote TransnationalTerrorism?’ International Studies Quarterly 52/3 (2008) pp.469–88; Peter Tikuisis, ‘On the

Relationship Between Weak States and Terrorism’, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and PoliticalAggression 1/1 (2009) pp.66–79; Dipak K. Gupta, Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence

(London: Routledge 2008) pp.70–1.18. Michael A. Innes, ‘Terrorist Sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Challenging Conventional

Assumptions’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28/4 (2005) pp.295–305.19. Edward Newman, ‘Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence 19/4

(2007) pp.463–88; Aidan Hehir, ‘The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to

the Conventional Wisdom’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1/3 (2007) pp.307–32.

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20. Cristiana C. Brafman Kittner, ‘The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism’, Terrorism and

Political Violence 19/3 (2007) pp.307–29.21. Rem Korteweg, ‘Black Holes: On Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental Weakness’, Civil Wars

10/1 (2008) pp.60–71.22. Innes, ‘Deconstructing Political Orthodoxies’ (note 4).23. Jeroen Gunning, ‘Social Movement Theory and the Study of Terrorism’ in Richard Jackson, Marie

Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning (eds) Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda

(London: Routledge 2009) pp.156–77.24. Ken Menkhaus and Jacob N. Shapiro, ‘Non-State Actors and Failed States: Lessons From the

Al-Qaeda’s Experiences in the Horn of Africa’ in Cluman and Trinkunas (note 5) pp.77–94; Ken

Menkhaus, ‘Quasi-States, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens’, Journal of Conflicts Studies

22/2 (2003) pp.3–21; Brian Glynn Williams, ‘The Failure of al Qaeda Basing Projects from

Afghanistan to Iraq’ in Michael A. Innes (ed.) Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe

Havens (Westport, CT: Praeger 2007) pp.49–67; Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam

(London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. 2006) pp.237–53.25. Pierre Clastes, Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology (New York: Zone Books

1989); James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast

Asia (Yale: Yale UP 2009).26. Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP

1975).27. Bertrand Badie, The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order (Stanford, CA:

Stanford UP 2000).28. Cluman and Trinkunas (note 5) p.23.29. Elham M. Manea, ‘La tribu et l’Etat au Yemen’ (‘The Tribe and the State in Yemen’) in Mondher

Kilani (ed.) Islam et Changement Social (Islam and Social Change) (Lausanne: Editions Payot 1998)

pp.205–18, available in English online at ,www.al-bab.com/yemen/soc/manea1.htm., accessed

13 Sept. 2011.30. Daniel Corstange, Tribes and the Rule of Law in Yemen, Paper presented at the Annual Conference of

the Middle East Studies Association, Washington, 22–25 Nov. 2008; For more details on customary

or tribal law (‘urf) in Yemen see Rashad al-‘Alımı and Baudoin Dupret ‘Le droit coutumier dans la

societe yemenite: nature et developpement’ (Customary Law in Yemen: Nature and Development)

Chroniques Yemenites, vol. 9 (2001).31. Simon Haddad, ‘Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Terrorist Organization’, Studies in Conflict

& Terrorism 33/6 (2010) p.551.32. Jutta Bakonyi and Kirsti Stuvøy, ‘Violence and Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia and Angola’,

Review of African Political Economy 32/104 (2005) p.364.33. The teip is a basic tribal organisation in Chechnya.34. K. H. Ibragimov, Sedoj Kavkaz, vol. I (Moscow: GPU 2001) p.84.35. Yaacov Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union from the Second World War to Gorbachev (New York:

Columbia UP 2000) p.663; S. Umarov, ‘Muridism at Home’, Nauki i religii 10 Oct. 1979, pp.30–2 in

The Current Digest of the Soviet Press XXXII/1, 6 Feb. 1980, p.9.36. On the concept of mediated state strategy see Ken Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government in

Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping’, International Security 31/3 (2006/07)

pp.74–106.37. Ty L. Groth, ‘A Fortress Without Walls: Alternative Governance Structures on the Afghan-Pakistan

Frontier’ in Cluman and Trinkunas (eds) (note 5) pp.95–112.38. Julian Schofield, ‘Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of the Pakistan-Afghan

Confrontation’, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 17/1 (2011) pp.6–8.39. Sarah Phillips, Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective. Patronage and Pluralized

Authoritarianism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2008) p.4.40. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley:

University Press of California 1986) p.25.41. Our conceptualisation of social space differs from that of Bourdieusian field for it neither possesses a

sufficient degree of objectification, nor an adequate degree of structuring. See, for instance, Pierre

Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press 1992) p.101. Our conceptualisation also differs from the sociological notion of networks, such

as defined by Manuel Castells, because of their logics of inclusion or exclusion that acknowledge only

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for social cleavages. See Manuel Castells, The Rise of Networked Society (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell2000).

42. Lilian Mathieu, ‘L’espace des mouvements sociaux’ (‘The space of social movements’), Politix 20/77(2007) pp.131–51.

43. Anthony Giddens, ‘Agency, Institution, and Time-Space Analysis’ in Karin Knorr-Cetina and AaronV. Cicourel (eds) Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Towards Integration of Micro andMacro Sociologies (Boston and London: Routledge 1981) p.169.

44. Norbert Elias, What is Sociology? (New York: Columbia University Press 1978) p.75.45. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: The Study of Social Order (Cambridge: CUP 1989).46. Norbert Elias, ‘The Retreat of Sociologists into the Present’, Theory, Culture & Society 4/2–3 (1987)

pp.223–47.47. Charles Tilly, Identities, Boundaries & Social Ties (London: Paradigm Publishers 2005) p.17.48. Dustin Dehez and Gebrewold Belachew, ‘When Things Fall Apart: Conflict Dynamics and an Order

Beside the State in Postcollapse Somalia’, African Security 3/1 (2010) p.2.49. We here consider the structures of opportunities as a form of social temporalities. As such, we diverge

from its more traditional conceptualisation presented in the literature on social movements. See DougMcAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements:Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: CUP 1996).

50. The notion of ‘sensitivity’ is introduced by Dobry. Michel Dobry, Sociologie des crises politiques(Sociology of Political Crises) (Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po 2009) p.35.

51. April Longley Alley, ‘The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen’, The MiddleEast Journal 64/3 (2010) pp.385–409.

52. Paul Dresch, ‘The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni Crisis’ in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (ed.) The Yemen War Ofthe 1994: Causes and Consequences (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies andResearch 1995).

53. Phillips (note 39) p.91.54. Alley (note 51) p.396.55. The number of tribal conflicts dramatically increased between 2001 and 2005 (35 tribal conflicts),

compared with last periods: 1996–2000 (22 tribal conflicts) and 1991–1995 (14 tribal conflicts). See‘Yemen: Tribal Conflict Management Program Research Report’, National Democratic Institute forInternational Affairs (Mar. 2007); Nadwa al-Dawsari, Nabeel Khoury, and Cristopher Boucek,‘Tribal Conflict and Resolution in Yemen’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace(March 2010), online at ,www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa¼eventDetail&id¼2832.,accessed 13 Sep. 2011.

56. Yemeni tribes usually use two strategies of pressure to force the central authorities to political,cultural or financial concessions: the kidnapping of foreigners and the attacks of governmental and oilinfrastructures. Moneer Al-Omari, ‘History of Foreigners’ Kidnapping in Yemen’, Yemen Post 10Apr. 2010.

57. Well before the birth of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, some Yemeni tribes concluded temporaryalliances with terrorist groups. In December 1998, a tribe originated from the Bani Dabyan districtparticipated in the kidnapping of 16 tourists by the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army.

58. Allistair Harris, ‘Exploiting Grievances Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’, Yemen: On the Brink,Carnegie Paper Series, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program 111(2010).

59. We use here the term ‘social distinction’ in a Bourdieusian perspective; see Pierre Bourdieu,Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (London: Routledge 1984).

60. Saodat Olimova, ‘La jeunesse du Tadjikistan face a l’islam et a l’islamisme’ (The Tajik Youth, theIslam and the Islamism), Translated from Russian by Habiba Fathi, Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 15/16(2007) pp.196–222.

61. For more detail on Islam and traditional social orders in Tajikistan during the post-soviet period seeA. Niiazi and S. Lang, ‘Islam in Tajikistan’, Anthropology and Archaeology of Eurasia 36/2 (1997)pp.39–44.

62. Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’,Nationalities Papers 34/1 (2006) pp.1–20.

63. Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam Among Palestinians in Lebanon(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2007) p.276.

64. Gregoire Emmanuel, Touaregs du Niger, le destin d’un mythe (Touaregs in Niger: The Destiny of aMyth), 2nd edition (Paris: Editions Karthala 2010) pp.324–31.

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65. Interview with Maurice Feund, ‘Niger: C’est une entree en guerre qui se dessine’ (Niger: TheBeginning of a War is Looming), Rue 89, 22 Sep. 2010; Interview with Idebir Ahmed, ‘Le Saharaalgerien est tres convoite. . .’ (The Algerian Sahara is Coveted), El Watan 11 Oct. 2010.

66. Mariam Abou Zahab, ‘Frontieres dans la tourmente: une Talibanisation des Zones Tribales’(Borders in Turmoil: The Talibanisation of the Tribal Areas), Outre-Terre 1/24 (2010) pp.337–57.

67. Markus Virgil Hoehne, ‘Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped toProduce Militant Islamism’, Crisis in the Horn of Africa, SSRC (17 Dec. 2009).

68. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853,United Nations Security Council, S/2010/91 (March 2010) p.14.

69. International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia’s Divided Islamists’, Africa Briefing, issue no. 74 (18 May2010).

70. William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, ‘Framing Political Opportunity’ in McAdam et al. (note 49)p.277.

71. Clinton Watts, ‘Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: What Foreign Fighter Data Reveals About the Futureof Terrorism’, Small Wars Journal 17 Apr. 2008.

72. Sarah Phillips, ‘What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building’, CarnegiePaper Series, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, issue no. 107(March 2010).

73. ‘Al Qaeda Leader Urge Tribes to Fight Government’, Biyokulule Online 20 Feb. 2009, online at,www.biyokulule.com/view_content.php?articleid¼1755., accessed 13 Sep. 2011.

74. See the seminal article by Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem ofEmbeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology 91/3 (1985) pp.481–510.

75. Kepel (note 24) p.250.76. Ibid. pp.237–53.77. Tine Gade, Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon: Between Global and Local Jihad (Kjeller: Norwegian

Defence Research Establishment [FFI] 2007) p.44.78. Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, ‘Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical

Assessment’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31/5 (2008) p.417.79. Hank Johnston, ‘Ritual, Strategy, and Deep Culture in the Chechen National Movement’,

Critical Studies on Terrorism 1/3 (2008) p.335.80. Tom de Waal, ‘Khatab: Islamic Revolutionary’, BBC News 30 Sept. 1999.81. William Reno, ‘Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups’, Civil Wars 9/4 (2007) p.325.82. Roland Marchal, ‘A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab’, Journal of Eastern

African Studies 3/3 (2009) p.389.83. Report ‘Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government and

AMISOM in Somalia’, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 2010).84. Thomas Hegghammer published one of the first reflections of the hybridisation of jihadist groups.

See, Thomas Hegghammer, ‘The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups’, Current Trends inIslamist Ideology: Volume 9 (New York: Hudson Institute 2009).

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by [

190.

27.7

8.20

2] a

t 17:

11 0

5 M

arch

201

3