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Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy

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Page 1: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

Campaigns and Elections

History and Strategy

Page 2: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

I. History

A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations and friendly papers do the work.

Page 3: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

1. Campaigns are Personal and Ugly (1800 example)

Jefferson: Adams has a “hideous hermaphroditical character, which has neither the force and firmness of a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman”

– Jefferson hires a “hatchet man” for his worst slurs. James Callendar. He alleges Adams is bent on war with France

– Callendar is imprisoned for slander under Adams– Jefferson fails to aid him upon release Callendar reveals

Jefferson’s affair with his slave Sally Hemings Pro-Adams papers:

– Jefferson is “a mean-spirited, low-lived fellow, the son of a half-breed Indian squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto father.”

– “Murder, robbery, rape, adultery, and incest will all be openly taught and practiced”

Page 4: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

2. “Ads” are editorials and editorial cartoons

Example: Divine intervention saves America from Jefferson’s tyranny

Page 5: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

B. Symbolic Politics, 1828-1860

1. Symbols useful for personalized campaigns – reflect personality traits

2. Also useful when illiteracy is widespread

3. Origins: Jackson’s campaign of 1828 (Old Hickory).

a. Jackson learns from failure to campaign in 1824, mobilizes mass support

b. Characterized by de-emphasis of issue positions (Jackson refuses to render opinion on Adams economic policies) 1828 might be most negative campaign in history

Page 6: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

c. Mudslinging in 1828: Adams Targets Jackson

One Adams paper: “General Jackson's mother was a common prostitute, brought to this country by the British soldiers! She afterward married a mulatto man, with whom she had several children, of which number General Jackson is one!”

Jackson accused of murder for ordering execution of six militiamen for desertion in War of 1812

Jackson accused of adultery and his wife of bigamy (her divorce may not have been final when she married Jackson)

Page 7: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

1828: Adams Campaign Song: Jackson = “Plague and Pestilence”

“Little Know Ye Who’s Comin’” Sample lines:

– Fire's comin', swords is comin',– Pistols, guns and knives is comin',– Famine's comin', bannin's comin',– If John Quincy not be comin'!– Slavery's comin', knavery's comin‘…– Tears are comin', fears are comin',– Plague and pestilence is comin',– Hatin's comin’, Satan's comin‘…

So wonderfully (horribly) negative it was covered by band Piñataland for use against Bush in 2004

Page 8: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

d. 1828: Jackson Strikes Back

Rumor: Adams, while serving as American ambassador to Russia, had procured an American girl for the sexual services of the Russian czar Jackson men call Adams a “pimp”

Adams charged with using government money to buy a billiard table for his own amusement (he bought it himself)

Page 9: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

4. 1840: Log Cabin and Hard Cider

Memorabilia: Hundreds of objects (ribbons and postcards) emphasize log cabin

Page 10: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

5. Issues Overtake Symbolsa. 1848: Free Soil Campaigns against Slavery

(Campaign songs commonly set to well-known tunes like Yankee Doodle or Auld Lang Syne)

Note: VP candidate is son of Pres JQ Adams, son of Pres Adams

Page 11: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

b. 1856: Last Gasp of the Whigs: Fillmore (W) between Fremont (R) and Buchanan (D)

Page 12: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

c. Republicans vs. Democrats: The Slavery Issue

1856: “Clear the Tracks” (Republican song about Fremont – refers to Kansas violence)

1860: “The Flag of Liberty” (Patriotism associated with policies to “break oppression’s chain”)

Page 13: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations
Page 14: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

C. Politics of Division, 1860-1892

Symbols now = Issues.

1. 1860 and 1864 – focus on Union

Page 15: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

2. “Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion” 1868-1892

a. “Waving the Bloody Shirt:” Republicans criticize Democrats as party of treason (Rebellion).

1868 Grant slogan: “Vote as You Shot”

Page 16: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

1868: Anti-Democratic

Cartoons

Page 17: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

1868: Democrats run on white power

Sample lyrics (sung to Auld Lang Syne)

– Let, then, all freeborn patriots,

– Join with a brave intent – To vindicate our Father’s

choice, – “A white man’s

Government.”

Page 18: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

1876: Robert Ingersoll Reminds Listeners of Democratic Treason

Speech to Union veterans of Civil War in Indianapolis“Every ordinance of secession that was drawn was drawn by a Democrat. Every man that endeavored to tear the old flag from the heaven that it enriches was a Democrat. Every man that tried to destroy this nation was a Democrat. Every enemy this great Republic has had for twenty years has been a Democrat. Every man that shot Union soldiers was a Democrat. Every man that denied to the Union prisoners even the worm-eaten crust of famine, and when some poor, emaciated Union patriot, driven to insanity by famine, saw in an insane dream the face of his mother, and she beckoned him and he followed, hoping to press her lips once again against his fevered face, and when he stepped one step beyond the dead line the wretch that put the bullet through his loving, throbbing heart was and is a Democrat. Every man that loved slavery better than liberty was a Democrat. The man that assassinated Abraham Lincoln was a Democrat. Every man that sympathized with the assassin — every man glad that the noblest President ever elected was assassinated, was a Democrat. Every man that wanted the privilege of whipping another man to make him work for him for nothing and pay him with lashes on his naked back, was a Democrat. Every man that raised bloodhounds to pursue human beings was a Democrat. Every man that clutched from shrieking, shuddering, crouching mothers, babes from their breasts, and sold them into slavery, was a Democrat. … Soldiers, every scar you have on your heroic bodies was given you by a Democrat. Every scar, every arm that is lacking, every limb that is gone, is a souvenir of a Democrat. I want you to recollect it.”

Page 19: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

b. Democrat-Catholic alliance (Romanism)

Anti-immigrant sentiment in general, plus Opposition of pro-Republican English-

American families to Ireland, plus Dislike of Midwestern Protestants for

Catholicism Led to Irish-Democrat alliance.

Republicans run anti-Catholic and anti-Irish campaigns

Page 20: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations
Page 21: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

Fear of Immigration, 1884

Page 22: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

c. Prohibition issue (Rum)

Connected to Irish issue (stereotyping) National Prohibition Party established but

fails (Republicans simply shift to incorporate issue)

1880-1890: Wave of state anti-saloon laws (issue more potent locally than nationally)

Page 23: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

3. Machine Politics and the Issue of Character

a. Republicans vs. Liberal Republicans: The debate over civil service reform (see 1876 in Election Day)

b. 1884: Liberal Republicans support the Democrat Cleveland. Unusually competitive election dirtiest campaign of 19th century

i. Cleveland: “Public Office is a Public Trust” (implies opponent is corrupt)

Page 24: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

ii. Cleveland’s Sex Scandal

Cleveland believed to have fathered child with well-known prostitute.

Accepts responsibility

Republican chant: “Ma, Ma, where’s my Pa?”

Page 25: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

iii. Blaine’s Railroad Scandal

Blaine wrote letters during scandal implying he took money for railroad contracts. Last sentence of one letter = “Burn this letter.”

Democratic chant: – “Blaine, Blaine, James G. Blaine! The

continental liar from the state of Maine,

Burn this letter!”

Page 26: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

iv. Denouement: The battle for New York

Blaine fails to immediately disavow “Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion” slogan Irish voters turn to Cleveland

New York World publishes exaggerated depictions of Blaine feasting at Republican dinner while country is in depression

Blaine loses New York by 1149 votes

Page 27: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

v. The Sequel: Dirty Tricks Unseat Cleveland in 1888

Cleveland vulnerable in New York's sizable Irish community after his administration negotiated a fisheries treaty with the British Empire (hated by the Irish) Cross-pressured voters!

Republican George Osgoodby sent a letter to the British ambassador to the United States under the pretense that he was a British expatriate named Charles Murchison who wanted to know which candidate would best "favor England's interests."

Ambassador endorses Cleveland Republicans use “Murchison Letter” to drive a wedge between Cleveland and Irish voters

Page 28: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

5. Publicity stunts and technology

Edison’s gramophone allows recorded speeches and campaign songs.

Cleveland 1892: Publicity stunt only (few own gramophones, which are unsuitable for mass listening anyway)

Player piano rolls and cylinders of popular campaign songs become common

Page 29: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

D. Populism and Progressivism (1896-1920)

1. Republicans back away from support for civil rights (support for Plessy vs. Ferguson) race issue loses salience for white voters

2. Economic issues and social reforms gain prominence

3. The 1896 Campaign: Free Silver vs. the Full Dinner Pail and the “front porch” strategy -- See Election Day for context

4. Significant foreign policy differences re-emerge by 1900

Page 30: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations
Page 31: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

E. Origins of Polls and Paid Advertisements (1924-1948)

1. Literary Digest polla. Begun as publicity stunt in 1920, proves remarkably

accurate (within 1% in 1932)b. Fails miserably in 1936: Predicts landslide for

Landon (55 to 41) when real outcome is landslide for Roosevelt (61 to 37) – 20% error!

c. Why did it fail? Non-representative sample (automobile registrations and telephone books) and voluntary response (2.3 million out of 10 million)

d. Why did it work for so long? Remarkable consensus and stability in electorate…

Page 32: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

2. Gallup and Scientific Polling

a. Gallup predicts Roosevelt victory with smaller sample (about 2000 vs. 2.3 million)

b. Gallup also correctly predicts the Literary Digest prediction before the postcards are counted!

c. Method = quota polling (trying to ensure sample matches proportions in population)

d. Major failure in 1948: Quota polling replaced with random sampling (still used today)

Page 33: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

3. Origins of Mass Media Campaigns

a. Factors affecting print political advertising: Increased magazine circulation, national newspapers, news magazines (Time founded in 1923), mass literacy

Page 34: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

Roosevelt turns the “Full Dinner Pail” against Republicans, 1932:

Page 35: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

b. Local campaigns focus on local issues (diminished party control)

Example: Anti-Japanese racism in California, 1924

Page 36: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

c. Use of Motion Pictures Only way to see a candidate speak or watch an event unfold 1920: “Candidate” Coolidge makes the first political “talkie” 1934: MGM runs fake “California Election News” newsreels

against Upton Sinclair in California governor’s race

Page 37: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

d. The Effect of Radio First convention covered by radio in 1924 National networks emerge from 1926-1927 Radio ownership (households):

– 4.7% in 1924– 27.5% in 1928– 60% in 1932

First paid political spots: President Calvin Coolidge spends more than $100,00 to broadcast his speeches in 1924

First national political spots: 1928 (52 hours by Democrats, 43 hours by Republicans)

1932: Democrats use same amount, but Republicans increase to 72 hours!

Page 38: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

1928 ad for Zenith radio touts convention coverage!

Page 39: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

1932: Republicans increase air time to 72 hours – and lose

Hoover discovers that style matters as much as substance when he angers listeners by speaking too long

Example: Tuesday, October 4, at 8:30 P.M. Speech lasts far more than the expected hour:

– “(At 9:30) listeners confidently awaited the President’s concluding words. Confidently and also impatiently, for at 9:30 … Mr. Ed Wynn comes on the air. But Mr. Hoover had only arrived at point 2 of his 12-point program. The populace shifted in its myriad seats; wives looked at husbands; children allowed to remain up until 10 o’clock on Tuesdays looked in alarm at the clock; 20,000 votes shifted to Franklin Roosevelt. At 9:45, Mr. Hoover had arrived at point four; two million Americans switched off their instruments and sent their children to bed weeping.” – The Nation

Page 40: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

Roosevelt: Master of Radio

Roosevelt addresses audience intimately (aware that people listen to radio in small groups, not huge crowds)

“Fireside chats”

Page 41: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

F. Dawn of the Television Age

1. 1948: Coverage of conventions (although few own televisions). 3 of 4 conventions held in Philadelphia to enable widest TV coverage.

2. Truman prepares 1-minute spot in 1948, but Dewey sees advertising as undignified ignoring advice of consultants

Page 42: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

3. 1952: TV is undignified…but effective

"The idea that you can merchandise candidates for high office like breakfast cereal is the ultimate indignity to the democratic process."– Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson, 1956

Eisenhower has a product jingle in 1952…and wins!

Page 43: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

Print ads remain important for years

1952

Page 44: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

4. Putting It All Together: Political Consultants

1948: Truman hires PR firm to manage his flagging campaign. Combination of ads, whistle-stop campaign, publicity stunts (TV coverage), and consistent message (“do-nothing Congress”) lead to victory

Other campaigns emulate Truman’s success, adding more sophisticated techniques over time

Page 45: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

II. Modern Campaign Strategy

A. Strategy = Overall plan for victory. Determines:

– Who: the voters you need to win

– Why: the reasons they will vote for you

– What: the unifying message to address them

– How: acquiring resources to campaign

Page 46: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

B. District Analysis: What are the odds?

1. Voting patterns: Which party dominates and why?

a. Neither: District is competitive

b. Loyalty: One party is favored. Capturing voters will require de-emphasizing party and emphasizing ideology

c. Ideology: One ideology is favored. Candidate ideology must adapt in response.

Page 47: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

2. Demographics: Which groups will be critical?

a. Noncompetitive groups – Mobilize or Suppressb. Nonvoting groups – Ignore (especially relevant in

primary elections)c. Competitive voting groups – Persuade

i. Hillygus & Shields – who is competitive and how to persuade them is most of the book!

ii. Figure 4.1: even highly cross-pressured partisans usually remain loyal

iii. Figures 4.2 and 4.3: characteristics of voter (attentiveness, awareness) more important than campaign visits in 2004, but opposite true in 2000 how do we know when “persuasion” is more important than simply getting people to pay attention?

Page 48: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

C. Issue Analysis: Comparing Assets and Liabilities

1. Mobilization issues: Increase or decrease base turnout. (May also affect vote choice of swing voters Hillygus & Shields argue that 2004 “mobilization” issues were really “wedge” issues)

2. Wedge issues: Create a gap between opposition candidate and swing voters or “persuadable partisans” (pro-opposition leaners)

3. Policy issues: Problem/blame and solution/promise format

Page 49: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

4. Issues from 2004 (Hillygus & Shields survey data)

Three types of issues– Mobilization Issues: Economy, Iraq War, War on

Terror, Tax Cuts, Trade mostly economy/security issues

– Wedge Issues: Faith-Based Initiatives, School Prayer, Abortion, Prescription Drug Imports, Gay Marriage mostly “social values” issues

– Policy Issues: Few “neutral” policy dilemmas Is this why politicians don’t focus on “key

issues” or “real solutions” instead of “symbolic issues?”

Page 50: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

D. The Message1. The need for themes of support and opposition

a. Self-definition: One word or phrase to summarize reason for campaign. Examples: Clinton 1992 = change, Bush 1992 = “family values,” Bush 2004 = 9/11, Obama 2008 = change, McCain 2008 = patriotism change

b. Opposition: one word or phrase to summarize opponent; reinforce with issue ads and character ads. Examples: Bush I = “out of touch,” Dole = desperate, Bush II = dumb, Gore = liar, Kerry = flip-flop, Obama = elitist, McCain = “four more years”

Page 51: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

2. The need for repetition: Choices within the message

a. People remember very little from ads or news stories. Facts help imprint message, but won’t be recalled later.

b. Repeating the same facts bores people (voters become accustomed to highs/lows)

c. Solution: Reinforce the basic (often unstated) message with multiple examples (Opposition: Bush saying dumb things, Gore lying, Kerry shifting positions, etc)

d. Goal = voters remember/agree with the basic criticism (filter future news through that lens)

Page 52: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

3. Targeting the Message

a. Microtargeting: Communicating different messages to different voters. H&S link this to pre-TV campaigns and argue it made a resurgence in the 1990s.

b. Question: Has the Internet made this harder (because message can be retransmitted by others) or easier (because users self-select into narrow forums)?

c. Method: Personal visits matter more than ads (see H&S)

Page 53: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

4. Limits of the message

a. Candidates don’t control agenda – news organizations and interest groups raise “off-message” issues that can become critical

b. Negative message sticks better than positive message – i.e. easier to define opponent than self

Page 54: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

E. Fundraising: It’s hard for a beginner

1. Major donor approach: Need to establish credibility; hard money goes to winners

2. Issue organizations: Need credibility AND compatible policy positions (danger of extremism compared to electorate)

3. Direct mail and Telemarketing: Administrative costs eat up much of the money

4. Grassroots: Takes a great deal of candidate time and attention. Possible selling point in ads.

Page 55: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

04 06 08

Page 56: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations
Page 57: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

F. Building the Machine

1. Campaign manager (scheduling, coordination)

2. Consultants (strategy, polling and research)

3. Media relations

4. Foot Soldiers: Mass of employees or volunteers to spread the message, create signs, make phone calls, solicit donations, etc.

Page 58: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

III. Campaign TacticsA. Opposition research

1. Small campaigns: Read through minutes or Congressional record, news appearances, public records (FOIA)

2. Large campaigns: Permanent surveillance, interviews with past acquaintances

3. Most important skill: Convincing the media to use the information

4. Most opposition research done prior to campaign: need for steady dribble of damage (so scandals don’t crowd each other out – each piece of information must get full airing in media)

5. If tide turns in media, respond with new leak before public realizes old one was false (causes old one to leave front page)

Page 59: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

B. Polling

1. Interpreting Pollsa. Sample size – Generally less important than

random selection/representativeness. Larger sample = smaller…

b. Margin of error – Given laws of probability and assumptions about respondents (normal distribution), likely range of true value

c. Confidence level – Typically 95% confidence that true value is within margin of error.

Page 60: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

Example: Bush job approval

Page 61: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

2. Which polls can be trusted?

Page 62: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations
Page 63: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

Error vs. Bias: Compare Clinton

Fox over-estimated Bush popularity, Zogby underestimated Bush popularity

Was this political bias? Estimates of Clinton popularity

Page 64: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

3. Polling Techniques

a. Internal polls: Used to measure message penetration, allocate resources

b. Manipulation of Polls: Selective publication of internal polls or slanted wording in order to generate “momentum” (remember: big money bets on winners – and so do voters!)

Page 65: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

c. Tracking Polls Same question asked many times, often with overlapping

samples. Generally considered less reliable (smaller samples, high

volatility)

Page 66: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

d. Push Polls: “Polls” in Name Only

Method: Voter gets a call, ostensibly from a polling company, asking which candidate the voter supports. If the voter supports the “wrong” candidate, then the pollster asks whether voter would still support candidate if they knew… (insert rumor or allegation here)

Response irrelevant: Voter exposed to charges

Page 67: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

Two examples in McCain races

Vs. McCain in the South Carolina Republican Primary, 2000:– The McCains adopted a Bangladeshi girl from

Mother Theresa’s orphanage.– Anonymous opponents (usually assumed to be

Bush surrogates) used "push polling" to ask would-be supporters if they would be more or less likely to vote for McCain if they knew was the father of an illegitimate child who was Black

Page 68: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

Two examples in McCain races

Vs. Obama in Swing States, 2008– “Republican Jewish Coalition” sponsors poll

whish asks Jewish Obama supporters if they would support him knowing that

• He is a Muslim (false)• He funded the PLO (false)• He was endorsed by Hamas (true – although Obama

condemned the group)

Page 69: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

C. Media Relations

1. Spin Control – Instantaneous response to attacks (before uncontested attack gets on the air). Slow response = no response since story fades from view over time.

Page 70: Campaigns and Elections History and Strategy. I. History A. The non-candidate (1792-1824): Early candidates considered it unseemly to “campaign.” Organizations

2. Debates

a. Debating acknowledges equality – Leading candidates usually refuse

b. Debates are rarely debates – candidates write the rules, fear off-script moments

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c. Development

1960: TV vs. radio (impressions of Nixon) 1976 (next debate):

Ford offends East Europeans and Cold Warriors 1980, 1984: Development of sound-bites 1988: Vice-Presidential debate and the

overly-rational Dukakis 1992: Three-way format creates new rules, tactics 2000, 2004: Rules limit spontaneity; ratings

decline

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Do Debates Matter?

Not to partisans or people with strong opinions

Nonpartisans and less-informed voters are affected

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Key to successful speeches is media coverage

Incumbents have edge because they can issue policy changes

Candidates now filter crowds (i.e. only Bush supporters allowed to attend his speeches)

3. Public Events

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4. Investigative Journalism: Don’t Count On It

a. Most notable investigative reports are “seeded” by campaigns (e.g. Dukakis undermines Biden in 1988 primaries)

b. Media focus: Horse-Race stories

i. 45% of campaign news stories focus on horse-race/strategy

ii. 29% focus on campaign issuesiii. Less than 1% analyze and

critique campaign ads

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D. Advertising

1. Central goal: Reinforce the message about the candidate and the opponent

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2. Secondary Goals

a. Name recognition – Very important for all except general election for President

b. Alter issue salience – Prime voters to think about a particular issue controlled by one side

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Issue Salience: California 1994

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2. Secondary Goals

a. Name recognition – Very important for all except general election for President

b. Alter issue salience – Prime voters to think about a particular issue controlled by one side

c. Mobilization – Make supporters think that getting to the polls matters. LBJ: “The stakes are too high for you to stay home.”

d. Suppression – Make likely opponents think that no candidate represents them

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3. Tools of the Trade

a. Repetition – Within ads as well as between them

b. Syntax – Long sentences for nuance, fragments for blunt messages

c. “Loaded Words” – See handout

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d. “Code Words” and Prejudice

Many people have prejudices they don’t believe are prejudices they reject open bigotry but buy into stereotypes

The trick: Appeal to prejudice without using openly bigoted language or arguments

Examples– Republicans (race): “White Hands,” Willie Horton,

Immigration (and “those who don’t belong”)– Democrats: The Truth About Furloughs, “Hair Salon”

Immigration, Rocking Chairs

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e. Audiovisual Cues

1. Suggest evil – B/W footage, grainy film, ominous music

2. Suggest incompetence, bumbling, or ignorance – lighthearted music, caricatures

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f. Deception and Distortion

Issues/Votes: See http://www.factcheck.org/ for many examples

Media debunking often amplifies misconceptions by re-broadcasting original ad!

Common tactic in “opposition” territory: Play hide-the-party. Examples:

– D: Jim Webb (2006) and Tom Periello (2008)– R: Mike Steele (2006): response– Compare: Lavar Christensen

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4. Standard Political Ad Formats

a. The Biography (documentary). Often the first ad of the campaign.

Examples: Obama, Noriega (Texas)

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b. Talking Head Ads

Most common type of positive advertisement

Used by candidates to give “aura of leadership”

Usually focus on a particular issue (communicates competence and expertise)

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c. Message Ads

Use images or metaphors to reinforce positive or negative messages

Rely on viewer to already hold a point of view – seek to increase its salience to the voter (need for memorable visuals)

Examples: Daisy, Toy Soldiers, Bear, Revolving Door, Wolves

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d. Endorsement Ads

i. Prerequisite: Endorser must be more popular/known than endorsee. Sometimes misleading (common after bitter primaries). Can lead to embarrassment.

ii. Frequency decreasing: credibility transfers less than once thought.

iii. Still heavily used in local races, where “I’m qualified” is the central message (focus on name recognition rather than issues).

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iv. Guilt by Association: The “unwanted endorsement” ad

Early examples: KKK and Goldwater 1964 (warning: racist language), Iran and Carter 1980

Increasingly common:– 1994 Clinton morphs– ”Hillary” in Republican Primary (2006)– Democrats tie opponents to Bush in 2008 (MN,

Pres), Republicans do the same with Obama in solidly “Red” States

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e. “Man in the Street” Ads

Feature ordinary people – meant to represent key demographic groups– Look at who is not in the crowd

Examples: McGovern 1972, Carter 1980

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f. Education Ads

Meant to transmit knowledge to viewers (usually negative information about opponent)

Emphasize credible evidence (newspaper headlines, personal testimony, video footage, official reports, etc.) to convince fence-sitters

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5. Targeting Ads: Match Voters to Issues

a. Local Issues: Emphasize “us vs. them” mentality. Examples: Tornadoes in Indiana, Trade Policy in Pennsylvania, a Sub Base in Connecticut

b. Language: Target linguistic minorities. Examples: Spanish, Cantonese

c. Prospective Voters: Evaluate candidates based upon expected future behavior. Target with hope/fear.

d. Retrospective voters: Reward/punish candidates based on past performance. Target with evidence of success/failure (no alternative necessary).

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e. Issues and Voter Targeting

i. Economy – Usually retrospective. Examples:

• 1952: Eisenhower asks, Who Raised Prices?

• 1984: The Train: Retrospective success

• 1988: I Remember You: Republicans try to run against Carter again

• 1992: How Ya Doin’? And Read My Lips

• 2008: From Obama and McCain

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ii. Budget Deficits: Usually Retrospective

1984: Reagan Deficits

2000: Gore’s Spending

2004: Child’s Play

2008: Earmarks (CO)

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iii. Long Wars: Usually Retrospective

•Examples•Republicans criticize Korea in 1952 (Eisenhower)•Republicans criticize Vietnam in 1964 (Goldwater) and 1968 (Nixon)•Democrats criticize Iraq in 2004 (Kerry), 2006 (Lamont), 2008 (Coleman)

•Note that often criticism is of management of war (because requires no plan other than “do it better”)

•Defenses: Iraq 2006, 2008 (generally ineffective – no evidence ads change opinion of war, so best defense is to claim to oppose war “as fought”)

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iv. Tragedy: Always Retrospective

9/11: Ashley’s Story JFK Assassination: Promises Kept

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v. Veep Worries: Always Prospective

Vs. Nixon 1956

Vs. Agnew 1968

Vs. Quayle 1988

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vi. Gaffes: Usually Prospective

1964: The Saw

1980: Reagan Likes Proliferation

2006: Laffey Hopes You Die and Burns Hates Firefighters

2008: McCain’s 100 Year War and Merkley Needs a Moment

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vii. Preparedness and Escalation (Usually Prospective)

1968: Castro’s Bomb 1988: Tank Ride and Response 2002: Max Cleland Lacks Courage? 2008: Immigration as Terrorism,

Wiretapping for Security

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viii. Character and Scandal

1964: Our Lack of Moral Values (Dems respond to slogan with “In Your Guts…”)

1972: Watergate 1982: Jerry Springer for Governor 1992: Gray Dot 1996: Unusually Good Liar 2006: You Funded What?!? 2008: It’s Not Just the Indictment…

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E. Get out the Vote (GOTV)1. Most important in midterm elections and primaries

2. Still important in Presidential elections – Republican GOTV efforts probably won Ohio in 2004

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3. GOTV Strategiesa. RNC strategy (used since 2002): 72-hour program

i. Phone calls, polling data and personal visits identify would-be GOP voters and their top issues early in the cycle.

ii. Information is then fed into a database, allowing party leaders to flood them with pro-Republican messages through e-mail, regular mail and local volunteers.

iii. On Election Day, they receive a phone call or a visit to remind them to vote.

iv. Post-election interviews with targets to evaluate performance

v. Key difference with earlier efforts = national database of likely Republican voters. Allows much better targeting and more efficient spending.

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b. Democratic Strategies

i. The DNC’s 50-State Strategy: Spread resources throughout entire country to rebuild party in Red states.

ii. DCCC Plan: Target swing states by mobilizing single-issue groups and unions.

iii. Democratic efforts generally less successful in 2004 and California special election in 2006. Little coordination or information-sharing between efforts.

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F. Primaries: Same tactics, different voting groups

Unique feature: Incentive to interfere in other party’s primary cause disunion or simply support weaker candidate (must be secret)

Example: Muskie in 1972Just before New Hampshire primary, conservative paper’s editorial accuses Democratic front-runner Muskie of using an ethnic slur against French-Americans, a large voting bloc in NH. Evidence = letter from a Florida man (actually a hoax planted by Nixon White House). Muskie reacts emotionally (tears or melted snow?), and is defeated by ultra-liberal McGovern.

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IV. Do Campaigns Matter?A. Hillygus and Shields say yes – but…

1. Look at Figure 4.4 – linear trend is deceptive (increase in role of cross-pressures followed by decrease near end of campaign)

2. Surveys also misleading – how well do pre-election commitments reflect actual voting?

3. My conclusion – H&S are far better at explaining why campaigns adopt certain strategies than proving that these strategies substantially alter the outcome of the election. Size of effects is the key unknown.

B. Can we predict election outcomes without knowing anything about the campaigns? Need to try in order to establish maximum size of campaign effects.