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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Special Civil Action1 is one type of civil action. Its purpose is the same as

that of the other type, called ordinary civil action, which is the enforcement or

protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

Although both types of actions are governed by the rules for ordinary civil

actions, there are certain rules that are applicable only to specific special civil

actions. The fact that an action is subject to special rules other than those

applicable to ordinary civil actions is what makes a civil action special.

Special Civil Actions and their respective rules are found under Rule 62 to

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. In this paper, two special civil actions are

discussed: Interpleader and Contempt.

RULE 62

INTERPLEADER

DEFINITION

Interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property, real or

personal, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,

without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons

who claim the said property or demand compliance with the obligation, be

required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is

entitled to the same.

The essence of an interpleader, aside from disavowal of the interest in the

property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property

or funds in controversy with the court.

It is a rule founded on justice and equity, in order that theplaintiff may

not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the

pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as

entitled thereto.

Further, the remedy of interpleader has for its purpose to compel

conflicting claimants to interplead and litigate their several claims among

themselves and thus affording protection to a person not against double liability

but against double vexation in respect of ones liability.2

REQUISITES

Interpleader, as a special civil action, is governed by Rule 62 of the 1997

Rules of Court. Its subject matter includes property, whether personal or real,

and an obligation to be rendered wholly or partially. For an action ofinterpleader to prosper3, it requires that:

1Sec. 3[a], Rule 1, Rules of Court2Beltran vs. Peoples Homesite G.R. No. L-25138, August 28, 19693Section 1, Rule 62, Rules of Court


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1. The conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are, ormay be made against the plaintiff who claims no interest in

the subject matter or an interest (in whole or in part) which

is not disputed by the claimants.

2. There are two or more claimants to the fund or thing indispute through separate and different interest.

3. The claims must be adverse before relief can be granted andthe parties sought to be interpleaded must be in a position to

make effective claims.

4. The subject matter (fund, thing or duty) over which theparties assert adverse claims must be one and the same and

derived from the same source.

Thus, in an instance where a warehouseman is confronted with two or

more claimants not having the same interests with regard to goods deposited in

his warehouse, an action of interpleader can be given due course for the court todetermine the rightful owner of the goods.4

Interpleader is likewise available in the following instances: (1) in an

action of a lessee who does not know to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting

claims on the property5; (2) in an action by a bank where the purchaser of a

cashiers check claims it was lost and another has presented it for payment6; and

(3) in an action by the sheriff being in doubt as to the priority of conflicting

claims in order to determine the respective rights of the claimants.7

Moreover, the remedy is proper in search warrant cases. As held inVlasons Ent. Corp. vs. Hon CA8, where personal property has been seized under a

search warrant, and it appears reasonably definite that the seizure will not be

followed by the filing of any criminal action for the prosecution of the offenses in

connection with which the warrant was issued, the public prosecutors having

pronounced the absence of basis therefore, and there are, moreover, conflicting

claims asserted over the seized property, the appropriate remedy is the

institution of an ordinary civil action by any interested party, or of a special civil

action of interpleader by the Government itself, that action being cognizable not

exclusively by the court issuing the search warrant but by any other competent

court to which it may be assigned by raffle.

PARTIES

An interpleader may be brought by a disinterested person who has no

claim of any right in the property or the obligation to be performed; or one who

claims an interest, but which, in whole or in part, is not disputed by the

conflicting claimants.

The action is directed against two or more persons who claim the

property in the possession of the plaintiff; or two or more persons who consider

4Warehouse Receipts Law, Act No. 2137, Section 17 (1921)5Pagkalinawan vs. Rodas, 19486Mesina vs. IAC 19867Sy-Quia vs. Sheriff G.R. No. L-22807, October 10, 19248155 SCRA 186, October 28, 1987


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themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation against the

plaintiff.

In such action, the plaintiff asks the court that abovementioned defendants

be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is

entitled to one or the other thing.

AS DISTINGUISHED FROM INTERVENTION

Interpleader has a concept almost similar to the action of intervention in

that both remedies may involve at least three parties. However, the former

actually differs from the latter. The following are the well-recognized

distinctions:

INTERPLEADER INTERVENTION

An original action Ancillary action

Presupposes that plaintiff has no

interest in the subject matter of the

action OR has an interest therein in

whole or in part which is not

disputed by the other parties

Proper in any of the four

situations: person having a) legal

interest in the matter in litigation,

or b) success of either of the

parties, or c) an interest against

both, or d) is so situated as to be

adversely affected by a

distribution or other disposition

of property in the custody of the

court or of an officer thereof.

(Rule 19, Sec.1)

Defendants are sued precisely to

interplead them

Defendants are original parties to

the pending suits

PROCEDURE

A. COURT ORDER AND SUMMONSAn action for interpleader is commenced by the filing of a complaint and

the payment of the docket and other lawful fees. The complaint should be filed

within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by

either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, the action may be barred by

laches or undue delay.

Under Section 2, Rule 62, the court shall then issue an order upon the

filing of the complaint. The order requires the conflicting claimants to interplead

with one another. The court may also direct that the subject matter be paid or

delivered to the court if the interests of justice so require.

It is necessary that there be a declaration to this effect before the

defendants may litigate among themselves and file a complaint of interpleader.

This procedure will do away with groundless suits, and will save the parties time,


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inconvenience, and unnecessary expenses.9However, it was held in a much later

case that the Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file their answers is

to all intents and purposes an order to interplead, substantially and essentially

and therefore in compliance with the provisions of Rule 62 of the Rules of

Court.10

Thereafter, the following documents shall be served upon the conflicting

claimants: (1) Summons, together with (2) Copy of the Complaint; and (3) Copy

of the Order (Section 3, Rule 62).

B. MOTION TO DISMISS11Upon service of summons, each claimant has 15 days within which he

must file his answer. Within such time, each claimant may file a motion to

dismiss on the ground of: 1.) impropriety of the interpleader action; or 2.) other

appropriate grounds specified in Rule 16.Upon filing of the motion to dismiss, the period to file the answer is

suspended. If the motion is denied, the movant may file his answer within the

remaining period, or at least 5 days, whichever is longer, to be reckoned from the

receipt of the notice of denial.

An interpleader action is said to be improper when not filed within a

reasonable time. A party may no longer file for an application for interpleader

when it has been formerly sued by one of the conflicting claimants and, instead

of interpleading the other claimant, proceeded with the litigation.12

The party who initiates an interpleader action may file a motion to dismiss

the same when there is no more need to pursue such cause of action. In the case

of RCBC vs METROCON13, the reason for the interpleader action ceased when the

MeTC judgment directed METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on

the subject premises. When the decision became final and executory,

METROCAN has no other alternative left but to pay the rentals to LEYCON.

C. ANSWER AND OTHER PLEADINGS14Upon the service of summons, each claimant has 15 days to file his answer.

A copy of the answer must be served to the plaintiff and to each of the conflicting

claimants. A reply may be filed within 10 days from such service by the other

conflicting claimants.

If a claimant fails to file his answer within the period prescribed (15 days

or shorter if he has earlier filed a motion to dismiss which was denied), a party

may file a motion to declare such claimant in default. The court will thereafter

render judgment, barring him from any claim in respect to the subject matter.

9Praxedes Alvarez, et al. vs. The Commonwealth of the Phil., 65 Phil. 30210Mesina vs IAC, 145 SCRA 497 (1986)11Section 4, Rule 6212Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club vs. Lee Won, L-23851, March 26, 197613GR. No. 127913, September 13, 200114Section 5, Rule 62


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The parties are also allowed to file counterclaims, cross-claims, third-

party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto. In Arreza vs Diaz15, the

paragraph providing such rule is added to Section 5 to expressly authorize

additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete

adjudication of the controversy and its incidents. Hence, a compulsory

counterclaim not pleaded in the interpleader action bars the right of a defendantto raise it in a subsequent litigation.

D. JUDGMENTAfter filing of the pleadings, a pre-trial shall be conducted. Thereafter, the

court shall determine the respective rights and adjudicate their respective claims

(Section 6, Rule 62).

A writ of possession does not necessarily follow upon adjudication on an

interpleader. In Maglente vs Padilla (2007), the Supreme Court held that thedecision in the interpleader case merely resolved the question of who, between

petitioners and respondents, had the right to purchase the property. The

interpleader case did not delve into the issue of who has the right of possession

over the property.

The docket and other lawful fees shall be paid by the party who filed the

complaint. Such fees as well as the costs and expenses of litigation shall however

constitute a lien on the subject matter of the action unless the court shall order

otherwise (Section 7, Rule 62).

15364 SCRA 88


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DIGESTS OF CASES UNDER RULE 62

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC VS. WON

GR L-23851, March 26, 1976

Facts: Wack Wack Golf and Country Club Inc. (the Corporation), a non-stock,civic and athletic corporation, filed a complaint of interpleader against Lee e.

Won and Bienvenido Tan. It alleged that both Won and Tan claim ownership of

the same membership fee certificate 201; Won by virtue of a decision rendered

in a civil case and the issuance of the certificate by the clerk of court pursuant to

the order in the said case, and Tan, by virtue of an assignment made in his favor

by the original owner and holder of the membership fee certificate.

The court, upon motion of the defendants, dismissed the complaint upon

grounds of res judicata.

The Corporation appealed, contending that there was no identity of

parties, subject matter and cause of action between the former civil case and the

present action to constitute res judicata.

Ruling: The interpleader suit cannot prosper because the corporation has

already been made independently liable in the former civil case filed by Won,

therefore its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral

attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case.

The Corporation wasaware of the conflicting claims of the appellees longbefore filing the present interpleader suit. It recognized Tan as the lawful owner

yet when Won sued the corporation, it chose to not to interplead Tan but

proceeded with the litigation. Final judgment has been rendered against it. It is

therefore too late to invoke the remedy of interpleader.

A stakeholder (person entrusted with the custody of property or money

that is subject of litigation or of contention between rival claimants in which the

holder claims no right or property interest) should use reasonable diligence to

hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of

independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should filean action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen

without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he

may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable

diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

RCBC vs. METROCON

G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001

Facts:Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) obtained a loan from RCBC, witha real estate mortgage as security. LEYCON failed to pay its dues, prompting

RCBC to institute extrajudicial foreclosure. RCBC was the highest bidder.

Subsequently, LEYCON filed an action to nullify the extrajudicial

foreclosure.


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Meanwhile, RCBC, by virtue of the consolidation of the title of the property

in its name, demanded rental payments from Metro Container Corporation

(METROCON), which was leasing the property from LEYCON. LEYCON, as lessor,

also filed an unlawful detainer action against METROCON, causing METROCON to

file an action for interpleader.

In the unlawful detainer case, the MeTC court held METROCON liable to

pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises. This decision became

final and executory.

Thereafter, METROCON moved to dismiss the interpleader action for

being moot and academic due to the decision of the MeTC. The motion was

granted.

Ruling: The reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC renderedjudgment in the Unlawful Detainer case. While RCBC, not being a party to such

case, could not be bound therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC decision.

When such decision became final and executor METROCAN has no other

alternative left but to pay the rentals to LEYCON.

Arreza vs Diaz

364 SCRA 88 (2001)

Facts: Bliss Development Corporation (Bliss) is the owner of a housing unit in

Quezon City. A civil case was ongoing between Arreza and Diaz Jr involving aconflict of ownership regarding the housing unit. Because of such, Bliss filed a

complaint for interpleader. The trial court resolved the conflict in favor of

Arreza. The decision became final and executory.

Subsequently. Diaz filed a complaint against Blis and Arreza, asking them

to be liable for the cost of his acquisition and improvements on the subject

property.

Arreza moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of res adjudicate in the

interpleader case.

Ruling: Pursuant to Rule 62, Section 5, Diaz should have filed his claims against

Arreza in the interpleader action. Having asserted his rights as a buyer in good

faith in his answer, and praying relief therefor, respondent Diaz should have

crystallized his demand into specific claims for reimbursement by petitioner

Arreza. Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of

respondent Diaz being in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now barred.

As stated by the Court of Appeals, the court in a complaint for interpleader

shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate theirrespective claims. Such rights, obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if

put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights.


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Maglente vs Padilla

GR 148182 March 7, 2007

Facts: Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC) owned a parcel of land which was

leased to Maglente. In the contract of lease, it stated that if PRC were to sell the

property, Maglente would be given the first priority to buy it. The property wassubleased by Maglente to the respondents.

When the contract was about to expire, PRC offered to sell the property to

Maglente, which Maglente accepted. Subsequently, PRC received a letter from

respondents, expressing their desire to purchase said property.

PRC filed a complaint for interpleader to determine who among the claimants

has the right to purchase the property.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners. A deed of sale was

executed by PRC.

The petitioners then filed a write of possession, but respondents objected

on the ground that the trial courts decision on the interpleader case merely

resolved petitioners right to purchase the property but not declare them as

owners entitled to possession.

Ruling: The trial courts decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the

CA and the SC) merely resolved the question of who, between petitioners and

respondents, had the right to purchase PRCs property. The directive was only

for PRC to execute the necessary contract in favor of petitioners as the winningparties, nothing else.

A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the

right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly

relating to either. The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.

Petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion. They

must file the appropriate action in court against respondents to recover

possession.


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RULE 71

CONTEMPT

DEFINITION

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the

court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the lawinto disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties-litigant or their

witnesses during litigation.16

PURPOSE

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. Such power is

essential for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the

enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently

to the due administration of justice.

The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a two-fold aspect17,

namely:

1) The proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to thecourt or its order;

2) To compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by thecourt which he refuses to perform.

CLASSIFICATION

a.)As to its nature:i. Civil Contempt

A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to

done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party

therein.

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial

and civil in nature. They are proceedings for the enforcement ofsome duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to the

thing required.

ii. Criminal ContemptA criminal contempt is conduct directed against the authority

and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or

discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in

doing a duly forbidden act.

16Alcuaz vs Philippine School of Business Administration, 161 SCRA 717Slade Perkins vs Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271


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Civil Contempt Criminal Contempt

Against the party in whose behalf the

violated order was issued

Against the authority or dignity of the

court, and against organized society

and public justice

Primarily compensatory or remedial Primarily punitive

Aggrieved party or his successor, or

someone who has pecuniary interest in

the right to be protected

State is the real prosecutor

Intent is immaterial yet, good faith or

lack of intent is not a defense

Intent is a necessary element

b.)As to manner:i. Direct Contempt or Contempt in Facie Curiae

Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near

the court or judge or obstructs or interrupts proceedings before the

same.18

ii. Indirect or Constructive ContemptIndirect or constructive contempt is one committed out or

not in the presence of the court. It is an act done in a distance which

tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarrass the court

and justice.19

DIRECT CONTEMPT OR CONTEMPT IN FACIE CURIAE

ACTS CONSTITUTING DIRECT CONTEMPT

Under Section 1, the following are the acts which constitute direct

contempt: (1) Misbehaviour in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or

interrupt the proceedings before the same; (2) Disrespect towards the court; (3)

Offensive personalities toward others; and (4) Refusal to be sworn or to answer as

a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.

SUMMARY PUNISHMENT20

If any of the abovementioned acts is committed, the court may summarily

adjudge such person guilty of the act in contempt and provide for the penalties

accordingly.

The punishment for direct contempt depends upon the level of the court

against which the act was committed:

a) Where the act was committed against a Regional Trial Court or acourt of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by:

18Guerrero vs Villamor, 179 SCRA 35519Supra.20Section 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court


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1) a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos thirty thousandpesos [P2,000] or

2) imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or3) both fine and imprisonment

b) Where the act was committed against a lower court, he may bepunished by:

1) a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos [P200] or2) imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or3) both fine and imprisonment

REMEDY21

The remedy of appeal is not available to a person adjudged in direct

contempt. Instead, such person may avail himself of the remedies of: (1)

Certiorari or (2) Prohibition.

The filing of a petition for certiorari or prohibition has the effect of

suspending the judgment of contempt. But the suspension requires that the

person adjudged must file a bond fixed by the court which rendered the

judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment

should the petition be decided against him.

INDIRECT OR CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT

ACTS CONSTITUTING INDIRECT CONTEMPT

Under Section 3, the following are the acts which constitutes indirect

contempt:

1. Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official dutiesor in his official transactions;

Misbehavior is the wilful refusal or negligent failure, without just cause, of an

officer of the court to comply with an order of the court. For example: Failure ofsheriff to serve summons.

2. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment ofa court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected

from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent

jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such

real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession,

or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be

entitled thereto;

The writ or order must be lawful because otherwise, the disobedience or

refusal cannot be considered as contempt. For example: Re-entry after

dispossession.

21Section 2, Rule 71, Rules of Court


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3. Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedingsof a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

4. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, ordegrade the administration of justice;

An example of what constitutes an improper conduct is the filing of multiple

petitions by a lawyer to prevent execution.22

With regard to publications about a case, one made while the case is still

pending is generally considered as improper conduct. The court has held that

Publications of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending case respecting

the same has always been considered as misbehaviour, tending to obstruct the

administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings.23

However, it is different if it is made in good faith. Thus, a statement made that

the judge is grossly ignorant of the rules and procedure does not constituteimproper conduct if done in good faith.24

Such publications are no longer barred after the judgment has become

final. In People vs Alarcon25, it does not constitute contempt as there is no

pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and

has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. The exception lies where: (1) it

tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the

court; and (2) there is a clear and present danger that the administration of

justice would be impeded.

5. Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as suchwithout authority;

6. Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;7. The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an

officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

PROCEDURAL REQUISITES FOR PUNISHMENT26

Unlike in cases of direct contempt where the court will summarily adjudge a

person guilty of the act and impose punishment, cases of indirect contempt

follow procedural requisites before a person may be punished:

1. A charge in writing must have been filed;2. The respondent must have been given an opportunity to comment thereon

within a period fixed by the court; and

3. The respondent must have been given an opportunity to be heard byhimself or counsel.

22Foronda vs Guerrero, 436 SCRA 923In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 94424In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 5952569 Phil. 265261stand last par of Section 3, Rule 71


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Notwithstanding the abovementioned rule, the court may still issue processes

to bring the respondent into court or may hold him in custody pending such

proceedings.

MODES TO COMMENCE A PROCEEDING FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT27

1. It may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contemptwas committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the

respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

This mode is applicable when the contempt is committed against a

court or judge possessed and clothed with contempt powers.

2. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by averified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of

documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with therequirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court

concerned.

This is applicable to acts committed not against a court or a judicial

officer with authority to punish contemptuous acts.

3. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal actionpending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said

petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in

its discretion orders for consolidation of the contempt charge and theprincipal action for joint hearing and decision.

In the case of Commissioner Rodriguez vs. Judge Bonifacio28, the court

held that the present rules require a charge of contempt be filed not merely by

motion but through a verified petition as stated in Rule 71 section 4. Thus, a

verified petition is required even if the contemptuous act was committed against

a court or judicial officer. An exception is when the court motu proprio

disregards its previous orders, independently of the motions filed by the parties.

27Section 4, Rule 7128AM No. RTJ-99-1510


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PROCEDURE: FROM FILING OF CHARGE TO PUNISHMENT29

29Herrera, Oscar M. Remedial Law. 2006

Charge must be filed and a copy furnished

the person who must give the opportunity

to answer and be heard.

The charge shall be filed with the court or

judge against whom the allege act was

committed

If the contempt was committed against an

inferior court or judge, the charge may be

filed with the RTC of the province or the

city in which the inferior court is situated.

Date of hearing- court shall proceed to

investigate the charge and consider the

answer or testimony which the accused

may make or offer

Accused may be released on bail pending

the hearing of the charge

If found guilty of contempt, he shall be

punished accordingly


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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CONTEMPT CASES

Criminal Procedure may be applied in contempt cases. In the case of Flores

vs. Ruiz30, the Supreme Court held that a contempt charge is a proceeding that

partakes of the nature of a criminal prosecution. Petitioner, as the respondent ofthe contempt charge, was denied due process when the constitutional right of an

accused to counsel was not satisfied.

Subsequently, in Soriano vs. Court of Appeals31, conviction cannot be had

merely on the basis of written pleadings. The contemner is assured of his or her

day in court. If the contemner is served a notice of hearing, but fails to appear

anyway, then that is a different matter. A hearing affords the contemner the

opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in

his behalf. The hearing will also allow the court a more thorough evaluation of

the defense of the contemner, including the chance to observe the accusedpresent his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the

complainants or the court itself. In Sorianos case, no hearing was ever set or

held. The writ of habeas corpus is available if the proceedings on the contempt

charge have been vitiated by lack of due process.

COURT WHERE CHARGE IS TO BE FILED

Generally, the power to punish for contempt properly rests with the court

contemned being that the proceedings is a sui generis and is essential for the

contemned court to for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorumand respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and

processes. For the court to compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right

to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the

question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the

proceeding of half its efficiency.32

Under Section 5, a charge for indirect contempt must be filed in the

following proper court:

a) Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed againsta Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or

against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such

court.

b) Where such contempt has been committed against a lower court thecharge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in

which the lower court is sitting.

It may also be filed in the lower court against which the contempt

was allegedly committed. The decision of the lower court is subjectto appeal to the Regional Trial Court.

3090 SCRA 42831June 4, 200432People vs. Godoy, March 29, 1995


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However, this is subject to exceptions:

1. Indirect contempt committed against an inferior court may also be triedby the proper regional trial court, regardless of the imposable penalty.

2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to beinvestigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and

tried by the regional trial court, or the case may be referred to it for

hearing and recommendation where the charge involves question of fact.

WHEN THERE IS ALREADY A PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL

The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last

court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts

committed after perfection of the appeal. The trial court would have jurisdiction

only in the event of an attempt to block execution of its decision and that wouldbe after the remand of the case to the trial court. Until then the trial court would

have no jurisdiction to deal with alleged contemptuous acts. 33

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the

court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law

into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses

during litigation. It is defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in

opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful

disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct as tends to

bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or insome manner to impede the due administration of justice.34

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential

to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of

judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due

administration of justice.35

HEARING; RELEASE ON BAIL36

A respondent in a contempt charge must be served with a copy of thepetition. While the respondent is not required to file a formal answer similar to

that in ordinary civil actions, the court must set the contempt charge for hearing

on a fixed date and time on which the respondent must make his appearance to

answer the charge. On the date and time of the hearing, the court shall proceed to

investigate the charges and consider such answer or testimony as the

respondent may make or offer.37

If the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith, the respondent may be

released from custody upon the filing of a bond for his appearance at the hearing.

33Philippine Inter-Island Shipping vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 48934Regalado vs. Go, February 6, 200735Ruiz vs. Judge How, 459 SCRA 72836Section 6, Rule 7137Riano, Willard B. Civil Procedure (A Restatement for the Bar). 2009


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Summary for the procedure for indirect contempt*:

Procedure for Indirect Contempt

Who Initiates Court Motu Proprio Party

How is it initiated By order or any written

charge requiring

respondent to show

cause why he should not

be held in contempt

By a verified petition

with supporting

particulars and certified

true copy of documents

or papers involved and

full compliance with the

requirements for filing

initiatory pleadings in

ordinary civil actions.

Where it is initiated When the contempt is directed against an RTC or

equivalent or higher rank

When the contempt is directed against a lower court:

1.)RTC of the place where the lower court is sitting;

2.) In the same lower court subject to appeal to

higher court

Hearing and Bail If hearing is not immediately conducted, respondent

may be released upon filing of bond in the amount

fixed by the court

Appeal Appeal may be taken in proper courts as in criminal

cases

Execution of Judgment Execution of judgment shall not be suspended even

by appeal unless bond is filed conditioned upon the

performance by the respondent of that judgment

should it be decided against him on appeal.

*Based on the lectures of Dean Inigo

PUNISHMENT38

The punishment for indirect contempt depends upon the level of the court

against which the act was committed:

a) Where the act was committed against a Regional Trial Court or acourt of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not

exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six

(6) months, or both.

b) Where the act was committed against a lower court, he may bepunished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or

imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both.

In addition to such penalties, if the contempt consists in the violation of a

writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, he may also

be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of

the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.

38Section 7, Rule 71


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Restitution is defined as the act of making good or giving equivalent for

any loss, damage or injury; and indemnification. In the case of Rosario Textile vs

Court of Appeals, where the sewing machines were destroyed by fire long after

the court had ordered their return, the Court affirmed the complete restitution

of the money equivalent of the lost sewing machines. This is consistent with the

remedial and preservative principles of citations for contempt, and as demandedby the respect due the orders, writs and processes of the courts of justice. (GR

No. 137326, August 25, 2003).

An inability to obey an order is a good defense to a charge of contempt,

unless the person charged voluntarily and contumaciously brought the disability

upon himself (People vs Rivera, 91 Phil 354).

Acts done in good faith may also constitute a good defense to a charge of

contempt such as in the case of Gateway vs LandBank, where landbank instituted

foreclosure proceedings upon an honest belief that the mortagagor had defaultedin the payment of its obligations.

IMPRISONMENT FOR REFUSAL OR OMISSION TO DO AN ACT

Section 8 provides for indefinite confinement in contempt proceedings to

compel a party to comply with the order of the court. This presupposes that the

act contained in the order is yet in the power of the party to perform but he

refuses or omits to do such act. The party will only be released upon full and

complete compliance of the order of the court.

The penalty is neither cruel, unjust or excessive.39It has been held that if

the term of the imprisonment in this case is indefinite and might last through the

natural life of the petitioner, yet by the terms of the sentence the way is left open

for him to avoid serving any part of it by complying with orders of the court, and

in this manner put an end to his incarceration, the judgment cannot be said to be

excessive or unjust. The order to be imprisoned is purely a remedial measure

and its purpose is to coerce the party to do an act within his or her power to

perform.

In this note, it is important to stress that the exercise of such power topunish for contempt must be done on the preservative and not on the vindictive

principle, on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment.

Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for

contempt has been restricted by the statute, and subject to constitutional

provisions, where a contemnor fails or refuses to obey an order of the court for

the payment of money he may be imprisoned to compel obedience to such

order.40

PROCEEDINGS WHEN RESPONDENT BAILEE FAILS TO APPEAR

Under Section 9, failure to appear during a hearing by a respondent who

was released on bail has the following consequences: The court may a) issue

39Harden vs Director, 81 Phil 74140Halili vs Court of Industrial Relations, 140 SCRA 73


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another order of arrest, or b) order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited

and confiscated, or c) do both.

The measure of damages, if the bond be proceeded against, shall be: 1) the

extent of the loss or injury sustained by the aggrieved party by reason of the

misconduct for which the contempt charge was prosecuted; and 2) the costs ofthe proceedings.

Recovery on the bond shall be for the benefit of the party injured or the

aggrieved party. If there is none, the bond shall be liable and disposed of as in

criminal cases.

RELEASE OF RESPONDENT

The court has the discretion as to whether or not the person ordered to be

imprisoned will be discharged from such imprisonment so long that publicinterest will not be prejudiced by such release (Section 10, Rule 71).

REVIEW OF JUDGMENT; BOND41

In indirect contempt, the person adjudged may appeal such judgment or

final order to the proper court as in criminal cases, that is, by notice of appeal.

The execution of the judgment shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the

person held to be in contempt.

The bond is in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is takenand carries a condition that if the appeal be decided against the party filing such

bond, he will abide by and perform the judgment or final order.

The judgment against a person adjudged to be in contempt is immediately

executory and can be stopped only by filing a bond.

Civil contempt, which means the failure to do something as ordered by the

court for the benefit of a party, cannot be a basis for second jeopardy. In the case

of Cagayan Valley Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals42citing Converse Corporation

vs. Jacinto Rubber Plastics Co., Inc.43, the court reiterated the rule that an appealfrom a verdict of acquittal in contempt proceedings where the contempt is civil

in nature does not constitute double jeopardy.

In the case of Davao Timber Corporation vs. Syhunliong44, the court said

that a contempt charge partakes of the nature of a criminal action even where

the action complained of as an incident of a civil action. An appeal does not lie

from an order dismissing a charge of contempt of court. Thus, the

reconsideration by the trial court of its order denying the motion for contempt

had the effect of placing the respondents in double jeopardy, considering that the

denial of the motion for contempt on grounds of failure of movants to appear andprosecute such motion is equivalent to a judgment of acquittal.

41Section 11, supra.42November 8, 19894397 SCRA 15844GR. No. 80683, May 9, 1988


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In the case of Calderon vs. McMicking45, the court held that an appeal from

a judgment for indirect contempt may be prosecuted without waiting for the

termination of the principal case, just as in contempt committed in special

proceedings.

CONTEMPT AGAINST QUASI-JUDICIAL ENTITIES

Unless otherwise provided by law, rules on contempt provided under the

Rules of Court is applied suppletorily to contempt committed against persons,

entities, bodied or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions. The Regional

Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have

jurisdiction over such charges.46

As held in the case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Severino Listana 47,

the court said that the foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all

the questions regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-judicial bodies,to wit:

1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule

71 applied only to superior and inferior courts and did not comprehend

contempt committed against administrative or quasi-judicial officials or

bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined

as contempt of court, as is done in the second paragraph of Sec. 580,

Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to contemplates the

situation where a person, without lawful excuse, fails to appear, make

oath, give testimony or produce documents when required to do so by theofficial or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said person

shall be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon

application of the official or body with the Regional Trial Court for the

corresponding sanctions. (emphasis in the original)

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite

persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court

can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is

not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect

contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the RegionalTrial Courts.

Administrative bodies do not have the inherent power to hold a person in

contempt, unless a specific provision of law confers to such administrative

agency the power to punish a party for contempt.

An example of a quasi- judicial agency that has the power of contempt is

the DARAB or the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.

Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides:

4510 PHIL 262146Section 12, Rule 7147G.R. No. 152611, August 5, 2003


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Section 2. Indirect The Board or any of its members or its Adjudicator

may also cite and punish any person for indirect contempt on any of the

grounds and in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules

of Court.

Another example is the COMELEC. As held in the case of Lintang Bidol vs.COMELEC48, Supreme Court held that on the procedure adopted by the COMELEC

in proceeding with the indirect contempt charges against petitioner, Section 52

(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code pertinently provides:

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.

Xxx

(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same

procedure and with the same penalties provided therin. Any violation ofany final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall

constitute contempt thereof. [Emphasis ours.]

The aforecited provision of law is implemented by Rule 29 of

COMELECs Rules of Procedure, Section 2 of which states:

Rule 29 Contempt

Sec. 1. Xxx

Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt. After charge in writing has been filed with theCommission or Division, as the case may be, and an opportunity given to

the respondent to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of the

following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

Xxx

The intention to punish for contempt is to safeguard, preserve, and

maintain the integrity of the functions that these agencies carry out.

48G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009


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DIGESTS OF CASES UNDER RULE 71

Roxas vs Tipon

G.R. No. 160641 June 20, 2012

Facts: RTC directed Financial Catalyst to audit the books of petitioners. However,petitioners refused to allow Financial Catalyst to audit their books. Hence, RTC

declared petitioners in contempt of court and ordered their warrant of arrest.

Held: Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in

opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful

disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct which tends to

bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in

some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a

defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to

bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interferewith or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during litigation. The

asseverations made by petitioners to justify their refusal to allow inspection or

audit were rejected by the trial court.

It may be noted that a person may be charged with indirect contempt by

either of two alternative ways, namely: (1) by a verified petition, if initiated by a

party; or (2) by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to

show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court

against which the contempt is committed. In short, a charge of indirect contempt

must be initiated through a verified petition, unless the charge is directly madeby the court against which the contemptuous act is committed

Esperida vs Jurado

G.R. No. 172538 April 25, 2012

Facts: Respondents filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition to Declare

Petitioners in Contempt of Court. According to respondents, the petitioners are

guilty of indirect contempt of court on the basis of their alleged acts of

dishonesty, fraud, and falsification of documents to mislead the CA to rule in

their favour.

Petitioners filed Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer, but was

denied. A Second Motion for Extension was also denied. In denying the motions,

the CA ratiocinated that the petitioners did not file their answer within the

reglementary period and clearly disregarding the rules of procedure.

Held: Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically outlines the

procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt.

First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he

should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given theopportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a

hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent's

answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished

accordingly.18The law requires that there be a charge in writing, duly filed in

court, and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_172538_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_172538_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_172538_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_172538_2012.html#fnt18


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counsel. What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an

opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. This

is due process, which must be observed at all times.

It is settled that "subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the

relaxation of the rules of procedure." Time and again, this Court has held that astrict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to

frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Considering the nature of

contempt proceedings and the fact that petitioners actually filed their Answer,

albeit belatedly, the CA should have been more liberal in the application of the

Rules and admitted the Answer.

Clearly, the contempt case against petitioners is still in the early stage of

the proceedings. The proceedings have not reached that stage wherein the court

below has set a hearing to provide petitioners with the opportunity to state their

defenses. Verily, a hearing affords the contemner the opportunity to adducebefore the court documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing

will also allow the court a more thorough evaluation of the defense of the

contemner, including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open

court and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or the court

itself. In fine, the proper procedure must be observed and petitioners must be

afforded full and real opportunity to be heard.

State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T. Comilang and Ma. Victoria Sunega-

Lagman vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen

AM No. RTJ-10-2216 June 26, 2012

Facts:State Prosecutor Comilang was designated to assist the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Calamba City in the prosecution of cases on February 7, 2005. On

February 16, 2005, he appeared before Judge Belen of the RTC of Calamba City

manifesting his inability to appear on Thursdays because of his inquest duties in

the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Laguna.

Judge Belen issued his February 24, 2005 Order in Criminal Case entitled People

of the Philippines v. Jenelyn Estacio("Estacio Case") requiring him to (1) explain

why he did not inform the court of his previously-scheduled preliminary

investigation and (2) pay a fine of P500.00 for the cancellation of all the

scheduled hearings.

On October 1, 2007, Judge Belen held State Prosecutor Comilang of indirect

contempt of court for his failure to obey a duly served subpoena,and sentenced

him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days' imprisonment. He was

also required to post a supersedeas bond amounting to P30,000.00 to stay the

execution of the December 12, 2005 Decision.

In its Report dated November 27, 2009, the OCA found Judge Belen to have

violated Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by failing to separately docket or


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consolidate with the principal case (the Estacio Case) the indirect contempt

charge against State Prosecutor Comilang.

Issue:Whether or not Judge Belen violated section 4 of Rule 71 of the Rules of

Court.

Held: No. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. How proceedings commenced.Proceedings for indirect contempt may

be initiated motu proprioby the court against which the contempt was

committed by an orderor any other formal charge requiring the respondent to

show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a

verified petitionwith supporting particulars and certified true copies of

documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with therequirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court

concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal

action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact

but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless

the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge

and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

Indirect contempt proceedings, therefore, may be initiated only in two ways: (1)

motu proprio by the court through an order or any other formal charge requiring

the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt; or(2) by a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for

initiatory pleadings. In the second instance, the verified petition for contempt

shall be docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court in its discretion

orders the contempt charge, which arose out of or related to the principal action,

to be consolidated with the main action for joint hearing and decision.

In this case, the contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition,

but by Judge Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring

State Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect

contempt. As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition forcontempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with the

principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in

not directing the contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be

docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action, i.e., the Estacio

Case.

Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. Provincial Agrarian Reform

Officer of Pampanga

GR No. 155322-29 June 27, 2012

Facts: The Department of Agrarian Reform issued nine certificates of land

ownership award. The lot is in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.


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In view of the findings, the BCDA filed separate Complaints for Cancellation of

Title against the private respondents, the PARO, and the Register of Deeds of

Angeles City, Pampanga.

In its complaints, the BCDA alleged that since the properties (subject properties)

were outside those allocated to DAR, and were already titled in the name of theRepublic of the Philippines then transferred to the BCDA, they could not be the

subject of an award by the PARO. The BCDA added that the subject properties,

which had already been transferred to it, were reserved by the Philippine

government as part of the Clark military reservations in accordance with the

1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of

America. Moreover, the BCDA claimed that the approval and issuance of CLOAs

by the PARO, which became the bases for the TCTs issued to private

respondents, were null and void in view of the fact that these subject properties

were already titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

Private respondent Benjamin Poy Lorenzo, on February 23, 2004, filed a Motion

to Cite the Petitioner in Contempt of Court for certifying before two branches of

the RTC in Angeles City, wherein it filed eminent domain cases against him and

Lavernie Poy Lorenzo, that it has not commenced any other action before this

Court.

Opposing the motion, the BCDA argued that the complaints for expropriation

involve issues that are completely different from the one posed in this petition.

Moreover, the BCDA said, it had no intention at all to mislead the RTCs of Angeles

City as it mentioned, in both complaints for expropriation, that the privaterespondents titles were subject to pending complaints at the RTC for

Cancellation of Title. The BCDA went on to point out Benjamin Poy Lorenzos

improper initiation of a contempt proceeding, as it was done through a mere

motion instead of a verified petition.

Issue:Whether or not BCDA could be charged with indirect contempt.

Held: No.This Court, at the outset, would like to resolve Benjamin Poy Lorenzos

motion to cite the BCDA in contempt, for allegedly certifying before the RTCs in

Angeles City, that it had not commenced a similar action before the SupremeCourt. Since the alleged misconduct falls under indirect contempt, proceedings

should be initiated either motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the

offended court, or by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified

true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance

with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court

concerned.

It is clear that Benjamin Poy Lorenzo has missed out on all of the above

requirements. Moreover, as the BCDA has shown, it did not hide the fact that it

had commenced a separate action involving his lot before RTC Branch 58 ofAngeles City. In fact, the BCDA mentioned it both in its Complaint for

Expropriation and in its Verification and Certification as to Non-Forum

Shopping. This Court is, therefore, denying the motion of Benjamin Poy Lorenzo

and will not belabor the point that such is not in keeping with the rules and

jurisprudence.


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FEDERICO S. ROBOSA vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

GR No. 176085 February 8, 2012

Facts: On August 23, 1991, the NLRC issued a TRO. It directed CTMI, DeLuzuriaga and other company executives to (1) cease and desist from dismissing

any member of the union and from implementing the July 23, 1991

memorandum terminating the services of the sales drivers, and to immediately

reinstate them if the dismissals have been effected; and (2) cease and desist from

implementing the July 15, 1991 memorandum grounding the sales personnel.

Petitioners contend that the respondents were guilty of contempt for their

failure to reinstate the dismissed petitioners and to pay them their lost wages,

sales commissions, per diems, allowances and other employee benefits.

Respondents argue that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over an indirect contempt

charge.

Issue:Whether NLRC has contempt powers.

Held: Yes.On the first issue, we stress that under Article 218 of the Labor Code,

the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt,

directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law.

The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the

degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is against the Commissionor the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the

Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule

71 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC

to initiate indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode

is to be observed only when there is no law granting them contempt

powers.As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or

the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or

parties in direct or indirect contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have notimproperly brought the indirect contempt charges against the respondents

before the NLRC.

cambria with digests 2012

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