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2004-11

Nuclear Strategy and the Modern Middle East

Russell, James A.

Middle East Policy / V.11, No.3 (Fall 2004)

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/30473

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MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XI, NO. 3, FALL 2004

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND THE MODERN MIDDLE

EAST

James A. Russell

Dr. Russell is a senior lecturer in the Department of National SecurityAffairs a the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. The viewsexpressed in this article are his own.

While the press and punditsgreeted the release of theNuclear Posture Review(NPR) in January 2002 with

a flurry of commentaries and outcries,there has been little analytical follow-upfrom the academic and think-tank commu-nities on the far-reaching implications ofthis document for specific regional geopo-litical environments such as the PersianGulf or the wider Middle East.

This is surprising, since implementationof the NPR over the next decade promisesto affect profoundly the shape and contentof the nation’s national security strategywrit large and, in turn, security strategiesdeveloped to pursue regional objectives ineach of the geographic theaters around theworld. Nowhere is this more the case thanin the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.The NPR indicates that the United Statesis making the region a central focus of theredesigned strategic deterrent, now com-prising nuclear and conventional compo-nents, with conventional long-range preci-sion-strike weapons functioning in a“strategic” context. While it might be toodramatic to suggest that the Middle Easteffectively replaces the Soviet Union as

the central targeting requirement for sizingand configuring the U.S. strategic deter-rent, it seems clear that regional contingen-cies will assume a more prominent role inthe nation’s nuclear strategy.1

This paper will examine the implica-tions of the NPR for U.S. security strategyin the Middle East, framing NPR imple-mentation in the context of theoreticalliterature surrounding the role of nuclearweapons in deterrent and coercive politicalstrategies. The paper will also highlightpolicy challenges facing the United Statesas it seeks to use the reconfigured strategicdeterrent as a means to promote itsinterests and achieve its objectives in thisvolatile region.

To illustrate the difficulties of applyingthe strategic deterrent as a tool for regionalsecurity, the paper will apply the theoreticalframework to an examination of thecoercive/compellant framework with Iraqfrom 1991-2003. The study will concludewith an assessment of the contributions,positive or negative, that the redesignedstrategic deterrent could make toward thebuilding of a qualitatively new regionalsecurity order in the post-Saddam MiddleEast.

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RUSSELL: NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORKThe NPR represents strands of

continuity and change when viewed in thecontext of the historical role that nuclearweapons traditionally have played in U.S.security strategy in the Middle East.Throughout most of the Cold War, nuclearweapons were seen as the ultimate guar-antor of the broader military mission to“defend the region” against encroachmentfrom outside powers like the Soviet Union.Planning for the use of nuclear weapons inthe Middle East began in earnest in theearly 1950s as military planners looked forways to redress Soviet conventionalmilitary superiority around the world. InJune 1950, the National Security Councilissued a report (NSC 26/3) titled Demoli-tion and Abandonment of Oil Facilitiesand Fields in the Middle East. The reportaddressed the possibility of plugging Saudioil wells “…as a means of conservationand denial during enemy occupation.”Nuclear weapons were looked at as apossible tool to deny the Soviets access tothe oil fields. The report found, “Denial ofwells by radiological means can be accom-plished to prevent an enemy from utilizingthe oil, but it could not prevent him fromforcing ‘expendable’ Arabs to enter thecontaminated areas to open well heads anddeplete the reservoirs. Therefore, asidefrom other ill effects on the Arab popula-tion, it is not considered that radiologicalmeans are practicable as a conservationmeasure.”2

Such was the initial (and unsuccessful)attempt to find a useful role for nuclearweapons in regional strategy. But nuclearweapons eventually came to be seen asone tool available to the United States as itsought to protect its interests in the MiddleEast and counter the Soviet Union’s

conventional military superiority along theTurkish and Iranian borders.

Applying the strategic deterrent inother regional scenarios periodicallysurfaced during the Cold War as a way todeter Soviet involvement in regional affairs.In October 1973, U.S. forces – includingthe Strategic Air Command – were placedon heightened alert in response to possibleSoviet military intervention to keep theIsraelis from destroying the surroundedEgyptian Third Army. During the crisis,Henry Kissinger sent Soviet leaderBrezhnev a message stating that theintroduction of Soviet troops into the regionwould represent a violation of the recentlysigned Agreement Between the UnitedStates of America and the Union of SovietSocialist Republics on the Prevention ofNuclear War.3 The implication ofKissinger’s message was obvious: intro-duction of Soviet troops could have led to anuclear face-off between the Cold Warantagonists.

In January 1980, following the take-over of the American embassy in Iran andin response to the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan, President Carter stated, “Anattempt by an outside force to gain controlof the Persian Gulf region will be regardedas an assault on the vital interests of theUnited States of America, and such anassault will be repelled by any meansnecessary, including military force.”4 Atthe time, Carter’s statement was widelyconsidered to encompass the use ofnuclear weapons in response to a Sovietadvance into Iran. In February 1980,details of a Pentagon report emergedindicating that the United States might haveto use tactical nuclear weapons in responseto any Soviet military advance toward theGulf.5 The Pentagon study, Capabilities

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in the Persian Gulf, helped form the basisfor recommendations to create the RapidJoint Deployment Task Force, which laterbecame the U.S. Central Command.

In the spring of 1996, the application ofthe strategic deterrent in the region oc-curred in the context of counter-proliferation policy. The United Statesdetected construction of an undergroundsite at Tarhuna in Libya that was widelybelieved to be related to Libya’s productionof chemical-warfare agents. Secretary ofDefense William Perry stated that theUnited States would consider a wide rangeof options to ensure that Tarhuna did notbecome operational. In discussing theLibyan site, Perry stated that any countryattacking the United States with chemicalweapons would “…have to fear theconsequences of a response from anyweapon in our inventory.” He furtherelaborated that “we could make a devas-tating response without the use of nuclearweapons, but we would not forswear thatpossibility.”6

Potential use of nuclear weaponsemerged in wars with Iraq in 1991 andagain in 2003. Statements made by avariety of senior government officials inboth crises reflected a belief by decisionmakers that the nuclear arsenal had a roleto play in deterring Saddam from using hischemical and biological weapons againstcoalition forces. Specific warnings weremade by senior U.S. officials to Saddam inboth cases. Secretary of State JamesBaker passed a message to Iraqi ForeignMinister Tariq Aziz in January 1991 statingthat any Iraqi use of weapons of massdestruction (WMD) would be met withoverwhelming force. Similar publicreferences were made by a variety of U.S.officials before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

NPR AND THE MIDDLE EASTA review of the historical framework

reveals the episodic appearance of theregion in U.S. nuclear strategy. Duringtimes of crisis, decision makers drew uponthe strategic deterrent; and with thesubsiding of each crisis references tonuclear weapons subsided. The focus ofthe strategic deterrent during the Cold Warwas on the Soviet Union and the variousgeographic theaters of conflict during theperiod.

But with the passing of the Sovietthreat and the emergence of a new secu-rity environment defined by rogue states,transnational terrorist organizations and theproliferation of weapons of mass destruc-tion, the strategic deterrent has found anew series of missions that seem particu-larly prominent in the Middle East andPersian Gulf. A reading of the NPRsuggests that the strategic deterrent will beapplied on a more or less ongoing basis inthe region as a means to achieve a numberof short- and longer-term strategic andpolicy objectives.

The NPR implies that the defense ofIsrael represents a core mission for thestrategic deterrent by identifying severalnear-term contingencies involving an attackon Israel that could lead to the use ofnuclear weapons by the United States.7

Moreover, with (as of this writing) twocountries in the region (Syria and Iran) stillsupporting terrorism and possessingprograms to develop WMD, the strategicforce has two other potential targets. And,last but not least, the region seems implic-itly highlighted by the NPR’s treatment ofthe targeting problem posed by hardenedand deeply buried targets that cannot bethreatened by conventional weapons.8 Asnoted in the NPR, these targets necessitate

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a new family of munitions including low-yield nuclear weapons that may have to befielded over the next decade. Thesemunitions must be developed in partbecause of the characteristics of thestrategic targeting problem in countriessuch as Iran and Syria.9

The NPR identifies Iraq, Iran, Syriaand Libya (in addition to North Korea) ascountries that “…could be involved inimmediate, potential or unexpected[nuclear] contingencies. All havelongstanding hostility towards the UnitedStates and its security partners…. Allsponsor or harbor terrorists, and all haveactive WMD and missile programs.”10

Saddam’s forcible removal and Libya’sapparent abandonment of its WMDprograms presumably delete these coun-tries from the potential list of contingencies,still leaving Iran and Syria as countries inthe region that might be involved in situa-tions requiring the use of nuclear weapons.

The NPR strongly implies a U.S.commitment to use nuclear weapons in thedefense of Israel, stating that an “immedi-ate contingency” that might lead to the useof nuclear weapons includes “…an Iraqiattack on Israel….” While such an attackclearly has been obviated with Saddam’sremoval, it stands to reason that the samelogic would apply to a Syrian or Iranianattack on Israel. Both Syria and Iranmaintain well-established WMD capabili-ties, and both maintain longstanding andovert hostility towards Israel. This chain oflogic suggests that defending Israel froman attack by Syria or Iran is a core missionfor the strategic deterrent.

While the NPR specifically refers toseveral regions, the strategic deterrent isassigned a broad array of functions thatare particularly salient within the Middle

East regional context:• Assurance: “U.S. nuclear forces will

continue to provide assurance to securitypartners in the presence of known orsuspected threats of nuclear, biological orchemical attacks or in the event of surpris-ing military developments. This assurancecan serve to reduce the incentives forfriendly countries to acquire nuclearweapons of their own to deter such threatsand circumstances.”11

• Dissuasion: The wide array ofconventional and nuclear capabilities in thestrategic deterrent “…may dissuade apotential adversary from pursuing threaten-ing capabilities.” 12

• Deterrence: “[Missile] [D]efense ofU.S. territory and power-projection forces,including U.S. forces abroad, combinedwith the certainty of U.S. ability to strike inresponse, can bring into better balanceU.S. stakes and risks in a regional confron-tation and thus reinforce the credibility ofU.S. guarantees designed to deter attackson allies and friends.” 13

• Defeat: “Composed of both nuclearand non-nuclear weapons, the strikeelement of the New Triad can provideflexibility in the design and conduct ofmilitary campaigns to defeat opponentsdecisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilitiesmay be particularly useful to limit collateraldamage and conflict escalation. Nuclearweapons could be employed against targetsable to withstand non-nuclear attack (forexample, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities.)”14

The NPR identifies the strategicdeterrent and its nuclear component as atool that can help support a broad array ofpolicy objectives. The NPR’s broadlydefined strategic objectives of assure,deter, dissuade and defeat mirror the

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verbiage in the Quadrennial DefenseReview (QDR). 15 According to DefenseSecretary Donald Rumsfeld, these con-cepts represent “…key goals that willguide the development of U.S. forces andcapabilities, their deployment anduse….”16 The same formulations appear inthe Bush administration’s National SecurityStrategy report.17

The reason to belabor what mightseem an obvious point is simple: thestrategic deterrent performs an integral(even a core) function in the diverse arrayof capabilities available to the NationalCommand Authority. The strategic nuclearforce is seen as a tool to address a widevariety of different threats in differentmission scenarios requiring the threat andactual use of force. As described in theNPR and other strategy documents, itseems clear that nuclear weapons and thestrategic deterrent will be applied in manypeacetime and wartime scenarios short ofmassive retaliation and all-out war. That is,the NPR assigns nuclear weapons manyroles beyond simple retaliation for a WMDattack on the United States or its allies. Assuch, it extends the function of nuclearweapons beyond simple deterrence ofenemy behavior.

The NPR does state that the strategicnuclear force can serve as a powerfuldeterrent to preserve the status quo andprevent the outbreak of interstate conflict.However, Bush administration strategydocuments further assert that the U.S.nuclear arsenal can help change thebehavior of states through dissuasion,which seeks to convince states of thefutility of entering into a direct competitionwith the United States.

The documents also highlight thesalience of threats coming from the spread

of WMD together with terrorism. Thestrategic deterrent is presented as a tool todeter states from providing WMD toterrorist clients and from attacking theUnited States and its friends and allies.While many of the Bush administration’sstrategy documents show a lack of confi-dence in applying deterrence to non-stateactors, the documents expand the role ofdeterrence to provision of WMD toterrorists by so-called “rogue states.”18

Hence, not only is a state such as Irandeterred from undertaking offensiveoperations against its neighbors, but it ispresumably deterred from providing certainmass-effect technologies, materials andweapons to non-state actors.

In addition to these aforementionedbroadly defined deterrent objectives, thestrategic deterrent’s family of precisionconventional and nuclear-strike munitions isalso presented as a powerful tool ofcounterproliferation policy. The nuclearand conventional components together arepresented as tools both to deter the spreadof WMD to non-state actors and also todeny those states with WMD the advan-tages that these capabilities might presentin an actual conflict. Should WMD beused against the United States or itsregional partners, the strategic arsenal ismeant to decisively defeat an adversarythrough the combined capabilities of thenuclear and conventional strike compo-nents of the strategic deterrent. Thestrategic arsenal’s counterproliferationmission also seems particularly highlightedby the NPR’s treatment of the strategictargeting problem posed by hardenedunderground targets that cannot be held atrisk by conventional munitions.

The prospect of using the deterrent inshort-notice operations also is strongly

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implied by the NPR’s call to replace thecumbersome Single Integrated OperationalPlan with something called “adaptiveplanning,” in which components of thestrategic nuclear forces can be integratedinto responses to ongoing contingencies onreasonably short notice. Making thestrategic arsenal more responsive in short-notice contingencies seems particularlyapplicable to potential counterforce strikesagainst WMD and leadership targets.

In applying the strategic arsenal toactual wartime use, the Bush administra-tion repeats formulations from previousadministrations reserving the right to usenuclear weapons in certain contingencies.As stated in the National Strategy toCombat Weapons of Mass Destruction:“The United States will continue to makeclear it reserves the right to respond withoverwhelming force – including throughresort to all our options – to the use ofWMD against our forces abroad andfriends and allies.”19

These broadly defined political andmilitary objectives suggest certain identifi-able formulations about the role the strate-gic deterrent will play in regional securitystrategy:

• Deter and defend attacks againstforward-deployed forces;

• Deter and defend Israel from attackby adversaries using conventional or non-conventional means, i.e., WMD;

• Convince states with WMD or thosecontemplating the pursuit of WMD toabandon those programs, i.e., “dissuasion”of competitive behavior by opponents atthe strategic level;

• Convince states either engaged in orsupporting terrorism to cease these activi-ties (known in the broader security litera-ture as “compellance,” in which an adver-

sary is convinced to stop doing activitiesit has already started, and possibly toreverse any gains made);

• Deter states that possess WMD frompassing these weapons to terrorist organi-zations targeting either the United States orIsrael;

• Present the NCA with a flexible anddiverse array of attack options (bothconventional and nuclear) to defeat adver-saries in regional contingencies, such as:

– Counterforce operations againstWMD and regime targets; – Tactical support to theater commanders; – Strategic use in situations requiringmassive retaliation;• Assure Israel of the U.S. defense

commitment, which, in turn, can act as adeterrent to aggressive Israeli actionsagainst its neighbors;

• Assure coalition partners throughoutthe region that the United States can andwill use force to deter attacks on thesepartners and, by extension, defend themusing the strategic deterrent if necessary.

The above functions are not specifi-cally articulated in any strategy documentbut represent my judgments on how theQDR/NPR requirements match up againstU.S. national-security objectives in theMiddle East. Assuming that these objec-tives represent reasonable statementsabout the role of the strategic U.S. nucleararsenal in the region, it is fair to state thatthe NPR associates nuclear weapons witha variety of military and political objectivesin the region.

NPR, THEORY AND PRACTICEWidening the potential political and

military applications of the strategic nuclearforce is of particular significance in the

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context of the regional environment. Theregion boasts not only all the salientthreatening features of the internationalenvironment (terrorism, WMD and instabil-ity), but it is also a region where systemicinterstate communication problems imposeenormous obstacles for the United Statesin operationalizing complicated political andmilitary strategies. These communicationsissues, which will be highlighted below,represent a critical issue for analysis bypolicy makers as they determine the rolefor the strategic nuclear force in regionalsecurity strategy.

Implementing the NPR in the regionsuggests an interesting confluence oftheoretical approaches on the role ofnuclear weapons in strategy and the rolethat perceptions, signals and communica-tions play in interstate relations. The NPRimplies that the strategic deterrent and, byextension, nuclear weapons, have aprominent role to play in a family ofcoercive political and military strategies –in which states either threaten, or in somecases actually use, force to achievepolitical objectives. Associating thestrategic nuclear force with coercive anddeterrent strategies suggests the applicabil-ity of a theoretical framework articulatedduring the late 1950s and early 1960s byThomas Schelling in his works The Strat-egy of Conflict and Arms and Influ-ence.20 Schelling argued that nuclearweapons could serve as a useful tool topolicy makers engaged in what he calledthe “diplomacy of violence.”21 Schellingbelieved that nuclear weapons representeda tool for policy makers that could bewielded through strategies of deterrence,compellance and coercion. The NPR’sbroadly defined missions for the strategicdeterrent suggest that the Bush administra-

tion also believes this to be the case.Schelling believed that nuclear weap-

ons could play a role in the interstatebargaining process by discouraging anadversary from taking actions, forcing anadversary to change behavior and, ifnecessary, serve as tools to achievetactical and strategic objectives oncehostilities had been initiated. In his view,nuclear weapons could play a role inlimiting the scope of armed conflict oncebegun, since the “escalation dominance” itafforded could convince an adversary ofthe futility of continuing the conflict, andhence bring the action to a close onfavorable terms.

Schelling developed a model to analyzeinterstate conflict in his work The Strategyof Conflict. Strategies of deterrence,compellance and coercion, Schellingargued, could be placed into a frameworkof game theory called “a theory of interde-pendent decision.” His theory posited thatdeterrence, compellance and coercioncould be applied to achieve objectives aspart of the interstate bargaining process.22

His bargaining process needed a number ofcritical elements: (1) Actors in the systemhad to act rationally “…motivated by aconscious calculation of advantages, acalculation that in turn is based on anexplicit and internally consistent valuesystem.”23 (2) Actors had to have certaincommon interests and mutual dependenceeven if they simultaneously had otherconflicting interests (actors with totallyopposed interests would lead to wars ofextermination – a rarity in the internationalsystem).24 (3) There must be a peacetimeand wartime communications system foractors to convey intentions as an enablerfor bargaining.25 Under Schelling’s theory,operationalizing the concepts of deterrence

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and compellance in the bargaining processoccurred when states threatened the use offorce and, if warranted, used force toinflict successive levels of pain on anadversary to achieve a successful out-come.26 Schelling acknowledged that thebargaining process had one importantlimitation – when asymmetries in communi-cations prevented actors from receivingsignals of intent.27

The issues of actor rationality and thefunction of interstate communications havealways troubled analysts in thinking throughthe implications of assigning roles tonuclear weapons in deterrent and coercivestrategies. Former Defense SecretaryRobert McNamara cogently expressedthese doubts during his University ofMichigan commencement address in June1962, when he stated:

The mere fact that no nation couldrationally take steps leading to anuclear war does not guarantee that anuclear war cannot take place. Notonly do nations sometimes act in waysthat are hard to explain on a rationalbasis, but even when acting in a‘rational’ way they sometimes, indeeddisturbingly often, will act on thebasis of misunderstandings of the truefacts of a situation. They misjudge theway others will react, and the wayothers will interpret what they aredoing.28

McNamara’s misgivings about the sup-posed rationality of actors involved indeterrent relationships are reflected in muchof the literature on deterrence theory.29

The problem of interstate communica-tions – central to the application ofSchelling’s coercive-bargaining framework– is systematically addressed by Robert

Jervis in his seminal work The Logic ofImages.30 Jervis analyzed the processthrough which states drew inferences fromthe actions of other states and, in addition,how states could influence the inferencesbeing drawn by the desired actors.31

Jervis suggested that states communicatewith one another through a series ofimages: an internal image developed forinternal audiences and an external imagepresented to the world at large. A centralfeature of the system as described byJervis is that images constructed by statesconstitute a powerful tool for deception –they can be used to confuse actors. One ofthe main points in The Logic of Images isthe central role that conscious deceptionplays in international relations.32

Jervis’s theoretical frameworks onperception and signaling suggest thateffective interstate communications are atbest problematic and, at worst, haphazard.Sources of misperception, combined withthe complicated system of communicatingintent and developing indices, produce whatcan only be described as a process proneto uncertainty and unpredictability. Asnoted by Jervis, these difficulties can beexacerbated in cross-cultural communica-tions but can also occur even betweenstates with well-developed political andcultural relationships. For example, in hisbook Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisisin Perspective, Richard Neustadt providesa fascinating account of the inability of twoclose allies – the United States and the UK– to communicate effectively on an issueof mutual interest and concern.33

Accepting that, as described in theNPR, the U.S. strategic nuclear force isintended to function on variety of differentlevels within a framework of coercivestrategies, one might suggest that the

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theories of Schelling and Jervis need to bere-examined by those seeking to applynuclear weapons as a policy tool in theMiddle East. The confluence of theSchelling-Jervis theoretical approachessuggests a number of intertwined hypoth-eses that should be reviewed during NPRimplementation:

(1) To function effectively, coercivestrategies depend on common assumptions,mutual dependence, rational actors andeffective communications.

(2) Successful coercive strategiesdepend on a communications system thatallows actors to accurately convey andreceive intent.

(3) Inherent and systemic difficulties ininterstate communications can complicatethe interstate bargaining process.

(4) Absent a communication systemthat accurately conveys and receives intentwithin a coercive framework, actors maynot function predictably in accordance withbargaining and game-theory assumptions.

(5) Implementing coercive strategies insituations with acute communicationsissues or illogical images could result inunpredictable behavior and (at worst)strategic instability due to actions by theinvolved actors.

IMPLICATIONS IN THE MIDDLEEAST

During the Cold War, arms controlplayed an important role in establishing arelatively structured communicationssystem between the United States and theSoviet Union. The talks themselves and theaccompanying informal interactions on themargins of these meetings helped establisha communications framework that enabledthe deterrent relationship at the strategiclevel. The arms-control process came to

be an important tool to maintain strategicstability by, among other things, helping bothactors sort through the complicated processof drawing inferences from signals andindices. It also allowed the actors to takeunambiguous concrete actions (limitingStrategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, forexample), pursuant to an agreed-uponframework that sought to introduce predict-ability to the actors’ force structures.

Consistent with Schelling’s formula-tions, this meant that the actors in thebargaining process shared a basic set ofassumptions and could agree to pursuecompromise in certain aspects of theirrelationships, while at the same timeallowing and even encouraging conflict tocontinue in other areas. And, consistentwith Jervis’s ideas, the actors had astructured forum to convey intention anddevelop indices to gauge the impact thattheir signals were having.

In the Middle East, however, thereexists no institutionalized process foradversaries to ensure structured communi-cations on a routine basis outside of formalpolitical channels – and even these do notexist in the cases of Iran and the UnitedStates and Iran and Israel. Interstatecommunications tend to occur throughother means: the media and more tradi-tional forms of political or diplomaticcommunications. These forms of communi-cation leave a lot to be desired. Thelanguage of diplomacy, Jervis notes,effectively constitutes its own “code” withambiguous and open-ended meanings.34

He neatly summarized the characteristicsof diplomatic language:

The complex signaling system is notnoiseless and unambiguous, and thussignals are often intentionally uncleareven at the first, or semantic, level.

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This allows actors to issue signalsthey can disown and gives them moreflexibility to explore possible politicswithout changing others’ images ofthemselves to their detriment.35

Communication through the media,particularly in the Middle East, is evenmore problematic. Government-controlledmedia throughout much of the Arab worldroutinely push pronounced anti-Americanand anti-Israeli messages, which make it apoor channel through which to communi-cate signals.

Perhaps most important, furthercloaking the interstate communicationsprocess are differences flowing fromhistory, religion, ethnicity and particularlydistinct “national” identities as well as thepersonalities of the leaders themselves.Defining these differences between theUnited States and the countries in theregion as “cultural” seems somehowinadequate; a more complicated term isreally required. However, the interactionof these variables provides an importantfounding basis for the images suggested byJervis that are integral parts of the inter-state communications system. If theseimages are opaque, obscured or just plainmisperceived by the United States, it isdifficult to accurately convey intent throughthe signaling process. If the signalingprocess does not work properly, then thecommunications system cannot accuratelyconvey signals.

At the macro level, a classic example ofthis phenomenon is the seemingly unendingefforts by the last two American administra-tions to improve the “image” of the UnitedStates throughout the Arab world. Onecommentator in the Middle East eloquentlydescribed the systemic problems facing theUnited States as follows:

The basic problem is that the Ameri-can penchant for clarity and a neat,explicit, black-and-white classificationof people’s identities and intentionsclashes badly with the Middle East’straditions of multiple identities,sometimes hidden intentions, andfrequent imprecision in one’s statedintentions….Arabs and Americans arelike ships passing in the night,sounding their horns, firing their guns,making known their views, but havingno impact on the other.36

Such basic communications difficultiesform an important and arguably vitalbackdrop as policy makers start to thinkthrough the implications of applying thestrategic deterrent within the region assuggested by the NPR. These communi-cations difficulties imply that Schelling’sbargaining process cannot work with anydegree of predictability – and may in factwork illogically – due to the incongruenceof the respective images of the parties.This incongruence, in turn, undermines theability of the strategic deterrent to functionpredictably as an element in coercive anddeterrent strategies.

POLICY ISSUESDefense of Israel

Establishing the defense of Israel as acore mission for the strategic deterrent insome ways simply represents anacknowledgement of what has beenapparent for the last quarter century: thatpolicy makers of both main political partiesin the United States regard the defense ofIsrael as a “strategic” interest for theUnited States. While it is difficult to seethat Israel’s defense constitutes a classic“realist” strategic interest for the UnitedStates, the political relationship between the

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two countries has made it so. An analyticalissue for policy makers is to examinewhether the U.S. “extended” deterrent forIsrael should be treated in the same contextas the extended deterrent on behalf ofEurope during the Cold War. In Cold WarEurope, the United States stationed nuclearweapons on European soil, developed apublicly stated doctrine governing the useof nuclear weapons in a so-called “escala-tion ladder,” and stated as a matter ofpolicy that the U.S. strategic nucleararsenal represented a part of the continuumof capabilities that would be brought intoplay if the situation warranted it.

The situation in Israel today is obvi-ously very different. Israel maintains apublic position of strategic ambiguity,though there is little doubt that Israel is anuclear power with 100-400 weapons.37

Recent reports suggest that Israel has evendeployed nuclear weapons in subma-rines.38 While the stationing of U.S.nuclear weapons on Israeli soil might bedifficult politically for both countries,parceling out other parts of the strategicdeterrent to Israel seems reasonable, aswas the case in Europe during the ColdWar. One of the strategic deterrent’s newcomponents is strategic missile defense – acapability that the Israelis might welcomeas an addition to the Arrow missile. More-over, if Israel, as suggested, is a strategicpartner, it also makes sense that precision-strike conventional capabilities in thestrategic arsenal might be deployed for-ward to Israeli soil. As was the case withNATO partners during the Cold War, Israelcould even be assigned “strategic” targetsin connection with ongoing contingenciesthat would require use of the strategicconventional and nuclear arsenal.

Having made these points, it is admit-

tedly difficult to envision a military require-ment necessitating any of the aboveactions. The United States already hassignificant forward-deployed forces in theregion at a variety of different locations, sothe stationing of weapons in Israel seemsredundant. Moreover, in terms of targetcoverage, Israel offers nothing that couldnot be satisfied with basing elsewhere in theregion. But if the NPR is to be takenseriously, and if the United States is tointegrate the defense of Israel into themissions assigned to the strategic nucleararsenal, policy makers should devote thesame analytical effort accorded to theextended deterrent on European soil thateventually resulted in the doctrine of flexibleresponse in 1967. If nothing else, theanalytical effort would sort out some of thecomplicated conceptual and policy issues ofassociating the strategic nuclear andconventional arsenal with Israel’s defense.

As part of this effort, policy makersneed to examine the commitment to Israelin light of the NPR’s broadly stated objec-tive of assuring friends and allies. TheU.S. strategic arsenal is intended to assureIsrael (and other regional states) of theU.S. commitment to its defense. The“assurance” flowing from the U.S. postureis intended to influence Israeli behavior,most obviously acting as a constraint onIsrael’s use of force against its neighborsand vice versa. The strategic arsenalpotentially could act both as a tool torestrain overly aggressive Israeli actionsand to control conflict escalation.

Hence, determining how assurance willwork vis-à-vis Israel is a central challengefor U.S. security strategy. It might beequally argued that the strategic umbrellaprovided by U.S. forces could in factencourage Israel to act more aggressively

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than it otherwise would, since its actionswould be backed not just by its ownnuclear force but also by the thousands ofwarheads in the U.S. arsenal and the arrayof standoff conventional munitions used togreat effect in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In order to assess the impact that theU.S. strategic arsenal and its associateddoctrine can have on Israeli behavior, ananalysis of Israeli views of compellanceand deterrence is essential. A review ofliterature on Israeli deterrence suggests astriking and potentially dangerous variancebetween U.S. and Israeli views ofcompellance and deterrence. The U.S.view of compellance is generally to avoidescalation, while the Israelis actively seekit. Another way of describing this varianceis that the United States viewscompellance and escalation like a pyramidin which escalation proceeds incrementally.By contrast, the Israeli view ofcompellance and escalation is more like aninverted pyramid in which escalation isimmediate, uncontrolled and overwhelm-ing.39 This analysis suggests that theIsraelis have developed a compellence/deterrence model that is founded on anumber of assumptions: (1) Israeli leadershave historically sought to deliberatelyprovoke hostile Arab reactions in order toestablish dominance with an overwhelmingand disproportionate conventional re-sponse. (2) Seeking an excuse to escalateis a characteristic of Israel’s use of forceagainst its adversaries. (3) Bureaucraticinertia and the role of military officials inthe decision-making process have contrib-uted to a default position of conventionalescalation. (4) This approach has failed toachieve Israel’s objective of security andhas in fact played a role in compromisingthe ability of the actors to create a political

framework for negotiations.40

Understanding Israeli views of theseissues is of critical importance as policymakers attempt to determine how the U.S.strategic arsenal will interact with Israeliviews of compellance and deterrence. Thepreceding analysis suggests the importanceof arriving at a common set of U.S. andIsraeli assumptions to avoid escalation in acrisis situation that might in certain circum-stances involve the United States and itsstrategic forces.

Syria a TargetAnalysis of the historical record in Iraq

(which has only just begun) provides someuseful insights into an ongoing case ofapplying coercive and compellant strategyto Syria. Restating the obvious is impor-tant: the NPR suggests that Syria is aprimary country-specific target of thestrategic nuclear and conventional arsenal.Damascus continues to receive particularattention from U.S. policy makers due toits active support of terrorist groups, itsovert hostility to Israel and its well-devel-oped WMD infrastructure, particularly itsmissile and chemical-warfare programs.Pursuant to these threats, it seems clearthat U.S. forces are expected to support avariety of deterrent and compellant objec-tives that involve the threat and, if neces-sary, the actual use of force in contingen-cies that involve Syria. Bush administra-tion officials have in fact made a variety ofstatements in the aftermath of OperationIraqi Freedom implying that the samecalculations made in deciding to use forceagainst Iraq also apply to Syria.41 TheU.S. nuclear and conventional arsenals areexpected to either directly support or helpaccomplish the following objectives: (1)deter an attack on Israel; (2) defeat Syria

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(using nuclear weapons if necessary)should it attack Israel with WMD; (3)convince Syrian leader Bashar Asad tostop supporting terrorist groups targetingthe United States and its allies; (4) con-vince Asad to forgo Syria’s WMD pro-grams and disarm; and (5) provide thenational command authority with an arrayof nuclear and conventional counterattackoptions related to Syria’s WMD infrastruc-ture, some of which is buried underground.

Israeli-Syrian StandoffThe case of Syria is also interesting

since the United States is imposing ex-tended deterrence over an existing deterrentrelationship — Israeli nuclear weapons andoverwhelming conventional superiority, onthe one hand, and Syria’s well-developedWMD capabilities (mainly long-rangemissiles and chemical weapons) and inferiorconventional capabilities, on the other.Imposing a U.S. coercive and deterrentframework over this existing relationshipsuggests that deterrence in this situation is amultifaceted phenomenon functioning atdifferent levels with a wide variety ofvariables. The relationships among thesevariables need to be understood in thecontext of NPR implementation.

These issues assume particular signifi-cance in assessing the impact of NPRimplementation on the Israeli-Syriandeterrent relationship. The relationship ishighly unstable, with each side in anavowedly hostile posture towards the other.Syria uses terrorist surrogates to attackIsrael, while Israel responds with conven-tional attacks on those surrogates. InOctober 2003, Israel bombed a target nearDamascus that was allegedly associatedwith terrorist activities in the first suchattack deep into Syria since the 1973 war.

In response, Syrian Foreign Ministryofficial Bushra Kanafani stated, “Syriareserves the right to retaliate by all meansat its disposal.”42 Hizbollah officials madesimilar statements of intent to respond inthe event of further Israeli attacks.43

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon madeequally defiant comments, stating, “Israelwill not be deterred from protecting itscitizens and will strike its enemies in everyplace and in every way.”44 The Bushadministration’s response was to cautionboth parties but to emphasize Israel’s rightto defend itself.

The incident is only the latest indicatorin what is an obviously unstable politicalrelationship with the potential for escalationstemming from a variety of factors.Judging the “stability” of the Syria-Israeldeterrent relationship is problematic. Bothactors may well have intuitively agreedupon a series of “red lines” that form thebasis for a coercive bargaining framework.Israel mounted the raid into Syria as asignal of sorts, which, if nothing else,demonstrated its overwhelming militarysuperiority and its willingness to use forcewhenever it felt justified. Syria’s responserecognized its inherent weakness but alsoconveyed that there are limits beyondwhich Syria cannot be pushed. If thepreceding analysis about Israeli views ofdeterrence has any validity, it is equallyplausible that Israel would have welcomedescalation by the Syrians as a pretext for awider war.

Layering U.S. strategic forces overthis situation creates additional uncertain-ties. For example, it is unclear to whatextent either of the parties interacting inthis incident is aware that both are beingsubjected to deterrent and compellantstrategies as suggested in the NPR. So it

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seems manifestly unclear exactly how thestrategic arsenal is functioning in its role of“assuring” Israeli decision makers of U.S.commitment to Israel’s security. And itmust be admitted that there is also no suchclarity on what impact the deterrent effectis having on Syrian behavior.

Due to the U.S.-Israeli relationship, itseems clear that it would be easier for theUnited States to convey its intentions to itsclose ally, but Syria is another matteraltogether. It is not too much to suggestthat the United States may be wanderinginto the unknown insofar as it is integratingSyria into a coercive framework backed byU.S. nuclear weapons. It seems eminentlyunclear whether Bashar Asad realizes thathe is being subjected to certain coerciveand compellant strategies that are poten-tially backed up by nuclear weapons. It isalso manifestly unclear whether the U.S.deterrent plays any role in the Syriandecision-making calculus on conflictescalation or even surprise attack. If theNPR’s assertions about the central impor-tance of deterring attacks against Israeland actively defending it are to be takenseriously, one would expect that BasharAsad should be made aware that escala-tion in situations like the October 2003Israeli strike could potentially lead to aU.S. response.

In Syria and its leader Bashar Asad,the United States faces a superficiallysimilar situation to the one it faced withSaddam during the 1990s: an authoritarianleader, most probably operating on limitedand imperfect information with a decision-making environment characterized byrelatively few actors. A main motivationfor Asad is to maintain his hold on power.The internal political environment is also tosome extent opaque – as it was in Iraq. Yet

understanding this environment is crucial todevising a communications strategy thatcan accurately convey intent. In seeking tooperationalize coercive and compellantstrategies against Syria backed by thethreat of force, the United States mustonce again also confront the communica-tions issues so vital to the functioning ofcoercive strategy. Accurately conveyingintent is essential. Confronting thesecommunications issues forces the UnitedStates into critical analysis of BasharAsad’s structure of internal and externalimages through which intent has to becommunicated. These images, which arefunctions of the leader’s personality andhistorical experiences, also seem indeliblyetched by a particular regional culture – asundefined and amorphous as that termseems. Reduced to its most basic level, theessential issue becomes this: How does theUnited States convey intent with BasharAsad, and what indices can we develop toensure that the signals are being received?

Deterrence and Regional RoguesAs previously noted, the Bush

administration’s strategy documents almostuniversally assert that so-called rogueregimes are not subject to deterrence. Theabsence of the deterrent restraint on theseactors (as well as non-state actors) is oneof the underlying assumptions in theadministration’s arguments calling for pre-emptive military action and preventive war.

Analysts have vigorously challengedthe Bush administration’s assumptions onthese issues. Two of the most prominentof these are John Mearsheimer andStephen Walt, who made a persuasive casethat Saddam Hussein, for example, wassubject to deterrence and that the strategyof containment exercised by the United

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States during the 1990s effectively limitedSaddam’s threat to region and the widerinternational system.45 Walt has alsoargued separately that the wider threat ofrogue states has been exaggerated. Heargues that managing the insecurity ofthese states is the central policy challengefacing the United States, which can beaccomplished reasonably easily throughcoalitions and alliances.46

Examining the applicability of deterrenceand containment strategies – as opposed todissuasive, compellance-based strategies – isa critical issue for policy makers as theythink through the implications of applying thestrategic nuclear force in the region. Deal-ing with rogue regimes with containmentstrategies as practiced during the Cold Warand in the Gulf during the 1990s suggeststhat nuclear weapons (supported by conven-tional force) can function as a usefulelement in an overall strategy to manage thesecurity environment.

Assuming that there can be a usefulrole for traditional deterrence vis-à-visadversaries suggests that the United Statesshould seek to construct regional politicaland military coalitions backed by conven-tional and strategic capabilities as theunderlying framework of regional securityand stability. For example, using U.S.advanced transformational military capa-bilities and technologies to create a sharedsystem of situational awareness withcoalition militaries to create transparencyand trust could represent one building blockin a security architecture to minimize thethreat posed by anti-status-quo regimes.47

A critical component of a reconfiguredsystem of regional security could conceiv-ably draw upon one of the U.S. arsenal’snew components – strategic missiledefense. A region-wide missile-defense

system, in combination with programsinitiated during the Clinton administrationunder the auspices of the CooperativeDefense Initiative against Weapons ofMass Destruction, could serve as helpfulelements to strengthen deterrence through-out the region. CDI, as it was called,sought to encourage the Gulf states toundertake a variety of measures to addressthe possibility of attacks using WMD.

The “Demand” Side of SecurityApplying U.S. strategic forces toward

a non-coercive, deterrence-based mission,in the context of a broadly-based contain-ment strategy also implicitly addresses thedemand side of the security equation. Bycreating a system of transparency, trustand confidence, states may feel lessthreatened and have less motivation todevelop WMD capabilities. A centralassumption of this argument is that insecu-rity, which can flow from internal vulner-abilities, is a cause for aggressive behav-ior.48 By managing the external environ-ment, regional states might be less inclinedto pursue threatening capabilities andengage in aggressive behavior. In such anenvironment, a range of military capabili-ties, including the strategic deterrent, couldbe applied to form a seamless securityumbrella that makes all those under it feelsecure. Defensive capabilities, as notedabove, could form part of the umbrella.

But in the Middle East, theory inevita-bly collides with reality. Intransigent andenduring sources of conflict seem impervi-ous to all attempts to reduce tensions andpromote cooperation on a region-widebasis. These sources of conflict limit whatthe United States can expect to achieve byextending its strategic umbrella throughoutthe region. The extension of a security

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umbrella, including forward deployedforces, only exacerbates the securitydilemma of some of the regional states,most notably Iran and to a lesser extentSyria. Iran views the U.S. military pres-ence in the region as a threat to its securityand is almost certainly not interested inbeing “assured” by the strategic deterrent– except in a negative context.

Policy Lessons from Iraq?In hindsight and given available infor-

mation, it is difficult to underestimate theimpact of misperception and communica-tions issues on the coercive frameworkused throughout the 1991-2003 period bythe United States against Iraq.49 Thereare important lessons in this case as policymakers address the role of strategicweaponry, especially nuclear arms, inregional security strategy.

The stated objectives of U.S. policieswere threefold (and not necessarily mutu-ally supportive): deter Iraqi attacks againstits neighbors and mitigate Iraq’s militarythreat to the region; seek Iraq’s compliancewith a variety of U.N. Security Councilresolutions, the most of important of whichwas verifiable disarmament; and simulta-neously (from 1997 onward) topple Saddamby encouraging internal and externalopponents. Throughout the decade, theUnited States used a variety of diplomatic,economic and military tools in the contextof a broad-based strategy of compellanceand deterrence to achieve these objectives.The United States deployed forces engagedin ongoing military operations to enforce aU.N. trade embargo and simultaneouslydenied Iraq control over much of its ownairspace. It used its influence in the U. N.Security Council to isolate Iraq politicallyand took a leadership role in trying to

ensure the efficacy of the U. N. arms-inspection process pursuant to U.N.Security Council Resolution 687. Forcewas used repeatedly throughout the periodin response to various objectionable behav-iors by the regime.

The U.S. approach towards Iraqrepresented a classic mix of deterrent andcompellant strategies. The threat of forcewas always present, varying in intensitythroughout the period, depending on thecrisis du jour, and specific attacks werelaunched in 1993, 1996 and 1998. Apattern emerged during the decade:defiance by Saddam resulted in U.S.military deployments into the regionaccompanied by repeated statements ofintent to use force. These crises eitherwere resolved with a political compromiseat the United Nations or, alternately, U.S.attacks. This pattern continued untilDecember 1998, when the United Nationswithdrew its inspectors and the UnitedStates mounted Operation Desert Fox.Following these strikes, the rules of en-gagement for U.S. forces patrolling the no-fly zones were expanded, allowing a moresystematic and sustained military campaignagainst the Iraqi air-defense system andcommand-and-control network throughoutsouthern Iraq.

The approach taken by the UnitedStates reflected important elements ofSchelling’s bargaining process: use thethreat and actual use of force in tandemwith public statements as tools to conveyintent in pursuit of an objective. Escalationfollowed rhetoric if Saddam did not comply.Saddam’s defiance during the periodseemed to confirm a prevailing view thatthe United States was dealing with adangerous and recalcitrant “realist” whosemain motivation was to remain in power

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and continue defying the internationalcommunity by preserving his WMDprograms. Saddam’s refusal to provideinformation to correct discrepancies indeclarations to the U.N. weapons inspec-tors and the discovery of the so-called“concealment mechanism” during thetenure of U.N. Special CommissionChairman Richard Butler only confirmed aprevailing view that Saddam had stocks ofWMD stored just out of reach of inspec-tors. After all, so the reasoning went, whywould he go to such lengths and endure thewrath of the international community?

But in retrospect it appears that theother actor in the coercive bargainingframework (Saddam) was working off anasymmetrical series of motivations and haddeveloped images that were, for the mostpart, opaque to the United States (if not theentire international community). Theasymmetrical interests and opaque imagesmeant the signals and indices used by eachside were more like ships passing in thenight than signals conveyed by rationalactors communicating in a calculatedinterstate bargaining process. Saddamconsciously manipulated both signals andindices to deceive a variety of differentinternal and external actors. And he wasresoundingly successful in his deception.The United States and the internationalcommunity bought it, hook, line and sinker.

Further, Saddam’s motivations andimages were strongly rooted in the region’scultural and behavioral norms – a criticalone being not to lose face. The need forSaddam to preserve credibility with hisneighbors and internal opponents formedan important, perhaps even defining,element of Iraq’s external image. Saddamclung to these core beliefs and the support-ing image beyond what anyone could have

thought was rational. While the UnitedStates correctly perceived the importanceSaddam attached to his WMD programsfor regional and international credibility, itnever caught on to the deception, in partbecause it seemed illogical andcounterintuitive. While U.S. diplomaticand military actions undoubtedly had somecoercive and deterrent value, these actionsalso had the unintended effect of reinforc-ing what Saddam wanted the rest of theworld to believe: that he retained significantWMD stocks. For the United States, thedisconnect between the signals madepursuant to the coercive policy objectivesand the actions of the target could not havebeen more pronounced.

In retrospect, it seems clear thatasymmetrical interests, misperception (fedby intelligence failures) and communica-tions problems affected the coercivebargaining framework. Indeed, it isunclear to what degree the framework wasoperating at all in accordance withSchelling’s paradigm. The implications ofthis analysis for the months precedingOperation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are signifi-cant. As was the case in Gulf War I, avariety of senior U.S. officials, includingPresident Bush, stated that Iraqi use ofchemical and/or biological weapons againstU.S. forces or coalition partners would bemet with an overwhelming, i.e., nuclear,response. U.S. troops expected that Iraqwould in fact use its chemical and biologi-cal weapons in response to the invasion,suggesting that the National CommandAuthority would have been placed in theposition of having to make the decision onusing nuclear weapons against Iraqi forcesor regime targets. From the U.S. perspec-tive, the public declarations and the historyof Iraqi non-use of chemical/biological

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weapons in Gulf War I suggested thatdeterrence could play a role in the coerciveframework and discourage Saddam fromfirst use. But if the preceding analysisabout the inherent weaknesses in thecoercive framework is only partiallycorrect, it suggests that both parties hadentered a blind alley in the months beforeOIF. The United States believed that thecoercive framework was fully operationaland that deterrence could play a usefulrole. But if the post-war reports are anyindication, it seems unclear whetherSaddam was capable of taking the actionsexpected by U.S. decision makers withinthis framework or was receiving any of theintended signals. In short, the UnitedStates and Iraq were in a strategicallyunstable environment in which uncontrolledescalation could have flowed relativelyeasily due to actions by either party.

CONCLUSIONSThe preceding analysis suggests that

U.S. strategic forces, including the nuclearweapons arsenal, hold both promise andproblems as tools to help manage theregional security environment. In myjudgment, the primary value of U.S. forcesis not in the realm of coercion,compellance and dissuasion, in whichactors are made to reverse actions alreadyundertaken or change their entire foreignpolicy and security strategy to conformwith U.S. goals in the region. Rather, themain value of the arsenal lies with support-ing the broadly defined political objectivesof deterrence and assurance. If com-bined with a security environment charac-terized by cooperation, transparency andtrust, U.S. strategic weaponry could act asa stabilizing factor in the security environ-ment – at least for those states participating

in the framework. This suggests that thecentral policy challenge facing the UnitedStates is to craft a regional environmentthat builds relationships among cooperativestates while simultaneously managingthreats from anti-status-quo regimes.

Using U.S. strategic forces, includingnuclear-weapons forces, as part of acoercive interstate bargaining frameworkappears more problematic. In the MiddleEast, it seems clear that the United Statesmust address communications issuessurrounding the conveyance of intent onwhich the bargaining process depends.Lessons of the 13-year experience withIraq are not particularly encouraging. Acursory review of the interaction with Iraqsuggests serious communications discon-nects. While the United States effectively“got lucky,” since Saddam’s cupboard wasbare, it would be a mistake to conclude thatIraq’s non-use of WMD in Operation IraqiFreedom is a useful model for the future.An unfortunate conclusion out of the Iraqcase is that systemic communicationsdifficulties in fact make pre-emptive actionthat much more attractive in situationswhere there can be no confidence that thecoercive framework is functioning with anydegree of predictability.

These lessons seem particularlygermane to the ongoing Israeli-Syrianrelationship, with the potential for escala-tion on both sides, which by extensioninvolves the United States through itscommitment to Israel. Variances betweenU.S. and Israeli views of deterrence andcompellance should be closed if the UnitedStates wants its strategic deterrent tofunction in a constructive way to achieveits policy objectives with both parties.Moreover, deciphering the series of imagesmotivating Syrian leader Bashar Asad

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seems equally important if the UnitedStates is to construct a communicationssystem that can accurately convey intent.

One conclusion of this analysis is thatpolicy makers must address communica-tions issues, images and perceptions beforeusing strategic nuclear forces in anyregional coercive-bargaining framework. Inthe Middle East and elsewhere, systemiccommunications problems, complicated bycross-cultural issues, impose enormousdifficulties in operationalizing nuclearweaponry as an instrument of coercive andcompellant strategies. But the promise of

using nuclear and conventional weaponspurely as a strategic deterrent – that is,for providing an open-ended and admittedlyambiguous deterrent presence for acooperative regional security environment– should not be minimized. Using nuclearweapons in this traditional sense of deter-ring aggression, as one supporting elementin an overall system of managing regionalsecurity, suggests that U.S. policy shouldconcentrate on the demand-side of thepolicy equation, to create a system oftransparency and trust with all regionalstates.

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1 See John Donnelly, “DIA: Mideast Most Likely Place Nukes Could Be Used,” Defense Week, (Vol. 21. No.19, May 8, 2000).2 Declassified Top Secret Memorandum for the National Security Council, June 29, 1950, NSC 26/3, Subject:Demolition and Abandonment of Oil Facilities and Fields in the Middle East..3 See details in William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967(Brookings Institution Press and University of California Press, 2001), pp. 120-124. Text of the agreementat http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5186.htm.4 President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, 23 January 1980, as cited by Secretary of State CyrusVance, “US Foreign Policy: Our Broader Strategy,” 27 March 1980, Department of State, Current Policy No. 153.5 Richard Burt, “Study Says a Soviet Move in Iran Might Require U.S. Atom Arms,” The New York Times,February 2, 1980, p. 1.6 Perry’s statements as cited in the Arms Control Association Fact Sheets, “U.S. Nuclear Policy: ‘NegativeSecurity Assurances,’” at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/negsec.asp.7 NPR as posed at the Global Security Website at http://globasecurity.org/wme/library/policy/dod/npr.htm p. 6.8 See Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2001, pp. 90-91.9 See Doug Frantz, “Iran Closes in on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb,” Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2003,p. A1. For details on Syria, see Dany Shoham, “Poisoned Missiles: Syria’s Doomsday Deterrent,” MiddleEast Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 4, Fall 2002. Also see Anthony Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction inthe Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and WeaponsEffects,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 15, 2003, pp. 51-59.10 NPR, p. 6, as posted on the Global Security.org website.11 Ibid. p. 4.12 Ibid. p. 5.13 Ibid. p. 5.14 Ibid. p. 5.15 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, The Defense Department, September 30, 2001, pp. iii.16 Ibid. p. iii.17 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, September 2002, p. 29.18 For an expanded discussion of this issue, see James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell, “U.S. Policy onPreventive War and Preemption,” The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 10, Number 1, pp. 113-123.19 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, The White House, December 2002, p. 3.20 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University, 1960). Arms and Influence (Yale UniversityPress, 1966).21 Arms and Influence, p. 34.22 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Chapters 2 and 4.

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23 Ibid p. 4.24 Ibid p. 4.25 Ibid, Chapter III, “Bargaining, Communication and Limited War,” pp. 53-80, and pp. 146-150.26 Arms and Influence, pp. 16, 31.27 The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 146-151.28 Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, “The No Cities Doctrine,” University of Michigan Commencement,June 1962. In this speech, McNamara also argued that “…basic military strategy in a general nuclear warshould be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded inthe past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a majorattack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy’s forces, not his civilian population.”29 For example, in his book Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Sage Publications, 1977), p. 78, PatrickMorgan notes that the circumstance of threat and reaction can create psychological reactions in the minds ofthe actors that can introduce “…some influence from irrational objectives and perceptions…” into anotherwise rational decision-making process.30 The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton University Press 1970) p. 281.31 Ibid. p. 332 Ibid. p. 11.33 Richard Neustadt, Report to JFK: Skybolt in Perspective (Cornell University Press 1999).34 Logic of Images, p. 115.35 Ibid. p. 138.36 Rami G. Khouri, “A View from the Arab World,” Daily Star, Internet edition, February 11, 2004.37 See a summary of Israel’s nuclear program at Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center forNonproliferation Studies, Israel country summary, at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel.htm38 Peter Beaumont, “Israel Deploys Nuclear Arms in Submarines,” Guardian Unlimited, Internet Edition,October 12, 200339 Zeev Maoz, “The Unlimited Use of the Limited Use of Force: Israel and Low Intensity Warfare, 1949-2004,” unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal,March 17-20, 2004. Cited with the author’s permission.40 Ibid. These conclusions are drawn from pp. 29-30.41 In an interview on April 5, 2003, Undersecretary of State John Bolton stated that the invasion of Iraqwould send “a message” to Syria that “the cost of their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is potentiallyquite high…[and] the determination of the United States…to keep these incredibly dangerous weapons out ofthe hands of very dangerous people should not be underestimated.” See also Paul Kerr, “Top U.S. OfficialsVoice Concern About Syria’s WMD Capabilities,” Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, May2003. On April 16, 2003, Bolton further stated that the United States intends to exert “a maximum diplo-matic effort” to persuade “states like Syria, Libya and Iran among others to give up their pursuit of nuclear,chemical and biological weapons and long-range ballistic-missile delivery systems.... We want a peacefulresolution to all of these issues, but the determination of the United States, especially after September 11, tokeep these incredibly dangerous weapons out of the hands of very dangerous people should not be underesti-mated.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/syria-intro.htm.42 As quoted in Kim Ghattas, “Syria Warns Israel of Retaliation,” BBC News, October 11, 2003.43 Ibid.44 As quoted in “Syrian Ambassador Promises Military Responses to Further Attacks,” Guardian Unlimited,October 8, 2003.45 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2003.46 Stephen M. Walt, “Containing Rogues and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counterproliferation,” in VictorUtgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests and World Order (MIT Press, 2000).47 Explained in greater detail in James A. Russell, “Searching for a Post-Saddam Regional Security Architec-ture,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2003.48 See Steven Walt, “Containing Rogues and Renegades,” in Utgoff op. cit., pp. 193-193.49 See Dan Byman and Mathew Waxman, Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the GulfWar (Rand Corporation, 2000).

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