calgary city council performance report...
TRANSCRIPT
1
CALGARY CITY COUNCIL PERFORMANCE REPORT: THE DEMOCRATIC TOOLBOX 2.0
JEROMY ANTON FARKASMAY 28, 2014
KEY POINTS
• It’s hard to follow what goes on at City Hall, but it can be made easier by expanding the “democratic toolbox” available. Since September 2013, the Manning Foundation pilot “Growing the Democratic Toolbox: City Councillor Vote Tracking” has been downloaded more than 10,000 times.
• The Democratic Toolbox, implemented online at CouncilTracker.ca, provides citizens with the technology they need to better track and hold accountable the level of government closest to them.
• This performance report assesses the official voting records and behaviour of the 2013-2017 Calgary City Council during its first six months after election (October 28 2013 to March 31 2014).
• Performance measures include attendance, how time is spent, questions asked, coalition analysis (who regularly votes with and against whom?) and voting positions on taxation.
2
3
“A WELL-INFORMED CITIZENRY IS THE ONLY TRUE REPOSITORY OF THE PUBLIC WILL.”
– Thomas Jefferson
5
1. 22% of Calgary City Council business is conducted in camera, up from 18.5% for the
2010-2013 term as measured by Manning Foundation Researcher Jeromy Anton
Farkas. Topics discussed in private include snow removal, flood and tax scenarios,
sporting events, and internet access.
2. 93% of council meetings proceeded with at least some portion being behind closed
doors, up from 78%. About a fifth of council meetings spend more time in camera than
in public. The previous council had some opposition to motions to move in camera, but
this new council has been mostly unanimous in keeping deliberations closed.
3. Tax restraint by Calgary Ctiy Council has increased overall since the 2013 municipal
election. The average Councillor voted to hold the line on taxation about 52% of the
time, up from 40%. Some Councillors have made dramatic shifts since the previous
term. On financial questions, Council appears to be divided into two coalitions of 6
Councillors each, with a group of 3 Councillors who are often the swing vote. One
Councillor swings in favour of more tax restraint, and 2 swing in favour of less tax
restraint.
4. Council average attendance remains high; however, most absences from meetings
remain excused without any reason given and some Councillors miss large amounts
of key roll call votes. Only one Councillor has abstained themselves so far from any
Council business due to a conflict of interest.
5. Council typically doesn’t ask many questions of the administration during Question
Period. Six out of fifteen council members account for all questions asked.
6. Council tends to be relatively divided on roll call questions brought forward: 42% of
roll call motions were decided by only a 1 to 3 vote spread.
KEY FINDINGS CALGARY CITY COUNCIL PERFORMANCE
OCTOBER 2013 TO APRIL 2014
6
There are more than 25,000 elected municipal
officials in Canada, compared to 757 elected
provincial and territorial officials and 308
elected federal officials.
Large urban municipalities such as Calgary,
Toronto, and Vancouver have larger populations
than many provinces. Despite this, the
democratic needs of municipal government in
Canada has received much less academic, media,
and public attention than deserved.
Most of Canada’s public-policy think tanks
and political science departments are far more
focused on federal, provincial and international
issues than municipal issues. Municipal
government is most often seen as the “third”
level of government rather than as the first level,
closest to the people. Municipal government
structures and practices - usually defined by
provincial statutes - have generally failed to keep
pace with the country’s urbanization.
In 2013, the Manning Foundation for
Democratic Education conducted two large,
city-wide public opinion surveys identifying
municipal issues of most importance to
Calgarians.
Among the results of this poll were several
results related to the democratic process:
• Calgarians rank ‘making city hall more
accountable’ fourth behind congestion,
affordability, and safety;
• Calgarians very strongly oppose a party
system in municipal politics; and
• Calgarians generally favour the Council
holding the line on taxes as opposed to
raising them.
THE DEMOCRATIC TOOLBOX 2.0
7
Of particular use to all participants in the
democratic process was a municipal tracking
system developed by Manning Foundation
researcher Jeromy Farkas for assessing 2010-
2013 Calgary City Council performance on
everything from Councillor attendance, to
time spent on particular subjects, to votes and
voting patterns on key issues. This system
and its methodology are described in a pilot
report Growing the Democratic Toolbox: City
Councillor Vote Tracking. It has application for
tracking the performance (for accountability
purposes) of any municipal council where there
is relatively free voting.
Democracy itself was an invention of the
city-state politics of ancient Greece, so it is
appropriate that efforts toward democratic
accountability be made at the municipal level.
Essential to democratic accountability is the
ability of the public to monitor and assess the
representation they receive.
However, this monitoring is an immense
challenge for the public, whose time is valuable
and who face many demands. In one year
a council can meet for thousands of hours
in total, while considering of thousands
of motions, some of which have policy
implications and many of which are merely
procedure. In the process, they may also
generate hundreds of thousands of lines of code
published via government open data sources.
The aim of this project is to develop a
methodology that simplifies and summarizes
the voluminous data emanating from Canadian
council chambers and makes it available to the
public.
At the provincial and federal levels of
government, and in some municipalities, this
information is filtered through party lenses,
so it is easy for the public to see what general
positions an elected representative is likely to
take. However in Calgary and likely in other
municipalities, there is great opposition to this
kind of party organization at the municipal
level. The intent here is to provide the best
of both worlds: independent candidates, and
highly accessible information about how they
vote.
METHODOLOGY
This research paper and its corresponding
municipal performance report is a second
attempt at a very ambitious project.
It is designed to show what is possible by
assembling quantitative data on a law-making
body where representatives do not vote along
party lines, as well as how their behaviour and
representation can change over time.
The Democratic Toolbox 2.0 expands on the
initial pilot by comparing the previous Calgary
City Council (October 2010 - March 2013) with
the newly elected council (October 28 2013 -
March 31 2014).
This research paper incorporates data from
8
all sixteen City of Calgary Council Meetings
held between October 28 2013 and March 31
2014, and in particular assesses all of the 100
recorded roll call votes performed during that
time. This selection of roll call votes represents
approximately 10% of the questions considered
by council, and marked questions where council
lacked unanimity.
The motions used for this report are not a
scientific sample, but instead were selected
because firstly they were recorded and did not
require subjective interpretation of a voice vote,
and secondly that they demonstrated some
amount of healthy debate. Such a selection is
necessary for any exercise such as this because
a great many votes are procedural and tell us
little about the policy positions that each council
member is pursuing. As such, this report should
not be considered as a definitive conclusion on the
behavior of any particular council member, but
rather be indicative of what the record has shown.
This research is based on the official City of
Calgary minutes & agenda as approved by Calgary
City Council. It simply reports what has occured
and does not attempt to judge the merits of
those events. There is no single measure that can
determine the performance and effectiveness of
an elected body or single representative, but given
enough data and measures, clear patterns begin to
emerge.
9
The Democratic Toolbox is the
application of technology to impartially
assess the performance of elected
representatives.
Section A (pages 10-13) provides general
analysis of all council roll call votes
performed to date and incorporates the
win rate by council member, no rate
by councillor, motions forwarded and
seconded by council member, and margins
for how close roll call votes were decided.
Section B (pgs 14-17) continues with “who
votes with whom” analysis, incorporating
all 100 roll call votes, budget votes, and
close votes. It also examines how behaviour
changes from a typical vote to a close vote.
Section C (pgs 18-21) provides “who
votes with whom” charts for each council
member.
Section D (pgs 22-29) visualizes the
relationships established in the previous
section and highlights spending coalitions,
swing votes.
Section E (pgs 30-33) breaks down time
spent by council in camera and in public,
topics considered, and contrasts those
areas to the previous council.
Section F (pgs 34-36) assesses attendance
by council member, missed key votes, and
breaks down reasons given for absence
(if any), and contrasts those areas to the
previous council.
Section G (pgs 37-40) assesses questions
asked of administration by council
members, and breaks down the questions
by topic.
Section H (pgs 41-43) provides a tax
restraint score that assesses how often,
out of the financial roll call votes selected,
each council member voted to hold the line
on, or reduce, spending when given the
opportunity. Additional comparison to the
previous term is provided.
Conclusions, acknowledgements,
notes, and author information
follow.
WHAT IS IN THE DEMOCRATIC TOOLBOX?
10
SECTION A: GENERAL VOTE
ANALYSIS
This report begins with a general assessment
of all 100 roll call questions considered by the
newly elected Council. Although these votes are
not exhaustive or definitive, they provide an
opportunity to gain some further insights on
how members of City Council interact with one
another on important issues.
This is one area where impartiality in developing
a metric for performance is possible; an effective
Councillor may very well be one that has success
in bringing forward motions, collaborates with
other council members, or serves as a sober
second thought.
General analysis provides a glimpse into those
interactions by showing whether council
members are likely to move or second motions,
vote no against a motion, and vote with or against
the majority.
Figure A1 depicts the general win rate for each
council member, or in percentage terms how
often they were on the winning side of either
passing or blocking a motion.
Figure A2 depicts in percentage terms how often
council members vote “no” to a given motion.
Figure A3 breaks down the amount of
motions put forward and seconded, by council
member. Note that not all proposed motions or
amendments are seconded.
Figures A4 & A5 break down the margins of
how close roll call questions were decided. For
example, 17% of the time, roll call votes were
decided by a margin of 1 vote (8-7 or 7-8).
Note that with absences, even vote spreads are
possible as well (ie. 2 point spread with 8-6 or
6-8).
11
WIN RATEPercentage win rate for all roll call votes, by council member.
FIGURE A1
52%
54%
56%
57%
58%
58%
60%
63%
63%
63% 67
%
69%
72% 77
%
79%
NO VOTESPercentage frequency of no votes for all roll call votes, by council member.
FIGURE A2
26%
37%
39%
40%
41%
43%
44%
44%
45%
45%
47% 50
% 53%
54% 61
%
12
MOVERS AND SECONDERSAmount of motions put forward and seconded for all roll call votes, by council member.
FIGURE A3
1 16 6 6
27 5 7 5 6
15
614 14
52
5 5 105 8 6 9 10
111
5
14
MOTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD MOTIONS SECONDED
MARGINS OF VICTORYPercentage frequency of how close roll call votes were decided.
FIGURE A4
17%
12% 13
%
8%
18%
3%
13%
3%
9%
0
3%
13
MARGINS OF VICTORYProportional distribution of how close roll call votes were decided.
FIGURE A5
Decided by 1-3 votes43%
Decided by 4-6 votes29%
Decided by 7-13 votes28%
14
This section attempts to provide deeper insight
into council’s interactions as demonstrated by
their voting record. This analysis draws upon
three categories of votes for cross comparison:
• All 100 roll call votes, in order to provide a
baseline for all interactions (“all votes”);
• A subset consisting of the 29 2013 year end
budget deliberation votes, in order to develop
a case study for coalitions during budgeting
(“budget votes”); and
• A subset consisting of 43 votes with close
margins, where the outcome was decided
by a spread of 0 to 3 votes; in order to
determine along which lines council is most
often polarized (“close votes”).
It’s difficult to translate large sets of data
into something workable, but there are a few
different ways to map out the relationships
between councillors.
Figures B1-3 use similarity matrices in order
to depict the individual agreement rate between
council members. A similarity matrix highlights
the likelihood in percentage terms that a given
individual will vote the same way as another
(either both in support or in opposition to a
given motion).
These matrices identify who votes with
whom and shades agreement from red (zero
agreement) to orange (50% agreement) to
green (100% agreement). Using this method,
you can quickly assess voting pairings between
council members amongst the three sets of votes
described earlier. Comparing “who votes with
whom” data between sets of votes helps to better
illustrate how relationships change depenging.
For example, when considering all votes, Mayor
Nenshi votes with himself 100% of the time, but
only 32% of the time with Councillor Magliocca;
this drops to only 9.3% when considering close
votes. In contrast, Mayor Nenshi votes with
Councillor Farrell 66% of the time on all votes,
and that rises, rather than drops, to 79.1% for
close votes.
Figures B4 and B5 illustrate the relationships
between councillors by comparing their baseline
with how they vote on close and budget votes.
This can be used in order to determine how
council members actually interact on matters of
substance, excluding votes like deciding when to
take break.
SECTION B: TARGETED VOTE
ANALYSIS
15
WHO VOTES WITH WHOM: ALL VOTESPercentage scale depicting agreement on all votes, by council member.
FIGURE B1
WHO VOTES WITH WHOM: BUDGET VOTESPercentage scale depicting agreement on budget votes, by council member.
FIGURE B2
WHO VOTES WITH WHOM: CLOSE VOTESPercentage scale depicting agreement on close votes, by council member.
FIGURE B3
16
BASELINE VS. CLOSE VOTESIn real points, comparison between all votes and budget votes. Increase in points (green) means
that there is an increase in likelihood of that pair agreeing. Reduction (red) means less.
FIGURE B4
17
BASELINE VS. BUDGET VOTESIn real points, comparison between all votes and close votes. Increase in points (green) means
that there is an increase in likelihood of that pair agreeing. Reduction (red) means less.
FIGURE B5
18
This portion of the report visualizes the data from the previous section in order to allow for
deeper insight into council’s interactions on budget questions. As more votes become available for
assessment, similar comparisons will be possible on a multitude of issues. Budget questions were
chosen for this section because they represent the largest substantive portion of the new council’s
deliberations to date. When council is divided and asks for a roll call, it has so far been most often
along spending lines.
Figures C1-C3 provide percentage scale comparisons of who votes with each council member on
budget questions. For example, the graph titlted ‘Who votes with Nenshi’ demonstrates that, on
budget questions, Councillor Pincott votes with Mayor Nenshi 63 per cent of the time, whereas
Councillor Magliocca votes with him 31 per cent of the time.
Note that even budget questions allow for a certain element of strategic voting. Votes are not typically
held simultaneously nor by secret ballot, dispersing advantages and disadvantages. For this reason,
looking at council member voting comparisons on close votes may very well be more indicative of the
relationships between them.
SECTION C: COUNCIL VOTING
COMPARISONS
19
COUNCIL MEMBER VOTING COMPARISONSPercentage scale comparison of who votes with Mayor Nenshi, and Councillors
Colley-Urquhart and Carra on budget questions.
FIGURE C1
31% 35
%
35%
35% 39
%
39%
41%
55%
57%
57%
59%
59%
61%
63%
WHO VOTES WI TH NENSHI
35%
35% 39
% 43%
45%
45% 51
% 55% 59
%
59%
61%
63% 73
%
76%
WHO VOTES WI TH CARRA
24%
27% 35
%
37%
39%
41%
41%
43% 51
%
53% 59
%
59% 65
% 69%
WHO VOTES WI TH COLLEY-URQUHART
20
COUNCILLOR VOTING COMPARISONSPercentage scale comparison of who votes with Councillors Chabot, Chu, Demong, Farrell,
Jones, and Keating on budget questions.
FIGURE C233
% 39%
41%
41%
43%
45% 49
%
51% 57
%
57%
59% 69
%
69% 80
%
WHO VOTES WI TH CHABOT
29%
31% 35
%
37%
39%
39%
39% 47
% 55% 61
% 65%
67%
69% 84
%
WHO VOTES WI TH CHU
35% 39
%
39% 43
%
43% 51
%
53%
53%
53% 57
% 61%
61% 65
% 80%
WHO VOTES WI TH DEMONG24
% 33% 37
%
37%
39%
41%
43% 53
%
55%
55% 63
%
63%
65% 76
%
WHO VOTES WI TH FARRELL
39% 43
%
43% 47
% 51%
51%
53%
55%
57%
57%
57%
57%
59% 71
%
WHO VOTES WI TH JONES
43% 49
%
49%
49%
51%
51%
51%
53%
55%
55% 59
%
59%
59% 65
%
WHO VOTES WI TH KEATI NG
21
COUNCILLOR VOTING COMPARISONSPercentage scale comparison of who votes with Councillors Magliocca, Pincott,
Pootmans, Stevenson, Sutherland, and Woolley on budget questions.
FIGURE C331
% 35%
37%
39% 43
% 49%
51% 57
%
59%
59%
61% 67
%
67% 71
%
WHO VOTES WI TH MAGLI OCCA
27% 31
%
33%
35% 39
%
39% 49
%
51%
51% 61
%
63%
63%
63% 69
%
WHO VOTES WI TH PI NCOTT
39%
39%
41%
43% 51
%
51%
53% 57
%
57% 61
% 65%
65% 69
% 73%
WHO VOTES WI TH POOTMANS35
% 39%
41%
43%
43%
45% 49
%
49%
49%
51%
51%
53%
53% 57
%WHO VOTES WI TH STEVENSON
33%
35%
35%
35%
37%
39% 43
%
43%
59% 65
%
67%
69%
69% 84
%
WHO VOTES WI TH SUTHERLAND
29% 37
%
37%
39% 43
% 49%
49%
49% 57
%
57%
57% 61
%
61%
63%
WHO VOTES WI TH WOOLLEY
22
SECTION D: COALITION ANALYSIS
Using the previously determined “who votes with whom” data, we can compare each Councillors’
outlook toward the rest of council to see if they, as groups, tend to disagree or agree with certain
others. The following six case studies examine the voting relationships between council members.
Figure D1 uses a technique called multi-dimensional scaling in order to visualize the virtual
distances between, and groupings of, council members as manifested through budget decisions. As
council members are persons with a range of preferences rather than fixed points on a map with fixed
distances between them, this results in some loss of accuracy. However, this technique is still a useful
method to visualize council’s arrangement at a glance.
This initial arrangement will be used to seed investigation into potential coalition case studies - for
example, it demonstrates distance between Colley-Urquhart and Farrell’s voting positions, as well as
proximity between Sutherland and Chu, and will be assessed on the following pages.
The following Figures D2-7 explore coalition case studies.
23
Nenshi
Carra
Col ley-Urquhart
Chabot
Chu
DemongFarrell
Jones
Keating
Magl iocca
Pincott
Pootmans
Stevenson
Sutherland
Wool ley
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
COUNCIL VOTING POSITIONSCouncil’s arrangement as visualized through multi-dimensional scaling, on budget questions.
FIGURE D1
24
COALITION CASE STUDY 1How Councillors Colley-Urquhart and Farrell vote versus the rest of council.
FIGURE D2
Figure D2 demonstrates a pronounced difference in how Councillors Colley-Urquhart and Farrell
vote, and is used as the first case study. These council members were chosen because they had the
most marked difference in voting patterns of any combination of councillors on budget questions.
• Colley-Urquhart and Farrell and Chabot rarely vote the same way (24%).
• Those that that Colley-Urquhart tends to agree with are those that Farrell tends to disagree with,
and vice versa. There is substantial divergence.
• Colley-Urquhart seem to be less polarized on Jones, Keating, and Stevenson, suggesting that those
Councillors pose a common ground.
39% 35%
100%
59%65%
53%
24%
43%51%
59%
27%
41% 41%
69%
37%
55%
76%
24%
41% 37% 39%
100%
55%
43%37%
63% 65%
53%
33%
63%
Colley-Urquhart Farrell
25
Figure D3 demonstrates the similarities in voting behaviour between Councillors Chu and
Sutherland, and is used as the second case study. These council members were chosen because
they had the most marked similarity in voting patterns of any combination of councillors on budget
questions.
• Chu and Sutherland very often vote the same way (84%).
• Both councillors vote often with Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Demong, Keating, and Magliocca.
• Both councillors vote often against Nenshi, Carra, Farrell, Pincott, Pootmans, and Woolley.
• There is minimal divergence.
COALITION CASE STUDY 2How Councillors Chu and Sutherland vote versus the rest of council.
FIGURE D3
35%39%
65%69%
100%
61%
37%
47% 55%
67%
31%39% 39%
84%
29%35%
69%
84%
65%
33%
43%
59%
35%43%
100%
37%
Chu Sutherland
26
Figure D4 demonstrates the similarities in voting behaviour between Councillors Carra and
Pootmans. These council members were chosen because they also had a marked similarity in voting
patterns on budget questions.
• Carra and Pootmans very often vote the same way (73%).
• Both councillors vote often with Nenshi, Farrell, Pincott, and Woolley.
• Both councillors vote often against Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Chu, and Sutherland.
COALITION CASE STUDY 3How Councillors Carra and Pootmans vote versus the rest of council.
FIGURE D4
59%
100%
35%45%
39%
51%
76%
59%55%
43%
63%73%
45%
35%
61%61%
73%
41% 43% 39%
53%
65%57%
65%
51%
69%
100%
51%39%
57%
Carra Pootmans
27
Figure D5 demonstrates the voting patterns of Nenshi, Carra, Farrell, Woolley, Pootmans, and
Pincott, and is is used as the fourth case study: “Coalition A”
• There is generally a close overlap between these six council members.
• These six council members do not agree with each other 100% of the time, but their support for
each other is still stronger than the rest, as a trend. They regularly vote together and against all
others.
COALITION CASE STUDY 4How council members Nenshi, Carra, Farrell, Woolley, Pootmans, and Pincott vote
versus the rest of council: “Coalition A”
FIGURE D5
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
Nenshi Carra Farrell Pincott Pootmans Woolley
28
COALITION CASE STUDY 5How councillors Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Chu, Demong, Sutherland, and Magliocca vote
versus the rest of council: “Coalition B”
FIGURE D6
Figure D6 demonstrates the voting patterns of Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Chu, Demong, Sutherland,
and Magliocca, and is used as the fifth case study: “Coalition B”
• There is generally a close overlap between these six council members.
• As with case study 4, these six council members do not agree with each other 100%. However, their
support for each other is still stronger than the rest, as a trend. They share those who they vote
with as well as who they vote against.
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
Colley-Urquhart Chabot Chu
Demong Magliocca Sutherland
29
COALITION CASE STUDY 6How Coalitions A and B perceive the rest of council, overlayed.
FIGURE D7
Figure D7 compares the previously established Coalitions A and B. Voting tendencies of the two
groups have been average and overlayed. Coalition A percentage is determined by the average of Nenshi,
Carra, Farrell, Woolley, Pincott, and Pootmans. Coalition B percentage is determined by the average of
Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Chu, Demong, Sutherland, and Magliocca.
• There is a marked difference in how the two coalitions perceive the rest of council.
• Councillors Jones and Keating seem to be positioned as key swing votes, as they are perceived
equally by both groups. These two council members appear about as likely to support one coalition
as the other.
• Stevenson is also a swing vote, but seems to swing slightly in favour of Coalition A (51%) rather
than Coalition B (42%).
36%41%
68% 72% 74% 70%
35%
53% 54%
69%
34%44% 42%
76%
39%
66%72%
34%40%
35%43%
70%
41%
70% 71%
51%
35%
67%
Coalition B Coalition A
30
Calgary City Council met for a total of about 119
hours between election in October 2013 and
April 2014. This represents about 7 hours and 26
minutes per meeting.
More than a fifth (22%) of that time – nearly
27 hours spanning 82 agenda items – was
conducted in camera: in secret and closed to
the public. 64.6% of confidential items were
planned for in advance, while the remaining
35.6% arose as urgent business.
Council spent an average of 19.3 minutes per
confidential item, but there is no accurate way
to more deeply assess how much time is being
spent on a given topic in secret.
The majority of meetings (93.8% or 15 of 16)
were closed to the public for at least some
portion.
Only one meeting was held in public for its
entirety, for only 40 minutes (October 28 2013).
Calgary City Council has so far been unanimous
in keeping proceedings confidential. In contrast,
there was opposition to closing deliberations at
least 17% of the time from 2010-2013.
Figure E1 provides a breakdown of topics of
items discussed in camera, as classified by the
Manning Foundation.
Figure E2 provides breakdowns of meetings
and how time is spent by Council, in camera and
in public.
EXAMPLES OF IN CAMERA TOPICS• Labour and collective bargaining (various)
• Proposed acquisitions, sales, leases (various)
• Legal matters (various dates)
• “Sports events recommendations” (2013-12-
16)
• Utility rates, fee hikes, and taxation scenarios
(2014-03-14)
• Internet access (2014-01-27)
• Personnel items/appointments/reviews
(various)
• Auditors’ reports (various)
• South West Ring Road (various)
SECTION E: SECRECY
31
FIGURE E1
TOPICS IN CAMERABreakdown of topics of items discussed in camera, as classified by the Manning Foundation.
32
FIGURE E2TIME SPENT BY COUNCIL
Breakdowns of meetings and time spent by Council, in camera and in public
Time spent in public
(93.3 hours)
Time spent in camera
(26.4 hours)
No part was held in secret
(1 meeting)
Some part was held in secret (15 meetings)
33
“NO GOVERNMENT IS
PERFECT. ONE OF THE CHIEF
VIRTUES OF A DEMOCRACY,
HOWEVER, IS THAT ITS
DEFECTS ARE ALWAYS
VISIBLE, AND UNDER
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES,
CAN BE POINTED OUT AND
CORRECTED.” – President Harry S. Truman
34
SECTION F: QUESTION PERIOD
Members of council have the opportunity to
question administration regarding the day to day
operation of the City of Calgary. This allows them
to better represent their constituents by raising
areas of concern with those who are directly
responsible for providing services. This section
provides breakdowns of the questions asked
and their subject matter. Although not a perfect
metric, an effective representative will typically be
one that takes advantage of the time allotted for
queries, rather than not.
During the portion in the record identified as
Question Period, 20 questions spanning about
1,200 words were asked by members of council.
6 of the 15 council members represented all
questioned asked during this period. The
remaining 9 did not ask any questions.
With this small a sample size, fair language
complexity analysis is not possible.
Figure F1 lists the amount of questions asked
during Question Period, by council member.
Figure F2 breaks down the questions asked
during Question Period, by topic.
EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS ASKED “It appears to me that Light Rail Transit (LRT)
has performed much better this year than
in previous years. With an aging fleet, I am
wondering if you can advise, what are some of
the solutions you are using to make sure that it
continues to perform as required for our transit
users?” (Pootmans, 2014-02-10)
“Recently there were comments made and
reported in the local media that the Calgary
Police Service operating budget is determined
without taking into consideration revenue
from fines. Can you verify the accuracy of
this statement and advise on actual budgetary
practice?” (Colley-Urquhart, 2014-02-10)
35
QUESTIONS ASKEDAmount of questions asked during Question Period, by council member.
FIGURE F1
1
3
4 4 4 4
36
FIGURE F2
TOPICS IN QUESTION PERIODBreakdown of topics of items in Question Period, as classified by the Manning Foundation.
Development5%
Traffic5%
Bylaws5%
Snow & ice removal32%
Historic buildings11%
Trans it16%
Road safety5%Pol ice
5%Sales
5%
Other governments11%
37
SECTION G: ATTENDANCE
Attendance is an important measure for judging
the performance of any elected assembly; before
anything else, representatives must show up in
order for them to represent their constituents.
Calgary council members were often not present
at meetings for extended portions, but were not
noted in the minutes to be officially be absent.
This analysis avoids any subjective discussion
regarding what it means to be “present,” and is
based solely upon what is noted in the official
record at the end of each set of council minutes.
Representation is not as simple as being present
at the beginning and ending of a meeting. An
effective representative must also be present for
the key votes in between. Figure G1 breaks down
the percentage of key roll call votes missed, by
council member.
There were 8 absences observed out of 16
meetings, or in other words, a councillor was
usually missing for every other meeting. Average
attendance was 96.2%, very slightly down from
97.4% last term. Figure G2 breaks down the
percentage attendance rate, by council member.
Elected officials may sometimes be required
elsewhere in order to perform official council
business. However, councillors usually gave no
reason for their absence. Figure G3 breaks down
the reasons given for absences, if any, by council
member.
Under City of Calgary Council policy, councillors
may abstain from deliberations due to a declared
conflict of interest (recorded in council minutes
as “Declaration of Pecuniary Interest”). Proactive
disclosure is an essential part of open government
and accountable democracy; such disclosures are
not an area of criticism, but instead an element
of transparency to be commended. If any elected
official stands to gain monetarily or otherwise
from matters being deliberated, it’s imperative
that they recuse themselves as well notify the
public about it.
Since election in October 2013, this new council
has collectively spent very little time away from
deliberations due to conflicts of interest. Only one
such abstention occured in the official record:
for 33 minutes by Councillor Sutherland with
the stated reason that family members were
employed by an applicant before council.
Note that the accuracy of this analysis depends on
the accuracy of the official record.
38
ROLL CALL VOTES MISSEDPercentage of key roll call votes missed, by council member
FIGURE G1
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
3.0%
3.0%
3.0%
3.0%
3.0% 4.
0% 5.0%
5.0%
5.0%
8.0%
8.0%
39
FIGURE G2
ATTENDANCE RECORDPercentage meeting attendance rate, by council member.
78.6
%
85.7
%
92.9
%
92.9
%
92.9
%
96.2
%
97.4
%
100.
0%
100.
0%
100.
0%
100.
0%
100.
0%
100.
0%
100.
0%
100.
0%
100.
0%
100.
0%
40
FIGURE G3
MEETINGS MISSEDAmount of meetings missed to date, by council member.
1
2
1 1
2
1
PERFORMING OTHER COUNCIL BUSINESS NO REASON FOR ABSENCE
41
Amount of meetings missed to date, by council member.
When given a list of relevant issues, Calgarians expressed concern about the city’s cost of living
and demonstrated a preference to hold the line on taxes rather than increase taxes to improve city
services.
Figure H1 uses a tax restraint score to depict how often, out of the financial roll call votes selected,
each council member voted to hold the line on, or reduce, spending when given the opportunity. For
example, Councillor Colley-Urquhart voted to hold the line on or reduce spending 86.2% of the time.
Further analysis and subsequent scores on other issues, such as development and planning, will be
possible when a larger sample pool of votes becomes available.
Figure H2 compares the tax restraint scores of the newly elected Calgary City Council with that
of the 2010-2013 term. Note that in the case of freshman council members, the score of the ward’s
previous representative is used for comparison.
SECTION H: TAX RESTRAINT
42
TAX RESTRAINT SCOREPercentage scale. 100 points means that the individual always votes to
hold the line 0n, or reduce spending when given the opportunity.
FIGURE H124
.1%
24.1
%
27.6
% 37.9
%
37.9
%
40.3
%
44.8
%
44.8
%
44.8
% 52.0
%
58.6
%
58.6
% 65.5
%
65.5
% 75.9
% 82.8
%
86.2
%
43
COUNCIL MEMBER
2010-2013SCORE
2013-2014SCORE
CHANGE IN SCORE
Stevenson 42.5 24.1 -18.4
Woolley* 34.2 (Mar) 24.1 -10.1
Chabot 75.3 65.5 -9.8
Nenshi 50.7 44.8 -5.9
Jones 49.3 44.8 -4.5
Demong 68.5 65.5 -3.0
Keating 58.9 58.6 -0.3
Pootmans 28.8 37.9 +9.1
Farrell 16.4 27.6 +11.2
Sutherland* 63 (Hodges) 75.9 +12.9
Carra 28.8 44.8 +16.0
Pincott 21.9 37.9 +16.0
Magliocca* 21.9 (Lowe) 58.6 +36.7
Colley-Urquhart 31.5 86.2 +54.7
Chu* 20.5 (Macleod) 82.6 +62.3
All 612.2 779.1 +166.9
TAX RESTRAINT SCORE COMPARISONComparison of tax restraint scores measured from October 2010 - March 2013
and October 2013 - April 2014. Note: In the case of newly elected council members
(*), the ward’s previous representative’s score is used for comparison.
FIGURE H2
44
CONCLUSIONAs final test cases, Figures I1 & I2 overlay and combine the previously identified coalitions (pages
22-29) on the tax restraint (page 42) and council voting position data (page 23).
It’s hard to follow what goes on at City Hall, but it can be made easier through technology. The
Manning Foundation for Democratic Education remains committed to developing technological tools
to enable voters to monitor the effectiveness of the representation they receive.
The Democratic Toolbox as a platform for city council vote tracking is able to simplify and summarize,
in a highly accessible way, the large amount of raw data being produced by Canadian council
chambers. Despite the inherent challenges of politics and subjectivity, it is possible to produce
impartial and robust statistical measures of Councillor behaviour and performance.
Technology and multimedia can also enable the public to better understand the substance of what
is being discussed by City Council, both in public session and behind closed doors. Research is just
beginning in this area, and will expand to tackle more policy issues and other municipalities.
Since September 2013, the Manning Foundation pilot “Growing the Democratic Toolbox: City
Councillor Vote Tracking” has been downloaded more than 10,000 times, demonstrating a clear
demand for further efforts in this area. While this performance report only represents a snapshot
of the record to date, subsequent analysis will be published digitally online and made available at
CouncilTracker.ca, in order to provide citizens with the technology they need to better track and hold
accountable the level of government closest to them.
45
46
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe author would like to thank policy analyst Angela MacLeod Irons for her help in collecting,
summarizing much of the data on the newly elected Calgary City Council referenced in this report.
John Whittaker was also instrumental in reviewing and compiling a portion of the data collected.
Furthermore, the author is indebted to Dr. Tom Flanagan’s work on Game Theory and Canadian
Politics (University of Toronto Press, 1998) which broke ground in this area and highlighted how
detailed analysis of legislatures not only challenges intuitions, but can produce new, and oftentimes,
surprising conclusions.
Last, but hardly the least: Morten Paulsen, Olivier Ballou, Brianna Heinrichs, Samantha Leclerc, David
Seymour and Preston Manning have all provided tremendous creative support and encouragement
throughout this project’s various stages of development.
The author, the Democratic Toolbox, and the pursuit of responsible government in Calgary and afar
have been well served by those named above.
47
1. This report’s introduction and justification for theoretical framework largely reiterates that of the initial September 20 2013 Manning Foundation pilot “Growing the Democratic Toolbox: City Councillor Vote Tracking” and its ac-companying November 6 2013 opinion editorial “You can’t slight city hall,” (Preston Manning, Globe and Mail). For more information on that study please visit http://www.manningfoundation.org/our-work
2. For more information regarding the poll and its methodology please visit the Municipal Survey Report, hosted on-line at http://www.manningfoundation.org/our-work
3. For an expanded digital version of this report containing database copies of all the votes studied, as well as the source data used to build each of the figures composing this report, please visit the digital version of the Democratic Toolbox hosted at http://www.counciltracker.ca or http://www.manningfoundation.org/our-work
4. The following sixteen general, special, organizational, and strategic meetings of council were used to generate this report: 2013-12-02, 2013-11-04, 2013-11-05, 2013-12-10, 2014-02-10, 2014-03-10, 2014-01-13, 2013-12-16, 2013-01-17, 2014-03-17, 2013-11-18, 2014-02-24, 2013-11-25, 2014-01-27, 2013-10-28, 2014-01-31, & 2014-03-31.
5. Records of meetings of Council and its Committees that have occurred since October 31, 2010 can be viewed on ELMS, the City of Calgary’s Electronic Legislative Management Solution, hosted online at: http://agendaminutes.calgary.ca/sirepub/meetresults.aspx
NOTES
48
UPCOMING PAPERS The Manning Foundation is building intellectual capital for municipal governance in five streams of public policy enquiry. Each stream will include a series of public policy papers designed to stimulate new thought about the role of municipal government in society. Manning Foundation research papers are placed in the public domain via the Foundation’s website and are available for review, debate, criticism and support by Canadians regardless of their political affiliation.
1. ORGANIC CITIES
An enquiry into how cities grow and what role government should play in regulating growth and providing infrastructure, with the goals of economic efficiency and liveability. Much of the debate around municipal development is based around what urban forms are desirable, with sprawlers and smart growthers alike arguing that land-use regulation and infrastructure provision should favour their ‘optimal’ urban form.
The Organic Cities project takes a different perspective: that what is important is not the urban form that emerges, but the processes that are in place, particularly the role of government. On this view, it is more important that the market is left free to serve consumer demand, with the important constraints being property rights and the real costs of infrastructure provision rather than land-use regulations.
Upcoming papers include enquiries into the economics of consultation processes so in vogue at city halls across the country and the effects of future advances in vehicle technology.
2. APPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES
An enquiry into the optimal role of government, with a positive analysis of what municipal government currently does and a normative analysis of what roles government is best equipped to fill. These roles broadly divide into an ownership role, a regulatory role, and an expenditure role each of which can be over or under played. This stream builds on concepts such as market failure, public goods and subsidiarity to identify which activities municipal government does or does not have a comparative advantage over other levels of government.
Upcoming papers include enquiries into the proper role of municipal government as a regulator and as a distributor of wealth.
49
3. CITIZEN SOVEREIGNTY
An enquiry into how well citizens can hold government to account, including monitoring of its activities and protecting their natural rights. This stream investigates standards of municipal accounting and performance reporting, open government, public safety and intergenerational equity. It considers concepts such as open government and open data, and property rights.
Future papers in this series include enquiries into the quality of performance reporting, intergenerational equity with respect to municipal government and open data projects.
4. THE OPEN SOCIETY
Open societies share power among a range of different institutions, unlike closed societies where it is vested in just one. The Open Society is an enquiry into the role of different institutions in the city, including the church, charities and associations. This stream has a historical element, it considers how these different elements have interacted in the past and may do so in the future.
Upcoming papers include an account of the role of civil society in building Calgary.
5. MUNICIPAL ISSUE PAPERS
This stream covers basic elements of public policy, including an introduction to the role of government at municipal level, briefings on areas of municipal policy and issue papers framed in terms of values, facts and ideas of conservatism applied to municipal policy. Particularly salient policy areas include public safety, mobility and affordability.
MANNING FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRATIC [email protected] 403.536.8585514 11 Ave SWCalgary, AB T2R 0C8
50
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
JEROMY ANTON FARKAS is the creator of, and leads
the Manning Foundation’s Democratic Toolbox project to develop better tools to
achieve effective democracy and responsible government. For six years prior to
joining the Manning Foundation as a Senior Researcher, Farkas was the Program
Administrator for the University of Calgary Israel Studies Doctorate Program.
He has negotiated international policy projects and partnerships on behalf of the
University of Calgary, and has served as a research team lead and data analyst for
the Faculties of Social Sciences, Arts, Medicine, and Veterinary Medicine.
51