caetano-defining personal reflexivity-a critical reading of archer's approach (febrero)

Article

Defining personalreflexivity: A criticalreading of Archer’sapproach

Ana CaetanoISCTE-Instituto Universitario de Lisboa, CIES-IUL, Lisbon, Portugal

AbstractMargaret Archer plays a leading role in the sociological analysis of the relation betweenstructure and agency, and particularly in the study of reflexivity. The main aim of thisarticle is to discuss her approach, focusing on the main contributions and limitations ofArcher’s theory of reflexivity. It is argued that even though her research is a pioneeringone, proposing an operationalization of the concept of reflexivity in view of its empiricalimplementation, it also minimizes crucial social factors and the dimensions necessary fora more complex and multi-dimensional study of the concept, such as social origins, familysocialization, processes of internalization of exteriority, the role of other structure–agency mediation mechanisms and the persistence of social reproduction.

Keywordsagency, Archer, internal conversation, reflexivity, structure

The way that people reflect to themselves, taking into consideration their social circum-

stances is problematized in different sociological approaches, whether the reference to

reflexivity is explicit and clearly emphasized, or intentionally absent. The widespread

presence of this notion in sociological theory can be understood by the fact that it refers

to a central problem: the interplay of structure and agency.

Classical sociologists, such as Marx (1994), Durkheim (2001), Weber (1978) and

Simmel (1982) created the foundations for the discussion about the relationship between

Corresponding author:

Ana Caetano, CIES-IUL, Edifıcio ISCTE, Av. das Forcas Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, Portugal.

Email: [email protected]

European Journal of Social Theory2015, Vol. 18(1) 60–75ª The Author(s) 2014

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the individual and society. The debate has proceeded cumulatively through approaches

such as that of Parsons (1937) or of authors working in the field of interpretative micro-

sociologies, such as Garfinkel (1999), Schutz (1972) and Goffman (1990), whose

research manifests the difficulty of balancing structural properties, on the one hand, and

agential capabilities, on the other. Bourdieu’s (1984, 1992, 1998) and Lahire’s (2003,

2011) dispositionalist approaches have also offered key contributions at this level, as

they emphasize the routine and habitual character of action, which articulates with the

practice of reflexivity on a daily basis. However, of these two authors, only Lahire

valued this combination. With Beck, Giddens and Lash’s (1994) reflexive modernization

approaches, the concept of reflexivity has taken on a new centrality in sociology,

especially as regards the interpretation of the dynamics of change and the analysis of the

social processes of late modern societies (Caetano, 2014b).

However, despite the popularity of this notion in the past 20 years, a sociologically

grounded proposal aimed at studying the concept empirically has only recently emerged.

Since 2003, Margaret Archer’s work (2003b, 2007a, 2012) has attempted to analyse

reflexivity empirically in its multiple dimensions. It soon became paradigmatic in the

sociological field, generating different reactions from various academic backgrounds.

Aiming to contribute to this debate on Archer’s proposal, this article discusses her

approach, highlighting its main contributions and limitations.

Dualism, reflexivity and internal conversation

Archer’s approach has the merit of explicitly introducing into the sociological debate a

concept that has often been perceived as being on the borderline with other scientific

domains. Not only does she emphasize the pertinence of its analysis from a sociological

point of view, she also mobilizes theoretical and methodological tools from the

discipline to study reflexivity empirically. Archer’s research is, at heart, a work of syn-

thesis and dialogue, particularly in relation to pragmatist, dispositionalist and reflexive

modernization perspectives, even if she assigns a different status to each of these.

The possibility of undertaking a sociological analysis of reflexivity has been accorded

particular attention in her most recent studies (2003b, 2007a, 2010a, 2012), though her

research on the topic, framed by the principles of critical realism, is firmly grounded in

her previous work (1982, 2003a, 2007b, 2013). In these texts, she developed the morpho-

genetic approach, which stems from her concern in linking structure and agency without

incurring the risk of reductionism and conflation (ascendant, descendent or central). The

author devotes special attention to central conflation, criticizing the way in which struc-

ture and agency are merged. Archer distinguishes herself particularly from Bourdieu’s

(1984) and Giddens’s (2004) structurationism, arguing that the mutual constitution of

structure and agency hinders the analysis of their interplay.1

Considering these two entities as distinct and autonomous, Archer proposes, as an

alternative, the notion of analytical dualism in order to problematize the relationship

between structure and agency, advocating the ontological primacy of the former over the

latter. Although like Giddens and Bourdieu, she recognizes the interdependent character

of their relationship,2 she nevertheless considers that structure and agency operate on

different timescales.

Caetano 61



It is in this analytical separation that the sociological study of reflexivity is anchored.

According to Archer, the conflation of structure and agency compromises the concep-

tualization and operationalization of reflexivity because reflexive deliberation requires

a clear separation between subject and object so that their interplay can be analysed.

Archer’s main contribution lies in the way reflexivity is defined as an internal

dialogue, a condition of existence in society, which activates the causal powers of struc-

tures and allows individuals to project their actions based on the articulation between

personal concerns and the conditions that make it possible to accomplish them. Internal

conversations basically consist of the dialogues that people engage in inwardly and

through which they define and clarify their beliefs, attitudes and goals, evaluate social

circumstances and define projects based on their main concerns. For Archer, reflexivity,

as an emergent personal property, mediates between structure and agency. Reflexivity,

exercised by internal dialogues, not only mediates the impact that structures have on

agents, it also conditions individual responses to particular social situations.

Through a three-way model that emphasizes both objectivity and subjectivity and

explicitly incorporates their interplay in the process of reflexive mediation, Archer

argues that: (1) structural properties shape the situations that agents face involuntarily

and have generative powers of constraint and enablement over (2) individuals’

subjectively defined concerns; and (3) therefore, social practices are produced from

agents’ reflexive deliberations, which determine their projects by reference to their

objective social circumstances (2003b: 135; 2007a: 17).

A key element of Archer’s proposal is that even though reflexivity is considered to be

common to all individuals, different people exercise it differently. Based on qualitative

research carried out by means of biographical interviews, Archer defines a typology of

four modes of reflexivity: communicative, autonomous, meta and fractured.3 She

concludes that the practice of reflexivity does not consist of homogeneous processes

of internal deliberation; rather, it is exercised in diverse ways depending on the relations

people establish with their social contexts and their main concerns. Communicative

reflexivity stems from internal conversations that require confirmation by others before

resulting in specific courses of action. Autonomous reflexivity is defined as

self-contained inner dialogues that lead directly to action without the need for validation

by other individuals. Meta-reflexivity refers to the reflexive critique that subjects direct

at their own internal conversations, which intensifies personal stress and social disorien-

tation. Fractured reflexivity is exercised by individuals whose inner dialogues do not

allow them to deal properly with social circumstances.

More recently, Archer (2007a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012) has sought to understand how this

typology is connected to social change in contemporary societies. According to her, there

are increasingly favourable conditions for the development of autonomous reflexivity,

meta-reflexivity and also fractured reflexivity, while communicative reflexivity is,

correspondingly, on the decline. Increased geographical mobility, improved educational

levels (particularly in higher education) and greater cultural diversity all operate against

contextual continuity in that they increase the likelihood of subjects’ biographical path-

ways being framed by social contexts different from those in which they started their lives.

In one of her most recent books, Archer (2012) devotes special attention to the

centrality of reflexivity in societies that are in constant change. She refers to the reflexive

62 European Journal of Social Theory 18(1)



imperative to account for the pressing need that individuals feel to be reflexive in con-

texts where social guidelines are no longer effective in orienting choices and practices.

For her, social origins are increasingly inadequate to prepare individuals for the intense

flows of change that affect their lives. In this sense, the rise of contextual discontinuity

and incongruence is inseparable from the growth of autonomous and meta-reflexivity.

What is more, the reflexive imperative accentuates the fallibility of personal projects,

which increases the number of individuals who are unable, even if only temporarily,

to guide their actions reflexively, revealing a fractured reflexivity.

The bumps in the road in Archer’s ‘way through the world’:critical notes

Archer’s work makes a central contribution to the study of reflexivity, in the various

dimensions discussed above. But there are a number of important implications to her pro-

posal. The following topics discuss central issues of her approach that preclude a more

complex and multi-dimensional understanding of the concept.

Social origins and family socialization

First, the emphasis assigned to agency, due to the central focus on reflexive delibera-

tions, results in the minimization of the role of social structures in determining action.

In line with the principles of critical realism, Archer emphasizes the causal powers of

social structures and their temporal priority, but does so mainly at a theoretical level.

That is to say, her empirical analysis is not always consistent with these principles. The

notion of social structures appears in her work with a considerable degree of malleabil-

ity. Personal emergent properties tend to overlay relatively easily the causal powers of

structures. If, as Archer states, human conduct can only really be explained by analysing

the interplay between these two types of powers, it is difficult to understand the second-

ary role ascribed to social origins and to socialization in her more recent work.

In fact, this has been one of the main critiques directed at her.4 Archer’s stance in this

regard was developed in dialogue with Bourdieu (1984, 1992, 1998), an author criticized

for emphasizing precisely the other end of the structure–agency relation. Several scho-

lars have recently argued that Archer’s theory should be complemented with Bourdieu’s

notion of habitus, by considering routine action in close articulation with reflexive delib-

eration in the analysis of social conduct (Adams, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007; Akram, 2012;

Caetano, 2011, 2014a; Chandler, 2013; Elder-Vass, 2007, 2010; Farrugia, 2013; Fleetwood,

2008; Mouzelis, 2008; Mutch, 2004; Sayer, 2009, 2010; Sweetman, 2003; Vandenberghe,

2013).5

Archer believes that social origins fail to prepare new generations for the contexts and

flows of change in contemporary societies. But the arguments she presents are not

empirically validated to postulate the declining influence of socialization. None of the

examples she uses to illustrate her reasoning are in line with her theoretical statements.

In one of her latest books, Archer (2012: 82–4) mentions the case of a law student in

the United Kingdom, Han-Wing, from South-East Asia, who comes from a privileged

social background.6 Her parents wanted her to complete her degree and then return home

Caetano 63



to practise law, as her brothers had done. However, Han-Wing still has no defined

projects for her professional career, and rejects her family’s ideals, which she considers

to be too conservative. Indeed, she values the spatial separation from the family because

it allows her more freedom. This refusal to reproduce the family’s economic and educa-

tional aspirations means that her socialization has had the opposite effect to what her

parents expected. According to Archer, this is an example of contextual incongruity.

It is difficult to understand how this case reinforces the idea that ‘socialization isn’t

what it used to be’ (Archer, 2010b: 136; 2012: 82). The situation described by Archer is

repeated in different countries and different social contexts for different generations of

people. Even in Bourdieu’s (1992) approach, this kind of situation is evident. Genera-

tional conflicts along similar lines are not exclusive to the contemporary condition.

Research on youth and transitions to adulthood often report disagreement between

parents and children or adolescents regarding values and lifestyles, regardless of social

origins. These conflicts can produce alternative social trajectories (contextual dis-

continuity and incongruence), but can also result in the reproduction of the family’s

cultural and socio-economic condition (contextual continuity). Reflexivity may indeed

be key to understanding diverse social conducts, but it should not result in the minimiza-

tion of socialization as an explanatory factor.

On the contrary, the central point in the example described above is that this young

woman had the opportunity to move away from her context of origin and come into contact

with other ways of living, values and norms. This then allowed her to rethink her options

and her family’s choices, and define new personal projects, which may not have coincided

with what her parents had expected from her, but they are not nevertheless completely

incongruent with her social origins. Furthermore, if the family socialization had not been

effective, how could this young girl have gone to study in a different national context and

had the ability to organize herself on a daily basis, defining new ideals and ways of life? This

is where the importance of embodied dispositions comes into play, which Archer disputes.

The problems that Archer poses to Bourdieu’s approach appear to result from a

restricted understanding of the meaning of habitus. Claiming that parents fail to provide

their children with adequate resources to prepare them for a future of intense change

(because they had markedly different life experiences) is like saying that a young person

cannot learn how to use a computer because his/her parents never did and that, accord-

ingly, they did not prepare her/him properly.

Correspondingly, and especially over the last quarter of a century, socialization has been

decreasingly able to ‘prepare’ for occupational and lifestyle opportunities that had not

existed for the parental generation: for social skills that could not become embodied

(stock-market trading or computer programming), needed continuous upgrading, and readi-

ness to re-locate, re-train and re-evaluate shifting modi vivendi. (Archer, 2010b: 136)

One of the main features of the habitus, as defined by Bourdieu, is precisely its transfer-

ability. For example, learning that requires the use of a computer can be enhanced by the

incorporation of dispositions that, even if not directed at computers, develop more

general skills and interests that can be used in different contexts, for different tasks.

Otherwise, most children born in the 1970s and even in the 1980s to parents of low and




medium educational levels would not have been able to learn how to use information

technologies for various purposes. In a context like Portugal, for instance, which is per-

meated simultaneously by late modern and traditional social features, exactly the oppo-

site occurs, illustrating the need for the contextual adaptation of theoretical concepts

(Costa et al., 2009). Moreover, the use of computers is one of the cornerstones of general

learning processes, and reinforces other important socialization contexts apart from the

family, such as school and social networks.

Parents who, according to Archer, failed to prepare their children for changes such as

those arising from information technologies can themselves be protagonists of learning

processes, even if it is via the frequent contact with these media enabled by their chil-

dren. The younger generations are not the only ones who have to deal with the intensity

of social change processes. In this regard, social origins are crucial to explain differences

in learning by older generations.

Archer reconceptualizes socialization using the notion of ‘relational reflexivity’.7

This is in sharp contrast with a concept of socialization circumscribed to the reception

of consensual messages, the creation of clear and durable expectations regarding the

performance of social roles, and the promotion of normative consistency. Basically she

aims to account for the dynamics of socialization processes, noting that people interact

differently with the norms and resources conveyed by their social origins.

Based on this notion, Archer (2012: 98–104) connects her typology of reflexivity to a

typology of modes of relating to family relational goods. Subjects with communicative

reflexivity are understood as identifiers because they relate to their parents’ modus

vivendi and define it as their life project without having to resort to alternative choices.

Independents, who have an autonomous mode of reflexivity, experience family

disruption, which leads them to select only those elements of their contexts of origin that

are compatible with the choices they autonomously pursue. The disengaged, who have a

meta-reflexive mode, develop a critical vision of their parents’ modus vivendi, despite

valuing their family’s relational goods, and operate selection processes in their life

contexts in order to define projects that are better adjusted to their concerns. Finally, the

rejecters, with fractured reflexivity, renounce their social origins because they are under-

stood to be the source of their problems in life. They try to distance themselves from

them, though without being able to define specific personal projects.

By making this differentiation between the various ways individuals relate to their

social origins, Archer intends to distance herself from more traditional notions of socia-

lization. However, this stance reveals a narrow view of the concept. This reconceptua-

lization does not produce a new and innovative definition or add anything substantial

to existing understandings of the term, which are already complex and multidimensional.

Basically she wants to emphasize that individuals are active agents in socialization pro-

cesses, that they receive heterogeneous and sometimes even contradictory messages

within family contexts, that they relate differently to their social origins, that personal

concerns are defined relationally, and that socialization is an unfinished process not cir-

cumscribed to the family sphere. But these ideas are not recent and in no way contradict

the theoretical and empirical patrimony of sociology (Abrantes, 2013; Lahire, 2003,

2011). So it is not clear what relevance this new notion has to account for something that

also fits the original concept of socialization.

Caetano 65



Given this grounding, it is easier to understand why Archer did not find any kind of

correlation between modes of reflexivity and social origins in her empirical research. Her

analysis is focused on individuals’ capacity to evaluate their social circumstances,

leaving no room for a problematization that is articulated with the hierarchical dimension

of social life.8 Furthermore, as she herself states, she is more interested in the conse-

quences and effects of the modes of reflexivity than in their processes of formation,

which would imply considering the importance of social origins.9

Following up Archer’s theory, the empirical work of Mrozowicki (2010, 2011),

directed at the working class in Poland, demonstrates the analytical gains of understand-

ing practices from the perspective of an articulation between reflexivity and the

structural dimension of action.10 The main aim of this research was to understand if

theories that emphasize agency, such as Archer’s, could be applied to the analysis of

unprivileged social contexts. Using a biographical approach, Mrozowicki assessed the

processes of monitoring, adaptation, reproduction and resistance of a group of workers

from an industrial region in Poland. This analysis resulted in a typology of four life

strategies that intersects the dominant mode of reflexivity (more individualized or more

community-centred) with the mode of structuration of individual life projects (in terms

of the structuring role of agency or structural dependence): integrating, embedding,

constructing and getting by.

Internalization of exteriority

Another aspect that is missing from Archer’s analysis is the internalization of exteriority

process. Her approach is also constructed as a counterpoint to the theory developed by

Mead (1967), who is considered to be the major precursor of the notion of inner dialogue.

However, according to Archer, his analysis denies the three main features of internal

conversations: interiority, subjectivity and causal efficacy. Archer claims that Mead

over-socializes these dialogues, in that subjects do not converse with themselves in their

minds, but to society embodied in the notion of the ‘generalized other’. Reacting against

the insufficiency of this proposal Archer ends up by largely removing this societal

presence from internal conversations.

Because she does not consider social origins, socialization and differentiated

locations in social space to be relevant in explaining reflexivity, the subjects’ mental

structure does not reflect their social conditions of existence. Reflexivity is analysed

mostly as the cause of specific courses of action and less as the effect of social processes.

Using a quote from Norbert Wiley, she even claims that individuals are like gods in their

inner worlds: ‘no rules govern what we choose to dwell upon in the privacy of our own

heads’ (2012: 14). Social structures are only present in internal conversations when

individuals evaluate them in articulation with their main concerns. The causal efficacy

of structures is not directly felt upon subjectivity itself, but on the result of that subjec-

tivity: individual projects, from which potential courses of action are defined. Archer

does not consider the possibility of personal concerns being a product of social contexts

(Atkinson, 2014).

The notion of analytical dualism can indeed overcome the limitations of approaches

that tend to conflate structure and agency. But if one considers structures always as




external entities, it becomes impossible to explore another understanding of their causal

efficacy: that which can occur internally in the form of constraint or enablement. Struc-

tural conditioning is not always external; society also exists internally in subjects’ minds,

consolidated in systems of dispositions that, like reflexivity, have the potential to guide

action (Bourdieu, 1984, 1992, 1998).

Bourdieu does not acknowledge the importance of reflexivity in the explanation of

action, but instead highlights another important dimension of social practices: practical

sense, which allows agents to know what to do in social contexts without having to delib-

erate consciously on their options. In fact, the inner life of subjects is not only composed

of conscious dynamics. Individuals are not in a constant state of alert. Combining

Archer’s theory with the dispositionalist approach allows a conceptualization of indivi-

dual interiority as consisting not only of conscious mechanisms, but also of social pro-

cesses that take place without individuals being aware of them. The concept of

dispositions makes it possible to take account of this pre-reflexive element of practices,

embodied in schemes of perception and interpretation that have the potential to guide

human conduct (Bourdieu, 1992, 1998). As Bernard Lahire (2011) states, dispositions can

be taken as an object by the subject, but they tend to operate without being questioned.

Mechanisms of structure–agency mediation

Another relevant criticism that has been levelled at Archer’s work is the fact that she lim-

its the process of mediation between structure and agency to reflexive deliberations. One

of the most important contributions of her approach is precisely the role she ascribes to

reflexivity in this process. However, reflexivity is not the only means of mediation. The

external conversations people have with one another in specific social contexts should

also be taken into account in the explanation of human conduct, as they contribute

equally to the definition and negotiation of personal concerns and projects. The work

of scholars such as Goffman (1990), Schutz (1972) and Garfinkel (1999), but also Weber

(1978) and Simmel (1982) points precisely to the importance of this component of social

relations.

Archer acknowledges this possibility in the case of communicative reflexivity,

assuming that all individuals, in some circumstances and regardless of the predominant

mode of reflexivity, potentially feel the need to seek other people’s advice when making

a decision. But she understands this process more as an extension of internal dialogues

and less as a different form of mediation with its own specificities. The three other modes

of reflexivity lack interactional dynamics.

Therefore, in addition to minimizing the guidance of practical sense, the emphasis

Archer ascribes to internal action tends also to result in the minimization of interaction

as a mechanism of mediation between structure and agency. Several scholars have

stressed the need to also consider external conversations, whereby expectations, goals

and projects are contextually negotiated in the presence of and with the participation

of other subjects (Chalari, 2009; Depelteau, 2008; Mouzelis, 1999, 2007, 2008, 2010;

Vandenberghe, 2005).

In Archer’s approach, reflexive deliberations seem to lead directly to action. How-

ever, it is necessary to take account of the fact that decisions are always filtered by the

Caetano 67



context of interaction. Ultimately, it is not possible to fully predict all the elements

involved in these social settings. The choice of a particular sequence of action may bring

setbacks, reformulations and in loco adjustments. The course of an interaction always

depends on numerous factors that subjects cannot entirely control, so they have to

frequently adjust to the parameters they find. A situation is defined by joint negotiation,

through which social actors control certain aspects of their behaviour (emotions,

gestures, what they say) to convey a particular image of themselves.

There is also no reason to think that Archer’s ten mental activities (2003b: 161;

2007a: 91), through which subjects converse with themselves, cannot be exercised exter-

nally and discursively expressed in interaction contexts. It is part of social existence to

plan, rehearse, mull over, decide, re-live, prioritize, imagine, clarify, establish imaginary

conversations and budget in situations of co-presence and in collaboration with other

social actors.

Basically, Archer does not acknowledge the importance of discourse, either orally in

face-to-face situations or written, as a mean of reflexivity. Lahire’s (2008, 2011)

research on writing practices points to its potential in the exercise of reflexive compe-

tences. Putting thoughts, arguments, confessions, reasons for acting, tasks, schedules,

routines, emotions, future projects and past memories into words means establishing a

distance towards action. Taking action as an object, writing allows for a symbolic control

over something that was previously only mastered in practical terms. This objectifying

distance represents a break with practical sense, thereby enabling the questioning and

rationalization of social conduct. It stems from the specific dynamics of subjects’ inner

lives, and whether undertaken in private or public, writing functions as a platform for

dialogue that individuals establish with themselves. However, it is not limited to the

mere transposition of internal conversations, as it entails selecting, filtering and sorting

thoughts, emotions, symbols and images. In this sense, writing generates reflexivity,

stimulating new reflections, exploring existing ideas in more depth or approaching them

in a new way. It could be said that writing reworks the reflexivity produced by internal

and external conversations.

Archer also does not problematize the possibility that an individual has of exercising

different modes of reflexivity contextually. In her research, each subject was assigned a

dominant mode of reflexivity that is mobilized in any interaction context. Therefore, she

does not acknowledge that one person can be highly reflexive in certain social situations,

but strongly guided by structural constraints in others. The activation of reflexivity

cannot be thought of as a uniform and transversal process. Some social settings and inter-

action contexts stimulate more than others the mobilization of reflexive competences to

meet the demands of interpersonal relationship. It depends largely on the importance of

each social domain in terms of identity formation, and on the degree of familiarity and

formality of the contexts of action.

This problematization is also lacking in a temporal dimension that enables an under-

standing of the durability of reflexivity modes and their potential for change throughout

individual biographies. For example, initial contact with a particular context of interac-

tion requires a more or less prolonged period of rule-learning, which involves greater

individual monitoring. When these norms have been internalized, the activation of

reflexivity is considerably reduced. Life experiences also have real effects on subjects’




inner lives. They can develop new reflexive competences, just as they generate disposi-

tional adjustments. The way each person reflects upon him/herself in the world can

change over the course of life, in line with transformations in circumstances, contexts

and life experiences, as well as according to socialization processes.

Change and permanence

Finally, the implications of Archer’s perspective on social change should also be men-

tioned. According to her, the intense flow of transformation that characterizes contempo-

rary societies decreases contextual continuity, which is inseparable from the decline of

routine action. However, the contours of this decline are never clarified in her arguments,

nor are they empirically grounded. Archer seems to be referring particularly to actions con-

nected to important decisions of individual biographies, and not so much to subjects’ daily

practices. As Sayer (2009: 120; 2010: 121) states, individuals could hardly be competent

social actors if part of their actions was not based on Bourdieu’s (1992) practical sense.

Although she tries to distance herself from the zero-sum game of the reflexive mod-

ernization approach, in terms of having to choose between structure or agency, Archer

advocates social restructuring processes that appear to be moving towards the structural

weakening that she criticizes in Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994).11 If contextual continu-

ity decreases while contextual discontinuity and incongruence increase, then the social

consequences of these dynamics suggest, first, that social reproduction is declining, and,

second, that upward social mobility and social volatility tend to be predominant. This

means that social origins play an increasingly smaller role in the definition of an individ-

ual’s life course over the reflexive imperative, i.e. the growing importance of reflexive

deliberations. The unequal distribution of resources and opportunities would thus gradu-

ally cease to structure individual biographies in a lasting and effective way.

The scenario of unlimited possibilities conveyed in these considerations is at odds

with the research on social structures that has been undertaken in recent years in different

national contexts, particularly in terms of social class (Atkinson, 2010; Bennett et al.,

2009; Costa et al., 2009). What these studies show is that different positions in social

space still have a decisive impact on subjects’ fields of possibles. Taking once more the

Portuguese context as an example, it is clear that upward mobility is not increasing;

rather social inequality is expanding in the context of the economic crisis, with a growing

number of families losing part of their usual income and material resources. Social class

takes centre stage in explaining these dynamics of transformation, defining the opportu-

nities and constraints these individuals face and the ways in which they respond to the

crisis (Carmo et al., 2012).

One can also take as an example the impact that literacy skills have on individuals’

daily lives, something that is inseparable from the educational levels and asymmetries

in Portugal (Avila, 2009). As literacy basically involves a person’s ability to mobilize

and interpret written information (which can also be understood as a means of reflexiv-

ity), it is hard to imagine how reflexive modes cannot be formed in a socially differen-

tiated manner, in line with the unequal distribution of these skills.

Furthermore, as Archer’s findings, particularly in one of her last publications (2012),

are based on the specific case of higher education students, they do not fully reflect the

Caetano 69



social processes involved in the experiences of larger groups of people, especially from

different social classes and other national contexts. Although she begins the conclusion

of this book with the idea that one needs to be cautious in formulating hypotheses,12 all

her arguments point to broad conclusions that are sustained only by the analysis of a

group of educated young people.

Conclusion

Margaret Archer’s work on reflexivity, though relatively recent, has had a considerable

impact on several European academic contexts, especially in the United Kingdom. There

is already a considerable body of sociological research that has been undertaken with the

aim of continuing, testing or assessing her approach. Indeed, her work has become a

central reference in the sociological analysis of the social mechanisms of reflexivity and

in the study of the interplay between structure and agency.

Some of the most substantial contributions of her theory include broadly: the defini-

tion of reflexivity as a sociological object of analysis; the operationalization of the

concept; the implementation of a methodological device adjusted to the specific

challenges entailed in studying reflexivity; and the interpretation of empirical results

in the light of her analytical model. This is theoretically-driven empirical work that

results, in turn, in the production of theory. It should also be noted that in each of the

three books in which she has published her own research on the topic, Archer studies

thoroughly different dimensions of analysis: a typology of modes of reflexivity

(2003b), the connection between reflexivity and social mobility (2007a), and the relation

between reflexivity and social change in contemporary societies (2012).

The importance of her work also lies in the dialogue she promotes with the already

existing body of knowledge from sociology. It is a dialogue-based approach, which,

on the one hand, recovers elements from different authors and approaches, and, on the

other, is defined in opposition to others. Basically she defines a field of possibles in

sociological research for the study of reflexivity.

There are, however, some issues that the author neglects or chooses not to work with

that generate problems and reveal limitations in her approach, namely: the weak role

ascribed to social origins and to socialization; the non-acknowledgement of the inter-

nalization of exteriority processes and of other social mechanisms mediating structure

and agency; and the strong emphasis on contextual discontinuity and incongruence in the

analysis of social change.

This criticism of Archer’s approach does not imply a rejection of her theory. The

purpose of this discussion was to highlight the most significant aspects of her work and

those which acquire analytical importance when articulated with other approaches that

emphasize issues that she has tended to minimize.

It is also important to take account of the fact that Archer’s argument falls entirely

within the power dynamics of the sociological field. For instance, because she wishes

to emphasize what Bourdieu neglected, the core of dispositionalist theory is particularly

questioned as a means of legitimizing her approach. The same applies to the reflexive

modernization approach and to Giddens’s structuration theory.




Rather than making a unilateral choice between the possibilities of one or another

approach, the combination of the different ontologies advocated by these authors (analytical

dualism and the duality of structure) is more important and analytically prolific for the anal-

ysis of action (Stones, 2001).13 Since these theoretical perspectives are not mutually exclu-

sive, their articulation promotes the analysis of a wider set of topics and analytical

dimensions than the selection of one or the other would allow (Caetano, 2011, 2014a).

Notes

1. However, it is debatable whether Bourdieu and Giddens can be placed on the same level of

conflation, as they tend to weigh structural and agential causality differently.

2. Archer (1982: 456) points out two elements that are common to the structuration theory

(Giddens, 2004) and the morphogenetic approach. Both acknowledge that: (1) structural pat-

terning is based on interaction processes; (2) and that social practices are shaped by unac-

knowledged conditions of action, generating unintentional consequences that create the

contexts for subsequent action.

3. This qualitative approach served also as a basis for Archer to develop the Internal Conversa-

tion Indicator (ICONI), which allowed her to identify the dominant mode of reflexivity

through the application of a questionnaire. Using this quantitative tool, she was able to select

consistent practitioners of each mode to interview (Archer, 2007a, 2012).

4. Archer’s work has also been questioned in its own foundations. Authors such as Depelteau

(2008) and King (1999, 2010) critique the ontology and the co-deterministic nature of her

approach, questioning the explanation of social life in terms of the interactions between struc-

ture and agency.

5. There has been an intense debate on these issues between Archer and several authors in aca-

demic networks formed and promoted in scientific meetings and specialized publications

(Archer, 2010a; Archer and Maccarini, 2013). In this sense, Archer has responded directly

to criticism by identifying and simultaneously disputing three types of articulation between

reflexivity and habitus: (1) empirical combination (Fleetwood, 2008; Sayer, 2009, 2010);

(2) hybridizing reflexivity and habitus using the notion of reflexive habitus (Adams, 2003,

2004, 2006, 2007; Sweetman, 2003); and (3) ontological and theoretical reconciliation

through an emergent social theory of action (Elder-Vass, 2007, 2010). See also the discussion

undertaken in Archer and Elder-Vass (2012) regarding the social ontology of propositional

culture.

6. For other examples, see also Archer (2007a: 58–60).

7. In close articulation with Donati’s relational sociology (2010, 2011a).

8. This dimension is neglected from both an external and internal point of view. Scholars such as

Reay (2005), Sayer (2005) and Skeggs (1997, 2004) have been working on the internal and

conscious dimension of structures such as social class.

9. ‘The present study makes its contribution less in relation to the social origins than to the social

consequences of endorsing a particular mode of reflexivity as the dominant one, particularly in

defining subjects’ trajectories of social mobility’ (Archer, 2007a: 97).

10. Archer’s work has been used as a starting point for the study of topics such as consumption

practices (Garcıa-Ruiz and Rodrıguez-Lluesma, 2010), family transitions (Donati, 2011b) and

the impact that organizational change can have on the modes of reflexivity (Mutch, 2004,

Caetano 71



2010). Her approach has also been empirically tested in different national contexts (for

instance, Porpora and Shumar, 2010).

11. See King (2010) for an exploration of the similarities between Archer and Giddens.

12. ‘These are largely qualitative findings about educated young people in late modernity. Tempt-

ing as these findings are for hypothesis formation, various forms of inference or extrapolation

simply cannot be supported from the empirical work undertaken’ (Archer, 2012: 292).

13. The combination of analytical dualism and the duality of structure is proposed in this article

within a sociological framework that attributes explanatory value to the relation between

structure and agency. There are, however, other approaches that advocate a different ontology

that implies moving beyond the notions of structure and agency (Depelteau, 2008; King, 1999,

2010).

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Fundacao Portuguesa para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia (FCT) (grant

number SFRH/BD/43350/2008).

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Author biography

Ana Caetano has a PhD in Sociology, and is a researcher at the Centre for Research and Studies

in Sociology (CIES-IUL) at the ISCTE-University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL), Lisbon,

Portugal. Her research interests span the fields of social theory, sociology of culture and sociol-

ogy of education. Her work has focused on the topic of personal reflexivity and she has published

articles on reflexivity, biography and identity.

Caetano 75



caetano-defining personal reflexivity-a critical reading of archer's approach (febrero)

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