caesar 22 - party-military relations in the ussr and the fall of marshal zhukov

8/4/2019 Caesar 22 - Party-Military Relations in the USSR and the Fall of Marshal Zhukov

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--'-.. I .- _-. .--, * .-. -.A P P R ~ V E D OR RELEASEDATE: JUN 2 0 0 7, .,.. .

I I OCI No. 0077/590opy No.8 June 1959. . . . .

SOVIET STAFF STUDYPARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE USSR

THE FALL OF MARSHAL ZHUKOVAND(Reference Titles: CAESAR I and. 11-B-59).... ._,. .. ... . .

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Office of Current IntelligenceHR70-14(U)CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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T h i s working paper is another s tudy Int h e series prepared under Project CAESAR.Project CAESAR is designed t o p rovide de-t a i l e d analyses from a l l i n t e l l i g e n c e somcesof developments affecting l ead ing m em b e r s o f .t h e Sovie t hierarchy, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l andpersona l a s soc iat ions* , po l ic ie s w i t h whicht h e y have been i d e n t i f i e d , a n d p o l i t i c a l i n -s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s which af fec t , t h e Sovie tl eade rsh ip s i t u a t i o n .While t h e papers in t h i s ser ies are co-ordinated and checked fo r f a c t u a l a cc urac ywi th in OCI, t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and t h o s e of

t h e authors and do not represent the o f f i c i a lviews of CIA.


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PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS I N THE USSRANDTEE FALL OF MARSHBL ZHUKOVPAGE

INTRODUCTIONZHUKW AND PARTY CONTROL I N THE ARM!lZhukov's a t t i t u d e to ward p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g

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in the a rmed fo rces not newAnt ipar ty or p r o m i l i t a r yZhukov a n d p a r t y c o n t r o lZhukov vs. t h e GPU in o r d e r s a n d d i r e c t i v e sHow much p o l i t i c s f o r t h e t r o op s ?The con t ras t in p o l i t i c a l m etho do lo gy,1956-1958Zhukov and one-man commandZ h u ko v v s. t h e c h i e f of t h e GPUZHWOV AND THE CULT OF PERSONALITYThe a r t of making enemies:The a r t of making enemies:

p a r t y l e a d e r sZhukov vs.his comrades a t arms

ZHUKOV AND THE CHARGE OF * * A D ~ U B I S M "TEE MECHANICS dlqD TIYIHG OF ZHugOv'S BEIUOVBLThe time r e q u i r e d t o remove ZhukovThe t rans fe r of Marshal RokossovskyMTER ZHUKOVThe t r an s f e r o f Zhe l tovM i l i t a r y Dis t r i c t sM i l i t a r y - p a r t y r e l a t i o n sThe ul t ima te p r o d u c t : T a c t i c i a n - P o l i t i c i a nuONCLUSIONS

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I . INTRODUCTION .

The removal of Marshal Georgi IC. Zhukov from h i s postas USSR mini s ter of defense on 26 October 1957 was unexpected.When Zhukov l e f t Moscow on a ceremonial v i s i t t o Yugoslavia.att h e beginning of the month, he appeared t o be a t t h e peak ofh i s populari ty and prest ige . A dis t inguished w a r t i m e command-e r and four t i m e s Hero of t h e Soviet Union, Zhukov had beene le va te d t o f u l l membership in t h e par ty presidium fo l lowingt h e 1957 June purge of t h e **ant ipar tygroup.** In many West-e rn circles it was bel ieved a t t h a t t i m e t h a t Zhukov hadsaved Khrushchev from t h e machinations of t h e "antiparty group**by dramatically throwing h i s w ei gh t, and t h a t of t h e four-million-man army, behind th e par ty leader, and t h a t t h i s ac-tion was rewarded by h i s promotion t o f u l l presidium membership.w a s terse and gave no c l u e as t o h i s fu ture . Observers in MOS-COW d i f f e r e d as t o whether he would be promoted t o mi nis terwithout portfolio, "kicked ups ta i r sv1 o some honori f ic pos t , ordemoted. The l a s t w a s proved correct on 2 November when a cen-t r a l committee resolution removing Zhukov from both t h e p a r t ypresidium and cen t ra l committee was made publ ic .aga ins t h i s a l l y of June. Khrushchev's advancement t o powersince S t a l l n l s death had been accompanied by Zhukov's rise i nt h e Ministry of Defense and p a r t y hierarchy. The t w o appearedt o be on t h e best of personal terms. Some observers f e l t t h a tKhrushchev had not taken t h e i n i t i a t i v e , b u t t h a t opponents oft h e par ty l eade r had forced t h e i s s u e in order t o deprive h i mof one of h i s l o c i of power.

The announcement of Zhukov's release as defense minis ter

Speculation continued a s t o why Khrushchev had turned

Another serious ques t ion was t h e t h i n g . Why had t h eleadership f e l t i t necessary t o drop Zhukov from i t s ranks whent h e Syrian-Turkish crisis w a s a t i t s h e i g h t and on t h e eve oft h e ce lebra t ion of t h e 40th anniversary of t h e Bolshevik Rev-o lu t ion , a t which emphasis on party unity would have been mostdesirable?The ce nt ra l commit tee' s re sol ut i on of 3 November 1957accused Zhukov of three se r ious **v io la t ionsof Lenin i s t , p a r t y

principles '*: (1) el iminat ing par ty control and oppos ing t h ework of p a r t y organiza t ions in t h e armed fo rces ; (2) implant-ing a "cult of h i s own personal i ty**in t h e Sovie t Army, a

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sm?ar e s u l t o f h i s l o s s o f "par ty modesty" which permitted h i m t ob e l i t t l e t h e "tremendous e f f o r t s of t h e Soviet people (in WorldWar 11), t h e heroiram of...the armed forces , t h e r o l e of com-manders and po l i t i c a l workers, t h e m i l i t a r y s k i l l of t h e com-manders of fronts, armies and f lee ts , and t h e l ead ing and in-s p i r i n g role of t h e Communist p a r t y of th e Soviet Union"; and.,(3)being p o l i t i c a l l y deficient and disposed t o "adventurismboth in h i s undergtandlng of t h e major t a s k s of th e SovietUn&onts foreign pol icy and in h i6 leadership of t h e Minis t ry

3 of D8fense."The following re-examination of these charges aga ins tZhulcov and of t h e events which preceded and followed h i s ousterIs intended t o c la r i fy some of these problems. The f u l l storyof t h e Zhlllrov case is not and probably never w i l l be known

out6 ids the Sovie t hierarchy. Therefore, it w i l l be necessaryt o f i l l in severa l gaps w i t h specula t ion which we s h a l l t r yt o keep cons i s t en t w i t h t h e known fac t s of t h e case.

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11. ZBUKOV AND PARTY CONTROL I N THg ARb!?Zukov*s Attitude Toward Po l i t i c a l Tra i ni ng i n t h e ArmedForces N o t New. The removal of Marshal Zhukov from h i s gov-ernment and pa r t y p o st s i n October and November 1957 focuseda t te n t io n more sharp ly on m i li ta r y- p ar ty r e l a t i o n s i n t h e So-

T h i s event has been widely interpreted as a log ica l climax ofwidespread and dee ply rooted. army-party po li cy clashes da t i ngback to t h e demise of S t a l i a , but t h i s explana t ion . l eaves ap o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l in t h e armed forceb without reducing m i l l -t a ry e f f i c i ency has f aced t h e Soviet Communist party sincet h e army wa6 f i r s t e st ab li sh ed .

Zhukov was held persona l ly l i a b l e in October 1957 for re-ducing t h e au t h o r i t y of p o l i t i c a l workers r e l a t i ve t o ' t h a t ofm il it a ry commanders. Y e t , before Zhukov returned to prominencefrom t h e obscur i t y S t a l i n p r epared f o r h i m af t e r World War 11,a u t h o r i t a t i v e s t a t em ent s had been made which i n f l a t e d t h epr es ti ge of command personnel and ignored p o l i t i c a l vorkers,and Marshal Vasilevsky, then min is te r of war, spoke i n t h esame vein a t t h e 19th party congress in October 1952.more, t h e same sentiments r eappea red i n t he pa r t y l i ne a yeara f t e r Zhukov's second f a l l from grace.doc tr in e propagated in t h e f a l l of 1958 , po l i t i c a l work int h e armed forces was t o be directed toward r a i s i n g d i s c i p l i n e ,increas ing t h e a u t h o r i t y of ''one-man commandtt (y ed in ona ch al iy e) ,and ensuring fu l f i l lm en t of th e combat t ra in in g mission.

\ viet Union than a t any t i m e s i n c e t h e end of World War 11.L

I. number of unanswered questions. The problem of maintaining

Further-According t o th e

. . . . .. Ant ipar ty or promi l i t a ry . Zhukov never chal lenged th epre-eminent authority of t h e Communist party over t h e m i l l -t a ry es tab l i shment as a whole, but he wanted t h e same c o n t r o lover t h e work of t h e p o l i t i c a l o rg an s in t h e armed f orc es t h athe had over a l l other arms and . se rv i ce s of h i s Defense Min-i s t r y . His purpose appears t o have been t o Improve t h e com-bat r ead i nes s of h i s command. In t r e a t i n g t h e C h i e f Pol i t -i c a l Di rec t o r a t e ( G W ) f t h e Defense Wnis t ry , which a lsofunc t ions as a department of t h e par ty cent ra l committee, a sa s t a f f o rgan i za ti on l i t e r a l l y subordi nat e t o h i s adminis t rn-t i v e f i a t , however, Zhukov in ef fec t reached for more po l i t i ca lpower than t h e p a r t y was wi ll in g t o al low any Communist leaderwho a l so co ntr ol l ed th e ,Soviet m i l i ta ry machine.

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I t does not appear t h a t Zhukov consciously sought in t h i sway t o aggrandize his personal power posi t ion vis-a-vis hiscol leagues in t h e pa rt y presidium. Apparently h e d id assume,however, t h a t t h e pre roga t ives of h i s m i n i s t e r i a l rank weregenuine, and a f t e r h i s e leva t ion i n June 1957 t o f u l l member -s h i p in t h e p a r t y presidium he began t o assert them more .s t r o n g l y a g a i n st t h e GPU. The ac t ua l power r e l a t i ons h ip be-tween t h e a n i s t r y of Defense and i t s t ed hr i l ca l l y subordinateChief Pol i t ica l D i r e c C o r B t e , which was a l s o a department ofthe p a r t y apparatys, had not previously been tested: no m i l i -t a r y leader had eve r r i s e n t o f u l l membership i n t h e par typresidium and therefore been i n a pos i t ion t o demand that t h erole of t h e GPU be c la r i f i ed (Trotsky as War commissar w a sIn Lenin's pol i tburo , but he had been a p o l i t i ca l leader inh i s own r i g h t previously; Bulganin's case -6 S h i l a r ) .Zhukov's apparent fee l ing that as long as t h e GPU was Inh i s m ini s t ry he could run it as he saw f i t was t o be t h echief reason f o r his downfal l .l i t i c a l a@para tusin t h e army and make it more e f f e c t i v eappears t o have been Zhukov's ch i e f concern.t i m e and again t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l apparatus in t h earmed forces d id not seem to h i m to cont r i bute anything pos i-t i v e to i nc reased t r a in ing e f f i c i ency , b e t t e r d i s c i p l i n e , ormastery of t h e new techniques of modern warfare. On t h e con-t r a r y , t h e i n e f f e c t u a l p u t t e ri n g s of t h e p o l i t i c a l o rg an shamstrung h i s commanders in t h e i r e f f o r t s to a t t a i n t h e t r a i n -ing goals assigned them by t h e Defense Ministry.

Nei ther th e ce nt ra l committee 's indictment on 2 November1957 nor subsequent at tacks by high-level party and m i l i t a r yfu nc t io na rie s imputed any "ant iparty" motives t o Zhukov.(During t h e Ukrainian p a r t y congress i n January 1959, MarshalChuykov charged h i m w i t h "revisionismst* but t h i s charge hasnot been repeated and t h e Zhukov case was not mentioned a tt h e 21st al l-union par ty congress.) Zhukov was a long-timeCommunist party memb e r as w e l l as an o ld so ld ie r , and h i sspeeches and articles were replete w i t h r e fe rences t o "thew i s e leadership of t h e glorious Communist party and its cen-t r a l committee." By using h i s own pos i t ion in t h a t leader-s h i p t o t i g h t e n h i s con t r o l of his ministry, however, Zhukovevent ual ly antagonized a l l important elements within Sovietoff icialdom, and t h e summation of t h i s h o s t i l i t y f i n a l l y causedh i s downfall. By October 1957 he had l o s t t h e support of t h e

The need t o reform t h e in ef f i c i en t , nonproductive po-He i n s i s t e d

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very people on whom he r e l i ed fo r profess ional ex is tence--h i s p o l i t i c a l depir$y, t h e top m i l i t a r y echelons , and f i na l l y ,Khrushchev.

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Zhukov and P a r t y Control. As al ready suggested , it w a snot party c o n t r o l t o which Zhukov objected, but t h e mechanicsof i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e armed forces--the mechanics of t roopindoc t r ina t ion . Against t h e charge t h a t h e sought t h e e l im i n a -t i o n of party control and opposed the work of par ty organ iza-t i o n s in t h e armed forces must be p laced ex t r ac t s f rom t h em i l i t a r y press and r ad io ca l l in g f o r improvement in both t h equality and method of p o l i t i c a l work. On 15 September 1955Red S t a r , t h e Soviet Army newspaper, publis hed an exp osi tio nTB-se Mlnis t ry th ink ing on t h e s u b j e c t of p o l i t i c a l workunder t h e t i t l e , "Raise t h e Ideological Level of P o l i t i c a lInformation." This piece urged t h a t p o l i t i c a l i n f o r ma t i o nsessions be he ld "not l e s s than three times a week**and spee-i f i e d t h a t attendaxlce a t these sess ions by e n l i s t e d p er so nn elw a s mandatory. The paper noted that **inmany units t h e valueof p o l l t i c a l information i s underest imated, gatherings areheld infrequently , and t h e content of t h e t a l k s is one-sidedo r s u p e r f i c i a l . Pol i t i ca l information periods should not beused fo r other purposes such as cu r ren t mi l i t a r y t r a in ing .. . ."In tone and conten t t h i s i t e m might have been extracted fromany of t h e hundreds of exhor ta t ions t o improve p o l i t i c a l t r a i n -ing which f i l l e d t h e m i l i t a r y press a f t e r Zhukov's ous ter .

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oreover, on 21 November'1955 Radio Volga, t h e DefenseMin is t ry ' s t r ansmi t t e r se rv ic ing t h e Group of Soviet Forcesin Germany, sha rp l y cr i t ic ized shortcomings in p o l i t i c a lwork in t h e army in a manner which graph ica l ly i l lu s t r a tedt h e poin t t h a t t h e t a r g e t of the Defense Minis t ry ' s at tack w a sno t po l i t i ca l work per se, but th e manner i n which it was con-ducted:Pol i t i ca l workers do not teach t h e great achieve-ments of t h e Soviet people in matters of indusfry,agronpmy, or cul ture. . . . L i t t l e concern is shownf o r th e th eo re t i ca l and methodological p repa rat ionof p o l i t i c a l group leaders. Only very f e w seminarspay a t t e n t i o n t o methodical l e c t u r i n g , t h e i a d f - -W u a l r ea d in g of l i t e r a t u r e , t h e organ iza t ion ofi nd iv idua l work w i t h i n s t r u c t o r s , a n d t h e correctu t i l i z a t i o n of c l ea r ly unders tandab le v i s ua l a id s .There a r e s t f l l few q u a l i f i e d lecturers, and hardW

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any lectures are given by t h e superv i sor of po-l i t i c a l lectures ( S ~ C ) ~s p e c i a l l y on t h e ques-t i o n s of his tory , theory of t h e Soviet Communistpa r ty , or questions of t h e foreign and domesticpol icy of th e Soviet state....p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g methods c a l l e d f o r by t h e De-fense Mln is t ry requ i r es a l l commanders and partyand Kolslsomol organizations of uni t s and subuni t s .t o s u p e rvi s e d a i l y t h e p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g of a l lpersonnel.

The change i n

I n no objec t i ve sense cou ld t h i s s p u r r i n g of p o l i t i c a l organst o greater ef for ts be termed an attempt t o neliminate p a r t yc o n t ro l.mindednessw is manifested by t h e conduct of poli t ical work' ln-c iden t t o t h e 20th pa r t y congress he ld i n February 1956. Amonth before t h e congress convened, a l l elements of t h e armedse rv ic es began a per iod of in te ns iv e s tudy and di scuss ion oft h e c e n t r a l conunittee's d r a f t of t h e S i x t h Five-Year Plan.Meetings were he ld a t div i s ion l eve l and higher t o plan t h ei n d o c t r i n a t i o n of t roops on t h e announced agenda on $he con-gress . On 13 March 1956, Zhukov and t h e head of t h e DefenseM i n i s t r y ' s Chief Pol i t i ca l D i re c to ra t e j o i n t l y s i gn e d a de-t a i l e d d i r e c t i v e s e t t in g . f o r t h t h e lessons derfved from t h econgress and how t h e y were t o be taught. T h i s document wasd i s t r i b u t e d t o every major command of t h e Soviet armed fo r c e s .F ina l ly , a conference of s e n i o r p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s of t h e armedforces was he ld i n Moscow i n ear ly A p r i l a t t h e height of po-l i t i c a l a g i t at i o n i n t h e defense establishment for improvementi n t h e q u a l i t y p o l l t i c a l i n s t ru c t i o n .Zhukov cas&: (1) he recognized tha t de f ic ienc ies in p o l i t i -c a l t r a i n i n g e x i s t e d, and (2) he w a s determined t o correctthem i n h is .own way.

Another demonstration of Defense Mlnister Zhukovvs w$arty-.

i l lu s t ra te s t w o important fac tors i n t h e

It is i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t e t h a t none of t h e above ex-amples refers t o ' t h e commander - po l i t i c a l of f i ce r r e l a t i o n -ship, but It was on t h i s c ruc ia l ' i s sue t h a t Zhukov's f a t ehinged.

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Zhakov vs. t h e GPU in Orders and Dir ecti ves. Evidenceof t h e cleavage of i n t e r e s t which developed between t h e de-fense d l n l s t e r a nd h i s Chief Pol i t ica l Direc to ra te is re?. vealed in t h e m i n i p t r y ' s w r i t t e n orders and d i rec t ives onp o l i t i c a l work during t h e Zhukov period. Soon a f t e r h e be-came defense mi nis t er i n February 1955, Zhukov apparentlyissued a secret order forbidding criticism of s e rv i ce d u t i e s 'of m i l i t a r y commanders a t par ty meetings. On a t l ea s t t w osubsequent occasions commanders c i ted an order of t h i s na turein quashing cri t icism of t h e i r ac t ions by p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s 'i n t h e i r commands.

The Defense M inis t ry d i r e c t i v e on t h e r e s u l t s of t h e20th party congress cal led t h e a t t e n t i o n of a l l elements of .t h e armed f o r c e s t o t h e primary role of p o l i t i c a l organs int h e m i l i t a r y establishment--support and as si st an ce f o r com-manding off icers.preparation of t h e decfsions and materials of t h e congressa r e t o be directed t o strengthening one-man leadership, t oincreas ing m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e , and t o mast ering combattechnology and weapons. wZhukov a lso took s t e ps in March 1956 t o s u b j e c t p o l i t -i c a l workers in t h e armed forces t o a d di t io n al t r a i n i n g i np u r e l y m i l i t a r y s u b j e c t s , a project hin ted a t in a speech

' he de l ive red t o po l i t i c a l workers in.Apri1. A Defense Min-i s t r y order made t ac t i ca l commanders personal ly responsiblef o r t h e m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l workers and re-quired a report on t h e s t a t u s and nature of s u c h t r a i n i n gfrom each major headquarters in t h e armed forces. This notehad been sounded ea r l i e r when Soviet Flee t , the Soviet Navy'snewspaper, edi toria l ized i n May 1955 t h a t "a l l p o l i t i c a lworkers m u s t be e z p e r t on naval as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l a f fa i r s ,f o r without such knowledge t hey cannot e f fec t ive ly assist.others.** The campaign t o produce a well-rounded p o l i t i c a lworker - officer is also an Important requirement in post-

The document directed tha t "the s tudy p d *

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Zhukov policy.How Much Po l i t i c s for t h e Troops? The difference in t h ea t t i t u d e s of Zhukov and h i s successor toward Doli t ical in-doc t r ina t ion , as opposed t o basic m i l i t a r y t r h i n g , is demon-s t ra ted by a comparison of t w o ar t ic les , publ ished two and ah a l f years apar t , on t h e conduct of p o l i t i c a l s t u d i e s in t h earmy. Red Star a M O U U C e d on 13 October 1955 t h a t " the sub;/ects


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of political studies have been changed, The number of themeson questions of military education, as well as the time de-voted to them, is being increased significantly...The platoon' leader himself will personally conduct political studies withall the soldierla of his platoon, and he tail1 answer not onlyfor their military education but for their political educa-tion.

Maj. Gen. N. M. Yironov, head of the propaganda andag$tation department of the GPU, wrote the second article,which appeared in Bed Star on 10 January 1958,wasted no words:-tion and method of political instruction I s being changed.The emphasis is to be on political themes.,.attendaace atlectures is compulsory." Thus, between 1955 and 1958, theemphasis shifted sharply from military to political themesas the basis of political work in the services.

Mlronov"In this new educational year the composi-

The Contrast in Political Methodology, 1956-1958. TheImportant role of company officers 1n.stressing the militaryaspects of political training was emphasized cpnsistently inthe military press throughout 1956.was used increasingly in reference t o military-political ed-ucation and training of troops.. This concept correspondedroughly to the long-established "Integrated training" prin-ciple of Western armies. Subjects which formerly had beenconsidered npolitical**--mllitary courtesy and discipline,traditions of the service, Soviet patriotism--were nowtaught in conjunction with other purely military subjects.Slmultaneously, the amount of t h e allotted to formal in-struction in purely theoretical snbjects--~rxlsm-lg~iniSm,political economy, and the history of the Communist party--was reduced.

Immediately after the Zhulrov ouster, however, rneasqeswere instituted to increase formal political schooling forsoldiers, particularly for officers. The GPU announced Inmid-November 1957, for example, that because of suggestions9roa the officbr corps itself," the number of hours de-voted to classroom-type instruction for officers in politl-cal theory would be "more than doubled" Y n 1958, At thepresent t h e all officers are coqblled to attend the obliga-tory minimum of 50 hours of political lectures yearly,

me term "unified process"

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Zhukov and One-Man Command. The pr i nc i p l e of "one-mancommand" ~yedinonach&k,&Q) a s long been a s t a p l e of L e n i s i s tadminis t ra t ive theory . In 1925, t h i s was declared t o be t h enorm for t h e Bed Army, although p o l i t i c a l c d s s a r s cont inuedt o conduct t h e p o l i t i c a l i ndoc t r i na t i on of t roops. In 1928,commanders who were bonafide par ty members also assumed re-s p o n s i b i l i t y for p o l i t i c a l t ra ini ng. During th e purges oft h e l a t e 1930s t i g h t pa r t y con t ro l s were ag al n imposed, and. -one-man command-vas pushed i n t o t h e background. From 1942t o t h e present, however, despi te temporary periods of s t rong-e r control measures, t h e clamor f o r more vigorous asser t ionof t h e pedinonachal iye pr inciple has increased.Zhukovts a t t i t u d e toward one-man command was dramatically

def ined in a speech before a party conference of t h e MoscowM l l i t a r y D i s t r i c t in January 1956. On t h i s occasion he ex-p l i c i t l y ass igned p o l i t i c a l organs in t h e armed forces a rolesubordinate to commanders:In t h e d i s t r i c t there have been noted separateat tempts t o s u b j e c t t h e performance of servicedut ies (s luzhebna a de a t e l n o s t ) of commandersmt1-t- Any such a t-tempts deserve condemnation.s t r eng then t he au t ho r i t y of commanders in everyway and t o support exact ing o f f i ce r s and generals....

Our t ask is t o

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Zhukovts InJunc t i on r e s t r a i n i ng po l i t i c a l workers' c r i t i -c i s m of commanders' "service dut ies" was, for practical pur-poses, without precedent, N e i th e r t h e par ty s t a t u t e s northe 1951 In te r i or Serv ice Regula tions of t h e Sovie t armedforces contain any suggest ion t h a t a commanding o f f i c e r ist o be considered immune from cr i t ic ism by par ty organiza t ionsand pol i t i ca l organs.r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a nd his ob l i ga t i ons in carrying them out, 'rather than h i s personal Inuaunitles.Both documents stress t h e comrmmdelp's

Faced w i t h t h i s hazardous dichotomy in i n t e r p r e t a t i o n oft h e "one-man command**pr i nc i p l e , t h e p a r t y c e n t r a l committeeon 27 Apr i l 1957 promulgated a new set of "Ins t ruc t ions t ot h e Organizat ions of t h e Communist p a r t y of t he '$ov i s t Uninni n t h e Soviet Army an d Navy."himself took t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n requesting w ri tt en documenta-t i o n of h i s pos i t i on on army-party relat ions, and Khrushchevmay have approved these i n s t r u c t i o n s in an attempt t o de f i ne

I t is probable t h a t Zhukov

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?EeR!Ez

' relations between his defense minister and the Chief PoliticalDirectorate. At any rate, the Instructions seemed to grantthe defense minister the essence of what he had been publiclydemandiag--j~isdiction over the political organs within hiscommand. The document instructed party organs to increasetheir efforts to "rally" the armed forces around the Com-munist party and the Soviet Government, but it interpretedyedinonachalise as precluding criticiem of "the orders and com-mands of commanders...at party meetings."The fine distinction posed between Zhukov's **serviceduties** nd the central committee's "orders and commandsninvolved much more than semantics. In the days Immediatelyprior to q;hukovts emoval, official party organs emphasized .the poiht that the phrase "orders and commandsn applied only

to those formal written and verbal orders which a commanderissued in performance of his most literal command functions.Thus the commander remained liable to criticism for de4iEienclesand errors of .omission and commission by his unit in the courseof Its training.commander were exempt from criticism, but the effects of theorders were fair game for party snipers.In other words, orders as enunciated by the

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A tendency to Water down" the Implications of the newAmid theinstructions was actually noticeable in the press shortlyafter the June 1957 purge of the antiparty group.welter of words a b e d at the "plotters and connivers," theopinion was frequently expressed that all Communists, regard-less of rank or position, shared %quaEights and responsi-

bilities.*l The military press in particular stressed thatcommanders should not only tolerate, but actively solicitparty criticism of tHeir personal and profesaional shortcomings.A single example of the new tone in the press will suf-fice to show which way the wind was blowing in mid-1957.Gen. A. Shmelov, chief of the Far Eastern Military District'sPolitical Directorate, lauded party criticism of a commanderin Bed Star on 12 September 1957. Among other "Insolences,"theoff= had'srrmmoned subordinates from a party meetingnwithout any special need for it.** Retribution quickly befellthe errant commander, however: **Not long ago Comrade Silantevlearned a lesson. At a party meeting the Communists subjectedhim to sharp and just criticism for h i s rude attitude toward

party discipline. They remin9ed the CQIIIrade that In the eyesof the party all are equal and that no one is permitted toviolate the norms of party l i f e . "

Uj.

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II ! ,

After t h e October 1957 s e s s i o n of t h e p a r t y cen t ra l com-mittee, It was claimed t h a t t h e I n s t r u c t i o n s had been con-ceived as a direct r e s u l t of Zhukov's excesses i n s h i e l d i n gm i l i t a r y personnel from par ty criticism and t h a t t hey weredesigned t o correct the harm done by him. For example, RedS t a r on 3 November 1957 repor ted t h a t a speaker a t t h e spe--meeting of t h e Moscow U l i t a r y D i s t r i c t p a r t y a k t i v calledt o endorse t h e ce nt ra l commit tee' s ac t ion charged, "Unt i l t h eissuance of th e ce nt ra l committee 's ins t ruc t ion s , p a r t y organ-i z a t i o n s were deprived of r i g h t s provided fo r i n t h e p a r t ys t a t u t e s and were pushed aside f r o m a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n int h e solution of t h e problems of m i l i t a r y t r a in ing . "meeting of t h e GSFG p a r t y a k t i v as say ing th a t "un t i l r ecen t -l y , on t h e order of Comrade Zhukov (underl ines added), formerm in i s t e r of defense, t h e role of t h e par ty and p o l i t i c a l ac-t i v i t y in t h e armed forces had been reduced....publ ica t ion of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o par ty o r g a n i z at i o n s i n t h eSoviet Army and Navy, approved by t h e p a r t y ce n tr al committee,t h e p a r ty organiza t ions d i d no t in f ac t carry o u t t h e i r tasksas s t i p u l a t e d i n t h e p a r t y s t a t u t e s . "

On 5 Xovenber 1957, Radio Volga quoted a speaker a t a

U n t i l t h e

There was no evidence In the s p r i n g or e a r l y summer of1957, however, t h a t e i t h e r t h e Defense Min i s t r y or t h e p a r ty ,cen t ra l com mittee in t e rp re t e d the ins t ruc t ion s as more orless than confirmation of t h e Zhukov doc t r ine on t h e primacyof command. The narrow in te rp re t a t i on of t h e "orders andcommandsn sanction came la ter . The immediate v i c t o r y seemedt o be Zhukov's.

Zhukov vs. t h e C h i e f of t h e GPU. Zhukov and h i s p o l i t -i ca l deputy, C o l . Gen. Aleksey Zheltov, clashed head-on overt h e n a tu r e of t h e del icate p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y r e l a t io n s h i p .Zheltov, as head of t h e Chief P o l i t i ca l Directorate of t h eDefense MiniStry, headed an or ga ni za tio n which w a s t e c h n i c a l l yan organic pa r t i o f t h e p a re n t m ini s t ry bu t which simultaneous-l y functioned as a department of t h e p a r t y s s central commit-tee. This l a t t e r sta tus endowed t h e GPU w i t h far-reachingimmunities from mi ni s t er ia l cont r o l . Zhnkov w a s unhappy overt h i s circumstance, and h i s pub l i c u t t e rances l eave l i t t l eground fo r doubting t h a t Zhukov and Zheltov were a t logger-heads as e a r l y as t h e beginning of 1956.

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Zhukov's dissatisfaction with the Gpd As evident in hisspeech in April 1956 before an all-union conference of polit-ical workers in the rrrmed forces, referred to above in connec-tion with 20th congress indoctrination. The address is a re-markable indictment of the structure and functioning of thepolitical apparatus in the military establishment. In hisopening remarks, which set the tenor of the entire speech,tary-political figures during the previous seven years todiscuss wlth them the status and problems of party-politicalwork in the armed forces and measures to improve politicalwork. Zhukov left the clear impression that the head of theGPU was guilty of gross indifference toward the most pressingpolitical pr ob le m of the day in the military. establishment.

As for political work, Zhukov found "serious deficiencies**in the political training of some units; these, in turn, hadresulted In **intolerable axities in the state of discipline...in the armed forces." He called for a "fundamental rebuildingof the entire system of political and military education...newand more effective methods of party-political work.'* Zhukovdefined the goals of this reorganized system as' na high qualityof military and political training, an improvement in combatreadiness, organization and discipline, a superior knowledgeof military eqiulpment and armament, and the proper performanceof duty by all personnel." These goals in turn were to beattained through four major steps: (1) discontinue studyingthe state 0% affairs and conditions in units from papers andreports; (2) stop bureaucratic direction of units from of-fices; (3) be closer to the troops, examine the command per-sonnel, and then replace un sd tabl e workers with more com-petent persons; and (4) go to the masses, eliminate existingdeficiencies, and mobilize eyery Communist and Komsomol,every soldier, sailor, and officer, for the active and crea-tive solution of problems.

Current political propaganda, continued Zhukov, wasnunrealistic and separated from the actual condittons of thetroops and the practical problems facing every unit andformation.? Reforms in both %ontent** and *bethod" of prop-aganda work were essential, he.pdmonished, in order to "lib-erate) ur military thinking from that inflexible n a r r o d n d -edness which was born of the cult of the individual and toawaken creative thinking, which is based-not on quotationsserving the cult of the individual but on the objective an-alysis of reality, on the entire wealth of ideas of Marxist-Leninist theory, and on military science..'*

Zhukov attacked the GPU for not having assembled leading mill- ' .

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Turning t o t h e c ru c i a l i s s u e of t h e missdon of p o l i t i c a land party organs in the armed forces, Zhukov assignedthemth e t a s k of "str ong ly sup por tin g th e commanders...to pre ven tt h e lowering of t h e pres t ige of command pe rsonne l, in cl ud in gnoncommissioned officers.**maJor stady...of t h e s t ru c t u r e and s t a f f i n g of t h e p o l i t i c a lorgans in t h e armed forces .** Sp eci fic all y denouncing over-s t a f f i n g of p o l i t i c a l s e ct i on s , he found evidence of **great.excesses in t h e organ iza t iona l f i e l d which unnecessar i lyformalize a number of f i e l d s of endeavor where the party andKomsomol. organlza tio ns ... could app ly themselves w i t h g r e a t e rcreativeness."*

The d ef i ci e n ci es noted, Zhukov s a i d , n e c e s s i t a t e d "a

*Party work and control functions in t h e Soviet armedfo rces are performed by t w o d i f fe ren t . groups: (1) t h e p o l i t -i c a l off icers (jmmpolity) and (2) t h e uni t pa r ty o rgan izat ions.The p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r i s a t once t h e unit r e p re s e n t a t i v e oft h e Chief P o l i t i c a l Directorate an d 't h e deputy commander fo rp o l i t i c a l a f fa i r s (zampolit) of h i s u n i t . He is appointedfrom above and in turn appoints t h e z m p o l i t y a t t h e nextlower echelon. He is ult imately re spons ib le t o t h e ChiefPol i t ic a l Di rectorate f o r a l l p o l i t i c a l a f fa i r s in h i s u n i t ,and t h i s respons ibi1i tp : j lus h i s dual subordinat ion--to t h ezampolit of t h e next h igher echelon as w e l l as t o t h e com-manding o f f i c e r of h i s unit--frequently leads him t o i n t e r -fere in t h e work of that commander, particularly in mattersof t ra in ing.

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Party organiza t ions in t h e armed s e rv i c e s are roughlyequivalent t o those in c i v i l i a n l i f e , except t h a t they arese t up according t o m i l i t a r y units (battal ion, regiment,d iv i s ion) ins tead of geographical areas ( c i t y or rayon, ob-l a s t , republ ic . ) They **elect* secretaries-who are nominatedby t h e zampolit--send del egat es t o pa r t y conferences a t h igherechelon le ve ls and, under th e d i rec t ion of th e zampol i t, carryout propaganda work among the troops, strengthen discipline,care for t h e welfare o f t h e soldiers , etc. Although t h ezampolit may encourage them t o do so a t times, they have nor i g h t to **checkon t h e execution**of orders rece ived by t hecommander, in c o n t r a s t t o party organiza t ions in c i v i l i a ne n t e rp r i s e s w h i c h have as one of their chief t asks checkingon execution by t h e management of party and government direc-t i v e s and pla ns. (Footnote contin ued, page 14)

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,Moreover, Zhukov scored Zhel tov ' s admini s t ra t io n of theGPU. "I assume,'* he concluded, " t h a t t h e Chief P o l i t i c a l

Directorate and the po l i t i c a l d i r ec t o ra t e s of a l l branches oft h e armed forces . . . m i l i t a ry d i s t r i c t s and f l e e t s . . . w i l l closet h e gap which now separates t h e d i r e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l organs fromt h e groups , mi l i t a ry d i s t r i c t s , f l e e t s , armies, and f l o t i l l a swhich they superv i se I'Less than a year l a t e r , i n March 19S7, Zhukov a g a in pu bl ic -l y censured Zh el to v- fo r undue d elay i n convening an importantmeet ing, th is t i m e an all-army conference of out sta nd in g m em -bers of t h e armed forces . Thus i n a span of 11months t h e de-f e n s e mi n i s t e r had twice reprimanded h i s p o l i t i c a l d e pu ty fo ri n e f f i c i e n c y a n d i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , f i r s t before a b a s i c a l l y po-l i t i c a l audience and then before a mil i t a r y ga the r ing . Therecould be no doubt t h a t there w a s co nf l i c t between t h e m i l i t a r y

and p o l i t i c a l wings of t h e minis t ry , nor t h a t Zhukov had beenunable, or unwil l ing, to s e t t l e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s in pr iva te andhad chosen t o humi l ia te h i s t echn ica l subordina te pub l ic ly .Sometime during t h e summer of 1957, relat ions betweenZhukov and Zheltov became so s t r a i n e d t h a t t h e t o p p a r t y lead-e rs had t o i n t e r f e r e . An American correspond ent i n Moscow wast o l d t h a t t h e t w o clashed i n August over t h e manner of conduct-ing lec tures and conferences to expla in t h e June plenum t o t h etroops. Zhukov charged Zheltov w i t h insubordinat ion, and t h el a t t e r complained t o Wrushchev, who asked Suslov to look i n t ot h e matter. Zhukov thereupon t o l d Suslov t o keep o u t of de-fense a f fa i r s . The correspondent also heard about a meetingbetween t h e party presidium and t h e high command . a t which

-(Footnote continued from page 13)Zhukov evidently f e l t t h a t zampolit s t a f f s (and t h e i rhigher echelon equ iva len t s - -po l i t i ca l s ec t ion s a t corps andd i v i s i o n l e v e l a nd p o l i t i ca l direc tora tes of m i l i t a r y d i s -t r i c t s ) should be c u t and more res po ns ib i l i ty g iven t o t h eregu la r pa r ty o rgan iza t ions . S ince pa r ty o rgan iza t ion s them-s e l v e s had n e i t h e r t h e r i g h t nor t he a b i l i t y t o i n t e r f e r e w i t ho r question command decisions, Zhukov wanted t h e i r r o l e t o beenhanced f o r improvement of propaganda and t ro o p d i s c i p l i n e ,and he wished t o weaken t h e role of the zampolit, who couldques t ion dec i s ion s of commanders. No one questioned t h e neces-

s i t y of improving t h e work of pa rty org ani zati ons . Zhukov'splans fo r reducing t h e zampolit, however, were t o g e t him i n t oser io us d isagreement w i t h t h e regime, because t h e u l t i ma t e e f f e c twould be t o make t h e C h i e f P o l i t i c a l Directorate subord ina te t ot h e Minis t ry of Defense alone and to reduce i t s ro le a s a de-partment of t h e c e n t r a l p a r t y a p p arat us .-14-

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Zhukov w a s alleged t o have t a r t l y reminded Khrushchev t h a t h e,Zhukov, k n ew how t o run t h e m i l i t a r y establishment. Zhukovapparently l e f t f o r Pugoslavia before t h e c o n f l i c t w a s resolved,but not without promising Zheltov t h a t he would fire him.t h i s s h y ' t o t h e ef fect t h a t Zhukov objected t o t h e read ingof t h e l e t t e r on t h e an t ipa r ty g roup t o occupation troops asdangerous t o morale and d i sc ip l ine .presumably Zheltov, ordered t h a t t h e l e t t e r be read. Zhukov,angered, dismissed t h e subordinate. The l a t t e r complained t ot h e c e n t r a l committee, w i t h Suslov handling t h e complaint.d scene between Zhukov and Suslov ensued. A t meetings of t h eMoscow M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t party organizat ion on 24 and 25 Octo-ber 1957, Khrushchev charged Zhukov w i t h having t r i e d to re-'move Zheltov and w i t h %onspiring by dishonest means" t o pre-vent t h e l a t t e r ' s e l e c t i o n as a candidate member of t h e c e n t r a lcommittee.

Another Western correspondent has reported a v a r i a n t of 'A high-ranking subordinate,

.

Once t h e quarrel between Zhukov and Zheltov became sob i t t e r it had t o be s e t t l e d i n t h e presidium, t h e outcome w a salmost inevitable. O l d party apparatchik Zheltov had directaccess t o and long personal ass ocia t i on w i t h t h e party ap-paratchiks . who compr2sGd t h e bulk of t h e presiddum. The l a t -t e r , for Eeasons t o be discussed i n t h e next chap te r , w e r e prob-a b l y having second thoughts about t h e marshal-minister who w a st ak ing h i s presidium membership too se r i ous ly and w a s t r y i n gt o change t h e i r system of con t r o l over h i s m i l i t a r y es t ab l i sh -ment. Thus t h e reason f o r Zhukov's ous ter ta ki ng place wheni t d i d appears t o have been t h e urge nt need t o s o l v e t h eproblem of ai defense mi ni s t er who could not work i n har nessw i t h t h e head of t h e Chief Politfcal Directorate, whose postw a s more s i g n i f i c a n t f r o m t h e p a r t y point of view. ThatZheltov stayed on as GPU chief u n t i l t h e i n i t i a l c on fu si onhad ended and then w a s t r a n s f e r r e d t o a no t he r r e s p o n s i b l ep a r t y post i n d i c a t e s t h e leadership w a s n o t , d f s s a t i s f i e d w i t ht h e way he had conducted himsel f .

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111. ZEUKOV AND TEE CULT OF PERSONALITYThe second'charge against Zhukov w a s t h a t he had a t -tempted t o bui ld up a "cult" of h i s personal i ty and t o ex-aggerate the importance of h i s personal r o l e duri ng World

. . War 11. T h i s con t ras ted sha rp ly w i t h t h e plb tu re genera l lydrawn, in t h e West a t l eas t , of t h e marshal as S t a l i n ' s vict imand therefore t h e a n t i t h e s i s of dic ta to rsh ip , as a n apo l i t i ca lcareer s o l d i e r i n t e r e s t e d o nl y in mil i ta r y sc ience , and a s aperson popular with bo t h t h e public and h i s col leagues .The A r t of Maklng'Enemies: P a r t y Waders . Prior t o t h e even ts

of l a t e october i g w Xhukov appeared to eaioy a cl os e workinga l l i an ce w i t h Soviet leaders in general and w i t h N i k i t a Khru-shchev in p a r t i c u l a r . A f t e r being ex il ed by S t al in , Zhukovsupposedly owed h i s r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and h i s l o f t y r a nk in t h eSoviet hiera rchy t o Khrushchev's interv ention on h i s behalf .One competent Western diplomatic observer noted t h e f ac t t h a twhenever t h e t w o appeared together, Zhukov wore a "look ofp r id e a n d almost adoration" and conducted h imse l f In a mannerwhich c le ar l y deferred t o Khrushchev's se ni or i t y and au th or i ty .

t

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Information on t h e Soviet po l i t i ca l scene in t h e immedi-a te postwar years is sketchy. Zhukov's transfer f i r s t t o t h eOdessa and t h e n t o t h e U r a l s M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t has been a t -t r i b u t e d t o S t a l i n ' s f ea r t h a t t h e popular marsha l m i g h t chal -l enge him in pres t ige or even pose a threa t to h i s p ow e r . InAugust 1945, however, during t h e v i c t ory c e l e b ra t i o n s in Mos-cow a fr ie nd ly re la t i on sh ip exis ted between S ta l i n and Zhukov.General Eisenhower (in h i s book Crusade in-Europe) descr ibedit as follows:a g r ea t f a v o r i t e w i t h S t a l i n .... The two spoke t o each otheron terms of . intimacy and cord i a l i t y . " Y e t in less than a year,dur ing most of which Zhukov w a s s t a t i o n e d in Germany, h e w a sremoved from t h e p a r t y central committee and as commander oft h e ground fo rc es and se n t t o Odessa. The p a r a l l e l between1946 and 1957, i nc lu di ng rumors a t t h e l a t t e r date t h a t h ewould be offered a lesser job , possibly as commander of ami l i t a ry d i s t r a c t , is noteworthy. Pravda of 3 November1957, commenti'ng on t h e Zhukov r e m o m a i d t h a t t h e m a r s h a lconsidered himsel f a super io r sov ie t leader, put h i s personalambitions above t h e party and amy, and "repeated h i s mistakesof 1946." Whether or not the re is a par a l l e l between S ta l in ' sand Khrushchev's treatment of Zhukov w i l l probably never bees t ab l i shed . The matter is raised here merely t o p o in t o u t

"At t h a t t i m e Marshal Zhuzv w a s p a t e n t l y

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t h a t relat ions between Soviet leaders cannot soundly bedetermined by t h e i r a t t i t u d e s shown toward each o t he r inp u b l i c .

In any event , Zhukov's e x i l e cannot be at tr ib ut ed t ol a s t in g enmity on S t a l i n ' s .part--although Zhukov undoubtedly .h e ld such fee l ings toward Stali n--f or Zhukov re tu rn ed t oMoscow, probably as commander of t h e ground forces o r in-spector ge ne ra l, sometime i n 1951. Furthermore, Zhukov w a selected a candidate m e m b e r of t h e ce nt ra l committee a t t h e19th par ty congress in October 1952. Thus h e w a s b o th m i l i -t a r i l y and p o l i t i c a l l y r e h a b i l i t a t e d d u r i n g S t a l i n ' s l i f e -time ,and overly s t r i c t d i s c i p l i n a r i a n b y h i s subordinates. Oneeffec t of h i s removal was a reduct ion in t h e s t r ingency ofmi l i t a ry d i s c i p l i n e , i n c lu d i ng t h e repeal of O r d e r No. 060--probably issued in March oP .Ap ril 1957--concerning di sc ip li na ryprocedures. This decree w a s described as being too severe . 6As an example of Zhukov's ar b it ra ri n es s, there is a reportt h a t he re t i red a co lone l on t h e general s t a f f because t h el a t t e r w a s overweight and f a i l e d t o a t t en d p h y s i c a l c u l t u r eclasses. A f t e r Zhukov's removal, Wrushchev restored t h e co lone lt o d u t y .

There is evidence t h a t Zhukov w a s considered a r u t h l e s s 8

, . . . .. , .

There is a cons iderable body of evidence suggesting t h a tZhukov's elevation t o f u l l membership in t h e presidium In June1957 went t o h i s head, One of h i s f i r s t o f f i c i a l a c t s i n t h i s Icapaci ty was t o d e l i v e r speeches in Ieningrad on 14 and 15July 1957, short ly a f t e r t h e purge of t h e a n t i p a r t y group, . H eentered t h e c i t y on t h e crest of a wave of spontaneous heroworship; a l l s t r a t a of Leningrad soci e t y vol unt ar i ly turned outt o cheer him. Zhukov's speeches, t h e tnost p o l i t i c a l l y weightedd i sc o ur se s i n h i s r e p er t o ry , were h a rd l y c a l c u la t e d t o c o n c i l i a t ee i t h e r h i s mil i ta ry contemporar ies or h i s peers in t h e p a r t ypresidium. On t h e one hand there w a s a conspicuous lack ofsel f -e ffacement i n desc r ib in g h i s own c o n t r i b u ti o n s t o t h e Ger-man defeat i n World War 11, and on t h e other hand he carr iedh i s a t t a ck on t h e a n t i p a r t y g rou p t o p o l i t i c a l ex tremes.Speaking a t a Leningrad factory on 15 July 1957, Zhukovcharged:ures pursued by t h e p a r t y f o r l i q u i d a t i n g t h e consequences oft h e p e r so n a li t y c u l t , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e d i s c l o s u re a n d c a l l i n gt o account of those mainly respons ib le f o r a l lowing t h e l a wt o be violated." He exceeded t h e previous l i m i t s of abuse of

**The n ti pa rt y group.. .s tubbornly resisted t h e meas-

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i

,

t h e Molotov, Ulenkov, Kaganovich cl-que by in,imating t h a tthey should be expelled from t h e p a r ty .party group " los t t h e right t o pretend t o t h e ro l e of leadersof t h e party and s ta te , " lie sa id , "but even t o t h e name oflegitimate members of o u r great Communist party." I t isprobable t h a t Zhukov carried h i s attack even further. TheSoviet press , af te r r e p o r t i n g that he had de l ive red *'a longspeech," printed a re la t i ve ly b r ie f t ex t ua l ve rs ion consplcu-ously aneven in i t s t r a ns i t io ns from one top ic t o ano the r.These were not t h e words of a m i l i t a r y commander inchief but of a p o l i t i c i a n , and they may w e l l have causedWrushchev and t h e other presidium members t o t a k e a n o t he rlook a t t h e i r newly acquired colleague.Se ve ra l di pl om at ic and pr es s ob serv ers i n Moscow com-mented during t h e summer of 1957 t h a t Zhukov w a s becoming in-creasingly cpcky and t h a t h e behaved as i f he w e r e second onlyt o Khrushchev; During h i s t r i p t o Yugoslavia he a l s o createdt h e impression that he w a s t h e second-ranking man i n t h e So-viet Union.

N o t only had t h e a n t i -

. ... .

-1

:The A r t of Making Enemies: Zhukov vs. H i s Comrades inArms. Zhukov wa$ charged both a't a p a r t y meeting of t he MOS-m i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t on 24 October 1957 and i n lldarshal Konev'sa r t i c l e in Pravda on 3 November w i t h having wished t o d is pl aya portrai t ofh imse l f , mounted on a w h i t e charger, i n t h e ac tof l i be r a t in g Berl in.Several reports follow ing Zhukov's downfall ind ica tedt h a t h e had blocked appeals t o t h e ce n t r a l committee by sub-ord ina tes wi th in t h e Defense Ministry.of t h e London k i l y Worker, a t times an unusually well-informedsource on t h e m t - r c h y , f i l e d a s t o r y from Moscow on 29October 1957 that p o l i t i c a l workers i n pa r t i cu la r w e r e deniedaccess t o t h e c e n t r a l committee, and t h a t Zheltov himself hadf i l e d a p ro t e s t t o t h a t body which p re c i p i t a t e d t h e specia l Oc-tober plenum. W i l l i a m J. Jorden of t h e New York T i m e s report -ed f r o m Moscow' on 9 November t h a t "some i?Z5rmTsources" be-li ev ed Zhukov's removal had been caused by pressure from w i t h -i n t h e m i l i t a r y i t s e l f . Zhukov, he noted, had become unap-proachable, even in su lt in g, t o o ld comrades. Jorden a l s onoted accounts t h a t Zhukov had blocked appeals t o t h e c e n t r a lcommittee.

The Moscow corkespondent

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. -. ,. .. ,. I . , .

. ..,

... ,. ,.

. . .. .

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.- . ..

Moreover, there is no evidence of p ro te s t aga ins t t h eous te r by any major commander a t t h e par ty a k t iv meet ingsheld a f t e r t h e plenum i n a l l m i li ta ry d i s t r i c t s to discussthe re so lu t ion . On the con t ra ry , career i s t s such a s Malinovsky,Konev, Moskalenko, and Biryuzov may have take n some p le asu rein heaping coals of f i r e on t h e unfortunate one.o f f i c e r s p r e se n t a t t h e ce n tr al committee meet ing repor ted ly werepol led sepa ra te ly on t h e ou st er motion and voted unanimously ag ai ns tZhukov.

The m i l i t a r y'

In t h e f l o o d of reports rec t e r ,I from those i n t h e press t o those therew a s s u rp r i s i n g l y l i t t l e evidence i mpersonally on t h e pa r t of any ember of t h e Soviet armed forces.eported t h a t t h e rank and f i l e

removal of Zhukov, whom t h e y re-garded as a " fa ther f igure ," and t h a t , a f t e r t h e ous ter , concernf o r t h e s o l d i e r s ' welfare l es se ne d and p o l i t i c a l c o n t ro l ln-creased. On t h e whole, however, reactions tended m o r e in t h edi re ct io n of resentment a t Khrushchev's methods--e.g., ou s t ingZhukov w h i l e he w a s out of t h e country--rather than of supportfor Zhukov. Similarly, t h e snubbing of Marshal Konev by otherm i l i t a r y leaders a t t h e 40th October Revolution Anniversary re -cept ion seemed t o re f lec t d i s t a s t e f b r t h e v i t r i o l and vehemence ofh i s public denuciat ion of Zhukov, more t h a n any rese rvo i r ofsympathy f o r t h e f a l l e n . In any event, whatever sympathy t h e r ew a s f o r Zhukov w a s not s t ro ng enough t o s tand up aga ins t t h e pres-su re mobilized by t h e party propaganda machine in October 1957.Zhukov's domineering pe rs on al it y in i t s e l f would scarcelyappear sufficient ground.forremoving h i m from h i s p o s t s , p a r t i c -ularly. , on t h e e v e . d f th e 40th October Revolution A nniversaryand a t a time when tension over t h e Turkish-Syrian crisis w a ss t i l l mounting. What i t probably did do w a s t o antagonize othermembers 6f t h e presidium and t o a l ie n at e h i s mi l i t a ry c o l l e ag u e s,thus prepar ing t h e climate f o r h i s removal.

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IV. ZHUKOV AND THE CHARGE OF "ADVENTURISM"

The ce nt ra l commit tee' s charge t h a t Zhukov w a s p o l i t i c a l l ydef ic ient and disposed t o "adventurism" in t h e f i e l d s of fo re ign ~policy and in t h e l eade rsh ip of t h e Defense Ministry may alsohave had some bas is in fac t . In t h i s c a n e c t i o n , however, Zhu-kov's "adventurism" m u s t be i n t e rp re t ed as t h e Sovie t leadersthemselves would in t e r p r e t i t - - i .e . , a s advocating a p o l i t i c a lor mi l i t a ry p o l i c y which could in any way be i n t e r p r e t e d a sleaving t h e USSR in an exposed position.. "

, ... .

, ..' *.-..

A t an embassy recept ion in Moscow in J u l y 1957, Zhukovs t a t e d t h a t . h e was prepared t o open up t h e e n t i r e Sovie t Uniont o i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s p e ct i on i f such act io n would co nt ri bu tet o a gen uine disarmament agreement. One observer rece ived t h eimpression that t h e defense m i n i s t e r ' s p r i c e f o r such a conces-sion w a s opening up t h e r e s t of t h e world t o Sovie t inspect io n;never the less , no top- f l igh t Soviet leader had ever before somuch as impl ied t h a t p h y s i c a l inspect ion of t h e USSR by out-s iders would be acceptable under any circumstances.

Later in t h i s conversation Zhukov displayed e i the r re-markable candor or equally remarkable naivete in d i r e c t l ycon t rad ic t ing an ea r l i e r policy s tatement by Khrushchev. Whent h e sub jec t of t h e reduct ion of fo rc es arose , Zhukov s t a t e dt h a t t h e Soviet armed forces numbered far less than t h e fourmi l l ion men g e n er a ll y a t t r i b u t e d to them by t h e West, and headded t h a t he would Pike t o r e l e a s e t h e a c t u a l f i g u r e b utthat ghrushchev and Bulganin d i d not agree t o t h i s .The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s l a t t e r claim becomes clearer i nt h e l i g h t of Khrushchev's di am et ri ca ll y opposed sta tem ent int h e TV in te rv iew which he granted t h e Columbia BroadcastingCompany f o r release on 28 May 1957. The par ty leader had de-c l i n e d t o answer a ques t ion on t h e s t ren g th of Sov ie t fo rceson t h e grounds t h a t he had not expected t h e question and "hadnot asked h i s defense mi ni ste r," Zhukov, f o r t h e f igure . Headded, however, " W e are always ready to answer t h i s question."Was t h i s "adven tur ismt1? Had Zhukov gone t o o f a r in as-suming p o l i t ic a l i n i t i a t i v e in a s e n s i t i v e a r e a of Sovie tdiplomacy, as w e l l as in compromising t h e leaders of t h e So-v i e t Government in t h e bargain? A sequel t o t h i s curiousp a t t e rn of poin t and coun te rpoin t ind ica tes th a t t h i s may in-deed have been t h e case . Six weeks a f t e r t h e Zhukov ouster

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t h e same observer who had t a l k e d t o Zhukov i n Ju ly had occa-s i o n t o inqu i r e of Premier Bulganin what w a s meant by t h eterm "adventurismn i n th e cen tr al committee 's de cl ara t io n onZhukov. Bulganin chose t o answer the question obliquely andlaunched into a long d i s se r ta t ion on t h e disarmament problem,concluding w i t h t h e statement t h a t there'were t h os e i n t h e So-v i e t Union who advocated in sp ect io n and co nt ro l, but t h a tthese persons were g u i l t y of "adventurism. **

. .

UndeP t h e circumstances i t is c l e a r t h a t Bulganin hadZhukov i n mind. .men though Bulganin apparently expectedt h a t t h i s conver sation would be rep orted t o American o f f i -c i a l s and therefore used i t t o reaffirm t h e USSR's p o s i t i o non inspect ion, it I s a logica l conclus ion t o t h e best ev i -dence on what was meant by t h e charge.of *fadventurism**against Zhulrov.There is a l s o a possibility that Zhukov opposed Khru-shchev's t ac t i c s vis-a-vis t h e Turkish-Syrian crisis i n Oc-tober 1957, although he rendered l i p s e rv i c e to them i n amajor speech during h i s v i s i t i n Albania. Zhukov may w e l lhave sought t o r e s t r a i n Khrushchev f r o m t ak ing r i s k s i n t h eMiddle East which could have involved t h e USSB In war w i t ht h e United States . These r i s k s would have been considered**adventurism*' n t h e Western sense, but, i n Khrushchev 'sview, Zhukov's op po si ti on wi th in t h e presidium t o such t ac t i c sor h i s fa i lu re t o r ea dy t h e mil i ta ry es tabl ishment t o backup Soviet foreign policy maneuvering would have constituted"adventurism.

I .

A t an I ranian recept io n on 26 October, t h e day of Zhu-kov's release as defense minister, Khrushchev re la ted af a b l e t o a Western correspondent. The s t or y concerned a"humble l i t t l e J ew , Pinya** (Khrushchev?) who i n t i m e ofdanger proved more courageous than ' the **burlyanarchis t '*(Zhukov?). This alle gor y could have referred t o t h e gen-e r a l outlook on fo re ign po l i cy of Khrushchev and Zhukov and/-or t h e i r a t t i tu de s toward t h e Turkish-Syrian crisis i n p ar-t icular. Zhukov's remarks on inspect ion and co nt ro l and h i scomments on t h e d e s t ru c t i v e fo r ce of nuclear w a r t e n d t o s up-p o r t t h i s t heory . -.one occasion h e s t a t e d t h a t an a r t i c l ehe had written,was censored because h i s g ra p h ic d e s c r i p t i o nof t h e e f f ec t s of atomic weapons might frighten people. Asa m i l i t a r y commander, Zhukov may have recommended cau t ion

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in t h e Turkish-Syrian crisis and opposed any mi l i t a ry p o s t u re so r movements of tr oo ps , etc. , which would aggravate t h e situa-t ion .Against t h i s view i t might be argued that Zhukov hadacted qu ic kl y i n Hungary and would have l i k e d t o have doneso in Poland. These cases, however, were q u i t e d i f f e r e n t .In Hungary th e a ut h or it y and pres t ige of t h e USSR and t h eSoviet Army had been challenged by a rebel l ious s a t e l l i t epeople; fn Paland, ' . there was t h e danger tha t con t ro l of t h eC e n t r a l European Plain, t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i nv as io n route tot h e E a s t , would be l o s t . Under these more di rec t ly threat-ening circumstances, no commander would hesi ta te t o respondimmediately and forcefully.Despi te t h e fac t tha t , f rom th e Soviet p o i n t of view,there was a b a s i s fo r t h e adventurism charge against Zhukov,t h i s apparently was much less a f a c t o r c o n t r ib u t i n g t o h i sdownfall t han t h e other two accusations. Even if Zhukovhad had such tendencies in t h e f i e l d of f o r ei g n r e l a t i o n s ,there was l i t t l e he could do about them without openlych al len gi ng Khrushchev and t h e presidium; and he was neveraccused of t h i s type of "an t ipa r ty" a c t i v i ty .

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V. THE YlECHANICS AND TIMING OF ZHUKOV'S REMOVAL

., I.....Zhukov l e f t Moscow on 4 October 1957 on a ceremonialv i s i t t o Yugoslavia t b reciprocate t h e June v i s i t of Yugo-s la v Minist er 'o f Defense -Ivan Gosnjak to t h e USSR. En rou tehe stopped off a t Yalta t o see Khrushchev, who w a s vacat ion-ing there. While Zhukov may have related h i s s i d e of t h e ,.'dispute with Zheltov, there a r e no c l ue s a s t o whether any-th ing came up a t t h e meeting which made Frushchev decidet h a t t h e marshal must be removed from h i s minis t ry . On t h econtrary, Khrushchev on h i s re tu rn t o Moscow g ra nte d aninterview with James Reston of t h e New York Times , in whicht h e Soviet leader on h i s own i n i t i a tdv e expressed t h e USSR'sdisappointment t h a t t h e US had rejected a visit!bp Zhukov.This could w e l l have been dfsslmulat ion on Khrushchev's part,

a l though the fu l l s t o r y of the timing of t h e f i n a l d e ci s io non Zhukov is s t i l l soxuewhat murky.Sometime between the Reston interview, which took placeon 7 October, and 12 October, when TASS announced th a t Zhu-kov would extend h i s t r i p by vi s i t i n g Albania, Khrushchey ap-paren t ly became convinced t h a t t h e bitter dispute between Zhu-kov and Zheltov had not only not been resolved but in fac thad been aggravated during t h e pa r ty leader 's vacat ion. West-e rn observer s r epo r t ed inc reased t r a f f i c in t h e Kremlin areaon 16 October, and rumors c i r c u l a t e d in Moscow t h a t t h e cqn-t r a l committee was in session. Apparently no plenum actuallytook place, but there were se ve ral high-level meetings a tparty headquart-ers. A t th e same t ime, Star on 16 October

carried an e d i t o r i a l which stressed t h e p a r t y ' s r o l e in guidingand supervising t h e mi l i t a r y .hukov went t o Albania from Belgrade on 17 October, plan-liinn. I to6 p e : d ' G C ! Svisi t was extended, but Zhukov ev en tua lly spe nt more t i m e inAlbania t han he ha d- in Yugoslavia. . I t is p o s s i b l e t h a t be-.cause of t h e Turkish-Syrian cr i s i s , t h e regime d id not wantt o announce i ts; dec i s ion on t h e Zhukov-Zheltov problem andn o t i f i e d t h e marshal t o extend h i s s t a y -in Albania, duringwhich t h e he gave h i s hard-l ine speech on t h e Near E a s t . I tis a l s o p o s s ib l e t h a t Zhukov, whose self-confidence had ln-creased no t iceab ly dur ing t h e previous f e w months, extendedhis t r i p h i ms el f, refusing t o r e t u r n t o Moscow u n t i l t h e f i n a ldecision was reached.

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By 19 October t h e central committee had issued a l e t t e rc r i t i c i z i n g t h e leadership of t h e Minis t ry of Defense f o r in-a d e q u a t e p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g in t h e armed forces.name, however, w a s no t mentioned--a fa ct. wh ic h sug ges ted t h a ta f i n a l d e c i s io n a s t oh i s fu t u re had not been reached. The de-c i s i o n t o reldeve Zhukov a s defense minis ter probably occurredimmediately p r i o r t o o r on 22 October. The previously men-t ioned r e p o r t t h a t l a rge numbers of h igh m i l i t a r y personnelwere seen ent er i ng and leaving th e Kremlin from 22 t o 24 Oc-tober would tend t o confirm t h i s date. A t meetings of t h eMoscow Military Dis t r i c t party organiza t ion on 24 and 25 Oc-tober, Khrushchev c r i t i c i zed Zhukov for overvaluing t h e ro l eof one-man command, fo r p e t i t io n i n g f o r t h e removal of Zheltov,f o r f a i l i n g t o inform t h e central committee of h i s a c t i v i t i e s ,and fo r r e fu s i n g t o a llo w h i s subord ina tes t o con tac t t h ece nt ra l committee. Agreement on Zhukov's release as m i n i s t e rof defense had evident ly been reached by t h i s t i m e , althoughi t is poss ible tha t d iscuss ion cont inued as t o what h i s newpost would be. I t is unl ik e ly , i n view of t h e se r iousnessof these charges, t h a t he would have be en mr mi t te d t o re ta inh i s p a r t y p o s i t i o n s ,

Zhukov's

Zhukov re tu rn ed t o Moscow on 26 October and went direct-l y from t h e airport t o t h e Kremlin, where he was o f f i c i a l l yinformed of h i s release. The session apparently w a s a s tormyone. The p a r t y leaders postponed t h e t i m e of t h e i r a r r i v a lat an I ran ian recep t ion t h a t nigh t , o r i g in a l l y s chedu led f o r1800 hours, t o 1900 and a c t u a l l y d id no t a r r i v e u n t i l 2000.The Time Required t o Remove Zhukov. The m o s t puzzl ingaspect of Zhukov's f i n a l f a l l is t h a t i t took so long. Int h e in te rv al between t h e 26 October announcement of Zhukov'sr e l e a s e as defense min is te r and t h e 2 November announcementt h a t he had l o s t h i s par ty pos t s , there was considerablespecula t ion on t h e meaning of h i s removal.The s implest exp lanat ion fo r t h e delay , of course, ist h a t i t took t i m e t o prepare party meetings which would havet o be h e l d t o get out t h e a u t h o r it a t i ve - i n e on Zhukovosous ter . The c e n t r a l committee meeting t o dis cus s t h e Zhukova f fa i r convened on 28 October and probably la s te d throu ght h e 30th or 31st, fo r on 1November t h e central committee

issued a l e t t e r desc r ib ing t h e plenum.ment of t h e charges w a s re leased on 2 November.The o f f i c i a l announce-

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.. .

Se ve ra l ot he r exp lana tion s, however, have been offeredf o r Zhulcov's f a l l and i t s timing. One theory was t h a t Khru-shchev, fear ing a Bonapartist coup, had t o eliminate Zhukovas a th rea t t o h i s power. This theory w a s based primari lyon overemphasis of zhakov's persona l ro l e in t h e June purgeof t h e "a nt ip ar ty group," which was considerably exaggerateda t t h a t t i m e , as w a s t h e amount of personal support Zhukovcommanded in t h e armed forces . . I t a lso disregarded t h e e x t e n tt b which t he m i l i tar y forces are penet ra ted a t a l l l e v e l s byparty and state secur i ty agen t s fo r t h e purpose of keepingt h e mi l i t a ry es tab li shmen t out of p o l i t i c s and f o r e s t a l l i n gt h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a coup.' -

There were a number of i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t , ins tead of con-sidering Zhukov a r i v a l , Khrushchev--who i s extremely consciousof t h e pres t ige of t h e USSR--enjoyed having an i n t e r n i t i o n a l l yrecognized hero i n his entourage. If t h i s was t h e case , t h et i m e l a g a f t e r 26 October may have r e s ul te d from Khrushchev'sattempts t o persuade t h e marshal t o remain i n t h e governmenti n a lesser Dosition. Such an o f f e r would have been i n accordw i t h Soviet practice s i n c e Malenkovts removal f r o m t h e premier-s h i p in 1955. On 29 October, Khrushchev indicated t h a t Zhukovwould be given another post "in accordance w i t h h i s q u a l i f i -ca ti on s and experience," echoing what had been s a i d aboutMolotov in July. The TASS announcement of Zhukov's release -contained no refere nce t o "other work" fo r t h e marshal, buti t i s poss ib l e tha t one or more res pectab le pos i t ion s wereoffered h i m and t h a t h e refused them. In i t s r e s o l u t i o n of 2November, t h e ce nt ra l committee in s t r uc ted t h e p a r t y secre-t a r i a t "to provide Zhukov w i t h another job:' I t is s t i l l notclear what Zhukov has done since h i s removal, although rumorspers is t t h a t he has r e t i r ed on a pension.

Another s ugg es tio n was t h a t t h e removal of Zhukov w a sengin eered by Khrushchev's opponents in t h e l eader sh ip i no r d e r . t o i so la te t h e par ty leader from a s t r o n g source of sup-po r t . In t h i s case, t h e time requi red t o effec t t h e o u s t e rwould have resulted from Khrushchev's own a t tempts t o f i g h tback. As ha s been in dic at ed, howeverp even ts have provedthat Zhukovts control of t h e armed forces was not so g r e a tas had been suppose d. Furthermore, h i s successor, MarshalMalinovsky, w a s 8' strong supporter-of -ghrushchev.

estab1;lsh. Of t h e f u l l members of t h e presidium a t t h a t t i m e ,The na tu re of th e so-called opposi t ion is d i f f i c u l t to

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Yikoyan and Suslov have shown l i t t l e , i f a n y , i n c l i n a t i o n to-ward involvement in a struggle fo r pe rsona l power; Bulganin,as has s ince .been es tabl ished , had been d is cr ed i t ed by h i s as-s o c i a t l o a w i t h t h e "antiparty group" in June; nei ther Voroshi lovnor Shvernik were s t ro n g enough t o trouble Khrushchev, and t h eremainder were Khrushchev^prot6g6s o r m em b e r s of h i s hand-picked secre tar ia t .On balance, i t would appear t h a t t h e removal of Zhukovfrom h i s government post,was vnecess i t a tedby h i s own arroganceand h i s refusal t o share his command of t h e m i l i t a r y w i t h t h epar ty apparatus. While t h i s would s e e m t o have le d automatical-l y t o l o s s of h i s par ty posts a s w e l l , the f a c t that t h i s w a snot announced until a week l a t e r may i n d i c at e t h a t t h e causewas Zhukov's re fusa l t o accept a secondary j o b t o sav e t h e lead-

e r s h i p ' s f a c e on t h e eve of t h e 40th anniversary of t h e Bol-shevik Revolution.The Transfer of Marshal Rokossovsky. One curious eventwhich became interwoven w i t h t h e Zhukov ouster w a s t h e appoint-ment of Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky as commander of t h e Trans-Caucasus Military D i S t r i c t .radio and Zarya Vostoka, t h e Georgian newspaper, on 23 October;t h e c e n t r a l press d i d not mention t h e appointment u n t i l 25 Oc-tobe r , when Pravda c i t ed t h e provincia l paper a s i t s source.A f t e r Zhukov's removal was made publi c , spe cul at io n aroseas t o whether Rokossovsky had been transferred e i t h e r because

he supported Zhukov or because he had been embarrassed t o op-pose h i s former comrade. In fact, Rokossovsky apparently d i dnot go t o Tbilisi u n t i l 6 November, when he appeared there a tOctober Revolution anniversary celebrations. Be spoke in Mos-cow a t the c e n t r a l committee plenum which began on 28 Octoberand again a t a meeting of t h e Moscow Oblas t p a r t y a k t i v on 1November.

The announcement was made by Tbilisi

In balance, then, it would appear that Rokossovsky's*?t ransfern o T b i l i s i had l i t t l e , if anything, t o do w i t h t h eZhukov case. Bather, i t w a s another Kremlin t a c t i c t o keepup pressure on th e Turks, along w i t h such measures as t a l k of"volunteers" and inc rea sed a i r a c t i v i t y in t h e border areas.In t h i s connection, however, t h e t iming of t h e Zhukovous te r and t h e "adventurism" charge ag ai ns t h i m may have


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. . . S h T

played a"ro1e. A-sm i l i n g glirushchev aldd-.'Mikoyan"uriexpected1.y&opped..'ln on a mrklsh.Bnbajlsy, reception .in 'Moscow..'on'.29;-t.obbr - ~ a ,. i n .h e.pres.enc.e .02 many.Western :'coSoviet .~pie..sru;e 0-n the...TurEi3-sh:~ n .2' Hovem6e . 2 the Soviet i.press ana .radi.oHear E a r i t s i t u a t i o n , ' it i s q u i t e . p o s s i b l e t h a t , h av in g' h adI n f e r t h a t Its a d v e n t u r i s t l c t a c t i c s ,in. h e Near E a s t were

" .

. \ -itgallist Zhukob "of "advenfurism" -In f oreI&h.'.jxjilcy. Althoughno' 'SovXet sou fd e . ' ha s lin ke d 'Zhukov's "adventurism" f o " t h et'o s u p p o r t Zheltov against an adamant .Zhukov apd.oust the . ,l a t t e r , t h e . p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p d ec id ed t o l e t Western observers

. .

., . .. : , ' t h o s e of'Zhukov. .. I '. _ . ., . . :

. . .... . .. .

, .. . .. ,... ... ._

,

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S E h q


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..

. . . . ., . .. . . . . .

.. . .

. .. ..... ., . ..

..,.. . ..

The t r an sf er of Zheltov. In t h e period between 27 Decem-ber 1957 and 10 January 1958, C o l . Gen. A. S, Zheltov w a st r a n s f e r r e d from h i s p o st as head of t h e Chief P o l i t i c a l Di-rectorate t o a corresponding pos i t io n 'as 'chi ef of t h e admin-i s t r a t iv e department of t h e par ty ce nt ra l committee. H i ssuccessor in the GPU bas Col, Gen. F. I . Golikov, a profes-s i o n a l s o l d i e r n o t p r ev io us ly assigned t o the upper m i l i -t a ry -po l l t i ca l eche lon .l a t e ra l t r a n s f e r . One theory h o ld s t h a t t h e s h i f t c o n s t i t u t e dt h e p a r t y ' s t a c i t recogni t ion of Zhelto v's .per son al unpopu-l a r i t y a t t h e lower levels of military command. Another pos-s i b i l i t y is t h a t t h e move was a gesture to .$nd ica te t h a t someblame f o r t h e Zhukov a f f a i r may have l a i n w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a lapparatus, and t h a t t h e October plenum was not t h e hera ld ofa general purge of career of f ice r s . The appointment of tank-man Golikov would serve t o s t rengthen t h i s reassurance,

Se ve ra l hypotheses have been advan,ced t o ex pl ai n Zhe lt ov 's

S t i l l another explanation--and a combination of t h e above--is t h a t Zhe l tov ' s t rans fe r was another example of Khrushchev'spragmatic approach t o organizational-jurisdictional problems.The anomalous position of t h e GPU, which serves two masters--t h e Defense Ministry and t h e p a r t y c e n t r a l committee, w h i l eul t ima te ly re spons ib le on ly to t h e latter--had exacerbatedarmy-party r el at io ns acutely. The i l l -de f ined p re roga t ivesof p o l i t i c a l of f i ce r s and l i n e commanders a t lower ech elo ns inp o l i t l c a l m a t t e r s , th e murkiness of "one-man commandw as itper ta ined t o p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g , were only ref lec t ions of t h i soverlapping dualism a t t h e top.v io len t ly ove r t h i s ques t ion on which no one has ever come upw i t h a co ns is te nt clea r-c ut policy. Zhukov, f o r a combinationof t h e press ing reasons shown above, los t ou t and w a s r e t i r e d .Zheltov may also have appeared in an unfavorable l ight f o rh avin g f a i l e d t o r e s o l v e t h e c o n f l i c t q ui ck ly and without fu ro r .I ts timing, on t h e eve of t h e 40th anniversary of t h e Bolshe-vik Revolution, was pa rt ic ul ar ly bad. 'Therefore it may havebeen decided t o appoint t o t h e Chief Pol i t i c a l D i re c t o ra t eGolikov, t h e high ly respected head of t h e armored f o r c e s academyand a frsnt-line commander in World War II--a man who could more

Zheltov and Zhukov, both stron g per so na li ti es , had clashed.

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. . . .

e f f e c t i v e l y ma i n t a i n $ t h e . r es p e c t of t h e m i l i t a r y w h i l e carry-ing ou t t h e new c en t r al committee d ir ec ti ve s than-could Zheltov.The l a t t e r , an appara tchik of unquestioned abil i ty and re l f -a b i l i t y , c o u l d use h i s a d mi n i st r a t iv e t a len ts as head of t h ead mi ni str ati ve department--a very important position ( i t ap-proves cadres and checks on the work of t h e secu r i t y o rgans,border guards, t h e procuracy, e tc . ) but one in which there isl i t t l e r o om for in-fighting and.maneuvering--to which Zheltov-.had evident ly resor ted a6 head of t h e Chief Pol i t i ca l Directo-r a t e i n h i s f i g h t w i t h presidium memb e r and Minister of DefenseMarshal, Zhukov. The regime in t h e past had resor ted t o t h it y p e of personnel s h i f t when i t was unable t o come up w i t hf i rm p o l i c y dec i s ion on' thorny questions.Chief Pol i t i ca l Directorate from t h e p a r ty centra l commit tee .apparatus--to confine it t o t h e Ministry of Defense and abol-i s h t h e dual subardinat ion which so complicated t h e r e l a t i o n sbetween commanders and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l deputies . The appoint-ment of Golikov and the t r an sf er of Zheltov suggested i n i t i a l -l y t h a t t h i s may have been done and th a t t h e l a t t e r may havetaken cen t ra l par ty superv i s ion of po l i t i ca l work in t h e m i l i -t a r y i n t o t h e admin is t ra t ive department w i t h h i m .

O p e org aniz atio nal so lu tio n would have been t o remove th e

Another theory is based on t h e change, made sometime be-tween 4 and 24 October 1957 w h i l e Zhukov was out bf t h e country,of t h e t i t l e of t h e GPU 3rom **Chief P o l i t i c a l Directorate oft h e Minis t ry of Defense" to "Chief Po l i t i c a l D i r e c t o ra t e oft h e Soviet Army and Navy." This change has been interpretedt o mean t h a t t h e G W had been removed from Ministry of De-f e n s e j u r i s d i c t i o n , and t h a t Zhukovvs e f s s a l t o accept t h i sf a i t accompli neces s i t a ted h i s removal. Golikov t h u s wouldhave been appointed t o head the GPU in order t o make t h i st r a ns f e r of Ju r i s d i c t i on more pa la tab le t o t h e armed forces.Subsequent pr ot oc ol li s t i n g s , however, have l i s t e d Golikovahead of higher ranking generals and a l so of Zheltov, indicat-i n g t h a t t h e GPU h a s r e t a i n e d i ts former s t a t u s . This a l s oi n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e regime is still not ready to consider sucha permanent solution a s a b ol i sh i ng p o l i t i c a l organs in t h em i l i t a r y establishment--as was done w i t h those in t h e t r a n s -port m i n i s t r i e s and t h e m i l i t i a following t h e 20th party con-gress--and en tr us t i ng pol i t ic al- org ani zati ona l work t o t h eregular par ty o rgan iza t ions i n m i l i t a r y units.of t h e c e n t r a l committee reportedly di rected t h a t t h e chiefof t h e GPU be included in t h e composition of t h e Supreme M i l i -t a r y C o u n c i l of t h e Ministry of Defense. I t appears l i k e l y

Mil i t a ry D i s t r i c t s . The secret l e t t e r of 19 October 1957

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that this took place, since--at military-district and group-of-forces level--the posts of member of the Military Counciland of chief of the Political Directorate were merged approxi-

. .

mately at the time' of the Zhukov dismissal.fication of a "member of the Military Council and chief ofthe Political Directorate" occurred on 30 October 1957, whenLt. Gen. N. M. Aleksandrov of the Kiev Military District wasso described. Since then this designation has been given tothe top political officers in other military districts.During the year following the Zhukov ouster, an unusual-ly large number of leading political officers were releasedfrom their dobs and not reappointed. Some of them may havebeen replaced as Zhukov supporters, but when the jobs of mem-ber of the Military Council and chief of the Political Di-rectorate were merged, leaving one post where two had existed

before,'at least half of the top political officers in thecase. Since identifications of Soviet military, and particu-larly of political-military, personalities are spotty at .best,it is impossible to determine why the generals in questionwere removed, but it appears this was the result of an ad-ministrative reorganization rather than of a general purge.

A large-scale turnover also occurred among MilitaryDistrict commanders after Zhukov's dismissal. Here the evi-dence points to normal replacements and rotation rather thanto a shake-up. Col. Gen. pukhov, the commander of the Sibe-,rlan Military District, died. Marshal Grechko's return fromGermany to assume command of the ground forces created avacancy which set off a chain of transfers.

There is only one case in which the replacement 0% a dis-trict commander appears to be directly connected with Zhukov'souster. In speeches at meetings of the Moscow Military Dis-trict party organization on 24 and 25 October, Khrushchevcharged that Zhukov had incorrectly influenced the attitudeof other senior officers. One example given was that of thecommander of "a Central Asian Military DiStrict" who refusedto return from'vacation to disseminate the central committeeletter of 19 October and ordered his chief political officerto do nothing about it. The person in question was probablymander of the Turkestan Military District after Zhukov''s re-moval.

The*first identi-

. districts and groups of forces had to be relieved in any

' General of the Army A. A. Luchinsky, who was replaced as com-


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. . . . . . - . . . .

ghrushchev also said that Col. Gen. S. M. Shtemenko, the* u p s nd downs of whose career remain a riddle, had been re-lieved as chief of military intelligence because he had re-ported only to-Zhukov.* On the whole, however, the Soviet highcommand has remained remarkahly stable both during and afterthe Zhukov dismissal. This gives additional support to thetheory that Zhukov did not enjoy the wholehearted support ofhis subordinates.

Military-party relations. During 1958 the regime onceagain took steps to resolve the built-in conflict between

. . . . .. ...

political officers and military commanders. Whereas Zhukovhad'been consistently'crltical of political workers and hadgenerally strengthened the role of his commanders, the newline called for denunciation of both categories for past lax-ness in fulfilling political responsibilities. As if towarn them not to take Zhukov's fat e-a s carte blanche to as-sert their prerogatives too strongly, political officers atfirst bore the brunt of the sharpest attacks. Both groups,however, were castigated in the press for indifference to-ward ideological education and the political indoctrinationof troops. Soviet Fleet, for example, on 18 February 1958chided both **dry-la-litical workers" in the navy who hadnever been up a gangplank and negligent commanding officerswho had avoided their responsibility for the political educa-tion of the aa$..hrs whom they commanded.A series of party conferences was conducted in all mili-tary districts and fleets in January and February 1958 todiscuss the results of the October plenum and to recommendways of implementing the central committee decree on improo-ing political work in the armed forces. .In effect, the re-gime told political officers and commanders to stop Seudingand to start working together on all problems of military andpolitical training. The political officer should "point outshortcomings** o the commander and recommend corrective ac-tion in matters of morale, training, discipline, and the en-tire complex of military life. Then, ideally, commander and*Shtemenko was identified in the DOSAAF journal -a -,ulemNumber 10, September 1958, as having been a judge at a recentcivilian motorcycle race in Kuybyshev.

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p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r sh ou ld take j o i n t a c t i o n t o e l im i n at e thesedef ic iencies . The po l i t i ca l o f f i ce r should conduct un i t par -t y meetings t o s o l i c f t t h e ideas of p a r t y m em b e r 6 f o r c o rr e c t-i n g s p e c i f i c defects in t r a in ing , and t h e commander should a t -t e n d and accept j u s t i f i e d c r i t ic i sm from below, a s t h i s wouldnot undermine t h e p r i n c i p le of *(one-man command.**These p a r t y organizations, however, appear t o have consti-t u t e d a problem i n relations between commanders and p o l i t i c a lo f f i c e r s d u ri ng t h i s per iod , pa r t i cu la r ly in lower m i l i t a r y

, u n i t s . While t h e **ideal**o l u t i o n for t h e problem w a s beingworked out a t t h e center and mi l i t a ry -d i s t r i c t l e v e l s , it be-came increa s ing ly apparent t h a t t h e p a r ty o r g a n iz a t i o ns i nsome companies and battali

caesar 22 - party-military relations in the ussr and the fall of marshal zhukov

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