caciquismo vs feudalism in the making of the venezuelan polity and some urban implications

8/7/2019 Caciquismo vs Feudalism in the making of the Venezuelan Polity and some Urban Implications

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HOW MAY AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE

VENEZUELAN POLITY AND ITS CULTURE-HISTORY HELP TO EXPLAIN

THE COUNTRY'S PRESENT-DAY URBAN REALITIES?

George Azariah-Moreno

BA Anthropology & Linguistics (dissertation)

University College London, June 2002

ABSTRACT:

This paper seeks to explore ways in which elements in Venezuela's culture-history,

specifically the cultural and historical construction of the Venezuelan polity and the

particular forms of political power and organisation that have come to characterize it,

may help explain the observable disparities and the nature of Venezuela's present-day

realities, with special reference to the urban context. The aim is to examine the evolution

of political power in Venezuela from the Pre-Columbine period to the present, free of the

year zero commonly entailed by the European conquest for the beginning of

Venezuelas political life. I explore the extent to which extant forms of political

organisation have maintained some degree of continuity in the nature of the Venezuelan

polity over time, and how far this affects present-day Venezuela. There is also an

evaluation of Venezuela's historical position and how this may have been conducive to

native elements maintaining some degree of continuity up until the present context. This

continuity is analysed in terms of the survival of elements of Caciquismo: a form of

political organisation rooted in Amerindian society, where the central political figure

exercises only a form of 'titular leadership' lacking coercive compulsion, in contrast with

Feudalism in Europe and its implications for the formation of the European state. It is

argued that this explains why Venezuela cannot be seen to fit the classical 'nation-state'

model. The fluidity of its territoriality is seen to illustrate this, as well as the state's

inability to effectively exert its modernising visions on society, particularly in the urban

context. Finally, some implications for development are explored, in the form of the

dangers of negative and oppositional conceptualisations, which fail to take into account

cultural specificity and define underdevelopment merely as an absence of development

along Western lines.

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CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION:

1. Background and Interest

2. Methods

3. Venezuela's position historically

CACIQUISMO: AN INDIGENOUS FORM OF POLITICALORGANISATION ROOTED IN

PRE-COLUMBIAN AMERINDIAN SOCIETY

1. Overview: what is Caciquismo?

2. Caciquismo vs. Feudalism

3. The imprint of Caciquismo from past to present in Venezuela

VENEZUELA: A MODERN NATION STATE? THE CONTINUOUS

RELEVANCE OF CACIQUISMO IN PRESENT-DAY VENEZUELA AND

EVIDENCE OF ITS SURVIVAL IN THE URBAN CONTEXT.

1. A fluid territoriality

2. How Caciquismo affects the urban context.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

1. Background and Interest:

In the 1970s, Venezuela was Latin America's wealthiest nation in per capita

terms, attracting a large volume of immigration to a promised land. Yet, it has

seen its economic position decline steadily up until the present time. For a

country having initially attained such a high level of income, it is indeed surprising

to observe that it has been progressively overtaken by almost every Latin

American country in economic terms; even those from which immigration to

Venezuela once originated (which would have seemed unimaginable once).

At the same time, it has one of Latin Americas most unequal and polarisedsocieties, with a wide gap between rich and poor, but also in its broadest sense.

From a Western perspective, 'deep economic and structural problems' are to

blame. But on closer inspection, this analysis reveals itself to be simplistic, as it

does not consider historical and cultural specificity. To such economic accounts,

culture remains a symptom, rather than a defining element.

More interestingly, the State seems unable to exert the same degree of control

over its urban spaces that would normally arise in a modern nation-state, asclassically defined. The result appears to be a largely amorphous urban context,

where the state consistently fails to establish its total vision, or only has a limited

degree of agency in ordering it. This paper seeks to explore ways in which

elements in Venezuela's culture-history and particular forms of political

organisation pertaining to the Venezuelan polity, in effect the nature of political

power in Venezuela, may explain these disparities and the character of

Venezuela's present-day seemingly amorphous and fragmented urban reality.

The aim is to examine, from an anthropological perspective, the extent to which

certain indigenous forms of political organisation have maintained some degree

of continuity in the nature of the Venezuelan polity, explore the question of how

far this affects present-day Venezuela, especially in the urban context, and

provide evidence for these possible influences.

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2. Methods:

The research was primarily library-based. Having established a growing

personal interest in the topic, given my childhood in the provincial Venezuelan

Llanos (in frequent contrast to the capital Caracas and its disparities), I chose the

most relevant titles produced by keyword searches on 'Caciquismo' and

'Venezuela'. In addition, bibliographical references were chosen in some cases.

Initial interest came from John Gledhill's work Power and its Disguises . In

particular, its exploration of titular chieftainship in the Americas before European

conquest and its mention of this as a counter-example to the classical definition

of power as coercive (Gledhill, 2000: p. 11).

However, there is a strong component of personal experience, having revisited

Venezuela on several occasions. Where no references are cited, this personalknowledge is being put forward. With an ethnographic lens, this experience takes

both the form of personal impressions, as well as stemming from conversations

with Venezuelans from different backgrounds; especially from a two-moth period

spent there in summer 2001.

3. Venezuela's position historically:

Venezuela was seen to be on the 'periphery' of the Spanish empire. This isdespite it being the first place in the South American continent upon which

Columbus set foot. As the Spanish empire developed, its centres of influence

grew in neighbouring New Granada (present-day Colombia) and centred around

Bogot; as well as Peru and Mexico. This geographical distribution of Spanish

imperial power reflects the crown's mining interests in the New World. Its primary

concern was to extract valuable metals and develop an adequate infrastructure

and administrative apparatus in and around the main centres of mining, in order

for this trade to function and in a way that allowed shipment to Spain to be

carried out efficiently.

But, in this light, Venezuela was not given importance. Its perceived lack of

precious metals did not place it high on the crown's agenda . At the same time,

Venezuela did not have in place a society with the same degree of material

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sophistication as the Incas or the Aztecs, nor were its tribes hierarchically

structured or united under one central figure or aristocracy as in those two cases.

This had made conquest and the extraction of wealth a relatively straightforward

affair in those instances, given that wealth in the form of precious metals was

visibly present and an infrastructure for its extraction in large amounts was

already there. There was also the advantage of being able to establish

centralised political control simply by replacing the top of an already present

hierarchical system. These elements facilitating conquest and wealth extraction

were not to be seen in Venezuela, nor did wealth manifest itself in a way that

would single it out for an imperative total conquest.

This was a favourable environment for indigenous forms of political organisation

to survive and find a degree of continuity, as the administrative mechanisms of the Spanish empire, based along European lines, were not as strong. There was

significant room for local interpretation in the running of day to day affairs.

Indeed, the 'captaincy general' of Venezuela, as it was officially known seemed

so marginal and insignificant to the Spanish crown, that it was the only portion of

its empire to be given as security for repayment of its debts, and temporarily left

under the control of German bankers, the Weslers, albeit for a brief period

between 1528 and 1556. The Germans, during this time, ran Venezuela as'overseers', without seriously undermining the political institutions of the local

Indian population and tried to avoid active intervention. One of the conditions

set by Spain was that Germans would not spread the Lutheran faith, so there

was less emphasis on the conversion of Amerindian communities than would

have occurred under a fully-fledged Spanish administration and its active support

of the Catholic missions. Perhaps given this lack of freedom to leave a

meaningful cultural imprint, Germans did not promote and attempt to introduce

settlers or to colonise the province. Rather, they concentrated on the dream of

trying to find the legendary El Dorado. Their failure in this respect sent further

signals to Spain that the region possessed no valuable resources and thus

preserved its low priority status.

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What is important for our purposes is that this period of German rule appears to

have actually provided a reprieve and spared Venezuela from some of the more

brutal elements of the initial Spanish conquest; forces that had been so

destructive and catastrophic to the Amerindian population and their institutions in

other parts of the continent, as they were reduced to slavery. Indeed, this

scenario of whole scale enslavement of the Amerindian population was already

being developed before the Germans took control, and it is acknowledged that

their arrival saw an interruption to this approach, as Spanish slavers were

'dislodged' by the German administration .

Indeed, had the Germans not undertaken the search for El Dorado, and the task

of finding the mythical 'city of gold' had fallen on the Spaniards, a far greater

degree of interest from the Spanish crown may have resulted in the territory's

large gold reserve actually being discovered and tapped. The ensuing gold rush

could have certainly put an end to the region's marginality, and the combined

impact of a strengthening of imperial administrative structures with the whole

scale enslavement of the indigenous population would not have allowed a great

deal of room for 'local interpretation'. Continuity in indigenous political

organisation may have been severely compromised.

Clearly then, the German presence was significant. As well as further emphasizing and strengthening Venezuela's perceived peripheral position vis--

vis the Spanish empire, and further isolating it from Spanish administrative

structures, I believe the period of German rule, albeit relatively brief, actually

allowed local Amerindian institutions and forms of political organisation to

consolidate and incorporate themselves into the day-to-day running of affairs

under European dominance at least to a greater extent than other places.

The subsequent return to Spanish rule certainly reversed some of this, but many

of the more brutal elements of Spanish colonisation had been avoided, and

endogenous forms of political organisation in the local government of the empire

were now firmer, more mainstreamed. The Spanish would have to take them

into account and the presence of this legitimised structure constrained their

previous ability to pursue a potential whole scale reshaping of society. But even

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subsequently, Venezuela remained of low priority and was seen as a marginal

province in comparison to the adjacent 'centres' of Spanish rule that were

Bogot, Lima and Mexico City, meaning that whatever form local government in

Venezuela took, this was not seen to have great importance.

This tendency of the Spanish empire to concentrate its mechanisms of power in

and around its mining interests mostly centred on a few urban points of influence,

without enforcing itself strongly in the provinces and more remote regions,

allowed local indigenous forms to persist and find legitimacy in a new creolized

context.

Even in Mexico, which as a vice-royalty was one of the centres of Spanish

imperial rule, it is commonly acknowledged that the provinces not under the

direct control of the Empire's larger urban centres of influence and seen as 'onthe periphery' by the empire's administration were a favourable setting to

movements by farmers to organise around caciques (Falcon, R, 1985) and pose

a counter-tendency to the Empire's administrative structure, in a way that was

crucial to Mexico's revolutionary movement. So the importance of these areas

'left to be', in terms of their potential for political change and upheaval should not

be underestimated.

If this was a possibility in Mexico itself, with its central position vis--vis theSpanish empire, the potential for such bottom-up indigenous local forms of

political organisation was clearly greater in Venezuela, since it was perceived as

much more peripheral. Especially telling is the case of Simon Bolivar, who hailed

from Venezuela and played a crucial role in the independence from Spain of

several Latin American countries. It could be argued that it is precisely this

context of marginality which led these forces to form and challenge Imperial

order.

Yet, while Bolivar's ideal had been to form a single unified 'Gran Colombia' from

the countries he liberated, inspired by Enlightenment ideals, along the lines of the

USA, this never became a reality. His dreams may have themselves been

frustrated by the factional political set-up which had given rise to him, endowing

him with prominence and sustained dictatorial powers all through the wars of

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independence. Once independence was achieved, however, these factional

elements had no appetite for a new centralised state with increased powers that

would harm the existing factional system, and so Bolivar was reduced to the role

of a symbolic figure; in effect a 'titular leader'.

Venezuela remained largely withdrawn from such centralising and consolidative

tendencies of modern state power, and the former centres of Spanish rule

maintained their prominence and position over such places as Venezuela, which

were largely seen as agrarian 'outbacks' ; so that even after independence in

1811, Venezuela maintained distance from tendencies of change and retained a

peripheral position, as it was not seen to play a significant geo-political role in

Latin America. This marginal position seems to have remained into the twentieth

century, with modernising tendencies only filtering through very slowly, thus

allowing the continued survival of autochthonous forms of organisation, where

political structures and day-to-day affairs remained subject to local interpretation.

Only after the 60's oil boom did this 'peripheral' position suddenly appear to be

strongly and permanently reversed, with the country's wealth soaring very

quickly, motorways being built and skyscrapers making their appearance.

However, the very rapid nature of this change may itself have allowed the extant

political forms to remain strong in the fabric of Venezuelan society; in terms of

how political processes were understood, etc. There was a lack of a slow and

gradual transition towards modernity and this has given rise to an intriguing state

of affairs were modernity and wealth is tempered by traditional understandings of

political processes and a continuity in the state's institutional weakness vis--vis

wider society, which is very real in the present Venezuelan setting.

While the oil boom is credited with having brought about the collapse of

Venezuelan agrarian society, fuelling a massive exodus to the cities, the rapid

nature of change ensured that there was insufficient time for peoples'

subjectivities to change and for them to fully embrace a new identity of 'modern

living' along with its all-new, imported political culture.

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This can be seen to apply especially to people's understandings of political

organisations and groups, and could be accounted for as a case of 'habitus', in

Bourdieus sense (i.e. maintaining socially habitual ways of engaging with the

political sphere). Since the change to an urban society happened with such

amazing speed, in barely the space of a generation, peoples' subjective sense of

political practice and their expectations of obligations to political authority were

nevertheless able to survive a radically different material and spatial context. This

extant political reality and its dynamics were in effect 'transferred' to the new,

'modern' urban setting:

Donde sea, la cosa est igual is commonly heard (its all the same

everywhere), referring to the realm of government.

Crucially then, it seems that Venezuelan modernity has not been accompanied

by what is traditionally understood as the development of a modern nation-state.

This is illustrated by the apparent lack of a neutral political ground. Supposedly

neutral government functions and offices change hands when do governments,

and according to party lines. It is the party in power that seems to influence who

takes key civil service posts. And this widespread clientelism has reflected more

a consensual pact of rotation between previously competing factions (originatingin the post-dictatorship Pacto de Punto Fijo of 1958), rather than a fully

functional modern nation-state.

The Pacto de Punto Fijo itself, far from being a wholehearted embrace of

democracy as it was portrayed, was much more a mutual adjustment between

the old military regime and the new. In its very conception, the objective at heart

was to provide continuity to existing political structures, under a veneer of

democratic credibility: through the creation of a generic two-party system, which

excluded critical elements, but encompassed the interests of those traditionally in

power. In such conditions, a truly representative and legitimate regime, able to

engage with, and act on behalf of the population as a whole, giving real

expression to national reforming policies, seemed far-fetched although the idea

of Venezuela as a consensual society was strongly promoted, as well as

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Venezuelan identity as caf con leche (in reference to its multi-ethnic heritage,

but actually obscuring racial contradictions).

Further evidence for this institutional weakness of the state can be seen in

Venezuela's sketchy control over its borders, which will be discussed in more

detail below.

Only recently, in response to particular conditions and with the emergence of

new actors, do Venezuelan political structures seem to be critically coming to

terms with the countrys rapid urbanisation and modernisation, and all that

implies for the countrys overall development. For instance, there have been

attempts for the first time to bring about far-reaching land reform.

It could be argued that this was central to the rise of Modernity in Europe, and

with it the establishment of an effective state, perceived as a neutral institution,able to implement its policies and vision with some success.

Following the failure of economic Structural Adjustment policies and their

extreme effects on the population, culminating in the Caracazo (violent riots in

Caracas) of 1989, resent continued to brew against the political system, and the

now largely impoverished public sought refuge in the figure of Hugo Chavez, who

was elected with a popular mandate in 1998. He sought to put an end to the old

order, and attempted to mark a conscious shift away from the widely perceivedfailure of Venezuelan democratic tradition, with its inescapable factional

character as enshrined in the Pacto de Punto Fijo of 58.

On the agenda were a number of socialist-inspired redistributive reforms,

including the issue of land -which by now was largely in the hands of the factional

elites, following the emptying of the Venezuelan countryside and the exodus to

the cities (yet left mostly unproductive given the centrality of oil export in the

economy, as well as an absence of labour in the countryside).

But, not surprisingly, this reformist ambition to expand the states sphere of

action and its capacity to give critical expression to a national policy, has been

met with strong and vehement resistance from the extant political forces, as

recent events have shown. Chavez' ousting and quick replacement only seem to

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symptom the state's inability to make any real headway, as well as simply being

subject to factional forces playing themselves out. As such, the head of state

seems largely helpless and unable to bring about change, without the consent or

backing of the dominant faction, regardless of actual numerical democracy. This

further illustrates how the president in the Venezuelan context can be compared

to a cacique, having to be accountable to factional forces and not being directly

in control, but rather exercising a form of titular leadership.

Many Venezuelans echo this, in what they see as a 'deep-rooted problem', at

the heart of Venezuelan political structures: a chronic problem. Simplistically, it is

seen as 'corruption'. But this stand alone term does nothing to reveal the actual

workings of the political structure, its internal logic and its specificities. Rather, it

is simply an acknowledgement that these are not the workings of a 'modernnation state' as commonly understood. "Everyone is in it for themselves, for their

own gain". This is at times followed by "It is deep within us, our 'viveza', our

cunning, or malice"; some even hint that this 'viveza' and 'malicia' are an

inheritance of the 'Indio', of our Indian heritage -something they seem to utter

with a degree of ambivalence: there is dismay, accompanied by a warm glow of

pride. Foreigners are often perceived as vulnerable 'flojos' (gullible, too trusting,

nave, etc), specifically because they are seen to lack this 'malicia' and 'viveza'.This leaves the question: if Venezuela was indeed on the periphery of the

empire and Western modernising tendencies until relatively recently, allowing

local, indigenous forms of political organisation a certain degree of continuity

historically, what exactly were these local forms of political organisation that

appear to have had such a deep impact on the present-day Venezuelan polity

and can help to explain the state's apparent weaknesses and inability to establish

its gesamtkunstwerk of Modernity (or total modernising vision), as seems

especially evident in the context of its urban realities?

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CACIQUISMO: AN INDIGENOUS FORM OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION

ROOTED IN PRE-COLUMBIAN AMERINDIAN SOCIETY

1. Overview: what is Caciquismo?

The form these indigenous forms of political organisation have taken in these

regions, peripheral to imperial influence, has often been characterised as

Caciquismo. Caciquismo has repeatedly been put forward as a form of political

organisation and power particular to Amerindian society. Traditionally, the

'cacique' was the chief of a small Amerindian community. It is the nature of his

chieftainship and the limits to his power which seem to define Caciquismo. In

Power and its Disguises , Gledhill offers Caciquismo as a counter-example to

coercive power as defined by Foucault and as espoused by Radcliffe-Brown. Thefact that in Caciquismo there seems to be no compulsion to directly obey the

cacique certainly seems to throw into doubt the assumption that power is

universally coercive (Gledhill, 2000: p. 11). The cacique's power is more a form

of 'titular chieftainship'. His subjects choose whether or not to obey, according to

their own imperatives. Certainly, the cacique "possessed no ability to issue

commands which would automatically be obeyed" (ibid. p. 28). In many ways,

therefore, the central political figure of the cacique was merely an accessory toand secondary to the play of factional elements within the tribe.

In times of war, Gledhill argues, caciques were able to command far greater

support. But this could be precisely because the war effort was primarily a

function of pressure and support from a certain faction within the tribe. In times of

peace, the cacique's temporary power enjoyed in war time simply "evaporated"

(ibid. p. 28).

Among the Yanomami indians of Venezuela, Clastres describes the case of the

cacique Fousiwe attempting to "extend hostilities beyond the point which the

community regarded as legitimate", but finding himself unable to muster support

(Clastres, 1977: pp. 178-179).

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Clearly then, the power of the leader was primarily subject to the opinion of

those surrounding him and thus the cacique's power had to adopt a consensual,

inclusive, non-coercive character.

In the case of the Pemon Indians, a Carib population that presently enjoys a

reasonable degree of prosperity and recognition, and has been credited with

having the most 'advanced' material culture in Venezuela, Caciquismo is

certainly present. According to Thomas (Thomas, 1982: p. 1), their political

system can be described as a situation of "order without government". It is

evident that the Pemon chief's power is very much subject to the very constraints

that occur in Caciquismo, as seen above: "A leader in Pemon society can be a

person who achieves prominence in any number of areas, but a leader is not a

person who gives orders." (ibid. p. 3). Thomas continues:"Even in a conflict situation or a situation in which he or she is trying to move

people toward a certain course of action, the function of a leader is to exhort,

remind, and persuade (and sometimes to threaten)".

Caciquismo, in this understanding is therefore a counter-example to the

classical definition of power as coercive. Another aspect of the chief's primarily

symbolic role is his inability to amass wealth. Gledhill notes: "in some South

American groups, finding the chief is a matter of searching for the poorest andshabbiest-looking member of the community" (Gledhill, 2000: p. 29). This is

because chieftainship has a primarily moral character, where the cacique is

obliged to redistribute the wealth he acquires among his tribe, in what Clastres

suggests amounts to a "denial of reciprocity".

Clastres finds in Caciquismo evidence for the stage of 'stateless' egalitarian

society that 'precedes' the state. He sees the transition to the state as a 'rupture'

in human history.

But this analysis is subject to criticism, in that Clastres is offering a picture that is

in danger of romanticising so-called 'stateless' societies, in a way that

approximates notions of the 'noble savage'.

While the chief's role maybe described as titular, factional elements in the tribe

and how they determine policy clearly amount to the basic workings of a state.

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These workings determine the course of action for the whole community and,

once decided upon, there does not appear to be room for disagreement or

defection, as the case of warfare illustrates.

Clastre's analysis of the transition to the modern state as a historical 'rupture'

also assumes a fixed model of statehood, and risks overlooking cultural

specificity. Crucially, his analysis of historical rupture leaves no room for the

structure of Caciquismo to find a significant degree of continuity and

accommodation within the state, which seems to be widely reported in many

contemporary Latin American societies (Brisk, 1973: p. 158).

2. Caciquismo vs. Feudalism: a point of contrast

On the other hand, Feudalism was a rather different system and can be seen tohave played a crucial role in the development of the European model of the

nation-state. A tight hierarchical system, each link in the chain was able to

demand total obedience of his or her subjects, in a way that clearly delimited

their obligations and responsibilities vis--vis seigniorial power. The subject could

expect protection to his/her person in exchange. Unlike Caciquismo, there was

no room for consensual politics between the leader and his subjects, in what

amounted to a contractual agreement. In this light, the feudal setting establishedan ethic of delimited responsibilities vis--vis the state, with the real threat of

coercive power, in absence of their fulfilment. This, I believe, formed the

foundations for the emergence of the modern, panoptic nation-state in Europe.

Equally, this system achieved much greater 'markedness' in the territory as the

contractual obligations between individuals often tied them to their land, making

their movement impossible or highly undesirable, as a new setting would likely

entail a reduction in entitlements. In a sense, this could be seen as a form of

territorial 'entrapment', allowing the state to achieve far wider control over its

territory and regulating its boundaries, as well as controlling its subjects. The

state's power and its ability to impose its vision of how society needed to be

structured were largely unproblematic. In the feudal setting, the state possessed

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the power to execute at will, accompanied by a constant threat of coercive power

on its subjects.

I believe it is a combination of these elements which allowed a transition to the

modern nation-state in the European setting. In contrast, there is a clear sense in

which the case of Caciquismo departs considerably from this.

3. The imprint of Caciquismo from past to present in Venezuela

As seen above, Venezuela's perceived peripheral position both during the time

of Spanish colonisation, and up until the second half of the twentieth century,

was a favourable environment for indigenous forms of organisation to persist and

to influence how administrative guidelines from the empire were interpreted and

carried out locally, without significantly affecting local power relations and politicalorganisation. As such, this view suggests that a certain degree of continuity was

sustained from the time of the Pre-Columbian cacique to the present day.

This idea that the cacique has somehow 'survived' to the present day and

strongly influences the current, modern Venezuelan scene at first appears

unrealistic and may be susceptible to the criticism of romanticising a continuity in

indigenous social 'forms'.

However, what is being suggested is by no means that the cacique hassomehow survived intact.

With the growing influence of European ideas of nationhood, and in particular

the context that gave rise to national movements of independence, regional and

local chieftains or caciques espoused these nationalist dreams and became

caciques on a national scene. These 'national' caciques came to be known as

Caudillos.

Before that stage, the caciques and their form of political organisation had

already been well incorporated into the creole mestizo society and was in a

sense part of the imperial administrative structure, in that the centres of Imperial

Spanish administration did not challenge or contest the authority of these local

chiefs in what were seen as peripheral areas, but rather accepted and tolerated

them as its agents (Kern, 1973: p. 152).

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Caciquismo, had thus already undergone a significant transformation from its

original form within small Amerindian communities, while in parallel acquiring the

status of a regional phenomenon, with the acquiescence of Spanish rule.

Indeed, imperial Spanish administration often preferred to turn its back on such

areas, as these were feared as dangerous and lawless.

In this sense, the ultimate periphery of the Llanos (vast grasslands of the

interior) provided a fertile ground for Caciquismos continuity in a mestizo

context, as a seemingly limitless hinterland to which slaves and renegade

Europeans fled to, meeting with Amerindians who already inhabited the area,

along with their pre-existing social organisation, creating a veritable melting pot

that was further conducive to caciquil power structures in a new mestizo context.

This is exemplified in the figure of Paez, a Llanero of mixed origins, who provedcrucial in Bolivars strategy. It was Paez and the support he was able to

command from his fellow Llaneros as their chief who actually made up Bolivars

expedition over the Andes to liberate Colombia from Spanish rule.

Paez then, a cacique of the Llanos, had transcended the obscurity of the

hinterland to achieve salience in the national political context, in a way that was

vital for the course of the Independence movement and thereby clearly helped

define the future of the Venezuelan polity.

Clearly then, the caudillo era brought about another shift in the evolution of

caciquil structure, by raising the cacique to a national level, in a way that had

previously not been seen. It established a form of 'meta Caciquismo' that was

crucial in the Independence movements of Latin America. Thus Caciquismo can

be seen to have gone a long way from its beginnings in Amerindian society to a

much larger force, capable of digesting and adapting to nationalist aspirations

along European lines, but where the factional and consensus-based character of

caciquil structure was no less present.

Further evidence for this presence of Caciquismo in the caudillo era is presented

by Bunge (1965: p. 122). Referring to personal feuds between caciques in this

period, he notes that "The people (...) will leave them to fight it out, unperturbed,

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as simple spectators who do not commit themselves in advance to the triumph of

one or the other."

This clearly would have been unthinkable in a feudal context, where such

confrontations would very often see the leader expecting to command his or her

subjects' full support.

It is precisely this ability of Caciquismo to adapt to changing conditions, while

maintaining its dynamics, which has ensured its continuity and that make it a

relevant and important element when studying contemporary Latin American

society.

In the Venezuelan case, this is particularly important since, from it's

independence in 1811 up until the 1950s, Venezuela was ruled by a successionof caudillos.

Brisk points out that this was among the most successful cases of Caciquismo

being promoted to national prominence in the form of the caudillos (Brisk, 1973,

p. 152), and this could be precisely because it remained a peripheral geo-political

entity. In Brisk's view, the peace that resulted under caudillo rule was "achieved

through tacitly accepted disunity", clearly indicating continuity in the consensual

factional politics of Caciquismo, as well as the fragility of the central power of thecaudillo himself.

However, what is of crucial importance is the way that this prolonged period of

caudillo rule can be seen to have left a deep imprint on present day Venezuelan

politics, as these are fairly recent events in Venezuela's trajectory.

Although often hailed as a democratic model, Venezuela has been under

caudillo rule for longer than it has been a democracy, and the change is barely a

generation away.

Indeed, this peace through tacitly accepted disunity is very much present in the

transfer of power from the military regime to a form of democracy that satisfied all

parties concerned in the Pacto de Punto Fijo of 1958.

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The following section examines how exactly the peculiarities of Caciquismo as a

system of national political power has come to influence present-day Venezuela,

combined with an 'absence of Feudalism and its contractual, coercive, biding

inheritance in the emergence of the European nation-state.

VENEZUELA: A MODERN NATION STATE? THE CONTINUOUS

RELEVANCE OF CACIQUISMO IN PRESENT-DAY VENEZUELA AND

EVIDENCE OF ITS SURVIVAL IN THE URBAN CONTEXT

1. A fluid territoriality

A clear way in which this 'absence of Feudalism' reveals how Venezuela doesnot fit the traditional pattern of a nation-state is evident in the nature of its

'territoriality'.

Unlike some of its neighbours, Venezuela does not appear to have the same

degree of effective control over its borders as would normally arise in a modern

nation state. Indeed, it is the only country in the region to have progressively

ceded territory to all its neighbouring countries, without gaining any land. This

has resulted in Venezuela today having only around half the total area it had atindependence.

Colombia acquired a significant portion of the savannah plains and the

strategically-important Guajira peninsula, which is South America's northernmost

tip. This is despite the plains being central to Venezuela's agrarian economy in

the pre-oil era, which should have ensured they were well protected, were

Venezuela a classical case of the 'nation state'. Brazil was able to acquire the

vast area that is the Rio Negro region to the south of Venezuela, and the British

saw no obstacle in trebling the size of Guyana, at the expense of Venezuela. It

has shed significant tracts of territory on all sides.

What is interesting here is that this shedding of territory has never been

accompanied by any form of military confrontation, which would be expected in a

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typical nation state scenario. Instead, Venezuela only seems able to respond

with vocal disagreement, at most.

On discussing this matter with some ordinary Venezuelans, I encountered a

certain sense of revulsion and there was a feeling in which national pride had

been affected. But this proved to be quite mild and usually amounted to no more

than a passing mistrust of Colombia. There certainly was no compulsion to follow

things through, nor even a real desire that these lands should be restored to

Venezuela at some point in the future. There was clearly a sense of inevitability

and this was accompanied by a dissociative attitude. Very often these

conversations would simply end in: "que se puede hacer? Son los gobiernos..."

(What can be done? It is the governments that have brought this about..). This

detachment from the actions of the state and the fact that all successivegovernments are seen to hold the blame, irrespective of leadership or political

affiliation, is not dissimilar from the way in which there is a certain detachment

and dissociative attitude vis--vis the cacique from members of his tribe. The

state can thus be seen to occupy this place of mere titular leadership and there is

a close resemblance to caciquil structure, in terms of the relationship between

the cacique and those around him.

But crucially, this relatively unproblematic shedding of territory has beenoccurring both before the oil boom and after, indicating that it is not a case of

Venezuela lacking the resources to challenge its neighbours. Again, despite oil

being central to Venezuela's economy and interests, it has allowed Colombian

encroachment of some of its oil fields. Indeed, much of the Guajira peninsula

which has large coal reserves (something that had been known to Venezuela)

was acquired by Colombia at a time when Venezuela was at its most prosperous

and superior to Colombia in terms of material resources. Occasionally, this

encroachment and the magnitude of Colombia's billion-dollar extraction of

previously Venezuelan coal are reported in the news. But seldom is any course

of action discussed, apart from a few diplomatic appearances. Thereafter, the

issue appears to be lost in oblivion.

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Venezuela still claims more than half of former British Guyana. Yet relations

between the two countries are friendly and there has been no active attempt to

regain the territory. Indeed, the state simply seems content with being able to

draw the disputed territory on the Venezuelan map. Occasionally, discontent is

still voiced, but this is not pursued further.

Even more significant and illustrative of the limited relevance of the classical

nation state model to the Venezuelan case, is the way in which its borders

appear to be permeable to external political forces. Colombian guerrillas have a

sophisticated network in Venezuelan territory and at times seem to be more

successful in imposing their will than the Venezuelan state. They often demand

that large landowners in the plains pay them a 'vacuna'; a form of tax, in the

absence of which the landlord's family members are liable to be kidnapped or killed. Clearly, coercive power is startlingly at work here, in a way that seems to

overrule the influence of the Venezuelan state's political instruments. In fact,

guerrillas often use western Venezuela as a form of safe haven from which they

are able to carry out operations in Colombia. Venezuela's state mechanisms

remain in place in the face of this. Normal communications are present and the

guerrilla presence is 'invisible' to the external observer. Yet the Venezuelan state

seems unable to police the guerrillas' operations and prevent what can in manyways be seen as an encroachment of a competing form of state mechanism on

Venezuelan soil.

Here, a contrast with Venezuela's neighbour, Colombia is useful. As a centre of

Spanish imperial power, Colombia was far more subject to European models of

political organisation, both at the local and central level. Local chiefs were able

to exercise much deeper social control and were able to enforce their power

through coercive means, in closer keeping with the feudal scenario. The caudillo

era here was different, in that each faction sought to achieve statehood, and this

is very much present to the present day. In many ways, Colombia today can be

seen as several potential 'states', in competition for statehood along lines more

consistent with the nation state model, where power is enforceable on subjects

through coercive means. The result has been a very violent reality, where these

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potential 'states' are not territorially bounded and move through regions with

disastrous consequences for the local population caught up in the confrontations.

They can be subject to the coercive enforcement of power by different elements

over time, as these 'states' each seek to form a 'power base' using the local

population. But also, the way these potential 'states' seem able to successfully

infiltrate Venezuelan territory, in the case of the guerrillas, and enforce their

influence there by effectively collecting taxes, demonstrates their relative strength

and adherence to a 'nation-state' model, as well as conversely illustrating the

comparative weakness of the Venezuelan state's political power and its limited

control over not only its borders, but also its territory.

An explanation for this fluidity of Venezuela's 'territoriality', for which the state's

inability to enforce its borders is symptomatic, can be seen in the caciquilstructure of the Venezuelan polity, in that competing factions that determine state

policy do not explicitly favour nor encourage an extension to state power in a way

that would allow it to enforce itself fully and become a force in its own right,

surpassing the interests of these different factions. This is what Brisk terms the

'new Caciquismo' and seems consistent with his analysis of peace under caudillo

rule as a case of "tacitly accepted disunity" (Brisk, 1973: p. 152).

2. How Caciquismo affects the urban context.

Indeed, the speed with which urbanisation took place and the agricultural

infrastructure largely disappeared, illustrates the fragility and fluidity of

Venezuela's territoriality. The historical absence of a feudal structure meant that

people were not 'socially-entrapped' in the same way as in Europe, nor was there

a structural or coercive force that encouraged a relatively permanent sedentism

in the same way as in the European feudal context. Conversely, the territory

moved into was not already 'taken' or appropriated in a way that impeded

resettlement. In the feudal European context, moving into territory entailed being

subject to new social relations of power and an existing social order or use of the

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land. In the Venezuelan context, this degree of social entrapment discouraging

displacement was simply not present. Indeed, it was possible to migrate to the

city and maintain existing social networks, as whole communities emigrated

together and transplanted themselves to the periphery of cities.

Although territory may be officially 'owned' by big landowners or the State, these

owners were not tied with the land in the same way as in the feudal context, or in

a way that discouraged intrusive settlement. There is a sense in which it is simply

a case of filling a vacuum, where territory offered no 'social resistance' or

obstacles to movement. There were simply no mechanisms to enforce 'social

embeddedness' and markedness within the territory in a permanent way, as seen

in the feudal context.

This applies very directly to Venezuela's urban realities. At the outset, there wasan absence of feudalism's instruments of 'social entrapment', which discouraged

both movement out from the relative safety of the habitual provincial setting

(positive entrapment), as well as movement into an already occupied territory

(negative entrapment) with its established social context, and the burdening new

power relations this would entail.

Albeit exploitative, Feudalism guaranteed subsistence in a rural setting, as well

as protection in the contractual relationship between lord and serfs, in exchangefor part of their labour. Given the prevailing uncertainty of Medieval times, risking

this stability (positive entrapment) and abandoning it if favour of a new setting

would have been unthinkable, except in extreme circumstances.

Venezuela, in contrast (the Andes are perhaps the exception), did not have an

established pre-Columbine agrarian society, as seen in other parts of Latin

America. The prevailing Amerindian groups, the Caribs and Arawaks were mostly

hunter-gatherers.

When an agrarian society did emerge, centred around plantations, it did not take

the form of subsistence agriculture. Instead, it was geared towards producing

export crops in the form of cocoa, coffee, sugar cane, etc. This meant that the

possibility of direct subsistence from the land was limited, leaving the rural

individual in a position of greater vulnerability. There wasnt the symbiotic

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contractual relationship of protection in exchange for labour as seen in

Feudalism. At the same time, there was no real impediment to migrating to the

city, in that these had large uninhabited, unproductive spaces all around them.

In the absence of this social entrapment of Feudalism (both negative and

positive), which I believe played a crucial role in the spatial distribution of cities in

Europe, movement and resettlement for many poor agrarian Venezuelans was

not an overly problematic notion.

Hence the very rapid decline of the agrarian society that existed, with the advent

of perceived opportunities in the cities. There seemed to be no incentive or

coercive mechanism to ensure its permanence, nor even the permanence of land

use as a productive medium. The states inability to control this fluid nature of

territoriality is particularly salient.To a large extent, the territory these re-settlers occupy are state lands in and

around large cities. At the outset, they commonly take the form of sprawling

shanty towns, and again the state seems unable to control their spread, plan, or

even contain the growth of these areas. Furthermore, the fact that a territory has

been occupied does not seem to entail burdening power structures, as seen in

the feudal case, as it does not appear to provide a disincentive to continued in-

migration into these areas. Instead, there is an astonishing proliferation of newsettlements, causing very high population concentrations. Very little space

separates each shack and wherever space is available, more dwellings are

improvised. The potential of these areas to accommodate newcomers seems

almost limitless, as whole mountains are covered: at night, the whole of a

mountain's silhouette can be recognised from the apparently infinite dots of light.

What this illustrates is that, unlike in a feudal setting, the occupation of territory

and the resulting social setting do not seem to present an obstacle to in-

migration, so that the 'social entrapment' scenario does not apply. This, in my

opinion is to do with the lack of the same coercive/incentive environment as in

feudalism and the State's inability to 'enforce' its territoriality.

And this further demonstrates the continued relevance of Caciquismo in present-

day Venezuela.

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The way this pattern of improvised settlement occurs in larger cities nation-wide

under very similar circumstances, and following very similar form, I believe

illustrates the state's limited control over its territory and illustrates the limited

ability of the Venezuelan state to enforce its vision and urban policy. This is

because its power to assert itself fully is constrained by the factional elements

pertaining to caciquil influence on the state's workings.

It is in fact a way in which even the poorest sections of society are able to exert

their limiting agency on the state in a very visible way. These barrios as 'external'

entities from the state spring up unceremoniously, given the fluidity of the state's

territoriality and an absence of feudal history. Territory is fluid and available.

In my view, this inability stems precisely from the nature of the Venezuelan polity

and its 'institutionalised Caciquismo'. The state is primarily dependent on interestgroups for its continued legitimacy -what Brisk terms 'the new Caciquismo'. This

is not conducive to the state increasing its power in a way that would enable it to

fully create a 'modern nation-state' (Brisk, 1973: p. 157). He contends that "The

obviously increasing power enjoyed by Latin American states is more than

matched by the power of well-organized private groups. This is true because

consensus over extending the state's power is as unobtainable today as it was

under the caciques".In the urban context, this weakness manifests itself more than just in terms of

the 'fluidity of territoriality'. The fact that the State is unable to establish its

modernising vision and unable to enforce a policy of urban planning is a further

symptom of this 'institutionalised Caciquismo'. It is illustrative of the titular

chieftainship of Caciquismo, based on consensual leadership accommodating

factional elements. In Brisk's words: "This carving up of the state's ability to make

policy is Caciquismo in modern dress.

But this also operates at a grassroots level as citizens, not faced to the same

extent with the threat of historically constructed incentive/coercive measures that

are normally seen at work in a nation-state, see the state's vision as merely an

optional 'guideline' -rather than a binding, authoritative directive. The state is

unable to actively enforce its vision. Instead, the factional elements behind the

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state express their interests directly in space, or see the state as a medium for

the expression of their own particular urban identity one that has increasingly

looked North, especially following the oil boom, in an attempt to emulate

American urban form.

This is very clear in the way the state has endeavoured to organise urban space

around large modern public projects of urban regeneration, but failing. Vast

proportions of the country's oil revenue have been assigned to large urban

projects and considerable efforts to landscape urban space along modern

American lines. However, the state seems unable to substantiate these efforts

with the corresponding social change it seeks, as these efforts represent only a

subset of the urban population in the form of the dominant factional elements

-essentially turning their backs on the ranchos, as separate from their city.Whats more, far from what was originally envisaged, these spaces are often

appropriated by informal sectors of society and turned into improvised markets,

where illegal black market traders or buhoneros operate. This is often seen in

the very heart of the capital, alongside government buildings and ministries. The

best example is the Simon Bolivar centre in the heart of Caracas. When it was

built, these were the highest towers in South America; built to withstand

earthquakes and symbolising the modern course that the state had set out for Venezuela to embark upon. While this presently houses several key government

offices, street level is an altogether different reality, with stalls upon stalls of

contraband goods being offered and seemingly immune to the state's

bureaucratic apparatus.

This not only seems to illustrate the state's inability to police and control its

citizens as in the classical nation-state scenario, but may indeed demonstrate a

deeper reticence imbedded in the state's workings to alienate its citizens in any

overt way. In fact, it may deeply illustrate the consensual relationship between

the Venezuelan state and its citizens, where the central power cannot be seen to

directly constraint its citizens, nor issue orders, as with the Cacique.

Another clear and startling example of the state's inability to impose and 'imprint'

itself meaningfully on the urban context is the fact that addresses are always a

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relative notion. There may well be numbers to streets, but these are never used,

despite the state efforts to impose western models of organisation. Instead on an

address card what is often found in lieu of a definite address, is an indication that

the place lies between one corner and the other. Corners are given names,

which often illustrate a city's popular history. There is a corner called 'El Muerto'

(the dead man), for instance, where a soldier got up again after being taken for

dead during an independence coup. Needless to say, getting around Caracas is

not a simple affair for a newcomer, with addresses lacking numbers and instead

featuring rather bizarre indicators of place in the form of 'corner names', always

open to some amount of personal interpretation.

The same applies to postcodes. Although they exist, nobody seems to have any

knowledge of them, nor are they ever used. Indeed, the postal system exists intheory, but very minimally in practice.

Yet another illustration of this is the strong presence of neighbourhood

movements. As Rivero Santos argues, these neighbourhood associations have

"demonstrated an increasing effectiveness as political power bases" (Rivero

Santos, 1999: x). Of significance is the way that generals who recently sought an

end to Chavez' rule, set about appealing precisely to such neighbourhood

associations, which have come to present a further pressure group in the caciquilstructure, influencing state policy (Brisk, 1973: 160).

These cases illustrate the mark of Caciquismo and the state's inability to impose

itself in the Venezuelan urban context, as a unifying source of coherence and

integrative identity in the urban consciousness, and there is a clear sense in

which the state can be equated to caciquil authority here.

Furthermore, the state is seen as a provider, as with the Cacique. Its purpose

and raison dtre are to redistribute wealth. This clientelist system of patronage

was an effective redistributor of oil wealth during the surge of oil prices in the

70s, with all sectors of society getting a piece of the pie, and fuelling social

mobility.

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In this light, it may seem contradictory that Venezuelan society is now so deeply

polarised along wealth lines. Partly, this is because of the declining oil prices, the

unsustainability of the wealth production system, culminating in a profound debt

crisis, and the enforcement of Structural Adjustment policies. The states inability

to stop a very clearly unsustainable system of patronage that had gone into

overdrive, and act appropriately in a national strategic interest is also indicative of

its caciquil nature: it sought instead to indebt itself to artificially maintain the

clientelist dynamics at its heart.

But one reason reform has been particularly hard is that, given a reduction of the

pie, the wealthier and traditionally dominant factions and pressure groups have

achieved even greater prominence in influencing state policy, in an effort to keep

their slice of the pie the same size as before. After a period where flying to Miamion shopping sprees every weekend became emblematic of Venezuelan elites, it

was certainly not an option to be suddenly subject to greater state control and

redistributive pressure for the national interest and benefit of wider society;

especially as the elites provided for their own services privately, such as

education, health, security (in gated communities), etc, in the absence of a state

that could transcend factional interests to provide quality services for all. A

vicious circle indeed, given that the states tax revenue derives almostexclusively from taxes on oil exports. The vast majority of the population pays no

tax, which further underlines the mark of Caciquismo on the state, with its

perceived primary function as a distributor to its clients, alongside the denial of

reciprocity described by Clastres.

In the face of this, Chavez' inability to bring about reform stems precisely from a

weak state structure, traditionally subject to factional forces and their influence. It

is not simply a case of the caciquil state losing control through the unsustainable

redistribution of wealth here, but rather the state being subject to influences and

demands from particular sections of society. It is primarily these groups and

sections of society which appear to exercise agency over state policy and act

together to constraint the state's power in keeping with their interests.

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This is something ever present in the strong use made by traditional elites and

factional elements of the national private media, which is largely in their hands,

as well as internationally to derail Chavez reformist pretensions and the

extension of state agency beyond factional manipulation.

The push and pull of these different sections of society can be seen in the recent

ousting and re-instatement of Chavez: effectively a coup dtat where the

factional elites, making strong use of the media as a key instrument succeeded,

albeit briefly, to reaffirm their power.

This clearly contradicts the simplistic outside perception of Chavez as a firm

leader with strong military support and threatening tendencies, and reveals that

his position is less solid than it appears, in the context of a caciquil state prone to

strong factional forces.

The growing social polarisation resulting from a persistence of Caciquismo in

Venezuelan institutions and political culture, against a backdrop of adverse

economic conditions, has served to further accentuate urban contrasts and

processes of fragmentation in the city as seen previously. These were already

apparent in the good times of the 70s, where the factional character of the state

was unable to express and promote an overall vision of the city and applyappropriate urban policies that transcended the factional straightjacket.

Whether the Chavez regime will indeed succeed in its bold and ambitious task to

consolidate the Venezuelan polity, in a way that transcends factional interests,

or whether this drive will itself fall prey to factional dynamics and the limitations of

caciquil political power, making him yet another cacique, will be an interesting

space to watch. Either way, there will be important implications for the future of

the Venezuelan city.

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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS:

Clearly then, an understanding of Caciquismo is very relevant when trying to

understand Venezuela's present day urban context. The state's inability to

marshal its vision of modernity and apply it to its urban fabric is certainly a

symptom of this characteristic aspect of the Venezuelan polity. In many ways,

state power can still be equated to the 'titular chieftainship' of the Cacique.

Executive political power is limited and constrained by factional elements, and it

is primarily the competing interests of these elements that determine policy, their

policy, often behind a facade of a Western republican model of statehood.

There are important implications for development approaches. These processesare often seen simply as a 'lack of development' from a Western perspective,

which ignores the culturally-specific causes of observable disparities in the urban

sphere, as well as the apparent absence of adequate urban governance to

promote continuity and coherence in the city.

While it is true that this is habitually analysed as 'deep structural problems', this

assumes that, given the right economic parameters, 'development' would result.

A certain circularity is evident here. This 'lack of development' is very oftenreduced to figures and economic parameters, and development is measured in

terms of how far these macro-economic figures converge with Western levels of

development. It is assumed that the present absence of development can be

equated to the absence of institutions based on western models, which would

naturally arise given the right economic environment.

These oppositional conceptualisations often lead to crucially important cultural

processes in understanding a society being dismissed as mere 'corruption', for

example. This rationale is oppositional, as it defines the observed functioning of

the political and public spheres in opposition to a Western notion of institutional

organisation based on contractual agreement, which emerged in its own

historical context, rather than attempting a qualitative understanding of the

complexity actually at work. The result is often a process of othering and the

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creation of homogeneous categorisations to describe difference, along with

attempts to apply successful Western models.

One question that immedetiately arises is, given its factional character, how is it

possible to promote good urban governance, favour a coherent identity of the

city and a functioning sense of contractual obligation in the context of

Caciquismo, as well as reversing the denial of reciprocity towards the state, and

its implications for policy-making?

The dangers of the 'Western gaze' are very much present in the field of

development. An exploration of the continued relevance of Caciquismo in

understanding the contemporary Venezuelan context, and its urban realities in

particular, reveals the weaknesses of negative and oppositional categorisations

implicit in development approaches.Crucially, this case highlights the importance of positive characterisations that

take into account the cultural processes at work in shaping urban space; where

these cultural processes are the basic starting point and not simply a sympton.

This could be seen as Anthropology's principal contribution to development

policy.

Notes:

Venezuela Country Brief, World Bank website:

http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/Countries/Venezuela/5E35E

D58EF8E69238525696700736330?OpenDocument

Almanaque Mundial, Editorial Andina 1986

30
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/Countries/Venezuela/5E35ED58EF8E69238525696700736330?OpenDocumenthttp://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/Countries/Venezuela/5E35ED58EF8E69238525696700736330?OpenDocumenthttp://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/Countries/Venezuela/5E35ED58EF8E69238525696700736330?OpenDocumenthttp://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/Countries/Venezuela/5E35ED58EF8E69238525696700736330?OpenDocument


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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System of Caciquismo in the Luso-Hispanic World , Kern, R. ed. University of

New Mexico Press, 1973

2. Bunge, C. O. Caciquismo in our America in Dictatorship in Spanish America ,

Hugh M. Hammill, Jr. ed. (New York, 1965)

3. Clastres, Society against the State , Mole Editions, 1977

4. Cornelius, W. A. Jr. Contemporary Mexico: A Structural Analysis of Urban

Caciquismo in The Caciques: Oligarchal Politics and the System of Caciquismo

in the Luso-Hispanic World , Kern, R. Ed.

5. Falcn, R. Revolucin y Caciquismo en San Lus Potos 1910-1938 ,

El Colegio de Mxico, 1984

6. Gilbert, Healey. The Political Economy of Land: Urban Development in an Oil

Economy , Gower 1985

7. Gledhill, J Power and its Disguises: Anthropological Perspectives on Politics ,

Pluto Press 2000 Clastres, Society against the State, Mole Editions, 1977

8. Hillman, Democracy for the Privileged: Crisis and Transition in Venezuela ,

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994

9. Kern, R. The Caciques: Oligarchal Politics and the System of Caciquismo in

the Luso-Hispanic World , University of New Mexico Press, 1973

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10. Lieuwen, E Venezuela London, 1961

11. Rivero Santos, A. A. Grassroots and the State: Perspectives from the

Neighbors' Movement in Caracas, Venezuela, UMI Dissertation Services, 1999

12. Special Country Report on Venezuela, Forbes Global Magazine, April 2002

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13. Thomas, D. J. Order Without Government: The Society of the Pemon Indians

of Venezuela University of Illinois, 1982

14. Venezuela Country Brief, World Bank website:http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/Countries/Venezuela/5E35ED5

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caciquismo vs feudalism in the making of the venezuelan polity and some urban implications

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