Al-Khair University, Bhimber

Jinnah and Cabinet Mission Plan 1946

WALEED AKRAMwaleedchoudry@hotmail.com

The Cabinet Mission Plan

Background

As the provincial election campaigns heated up, reports of Hindu Muslim riots, and of

“poisonous propaganda” especially in Punjab, increased. The failure of the Simla conference had

created a dangerous stalemate in Indian politics. It might be said that the body politic in India

almost died of a surfeit of conferences. Moreover, Pethick Lawrence had concluded by then that

it would be useless to leave the another round of political negotiations to the viceroy alone, and

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nothing less than a Cabinet Mission to India was required to break the Hindu Muslim

“deadlock”.1

Mr. Attlee made it clear that the Cabinet Mission would not take any definite proposals

with them as had sir Stafford Cripps in 1942 nor would have any share in the constitution

making. ‘India herself must choose’. He made a remark which was most significant from the

point of view of the Muslims. He observed, ‘we are very mindful of the rights of minorities and

minorities should be able to live free from fear. This remark welcome to the Congress leader

while Muhammad Ali Jinnah replied ‘Muslims are not a minority in India they are a nation and

self determination is their birthright’. The British Ministers examined the Muslim demand for

Pakistan and came to the conclusion that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign state of Pakistan

would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem. They referred to what they

termed as ‘weighty administrative, economic and military consideration’ against the idea of

partitioning of India and the setting up of two sovereign states. The Cabinet Mission denounced

‘the Muslim demand for Pakistan in unqualified terms. The Cabinet Mission, however, admitted

‘the real Muslim apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might become

submerged in a purely unitary India in which the Hindu with their greatly superior numbers must

be dominating element.’ 2

The Secretary of State said that the Mission was here to explore the position. They were

exploring the possibility of Pakistan and its viability both in peace and war. If Mr. Jinnah could

not convince the Delegation of the defensibility of Pakistan he was rather driving the Mission

into the solution of handing over authority to a United India. Mr. Jinnah said that if he had not

convinced the Delegation he could not do so. He could not agree to anything which would

derogate from the sovereignty of Pakistan. He was not there to persuade the Cabinet Mission or

as a plaintiff. ‘India was neither united not divided-- it was a British possession.’ Great Britain

proposed to transfer power; he had been asked to say how he thought this could be done. The

only way in his opinion it could be done with safety was by division. On certain matters he could

say that he would make agreements.3

Cabinet Mission

1 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 254.2 G.W. Chaudhary, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (New York: Institute of Pacific Relation, 1969), 6, 9.3 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2010), 179.

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The cabinet decided in February to send Cripps and first lord of the admiralty, A.V. Alexander to

India together with Pethick-Lawrence. Wavell was afraid Cripps would be the “operative

element” among those magi and considered Cripps “sold to the Congress point of view” and not

quite “straight” in his “methods”. Alexander was the weakest brother of this three-man team. It

was a high powered mission. But it was in reality Sir Cripps who mattered most. He was at heart

a votary of Mr. Gandhi, Lord Pethick Lawrence also held Mr. Gandhi in high esteem. He was a

friend of Mr. Nehru and sympathetic toward the Hindu-Congress. In fact the whole Government

of Mr. Attlee favoured the Congress.4

A month before the Cabinet Mission left for India, the parliamentary delegation led by

Richards returned to 10 Downing Street to report what it had found. Most members agreed that

some form of Pakistan would have to be conceded sooner the better. Mrs. Nichol, who admitted

that she began her visit to India “impressed by strong necessity of maintaining the unity of

India,” found the Punjab “explosive”. The Muslim population there was “all worked up in favour

of Pakistan,” she concluded, and therefore, it “must be conceded.” She believed Jinnah would

modify his demand, but only if the “principle” were granted “at an early stage.” Pethick

Lawrence a brilliant private secretary, Francis Turnbull, then prepared a note on the “viability of

Pakistan” which helped brief the Cabinet Mission prior to the start of negotiations.5

At arrival in Karachi Cabinet Mission asked about their opinion on Pakistan, Sir S.

Cripps emphasized that they had come with an open mind. “We have not come with any set

views” he declared. “We are here to investigate and enquire about that”. This indicates that the

Muslim resolve to have at any cost sovereign, independent states in Mussalman majority areas is

having its effect. The Britishers are after all a nation of shopkeepers. Mr. Jinnah having pointed

out that ‘the Indian Muslims are the largest buyers of British goods and the Congress failure to

contradict this assertion have evidently caused searching of the heart in England and now there is

disposition not to by-pas the Muslims.’ The Cabinet Mission must base its final decisions on the

special relations of the Indian situation and not be misled by Congress propaganda which

proceeds from the wrong hypothesis that India is the home of a homogeneous nation.6

4 Muhammad Munawar Dimensions of Pakistan Movement (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1987), 237.5 Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 254-5.6 Ahmed Saeed, The Eastern Times On Quaid-I-Azam (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1983), 253.

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Purpose and Proposal

The Mission's task was to try to bring the leaders of the principle Indian political parties to

agreement on two matters:

1. The method of framing a constitution for a self-governing, independent India

2. The setting up of a new Executive Council or interim government that would hold office

while the constitution was being hammered out.7

The main problem was, as it always had been, the Hindu-Muslim partition. Congress wanted a

unified India and the Muslim League wanted a separate, independent Pakistan. The Mission set

to work at once, spending two weeks in lengthy discussions with representatives of all the

principal political parties, the Indian States, the Sikhs, Scheduled Castes and other communities,

and with Gandhi and several other prominent individuals. But at the end of these discussions

there was still no prospect of an agreement between the parties and the mission decided to put

forward the two possible solutions for consideration.

1. A truncated Pakistan, which Wavell had wanted to tell Jinnah, was all he would get if he

kept insisting on a sovereign Pakistan.

2. A loose federation with a three-tier constitution - provinces, group of provinces and an

all-India union embracing both British India and the Indian States, which Cripps had

devised with the help of two Indian officials, V.P. Menon and Sir B.N. Rau. The Union

would be limited to three subjects, foreign affairs, defence and communications, with

powers to raise funds for all three; all other subjects would vest in the provinces, but the

provinces would be free to form groups, with their own executives and legislatures that

would deal with such subjects as the provinces within the group might assign them. In

this way the Provinces that Jinnah claimed for Pakistan could form Groups or sub-

federations and enjoy a large measure of autonomy thus approximating to Pakistan.

Cabinet Delegation Meeting with Jinnah April 1946

7 Ishtiaq Hussian Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1987), 209.

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Once the Cabinet had given the go-ahead, the way was clear to offer Jinnah the

alternatives of a small Pakistan with sovereign rights and treaty relations with Hindustan, or a

larger Pakistan (with some minor boundary adjustments and only excluding Assam) inside a

federation with Hindustan. The great merit was that in such a federation 'Pakistan' would have

equal status with Hindustan in those two matters over which a rather emasculated all-India centre

was to be given authority. There was to be no union legislature and any question at the centre on

which the two federal units failed to agree would be referred back to their respective group

legislatures. Agreement would not be imposed by central dictate, but by agreement between two

federated governments.

To make this all-India federation even more attractive for Jinnah, it was clearly stated that

the Muslim-majority areas would have complete control over all their affairs except those

specifically given to the centre; and at the centre 'they would meet the Hindus on a level where it

was States which counted and not the number of individuals in them.' This principle of equality,

which was exactly what Jinnah had been fighting for all along was, he was now told, 'the essence

of the proposal'.

His Pakistan did not intend to throw the advantages of an undivided Punjab and Bengal to the winds, nor

did it plan to leave the Muslims in Hindustan unprotected. Undivided provinces and protection for

minority Muslims could only be achieved inside the framework of a union with an effective centre where

the League had an equal say. So we must carefully assess why Jinnah did not jump more openly and more

enthusiastically at what the Mission now offered in its Scheme A...It was only by pressing for even more

than he had been offered that Jinnah hoped to persuade the Congress to accept the Mission's proposed all-

India federal scheme as a lesser evil. Then there were his own followers to consider. Few among them

would understand that the Mission had dealt them a royal flush or that equality at an all-India federal

centre outweighed the advantages which a sovereign but truncated Pakistan would bring.8

Plan of May 16

The Mission announced their own plan on 16 May which rejected the demand for an independent

and sovereign Pakistan. India was to remain united. The union government was to control

Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications and would have the power to raise finances

required for these purposes. The Union would have an executive and legislature. Any question

8 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 186-7.

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involving a major communal issue in the legislature would require for its decision a majority of

the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a

majority of all the members present and voting. All functions other than those given to the Union

and the residuary powers would vest in the Provinces.9

1. A united Dominion of India would be given independence.

2. Muslim-majority provinces would be grouped Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab and North-

West Frontier Province would form one group, and Bengal and Assam would form

another.

3. Hindu-majority provinces in central and southern India would form another group.

4. The Central government would be empowered to run foreign affairs, defence and

communications, while the rest of powers and responsibility would belong to the

provinces, coordinated by groups.

Main Provisions of the Cabinet Mission Plan:

The Cabinet Mission proposed two-tiered federal plan which was expected to maintain

national unity while conceding the largest measure of regional autonomy:

(i) There was to be a federation of the provinces and the States, with the federal central

controlling only defence, foreign affairs and communications.

(ii) At the same time, individual provinces could form regional unions to which they

could surrender by mutual agreement some of their powers.

(iii) There would be three groups of provinces (i) Group 'A' was to include Madras,

Bombay, U.P., Bihar, Central Province and Orissa (ii) Group 'B* was to comprise

Punjab, Sindh, N.W.F.P. and British Baluchistan (Muslim majority in most of the areas)

(Hi) Group 'C' was to include Bengal and Assam.

These groups would draft their own constitutions in consultation with their respective

provinces included in each group.

9 Waheed Uz Zaman, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality, (Islamabad: NIHCR, 2001), 76, 77.

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(iv) A Constituent Assembly consisting of 389 members-292 from provinces, 4 from

territories governed by Chief Commissioners and 93 from Indian Princely States would

draft the Constitution of India.

(v) An interim government at the Central consisting of representatives of all the

communities, provinces would be installed on the basis of parity between the

representatives of the Hindus and Muslims.

In his first public statement, the Secretary of State announced that the Mission came with

no recipe for Indian independence. The Cabinet Mission sought to solve the problem of British

strategic interests in India by 'giving both the claimants some part of what they wanted...'a

Pakistan trimmed to the bone[Scheme B], or a central government stripped of most of its real

powers, and not 'worth much'[Scheme A].10

The 16 May statement was potentially a disaster for Jinnah. He wanted parity; he was

against allowing the union centre to raise its own revenues; he did not want a union legislature or

executive, on any ‘controversial’ matter at the centre must have a three fourths not a bare

majority. But there was worse to come. The league had demanded that provinces and the

Princely States should be sovereign in all matters except those specifically concede to the

centre.11

Plan of June 16

The plan of May 16, 1946 had envisaged a united India in line with Congress and Muslim

League aspirations. But that was where the consensus between the two parties ended since

Congress abhorred the idea of having groupings of Muslim majority provinces and that of Hindu

majority provinces with the intention of 'balancing' each other at the Central Legislature. The

Muslim League could not accept any changes to this plan since the same 'balance' or 'parity' that

Congress was loath to accept formed the basis of Muslim demands of 'political safeguards' built

in to post-British Indian laws so as to prevent absolute rule of Hindus over Muslims.

Reaching an impasse, the British proposed a second, alternative plan on June 16, 1946.

This plan sought to arrange for India to be divided into Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-

majority India that would later be renamed Pakistan, since Congress had vehemently rejected

10 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 176.11 Ibid, 195.

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'parity' at the Centre. A list of princely states of India that would be permitted to accede to either

dominion or attain independence was also drawn up.

“Partition was altogether ruled out; therefore no separate Muslim homeland could be conceded to the

Muslims of India. The day the Cabinet Mission announced their proposals was a hey-day for the Hindus

and Sikhs. They carried themselves hoarse with joy. Jawaharlal Nehru remarked that Pakistan had been

given a Royal burial. It had been buried deep down.”12

Jinnah’s Discussions with Cabinet Mission Plan

Mr. Jinnah said that throughout her history from the days of Chandra Gupta there had

never been any Government of India in the sense of a single Government. The Muslim Moghul

Empire had had the largest control but even in those days the Mahrattas and the Rajputs were not

under Muslim rule. When the British came they gradually established their rule in a large part of

India but, even then, India was only one-third united. The big States and sovereign States were

constitutionally and legally already Pakistanis.

Now we have strong Hindu-Muslim tension. This began to develop at the first transfer of

a small amount of power about 1906. The British Government to meet it gave separate

electorates. The same troubles arose at the time of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the

British Government gave a constitution which they thought best suited to India. In the

discussions of 1930-35 no agreement could be reached on the communal question and the British

Government gave a decision. No doubt the present constitution was an advance and gave more

contact with power than ever before, but it showed that the grave apprehensions of Muslims had

come true. In the 1935 discussions the Muslims insisted that Sind should be separated and the

Frontier made a full Province so that there would be at least four Muslim majority Provinces. All

this was decided by the British Government.

Therefore you must have a "steel frame" for an independent India. Mr. Jinnah could see

none and had therefore definitely come to the conclusion, after years of experience that there is

no other solution than the division of India. Any scheme for this has obvious objections which

can be raised against it. But there must be division so that in each of the two parts there will be a

dominant community which can provide the "steel frame". Where you have three Muslims and

one Hindu your "steel frame" is there.

12 Munawar, Dimensions of Pakistan Movement, 239.

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Sir S. Cripps asked whether 51 per cent. Muslims to 49 per cent of others would provide

a "steel frame". Mr. Jinnah said that there would then be no "steel frame". You must choose the

0area with a clear and dominant majority. It need not necessarily be as high to three to one. If

there were no "steel frame", the Civil Service, the Police and the Army would not stand loyally

to the Cabinet and the Legislature and the State could not survive. Fortunately, in India the

Muslims have their homelands and so let us divide India.

Sir S. Cripps asked whether Mr. Jinnah thought the difference between the Hindu and the

Muslim in Bengal was greater than the difference between the Pathan and the Muslim in Sind.

Mr. Jinnah said that the fundamentals were common to Muslims all over India. He had traveled

everywhere and he knew. The Muslims believed in one God. They believed in equality of men

and in human brotherhood. The Hindus believe in none of those principles. Wherever a Muslim

goes in India he would not say that everyone understood him but a very large body of Muslims

does. Even in the remote rural areas of Bengal the Muslims understood him.

Mr. Alexander asked whether the difference was essentially racial or religious. Mr.

Jinnah said that he readily admitted that 70 per cent. of Muslims were converts from Hindus. A

large body was converted before any Muslim conqueror arrived. Muslim missionaries came from

Arabia and converted large numbers of Hindus, not singly but by whole sub-Castes together, 10

to 20 thousand people at a time. These Muslim converts were made outcasts by the Hindus. They

were thrown out of every department of social life. Therefore you find millions who have stood

for centuries under the umbrella of a totally different civilization of their own. There are in India

two different civilizations with deep roots side by side. They are totally different. The only

solution is to have two "steel frames", one in Hindustan and one in Pakistan.

Reactions, Acceptance then Rejection

The initial reaction of the Hindu-dominated Congress to the Cabinet Mission Plan was

favorable. The approval of the plans would determine the composition of the new government.

The Congress Working Committee had initially approved the plan.

“Mr. Gandhi welcomed it as containing ‘a seed to convert this land of sorrow into one without sorrow and

suffering.’ The Muslims on the other hand were greatly disappointed due to rejection of the idea of Pakistan. Jinnah

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said, ‘it is only done to please the Congress.’ The Muslim League Council resolution of 6 June 1946 termed the

remarks of the Cabinet Mission as unwarranted, unjustified and unconvincing.”13

However, on 10 July, Jawaharlal Nehru, held a press conference in Bombay declaring

that the Congress had agreed only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and "regards itself

free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best." The Congress ruled out

the June 16 plan, seeing it as the division of India into small states. Moreover, the Congress was

a Centralist party. Intellectuals like Kanji Dawarkadas criticized the Cabinet Plan. Congress was

against decentralization and it had been under pressure from Indian capitalists who wanted a

strong Center. The plan's strongest opponent was the principal Indian leader Mohandas Gandhi,

due to the reason that the territories had been grouped together on the basis of religion.

The Cabinet Mission Plan was the nearest approach to Pakistan.14I advised you to reject

the Cripps proposal, I advised you to reject the last Simla Conference formula. But I cannot

advise you to reject the British Cabinet Mission's proposal. I advise you to accept it."...Mr.

Jinnah added "The Lahore resolution did not mean that when Muslims put forward their demand,

it must be accepted at once. It is a big struggle and a continued struggle. The first struggle was to

get the representative character of the League accepted. That fight they had started and they had

won. Acceptance of the Mission's proposal was not the end of their struggle for Pakistan. They

should continue their struggle till Pakistan was achieved." Jinnah risked his popularity among

Muslims by accepting this compromise. Yet it was highly commendable, and refuted the

allegations of those critics who said that he invariably negative every proposal which fell short of

his vision of an independent and sovereign Pakistan.15 Mr. Jinnah said that they could create a

deadlock in the Constituent Assembly if anything was done against their wishes. They would

continue to fight in the Constituent Assembly for their objective. They would also fight for the

right of the Units or Groups to rejoin the Group from which they seceded.

As regards groupings, Mr. Jinnah is reported to have expressed satisfaction and said: The

Groups should have power on all subjects except defence, communications and foreign affairs.

But so far as defence is concerned, it would remain in the hands of the British till the new

constitution was enforced. So they need not worry about it now. They would fight in the

13 Chaudhary, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, 11, 12.14 K.K. Aziz, Studies in History and politics (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002),176. 15 Ibid.

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Constituent Assembly to restrict "Communications" to what was absolutely necessary for

defence only.16

On 6 June, the Council of Muslim League met in New Delhi, after many arguments the

members agreed, under Jinnah’s direction, that ‘inasmuch as the basis and the foundation of

Pakistan’ were ‘inherent in the Mission Plan, by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six

Muslim provinces, ‘they would accept the plan ‘in the hope’ that it would ‘ultimately result in

the establishment of complete, sovereign Pakistan.

“The League claimed that their support and decision was prompted by an ‘earnest desire for a peaceful

solution of the Indian constitutional problem.’ But Jinnah insisted that Mission Plan was no more than a halfway

house to Pakistan; and warned the British Government and the Congress that ‘the quickest way’ to the independence

of India was ‘to agree Pakistan.’ He raised his inevitable finger, shook it, and said, ‘Either you agree, or we shall

have it in spite of you’.”17

The Muslim League Council met at Bombay on 27 July. "Mr. Jinnah in his opening

speech reiterated the demand for Pakistan as the only course left open to the Muslim League.

After three days' discussion, the Council passed a resolution rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan.

It also decided to resort to direct action for the achievement of Pakistan." On 28 July when the

Council of Muslim league met in Bombay, he reviewed the arguments of the Cabinet Mission,

and then said, ‘I feel we have exhausted all the reason. It is no use looking to any other source

for help or assistance. There is no tribunal to which we can go. The only tribunal is the Muslim

Nation.’18

Conclusion

It says that the Plan failed either to win honest acceptance in India or to solve the

constitutional problem to the satisfaction of anyone.19 The Muslim League gave its approval to

the plan for 2 reasons: 1:grave issues were involved and Muslim league sincerely desirous for a

peaceful solution... 2:The basic and foundation of Pakistan are inherent in the mission plan, by

virtue of the compulsory grouping, of the 5 Muslim provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan,

NWFP, Bengal & Assam) Jinnah, in his speech to the League Council, clearly stated that he

recommended acceptance only because nothing better could be obtained. However, on

16 Khurshid Yusuf, Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam (Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal).17 Hector Bolitho, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006),144-5.18 Bolitho, Jinnah of Pakistan, 148-9.19 K.K. Aziz, Making Of Pakistan, 69.

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declaration from the Congress President that the Congress could change the scheme through its

majority in the Constituent Assembly, this meant that the minorities would be placed at the

mercy of the majority. Later on Council of Muslim league also reject the plan due to Congress.

There are some writings to the effect that after acceptance of the Mission’s Plan the Quaid i

Azam looked worried. He knew the magnitude of the risk he had taken. He was sure of the

ultimate victory of the Muslims of India. If he was worry the only reason was the Hindu

leadership hypocrisy. When he realized that the Labour Government not taking action against the

Congress leadership and accepting everything from Hindu relating Mission’s Plan, he withdrew

the acceptance as he had already warned the parties concerned on the eve of acceptance. He

reserved the right to do so. And he did so rightfully.20

Selected Bibliography

Aziz, K.K. The Making Of Pakistan. lahore: islamic book centre, 1989.

Aziz, K.K. Studies in History and Politics. Lahore: Vanguard, 2002.

Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Choudhary .G.W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan. New York: Institute of Pacific Relation , 1969.

Munawar, Muhammad. Dimensions of Pakistan Movement. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1987.

Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi. The Struggle for Pakistan. Karachi: university of karachi, 1969.

Jalal,Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2010.

Wolpert, Stanley. Jinnah of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Saeed, Ahmed. The Eastren Times On Quaid-I-Azam. Islamabad: NIHCR, 1983.

20 Munawar, Dimensions of Pakistan Movement, 247.

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Yusuf, Khurshid. Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam. Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal.

Zaman, Waheed Uz. Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Islamabad: NIHCR, 2001.

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