ca comments on atsdr report2

7/29/2019 CA Comments on ATSDR Report2

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Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Control Registry (ATSDR)Evaluation of Potential Exposures: Bulk Fuels Facility Groundwater Plume

(July 12, 2013)

Citizen Action New Mexico CommentsSeptember 9, 2013

I. INTRODUCTION

The Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) gallon jet fuel spill estimated at 24,000,000 gallonsis the largest contamination of an underground aquifer in the history of the United States.In a round about way, the ATSDR Evaluation Report informs the public that Kirtland'sjet fuel spill will reach Albuquerques municipal wells. But then, ATSDR assumes thatcontamination of the municipal wells will be prevented because remediation for thedissolved plume of Ethylene Dibromide (EDB) will supposedly take place. ATSDRassumes a source of replacement water for municipal, Veterans Administration Hospitaland Kirtland supply will be found

The ATSDR draws the incorrect conclusion of an incomplete pathway for exposurewhere it has no facts to support any effective ongoing or future remediation. ATSDRfails to inform the public that no plan or technology is in place or even identified forremediation of the EDB plume. ATSDR then states that it is not going to evaluate theefficacy of remediation, of which there is none to actually evaluate.http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/pha/HCPHA.asp?State=NM

ATSDR offers no assurance that EDB contaminated water will not be delivered toAlbuquerque water users at levels that are known to the US Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) to be toxic. EDB is allowed in New Mexico drinking water at levels 5

times higher than allowed in California.

The ATSDR Evaluation Report for the Kirtland AFB jet fuel spill is filled withconclusions that are not based on data or science. The ATSDR recommendations offernothing that will result in real solutions. The ATSDR report should be withdrawn in itscurrent form.

On July 30, 2013 one of the authors of the ATSDR report informed citizens at apublic meeting that the public will be left with an orphaned aquifer. That is, anaquifer so contaminated with Ethylene Dibromide that it will be unusable as a potablewater supply far into the future. ATSDR should include the orphan aquifer statement in

its report. This would mean abandonment of the most productive portion ofAlbuquerques aquifer.

The ATSDR report proposes that there is no expected future danger from thecontaminated water migrating to Albuquerque water supply wells for residents because 1)remedial action will take place, or 2) the municipal wells can be shut down, or 3) analternate source of water found. ATSDR states:


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There are no past, present, or expected future exposures via the groundwater(down-gradient water supply wells) pathway. Bulk Fuels Facility [BFF]-relatedcontaminants have not been detected in the water supply wells. Although it isexpected that BFF contaminants would eventually migrate down gradient to watersupply wells in the absence of remedial or contingency actions, such actions are

already occurring and will be upgraded in the near future (Shaw, 2012c). Anongoing groundwater monitoring program is also operating in order to determinethe efficacy of ongoing and planned remedial actions and provide warning shouldBFF contaminants approach the drinking water wells.

The ATSDR report paves the way for KAFB to try to escape 1) clean up of the EDBplume and 2) reduce financial liability for the largest contamination of an aquifer inUS history. There is no planned or ongoing containment or remediation of the EthyleneDibromide (EDB) plume that has traveled off of KAFB. This is an indication that KAFBintends to wait until the municipal wells become contaminated and then be shut down.Saying the aquifer is contaminated but wont cause exposure of the public creates

opportunity for Kirtland to request of NMED that the jet fuel spill, as a Solid WasteManagement Unit, needs No Further Action for clean up except perhaps monitoring anddeed restrictions for land use. The Air Force already claims the plume is stable, will becleaned up by microbial processes by 2025 and that a containment system is notnecessary.

II. CITIZEN ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS TO ATSDR:

1. The ATSDR should recommend that the KAFB jet fuel matter be immediately

placed on the National Priorities List to consider an emergency response program

for clean up. The Albuquerque Water Utility Authority Resolution 12-14 alsorequests emergency measures. (Attachment 1 -- WUA Resolution 12-14). After 15years of involvement by the New Mexico Environment Department, no meaningful

remediation plan or technology is in place for the dissolved plume of EDB headedfor Albuquerques municipal wells.

2. The ATSDR report should not be issued in its current form due to missing andunreliable data, errors and conclusions that are made without factual basis. TheATSDR report concludes the assumption (p. v) that future exposures, which arepossible, will be prevented if ongoing and prospective remedial actions are implementedas planned.


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III. DISCUSSION

The ATSDR assumptions for 1) remediation and 2) availability of alternate water

sources are false.1. Remediation

KAFB has failed for decades to conduct adequate remediation, allowing adissolved plume of Ethylene Dibromide (EDB) to reach within less than mile ofthe City of Albuquerques municipal supply wells.

Kirtland has no remedial action planned, no technology in place, or evenidentified to clean up the dissolved plume of EDB contamination.

The ATSDR does not grasp that the bulk of the diesel fuel is trapped beneath thewater table dissolving into the aquifer and cannot be removed with soil vaporextraction (SVE) technology.

Soil vapor extraction technology is unworkable for the dissolved plume of EDB.1

Pump and treat is not in place and has many drawbacks. There is no NPDESpermit for treated waste water from the fuel spill to be put in the Albuquerque

sewer system. There is no permit to re-inject contaminated wastewater into the aquifer.

There is no evidence to indicate that bioremediation is removing EDB dissolvedin the groundwater.

2. ATSDR does not or cannot identify the existence of an "alternate" source of

water for Albuquerque.

Councilor Rey Garduno stated at the 8/21/2013 Water Utility Authority meeting,there is no alternate supply.

There is no identification of where replacement water would come from for themunicipal wells, the VA Hospital well and the KAFB supply wells. Consideration of

cost and infrastructure are absent from the report. The ATSDR envisioned remedy, to shutdown the highly productive Ridgecrest

municipal wells, ignores the 45+ wells to the north of the Ridgecrest wells that willcontinue drawing the EDB to those wells. Several of those wells would need a sourceto blend down high arsenic levels. The Ridgecrest wells are the current source thatwould become unavailable if shutdown.

1Soil Vapor Extraction (SVE) Office of Underground Storage Tanks (OUST) US EPA

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:xh-4LGjXyvgJ:www.epa.gov/oust/cat/SVE1.HTM+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us-- Diesel fuel, heatingoils, and kerosene, which are less volatile than gasoline, are not readily removed by SVE, nor are

lubricating oils, which are non-volatile. SVE is generally not appropriate for sites with a groundwatertable located less than 3 feet below the land surface. Special considerations must be taken for sites with agroundwater table located less than 10 feet below the land surface because groundwater upwelling canoccur within SVE wells under vacuum pressures, potentially occluding well screens and reducing oreliminating vacuum-induced soil vapor flow. SVE is generally not effective in treating soils below thetop of the capillary fringe unless water table depression pumps are used to draw down the water table. Inthe vicinity of the extraction wells the water table responds to the vacuum by rising, or upwelling, whichcan cause the well screen to become submerged thereby reducing airflow.


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3. The EDB plume is headed directly toward municipal supply wells at Ridgecrest,

KAFB supply well #3 and the Veterans Administration Hospital supply well.

ATSDR does not discuss that a decision to shut down the VeteransAdministration supply well has been made by VA management, planning a switch

to Albuquerque city water to be paid for by the Air Force. The VA consumption is72,000,000 gallons per year.

The ATSDR report does not identify that KAFB supply wells #15 and #16,located to the west and east of the EDB plume have been shutdown and are nolonger monitoring for EDB. How much replacement water is required?

KAFB #3 is drawing the EDB plume toward itself expanding the plume furthertoward the east. KAFB #3 annual water replacement annually would require over450,000,000 gallons of water. (CITATION).

Contamination of the drinking water for the City of Albuquerque is imminentlythreatened by the highly toxic plume of EDB that is less than 4000 ft distant andmoving at an undetermined velocity toward the 5 Ridgecrest municipal wells.

4. The allowable exposure to EDB in drinking water in New Mexico is 5 times

higher than the State of California.ATSDR has not identified whether or not the City of Albuquerque will deliver EDBcontaminated water to the public that could be below the EPA Maximum ContaminantLevel (MCL) but above the detection limit. The EPA health goal for EDB is zeroexposure to EDB. The toxicity of the contamination of Ethylene Dibromide and othercontaminants that are encroaching upon Albuquerques municipal wells is inadequatelydiscussed.

2Instead ATSDR largely shifts the reports discussion to the potential for

benzene contamination in buildings.

The California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) establishesa public health goal (PHG) of 0.01 g/L (0.01 ppb) for ethylene dibromide in drinkingwater. This PHG is based on the carcinogenic effects observed in an oral study performedby the National Cancer Institute in 1978. The authors reported cancer of the forestomachin rats and mice. (See, PUBLIC HEALTH GOALS FOR CHEMICALS IN DRINKINGWATER ETHYLENE DIBROMIDE September 2003http://oehha.ca.gov/water/phg/pdf/Ph4EDB92603.pdf).

ATSDRs Recommendations, based on its Conclusions, call for continuing ongoingand proposed remedial actions. ATSDR states that (p.2-3) it will not address theefficacy of the proposed remedial actions on the potential for future exposures to

contaminants from the contaminated groundwater. ATSDR cannot confirm that there is

2Unlike the other gasoline contaminants that tend to float on top of the aquifer, once EDB reaches ground

water it mixes, is highly mobile and can travel separately from the original spill to where it may not bedetected. The hazard associated with EDB can persist indefinitely. The Agency for Toxic Substances andDisease Registry characterizes EDB breakdown in ground water as hardly at all. The Potential forGround Water Contamination by the Gasoline Lead Scavengers Ethylene Dibromide and 1,2-

Dichloroethane http://info.ngwa.org/GWOL/pdf/041879375.pdf, p.81-82.


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any ongoing remediation effort identified, proposed or planned for the dissolved EDBplume.

The ATSDR Conclusions are contradicted by the fact that there are no remedialefforts (other than shutdown of municipal wells) for the dissolved EDB plume and the

diesel fuel trapped beneath the water table. ATSDR does not identify that: There is no plan for remediation of the EDB plume

There is no plan to prevent EDB from reaching the municipal wells

There is no plan to treat the EDB by removal at the wellheads and no identifiabletechnology to do so

There is no technology in use for cleanup of the dissolved EDB plume

There is no technology in place to clean up the jet fuel spill trapped beneath thewater table.

There is the lack of an emergency response by local, state and federal agencies toa major environmental crisis.

ATSDR fails to address the citizen concern (p. 2) that the planned soil vapor

extraction remedy will not capture or retard migration of LNAPL or EDB. SoilVapor Extraction (SVE) is not an effective strategy for removal of EDB that isdissolved in the groundwater.

ATSDR does not discuss the strategy that the Air Force actually intends to relyupon: leaving the EDB contamination to natural processes. (March 2011 Air ForceReport to Congressional Committees). NMED informed KAFB that EDB does notnaturally attenuate or biodegrade.http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-026_3-27-2012_BFFS_In-well_treatment_disapproval.pdf, p.2.

The ATSDR analysis of the plume velocity and arrival time at municipal wells inapproximately 11 years is based on 2010 statements by KAFB and Shaw (the AFcontractor) that are out of date and unreliable. In March 2012, NMED criticizedKAFB for its unreliable statements on the velocity. ATSDR does not take into accountthat the flow velocity of the plume will continue to accelerate as it draws nearer to thedrawdown of the municipal wells. No monitoring wells have been installed near to theRidgecrest municipal wells for the collection of data to perform reliable andrepresentative modeling. The edge of the EDB plume still has not been determined.Acceleration as the plume approaches municipal wells has not been determined.

On September 7, 2010, the Air Force furnished expected travel time information from the

jet fuel spill to the Ridgecrest production wells that stated (Screening-level RiskEvaluation for Petroleum Hydrocarbon Fuel Compounds in Subslab Soil Vapor - Bulk

Fuels Facility, Kirtland Air Force BaseCH2M HILL October 27, 2009http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_9-7-2010_Transpor_Velocity_-_Travel_Time_Report.pdf):

Flow paths do exist from the Kirtland BFF plume toward production wellsRidgecrest 5 and KAFB-3. Flow paths toward KAFB-3 may be active only


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seasonally. However, flow paths toward Ridgecrest 5 are active throughout theyear.The best estimate of transport velocity along flow paths from the Kirtland BFFplume toward production wells is 0.45 ft/day. Transport velocity under a worst-case scenario is 0.90 ft/day.

Executive Summary Table ES-1 provided the best and worst case travel time forRidgecrest #5 as being Ridgecrest 37.0 years and 18.5 years, respectively, withgroundwater traveling at 0.45 ft and 0.90 ft per day.

The ES-1 estimates were made without reliable estimates of hydraulic conductivity. Theestimates were not based on data from aquifer tests performed at the Kirtland BFF site.Instead, the hydraulic conductivity was modeled from earlier studies made from 1993 to2002 using data from production wells at other locations. However, those studies give amuch shorter travel time. A study by McAda and Barroll (2002) indicated Horizontalhydraulic conductivity of the depth intervals used by production well fields was 30 ft/dayin the east-west direction, and 60 ft/day in the north-south direction. See section,Summary of Reports Providing Hydraulic Conductivity Estimates, last page.

The 2010 travel time report is contradicted by more recent information. As of

March 2012, according to NMED, KAFB still underestimates the flow velocity. ATSDR reliance on the 2010 report to make its statement indicates the ATSDR does notdo recent or competent research on the groundwater velocity issue. The KAFB report ongroundwater velocity, i.e., travel time for the EDB plume to the municipal wells wasdismissed as flawed by NMED.

NMED notes that the travel time from ground surface to the aquifer was notcalculated.

The volume of LNAPL in the vadose zone was never calculated.

The monitoring wells have not been in place long enough and are not sufficient innumber to determine the velocity.

Moreover, the edge of the plume has not been encountered to know how far, overwhat speculative time period, the plume may have traveled.

Source: http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-026_3-27-2012_BFFS_In-well_treatment_disapproval.pdf, p.5, item 6.

ATSDR should draw no conclusions whether WUA has sufficient time to meet itsgoals for contingency planning for the EDB contamination of municipal wells. First,the ATSDR lacks a rigorous analysis of the obstacles to contingency planning, i.e.,arrival time of the EDB plume, location of alternate sources, water rights, infrastructure,

eminent domain condemnation, EDB treatment, and costs. Second, the ATSDR estimateof worst case arrival time of EDB at the municipal wells of ~11years is speculation.ATSDR states that these contaminant transport times and durations are based onregional estimates of hydraulic conductivity rather than any site-specific pump test datafrom the aquifer zones of interest. Third, the ATSDR conclusion ignores:

The estimate of travel velocity is more rapid given the use of regional hydraulicconductivity rates, as discussed above at page 4.


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The effect on travel time given the increasing hydraulic gradient and velocity asthe EDB plume nears the radius of influence of the municipal wells.

The perception of the magnitude of the leak, how far and how fast it has traveledhas been consistently underestimated and minimized by KAFB. In 2000 KAFB

estimated the jet fuel spill at slightly less than 100,000 gallons based on inventory lossrecords. In a November 2000 addendum to its Abatement Plan, Kirtland claimed thatinventory records were only kept from 1996 forward and showed a loss of 157,353gallons of JP-8 for a 5-yearperiod but with no records for JP-4 fuel.34 The estimate roseto 24,000,000 gallons in 2012.

Planning for and installation of clean up technology has been minimal andinadequate to address the plume of carcinogenic contamination. Beginning in 2004until 2009, four Soil Vapor Extraction (SVE) units were put in place, operatingsporadically, often poorly located and shut down since December 2012. NMEDrequested that there be 16 operating SVE units. Those were not provided.

(ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Interim_Measures_WP_Part_1-FieldInvAct_BFFS/KAFB-010-0003-r0_Int_Meas_WP_rev25_11-04-2010.pdf, p.24).KAFB did not comply. KAFB installed two thermal oxidizer (TO) units in November2012 but changed to a less efficient design without notifying NMED.(http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-024_5-23-2013_Disapproval_SVE_Treatment_System_WP.pdf)

The ATSDR Site History disregards the problems with the Bulk Fuels Facility thatwere known by Kirtland AFB much earlier than 1999. KAFB failed to comply withregulations for pipeline testing and knew the pipelines would fail testing in 1985:

Kirtland failed from the 1950s on to comply with the requirements of AF Manual 85-

16 for annual and 5-year pipeline pressure testing. Kirtland knew from a feature on a 1951 aerial photograph that the historical fuel

offloading/dispensing location showed soil contamination;5

In 1985 Kirtland knew that the 5-year hydrostatic test, required by AF Manual 85-16,

3While fuel tanks now have gauges and modern technology that allow officials to more

closely monitor how much fuel goes in and out, Kirtland civil engineer Brent Wilson saysthe leak dates back to the days when the way to measure was to take a long stick and dipinto the tank. (Mr. Wilson fails to explain how personnel would dip a stick into a tankcontaining four million gallons of fuel).

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/20/kirtland-air-force-base-fuel-spill_n_1688603.html4http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_11-16-

2000_Cond_Appr_Add_Stage_1_AP_ST-106.pdfp. 1-2 NMED letter for ConditionalApproval of Addendum to Stage 1 Abatement Plan ST-106 (November 16, 2000)5https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/31%5C3159.PDF , 3/9/2007 NMED

letter to Carl J. Lanz, P.G., p. 2, Item 3. A plan to assess soil contamination near thehistorical fuel offloading/dispensing feature identified in the 1951 aerial photograph nearest theKAFB-1065 well


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would fail if it were conducted. The AF issued a waiver for the 5 year pressure testbecause the pipelines did not meet AF requirements. The waiver still required theannual pressure tests. The pipelines were not repaired and annually tested as orderedin the waiver. (See Attachment #2).

The Air Force knew the fuel facility was leaking in 19926 from a location identified

as Pump House Bldg 1033 and from contamination at a nearby evaporation pond;other pipelines were leaking elsewhere at Kirtland. The pump house was less than300 ft from the offloading racks.

In 1994 the AF issued waivers for both the 5 year pressure test and the annualpipeline testing because it was known that pipeline valves would fail. Replacementand repair of defective valves and piping was not done. The 1994 waivers describedpipeline testing as impossible. (See Attachment #3).

Kirtlands claim that it did not know the aquifer was contaminated until 2007 isfalse7. An internal Kirtland April 1, 2002 memorandum states:8

Contamination exceeding Water Quality Control Commission (WQCC)standards was detected in the subsurface soil to a depth of 300 ft below ground

surface (fbgs) with an areal extent of 6-7 acres. Contamination has been detectedin the groundwater beneath the site at a depth of 480 fbgs

ATSDR relies almost exclusively on the information from the polluter KAFB andShaw Environmental for its data and conclusions. There is no indication in the reportthat the ATSDR visited the Kirtland AFB site. The history of the spill and theindifference of KAFB to pipeline problems and failure to comply with administrativeorders from NMED under RCRA are not discussed by ATSDR. Citizen Action providedthat detailed information to the ATSDR previous to the issuance of this report. Whendata is provided by members of the public, ATSDR should at least take the time to lookto see if it is correct and evaluate it.

6 https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/00/35.PDF , FINAL NON-WASTE

LINE INVESTIGATION WORK PLAN, May 1994, p. 16-1:During a previous baseenvironmental compliance and monitoring program inspection, a spill was observed nearthe UST standpipe. In December 1992, Kirtland AFB Compliance and Assessmentpersonnel collected a soil sample near the suspected spill area. The sample was analyzedaccording to EPA Methods 8020 and 418.1 and contained petroleum hydrocarbons,ethylbenzene, toluene, and xylenes. The site was revisited on March 3, 1993 by KirtlandAFB personnel. Shallow soil samples (6 to 7 inches below grade) were collected at fourlocations in the spill area. Hydrocarbon odors were noted at all sample locations and

Kirtland AFB personnel reported a small area of surface soil contamination around thebase of the UST Stand pipe and extending a few feet west. Based on this information andprevious analytical results, the Condensate Holding Tank was added as a SWMU to theRCRA Part B Permit.7http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/afd-080825-042.pdf Questions andAnswers forFuel Leak Public Meeting: In early 2007, the well was installed and thefuel product discovered on the groundwater.

8https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/23/2345.PDF


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ATSDR disregards:

1) the many years of Notices of Deficiencies and Disapprovals from NMED,

2) the years of failure to comply with the NMED April 2, 2010 order,9

3) the findings of the WUA Resolution 12-14 (Attachment 1) and,

4) statements of other scientists for the poor quality of data collected by Kirtlandand its contractors. ATSDR states that its conclusions for health are based on the datacollected by KAFB, and its contractors.

The following public health conclusions are based on the preceding evaluation ofenvironmental data collected by KAFB and its representative contractors withoversight by the NMED, and groundwater monitoring data collected by the WaterAuthority.

ATSDR states, Based on currently available groundwater monitoring data there are nopast or current exposures via groundwater at down-gradient water supply wells. (P. 25)

Citizen Action Comment Response: The Water Utility Authority resolution requestedmonitoring wells to be installed as close as possible to the municipal wells. That has notoccurred.(http://abcwua.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1224200&GUID=E0DE5496-CCF2-408B-8BF7-2FCEB28D30E5 Click on 12-14.PDF) See Attachment 1.Available groundwater data for the municipal wells is not adequate to determineexposures. Municipal well screens are several hundred feet long, unlike monitoring wellswhich have 10 ft long screens. The municipal wells can pump up to 2850 gal. per minutewhich is an extremely high dilution factor for detection of ethylene Dibromide (EDB)that is measured in parts per trillion. Additionally, the most sensitive testingmethodology is not used for the sampling. Due to the low maximum contaminant level(MCL) of EDB (0.05 g/L) two additional, specialized EPA methods for EDB analysishave been developed. Method 504.1 is a more sensitive indicator than the method 8011that is used.http://www.epa.gov/oust/cat/Section_3-Properties_and_Methods.pdf.

The Figure 2 map used by ATSDR is from 2011 and out of date. The Figure 2 Map(p.7) depicting the extent of the EDB plume minimizes the plume boundary by onlyshowing the boundary line out to detections of 50 parts per trillion rather than down tothe limit of detection (10 parts per trillion) or the limit of quantification. In 3rd Quarter2012 groundwater sampling, Monitoring Well KAFB-10615 detected ethylene dibromide(EDB) at a concentration of 0.075 micrograms per liter (g/L); that is 1 times the EPAdrinking water limit.http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130222-

9http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_4-2-2010_Bulk_Fuel_Spill_HWB_Letter.pdf;http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_4-2-2010_Bulk_Fuel_Spill_GWQB_Letter.pdf;August 6, 2010 ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Bulk_Fuels_Facility_Spill/KAFB_8-6-2010_Fuel_Spill_NOD_and_Direction.pdf;December 10, 2010ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Bulk_Fuels_Facility_Spill/KAFB_BFF_Workplan_Approval_with_Modifications_12-10-2010.pdf;March 31, 2011 http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_3-31-2011_Cover_Letter_3_WPs.pdf


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079.pdfThe KAFB 10615 monitoring location, which lies southeast of Gibson andLouisiana, signals a possible widening of the EDB plume to the east by nearly 1000 ft. Alithographic depiction of monitoring wells from the 2012 4

thQ Report shows the

presence of EDB at the outer toe of the plume at a 100 ft depth that is attributed to thedownward pull of the Ridgecrest municipal wells.

A plan for a containment well was only partially approved by NMED because itcould make the plume travel further toward the northeast where municipal wellsare located:

NMED staff said that the light non aqueous phase liquid (LNAPL) containmentwell that was drilled to stop the forward movement of the fuel product floating onthe water table have been delayed due to some concerns raised at the NMED thatthe wells may act to pull the LNAPL plume further downgradient, rather than haltits movement. NMED staff told the board that the three concerns they have for thestatus of this site is the data gap that exists for the extent of the dissolved phaseplume, the existence of ethylene dibromide (EDB) above the drinking water

standards at all depths, and the evidence of a diving EDB at the farthest reach ofthe dissolved phase plume.

The fact that quarterly sampling often gives such varied results for the presence or non-presence of different GROs and DROs for a long-standing plume of LNAPLcontamination is additional evidence that groundwater sampling is incompetent.

The ATSDR is accepting compromised groundwater monitoring data. ATSDRmakes the statement that there are:

a number of limitations in ongoing KAFB sampling and data analysisprocedures. It is important to note that, in spite of these issues, both NMED andthe Water Authority accept the monitoring data used in this Health Consultation.

ATSDR fails to present the personal communications from ABCWUA Rick Shean andNMED William Moats or conduct its own analysis of the limitations in the data thatATSDR believes is confirmed in the Health Consultation. (Report, p. 22). The fact thatflawed data is accepted by ATSDR without correction of the record violates requirementsof the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). (See, 40 CFR 270.43 Termination of Permits causes can be the failure to disclose fully all relevant facts, orthe permittees misrepresentation of any relevant facts at any time.)

The sampling of soil and groundwater have been conducted inappropriately and

resulted in groundwater monitoring data that is not reliable and representative.

Numerous groundwater monitoring wells have had air bubbles in the samples thatvitiates the reliability and representativeness of the groundwater samples fordecision making. NMED has commented numerous times on samplinginadequacies for 30 groundwater monitoring wells due to presence of air bubbles:http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_6-21-2013_response_Repeat_Gas_Bubble_GW_Sampling.pdf, see NMED comment#4.


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The sampling of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in the 4th Quarter of 2012

violated EPA protocols for sampling. The laboratory sample checklist shows thatseals on sample bottles were not intact upon arrival; temperatures were not withinthe correct range of > 0 C to 6 C; sample temperatures were not taken andrecorded upon receipt; traffic report or a packing receipt was not present. VOC

sample analysis took place weeks later. Mixed air samples in Tedlar bags couldnot be performed at all. Use of such flawed sampling data for decision makingdefeats characterization of the nature and extent of the plume.http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_9-18-2012_Extension_Rqst_Qrtly_Rpt.pdf

Currently, ten (10 ) shallow groundwater monitoring wells have flooded well screensthat cannot provide reliable and representative groundwater samples. This includesKAFB 1064, which is the monitoring well nearest to the VA Hospital supply well.

These rising water levels have caused a number of wells to have screens that arenow flooded with the top of the screen below the current water table. First QuarterCY 2013 measurements show that groundwater elevations now exceed the top of

the screens in 10 shallow groundwater monitoring wells. As of January 2013, 10Shallow Zone wells have flooded screens, 7 wells have their tops of screen within2 feet of the water table, and 36 wells have their tops of screens more than 2 feetabove the water table.

(Quarterly Pre-Remedy Monitoring and Site Investigation Report for January-March2013 (Https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/36/3611.01.PDF, p. ES-3).

ATSDR cannot state on the one hand that effective remedies will be carried out andthen state that ATSDR is not examining the efficacy of the remedies. This isbureaucratic double-talk. The report must remove its conclusion regarding anincomplete exposure pathway based upon the incorrect assumptions that:

1) Effective remedies are being carried out and2) An alternate source of water for Albuquerque can be located and delivered.The ATSDR conclusion is directly contradictory to it own statement. The ATSDRCaveats -- Only for discussion -- states:

Although this consultation cannot evaluate the effectiveness of proposedremedial actions, it will serve as a vehicle for documenting those concerns, andhopefully, initiating community discussion of these issues.

The ATSDR draws the incorrect conclusion of an incomplete pathway for exposurewhere it has no facts to support any effective ongoing remediation. Contrary to ATSDRassumptions:

There is no effective remedy in place for the dissolved plume of Ethylene

Dibromide. There is no remediation plan.

There is no technology in place to remediate the Ethylene Dibromide plume.

The Water Utility Authority may deliver EDB contaminated water below the EPAMaximum Contaminant Level.

The ATSDR report fails to adequately address the reduction in water supplies forthe City of Albuquerque and the lack of available water for replacement. No


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analysis of the amount of water necessary for replacement is addressed or whether thealternate source would be from Albuquerque or surrounding or distant areas.

The suggestion that an alternate source of water can be found to replace the fiveRidgecrest wells and/or the 45+ supply wells to the northeast is unsupported byany data.

The replacement of water for the Veterans Hospital and KAFB supply wells #3,#15, and #16 is not addressed.

The legal ramifications, infrastructure technicalities, volume of water and costsfor obtaining alternate sources of water are not discussed.

The nature of the Rio Grande aquifer that relies on mountain front rechargefrom precipitation is not addressed. See http://pubs.usgs.gov/ha/ha730/ch_c/C-text4.html GROUND WATER ATLAS of the UNITED STATESArizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah HA 730-C, Rio Grande Aquifer

The ATSDR report states that the water pathway for the consumer and municipal

wells is incomplete because remediation will take place. The report minimizeshealth consequences by saying that continuing remediation will prevent the exposures.ATSDR should acknowledge that no effective approved remediation plan exists for thedissolved plume of EDB or the Liquid Non-Aqueous Petroleum Liquid (NAPL) plume tostop the movement toward the municipal wells. By omission of the fact that there is noeffective remediation plan, ATSDR is providing incorrect information to the public andreaching an incorrect conclusion for health consequences.

ATSDR incorrectly states that (p. 5):Thus, most of the leaked fuel is present as a light non-aqueous phase liquid (orLNAPL) which is not dissolved in groundwater and the LNAPL migrates down-

gradient at a different rate relative to the underlying groundwater.ATSDR disregards Shaws quarterly technical reports since at least 2011 that the bulk ofthe LNAPL has been trapped beneath the water table and is dissolving into the aquifer.The June 2012 Quarterly Report 10states:

NAPL chemical analytical results show that the trapped NAPL will be anongoing source of dissolved groundwater contamination indefinitely.

ATSDR incorrectly touts the new system replacing the original Soil VaporEvaporation (SVE) system. ATSDR fails to recognize the inefficiencies of the SVEsystem and that it cannot remediate the EDB dissolved plume, as described by NMED.(http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-024_5-23-

2013_Disapproval_SVE_Treatment_System_WP.pdf).

ATSDR does not recognize that KAFB reported to NMED that Supply wells 15 and16 are not functional. ATSDR states that, The Water Supply Wells include: KAFBWells 3, 15, and 16. EDB is not being monitored in 15 and 16 because they are shutdown. There are no plans for repair or restart of 15 and 16. KAFB 16 is high in arsenic

10http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120629-057.pdf


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levels and that may be an additional reason along with a $30,000 repair cost factor for notrepairing the supply well.

ATSDR fails to describe the groundwater contamination pathway for the VeteransAdministration (VA) Hospital. The report only cites the potential for vaporintrusion

into VA hospital buildings. The vapor intrusion conclusion is based on inadequate dataaccording to ATSDR. KAFB has not provided the laboratory data for the VA monitoringwells nearest to the VA supply well. The VA monitoring well data was requested underthe Freedom of Information Act. VA management has decided to shutdown the VAsupply well, switching to city water supplies and the Air Force paying for the water.

ATSDR failed to fully identify contamination at the VA Hospital supply well by onlyidentifying manganese and phthlate. Testing of water at the Veterans Hospital well in2011 identifed the presence of flourene, and gasoline organic compounds at low levels.Benzo-a-Pyrene was found above the EPA maximum contaminant level. In May 2012,Di(2-ethylhexyl) phthlate was detected. In June 2012 1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene was

detected. In September 2012, Pentachloroethane (PCE), also known as Perc, wasdetected. PCE is very difficult to treat once it reaches groundwater.

ATSDR does not address the concentrations of chemicals found in the groundwatermonitoring well KAFB 1064 that is nearest to the VA Hospital 200 ft away in theparking lot. ATSDR did not consider the KAFB 1064 monitoring well, 200 ft distantfrom the supply well. In 2006 monitoring well KAFB-1064 was constructed in the VAparking lot, 200 ft away, to serve as a sentinel monitoring well upgradient of the VAHospitals production well. TPH-DRO, TPH-GRO, toluene, naphthalene, phenanthrene,nitrate, dissolved iron, and dissolved manganese were detected from the very firstgroundwater sample. Instead ATSDR relies only on the samples found in the VA supplywell. Those samples suffer from the same problems of a long well screen and dilutionfactor cited above for the sampling of municipal wells. Even with the high dilution factorhowever, GROs and benzene are showing up in the drinking water for medicallycompromised veterans and medical staff.

ATSDR should consider whether the high levels of phthalate are nonetheless beingpresently served up to service personnel and their families. ATSDR waves away thehigh concentration results for bis (2-ethylhexyl) phthalate in water supply wells that areabove the MCL at KAFB supply wells #3, and #16 by claiming that perhaps the resultsare from leaching from pipes or laboratory equipment. With out knowing the reason forthe concentrations, ATSDR concludes that it is very unlikely that long termconcentrations in the drinking water will be above the MCL. KAFB #3 supply is in thedirect pathway of the EDB plume. KAFB #16 is high in arsenic.

Data collected in 2004 showed PCE contamination in Kirtland drinking water supplyWell #17. Very little data is available for PCE in drinking water on and around Kirtland.(NMED Curry 11/26/08). Is KAFB #17 still operational?


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The lack of any data for bio-degradation for EDB in Albuquerques aquifer was notmentioned by ATSDR. The false representations of KAFB regarding bioremediationof the EDB were not addressed. The possible volume of EDB released over decadesfrom millions of gallons of aviation gasoline and the amount of water that can already becontaminated in the aquifer was not discussed. That amount can be in the range of

billions of gallons of contaminated water. ATSDR recognized over a decade ago thatEDB degrades scarcely at all. NMED later informed Kirtland that EDB does notnaturally biodegrade.11 A half teaspoon of EDB can contaminate approximately9,000,000 gallons of water. A half teaspoon of EDB was in every gallon of aviation gasas an anti-knock agent.

The ATSDR report changes the emphasis of discussion from the main problem of

EDB in the aquifer to the hypothetical problem of vapor intrusion of Benzene intobuildings without having real data. Shutting down a building that may be too high inbenzene vapor is a much different problem than shutting down the most productiveportion of Albuquerques municipal wells.

The map of the former Bulk Fuels Facility (BFF) site Fig. 1 incorrectly describes thelocation of the former BFF.

For vapor intrusion, ATSDR states:BFF workers may be exposed to benzene in air via vapor intrusion intobuildings. As measured, benzene air concentrations are within the normal range ofUS residences and below regulated occupational concentrations. These exposuresare not expected to harm peoples health.

There is no recognized health damage threshold for benzene.

ATSDR should provide information for where the expected levels of soil vapor gaswill come from. Most of the LNAPL is trapped approximately 500 ft below the watertable. No description of how much product remains in the vadose zone is presented.Vapor intrusion became a major focus of the report despite the fact that groundwatercontamination is the primary problem.

ATSDR discussion of background exposure seems to be along the lines of Werealready being exposed, a little more cant hurt. A little more can cause damage andthere can be legal liability. There is no evidence of "safe threshold levels" when it comesto benzene exposure.Under California law (Thelma L. Rutherford, et al. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. 1997. 16 Cal. 4th 953), one does not need to prove that exposure to aparticular defendants' product actually caused his cancer, but needs only to showdefendants' product (in this case, benzene) was a substantial factor in increasing the riskof developing cancer.

11http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-026_3-27-2012_BFFS_In-well_treatment_disapproval.pdf


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Benzene is hematotoxic at levels below 1 ppm. The U.S. EPA Maximum ContaminantLevel Goal (MCLG) is zero (0.00) for benzene. Instead, the ATSDR uses occupationalguidelines to address exposures that would/should not be present in the workplace but forthe negligence of the AF in allowing the leaking to occur for possibly 50 years. TheATSDR does not consider the non-occupational exposures that will be in addition to

occupational building exposures. Sensitivities of various persons such as children,asthmatics, the elderly and pregnant women are inadequately considered

Bulk Fuels Facility workers may be women. Exposures to benzene, which is acarcinogen, can be dangerous for pregnant women and the fetus. Epidemiologic studiesof adults show clear evidence of causal association between benzene exposure and certainleukemias. http://www.epa.gov/teach/chem_summ/BENZ_summary.pdf

Two studies are available that measured prenatal or early life exposure to benzene. Onestudy measured concentrations of benzene in cord blood in humans as an estimate ofplacental transfer of benzene; benzene was detected in fetal cord blood at levels equal to

or greater than those levels found in maternal blood. Benzene was also detected in breastmilk. (Ibid). Prenatal exposures may be linked to miscarriages, lighter birth weight.Childhood leukemia may be associated with paternal benzene exposure. Acutenonlymphocytic leukemia was significantly associated with maternal occupationalexposure to benzene during pregnancy.

ATSDR states:Workers and patients at the Veterans Administration Hospital may be exposed tobenzene in air via vapor intrusion into buildings. Estimated benzene airconcentrations are within the normal range of US residences and below regulatedoccupational concentrations. Based on available data, these exposures are notexpected to harm peoples health. However, due to the limited amount of soil gas dataavailable for this location, additional characterization should be conducted.

Again, ATSDR draws conclusions without adequate data. If data were to show benzeneincrease above background levels, ATSDR does not consider the potential for increasedsensitivity of medically compromised veterans being treated in the VA hospital. Theconclusion that no harm is expected cannot be made based on the available data that isadmittedly limited for the vapor intrusion that is possible. Just how limited the data is,is stated by the ATSDR as no direct measurements of air near the VA hospital;measurements of soil vapors not being collected from soil vapor monitoring wells, and;unknown levels from past fuel tank leaking at the VA:

Although there are no direct measurements of air or near surface soil gassamples from the VA Hospital buildings, the proximity of the buildings to the SoilVapor monitor well with elevated soil gas contaminants (KAFB 106138) suggeststhat vapor intrusion is possible at this location. Measurements of soil gas vaporsin the shallow and deeper soil horizons between well KAFB 106138 and the BFFsource area SV monitoring wells to the east have not been collected. Therefore, itis not known whether elevated soil gas vapors at the VA Hospital originate fromthe BFF source or from a past VA Hospital fuel tank leak. The vapor intrusion


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pathway at the VA Hospital is considered a pathway of potential exposure.(Emphasis supplied.)

The ATSDR does not provide the size of the past VA fuel tank leak, the date of theoccurrence, the distance to the VA hospital or the fate and transport.

ATSDR states:It should be noted that ATSDR does not typically evaluate exposures to on-siteworkers. Occupational (worker) exposures are usually regulated by theOccupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or assessed by theNational Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).

Why did ATSDR not call on OSHA or NIOSH to perform the exposures to workers?Why did ATSDR not consider the exposures that workers may have already beensubjected to in the past at the various building locations.

The ATSDR provides contradictory statements regarding benzene exposure in the

buildings. ATSDR states:The highest benzene concentration in indoor air was 23 g/m

3

(7/17/12, Bldg.1026). While this concentration is about 16 times greater than the adjusted, non-

residential cancer risk evaluation guide (CREG; 1.4 g/m3

; Table 3), it is only 2.6

times greater than an outdoor (ambient) air sample (8.8 g/m3

) collected at thesame time.

ATSDR then dismisses the heightened concentration being inhaled by building occupantsby stating that

an indoor air concentration of 23 g/m3

from a building located at a major fueldistribution facility is not significantly elevated and is probably not indicative of

increased concentrations via vapor intrusion.

The Vapor Intrusion information is largely bogus and unsubstantiated. ATSDR has notinvestigated the volumes of vapor that are available from deep in the groundwater forVapor Intrusion to be a significant factor. The data used by ATSDR is from boreholesrather than samples actually taken from inside the buildings.

IV. CONCLUSION

The ATSDR report should not have been released in its draft form and should not befinalized in its present form. The contradictions, errors, lack of reliable data, poor

analyses of remediation and alternatives for Albuquerque for water supply,misinformation about velocity and many other factors described above do not provide areasonable basis for public discussion of the issues. One wonders why substantialtaxpayer funds were spent on such a disingenuous report.


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Respectfully submitted,

David B. McCoy, Esq.Executive DirectorCitizen Action New Mexico

POB 4276Albuquerque, NM 87196-4276505 [email protected]


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ATTACHMENT 1


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ATTACHMENT 21985 WAIVER OF 5-YEAR PIPELINE TEST


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ATTACHMENT 31994 WAIVERS


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ca comments on atsdr report2

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