c2 and force design for “all arms-all effects” warfare in

C2 and Force Design For “All Arms-All Effects” Warfare

in Cross Domain Operations The Johns Hopkins University

Applied Physics Laboratory10:30 AM, 30 January 2020

A presentation byColonel (ret) Douglas Macgregor, U.S. Army, PhD

EVP, Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC

This presentation is unclassified.

Burke-Macgregor Group LLC

Agenda for Discussion

1. What is the US Army doing?

2. Another Way Forward to Cross Domain Warfare;

3. New Operational Architecture;

4. A New Organization for Combat: The Reconnaissance-Strike Group

5. Summary of Main Points

US OperationalConcepts

US Military Strategy

US NationalSecurity Strategy

Strategic

Operational

Acquisition

Tactical

Unclassified.


Ø The paradigm shift in warfare: The impact of long-range precision effects through networked C4ISR capabilities from seabed to space;

Ø “All Arms-All Effects” Warfare is a New Joint Operational Concept: Operations that integrate Service-provided capabilities organized around ISR, STRIKE, MNVR, SUST across Service lines inside a flatter, Integrated, Joint Operational Command Structure;

Ø The goal is cross-domain synergy. The complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others…

JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT (JOAC) VERSION 1.0 17 January 2012

What you should take away:

Unclassified.


“Existing Divisions and Corps will be tasked with fighting and defeating specific components of the enemy’s system… under MDO, Divisions and Corps headquarters are to return to their historic warfighting roles, in which they employed subordinate units and allocated Corps- and Division-level assets to support subordinate units.”

Unclassified.

TWELFTH ARMY GROUP 18 JAN 1945 (Belgium and Germany)

US ARMY Today w/ 3 corps and similar frontage of 30-40 miles

FIRST ARMY(V, XVIII, VII

Corps)30-40 mile

front)

In WWII a U.S. field army kept 9 divisions on the front and 3 in

reserve—more divisions than exist in today’s

active Army.

5 to 6 salvos from a single 300mm Rocket Artillery BN (18 launchers) could destroy the front. Each Russian or Chinese Brigade would have a Rocket Artillery BN. A single

volley of 5 to 6 Russian or Chinese brigades could seriously disrupt/destroy the front.


Change in Command and Control (C2):

In the 1944-45 advance from Normandy to the Rhine, General Montgomery’s headquarters controlled only two armies, which in turn had only two and three corps respectively, and the corps operated only two to three divisions—sometimes, even, only one. The ratio of headquarters was no more economic in the U.S. Army… The abundance of headquarters was one reason why the advance to victory was so protracted, despite mobile instruments and exhausted opponents.

B. H. Liddell Hart, Defense of the West, 1950, pp. 533-535

Unclassified.


Ø First, ü Whom do we fight?

ü Where do we fight?ü How do we fight?

ü How do we get there?Ø Second, develop an appropriate military strategy

linking strategic ends with operational means.Ø Third, devise a new operational concept suitable

to the new environment; Ø Fourth, assess/develop/appoint new Leadership; Ø Fifth, within fiscal means reorganize and redeploy

the force into the new paradigm.

Another Way Forward:

Strategic Assumptions

New Rule and Mission Set

New Force Design &

Capabilities

New Force Development / Management /

Employment Paradigm

New Operational

Concept

Unclassified.


ISR Range WW I

ISR Range WW II ISR Range Desert Storm

Area of Influence and

Responsive Action- WW I


Responsive Action- WW II


Responsive Action- Desert

Storm

Capacity for responsive action and area of influence has not kept pace with ISR since 1945.

Space, Time, Lethality: The ISR Gap 1914-1991

• In 1914, C3 is static and single service. Maneuver limited to local envelopment. Days/weeks, even months needed to act.

• In 1939, C3 is single service, but more dynamic thanks to airpower—EW, ISR expand. Maneuver includes regional envelopment. Months/Days needed for effective action.

• In 1991, C3 below the strategic level is still single service. ISR and envelopment is 3D or global. Action in hours and minutes, but seldom across domains. No JOINT (integrated) C4ISR on the operational level. Unity of Command is weak.

Unclassified.


Evolution of “All Arms-All Effects Warfare “ and Integrated Operations in BTP, TUF, MOV

The U.S. is preeminently a global air and naval power, not necessarily a global land power. In all domains, mass is a liability.

Unclassified.

Joint Force; Integration (ISR; Precision STRIKE (IADS);

Maneuver Sustainment)

Forces-in-being

Pre-1914 UK Strategy

Recon-strike

complex, IADS

Soviet-Russian Operational art

ALB- Desert Storm, Kosovo

German Tactics & Formations

joint OPNS, Precision Strike, Airpower,


Strategic Implications for the US Armed Forces:

Relative sizes indicate Return on Investment

ü Industrial Age inefficiencies and duplications reduce operational impact;

ü Perpetuate unsustainable “cost exchange ratios” with opponents;

ü Optimizing “capability at cost” inside a new Post-Industrial Age structure dramatically increases operational impact of each dollar spent—maintaining/increasing security with reduced budgets.

Current Model Post-Industrial Model

Land Warfare

Sea Warfare

Air Warfare

ISR-STRIKE60%

MNVR plus SUST40%

Operational Impact

Operational Impact

Unclassified.


RSG

RSG

STR

C4I

SUST

C H E C K B A T T E R Y D A I L Y

O JXF

NLOJXF

Self-Contained Formations inside the ISR-STRIKE-MNVR-SUST Framework

JFC

ü The Operational Framework is the next logical step in the evolution of warfare; ü The Framework is not just about “things.” It’s about integrating existing and future

capabilities within an agile construct guided by human understanding. ü It’s an intellectual construct with technological infrastructure.


Build Flatter, Faster C2:Joint Force Commands

Industrial Age Post-Industrial Age


Lego-like Force with faster decision cycle.


Strike Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Sustainment

Service capabilities for employment plug in under one star or below.

Joint Force Command structures provide inside a reduced number of regional unified commands ensure that mission-focused force packages act

as a single unified force.

Maneuver

Joint Force C2

Unclassified.


“The real strength of an army is represented not by gross numbers of men in the service, nor even by the number of trained men, but by the number of fighting formations that it can deploy. Until troops are organized in formations, and these are trained collectively, they cannot operate as an effective force.”

B. H. Liddell Hart, Defense of the West, 1950, p.121.

Formation-based Change:

Unclassified.


Maneuver Echelon:(4) RSG: Reconnaissance Strike Group – (12) CMG: Combat Maneuver Group – (Armored) (6) ICG: Infantry Combat Group – (Motorized) (4) AAG: Airborne-Air Assault Group – (Light)

Strike Echelon: (Aviation/UCAV/GLCM/MLRS), TMD (4) ACG: Aviation Combat Groups (2) STG: Strike Groups (UCAV/MLRS) (4) TMD: Theater Missile Defense Groups

C4I Echelon: [C4, Information, Intelligence, EW, Space](4) C4I Groups

Sustainment Echelon: (See engineer consolidation)(8) CSG: Combat Support Groups (2) ENG: Engineer Groups (construction) (1) CBG: Chemical-Bio Warfare Group • The 8th Army (in Korea) contained 201,000 U.S. Soldiers + 26,000 Marines;• Note that ISR is embedded throughout the force.

Unit Types:Capability-Based Force Packages


Focus is the RSG


RSG: High Lethality-Low Density Formation

Reconnaissance-Strike Group

BG Commands 5,500-6,000

MNVR BN

MNVR BN

MNVR BN

MNVR BN

STRIKE BN

C4ISR BN

SUST BN

ü Maneuver forces must be capable of dispersed, mobile, operations to survive and fight in an integrated, Joint ISR, EW and STRIKE-dominated battle space.

ü The new battle space demands self-contained independent battle groups; formations that operate on land the way the Navy’s ships operate at sea: within the range of their organic ISR and STRIKE capabilities.

ü RSG suppresses or destroys enemy air defense and missile assets-RSG is effective when immediate responsiveness is required, in complex terrain or in poor visibility.

Unclassified.


RSG C2 is designed for Cross Domain Warfare:

Brigadier GeneralRecon-Strike Group Commander

Lieutenant Colonel Lieutenant ColonelLieutenant ColonelLieutenant ColonelLieutenant Colonel

Intelligence functions split, but integrated to support maneuver, strike and ISR

Maneuver(Operations

including PSYOPS)

ISR StrikeCOORD

Sustainment(Personnel +

Logistics)

Communications + EW & Cyber

ColonelChief of Staff

ü Responds Directly to Joint Force CDR

ü Integrates Army, USAF/USN Strike Assets (STRIKECOORD);

ü Collects, Analyzes and Exploits Information.

ü Absorbs additional Battalions or gives up battalions as needed;

ü Additional Staff Functions such as Civil Affairs, SJA can be incorporated as needed.

Unclassified.


Circles Depict Maneuver

Battalion Kill Zones

60-80 km front w/ 80-100 km zone/sector of operation (terrain dependent)

ISR-Strike Systems

distributed Inside circles

The RSG: How it Fights

Flexible distribution of integrated enablers to MNVR BNs• 10 SkyRanger SHORAD units (25 km

surveillance, 4-6 km engagement)• 5 NASAMS ADA firing units (120 km

surveillance with Sentinel radar, 50 km engagement)

• 4 ARTHUR radar targeting units (60 km weapon locating)

• 8 C3 support units (40-50 km point to point 4G communications)

Core Capabilities in Specialized BNs• Giraffe 4A radar (280 km surveillance,

100 km weapon locating)• 12 MRLS (150 km GLSDB)• 24 TARES Loitering Munition (200 km)• Long range communications to include

satellite commo. (SKYSAPIENCE)

Mobile Armored MNVR BNs• AGS (33 per battalion)• IFV (50 per battalion)• AMOS auto-loading 120mm mortars (12

per battalion)

Unclassified.


ü JFC uses RSG to close the “ISR-area of responsive action and influence gap.”ü JFC integrates Army and AF capabilities into an operational axis in offensive

operations or into a defensive sector in defensive operations;ü Joint Force connectivity along the operational axis is secure;ü RSG compels opposing STRIKE and IADs to displace or confront destruction; ü When IADS are destroyed/disabled STRIKE weapons achieve maximum effect.

Where are the Joint C4ISR nodes? Is there C4ISR redundancy? When can we see/know and act? How fast can we Move, Reload, Acquire & STRIKE?

Unclassified.

Burke-Macgregor Group LLCSummary:

Construct a 21st-century scalable, “Lego-like” force design; a modular design organized and equipped for dispersed, mobile warfare inside the MNVR-STRIKE-ISR-SUST Framework. RSG points the way:

ü Recognize that Joint, integrated C4ISR is the “hub” of the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework.

ü Single-service command structures are obsolete. U.S. capabilities must be integrated on the strategic and operational levels.

ü Apply the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework

as a methodology for investment planning and programming to enable informed choices as constrained budgets compel force optimization.

Unclassified.

c2 and force design for “all arms-all effects” warfare in

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