c. question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

8/9/2019 C. Question Must Be Raised at the Earliest Possible Opportunity

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C. Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

Umali vs. Guingona

Facts:At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the decision

of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1997, which set aside the Amended Decision dated

December 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 94-3079, anddismissed the petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction brought by petitioner against therespondents.

Petitioner was a Regional Director of the BIR which was charged for alleged violations ofinternal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director. Former

President Ramos then authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umaliand referred the complaint to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption

(PCAGC). PCAGC found evidence to support 6 of 12 charges against Umali. Then Pres. Ramosissued Administrative Order 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of

retirement and all benefits under the law. Petitioner filed a civil case with the RTC of Makatisaying that his constitutional right to due process of law and his right to security of tenure were

denied by respondents. The RTC judge handed down an Amended decision granting the petition.Also, respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals where the Amended Decision was

reversed.

Issue:Whether or not petitioners contention on the constitutionality of PCAGC, as a validly

constituted constituted government agency is raised at the earliest possible opportunity

Held:The Court ruled that it was too late to raise the issue of Constitutionality of PCAGC at such a

late stage of the proceeding. the petition is dismissable on the ground that the issues posited bythe petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion

arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts andcircumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to

consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct andunmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his

office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the SolicitorGeneral, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and

substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.


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Tijam vs. SibonghanoyFacts:

On July 19, 1948, the spouses Tijam commenced a civil case in the Court of First Instance ofCebu to recover from the spouses Sibonghanoy the sum of P1908 with legal interest thereon

from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid plus costs. A writ of

attachment was issued by the court against the defendants properties, but the same was soondissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and FidelityCo., Inc on the 31

stday of the same month.

After trial, court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a writ of executionagainst the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the

issuance of a writ of execution against the Suretys bond against which the Surety filed a writtenopposition. The court however denied the opposition. Upon the plaintiffs second motion for

execution against the bond, the suretys counsel was granted a period of five days within whichto answer the motion. Upon its failure, the court granted the motion for execution.

Barely a month before such case, RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 became effective. Thislaw changed the jurisdiction of the court of first instance. The highlight of the case is on the

undesirable practice of the surety submitting their case for decision and then accepting thejudgment only if favorable but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

Issue:

Whether or not the issue may be raised any time or at the earliest possible opportunity.

Held:The Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action

commenced. The rule that jurisdiction over the matter is conferred upon the courts exclusivelyby the law. The lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case

allowing objections be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hover, the surety is has beendeemed barred by laches from invoking such plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling

everything done.The surety has been estopped by laches. The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is applicable

to the case since the suretys invocation attack sound public policy required for the peace ofsociety. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure

affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such a relief,repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The surety is barred from such conduct not because

the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as adjudication but for the reason thatsuch a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy.

Laches, in general, is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is

negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption thatthe party entitle to assert is either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders appealed with costs against Manila Surety and FidelityCompany, Inc.


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Ballesteros vs. AbionFacts:

On April 30, 1996, petitioner received respondents April 25, 1996 letter demanding that hevacate the property and surrender its possession. On June 20, 1996, petitioner received another

letter from respondents counsel reiterating the demand for him to vacate the property. All this

notwithstanding, petitioner refused to vacate the premises. On September 4, 1996, respondentfiled a complaint for unlawful detainer with damages against petitioner in the Municipal TrialCourt in Cities (MTCC) of Iriga City, Branch 2. It was, however, dismissed for failure to state a

cause of action. On appeal, the RTC of Iriga City, Branch 37, reversed the decision of the MTCCand ordered petitioner to vacate the property and surrender its possession to respondent.

Petitioner was also ordered to pay respondent P50,000 as attorneys fees and P7,000 per monthas rental for the property from September 1995 until petitioner vacated the premises. Petitioner

moved for a reconsideration of the RTC decision but the motion was denied. Petitioner filed apetition for review with the CA. It was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46065. On July 15, 1999,

the CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification. The CA ruled that petitioners right ofpossession to the property was only by virtue of the second lease contract dated October 30,

1995 between petitioner and Ronald Vargas. It was clear, however, that Ronald Vargas was notthe owner of the property and therefore had no right to lease it out. Petitioner himself admitted

respondents ownership of the property. Neither was there any evidence that Ronald Vargas hadbeen authorized by respondent or even by Dr. Vargas himself to transact the second lease on

their behalf.

Issue:Whether or not the issue is raised at the earliest possible opportunity

Held:

Furthermore, it is also worthy to note that, in his motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision,petitioner explicitly prayed that the "MTCC decision be affirmed." Since he actively participated

in the proceedings before the MTCC and in fact later sought the affirmation of its decision, he ineffect recognized its jurisdiction and he should now be estopped from questioning the

jurisdiction of that court. In other words, petitioner cannot now assail the jurisdiction of theMTCC after voluntarily submitting himself to its proceedings.

22We have held that "while lack of

jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a partys active participation in the proceedings beforea court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction."


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Mangaliag vs. Hon. Catubig-PastoralFacts:

That on January 21, 1999 from 9:00- 10:00 am, the Dump truck of the petitioner driven by heremployee on the other side of the road tried to overtake and bypass a tricycle in front of it and

thereby encroached the tricycle where the respondent is in with 3 others driven by Jayson

Laforte; because of the petitioners drivers gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence indriving the truck and Mangaliag who failed to exercise due diligence required by law in selectingand supervising employee, the respondent and co-passengers incurred serious injuries and

permanent deformities; respondent was hospitalized and incurred expenses such as P71,392.00for medical, P500,000.00 for moral damages, loss of income of P25,000.00 and engaged the

services of counsel on a contingent basis equal to 25% of the total award.On May 10, 1999 private respondent filed a complaint for damages at the RTC; the petitioners

filed their answer on July 21, 1999 with counterclaim that the respondent has a cause of actionagainst them that they attributed fault or negligence on the accident on the driver who was

allegedly driving without license.On the pre-trial conference, private respondent rested his case while petitioner testified his

defense and subsequently on March 8, 2000, assisted by a new counsel, filed a motion to dismisson the ground of lack of jurisdiction; that the claim is within the MTC since the principal amount

falls within its jurisdiction however, private respondent opposed petitioners motion to dismiss,and that on March 24, 2000 the petitioners filed a supplement in support on their motion to

dismiss but, was dismissed by the RTC Judge Catubig- Pastoral on April 17, 2000 by themandate of Administrative Circular No. 09-94, par.2.

On May 19, 2000, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but were denied by the RTC.And on August 9, 2000 the court issued the TRO prayed by petitioners, the judge desisted for

further hearing of civil case No. SCC-2240.

Issue:WON the constitutional question was raised at the earliest possible opportunity

Held:

Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, provides interalia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases exceeds P100,000.00 exclusive of

interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusivejurisdiction thereof is lodged with in the RTC. xxx The exclusion of the term damages of

whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1)of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to cases where the damages are merely

incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claimfor damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim

shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.WHEREFOR, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Temporary

restraining order issued by this court on August 9, 2000 is LIFTED.

c. question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

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