c ombating t errorism c enter at west point countering terrorism in the 21 st century james jf...

COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Countering Terrorismin the 21st Century

James JF Forest, Ph.D.Director of Terrorism Studies


Agenda

• Understanding the Strategy of Terrorism• U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Post-9/11• Interagency Coordination for Counterterrorism

Notes: - This presentation is entirely at the unclassifed level. - The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.


Understanding the Strategy of Terrorism


Terrorism as Strategy• Terrorism as weapon in a strategy

• Terrorist attacks = form of strategic communication

• Terrorism is not new

• Terrorism is not merely religious: 1980 Bologna, Munich attacks; LTTE (Sri Lanka)

“You have to be lucky everyday – We only have to be lucky once” - IRA Bomber


Some Strategic Objectives of Terrorism

• Recognition: Gaining national or international recognition for their cause; recruiting new personnel; raising funds; demonstrating their strength

• Coercion: Force a desired behavior of an individual or government

• Intimidation: Prevent individuals, groups, or governments from acting

• Provocation: Provoking overreaction by a government to the attack on symbolic targets or personnel, thereby gaining sympathy for their cause.

• Insurgency support: Forcing the government to overextend itself in dealing with the threat, thereby allowing the insurgency to gain support and commit further attacks against the government.


Some Strategic Acts of Terrorism

The terrorist act is generally a symbolic gesture against a group or national government. Tactics include:– armed attacks – arson– assassination – bombing– hijacking – hostage-taking – kidnapping, etc.

Suicide bombings


Marine Barracks Beirut, Lebanon23 October 1983

• 241 Dead• 105 Injured


Khobar Towers - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 25 June 1996

• 19 Dead

• 240 Injured


Murrah Federal BuildingOklahoma City 25 June 1994

• 168 Dead

• 490 Injured


American Embassy Bombings, Kenya and TanzaniaAugust 1998 200 Americans, Kenyans, and Tanzanians deadOver 5000 injured


USS Cole, Aden, Yemen12 Oct 2000

17 Dead39 Injured


Terrorism as Strategy• Increasing interest in “soft targets” (economically

strategic impact, and less protected) such as:

– pubs in Northern Ireland & London UK– open markets & cafes in Israel– international airport, Sri Lanka– bus in Manila, the Philippines– shopping mall in southern Philippines– nightclub in Bali, Indonesia– banks in Istanbul, Turkey– hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia– nightclub in Berlin, Germany– commuter trains in Madrid, Spain

– and, of course . . .


September 11, 2001


Terrorism as Strategy• Terrorism as a means to achieve goals and objectives

• Strategic goals include:– Political change (e.g., overthrow govt.)– Social change (e.g., France headscarf ban)– Economic change (e.g., stop resource export)– Religious change (e.g., fundamentalism)

• Overall goal: create a “better” world

• Rationale for terrorism: perceived as only available means by which to achieve strategic goal

Significant militant Islamist attacks against Americans


Strategy and Recruitment– Recruitment and propaganda efforts

• Video and audio tapes, CD-Roms, DVDs and the Internet

– Key themes of al Qaeda recruitment: • The West is implacably hostile to Islam• Only language the West understands is violence • Jihad is the only option• 9/11 was a tremendous victory (U.S. economy was destroyed

and the course of history was changed)• U.S. is a paper tiger on the verge of financial ruin and total

collapse• “Patience and steadfastness” are required


Strategy and Recruitment• Terrorism is an individual’s strategic choice most often

driven by combination of:– Intense grievances– Sense of crisis– Address a power imbalance - empower the disenfranchised

• The ties that bind: training camps, extended family, social networks; trusted networks = key

• Combination of ideology and psychology

• No constraints re: geography, organizational affiliation, etc.


Strategy and Recruitment

• Recruit individuals with differing talents or attributes to offer– Locals with knowledge of customs, culture– Foreigners with passports, language skills– Sleepers or operationalists who can “fit in”– Individuals who can serve as critical functionaries


Terrorists as Strategic ActorsEven though it’s a decentralized network, there are still critical

functions that enable the network to operate

• Critical functionary roles – can become a hub of multiple networks – weapons procurement– financier (funder or banker) (particularly in Halawa system)– document forgerer– human traffickers

• Support individuals (trusted contacts) can and sometimes do support multiple networks; can provide supplies/facilitate trafficking of weapons & funds to multiple networks

• Example: 60% of day spent moving legitimate charity money around; 20% of day on Hamas transactions, other activity on side

• Some may get profit for doing these support/function roles

Different members of the network play support and action roles


Strategy and Training

Bomb-making, assault tactics, etc.


Strategy and Training• Psychological dimensions

• Moral disengagement– Displacement of responsibility– Disregard for/distortion of consequences– Dehumanization– Moral justification

• Group power over behavior, personal decisions

• Preparation for martyrdom



• Afghanistan• Algeria• Bosnia• Chechnya• Colombia• Egypt• Indonesia• Japan• Kashmir• Lebanon• Libya

Establish training camps – developing the will to kill and the skill to kill

• Operational space: Geographic isolation • Teachers: Experts in relevant knowledge, e.g., military combat experience• Committed learners• Time, money, and basic necessities

• Northern Ireland

• Peru• The Philippines• Somalia• Spain• Sri Lanka• Sudan• Syria• Turkey• United States• Uzbekistan

Think back to your basic training or basic officer courses...



• education in explosives and detonators: how to assemble bombs (e.g., TNT, C4), mines and grenades, pressure and trip wire booby traps, and the basic knowledge of electrical engineering

• how to mount rocket launchers in the beds of pickup trucks

• how and where to launder money

• how to successfully conduct a kidnapping

• how to conduct target identification, surveillance and reconnaissance

• how and where to build camouflage-covered trenches

• how to covertly communicate with other members of a group or network

• how to fire handguns, machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers

Lessons for new recruits include:



• the rudiments of chemical and biological warfare

• field command and escape tactics

• marksmanship and camouflage

• the use and employment of Soviet rocket-propelled grenades and shoulder borne STRELA missiles

• sniper rifle skills; how to fine-tune a rifle sight at short range to ensure accuracy at longer distances

• how to direct weapon fire at targets on the ground and in the air

• training in four-man unit deployments and formations—including wedges, columns, echelons and lines—techniques similar to those used by U.S. Marines and Army Rangers

Lessons for new recruits include:


Strategy and Training• These are Learning Organizations = committed to capturing knowledge,

analyzing it, forming new doctrine and tactics which are informed by lessons from the past

– Learn from each other– Learn from trial and error (IRA example)– Media showcasing ‘best practices’ to others– Managing public image (PR)

(becoming more sophisticated)

• Terrorists are learning many things in Iraq, like:– Manufacturing and concealing IEDs– Urban warfare– Sniper and ambush techniques– Hostage taking– Media manipulation

• OVERALL: How to recruit, fund, and execute assymetric warfare


Suicide Terrorism as Assymetric Warfare

• Unique tool in the implementation of a terrorist strategy

• More common in democracies than non-democracies

• Democratic leaders have publicly confirmed suicide attacks pushed them to make concessions

• Example: United States left Lebanon in 1983 because of suicide United States left Lebanon in 1983 because of suicide attacksattacks

“We couldn’t stay there and run the risk of another suicide attack on the Marines.”

-- Ronald Reagan, An American Life

“We couldn’t stay there and run the risk of another suicide attack on the Marines.”

-- Ronald Reagan, An American Life


Suicide Terrorism: Who?Suicide Terrorism: Who?

Perception: • Generalized profile of suicide

terrorists, including:

– Young– Single– Male– Uneducated– Religious fanatics

Reality• The “profile” is wrong• Terrorists are:

– Preteen - mid-sixties

– Both single and married with families

– Both male and female

– Both educated and uneducated

– Not motivated by religious fanaticism

– World’s leader in suicide terror are Hindu; Tamil Tigers who are conducting insurgency against Sri Lanka


Suicide Terrorism: Why?Suicide Terrorism: Why?

Perception: • Seemingly irrational act

Reality• Part of a strategy that is:

– Well planned

– Logical

– Designed to achieve specific

political objectives

• Does two things:– Inflicts immediate punishment

against target society

– Threatens more punishment in the future

• Suicide attacks have increased

over the past two decades

• Why?

• Suicide attacks have increased

over the past two decades

• Why?


Suicide Terror Attacks are . . . • inexpensive and effective; extremely favorable per-casualty cost

benefits for the terrorists

• less complicated and compromising – no escape plan needed, and success means no assailant to capture and interrogate

• perhaps the ultimate “smart bomb” – this “weapon” can cleverly disguise itself, use various modes of deception, and effect last minute changes in timing, access, and target

• a strategic communication device – successful attacks are virtually assured media coverage

• effective because the weaker opponentweaker opponent acts as coerceracts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target

• Key difference from other attacks: The target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage

• inexpensive and effective; extremely favorable per-casualty cost benefits for the terrorists

• less complicated and compromising – no escape plan needed, and success means no assailant to capture and interrogate

• perhaps the ultimate “smart bomb” – this “weapon” can cleverly disguise itself, use various modes of deception, and effect last minute changes in timing, access, and target

• a strategic communication device – successful attacks are virtually assured media coverage

• effective because the weaker opponentweaker opponent acts as coerceracts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target

• Key difference from other attacks: The target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage


Suicide Terrorism: Where?Suicide Terrorism: Where?

Three types of attacks are most likely to occur:

• High value, symbolic targets involving mass casualties– Important government buildings, installations, or landmarks– Major means of personal or commercial transportation

• High value, symbolic targets against specific persons– Political assassinations (e.g., head of state, regional governor,

etc.)

• Deliberately lethal attacks targeting the public– Bus, train, subway bombings; attacks on shopping malls, cinemas,

sports stadiums, public gathering spaces


Counterterrorism Strategy post-9/11


If the Terrorists have a Strategy, We Must Also Have a Strategy

• GWOT is considered by an increasing number of observers as a global counter-insurgency struggle

• To fight it, we need to use all 7 major elements of national power (note: some scholars prefer to discuss the 4-element DIME construct)

• These 7 are:– Diplomatic– Information/Intelligence– Military/Law Enforcement– Economics/Finance


SECRET SENSITIVE

NSDD 75

U.S. Relations withthe USSR

January 17, 1983

Informational

Military (Force/Violence) Diplomatic

Economic

National Security Strategy Guides Policy (Theory for the U.S.)


Table of Contents

IntroductionI. Overview of America's International Strategy II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Pr

event Attacks Against Us and Our Friends

IV. Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our

Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade

VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy

VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power

IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century

U.S. National Security Strategy,September 2002 (Replaces 2000 Clinton Edition)

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss1.html












National Security StrategyStructure

U.S. National Security Strategy is Unique to the U.S. Based Upon:

Founding Principles of the Republic (U.S. Constitution, Declaration of Independence, Federalist Papers, Major Presidential Addresses)

Historical National Precedents Current Security Concerns Current Political Realities

Reflects: Global Capabilities / Responsibilities

Congress’N.S.S. (535)

POLICYPROCESSARENA

(The “Real World”)

NationalSecurityPolicy

Statementsand Actions

of GovernmentDOD, State, NSC other U.S. Gov't. Executive Branch Input

NGOs, Think Tanks, Lobbyists, International Agencies, Media N.S.S.

President’sNational Security Strategy

Military Strategy and Foreign Policy

National Security Strategy Informs National Security Policy (Reality for U.S.)

Other Gov’ts. N.S.S.


National Strategy for Combating Terrorism- Released February, 2003

- Complements/Supplements the National Security Strategy

Table of Contents

– Introduction

– The Nature of the Terrorist Threat Today

– Strategic Intent

– Goals and Objectives• Defeat terrorists and their organizations• Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists• Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit• Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad

– Conclusion



National Strategic Framework for the GWOT

Overall Goal: Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to that way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists.

Ends

Means National, partner and international instruments of power

Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism

Protect the Homeland

Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks

Ways

EnemyFoot soldiers

LeadershipIdeological support

Safe havens

WeaponsFunds

Comms & Movement Access to Targets

Help create and lead a broad international effort to deny terrorist networks the resources they need to

operate and survive.


Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT

Strategic Goal: Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to our way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists.

Termination Objectives from the Contingency Planning Guidance (Classified)

Ends

Means Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies

Mili

tary

Str

ateg

ic O

bje

ctiv

es

Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism

Protect the Homeland

Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks

Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.

Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence mgmt. Ways

Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive.

Establish conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.

Defeat terrorists and their organizations.

Persuade, coerce, and when necessary, compel states and non-states to cease support for terrorists.

EnemyFoot soldiers

LeadershipIdeological support

Safe havens

WeaponsFunds

Comms & Movement Access to Targets

END-STATE

War Against Terrorism


• Our strategy must involve denying terrorists sanctuary; separating terrorists from the population

• Must isolate them, take away their support, force them to continually be on the run

• Organizing for force protection based on battle line mentality won’t work

• UAV’s aren’t as useful as you might think; over-reliance on technical wizardry has been a problem in the field

• Attrition – we must keep after them, never give up, while making sure they don’t recruit new members




• Human intelligence networks are critical (although non-efficient use of manpower)

• Must have continual presence – cannot go into a village “looking for the terrorists”

• “Know yourself; know your enemy (Sun Tzu)”– Must know strategic & tactics of enemy before CT can be

successful– so, what do we know about our enemy’s strategy & tactics?


The Terrorists’ Perspective

• For one thing, al Qaeda’s leaders believes that they have been tested by two superpowers (Soviets and Americans); they defeated the first, and survived the second despite overwhelming military force – thus, both are considered victories

• Our enemy believes this is an epic struggle that will likely take place beyond the current generation of fighters

• In Iraq, terrorists are developing a new “cult of the insurgent” by demonstrating how they, not the once-feared Saddam Hussein’s military, can inflict pain and suffering on the mighty U.S. (and coalition) forces


• Focus on the enemy’s ideology, not their tactics

• This is a War of Ideas: We need to convince them (potential supporters and recruits) that we (liberal democracies) offer a better way than separatist Islamic Jihad (but without attempting to convert them to our way of life)

• We must work to bolster the image of American morals and values being compatible with those of the Arab and Islamic world, where we are too often portrayed as greedy, selfish hedonists



• Information warfare - We must develop an effective counterideological message

• How well do we invest in and support the “extremists whom we like” (a.k.a., “moderates”) and support ways to amplify their voices?

• We must invest in educational & social institutions; media organizations




• Critical components of a successful counterterrorism effort include:

– Multinational partnerships– Interagency coordination


Interagency Coordination for Counterterrorism


U.S. Government Policy Making Responsibilities:Separate Branches with Overlapping Power to “Check & Balance”

Executive BranchLegislative Branch Judicial Branch

• Commander-in-ChiefCommander-in-Chief

• Treaty-MakingTreaty-Making

• Nominate OfficialsNominate Officials

• Fire Executive OfficialsFire Executive Officials

• Sign/Veto LegislationSign/Veto Legislation

• Execute LawsExecute Laws

• Suggest the BudgetSuggest the Budget

• Set the AgendaSet the Agenda

• Shape Public OpinionShape Public Opinion

• Declare WarDeclare War

• Advice/Consent (Ratify Treaties)Advice/Consent (Ratify Treaties)

• ConfirmationConfirmation

• Impeach President/Judges Impeach President/Judges

• Pass Legislation/Veto OverridePass Legislation/Veto Override

• Oversight of Laws/Policies: Oversight of Laws/Policies: Investigations, Hearings, ReportsInvestigations, Hearings, Reports

• Appropriate Federal BudgetAppropriate Federal Budget

• Influence the AgendaInfluence the Agenda

• Reflect Public OpinionReflect Public Opinion

• Review LegislationReview Legislation

• Review Legal IssuesReview Legal Issues


U.S. Government Today(109th Congress, 2005-2006)

Legislative Branch Executive Branch Judicial Branch

U.S. CONSTITUTION(7 Articles, 27 Amendments)

• THE PRESIDENT• VICE PRESIDENT(Both Elected 4-Year Termsbut Limited to Two Terms)

• Executive Office of the President

• 15 Departments• 60+ Agencies and Gov’t. Corporations

• 2.4 Million Full-Time Civil Servants• 1.4 Million Active Duty Soldiers

• SUPREME COURT• LOWER COURTS(Appointed for Life)

U.S. Population: 280,000,000

• SENATE (100 – 2 per 50 states,

elected to 6-Year Terms)

• HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES

(435 – 1 per 700,000 Constituency, elected

to 2-Year Terms)


POTUS

SE

CD

EF

SE

CS

TATE

Sec ofHome. Sec.

Nat’l SecurityAdvisor

CJC

S D

CI W

HC

OS

VP

NSC

DOS DOD

DOHS

NSC Staff

JCS

INTELCommunity

The National Security Council


National Counterterrorism Center

MissionTo inform, empower, and help shape the national and international counterterrorism effort, thereby diminishing the ranks, capabilities, and activities of current and future terrorists.

VisionTo become the nationally recognized center that empowers the Counterterrorism Community to shape the national and international counterterrorism effort, thereby eliminating the terrorist threat to U.S. interests, at home and abroad.

ValuesTo ensure precision, objectivity, integrity, and timeliness in everything we do; to develop expertise of NCTC employees, and to ensure their professional development and growth.



• NCTC currently has assignees (USG staff) from: • Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Department of Defense• Central Intelligence Agency• Department of Homeland Security• Department of State • Others – DOE, NRC, HHS, USDA, USCHP

• Assignees to NCTC retain authorities of parent entities

NCTC is a mission-oriented center – located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence – established to integrate terrorism information and coordinate counterterrorism activities across the U.S. Government and beyond


In NCTC, key organizations involved in the fight against terrorism are collectively fulfilling shared responsibilities

Terrorism Information Access and Integration


• Many U.S. Government networks are available in NCTC

• Integrated architecture will enable a simultaneous, federated search capability against the terabytes of dataavailable to the U.S. government

• Advanced analytic tools are facilitating the automated sourcing and tailoring multi-use products; enhancing data exploitation and integration

• “Terrorism information” covers an exceptionally broad array of data

• Active information acquisition effort underway• Seeking awareness and integration of non-obvious terrorism information

Terrorism Information Access and Integration


• Providing daily terrorism analysis for the President, senior policymakers, and the U.S. Government

• NCTC produces integrated and coordinated analysis – if there are analytic differences on the nature or seriousness of a particular threator issue, they are incorporated into the analysis• Producing special analysis and other in-depth, strategic, and alternative analyses

• Counterterrorism Requirements - Identifying gaps in knowledge; prioritizing transnational terrorism information needs

Terrorism Analysis and CT Requirements

The integration of perspectives from multiple departments andagencies is serving as a force multiplier in the fight against terrorism


• Beyond implementing Center responsibilities, the greater goal is facilitating a counterterrorism “system” as part of a greater U.S. Government (USG) system-of-systems

• All USG elements need not be centralized; however, a distributed but integrated framework must be consciously agreed upon and orchestrated• Roles and responsibilities of USG CT elements must be as unambiguous and straightforward as possible; intentional rather than haphazard redundancy• Need to orchestrate the various components of the nation’s counterterrorism effort; greater efficiency and effective optimization of resources and activities

Toward a Counterterrorism “System”


Questions?


Backup slides


Global Terrorism Networks

Interconnected terrorist groups, criminal organizations, individuals, etc. around the world.

Shared strategies, doctrine, tactics, training

Cross-fertilization, inter-organizational learning

Shared profits from trafficking in drugs, arms, other contraband

Increasingly connected via technologies/Internet


Example: How does the LTTE Sustain its Operation Financially?

Taxes from local Population

Taxes from Business

Taxes from Fishermen

Taxes from Visitors

Tax on Liquor

Taxes on Goods

Robbery

Blackmail & Ransom

Drugs/ Crime

Investing/ running LocalBusiness Ventures

LOCAL

Local Enterprises

Fund raising Projects Playing the Stock Market

In Areas heavily dominated by Tamils


Propaganda/ Fund raising projects

Donations from Supporters(Tamil Diaspora)

Foreign residence Tax

International

Asylum Seekers tax

Foreign Investments/Business

Drug SmugglingHuman Trafficking

Funding from state Parties

Shipping/Gunrunning

Money laundering/ Forgery

Credit card Fraud

Terrorist training

Aiding International Criminals

INTERNATIONAL FUNDING


US Counterterrorism Strategy

• Helped Sri Lankan military develop 4 key capabilities– Operate behind enemy lines– Engage in night fighting– SEAL, special boat operations– Psyops capabilities

• Helped Sri Lankan banking and commerce tracking systems locate & disrupt money laundering networks


• Orchestrating integrated analysis and the presentation of alternative views through institutionalized mechanisms

• Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) – meets at least twice monthly, with regular, virtual coordination on community products;produces Community-coordinated analytic assessments, warnings, alerts, advisories

• Terrorism Production Planning Board (TPPB) – meets five days a week• Red Cell – independent and interagency conferences and publications

• Working with Intelligence Community members to design an efficient, distributed U.S. Government terrorism analysis framework

• Goal is comprehensive coverage with planned redundancy and alternative analysis• Seeking to achieve a rational allocation of scarce analytic resources

Orchestration of Terrorism Analysis

This integrated business model capitalizes on our respective expertise, optimizing analytic resources

to enable more effective and comprehensive analytic coverage


• The SOP function was established to provide afull-time interagency forum to align plans, identify and address gaps and overlaps, and realize interagency synergies

• Coordinates the review, integration, development, and evaluation of interagency operational plans • Facilitates the implementation of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, specifying tasks, assigning lead responsibilities, and monitoring progress

• Based on interagency discussions, SOP includes:• Standing Plans, Dynamic Plans, and Evaluation Groups as well as a Senior Interagency Strategy Team• Members from across the Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, Military, and Diplomatic elements of the U.S. Government

Strategic Operational Planning (SOP)

Facilitating a synchronization and transparency of effortto ensure that all instruments of national power are brought to bear

against the scourge of international terrorism


• NCTC sponsors multiple forums and mechanisms for the exchange of terrorism information

• NCTC Online• Videoteleconferences • 24/7 NCTC Operations Center• Information Sharing Program Office

• NCTC is responsible for sharing terrorism information within the Federal family

• Supports Federal agencies and departments with statutory responsibility to provide terrorism-related information to state, local, and private officials

Facilitating Information Sharing

Facilitating the exchange and rapid dissemination of terrorism informationand analysis to those responsible for detecting, disrupting, and defending

against terrorist attacks at home and abroad


• NCTC maintains a database ofall U.S. Government information on international terrorist identities

• Supports a streamlined system for “watchlisting” and terrorist screening activities• Provides terrorist identities information and watchlist nominations to the FBI-administered Terrorist Screening Center

• Improving internal and interagency processes to integrate terrorist identities information into terrorism analysis and CT operations

Transnational Terrorist Identities Information

Supporting a government-wide system that ensures front line law enforcement officers, consular officials, and immigration and border personnel have the

capability to identify and screen terrorists before they enter the U.S.



Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 :

• Effective by 17 June 2005• Most functions assigned to NCTC by E.O. 13354 are now rooted in statute & in

some cases augmented • Report to the President on plans and progress of joint CT operations (other than

intelligence operations)

• New functions assigned to NCTC by the Act include:• “Advise the Director of National Intelligence on the extent to which the counterterrorism program

recommendations and budget proposals of the departments, agencies, and elements of the USG conform to the priorities established by the President”

• “…primary responsibility in the USG for conducting net assessments of terrorist threats”• “Develop a strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence operations and law enforcement

planning & operations into a cohesive effort to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility”

The implementation of NCTC responsibilities is tied to the creation and authorities of the Office of the DNI.

c ombating t errorism c enter at west point countering terrorism in the 21 st century james jf...

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