c kyung-sup - the second modern condition-compressed modernity as internalized reflexive...

The second modern condition? Compressedmodernity as internalized reflexivecosmopolitization1

bjos_1321 444..464

Chang Kyung-Sup

Abstract

Compressed modernity is a civilizational condition in which economic, political,social and/or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner in respectto both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence of mutually dispar-ate historical and social elements leads to the construction and reconstruction of ahighly complex and fluid social system. During what Beck considers the secondmodern stage of humanity, every society reflexively internalizes cosmopolitanizedrisks. Societies (or their civilizational conditions) are thereby being internalizedinto each other, making compressed modernity a universal feature of contempo-rary societies. This paper theoretically discusses compressed modernity as nation-ally ramified from reflexive cosmopolitization, and, then, comparatively illustratesvarying instances of compressed modernity in advanced capitalist societies,un(der)developed capitalist societies, and system transition societies. In lieu of aconclusion, I point out the declining status of national societies as the dominantunit of (compressed) modernity and the interactive acceleration of compressedmodernity among different levels of human life ranging from individuals to theglobal community.

Keywords: Compressed modernity; globalization; reflexive cosmopolitization; unitof modernity

1. Introduction

Most of the main impetuses for social and economic transformations in thenew century do not differentially or exclusively apply to certain limitedgroups of nations. Consider the following: global free trade and financializa-tion, corporate deterritorialization and transnationalized production, global-ized labour use and class struggle, globalized (or globally coerced by theIMF, etc.) policy consultation and formulation, informatization and

Chang Kyung-Sup (Department of Sociology, Seoul National University) (Corresponding author email: [email protected])© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 ISSN 0007-1315 print/1468-4446 online.Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden,MA 02148, USA on behalf of the LSE. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2010.01321.x

The British Journal of Sociology 2010 Volume 61 Issue 3

cyberspace, globally orchestrated bioscientific manipulation of life forms(to include human bodies gradually), borderless ecological and epidemiologi-cal hazards, transnational demographic realignments (i.e., migration oflabour, spouses, children), cosmopolitanized arts and entertainments, and,not least critically, globally financed and managed regional wars. There areno permanent systematic hierarchies, sequences or selectivities by which dif-ferent groups of nations – whether at different levels of development, indifferent regions or of different races – are exposed to these new civiliza-tional forces in mutually exclusive ways. Wanted or not, they are everynation’s concern because they are structurally enmeshed with the new civi-lization process Ulrich Beck calls ‘reflexive cosmopolitization’. And the civi-lizational condition thereby shared across the globe is called ‘secondmodernity’.

Recent world history seems to dictate that surviving, let alone benefitingfrom, these new civilizational forces requires every nation to actively inter-nalize them. Isolationist efforts – whether spoken in terms of trade protec-tionism, religious fundamentalism or media and internet control – are readilysubjected to international moral condemnations (in particular by neoliber-als). In fact, accepting or refusing these forces remains beyond willful politi-cal or social choice because they are globally reflexive – that is, compulsivelyoccurring through ‘the autonomized dynamism of (second) modernization’across national borders (Beck 1994: 5). Rephrasing this issue in terms ofinvolved risk, Beck emphatically indicates the arrival of ‘world risk society’as follows:

To the extent that risk is experienced as omnipresent, there are only threepossible reactions: denial, apathy or transformation. The first is largelyinscribed in modern culture, the second resembles post-modern nihilism,and the third is the ‘cosmopolitan moment’ of world risk society (Beck 2006:331).

At the level of each national society, the forces of reflexive cosmopolitiza-tion described above have been and need to be incorporated head-on in orderto maintain civilizational integrity as well as material and physical stability.Through this process, societies (or their civilizational conditions) are beinginternalized into each other, thereby making compressed modernity – a form ofmodernity I have to date been analysing in respect to externally oriented andrapidly overtaking modernizers in (pre-crisis) East Asia – become a univer-sal feature of national societies in the second modern world (Chang 1999,2010a). In the current paper, this thesis will be systematically discussed in theconcrete historical contexts of nations at varying levels of development andmodernization.

I will begin by briefly introducing the concept/theory of compressed moder-nity, and then proceed to theoretically discuss the new stage of compressed

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modernity as nationally ramified from reflexive cosmopolitization. In the mainanalysis, I will comparatively illustrate varying instances of compressed moder-nity in advanced capitalist societies, un(der)developed capitalist societies, and(from socialist to capitalist) transition societies. Finally, I will discuss thedeclining status of national societies as the dominant unit of (compressed)modernity and indicate the interactive acceleration of compressed modernityamong various different levels of human life (namely, the globe, world regions,subnational localities, families, individuals as well as national societies).

2. Compressed modernity and its cosmopolitan turn: universalization ofcompressed modernity under reflexive cosmopolitization

Compressed modernity is a civilizational condition in which economic, politi-cal, social and/or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner inrespect to both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence ofmutually disparate historical and social elements leads to the construction andreconstruction of a highly complex and fluid social system.2 Compressedmodernity can be manifested at various levels of human existence – i.e.,personhood, family, residential community, secondary organizations, urbanspaces, societal units (including civil society, nation, etc.), and, not least impor-tantly, the global society. At each of these levels, people’s lives need to bemanaged intensely, intricately, and flexibly in order to remain normally inte-grated with the rest of society.

Figure I schematically shows that compressed modernity is composed of fivespecific dimensions that are constituted interactively by two axes of time/spaceand condensation/compression. The time facet includes both physical time(point, sequence and amount of time) and historical time (era, epoch andphase).The space facet includes physical space (location and area) and culturalspace (place and region). As compared to physically standardized abstracttime–space, era-place serves as a concrete framework for constructing and/oraccommodating an actually existing civilization. Condensation/Abridgementrefers to the phenomenon whereby the physical process required for themovement or change between two time points (eras) or between two locations(places) is abridged or compacted (Dimensions [I] and [II] respectively).Compression/Complication refers to the phenomenon that diverse compo-nents of multiple civilizations that have existed in different areas and/or placescoexist in a certain delimited time–space, and influence and change each other(Dimensions [III] and [IV] respectively). The phenomena generated in thesefour dimensions, in turn, interact with each other in complicated ways andfurther generate different social phenomena (Dimension [V]).

The problem of time–space condensation was also presented as acore subject in David Harvey’s discussion of Western modernism and

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postmodernism (Harvey 1980).As compared to Harvey’s view that time–spacecondensation, at the global scale, accompanies the accumulation crisis of capi-talism at each stage and the aggressive effort to overcome it, the time–spacecondensation and compression in compressed modernity at various other (aswell as global) levels of human existence reflect much more diverse back-grounds, factors, and initiators. In addition, the phenomena argued by maintheorists of postcolonialism (such as cultural ‘hybridity’, ‘syncrecity’, etc.) canalso be included in time–space compression (See Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin2002). However, it needs to be pointed out that the breadth of cultures andinstitutions that are subjected to compression here is much wider than thatsuggested by postcolonialism, including even postmodern and global elements.

The concept of compressed modernity was first introduced to account forthe unique civilizational condition of contemporary South Korea which, on theone hand, has undergone full-scale capitalist industrialization, economicgrowth, urbanization, proletarianization (i.e., the transformation of peasantsinto industrial workers), and democratization within unprecedentedly shortperiods, and, on the other hand, still manifests distinctly traditional and/orindigenous characteristics in many aspects of personal, social, and political life.South Korea’s remarkable civilizational episode has been richly illustrated bythe now globally popular Korean dramas and movies, often dubbed ‘Koreanwave’ (hallyu). Not coincidentally, the concept/theory of compressed moder-nity is heavily utilized in a rapidly increasing body of international research onSouth Korean popular culture.3

Figure I: Five dimensions of compressed modernity

Time (Era) Space (Place)

Condensation/Abridgement [ I ] [ II ]

[ V ]

Compression/Complication [ IV ] [ III ]



Needless to say, the above civilizational experiences and characteristics arenot entirely unique to South Korea but have been shown or are being shownin many other formerly or currently late developing societies. Furthermore, asexplained in the subsequent sections of this paper, most Western countries andvirtually all state-socialist countries went through some analogous processesfor the sake of early modernization. In particular, such Western experienceswere comprehensively discussed by many so-called classical sociologists,including Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, etc.

Most recently, during what is called the ‘second modern’ (Beck and Grande2010) or ‘high modern’ (Giddens 1990) stage of humanity, compressed moder-nity has increasingly become a rather universal feature of contemporarynational societies. In order to survive, let alone benefit from, the powerfulforces accompanying second modernity – ranging from global free trade andfinancialization to borderless ecological and epidemiological hazards – eachnational society has to directly face these same forces in its economic and othermanagement.4 In fact, wanted or not, they have already become every nation’sconcern through ‘reflexive cosmopolitization’ – namely, the ‘autonomized’process of cyclically proliferating risks (as well as opportunities) across theglobe on the basis of rather impulsively judged and executed activities byvarious supposedly rational or reflective agents of modernity. Through thisprocess, national societies (or their civilizational conditions) are being inter-nalized into each other, thereby making compressed modernity a universalfeature of national societies in the second modern world.

3. Variations of compressed modernity as internalized reflexivecosmopolitization

Under reflexive cosmopolitization (of the world risk society), second moder-nity becomes ubiquitous, albeit with very diverse motives, processes, extents,and consequences. Relatively speaking, advanced capitalist societies may becharacterized by ‘autonomous second modernity’ in that most of the drivingforces of scientific-technical-cultural inputs and political-economic interestsfor radicalized reflexivity originate from their own intent and power. By com-parison, late developing and underdeveloped capitalist societies and (formerlysocialist) transition societies may be characterized more often by ‘secondmodernity by dependency’. Such societies become subjected to risks of radi-calized reflexivity largely due to their political and/or economic subordinationto advanced nations and global actors (such as transnational business) or as aresult of their own efforts at learning or seeking assistance and cooperationfrom them.

Societies of relatively autonomous second modernity may, in turn, be dif-ferentiated in terms of earlier systemic characteristics of first modernity – i.e.,

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liberal, social democratic, and developmental societies.5 The processes, natures,and consequences of second modernization may involve potential differences(as well as similarities) associated with such systemic characteristics. Similarly,societies of relatively dependent second modernity, in turn, may be differen-tiated in terms of varying experiences of first modernity vis-à-vis traditionality,and systemic complexities concerning socialist vis-à-vis capitalist institutions.This latter group of second modern societies constitutes an overwhelmingmajority of nations in the world. Their internal diversities are beyond any easyclassification. Nevertheless, they are commonly characterized by a partial real-ization of second modernity (because of the protracted existence of pre-modern, first-modern, socialist-modern components). Such partially realizedsecond modernity can sometimes produce devastating impacts due to its struc-tural dissonance with indigenous social orders and principles.

Relatively dependent second modern societies may also be characterized interms of (cosmopolitanized) compressed modernity. However, relativelyautonomous second modern societies can also take on compressed modernityto the extent that they are subject to cosmopolitanized risks as well as oppor-tunities associated with relatively dependent second modern societies. In sum,the internalization of cosmopolitanized risks takes place both in relativelyautonomous and relatively dependent second modern societies, so that com-pressed modernity becomes inseparable from reflexive cosmopolitization andthereby ubiquitous as well. Moreover, given that such cross-influencing takesplace in a cosmopolitanized process of reflexivity, a virtual simultaneity char-acterizes the temporal relationship between second modernity and com-pressed modernity.

It is however important to examine to what extent compressed modernitydifferentially impacts on relatively autonomous and relatively dependentsecond modern societies. Relatively autonomous second modern societies canbe characterized by low-order compressed modernity.This is because the usualimpacts on them from dependent second modern societies (through special-ized trade, international migration, cross-border pollution, etc.) are likely to bemore indirect, contained, monitored, and thus manageable (or presently tol-erable) than their impacts in the opposite direction (through selectively freetrade, transnational organization of production, financial invasion, neoliberalstructural adjustment programmes, bioscientific manipulation of local agricul-ture, cultural-ideological framing, etc.).6 As such, dependent second modernsocieties can be characterized by high-order compressed modernity. InWestern societies under low-order compressed modernity, the moderncultural-institutional-technological configurations tend to be less compressedbecause they have more often evolved from the internal (endogenous) histori-cal processes with the external influences incorporated in a carefully managedmanner; whereas in non-Western societies under high-order compressedmodernity, the corresponding configurations tend to be more compressed



because they have more often been superimposed, borrowed or adaptedinstantly from outside with the internal civilizational elements subjugatedwillingly or unwillingly. In the latter, the suddenness and involuntariness ofsecond modernity and its conflictual relations with indigenous interests andvalues, despite its globalized context, do not fundamentally differ from theclassic situation of colonial modernity. Terrorism appears to be an extremisteffort at bypassing such asymmetrical relations, whereas military invasion isnot infrequently used in order to reinforce the asymmetry.7 However, it is alsotrue that such asymmetry is becoming increasingly meaningless because themagnitude of the impact of relatively dependent second modern societies onrelatively autonomous second modern societies is growing at an unprec-edented speed.

4. Reflexive cosmopolitization and compressed modernity in advancedcapitalist societies

4.1 The historical nature of early modernization

European modernization was a fairly diverse and uneven process acrossvarious sections of the continent.8 The post-WWII portrayal of (Western)Europe as a set of institutionally stable and economically affluent units ofmodernity has often been arbitrarily extrapolated into the regional past his-tories, so that the arduous efforts of most European societies – many of themyet to be consolidated into independent or unified nation–states – to physicallysurvive the aggressions of a handful of pioneer modernizers and to catch upwith them by expeditiously learning their technological, economic, and politi-cal know-how have remained insufficiently recognized (see Hobsbawm andRanger 1992). The fierce intra-regional competition and rivalry embedded inEuropean modernization was critically responsible for the two world warsfought over the politico-military (and civilizational) hegemony of the region.For most European nations, modernity was a nationalist international projectinvolving both civilizational condensation and compression amid pluralsources of new knowledge, culture, and power. That is, compressed modernityhas characterized the civilizational nature of most European societies since thelate eighteenth century.9 Furthermore, the transcontinental political, economicand demographic expansion of Western Europe into America and Oceania ledto an overnight transplantation of modernity while indigenous nations in theseregions were completely subdued or almost exterminated. In the long run,however, various crises of capitalist modernity as well as domestic and inter-national socialist influences induced different national and regional reactions,which then would be politically consolidated into the two contrasting regimesof political economy and social policy, namely the Anglo-American liberal(and neoliberal) system and the North European social democratic system.

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The non-European ‘catching-up’ modernizers, particularly in Asia, havebeen engaged in the same nationalist international project of modernitythrough intercontinental (and interracial) transactions of commodities, tech-nologies, scientific and cultural knowledge, and social institutions.The mercan-tile nationalist motivation has been most distinct among these Asianmodernizers, who have shown an impressive capacity for intercultural learningas well as traditional organizational rehabilitation.10 The so-called develop-mental states in East Asia have proved to be both the most forceful vehicle ofcompressed capitalist development and the most tenacious conveyer ofneotraditionalist democracy centered on political and social familism (seeChang 2010a). Furthermore, the ‘Cold War liberalism’ in East Asia, orches-trated by the USA against the neighbouring communist superpowers, ideo-logically enshrined (and helped to transplant) capitalist modernity andpolitically guarded the neotraditionalist authoritarian regimes in the region.

4.2 Compressed modernity in advanced capitalist societies as internalizedreflexive cosmopolitization

As David Harvey insightfully indicates, the spatial integration and temporalcondensation of political economic and cultural activities on the global scalealready became a generic feature of capitalist modernity in the early twentiethcentury, and has intensified to such an extent that national societies haveincreasingly become obsolete as units of self-contained modernity.11 However,since nation–states continue to be the dominant regulatory unit of economiclife and sociopolitical citizenship, it is still epistemologically justifiable to con-ceive of national-level modernity (or modernities) whether it is endogenouslyshaped or not. In fact, as explained above, even Western modernity has neverbeen a self-contained evolutionary experience for most countries in the region.Nevertheless, the unprecedented global velocity of time/space condensationand compression has forced even advanced capitalist nations into such chaoticcivilizational conditions as to crucially debilitate various technological instru-ments and social institutions of national modernity. This roughly correspondsto what Beck seems to consider the second modern condition under cosmo-politanized reflexivity.

Substantively, late or second modernity in advanced capitalist nations hasbeen characterized by such diverse tendencies as deindustrialization (multi-national relocation of industrial production), corporate deterritorialization(transnationalization of business), informatization, national and global fin-ancialization, knowledge trading, industrial scientization (NT, BT, ICT),bio-engineering, international ecological incursion and governance, post-rationalist and transnational cultural production, cosmopolitization of classrelations and civil activism, cosmopolitan engagement in regional wars, tran-snational demographic realignments (i.e., migration of labour, children,



spouses), religious pluralism, etc.12 Whilst a detailed description of these ten-dencies is not feasible here, it is safe to say that none of them can be effectivelyaccommodated or countered by national societies as mutually independententities. That is, second modernity is a wild world of borderless civilizationalexperimentations and inestimable social interdependencies. Despite this,however, most nation–states have still tried to actively manage such experi-mentations and interdependencies for the sake of their exclusive nationalinterests. This has led to a seemingly universal process of internalization ofreflexive cosmopolitization, thereby engendering compressed second moder-nity in each national society.

As statist political economists have shown, however, some states have beenexceptionally successful in economically riding the tide of second modernity(see Weiss 2010). For instance, remote nations such as Iceland and Irelandsuddenly became global star economies mainly on the basis of globalfinancialization. Even the USA once appeared to have regained its economichegemony by manipulating its financial leverages internationally. In the infor-mation and communication industry, Finnish and South Koreans have dwarfedtraditional industrial powerhouses such as Japan, the USA, and Germany. TheUSA, on the other hand, has aggressively pursued the bio-engineering ofagriculture in order to reinforce their dominance in the world’s grain and meatmarkets. All these late capitalist achievements, however, have been accompa-nied by devastating incidents of economic, social and ecological crises. Mostsymbolically, the 2008–9 global economic crisis saw the near financial collapseof Iceland, Ireland and the USA.

In spite of mutually diverse configurations and achievements of secondmodernity amongst advanced capitalist nations, they have all collaborated inattempting to engage the rest of the world in this new phase of capitalistmodernity.This attests to their firm self-conviction as the pacesetters of secondmodernity. This group of advanced capitalist nations has been able to fullyutilize both old global institutions (such as the IMF, etc.) and newer ones (suchas the WTO, etc.) in order to restructure the world and extract maximum profitfrom both the existing and newer sources. The rampant expansion of globalinequalities and socio-ecological hazards since the late twentieth century hastherefore come as no surprise to these nations.13

As a result of the same historical process, however, the rest of the world hassuddenly become part of the basic economic, social, cultural, and ecologicalfabric of the advanced capitalist nations. Ironically, under the chronic pressureof un(der)employment and insufficient income, workers in deindustrializedcapitalist societies have become the main consumers of the industrial com-modities produced in newly industrializing countries. The price competitive-ness of these commodities is often based upon the use of hazardous materialsand technologies as well as socially problematic labour relations.14 The demo-graphic reproductive squeeze in European and, more recently, East Asian

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capitalist countries has been complemented by the sustained influx of variousforms of temporary and permanent migrants from neighbouring poor coun-tries, whose presence entails the multicultural and multiethnic reconfigurationof the societies concerned.15 The postmodern and/or post-rationalist turn inWestern academia, art, and literature has been accompanied by a strong inflowof theories and philosophies from the hitherto intellectual and culturalperipheries.16 The industrial divestment by local business in advanced capitalistcountries has sometimes been accompanied by corporate takeover or newindustrial investment by the capital from developing countries as well ascompeting developed countries.17 All these tendencies clearly attest to thecritical fact that, under second modernity, advanced capitalist societies increas-ingly experience the civilizational internalization of hitherto peripheral othersand thereby become compressed modern.

5. Reflexive cosmopolitization and compressed modernity inun(der)developed societies

5.1 The colonial and postcolonial conditions of modernity

For most Third World countries, modernity initially happened as an interna-tional political incident. Whether by partial but coercive economic and socialincursions or the complete colonial occupation by Western imperialist forces,Third World countries came to confront modernity as a totally alien civiliza-tional entity under which their indigenous systems of politics, economy, society,and culture were suddenly reconceived as obsolete or unjust. For Third Worldsocieties, modernity was therefore to be achieved by radically breaking awayfrom their past rather than by gradually building upon it.The Western colonialrulers, while inculcating and reinforcing such defeatist historical perspectiveson the minds of colonized people, pursued the modernization of Westerners, byWesterners, and for Westerners in their unilaterally declared new territories.Local figures, hired or utilized by colonizers for various auxiliary modernorganizations and professions, remained politically and culturally disarticu-lated from the rest of their nation, so that their marginal positions ofteninduced them to try to existentially vindicate themselves by practicing ordemonstrating exaggerated versions of modernity in a theatre-like socialcontext (see Geertz 1973).

On liberation, unless it was accompanied by anti-colonial or anti-feudalsocial revolution, many of these former colonial functionaries or collabora-tors were promoted into the political and cultural leadership of the newlyindependent nations and then unequivocally embarked upon a process ofmodernization oriented towards the West. Given that the Western colonizershad left the political systems and economic structures radically altered but



not modernized, modernity often arose as a substantively justifiable nation-al(ist) project. However, modernization as a national project led by theformer colonial collaborators was self-defeating because their vested mate-rial interests tended to preserve: first, the structural dependencies of theironly nominally independent nations on the West; and, second, the local struc-tures of inequality interwoven with such (neocolonial) dependencies. Soonmodernization became narrowly redefined as (capitalist) economic develop-ment or, more precisely, as economic catch-up. As a result, the political andsocial ingredients of modernity would be compromised in accordance withvarious versions of Third World particularism in modernization and devel-opment such as Rostow’s developmental stage theory and Huntington’sfunctional authoritarianism thesis (Rostow 1959; Huntington 1968). Con-densed economic development, as a component of compressed modernity,became an almost universalized national goal. Consequently, the actual pat-terns of modernity in the postwar Third World have been shaped by theeveryday practices in political governance, social mobilization and controland industrial management executed or justified for such economic devel-opment.18 (As discussed below, the Cold War intervention by the USA andits allies further reinforced this developmentally-excused distortion ofmodernity.) The worst historical tragedy in the modern world is that, despitethe sacrifice of political and social goals, economic development at meaning-ful levels and for sustained periods has been achieved only by a tiny minorityof (former) Third World nations.

5.2 Compressed modernity in un(der)developed societies as internalizedreflexive cosmopolitization

Despite the protracted developmental failures of most Third World nations(and, for that matter, their failures in the national project of first or classicmodernity), these nations have not been unaffected by the radical new worldof second modernity. Instead, an all-encompassing process of civilizationaltransformation has most directly and manifestly drawn un(der)developednations into the vortex of second modernity. This process has been furtheraccelerated by global neoliberal economic restructuring. As an interestingdevelopment, the concepts of modernization and modernity, much refuted inboth un(der)developed and developed nations since the 1970s, have suddenlybeen relinquished in the recent global interactions between them. Paradoxi-cally, this came to relieve the developed world of its hitherto noisily publicizedduty of guiding and supporting the modernization project of less developednations. Neither economic modernization nor industrial self-reliance is pub-licly encouraged anymore for un(der)developed nations in the globalNorth–South interactions and dialogues.19 In this context, Latin American ISI(import substitution industrialization) has been abandoned significantly, and

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even African subsistence farming has been sacrificed seriously (for exportagriculture). Local processes of ‘learn-and-practice’ industrialization havebeen replaced by direct industrial and financial investment by advancedcapitalist economies. At the same time, in order to reduce the risk of suchfinancial operations to themselves, advanced capitalist countries have, throughthe so-called ‘Washington consensus’, disciplined un(der)developed nationsinto becoming responsible debtors.20 Moreover, new economic initiativeslinked to various monopolistic/oligopolistic commodities based upon not-yet-vindicated scientific, technological, and financial experiments have beenimposed upon un(der)developed nations under the terms of global free trade(i.e., the WTO system).21 Interestingly, albeit tragically, the neoliberal propen-sity to subordinate all political, social, cultural, and ecological concerns toeconomic interests has intensified the existing chronic imbalances betweeneconomic and non-economic concerns in un(der)developed nations. Throughthis economically skewed and politically ungoverned process of globalization,each un(der)developed country has become a cosmopolitan arena for latemodern political economic interests and commercialized social and culturalrelations – another ostensible instance of compressed (second) modernity asreflexive cosmopolitization.

It appears quite instructive that the sudden change of heart by the USA andits allies concerning the modernization project of (capitalist) un(der)devel-oped countries happened at a critical juncture of Cold War politics. By theearly 1980s, the economic and social sustainability of the socialist systemsacross the world became highly questionable, even to many socialist politicalleaders themselves, including Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping. Theinternal systemic failure of socialist modernity induced the leader states ofthe capitalist bloc to seriously reconsider the political utility of subsidizing thecapitalist modernization process of numerous client nations.22 In retrospect,the Cold War was another global regime of modernity, in which political andideological space for an autonomously reflective (not reflexive!) pursuit ofmodernity was flatly denied to most Third World countries. The capitalistmodernity recommended by the West was a ready-made civilizational system,and its local realization – in an extremely condensed fashion – was strategicallysupervised and supported by the West as an effort to curb the internationalpolitical expansion of socialist influences. In this way, the American influenceon local politics exacerbated the already acute rigidity of the Third World’silliberal capitalism and thereby incurred endemic anti-American sentiment.As the global Cold War drew to a close, such paternalistic political support forthe (condensed) modernization project of many Third World countries wasinstantly terminated, giving way instead to an aggressively new but underre-flective paradigm of global neoliberal economic restructuring. In this sense,the neoliberal restructuring of Third World political economies is a post-ColdWar regime of cosmopolitanized reflexivity in economic (mis)management.



Interestingly, most of the former Cold War foes of the USA have ended upvolunteering to engage in such cosmopolitanized reflexivity in their post-socialist transitions.

6. Reflexive cosmopolitization and compressed modernity intransition societies

6.1 Socialist modernization

State socialism, focused around planned heavy industrialization, was a modernsystem of condensed economic development based upon the politically dic-tated maximum mobilization of national resources into producer-goodsindustries. In most state-socialist countries, the historical establishment of suchpolitical economic systems, in turn, was a highly condensed, top-down processof copying or emulating the Soviet model. This was in clear contrast to earliersocial revolutions in which the carefully crafted alliance between local grass-roots interests and communist ideals and strategies had enabled a self-reflective and indigenously propelled process of social and politicaltransformation. Whether supported by the local grassroots or not, the state-socialist economic systems initially proved to be extremely successful in pro-ducing desirable outcomes in industrialization and output growth.These initialsuccesses in economic performance of state-socialist countries gave the USAand its capitalist allies a serious cause for political concern, thus intensifyingthe civilizational rivalry between socialist and capitalist modernity. In the longrun, however, this state of economic and social affairs was not sustainable.Ironically, it was the frontrunning state-socialist countries that first had toconfront structural economic depression and social demoralization. In fact,virtually no other state-socialist countries managed to avoid the structuraleconomic and social crisis arising from the built-in failures of the endlesslyself-reflexive command economic system.

6.2 Compressed modernity in transition societies as internalized reflexivecosmopolitanization

After fierce internal ideological and political struggles, China and the SovietUnion openly embarked on the system transition to the market economy (and,in the Russian case, to representative democracy as well). Subsequently, almostall other socialist countries followed suit, seemingly completing the process of(capitalist) reflexive cosmopolitization. As in the earlier transition to statesocialism, the system transition (or reform) to a market economy has been ahighly condensed process of replicating the existing institutions and practicesof advanced capitalist societies. Industrial capitalism has suddenly become a

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desirable goal for what were former ideological adversaries. Such systemicchanges have, however, been plagued by the following three types of inherentrisks: risks intrinsic to any capitalist or market economic system; risks ensuingfrom the gross unfamiliarity with and/or ideological–emotional antipathytowards a capitalist or market economic system on the part of (former) social-ist citizens; and risks associated with the poor resource endowment of citizensand enterprises due to chronic economic depression.23 If, in addition, theserisks are exacerbated by political instabilities or corruption (as has been thecase in numerous transition societies), the human suffering and social costsinvolved would be devastating for the basic social fabric of the nationsconcerned. Some liberal – and thus radical in the context of transition politicaleconomies – Western advisors paradoxically considered these complex risks asthe primary justification for recommending a ‘big bang’ approach whichwould, as a form of shock therapy, hopefully minimize the duration of institu-tional uncertainty and human suffering.24 Unfortunately, in Russia (and manyother neighbouring transition societies), the big bang approach has only ampli-fied the above risks, whereas in China (and, more recently, Vietnam), thegradualist approach has allowed a much more stable progress toward materialaffluence and ideological–institutional rebirth. The Chinese case, therefore,arguably warrants more detailed attention.

China’s gradualist (and thus less condensed) system transition, dubbed‘reform’ (gaige), has meant the protracted coexistence of socialist, capitalist,and even (neo)traditionalist components of political economy, thereby impos-ing an ultra-complex (compressed) modernity on Chinese life.25 Interestingly,some socialist institutions, practices, and legacies have turned out to be quiteuseful for market-based development. These include, for instance, a highlyeducated and disciplined labour force being fully utilized for labour-intensiveindustrialization, powerful local states orchestrating aggressive yet flexibleprogrammes of local economic development, the public ownership of scarceresources (such as land) preventing speculative rent-seeking activities (andthereby facilitating the rational and fair allocation of economic inputs), therigid residential controls between urban and rural areas helping to dampen theexodus of poor peasants into already job-insufficient cities, etc.26 In spite ofthese seemingly accidental advantages of socialist legacies, various negativeimpacts and impediments arising from these and other socialist legacies needto be considered as well. It must also be recognized that, from the verybeginning of reform, China has tried to accommodate the full spectrum ofmodern and late modern industries led by Western capital in what theyhave designated as ‘special economic zones’ (SEZs or jingjitequ). This couldbe called an institutional framework of compartmentalized compressedmodernity. With dreams of possible gold rush-type economic opportunities inthe world’s would-be largest market, capitalist enterprises from the advancedindustrial economies began to flock into offshore Chinese SEZs and, in



response to desperate pleas from other local state units, into various interiorregions. This trend has made China an internally cosmopolitanized economicentity, directly exposed to both the benefits and risks of the radical new worldeconomy. Conversely, China’s internationally oriented developmental successin the post-socialist era, combined with a diverse set of institutional andsociocultural factors, has exposed the world to both the benefits and risks ofChina’s complex modern political economy. It can be argued that the entireworld has become, on the one hand, a perplexed consumer of cheap, functionalbut hazardous Chinese products and, on the other hand, an anxious sellerto voracious Chinese buyers of natural resources, technologies, and evenenterprises.

Eastern European countries constitute still another group of post-socialist(second) modernity societies. Their individual post-socialist transitions, byand large closer to the Russian big bang approach than to the Chinese gradu-alist approach, initially required their populations to experience profounduncertainty and trauma. Their geographic proximity and historical/culturalconnection to Western Europe have instigated a sort of ‘jumpstart’ effect of(first and second) modernization or development. East Germany, of course,provides the most direct example of this phenomenon due to its wholesaleeconomic and social incorporation into West Germany (see Sinn and Sinn1992). The recent completion of political and economic unionization inEurope will, no doubt, radically amplify such a jumpstart effect, so that com-pressed modernity as reflexive cosmopolitization will effectively encompassanother critical world region. Arguably, East Germans’ highly ambivalentfeelings in the post-unification era, as an unfailing index of compressedmodernity, will increasingly become a broader East European phenomenonin this second modern era.

7. Beyond national (compressed) modernity

The above account of developed, un(der)developed, and post-socialist coun-tries clearly demonstrates how reflexive cosmopolitization in the secondmodern world has ramified varying patterns of national-level compressedmodernity in virtually every corner of the globe. This finding, however,should be qualified in the following two aspects. First, national society hasrapidly lost its salient status as the unit of modernity, whereas other humanexistential domains or levels such as individual, locality, and world regionhave become seriously competing units of modernity. Second, and relatedly,these competing units are also increasingly characterized by compressedmodernity, again in conjunction with reflexive cosmopolitization. Thesetrends do not, however, imply that national societies or the states whichgovern them are reduced to inactivity. In fact, as convincingly indicated by

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many statist political economists, (second) modern states are entrusted withever expanding and challenging functional duties as are individuals, families,localities, regional blocs, and the world community. Under reflexive cosmo-politization, the functional relationship between national societies (andstates) and other human existential domains or levels does not remain in azero-sum structure, but rather, assumes a dynamic of mutual escalation. Like-wise, compressed modernities of different existential domains or levels tendto intensify reciprocally.

These developments are far from difficult to empirically discern. In addi-tion to the innumerable world conventions held by the United Nations andUN-affiliated global organizations, back-to-back global summits and govern-mental conferences are also being held in order to tackle a never endingseries of international economic crises, borderless epidemics, global ecologi-cal disasters, etc. Through the WTO framework, the political and economicelites of advanced capitalist countries envision the world as a fully integratedunit of economic modernity. While world-system thinking, led by ImmanuelWallerstein, has already taught us that self-contained modernity can only bemeaningfully conceived at the global level, the recent velocity of reflexivecosmopolitization certainly supports the necessity of probing ‘global moder-nity’ much more directly, above all, with regard to its increasingly com-pressed nature.27 Similarly, continents or world regions are intensifying theirstatus as the basic unit of political economy, culture, and even formal gov-ernance. The historic launch of the European Union as a formally legalizedunit of political sovereignty, as well as social and economic collaboration, iscertain to accelerate similarly targeted international efforts in other worldregions. This European experience clearly demonstrates that the formalelevation of world regions as human existential units is not necessarily predi-cated upon the civilizational homogenization of involved societies. Theextreme economic, sociopolitical, cultural, and even religious diversitieswithin the European Union will be further complicated through officiallysanctioned reflective and reflexive interactions, engendering new units ofcompressed modernity. As emphatically emphasized in the so-called glocal-ization literature, subnational entities – in particular, traditional localities –have also been activated as social units of (compressed) modernity. Realizingthat national societies and states are now increasingly ineffective in protect-ing or promoting the civilizational integrity and material stability oflocalities, many of them have reflectively and reflexively embarked uponself-helping projects with cosmopolitan contents.28 Not coincidentally, manyactivist postmodernists have been integral to such local civilizationalinitiatives.

What about traditionally private units of human existence, such as individualand family? Is individualization tantamount to an escape from the (second)compressed modernity which is ever intensifying at other human existential



units? The answer is to the contrary. The second modern individuality, evenwithout indulging in the time/space-annihilated cyberspace, is directly exposedto reflexive cosmopolitization and thus filled with compressed modernity.People are individually, as well as socially, much busier than before. Individu-alization, in a contemporarily generic sense, should mean people’s active man-agement of such individual-level compressed modernity, regardless of theirattitude and performance at other units of life.29 In the same vein, the supposedfamily crisis, widely deplored in various parts of the world, is largely an epis-temological obfuscation, if not a neoliberal conspiracy for arbitrarily blamingprivate families (rather than public offices) for the difficulties of children,elderly, etc.30 Families may be smaller and more flexible than before, but theseattributes are usually the outcome of people’s adaptation efforts in a socio-historical context which demands that families fulfill ever increasing and inten-sifying functions. The compact and adaptable nature of family forms andrelations is a requirement for compressed modern family life generalizedunder reflexive cosmopolitization. It is no coincidence that East Asians, stillunrivalled familists, have most drastically adjusted family schedules (i.e., mar-riage age, etc.), sizes, and living arrangements (see Chang 2009b). A pertinentand poignant example can be seen in the way affluent East Asian fathers have,in rapidly increasing numbers, become ‘wild geese’, in order to ensure theirchildren attend the best Western schools without losing maternal care. In orderto cope with the wild tide of globalization, they are aggressively globalizingtheir familial living (and studying) arrangements.

8. Conclusion

In today’s rapidly and intricately globalizing world, the driving forces ofradical scientific-technological-cultural inputs and monopolistic political eco-nomic interests operate across national boundaries without serious obstacles.The liberal system transition of former state-socialist countries has intensifiedthe globalizing nature of such inputs and interests. However, as Beck haspersuasively shown, the ecological, material, and sociocultural risks accompa-nying the latest capitalist offence are not unidirectional (from developed toless developed nations) any more (see Beck 1999, 2006). Even developednations cannot pass up the cosmopolitanized hazards and pressures generatedin the very process of their global economic and political domination over lessdeveloped nations. Managing these challenges, as well as exploiting the asso-ciated opportunities, by individual nations implies that internalization of cos-mopolitanized reflexivity takes place both in developed and less developed(capitalist and post-socialist) nations. In fact, the same is also true of worldregions, local communities, families, and individuals. Such internationalizationof cosmopolitanized reflexivity by individual nations with distinct preexisting

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civilizational characteristics engenders a new line of compressed modernitythat governs virtually every corner of today’s globe.

(Date accepted: June 2010)

Notes

1. The author is indebted to ProfessorUlrich Beck for inspiring comments andideas without which this exploratory theo-retical work may not have been possible.Two BJS reviewers also provided numerousstimulating points. Special thanks are dueto Gabriel Sylvian for excellent editor-ial assistance. Direct all inquiries to theauthor’s email ([email protected]).

2. For a full theoretical and historicalaccount of compressed modernity, I wrote aseparate article, ‘Compressed Modernity inPerspective: South Korean Instances andBeyond’ (Chang 2009a).

3. For instance, see David Martin-Jones(2007), ‘Decompressing Modernity: SouthKorean Time Travel Narratives and the IMFCrisis.’ The global popularity of SouthKorean dramas and movies may not beunrelated with the trend that, as I try toelucidate in this paper, compressed moder-nity is rapidly becoming a cosmopolitanizedphenomenon.

4. See Fine (2010) on financialization,among other trends.

5. In liberal societies (such as the UK andthe USA) market economic opportunities(business and labour) and political freedomhave sustained the sovereign status of citi-zens vis-à-vis the state (mostly in charge ofinfrastructure provision and policing). Insocial democratic societies (such as Scandi-navian countries), market economic oppor-tunities have been complemented by thepolitical right to state-organized socialprotection. In developmental societies (suchas Japan and South Korea), augmentation ofmarket economic opportunities has beenconceived as the core responsibility of thestate, which in turn has obliged citizens tomobilize private resources for care and pro-tection (Chang 2010b).

6. It needs to be pointed out that theinternally derived forces of second moder-nity are much stronger and diverse for rela-tively autonomous second modern societies,so that their compressed modernity intensi-fies in a different direction.

7. See Beck (2002) for his view on terror-ism and war in world risk society.

8. A BJS reviewer suggested a differentorder of discussing the three regionalcontexts of cosmopolitanized compressedmodernity – namely, un(der)developedsocieties (and then conceptual/theoreticalremarks on compressed modernity), fol-lowed by advanced capitalist societies andtransition societies. I totally agree with thereviewer on a necessity of more fullyexplaining compressed modernity in theconcrete historical context of South Korea(or late yet rapidly catching-up societies ingeneral), but this has been done in a sepa-rate work referred to in Note 2 (Chang2009a). I also hope that my new book,South Korea under Compressed Modernity(Chang 2010a) can help readers to compre-hend the South Korean experiences moreclearly.

9. For a highly suggestive analysis in thisregard, see Bloch ([1935]1991) .

10. It may not be a coincidence thatancient societies in East Asia – i.e., Chinaand Vietnam – have ultimately come back aseffective modernizers.

11. Harvey’s (1980) time/space ‘compres-sion’ corresponds to ‘condensation’ here.

12. About these diverse components ofglobalization or reflexive cosmopolitization,I refer to Beck (1999; 2006), Turner (1994),Turner and Khondker (2010), Mittelman(2000), Mittelman and Othman, eds. (2001),Jameson and Miyoshi, eds. (1998), etc. For ahighly persuasive and illustrative account of



Australia’s neoliberal globalization, seeWeiss, Thurbon, and Mathews (2007).

13. Not unrelatedly – that is, due todeindustrialization, financialization, etc. –domestic inequalities have also expanded inmany advanced capitalist countries.

14. One of the worst scandals in thisregard involves China’s toxic and/or boguscommodities. See Chang (2008).

15. Vietnamese brides in South Koreanvillages constitute a highly interesting yetdifficult instance. See ‘Baby Boom of MixedChildren Tests South Korea’ (New YorkTimes, 28 Nov 2009).

16. Postcolonialism literature has been amost successful case in this regard (see,for instance, Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin2002).

17. China’s aggressive hunt for techno-logically competitive overseas enterprises(including IBM) is a particularly noteworthyexample.

18. In successful cases, this may be calleddevelopmental modernity.

19. See Ha-Joon Chang’s (2002) ‘kickingaway the ladder’ argument for a forcefulcriticism of this trend.

20. The IMF-led structural readjustmentprograms have been the most disturbingexample.

21. American GMO produces are a mosttelling case in point.

22. See Cumings (1998; 1999) on the shift-ing Asia/South Korea–USA relations in thiscontext.

23. See Chang (2008) for the Chinese case.24. Some of these Western liberals were

formally appointed as key policy advisors bythe governments of transition countries.

25. Vietnam is a very similar case (seeMasina, 2006). See Chang (2008) for hisanalysis of China as a complex risk societywhich manifests risk tendencies of highlydiverse time–space dimensions.

26. See Chang (1993) for an analysis ofChinese rural industrialization focusing onthese unintended consequences of socialism.

27. See Dirlik (2003; 2004) on ‘globalmodernity’, and Pieterse (1994) on ‘global-ization as hybridization’.

28. See Stiglitz (2006) for an economist’ssympathetic view on such local initiativesagainst neoliberal globalization. In manyThird World countries, democratization hasalso facilitated this process by nurturinglocal political autonomy.

29. See another article by Chang Kyung-Sup and Song Min-Young in this specialissue of the journal, entitled ‘The StrandedIndividualizer under Compressed Moder-nity: South Korean Women in Individualiza-tion without Individualism’.

30. See Chapter 4 in South Korea underCompressed Modernity (Chang, 2010a).

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