(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:cab/66/55/34 Image Reference:0001

THIS DOCfUKEOT IS THE PROPERTY OP BOS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

T h e c i rcula t ion of t h i s p a p e r h a s been str ict ly l imited. 1 - ^

I t is issued for t h e persona l use of ^^^^r^^r^r^ TOP SECRET Copy N0.....L

v/.p.(aa) 334

25TH SEPTEMBER, 19hh WAR CABINET

TEE FUTURE SCALE OF ATTACK BY PLYING BOMBS AND ROCKETS ON THIS COUNTRY.

Honort by the Chiefs of Staff

Estimat00 ecale of flying bomb attack In the present state of om information, the only threat

to this country by flying bombs is by air launching.

2. If air launchings are confined to He.Ill aircraft then the maximum radius of action from London at which they could operate, making allowance for the range of the flying bomb itself, would be h80 miles. An arc of a circle of this radius from London includes the Southern half of Denmark and bases as far East as Magdeburg and Nurnberg. The number of He.111 aircraft believed to h ve been modified to carry the flying bomb is about 30, i.e. the aircraft of one Gruppe. It is unlikeljr that more than 20 of these aircraft will be immediately available to operate at any one time.

3. There is some evidence of experiments with other types of aircraft for launching the flying bomb. If the Do.217, Fw.200 or the He.177 were used for this purpose, suitable bases could be found in Norway, Denmark, and the greater part of Germany; the likely scale of attack by flying bombs would be proportionately increased. There is however no evidence of any such conversion in operational units. h. Aircraft which have launched flying bombs in the past have made use of a combination of visual beacons and dead reckoning navigation. If, as now seems likely, the enemy is forced away from coastal landmarks, he can make use of any one of five known systems of radio navigational aids without materially affecting the accuracy he has- edready obtained in his attacks on London. There may even be a slight improvement, so long­as the necessary radio stations are sited within about 350 miles oi the target.

5 . I t m a y b e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e e n e m y w i l l l a u n c h f l y i n g b o m b s a g a i n s t i m p o r t a n t t a r g e t s o n t h e E a s t C o a s t , s u c h a s H u l l o r t h e T y n e s i d e p o r t s . T h e i n h e r e n t a c c u r a c y o f t h e w e a p o n i s so p o o r , h o w e v e r , a n d t h e a r e a o f t h e p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s s o r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l f o r t h i s f o r m o f a t t a c k t h a t t h i s t h r e a t n e e d n o t b e s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d .

6 . D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d h t h t o 2 3 r d S e p t e m b e r i n c l u s i v e , t h e n u m b e r o f f l y i n g b o m b s l a u n c h e d a g a i n s t t h i s c o u n t r y h a s a m o u n t e d t o 8 5 . Of t h e s e t h e d a i l y a v e r a g e o f f l y i n g b o m b s f a l l i n g i n t h e L o n d o n D e f e n c e R e g i o n h a s b e e n 0 . 5 3 * I t i s c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e a v e r a g e s c a l e o f l a u n c h i n g s i n t h e i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e may a m o u n t t o a b o u t 20 o n s u i t a b l e n i g h t s , o f w h i c h a b o u t f o u r o n l y w o u l d b e l i k e l y t o r e a c h t h e L o n d o n D e f e n c e R e g i o n . T h i s s c a l e o f a t t a c k m i g h t b e g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d i f t h e e n e m y d e c i d e d t o d e v o t e a d d i t i o n a l b o m b e r s t o t h e t a s k . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , as we a d v a n c e i n t o G e r m a n y , we a p p r o a c h c l o s e r t o t h e e n e m y a e r o d r o m e s , a n d f o r c e h i s a i r c r a f t t o f l y o v e r t e r r i t o r y o c c u p i e d b y u s o r t o c i r c u m v e n t i t ; w e s h a l l t h u s a d d t o t h e l e n g t h a n d h a z a r d s o f h i s f l i g h t s .

B s t i m a t e d s c a l e o f r o c k e t a t t a c h

7 . T h e l a n d s i t u a t i o n i n - H o l l a n d o n t h e 2 5 t h S e p t e m b e r h a s b e e n e s t i m a t e d b y t h e War O f f i c e t o b e a s f o l l o w s : ­

" ( i ) I t i s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t by 2 5 t h S e p t e m b e r t h e r e w i l l h a v e b e e n n o m a j o r c h a n g e i n t h e p r e s e n t l i n e h e l d by o u r own t r o o p s i n H o l l a n d , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l w i d e n i n g o f t h e c o r r i d o r .

( i i ) B e l o w i s t h e e s t i m a t c-d l i n e -

W e e r t - D e u r n e - M i l l - Mooh - G r o e s b e e k -N i g m e g e n - H u i s s e n - - A m h e m - B a t e n b u r g -H e e s c h - B o x t e l - R e t h y - t h e n c e l i n e o f E s c a u t M e u s e J u n c t i o n C a n a l t o A n t w e r p ­t h e n c e l i n e of R i v e r S c h e l d t t o T e m e u s e n .

( i i i ) I t i s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e l i n e g i v e n a b o v e d o e s NOT m e a n t h a t a l l i e d t r o o p s a r e i n o c c u p a t i o n i n s t r e n g t h a l o n g i t s e n t i r e l e n g t h , b u t t h a t o u r t r o o p s w i l l b e h o l d i n g s t r o n g p o i n t s a t t h e m a i n c e n t r e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t 1 1 .

T h e l i n e m e n t i o n e d i n p a r a g r a p h 7 ( i i ) a b o v e i s i n d i c a t e d o n t h e a t t a c h e d m a p .

8 . O u r i n t e l l i g e n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y o f t h e e n e m y ' s r o c k e t t r i a l s , a n d t h e f a c t t h a t i n o r d e r t o a t t a c k L o n d o n t h e e n e m y h a s p o s i t i o n e d h i a l a u n c h i n g s i t e s o n t h e e x t r e m e W e s t e r n c o a s t o f H o l l a n d , i n d i c a t e v e r y s t r o n g l y t h a t t h e n o r m a l o p e r a t i o n a l r a n g e o f t h e A . h r o c h e t i s 2 0 0 m i l e s . A d r a i t t e d l y , ' t h e r e h a s b e e n o n e r o c k e t w h i c h c o v e r e d a d i s t a n c e o f 215 m i l e s i n t h e r e c e n t a t t a c k s o n L o n d o n .

9* Our s c i e n t i f i c e x p e r t s s t a t e t h a t i t s h o u l d b e t e c h n i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t o a c h i e v e a m e a n r a n g e o f a b o u t 2 h 0 m i l e s w i t h o u t a l t e r a t i o n t o t h e e x i s t i n g d e s i g n . T h e r e i s n o p r o o f , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e G e r m a n s h a v e b e e n a b l e t o d o t h i s .

10. In the light of the Y/ar Office appreciation Quoted above-, it seems that the possible Rocket launching areas within range of London will not be cut off from Germany by 25th September. Until we have finally over-run the whole of Holland, West of a line running North and South through Eindhoven, it will still be possible for thorn to fire rockets.

1 1 . It should be noted, however, that except for one rocket fired on the evening of the 18th September, no rockets have reached England since we commenced our air­borne landings in Holland. Owing to the general state of disorganisation especially as affecting eommunicat ions in this area it seems likely that few more rockets will be fired, at London. Publicity re garding rockets.

1 2 . Up to date, the enemy has made no mention of his rocket attacks on London. The main value to the enemy of this weapon would be in disseminating propaganda with the object of raising the morale of his fighting forces. While rocket attacks were in progress it was likely that any public announcement on our part would have been the signal for a general outburst of enemy propaganda.

13* It is almost certain that some information as to the fall of long range rockets l i a s reached the enemy through diplomatic channels. Furthermore, as a result of essential operations by our own special intelligence, vague reports indicating the arrival of the rocket in this country have doubtless reached Germany. ILi. On the other hand, once a public announcement of the fall of rockets were made in this country, we should have difficulty in restraining the Press from publishing information of value to the enemy, such as we experienced in regard to flying bomb incidents. It is certain that some information regarding the fall of shot, or the technical performance of the weapon would eventually reach the enemy. It is equally certain that this would be of value to him, if he were able to continue rocket attacks either against London or targets elsewhere.

15. It is concluded that as soon as our land forces are firmly in control of East to West communications on a line running North-South through Eindhoven to the Zuider Zee, there would be no.strong operational objection to making a public statement. It is therefore recommended that there should be no public statement on rocket firing at present and that the position be reviewed again in a week's t irae.

1 6 . It is suggested that if the Prime Minister's review of the war situation makes any reference to the present attacks, this should be confined to a statement indicating the scale of attacks now being experienced from both rocket and flying bomb, and that no specific reference to the rocket should be made.

(Iiit Id) A.F.B.. C P . E.N.S., for First Sea Lord,

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1 .

2$th September, 19U4* --x.