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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1 9 4 0 .

S E C R E T . Copy N o .

W.M. (40) 129th Conclusions.

T O B E K E P T U N D E R L O C K A N D K E Y .

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

W A R C A B I N E T 129 ( 4 0 ) .

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Sunday, May 1 9 , 1 9 4 0 , at 1 0 A.M.

P re sen t :

The R i g h t Hon . W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , P r i m e Min i s t e r (in the Chair). The R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E CHAMBERLAIN, I The R i g h t H o n . C. R. A T T L E E , M . P . ,

M.P. , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the Council. L o r d P r i v y Seal. The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T H A L I F A X , T h e R i g h t H o n . A . GREENWOOD, M.P . ,

Secretary of S t a t e for Fore ign Min i s t e r w i thou t Por t fo l io . Affairs. I

T h e following were also p r e s e n t : The R i g h t Hon . A . V . ALEXANDER, The R i g h t Hon . ANTHONY E D E N , M.P . ,

M.P. , F i r s t L o r d of the Admi ra l ty . Secre ta ry of S t a t e for W a r . The R i g h t Hon . S i r A R C H I B A L D T h e R i g h t Hon . S i r J O H N A N D E R S O N ,

SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P . , Secretary of M . P . , Secre tary of S t a t e for the S ta te for A i r . H o m e D e p a r t m e n t and Minis te r of

H o m e Secur i ty (Items 1 - 5 ) . The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T CALDECOTE, T h e R i g h t H o n . L O R D L L O Y D , Secre ta ry

Secretary of S t a t e for Dominion of S t a t e for the Colonies (Item 9 ) . Affairs.

The R i g h t Hon . L. S. A M E R Y , M.P . , T h e R i g h t H o n . A . D U F F COOPER, M . P . . Secretary of S ta t e for I n d i a and Min i s t e r of In fo rma t ion . Secretary of S ta t e for B u r m a (Item 4 ) .

The Hon. S i r A L E X A N D E R CADOGAN, A i r Chief M a r s h a l S i r C Y R I L L . N . P e r m a n e n t Under -Sec re ta ry of S t a t e N E W A L L , Chief of the A i r Staff. for Fore ign Affairs.

A d m i r a l of the Fleet S i r D U D L E Y Genera l S i r W. E D M U N D I R O N S I D E , P O U N D , F i r s t Sea L o r d and Chief of Chief of the I m p e r i a l Genera l Staff. Naval Staff.

Secretariat. Si r E D W A R D B R I D G E S . Major -Genera l H . L. I S M A Y . C a p t a i n A . D. N I C H O L L , R . N . Mr . W . D. W I L K I N S O N . Group C a p t a i n W . E L L I O T . Lieutenant-Colonel E . I . C. JACOB, R E . Mr. G. N . F L E M M I N G .

[ 2 1 3 0 7 A ]

W A R C A B I N E T 129 (40) .

C O N T E N T S . Minute-

No. Subject. Page 1 Mi l i t a ry , A i r and Nava l S i tua t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Progress of operations on the WesternAir operations. Recrudescence of U-boat activity. Antwerp demolitions. Blockships for Zeebrugge and Ostend.

Front.

2 Opera t ions in Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

3 N o r w a y 183 Proposal that hostilities should cease north of a given line.

4 I n d i a 183 Replacement of regular battalions

the United Kingdom. by territorial battalions from

5 I t a l y 184 Possible intentions. The Mediterranean: diversion of shipping.

6 I t a l y ,. 184 Contraband control.

7 TJ.S.S.R. 185

Suggested despatch of a special envoy to Moscow.

8 U n i t e d S ta t e s of A m e r i c a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Purchase of aircraft.

9 G i b r a l t a r 186 Evacuation of civilians.

The Military, Air and Naval Situation. Progress of operations on the Western Front. (Previous Eef erenee: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Air operations. (Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

181 W . M . 129 (40) .

1. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff gave the W a r Cabinet an account of the general s i tua t ion on the Wes t e rn F ron t .

I n the n o r t h the Belgians were r e t i r i n g to the r iver l ine from Ghen t to the Scheldt . The B .E .F . were on the i r r i g h t between Ghen t and T o u r n a i . To the r i g h t of the B .E .F . the F rench were hold ing a l ine t h rough St . A m a n d , Valenciennes, Maubeuge, L a Fere, Marie , Moncornnet , Bethel .

General H e a d q u a r t e r s of the B .E .F . h a d evacuated A r r a s a n d the Lines of Communica t ion had been moved back to Abbevi l l e -A r r a s .

The la tes t ind ica t ions were t h a t the Germans were cont inu ing their t h ru s t nor th-wes t from Landrec ies a n d Le Cateau, a n d advanced elements were said to have reached Alber t . A t Pe ronne an enemy reconnaissance group of a rmoured fighting vehicles h a d forced back l igh t B r i t i s h de tachments on the previous af ternoon, but no enemy movement was repor ted between P e r o n n e a n d A r r a s other than a few enemy a rmoured fighting vehicles. The immedia te danger was the r i sk t h a t the Germans would succeed in es tabl ishing themselves across the Br i t i sh lines of communicat ion between Amiens a n d Abbeville. I f th i s happened the B .E .F . could only be supplied t h r o u g h Boulogne, Cala is a n d Dunk i rk , all of which h a d been a t t acked from the a i r on the previous n ight . I t was of the utmost impor tance to prevent the B .E .F . a n d the Belg ian A r m y on i ts left being cut off from the ma in F rench armies .

The Belgians showed a ce r ta in re luctance to w i t h d r a w , as they were not being a t t acked and were na tu ra l l y loath to give u p more of the i r t e r r i to ry .

I n accordance w i t h the ins t ruc t ions of the P r i m e Minis ter , General Di l l had now gone to F r a n c e to spend the next four or five days w i t h Genera l Georges. A n Officer would be r e t u r n i n g t h a t evening w i t h a repor t from Genera l Di l l as to the posit ion.

The Chief of the Impe r i a l Genera l Staff sa id t h a t he h a d also telephoned to L o r d Gor t and h a d asked h im to consider whe ther he could concent ra te some p a r t of the Br i t i sh Exped i t i ona ry Force in the A r r a s area .

The Prime Minister sa id t h a t he felt sure the W a r Cabinet would approve the act ion taken by the Chief of the I m p e r i a l Genera l Staff. W h i l e the B r i t i s h A r m y was unde r the orders of General Georges, i t w a s r i g h t t h a t the Chief of the Impe r i a l General Staff and Lord Gor t should concert as to the p lans which should be taken in var ious eventual i t ies to sa feguard the posi t ion of the B r i t i s h Exped i t i ona ry Force, a n d t h a t these p lans should be communicated to General Georges, who would take them into account in g iv ing his orders for the conduct of the bat t le .

The Chief of the Air Staff gave the following account of a i r opera t ions in the previous 24 hours .

Bomber Command.

Thi r ty -n ine Blenheims had been sent to opera te in F rance from th i s country. Of these only 11 h a d been able to carry out their tasks, a t t a ck ing successfully troops and communicat ions in the a rea Landrec ies -Avesnes . The others, on account of the confusion caused by breakdowns in communicat ions, and for other reasons, h a d been unable to operate , a n d h a d r e tu rned to Eng land . Three Blenheims h a d been lost.

D u r i n g the n igh t heavy bombers h a d been despatched as follows :—

A r e a G i v e t - D i n a n t 11 A r e a Gembleux-Namur 12

[21307A]

Recrudescence of U-boat activity. Antwerp demolitions.

Blocksbips for Zeebrugge and Ostend. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Operations in Norway. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

These repor ted hav ing successfully bombed bridges, ra i lways , and in fan t ry on the roads .

Oil ins ta l la t ions a t M i s b u r g in Hanove r 23 Ra i lway objectives in the R u h r . 12 Oil ins ta l la t ions , H a m b u r g a n d Bremen 28 Mine- lay ing oh' the D u t c h coast 6

F o u r of the above a i r c r a f t had been lost, bu t the crew of one h a d been picked u p from the sea.

Fighter Command. There h a d been some ac t iv i ty off Dunk i rk , a n d d u r i n g the n igh t

enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been act ive off our coast from H a r w i c h to Beachy Head—probab ly mine- laying.

One enemy a i r c r a f t was repor ted to have been shot down by an t i - a i r c r a f t fire from Dover.

The six fighter squadrons o p e r a t i n g over F r a n c e from Eng land h a d repor ted hav ing shot down 20 enemy a i r c r a f t d u r i n g the day. They h a d themselves lost 10 or 12, of which five or seven h a d been damaged whi le on the g round a t V i t r y aerodrome.

A pa t ro l of th ree fighters off Zeebrugge h a d shot down 2 Me. 110's.

Advanced Air Striking Force. The squadrons of the Advanced A i r S t r i k i n g Force h a d been

re-forming in the Troyes area , a n d h a d repor ted no combats. They were going to co-operate t h a t day w i t h a F rench counter -a t tack which i t was believed was developing from the South .

Air Component of the B.E.F. Ful l r epor t s h a d not been received, as the i r squadrons were

probably on the move. The re h a d been considerable fighter act ivi ty, however, a n d i t w a s known t h a t the enemy losses had been heavy, and our own few.

Coastal Command. There seemed to be an increase in enemy submar ine activi ty,

and several h a d been s ighted a t va r ious places round the coast.

The Chief of Naval Staff sa id t h a t the repor t of demolit ions a t A n t w e r p showed t h a t all d ry docks a n d heavy cranes a n d 150,000 tons of petrol a n d oil h a d been des t royed; also t h a t one lock had been blocked.

Blockships for Zeebrugge a n d Ostend would be r eady to sail for Belgium at 1330 hours t h a t day. The Chief of Nava l Staff suggested t h a t the ships should sail , as a r r anged , as the re would be no difficulty in recal l ing them d u r i n g the af ternoon, if necessary.

L a t e r in the meet ing i t was decided tha t , i n view of the mi l i t a ry s i tuat ion, the sa i l ing of the blockships should be postponed un t i l the following day.

The W a r C a b i n e t ­(i) Took note of these s ta tements .

(ii) Decided t h a t the sa i l ing of the blockships for Zeebrugge a n d Ostend should be postponed un t i l the ensu ing day.

2. The W a r Cabine t were informed t h a t heavy German a i r a t t acks cont inued in the N a r v i k a rea . The two a i r c r a f t ca r r i e r s were w a i t i n g 100 miles off the Lofoten I s l ands to fly off the i r fighter a i rc ra f t a s soon as the l and ing grounds were ready. I t had been hoped t h a t the l a n d i n g grounds would be ready t h a t day the 19th May .

The W a r Cabine t took note of the above in format ion .

Norway. 3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w the Proposal that a t t e n t i o n of the W a r Cabine t to an unnumbered telegram, da t ed hostilities the 17th May , 1940, from Mr . Lascelles (the B r i t i s h Represen ta t ive should cease w i t h the Norweg ian Government in Norway) se t t ing out a r a t h e r north of a obscure proposal , a p p a r e n t l y of G e r m a n or igin, unde r which given line. fighting w a s to cease no r th of a l ine to be d r a w n a t some unspecified

d i s t ance n o r t h of Trondh jem. A s imi la r proposal h a d also been ment ioned in ear l ie r te legrams from the B r i t i s h Min i s t e r a t Stockholm.

The Fore ign Secre tary sa id t h a t i t was clear t h a t any such p roposa l would be qu i t e unacceptable , a n d i t was only in te res t ing as i n d i c a t i n g the s t r a i n which the cont inuance of opera t ions in N o r w a y w a s impos ing on the G e r m a n resources. H e thought , however, t h a t i t would be as well t h a t we should inform both the Swedish a n d Norweg ian Governments t h a t the proposal seemed to us ent i re ly impract icable .

The W a r Cabinet agreed t h a t the Swedish a n d Norweg ian Governments should be informed accordingly.

India. Replacement of Regular battalions by Territorial battalions from the United Kingdom. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

4. The Secretary of State for India sa id t h a t he h a d given cons idera t ion to the proposa l t h a t e igh t R e g u l a r B r i t i s h ba t t a l ions should r e t u r n from I n d i a to the U n i t e d Kingdom, being replaced by T e r r i t o r i a l ba t ta l ions .

The s ta tement made by the Sec re ta iy of S ta t e covered the fol lowing po in t s :—

(1) The re were now 42,000 B r i t i s h t roops in I n d i a as compared w i t h 77,000 in 1914. Of the 34 Regu la r i n f a n t r y ba t t a l ions included in the p resen t gar r i son , 13 were al located to the defence of the N o r t h - W e s t F r o n t i e r a n d 21 to i n t e rna l secur i ty du t ies .

(2) The i n t e rna l securi ty ba t t a l ions had , since the beg inn ing of the war , been d r a i n e d of the i r best W a r r a n t Officers, Non-commissioned Officers a n d men.

(3) Nevertheless, he was so impressed wi th the need for increas ing the s t r e n g t h of our a rmed forces in the Uni ted-K i n g d o m t h a t he w a s p r e p a r e d to ask the Viceroy to consent to the r e t u r n home of the e ight R e g u l a r ba t ta l ions . T h i s reques t would place the Viceroy in a difficult posi t ion which m i g h t be eased—

(a) I f the relief t roops left the U n i t e d K i n g d o m simultaneously wi th the d e p a r t u r e of t he Regu la r s from I n d i a .

(b) I f the relief consisted of more t h a n 8 ba t ta l ions of t e r r i to r ia l s . I n d i a would be an admi rab le t r a i n i n g g round for these te r r i to r ia l s , whi le troops t r a i n e d in I n d i a would be available for service in the Midd le Eas t .

(4) The pol i t ica l s i tua t ion in I n d i a was not such as to make the exchange impruden t .

I n discussion, i t w a s po in ted ou t t h a t there were serious difficulties in t he way of a r r a n g i n g for the relief to leave th i s coun t ry a t the same t ime as the R e g u l a r ba t ta l ions left I nd i a . The m i l i t a r y s i tua t ion did not jus t i fy as many as 16 B r i t i s h ba t t a l ions being on the h igh seas a t the same t ime. F u r t h e r , i t was unl ike ly t h a t sh ipp ing would be avai lable a t the same t ime to ca r ry b o t h cont ingents .

The W a r C a b i n e t ­(1) Inv i t ed the Secretary of S ta t e for I n d i a to ask the Viceroy,

as a m a t t e r of urgency, to agree to the r e t u r n of 8 Regu la r ba t ta l ions from I n d i a ; these ba t ta l ions would be

Italy. Possible intentions. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 9.)

The Mediterranean. Diversion of shipping. (Previous

' Reference: W.M. (40) 124th Conclusions, Minute 9.)

Italy. Contraband control. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 10.)

'A"

relieved by t e r r i to r i a l ba t t a l ions from the Un i t ed Kingdom, which would probably sail back in the ships which b rough t the ba t ta l ions home from I n d i a .

(2) I n v i t e d the Secre tary of S t a t e for I n d i a to d r a f t his te legram to the Viceroy in consul ta t ion w i t h the Secre tary of S ta t e for W a r .

5. The W a r Cabinet were given the fol lowing informat ion which had a bea r ing on I t a l y ' s possible in ten t ions :—

(i) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs r ead to the W a r Cabinet the reply to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s message to S ignor Mussolini .

(ii) The Chief of the Naval Staff sa id t h a t a seaplane-carr ier was due to sail from Tr ipo l i on the 22nd May, bound for Massawa . Th i s ship would not be clear of the Suez Cana l u n t i l the 25th May, a n d would not reach Massawa un t i l the 27th May.

(iii) The Chief of the Naval Staff also read out a s ignal from the F l a g Officer in charge a t Mal t a , g iv ing a repor t i n d i c a t i n g probable opera t ions by G e r m a n a n d I t a l i a n forces ac t ing in co-operation in the Med i t e r r anean .

(iv) The Prime Minister read out a fu r the r s ignal from the same source, fo rward ing a r epo r t t h a t general A r m y a n d A i r Force mobil isat ion was to t ake place in I t a l i a n E a s t A f r i c a immediately .

I n f o r m a t i o nMed i t e r r anean .

w a s given as to Nava l d isposi t ions in t he

The Chief of the Naval Staff sa id t h a t sh ipp ing in t he M e d i t e r r a n e a n was being th inned out g radua l ly . The t r a n s p o r t s which h a d b rough t the A u s t r a l i a n a n d New Zea land troops to Suez were, however, u rgen t ly requi red to t r a n s p o r t F rench t roops from Casablanca, a n d he suggested t ha t they should be told to sai l independent ly a n d chance ge t t ing t h r o u g h the Med i t e r r anean .

The W a r C a b i n e t -Took note of the above s ta tements , and agreed to the course proposed as r egards sh ipp ing in the Med i t e r r anean .

6. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id tha t , since Signoi Musso l in i ' s react ions to the proposal seemed likely to be favourable, he h a d explored fu r the r the possibi l i ty of en te r ing in to negot ia t ions w i t h the I t a l i a n Government w i t h the object of min imis ing the annoyances caused to t h a t Government by the present a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of our con t raband control. On the previous day he h a d been in consul tat ion w i t h the Min i s t e r of Economic W a r f a r e a n d his exper ts , and w i t h the Mas t e r of the Rolls. T h e Meet ing h a d reached the conclusion t h a t i t was pract icable , even in present condi t ions, to open discussions w i t h I t a l y on the l ines suggested. P u t briefly, the p lan would be t h a t a s far as possible all cargoes consigned to I t a l y from other countr ies should be covered by navicer ts . The a t t i t u d e of some expor t ing countr ies , for example, the U n i t e d Sta tes , m igh t make i t impossible to apply the p l a n universally, b u t the control by means of navicer ts would be made as complete as was reasonably possible. The l ine which we migh t t ake in publ ic would be to say t h a t we could not tell in advance how the new system would woi'k in p rac t ice but t h a t we intended, in order to meet the I t a l i a n grievances, to t ry i t on an exper imenta l basis.

The I n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l Mee t ing h a d agreed on three pr inc ip les which should govern the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of our con t r aband control vis-a-vis- I t a l y from the da t e of the new agreement , if one were concluded, u n t i l fu r the r not ice :—

(i) The object of the proposed re laxa t ion of our con t raband control was to avoid or a t least to pos tpone w a r w i t h I t a ly .

(ii) A n y r e laxa t ions of our con t raband control were of a t empora ry n a t u r e ( the use of the formula a t " A " above would be one method of s a f e g u a r d i n g our posi t ion in th i s respect) . W e should thus be able to re impose our

. control in i t s former severity if we though t fit. (iii) O u r re laxa t ions vis-a-vis I t a l y should not be such as to

destroy our g r o u n d s of act ion vis-a-vis o ther neu t ra l countr ies .

I t m i g h t be though t t h a t these proposals wen t very f a r in the d i rec t ion of weaken ing our control . B u t i t was no use m a k i n g th is new a p p r o a c h to the I t a l i a n s unless we met them w i t h an offer on generous l ines. I f we could hold the posi t ion vis-a-vis I t a l y d u r i n g the next c r i t i ca l weeks, i t would be well wor th whi le .

S i r W i l f r i d Greene was leaving for Rome on the 21st May, accompanied b) r advisers from the M i n i s t r y of Economic W a r f a r e . H e asked t h a t S i r W i l f r i d should be given full powers to reach a set t lement on the l ines wh ich he had ind ica ted general ly. Si r W i l f r i d should be empowered to agree t h a t no fu r the r I t a l i a n ships should be de ta ined whi le the new system w a s u n d e r t r i a l .

The W a r C a b i n e t -Gave a genera l approva l to the Fo re ign Secre ta ry ' s proposals as summar i sed above.

U.S.S.R. 7 xhe Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs s a id tha t , as a Suggested des- resul t of the decision of the W a r Cabine t a t the Mee t ing refer red patch of a to in the m a r g i n , he h a d discussed fu r the r w i t h the Min i s t e r for special envoy to Economic W a r f a r e the proposa l to send Sir Stafford C r i p p s on Moscow. a n explora tory mission to Moscow. They h a d reached the conclusion (Previous t h a t i t would be best to give him, as an experienced adviser a n d Reference: technical ass i s tan t , M r . A s h t o n G w a t k i n of the M i n i s t r y of W.M. (40) 127th Economic W a r f a r e , who h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d f rom the U .S .A . H e Conclusions, a n d the Min i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e proposed to see Si r Stafford Minute 13.) C r i p p s on the following day a n d to expla in to h im the n a t u r e of

the mission which he was be ing asked to u n d e r t a k e a n d the general pol i t ical background, a n d the Min i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e would also a r r a n g e to give h im de ta i led in format ion on the issues w i th which he was direct ly concerned.

I f S i r Stafford C r i p p s accepted the inv i t a t ion he (the Fore ign Secretary) would then p u t the suggest ion to M.. Maisky , w i thou t say ing a n y t h i n g as to the possibil i ty of ou r sending a n Ambassador to Moscow. I f the Soviet Government agreed, S i r Stafford C r i p p s a n d Mr . Ashton G w a t k i n would set off on the i r mission as soon as possible.

The W a r C a b i n e t -Inv i t ed the Secre tary of S ta te for Fo re ign Affairs to proceed on these l ines.

United States of 8. The Secretary of State for Foreign A ffairs r ead to the W a r America. Cabine t a te legram No. 759, which he h a d j u s t received, repor t ing Purchase of a conversat ion between L o r d L o t h i a n a n d P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt on aircraft. the previous evening. P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt had , of course, shown (Previous himself very fr iendly and h a d emphasised the efforts which he was Reference: m a k i n g to keep I t a ly from en te r ing the war . H e had, however, W.M. (40) 126th said no th ing which showed t h a t he recognised our press ing need for Conclusions, immedia te a i r c ra f t suppl ies ; nor had he ment ioned the suggestion Minute 3.) t h a t the U n i t e d S ta tes Government should let us have a i r c ra f t a t

once from the i r own suppl ies , to be replaced la te r from orders a l ready placed in the U n i t e d S ta tes .

The Prime Minister sa id t ha t in these circumstances he proposed to send a te legram to P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt a t once mak ing clear our immedia te needs.

The W a r C a b i n e t -Inv i ted the Secre tary of S ta t e for A i r to furnish the P r i m e Min i s t e r before 5 P . M . t h a t day w i t h informat ion for inclusion in such a te legram.

Gibraltar. 9. The Secretary of State for War recalled t h a t on the Evacuation of 16th May the W a r Cabine t h a d agreed t h a t the scheme for civilians. evacuat ing civil ians from G i b r a l t a r should be ca r r i ed out . The (Previous scheme covered both B r i t i s h Service families and G i b r a l t a r i a n s . References: A te legram h a d now been received from the Governor of W.M. (40) 108th G i b r a l t a r s t a t i ng t ha t he was unwi l l ing to ca r ry out the scheme. Conclusions, H i s ma in reason was t h a t the evacuat ion of c ivi l ians from Gib ra l t a r Minute 12, would create a mos t -unfavourab le impression on Span i sh opinion, and 124th and t h a t i t should not, therefore, be car r ied out unless we were Conclusions, cer ta in t h a t S p a i n would be hosti le. Minute 10.) The m a t t e r had been fu r the r discussed in te r -Depar tmenta l ly .

I t would be possible to ca r ry out the scheme a f te r w a r h a d broken out w i th I ta ly , but th i s would p u t a considerable s t r a i n on the Navy. The Fore ign Office h a d taken the view t h a t the effect of evacuat ion on Span ish opinion ought not to be serious.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id tha t , unless there was a revolution, he saw no reason to t h i n k t h a t Spa in would come in to the war . H e doubted whether the evacuat ion of cer ta in civi l ians from Gib ra l t a r would al ter Span i sh policy.

I n fu r ther discussion, the view was expressed t h a t the evacuat ion of civi l ians from G i b r a l t a r could proper ly be represented as a p recau t ionary measure , which was being t aken in view of the d is turbed s i tua t ion in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n generally, and not as a measure made necessary by anxie ty as to S p a i n ' s in ten t ions .

The W a r C a b i n e t -Agreed t h a t the Governor of G i b r a l t a r should be ins t ruc ted to p u t into effect the scheme for the evacuat ion of civil ians. Care should be t aken to expla in t h a t th is was a p recau t ionary measure taken in view of the d is turbed s i tua t ion in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n generally, a n d t h a t i t was not due to anxie ty as to S p a i n ' s in ten t ions .

Richmond Terrace, S.W. 1, May 19, 1940.