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Printed -for the War Cabinet. December 1917.

S KG R E T .

W A R C A B I N E T , 2 8 6 .

Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Thursday, November 29, 1917, at 1 T 3 0 A . M .

P r e s e n t :

T h e R i g h t Hon . A. B O N A R L A W , M.P. (in the Chair).

T h e R i g h t Hon. t h e E A R L C T J R Z O N O F j L i eu t enan t -Gene ra l the R i g h t Hon . K E D L E S T O N , K.G. , G.C.S.I. , G-.C.I.E J . C. S M U T S , K G .

T h e R i g h t Hon. G . N . B A R N E S , M.P. T h e R i g h t Hon. S I R E . C A R S O N , K . C . , M.P.

T h e following Avere also p r e s e n t

T h e R i g h t Hon. L O R D R. C E C I L , K.C. , S I R A. C. G E D D E S , K.C.B. , Minis ter of M.P., Ac t ing Secre tary of S ta te for - Nat iona l Service (for Minu te 10). F o r e i g n Affairs. T h e R i g h t Hon. G . H. R O B E R T S , M.P. ,

T h e R i g h t Hon. t he E A R L O F D E R B Y , KG-. , Minister of L a b o u r (for Minute 10). G .C .V.O. , C . B . , Secre tary of S ta te for

S I R D A V I D S H A C E L E T O N , K .C .B . , P e r m a -W a r . nen t Secretary, Minis t ry of L a b o u r Major - Genera l F. B. M A U R I C E , C . B . , (for Minu te 10).

Director of Mil i tary Operat ions .

V ice -Admira l S I R R. E . W E M Y S S , K . C . B . , C .M.G. , M.V.O., D e p u t y F i r s t Sea Lord .

L ieu tenant -Colone l W . D A L L Y J O N E S , C.M.G. , Acting Secretary.

Cap ta in t he Hon. W . O R M S B Y - G O R E , M.P., Assistant Secretary.

Flee t P a y m a s t e r P . H . R o w , R.N. , Assistant Secretary.

Mr. T H O M A S J O N E S , Assistant Secretary.

The Western Front. i . T H E Direc tor of Mil i tary Opera t ions r epor ted t h a t in t he Cambra i thea t re t he G e r m a n s had, a t t he commencemen t of our offensive, 3 divis ions. Since the commencemen t of t he offensive they had b r o u g h t u p 10 fu r the r divis ions. Of these 13 divis ions 6 h a d been wi thd rawn , l eav ing 7 in the l ine. Si r Douglas H a i g h a d engaged 10 of h i s divisions, and h a d w i t h d r a w n 2, l eav ing 8 in t h e l ine. O u r divis ions w e r e s t ronger t h a n t h e G e r m a n divisions.

The Invasion of 2. T h e D i r e c t o r of Mili tary Opera t ions in t ima ted t h a t the re were I t a l y - indica t ions of an enemy a t tack on the River P iave a t t h e po in t

immedia te ly sou th of t h e sector occupied b y ou r t roops . T h e enemy h a d t h r o w n eleven b r i d g e s across different a r m s of t he r iver , which in t h a t ne ighbourhood form a n u m b e r of i s lands . Al l enemy t roops in t he th rea tened a rea -were Aus t r i ans .

[ 1 3 6 5 - 2 8 6 ] B

Palestine. 3. T h e Direc tor of Mili tary Opera t ions repor ted t h e rece ip t of a full s u m m a r y of t he s i tua t ion to da t e from Genera l Al lenby . T h e la t t e r es t imated the T u r k i s h forces opposed to h i m on the 31st October at 41,000 rifles a n d 300 g u n s . He es t imated h i s subsequen t c ap tu r e s at 10,000 p r i soners and SO g u n s , the n u m b e r of enemy ki l led a n d wounded b e i n g p robab ly abou t 15,000. I n add i t ion to these h e had c a p t u r e d 20 aeroplanes and a g rea t quan t i ty of a m m u ­ni t ion a n d stores. N o enemy aircraft had been seen in t he air for m a n y days. His own posi t ion he es t imated as follows : On 31st October he h a d 96 ,000 effectives, a n d h e sti l l h a d 7S,000. T h e b r u n t of the work h a d fallen upon two mounted divis ions a n d upon two in fan t ry divis ions , viz., the 52nd and the 75th. T h e l a t t e r two r e q u i r e d a rest , a n d were now b e i n g rel ieved by o the r divisions. T h e s e were i n excel leut order , wi th the except ion of a division which h a d recen t ly a r r ived from Salonica, in which mala r i a was somewha t preva len t . T h e rai lway communica t ion w i t h E g y p t now ex tended to a po in t 10 mi les nor th of Gaza, a n d was b e i n g p u s h e d on. Suppl ies were b e i n g l anded at t h e m o u t h of t he W a d i Sukei r . A m o n g the c a p t u r e s from the e n e m y were six locomotives a n d a n u m b e r of waggons . T h e ma in r e m a i n i n g enemy force was concen t ra ted in t he ne ighbourhood of J e rusa l em, and, o w i n g to his g r e a t super ior i ty in n u m b e r s , mate r ia l , and aeroplanes , Gene ra l A l l enby would shor t ly b e in a posi t ion to deal w i th them. Should he p r o v e successful in c a p t u r i n g J e r u s a l e m he would be ab le to t ake u p a s t r o n g l ine somewha t to the n o r t h of it, be tween the J o r d a n a n d t h e sea, w h i c h wou ld have the a d v a n t a g e of hav ing a l a te ra l ra i lway i n i t s rear , viz., the J a f f a - J e r u s a l e m Rai lway, which could b e easily a n d qu ick ly r epa i r ed .

Ques t ioned r e g a r d i n g enemy re inforcements , Gene ra l Maur ice s t a t e d t h a t it w a s es t imated t ha t t h e r e were in t he vic ini ty of Aleppo one w e a k G e r m a n divis ion and two weak T u r k i s h divisions. One o the r w e a k G e r m a n divis ion was be l ieved to b e now m o v i n g to Nabbus . T h e Genera l Staff ca lcula ted t ha t i t would t ake from four teen to s ix teen days to move a T u r k i s h division from Aleppo to N a b l u s , from which po in t t hey would have to march south. I t was s t a t ed t h a t t h e T u r k i s h forces la te ly at Hebron h a d re t i r ed on J e r u s a l e m . A r r a n g e m e n t s h a d been m a d e for Arab co-operat ion in b l o w i n g u p por t ions of t he Hedjaz Ra i lway east of the J o r d a n , and also be tween Aleppo a n d Damascus . Near ly ,all t h e t r ibes were co-opera t ing , b u t t he r e appea red l i t t le p rospec t of t h e Druses c o m i n g to our ass is tance u n t i l the Br i t i sh advance h a d reached a more no r the r ly po in t .

I t was po in ted out tha t , j u d g i n g by exper ience in o ther t hea t r e s of t h e war , Gene ra l Al lenby ' s super ior i ty in the a i r should prove a va luab l e ad junc t in e m b a r r a s s i n g a r e t i r i ng T u r k i s h a r m y by e n g a g i n g them from a low elevation whi ls t they were on the move on t h e i r coastal l ine.

G e n e r a l Maur ice s t a ted tha t he ga the r ed t h a t Gene ra l Al lenby h a d b e e n m a k i n g full u se of th i s a r m , b u t t h a t t he h i g h l a n d s of J u d e a a n d Samar ia w e r e of such a n a t u r e t h a t it was ex t remely difficult to find l a n d i n g g r o u n d s . Gene ra l Al lenby h a d al l t h e a e r o p l a n e s he h a d asked for, a n d no fu r ther d e m a n d s h a d been made .

East Africa. . 4 . T h e Direc tor of Mil i tary Opera t ions d rew the a t t en t ion of t h e W a r Cabine t to t h e pub l i shed c o m m u n i q u e in t ha t m o r n i n g ' s p r e s s ; s ince t h e n a fu r the r success h a d been repor ted , a n d t h e only e n e m y forces now in t he field in th is t h e a t r e were 2,000 m e n u n d e r von L e t t o w , now on the P o r t u g u e s e frontier .

Shipping Losses. 5. T h e D e p u t y F i r s t Sea Lord repor ted t h a t t he re h a d been h e a v y losses at sea b y the act ion of enemy submar ine s be tween noon 27 th a n d noon 28 th i n s t an t . 20,932 Br i t i sh and 12,055 All ied tons of s h i p p i n g h a d been s u n k ; a n d 10,S8o tons of Br i t i sh s h i p p i n g d a m a g e d b y torpedo , b u t i t w a s hoped t h e la t te r could b e repa i red .

Naval Co-operation 6. T h e Deputy F i r s t Sea Lord repor ted tha t H.M.S. " L i z a r d " in Palestine. n a c [ firex[ t a p a r t y of T u r k s from the shore to t h e n o r t h of Jaffa. a

Russia. 7. The W a r Cabine t h a d before t h e m a n u m b e r of t e l eg rams from Pe t rog rad and J a s sy , i nc lud ing the fol lowing —

No. 1874 from Sir G. Buchanan , da ted 26 th November . I Q 7 o J O I O , , , , , , , j , , , ,

"SSI ,, ,, ,, 27 th 706 ,, Sir G. Barclay, ., 26 th ,, 710 c-*7th

,, 711. ,, the mi l i ta ry at tache a t J a s sy , da ted 27th November .

Lord Rober t Cecil s ta ted tha t , apa r t from t h e l a rge issues of policy ra ised in these t e l eg rams , t he re were two minor quest ions which could be separa te ly deal t with. T h e first was t h e d e m a n d p u t forward b y IVI. Tro t sk i for t he release of Chich i r in a n d Petroff, who are interned in th is country , and the v i r tua l t h rea t of repr isa ls against Br i t i sh subjects in Russ ia should t he two ag i ta tors not be released. T o release t h e m at Tro t sk i ' s b i d d i n g "would g rea t ly add to his pres t ige , and would be t a n t a m o u n t to a recogni t ion of his Government . T h e second ques t ion was t he compla in t m a d e by Sir G. B u c h a n a n tha t Gene ra l Bar te r had p u t t h e A m b a s s a d o r in a ve ry embar r a s s ing posi t ion by the th rea t of " ser ious consequences , " which accompanied the no te to t he Commander- in-Chief p ro t e s t ing against Russia 's infract ion of t h e 1914 Agreemen t .

The Director of Mil i tary Opera t ions said t ha t p robab ly Genera l Bar te r was influenced by the fact tha t M. Clemenceau had wired to t he Head of the F r e n c h Mission te l l ing him to t ake energe t ic action, and a d d i n g tha t the Commander - in -Chief would be suppo r t ed in any action h e took aga ins t Pe t rog rad .

The W a r Cabine t dec ided t h a t —

(a.) No notice should b e t aken of M. Tro t sk i ' s r eques t to re lease Chich i r in a n d Petroff.

(b.) The Secretary of S ta te for W a r shou ld enqui re into the compla in t aga ins t Gene ra l Bar te r , a n d tha t a su i table t e legram should b e sen t to Sir G. B u c h a n a n .

The W a r Cabinet nex t considered the gene ra l Russ i an s i tuat ion, especial ly as set forth in t e l eg rams Nos. 1878 a n d 1881 from P e t r o g r a d and No. 711 from Ja s sy . M. Tro tsk i had issued to the Mili tary At taches of All ied Powers , on 27th November , a no te s t a t ing t ha t he a n d his suppor t e r s were endeavour ing to b r i n g a b o u t a genera l a n d not a separa te a rmis t ice , b u t tha t they m i g h t be d r iven to a separate a rmis t ice by the All ies if they refused to negot ia te . If the All ied Governmen t s would no t recognise t he Bolsheviks the la t t e r would appea l t o t h e peoples as aga ins t t he i r Gove rnmen t s . Sir G. B u c h a n a n u rged t h a t a r ep ly should b e i s sued immedia te ly to th is " insolent communica t ion ," po in t i ng out t h a t T ro t sk i ' s proposal for a genera l a rmis t ice reached the Br i t i sh E m b a s s y n ine teen h o u r s after the Commander- in-Chief h a d opened pourpa r l e r s wi th the enemy, a n d tha t t h e All ies were de t e rmined to cont inue t he war un t i l a p e r m a n e n t peace h a d b e e n obtained. Sir G. B u c h a n a n fur ther u r g e d the G o v e r n m e n t tha t , as t h e s i tua t ion was now despera te , it was advisable to set Russ ia free from h e r ag reemen t wi th the Allies, so t ha t she could act as she chose, a n d decide to pu rchase peace on G e r m a n y ' s t e rms or fight o n wi th t he All ies . The policy of the Bolsheviks was to divide Russ ia a n d Br i ta in , and so pave t h e way for wha t would v i r tua l ly be a G e r m a n pro tec tora te over the former. T h e course he r ecommended , if adop ted , would m a k e it imposs ib le for t he Bolsheviks to r ep roach t h e Allies w i th

dr iv ing Russ ian soldiers to s l a u g h t e r for t he i r Imper i a l i s t a ims . I n the t e l eg ram sent to t he Chief of the I m p e r i a l Gene ra l Staff, t he mi l i t a ry a t t ache a t J a s s y proposed tha t , if it w e r e found tha t K a l e d i n was well-disposed to t he All ies , a F r e n c h and Br i t i sh Mission, fully accred i ted , should be sen t to h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s ; t h a t financial suppor t u p to IO,000,OOOZ. should h e g u a r a n t e e d to Kaleclin ; and , genera l ly , t h a t t he Br i t i sh Mission should have full power to act w i thou t w a i t i n g ins t ruc t ions from E n g l a n d .

T h e W a r Cab ine t were informed tha t a message h a d b e e n s topped by the P r e s s B u r e a u from Tro t sk i , add re s sed to t h e A m b a s s a d o r s of Norway , Hol land , Spa in , Sweden , Swi tze r l and , a n d D e n m a r k , a sk ing tha t p res su re should b e b r o u g h t to b e a r by t he Socialist and working-class organisa t ions in these count r ies i n favour of peace .

Lord Rober t Cecil said i t was i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e Cab ine t should a r r ive a t a decision at t he earl iest poss ib le m o m e n t on the ques t ions ra i sed i n the above t e l eg rams . Kaleclin was in c o m m a n d of t h e r e sources of Russia , a n d if he a n d h is Cossacks could b e u n i t e d aga ins t t he G e r m a n s , suppl ies would t h e r e b y be p r e v e n t e d from r e a c h i n g the enemy. T h e r e was no evidence to show tha t t h e Bolsheviks had a n y t h i n g l ike genera l s u p p o r t t h r o u g h o u t Russ ia . T h e r e w a s reason for t h i n k i n g t h a t t he peasan t s w e r e aga ins t t h e Bolsheviks . K a l e d i n h a d wdth h i m Alexieff, a n d poss ibly Savinkoff and Rodzianko. T h e one m a n w i t h an o rgan i sed force was Ka led in , and , as Chief of the Cossacks , he had g rea t p res t ige . H e (Lord R o b e r t Cecil) would send G e n e r a l Bal la rd to Ka led in , a n d , if he found Kaleclin genu ine ly in favour of t h e All ies , G e n e r a l Ba l la rd should b e au thor ised to t ake w h a t s teps he deemed wise, and to i n c u r e x p e n d i t u r e u p to 10,000,000Z.

Some m e m b e r s of t he W a r Cab ine t were impres sed wi th t he object ions to t he policy of e n t e r i n g in to act ive co-operat ion wi th K a l e d i n w i t h o u t fu r ther informat ion . S teps h a d been t a k e n to obta in such informat ion, b u t it h a d not yet b e e n received. Li t t le was definitely k n o w n of Ka led in ' s pe rsona l i ty , a n d t h e r e were s igns t ha t t h e Cossacks were not p r e p a r e d to fight. T h e scheme, on Gene ra l BallarcTs admiss ion , was not one wh ich could be r e g a r d e d as hopeful , a n d i t s only r e su l t m i g h t b e to dr ive t he R u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t definitely in to the a r m s of G/ermany. If we wai ted for a shor t t ime w e should l e a r n t he t e r m s offered b y G e r m a n y , and these m i g h t open the eyes of the R u s s i a n people to w h a t a G e r m a n peace rea l ly mean t .

Al te rna t ive courses open were to follow Sir G. B u c h a n a n ' s advice or to wai t a l i t t le longer in t he hope t h a t the s i tua t ion would subsequen t ly become clearer . I n any case, t h e sub jec t was one wh ich should be referred to t h e conference now m e e t i n g i n Pa r i s .

A t t en t ion was called to t he pos i t ion of t h e R o u m a n i a n a r m y , and some m e m b e r s t h o u g h t the re w a s less object ion to s ecu r ing t h e suppor t of Kaleclin for t h e R o u m a n i a n A r m y t h a n for an open expedi t ion aga ins t t he Bolsheviks . Aga in s t t h e pol icy of drift , i t was u r g e d tha t for the pa s t e igh t m o n t h s wre h a d sedu lous ly ref ra ined from i n t e r v e n i n g in t he policy of t h e R u s s i a n Govern­ment , a n d we were now confronted wi th the fact t h a t t he Russ i ans were n e g o t i a t i n g wi th the G e r m a n Gove rnmen t . I t h a d also to b e r e m e m b e r e d tha t Kaleclin h a d no informat ion as to w h a t were our views on the Russ ian s i tuat ion.

I t w a s genera l ly ag reed tha t , if K a l e d i n were approached , two Missions would not b e requ i red . Genera l Ba l la rd and a F r e n c h rep resen ta t ive should suffice.

T h e W a r Cab ine t decided t h a t —

T h e Act ing Secre ta ry of S ta te for Fo re ign Affairs should s end a message to P a r i s ca l l ing t h e a t t en t ion of t h e P r i m e Minister , Mr. Balfour,. a n d Lord Milner to the t e l eg rams refer red to above, and should add tha t t h e m e m b e r s of the W a r Cab ine t in L o n d o n were divided in opin ion a s

to the immed ia t e s teps to b e t aken , some be ing in favour of au thor i s ing Genera l Bal lard to proceed on the l ines ind ica ted "by h im, others b e i n g in favour of wa i t i ng un t i l fu r ther informat ion was received.

8. Sir E d w a r d Carson called a t ten t ion to a n u m b e r of wireless m e s s a g e s from R u s s i a - c h i e f l y Bolshevik p r o p a g a n d a — w h i c h b a d been received by the P ress Bureau , t he pub l ica t ion of w h i c h h e h a d t empora r i l y stopped. H e r e a d examples of t he messages , and also t h e following extract from a le t ter which h a d been received from Si r F r a n k Swet tenham :—

" The whole ques t ion of censor ing or s topp ing such p res s - messages as are now coming to t h i s office in r ega rd to Russ ian

affairs is so full of difficulty that there appea r s to be only one way to deal wi th it, a n d that is to au thor i se u s to pass , s top, or censor all such messages at our discret ion, w i thou t r e g a r d to exis t ing ins t ruc t ions t ha t cab legrams dea l ing wi th foreign affairs are to be passed to the addressees uncensored. If th is is done, we th ink i t would b e necessary to m a k e some pub l i c announcement on the subject , t h o u g h what cons t i tu tes ' foreign affairs ' in t h i s connect ion is a lmost impossible to de termine . The a l te rna t ive to this course is to pass e v e r y t h i n g of t he kind which comes from a press cor respondent a n d cannot be deal t wi th on g rounds other t han those of foreign affairs."

Si r E d w a r d Carson explained that some of t he messages were appea l s to the people as aga ins t thei r Governments , and were i n m a n y respec ts of a violent character . H e h a d discussed the ques t ion wi th Mr. Balfour a n d Lord Milner before thei r d e p a r t u r e for Par i s , and they were aga ins t publ ica t ion.

Lord Rober t Cecil said t ha t in t he a u t u m n of 1915 he h a d ob ta ined author i ty to r emove the censorship on Fore ign Office m a t t e r s , w i t h cer tain except ions , such as, e.g., a te legram go ing t h r o u g h th i s country for a fore ign country . I n h i s view the policy h a d justif ied itself, and it w a s be t te r to throw the onus on to t h e p r e s s a n d let t h e m r i sk prosecut ion u n d e r the Defence of t he Rea lm Act . H e would allow the publ ica t ion of these p r o p a g a n d i s t messages , for, if wi thhe ld now, they would leak out l a te r and the G o v e r n m e n t would be blamed for suppres s ing t hem.

Aga ins t this view it was u r g e d tha t the messages were p ropa­g a n d a from a Government w h i c h was no t recognised by us or t he Allies. A fur ther reason for s topp ing pub l i ca t ion was t h e Con­ference now mee t ing a t P a r i s .

I t was repor ted t ha t compla in t s had been received from some of t h e newspape r s that they w e r e only al lowed to see mut i la ted copies of some of the i r t e l eg rams .

T h e W a r Cabinet dec ided t h a t —

F o r the present t h e messages above refer red to should not b e pub l i shed , a n d tha t t h e Press Bureau should be al lowed to show the messages to t he newspape r s to wh ich they were addressed, at the i r discret ion.

86 ] C

S u p r e m e W a r C o u n c i l :

R e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n A r m y Counc i l a n d B r i t i s h P e r m a n e n t M i l i t a r y R e p r e s e n t a t i v e .

C o - o r d i n a t i o nC o m m i t t e e forL a b o u r D i s p u t e s .

9. W i t h reference to W a r Cabine t 276, Minute 3 , and P a p e r W . P . 67, the la t t e r b e i n g a record of t he p roceed ings of a Mee t ing of the A r m y Counci l held on the 19th November , 1917, re la t ive to the re la t ions be tween the A r m y Counci l and the Br i t i sh P e r m a n e n t Mili tary Represen ta t ive , t he W a r Cabine t d i r e c t e d —

T h e Secre tary to inform the Army Counci l t ha t the W a r Cab ine t h a d t a k e n note of the Minute in ques t ion of t he A r m y Counci l and of the i r des i re to co-operate cordial ly in t h e development of t h e work of the S u p r e m e W a r Counci l w i t h a view to better co-ordinat ion of effort in t he conduc t of t h e war, and tha t the W a r Cabine t feels a s sured tha t , w i t h t h i s co-operation, the n e w mach ine ry c a n be m a d e to work successfully in sp i t e of t he difficulties refer red to b y t h e A r m y Council .

10. W i t h reference to W a r Cabine t 285 , Minu te 13 , Mr. B a r n e s informed the W a r Cabine t tha t a m e e t i n g h a d been he ld o n t h e

p rev ious even ing in accordance w i t h t h e W a r Cabine t decision, a t wh ich Sir A u c k l a n d Geddes 5 p roposa l had been tho rough ly discussed, and tha t , a l t hough it was a d m i t t e d tha t theoret ical ly i t m i g h t be a bet ter scheme, the Commit tee did not cons ider t ha t it would b e prac t ica l in its work ing . H e a d d e d tha t m a n y of t h e t r ades were not organised sufficiently to car ry out the scheme on t h e l ines proposed by the Minister of Nat ional Service, a n d tha t t he Commi t t ee felt tha t for all p rac t ica l pu rposes the scheme as set out i n P a p e r G .T . -2772 was the only one tha t they could r e c o m m e n d for adopt ion . Certain minor a m e n d m e n t s h a d been m a d e i n the scheme as con­si dered b y the W a r Cabinet on t h e 28th November , and the Commi t t ee wished Sir Auck land G e d d e s to be added to t h e Co-ord ina t ing Com­mi t tee , and tha t Mr. Guy Ca l th rop should t ake the place of Si r R icha rd Redmayne . T h e Commi t t ee fur ther proposed to a r m them­se lveswi th power to a p p o i n t a n adviser from each t r ade to advise t h e C o ­o rd ina t i ng Commit tee as m i g h t be-requisi te d u r i n g the p re l imina r i e s of any d i spu te . Mr. B a r n e s po in ted out t ha t cer ta in D e p a r t m e n t s h a d been added , w i th a v iew to r ep resen ta t ives be ing appo in t ed from t h e m to si t on t h e Consul ta t ive Commit tee , a n d tha t t h e po in t for the Co-ord ina t ing Commit tee to a im at was to ob ta in r ep re ­sen ta t ives who should not act s t r ic t ly as r ep resen ta t ives of t h e D e p a r t m e n t s to which they be louged , b u t t h a t they should g ive t h e Commi t t ee t he benefit of the i r knowdedge of the condi t ions u n d e r discussion, a c t i ng in a j ud i c i a l capac i ty r a t h e r t h a n as m e m b e r s r ep resen ta t ive of D e p a r t m e n t s advoca t ing the i r own case.

Sir Auck land Geddes expressed the v iew tha t t o have a n official so ac t i ng would p u t the la t t e r in a n imposs ib le posi t ion, a s he wou ld be s i t t i ng in j u d g m e n t on the H e a d of h i s own Depa r t ­ment , from whom he m u s t na tu ra l ly receive h i s ins t ruc t ions .

As aga ins t th i s , Mr. B a r n e s s t rongly po in ted out t h a t it w a s h igh ly des i rab le for the efficient . w o r k i n g of the Co-o rd ina t ing Commi t t ee t h a t t he ac tua l v iews of the expe r t s should be ob ta ined , a n d not the views of the D e p a r t m e n t s as i n d i c a t i n g d e p a r t m e n t a l policy.

Sir David Shackle ton po in ted out t h a t t h e proposals set out i n P a p e r G . T . - 2 7 7 2 were ag reed to b y the whole of t he D e p a r t m e n t s concerned.

Sir A u c k l a n d G e d d e s s ta ted tha t , as it w a s now t h e d u t y of t h e Minis t ry of Nat iona l Service to ad jud ica te i n all cases of l abour supply , h e t h o u g h t it des i rable , in order t h a t h e m i g h t also b e in a n i n d e p e n d e n t posi t ion, tha t he should no t s i t as a m e m b e r of t h e Co-ord ina t ing Commit tee , a n d sugges t ed t h a t someone else m i g h t b e appoin ted instead. H e fur ther sugges t ed t h a t t h e r ep resen ta ­

7 WO 288

t ives of t h e b i g s p e n d i n g D e p a r t m e n t s m i g h t b e appo in t ed n o t as m e m b e r s of the Commit tee proper , b u t as assessors .

T h e W a r Cab ine t dec ided t h a t —

T h e scheme for co-ordinat ion, as set ou t in P a p e r G . T . - 2 7 7 2 , should be adop ted as a m e n d e d , a n d expressed the hope tha t S i r Auck land G e d d e s would find t ime to s i t as "vice-Chairman of t he Co-o rd ina t ing Commi t t ee .

F u r t h e r , t h a t t he W a r Cab ine t wished i t to b e u n d e r s t o o d t h a t r ep resen ta t ives of D e p a r t m e n t s on the Co-ord ina t ing Commi t t ee would act in a jud ic ia l capaci ty a n d not mere ly as r epresen ta t ives of the i r admin i s t r a t ive D e p a r t m e n t s .

2 , Whitehall Gardens, S.W., November 29, 1917.