by: date: federal aviation administration commercial aviation safety team (cast) aviation safety...
TRANSCRIPT
By:
Date:
Federal AviationAdministration
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)
Aviation Safety Information Analysis Sharing (ASIAS)
Presented to ICAO Air Navigation Commission
Jay Pardee
Director, Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention
October 6, 2009
Improving Safety through Collaborative Safety Initiatives
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)
Overview
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)
Overview
In the U.S., our focus was set by theIn the U.S., our focus was set by theWhite House Commission on Aviation Safety, and White House Commission on Aviation Safety, and The National Civil Aviation Review Commission The National Civil Aviation Review Commission
(NCARC) (NCARC)
1.1 . . . Reduce Fatal Accident Rate . . .
• . . . Strategic Plan to Improve Safety . . . • . . . Improve Safety Worldwide . . .
Vision - Mission - GoalsVision - Mission - GoalsVision - Mission - GoalsVision - Mission - GoalsVision Key aviation stakeholders acting cooperatively to lead the
world-wide aviation community to the highest levels of global commercial aviation safety by focusing on the right things.
Mission Enable a continuous improvement framework built on
monitoring the effectiveness of implemented actions and modifying actions to achieve the goal.
Goal Reduce the US commercial aviation fatal accident rate 80% by
2007. And Maintain a continuous reduction in fatality risk in US and
International commercial aviation beyond 2007.
* Representing P&W and RR** Observer
AIAAirbusALPAAPAATAIFALPANACABoeingGE*RAAFSF
CAST brings key stakeholders to cooperatively CAST brings key stakeholders to cooperatively develop & implement a prioritized safety agendadevelop & implement a prioritized safety agendaCAST brings key stakeholders to cooperatively CAST brings key stakeholders to cooperatively develop & implement a prioritized safety agendadevelop & implement a prioritized safety agenda
Industry
Commercial Aviation Safety Team
(CAST)
Government
DODFAA
• Aircraft Certification• Flight Standards• System Safety• Air Traffic Operations• Research
NASAICAO**EASA (ECAST)TCCNATCA** NTSB**
IATA**AAPA** ATAC**APFA**ACI-NA**
• Safety enhancement development
• Master safety plan • Enhancement
effectiveness• Future areas of
study
• Data analyses
CAST
Joint Safety Analysis Teams (JSAT)
Joint Safety Implementation
Teams (JSIT)
Joint Implementation Measurement Data
Analysis Team (JIMDAT)
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)
Safety Plan DevelopmentSafety Plan Development
AccidentJSATS
Case studies
AccidentJSITS
Case studies
SafetyEnhancements
IncidentAnalysisProcess
JIMDATReview
EmergingRisk
ChangingRisk
DevelopEnhancements
& Metrics
AviationSystem
Changes
PresentIn MasterFactors
Yes
No
DemographicChanges
IdentifyHazards
IdentifyFactors
DevelopContributing
Factors(new or
emerging
IdentifyHazards
IdentifyFactors
MasterContributing
Factors
11-5-03 CAST-051R
FAST Hazards
CASTPlan
RecommendedPlan
Revision
PerformanceTo PlanReview
Non-PerformanceInformation
Metrics
Robust CAST MethodologyRobust CAST Methodology
Detailed event sequence - problem identification from worldwide accidents and incidents
Broad-based teams (45-50 specialists /team)
Over 450 problem statements (contributing factors)
Over 900 interventions proposed
Analyzed for effectiveness and synergy
CAST Process Led to Integrated CAST Process Led to Integrated Strategic Safety PlanStrategic Safety Plan
CAST Process Led to Integrated CAST Process Led to Integrated Strategic Safety PlanStrategic Safety Plan
Part 121 or equivalent passenger and cargo operations studied
Current CAST plan:
72 Prioritized Safety Enhancements
50 Complete and 22 underway
Projected 74% fatality risk reduction by 2020
Industry and Government implementing plan
Resource Cost Vs. Risk ReductionResource Cost Vs. Risk ReductionResource Cost Vs. Risk ReductionResource Cost Vs. Risk Reduction
APPROVED PLAN
Completed + Plan (2007
Implementation Level)
Completed + Plan (2020
Implementation Level)
All JSIT Proposed Enhancements
(2020 Implementation
Level)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
Re
so
urc
e C
os
t ($
Mil
lio
ns
)
Risk Reduction
Total Cost in $ (Millions)
2007 2020
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Ris
k E
lim
ina
ted
by
Sa
fety
En
ha
nc
em
en
ts
Completed
$$
$$ $$ $$
$$
Do
llars
/Flt
. Cy
cle
Part 121 Aviation Industry Cost Due to Fatal/Hull Loss Accidents
100
80
60
40
20
0
Historical cost of accidents per flight cycle
74% Risk reductionSavings ~ $74/Flight Cycle
Or
~ $814 Million Dollars/Year
Cost of accident fatalities following implementation of the CAST plan @ 2020 levels
2020
Cost SavingsCost SavingsCost SavingsCost Savings
2007
CAST Safety PlanCAST Safety PlanCAST Safety PlanCAST Safety Plan
51 Completed Safety Enhancements51 Completed Safety Enhancements• Safety Culture Safety Culture
• Maintenance Procedures Maintenance Procedures
• Flight Crew TrainingFlight Crew Training
• Air Traffic Controller TrainingAir Traffic Controller Training
• Uncontained Engine FailuresUncontained Engine Failures
• Terrain avoidance warning system (TAWS)Terrain avoidance warning system (TAWS)
• Standard Operating ProceduresStandard Operating Procedures
• Precision ApproachesPrecision Approaches
• Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) SystemsMinimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) Systems
• Proactive Safety Programs (FOQA + ASAP)Proactive Safety Programs (FOQA + ASAP)
CAST Safety Plan (cont.)CAST Safety Plan (cont.)CAST Safety Plan (cont.)CAST Safety Plan (cont.)
21 Committed Safety Enhancements21 Committed Safety Enhancements• Policies and ProceduresPolicies and Procedures
• Aircraft Design Aircraft Design
• Flight Crew Training (additional aspects)Flight Crew Training (additional aspects)
• Runway Incursion PreventionRunway Incursion Prevention
• Precision Approaches (additional projects)Precision Approaches (additional projects)
• Icing (additional turboprop projects) Icing (additional turboprop projects)
• MidairMidair
• MaintenanceMaintenance
• Runway SafetyRunway Safety
• Safety culture, policies and proceduresSafety culture, policies and procedures
Fatal Accident Rate and Full Airplane Loss EquivalentsRate for Part 121 Operations (5 year moving average)
Fatal Accident Rate and Full Airplane Loss EquivalentsRate for Part 121 Operations (5 year moving average)
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.019
91
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Fa
talit
y A
ccid
en
ts o
r F
ull
Lo
ss A
ccid
en
t E
qu
iva
len
ts
pe
r 1
0 M
illio
n D
ep
art
ure
s
5 year moving avg of fatal accidents per 10 million departures
82% Fatality AccidentRate Reduction1996-2007
International PerspectiveInternational PerspectiveCAST Safety EnhancementsCAST Safety Enhancements
Western-built transport hull loss accidents, by airline domicile, 2001 through 2007
Accidents permillion departures
United Statesand Canada
0.4
Latin Americaand Caribbean
2.1
Europe0.7
China0.3
Middle East2.3
Africa10.0
Asia2.1
Oceania0.0
(ExcludingChina)
C.I.S.1
CAST70 SEs48 complete22 in work74% reduction
RASG-PA
ESSI35 SEs JAA11 SEs EASA62% reduction
ASET
COSCAP CIS
COSCAP NA, SA, SEA40 SEs in work60% reduction
1 Insufficient fleet experience to generate reliable rate.
World1.1
COSCAP GulfCOSCAP BAG
SummarySummary
• History shows focused action and introduction of History shows focused action and introduction of new capabilities have led to accident risk new capabilities have led to accident risk reductionsreductions
• Joint industry and government teams working Joint industry and government teams working together to a common goal can further enhance the together to a common goal can further enhance the safety of our very safe aviation systemsafety of our very safe aviation system
• Full implementation will require a coordinated effort Full implementation will require a coordinated effort between industry and governmentbetween industry and government
• CAST is moving forward to meet the challengeCAST is moving forward to meet the challenge
• ASIAS (Aviation Safety Information Analysis and ASIAS (Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing) initiative is under way help aviation safety Sharing) initiative is under way help aviation safety teams (CAST, IHST, GAJSC) meet the challenge teams (CAST, IHST, GAJSC) meet the challenge
18Federal AviationAdministration
FAA International Forum
March 24, 2009
• A collaborative Government-Industry initiative on data sharing & analysis to proactively discover safety concerns before accidents or incidents occur, leading to timely mitigation and prevention
What is ASIAS….
AAIRIRTTRAN RAN AAIRWAYS IRWAYS
AALASKA LASKA AAIRLINES IRLINES
AAMERICAN MERICAN AAIRLINESIRLINES
AAMERICANMERICAN EEAGLE AGLE
AATLANTIC TLANTIC SSOUTHEAST OUTHEAST AAIRLINESIRLINES CCHAUTAUQUAHAUTAUQUA A AIRLINESIRLINES
CCOMAIROMAIR
CCOMMUTOMMUTAAIRIR
CCOMPASS OMPASS AAIRLINES IRLINES
CCONTINENTAL ONTINENTAL AAIRLINESIRLINES
EEXPRESSXPRESSJJETET
FFRONTIERRONTIER AAIRLINESIRLINES
ASIAS AIRLINE PARTNERSASIAS AIRLINE PARTNERS
GGULFSTREAMULFSTREAM
IINTERNATIONAL NTERNATIONAL AAIRLINESIRLINES
JJETETBBLUE LUE AAIRWAYSIRWAYS
DDELTAELTA--NNORTHWEST ORTHWEST AAIRLINESIRLINES
RREPUBLIC EPUBLIC AAIRLINES IRLINES
SSHUTTLE HUTTLE AAMERICAMERICA
SSKYKYWWEST EST AAIRLINESIRLINES
SSOUTHWEST OUTHWEST AAIRLINES IRLINES
SSUN UN CCOUNTRY OUNTRY AAIRLINES IRLINES
UUNITED NITED AAIRLINESIRLINES
UUNITED NITED PPARCEL ARCEL SSERVICEERVICE
USUS AAIRWAYSIRWAYS
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution
ASIAS Participants at Major US Airports
20
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for DistributionASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution21
ASIAS ASAP Records in Production
Record counts as of 14 Sept 2009
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for DistributionASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution22
ASIAS FOQA Records in Production
As of Sept 2009, over 5 Million FFD Records available to ASIAS
Data Sources Supporting ASIAS InfoSharing and Analysis
23
Safety Reports
• Aviation Safety Reporting System
• Runway Incursion• Surface Incident• Operational Error / Operational Deviation
• Pilot Deviation• Vehicle or Pedestrian Deviation
• National Transportation Safety Board
• Accident/Incident Data System
• Service Difficulty Reports
De-Identified FOQA Data
De-Identified ASAP Data
• Traffic Management Reroutes and Delays
• Airport Configuration and Operations
• Sector and Route Structure
• Procedures• Surveillance Data for En Route, Terminal and Airport
ATC Information
• Bureau of Transportation Statistics
• Weather / Winds• Manufacturer Data• Avionics Data• Worldwide Accident Data
Other Information
• Flight Operations
•Maintenance
• Dispatch • ATSAP
Document Number Here
24 FAA International Forum March 24, 2009 24Federal Aviation
Administration
ASIAS is Governed by Formal Principles
Non-punitive reportingData used solely for
advancement of safety
Airline data is de-identifiedAnalyses approved by an ASIAS Executive Board
ASIAS Studies Completed or Underway
25
Terrain Awareness Warning
Airline Stability Metric
TCAS Resolution Advisories
AirlineBenchmarks
TCAS Resolution Advisories
Runway SafetyTerrain Awareness Warning
Unstable Approaches
Directed Studies
Approach and Landing
Controlled Flight Into Terrain
Mid-Air Collision
Icing
Cargo
Maintenance
Loss of Control
CAST Metrics:
Known Risk Monitoring
Safety Enhancement Assessment
Analysis In ProgressAnalysis
Completed
Analytical ProductsAnalytical Products
Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)Traffic Collision Advisory System (TCAS)Wrong Runway Departures (WR)Metrics
Data Fusion Provides Valuable Insights
Terrain Source: National Elevation Data
WeatherSource: FAA & NOAA
Traffic TracksSource: FAA National Offload
Program
Minimum Vectoring Altitudes
Source: Air Traffic Control
Airport & Airspace Procedures
Source: Air Traffic Control
Safety Event FocusSource: Digital Flight Data,
Safety Reports
Bay Area Traffic Flows – SE Plan
2929
Safety Enhancement 184 – Minimum Vectoring Altitude Reevaluation
• Reevaluate minimum vectoring altitudes (MVAs) at prioritized sites identified in the CAST TAWS study to reduce the number of terrain awareness warning system (TAWS) alerts.– ASIAS has developed a tool to identify MVA’s that should
be reviewed. – The CAST mitigation team is coordinating the evaluation
of this tool within the FAA.
•
3131
Safety Enhancement 185 – TAWS and RNAV Visual or Other Procedures
• This enhancement provides better separation from terrain by providing RNAV Visual or other procedures that mitigate known TAWS and terrain issues.– jetBlue has agreed to be the lead carrier in developing a RNAV
visual flight procedure for OAK– Multiple airports identified in the TAWS study have implemented,
or are developing, visual and/or instrument flight procedures• ABQ:
– RWY 26 RVFP in place– RWY 26 RNP waiting for completion of sight survey
• LAS:– RWY 19 RVFP (USAirways & NetJets)
• SAN:– RWY 27 RNP SAR having issues with survey & environmental
• Guam:– Continental talking about RVFP (no formal application)
•
OAK Traffic – RNAV Capable
Aircraft RNAV equipped per AC 90-100A DME/DME/IRU and/or GPS sensor input
33
Proposed: RNAV VISUAL Approach to OAK RWY 11
3434
Safety Enhancement 120 – TAWS Improved Functionality
• Current production models, new type design airplanes, and existing aircraft, where appropriate, will include GPS equipment to allow incorporation of certain TAWS enhancements. – CAST is developing a cost benefit analysis to help
promote this initiative
35
EGPWS Mode-2 Pull Ups – Pre 218
36
EGPWS Mode-2 Pull Ups w/218 or Higher(about 20X Less Frequent)
37
Analytical ProductsAnalytical Products
Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)Traffic Collision Advisory System (TCAS)Wrong Runway Departures (WR)Metrics
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for DistributionASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution
Data Sources and Analysis
FOQA Assess NAS-wide and airport-specific TCAS RA landscape. Provide Trend Information. Investigate pilot response to advisories.
NOP Run simulations that will encompass all carriers and traffic to better estimate RA rates and degree of risk. Perform domestic / foreign comparisons. (Provides intruder information.)
TOPA Mode-S downlink provides information similar to FOQA, and is enhanced with surveillance radar data.
Text Reports Help get the story behind the numbers at selected airports.
38
(National Offload Program radar surveillance data)
(TCAS Operational Performance Assessment)
(ASAP, ASRS, OE)
39
ASIAS Directed Study on TCAS RAs: Location from FOQA Data
39
Over a three-year period, Southern California, Northern California, and Denver accumulated the greatest concentrations of TCAS RA events. *
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for DistributionASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution
Common Themes Observed at Study Airports: VFR and IFR Traffic Interaction
GA aircraft under tower control interacting with structured* IFR traffic at a nearby airport
Example: BUR arrival and departure interaction with VNY “Loitering” VFR traffic interacting with
structured IFR traffic to/from nearby airportExample: Philadelphia downtown VFR traffic interaction with PHL arrivalsTypes of traffic observed in data: radio / TV traffic reporting airplanes and helicopters, aerial photography, law enforcement
Structured VFR flow near structured IFR traffic Example: VFR helicopter route crossing under EWR arrivalsExample: GA traffic crossing under JFK arrivals
*Arrival /departure route or an approach
40
500-ft separation is maintained in most cases, but it is not sufficient to prevent TCAS RAs
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for DistributionASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution
Common Themes Observed at Study Airports: IFR Traffic Interacting with Other IFR Traffic
Visual approaches to parallel runways– Close spacingExample: SFO 28R/L with 750’ centerline spacing– High altitude with increased TCAS sensitivity
Example: DEN 16R/L with 2500’ centerline spacing Arrival / departure interaction triggered by closure rate
Example: TEB west departures with EWR 22 arrivalsExample: DEN west departures with arrivals on both north and south flows
41
These procedures are in accordance with 7110.65, but they do not provide sufficient separation to
prevent TCAS RAs
42
Analytical ProductsAnalytical Products
Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)Traffic Collision Advisory System (TCAS)Metrics Wrong Runway Departures (WR)
Click to edit Master title style
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution
Mapping Problem Statements to FOQA Metrics
43
Unique FOQA Data used to Assess PSsUnstable Approach (HAT Method)Go-AroundBelow Desired Glide Path on ApproachVFE (Flap Airspeed Limit) ExceedenceFast Approach (CAS -VREF)Airspeed Low Relative to Stall SpeedRisk of Tail Strike during LandingSlow Approach (CAS-VREF)Low Power on ApproachAbove Desired Glide Path on ApproachHard Landing (Vertical Speed Method)Final Flap Position not Valid for LandingLate Final Flap ExtensionGPWS: Too Low GearLate Gear ExtensionLow-Level WindshearHigh Rate of Descent for this HeightHigh Rate of Descent on Final ApproachNot Aligned with Runway (Localizer Deviation)GPWS: Too Low FlapGPWS: Too Low TerrainGround Spoilers Armed LateGPWS: Sink Rate (Pull Up)GPWS: Terrain (Pull Up)GPWS: Glide SlopeNot currently measurable in FOQA
Accident Category Unique Problem Statements (PS)48. Lack of stabil ized approach criteria, mandatory go-around policy
19. Lack of basic piloting performance
44. Flightcrew failure to correct unstabil ized approach
47. Flightcrew failure to maintain system status awareness
42. Flightcrew failure to address combination of critical factors
22. Pilot Not Flying (PNF) failed to perform duties
45. Flightcrew failure to recognize impact of degraded systems
14. Equipment/Warning system failure
21. Flightcrew disregard of or failure to recognize cues to terminate current course of action or maneuver
11. Failure of flightcrew to correctly identify aircraft height
12. Failure of flightcrew to correctly identify aircraft position over the ground
34. Failure of captain to exercise command authority
10. Failure of flightcrew to follow established procedures (SOPs)
17. Failure of the airl ine/operator to provide standard operating procedures (SOPs)
23. Flightcrew intentional disregard of and failure to respond to flight deck warnings
Approach & Landing Accident Reduction
(ALAR)
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
Approach & Landing Accident Reduction
(ALAR); and Controlled Flight Into
Terrain (CFIT)
Click to edit Master title style
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution
1
1
Unstable approaches are measured using the Height Above Touchdown (HAT) method, which captures the HAT on the
first approach when the aircraft is 100% stable
Accident Spotlight
Air Carrier: Cayman Airways Aircraft Type: B737-300 Location: Grand Cayman, Cayman Is.Synopsis: Night; VMC; Experienced crew; Visual approach; Light rain; Tailwind; 7,021 ft. runway; Thrust reversers inoperative; Speedbrakes not armed or deployed; Fast approach; 3.5° descent angle
1
1. Stable on Glideslope2. Stable on Localizer3. Stable [CAS-Vapp]4. Stable [CAS-Vref]5. Stable Ground Speed6. Stable Rate of Descent (ROD)7. Stable Thrust
8. Landing Flaps Set9. Gear Down10. Stable in Pitch11. Stable in Roll12. Stable in Yaw13. Ground Spoilers Armed14. Speed Brakes Retracted
Metric Category
Level
Metric Category
Level
Safety Enhancement
Level
Safety Enhancement
Level
Problem Statement
Level
Problem Statement
Level
MetricLevel
MetricLevel
Example Metrics for Approach and Landing Accident Risks
44
Click to edit Master title style
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 ≤ HAT < 500 500 ≤ HAT < 1000 HAT ≥ 1000
Perc
ent o
f Tot
al F
light
s
Height Above Touchdown (ft)
Percent of Unstable Approaches by HAT & Last Event Type
Gear
Flaps
Thrust
ROD
Ground Speed
CAS-Vref
CAS-Vapp
Localizer
Glideslope
83.1%
15.8%
1.1%
Initial Results: Unstable Approach Metric
45
Click to edit Master title style
ASIAS Proprietary – Not for Distribution
Initial Results: Unstable Approach Metric
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1st Qtr (2006)
2nd Qtr (2006)
3rd Qtr (2006)
4th Qtr (2006)
1st Qtr (2007)
2nd Qtr (2007)
3rd Qtr (2007)
4th Qtr (2007)
1st Qtr (2008)
2nd Qtr (2008)
3rd Qtr (2008)
4th Qtr (2008)
1st Qtr (2009)
2nd Qtr (2009)
3rd Qtr (2009)
Even
ts p
er 1
0,00
0 Fl
ight
s
Unstable Approach (HAT Method) Events - Below 500 Feet HAT
No Go Around Go Around
46
Analytical Analytical ProductsProductsAnalytical Analytical ProductsProducts
Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)Traffic Collision Advisory System (TCAS)Metrics Wrong Runway Departures (WR)
48
Lexington Blue Grass (LEX) 2006
• Aircraft was cleared for departure on Runway 22 but departed on Runway 26– Comair flight 5191 crashed
approximately ½ mile from the end of runway 26
• Similar non-fatal events have occurred prior to this event– Cleared for 22 but lined up on 26 (1993)
– Poor visual cues and lighting also cited in other taxing related events by air crews
• Similar non-fatal events have occurred after this event
49
Findings – Part 121 OperationsWrong Runway Departures By Data Source
NOTE: ASRS database with certain exceptions captures ~ 18% of reports received by NASA on monthly basis0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
ASRS
PDS
NTSB (I)
AIDS (I)
PTRS
NTSB (A)
84
32
1
50
Findings – Part 121 Operations
Air Carrier Reported Wrong Runway Events (1981-2006)
Cleveland
Houston
Salt Lake CityMiami
ChicagoLexington
NOTE: ASRS database captures only 18% of all reports received by NASA on monthly basis0
5
10
15
20
25
30
51
Part 121 Contributing Factors
52
JIMDAT Mitigation Assessment
Risk Eliminated
53
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Findings – Part 135 OperationsWrong Runway Events (1981-2006)
NOTE: ASRS database with certain exceptions captures ~ 18% of reports received by NASA on monthly basis
Cleveland
Houston
Los Angeles
RichmondSyracuse Anchorage
PART 121
54
Part 139 (Class 1) Airport Review
355 Airports
International CollaborationInternational Collaboration
• Sharing of CAST safety products worldwide – Sharing of CAST safety products worldwide – COSCAP, GASR, etcCOSCAP, GASR, etc
• CAST ICAO Common TaxonomyCAST ICAO Common Taxonomy• ECCAIRs – common taxonomy, developing data ECCAIRs – common taxonomy, developing data
sharing proposalssharing proposals• TCAS RA mitigation study – including TCAS RA mitigation study – including
EurocontrolEurocontrol• Desire increased connectivity with ICAO ISDCAS Desire increased connectivity with ICAO ISDCAS
(Integrated Safety Data Collection and Analysis (Integrated Safety Data Collection and Analysis System) System)
• IATA GSIC – Evaluating sharing top level safety IATA GSIC – Evaluating sharing top level safety hazardshazards
• Partnered with E-CASTPartnered with E-CAST
http://www.cast-safety.org/http://www.cast-safety.org/http://www.cast-safety.org/http://www.cast-safety.org/
QUESTIONS?