business and management - institute and faculty of actuaries · the institute's collection of...

Reading List

Business and

Management

2009-2012

Institute and Faculty of Actuaries

December 2012

Compiled by Scott McLachlan

iii

INSTITUTE AND FACULTY OF ACTUARIES

LIBRARY SERVICES Napier House

4 Worcester Street

OXFORD OX1 2AW

Tel 01865 268208

Fax 01865 268211

(Please note there is

no physical library

at Napier House.)

Staple Inn Hall

High Holborn

LONDON WC1V 7QJ

Tel 020 7632 2114

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18 Dublin Street

EDINBURGH EH1 3PP

Tel 0131 240 1311

Fax 0131 240 1313

e-mail: [email protected]

**********

mailto:[email protected]

iv

THE LIBRARIES

The Actuarial Profession‟s libraries offer a wide selection of resources, covering actuarial science, mathematics,

statistics, finance, investment, pensions, insurance, healthcare, social policy, demography, business and risk

management. Our extensive range of online resources are available to you wherever you are.

The Libraries reserve the right to restrict the availability of any service to members of the Faculty and Institute of Actuaries

only.

ACCESS

The Libraries are open to all members of the Faculty and Institute. Opening hours are 9:00 to 17:00 Monday to Friday. Closed

on public holidays. If you are planning a visit, please let us know so we can ensure someone is available to welcome

you.

Online access to electronic resources is available through Athens: www.openathens.net

Members are entitled to a free account. For an account please email the libraries, quoting your ARN number.

LENDING

We can post books to members and other approved borrowers in the UK and overseas. We hold multiple copies of

popular titles. If an item is not in stock we will usually buy it or obtain it from another library.

PHOTOCOPYING

We can post, fax or email single copies of periodical articles and extracts from books, subject to copyright regulations.

ENQUIRIES

We can search for information, statistics and hard-to-trace references. We aim to respond within 24 hours.

ONLINE CATALOGUE

The online catalogue is available at: http://actuaries.soutron.net

READING LISTS

We produce topical lists of recent publications which you can download from the libraries area of the website. We can

compile customized lists on request (contact [email protected]) or you can search the library catalogue.

THE HISTORICAL COLLECTION

The Institute's collection of historical material is housed at Staple Inn. This collection comprises all books published before

1870, those of historical interest published 1870 - 1959 and historical studies published subsequently. It also includes full

sets of the Journal of the Institute of Actuaries, Journal of the Staple Inn Actuarial Society, Transactions of the Faculty of

Actuaries, Transactions of the International Congress of Actuaries, the journals of many overseas actuarial bodies, copies of

tuition material and a reference collection. Opening hours are 9.00am to 5.00pm. Prospective visitors are advised to

telephone in advance.

PUBLICATIONS SHOP

We stock all publications issued by the Profession, including Core Reading, Formulae and tables and titles from the list

of suggested further reading for the CT and SA exams. We offer discounts on a range of books and calculators approved

for the profession‟s exams. You can place orders and find news of the latest discounts at

http://www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/eshop

FEES FOR SERVICES

There may be a fee for some services. Please check the libraries pages on the website at:

www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/pages/borrowing

http://www.openathens.net/

mailto:[email protected]?subject=Athens%20account

http://actuaries.soutron.net/

mailto:[email protected]

http://actuaries.soutron.net/

http://www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/eshop

http://www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/pages/borrowing

v

Contents ACTUARIAL EDUCATION ................................................................................................................................ 1

ACTUARIAL PROFESSION ............................................................................................................................... 1

ADVISERS ......................................................................................................................................................... 1

ASSET VALUATION .......................................................................................................................................... 1

ATTITUDES....................................................................................................................................................... 2

AUSTRALIA ....................................................................................................................................................... 2

BAHRAIN .......................................................................................................................................................... 2

BANKRUPTCY................................................................................................................................................... 2

BANKS AND BANKING ..................................................................................................................................... 3

BENCHMARKING ............................................................................................................................................. 3

BIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................................... 3

BONUS SYSTEMS .............................................................................................................................................. 3

BUSINESS .......................................................................................................................................................... 4

BUSINESS CYCLES ............................................................................................................................................ 5

BUSINESS ENTERPRISE .................................................................................................................................. 5

BUSINESS FORMATION AND LIQUIDATION ................................................................................................. 5

CAREERS ........................................................................................................................................................... 6

CATASTROPHE ................................................................................................................................................. 6

CHANGE ............................................................................................................................................................ 6

COMMUNICATION SKILLS .............................................................................................................................. 6

COMPETITION .................................................................................................................................................. 6

COMPLIANCE ................................................................................................................................................... 7

CONSULTANCY................................................................................................................................................. 7

CONSUMER PROTECTION ............................................................................................................................... 7

CORPORATE STRATEGY.................................................................................................................................. 7

COST CONTROL ................................................................................................................................................ 8

CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................ 8

DECISION MAKING .......................................................................................................................................... 9

vi

DEFINED BENEFIT SCHEMES ......................................................................................................................... 9

DICTIONARIES ................................................................................................................................................. 9

DISCLOSURE ..................................................................................................................................................... 9

ECONOMICS ...................................................................................................................................................... 9

ENVIRONMENT .............................................................................................................................................. 10

FINANCIAL CRISES ........................................................................................................................................ 10

FINANCIAL MARKETS ................................................................................................................................... 10

FINANCIAL REPORTS .................................................................................................................................... 11

FUTURE STUDIES .......................................................................................................................................... 11

GENERAL INSURANCE .................................................................................................................................. 11

GERMANY ....................................................................................................................................................... 13

GOVERNANCE ................................................................................................................................................ 13

GOVERNMENT ACTUARY .............................................................................................................................. 14

HEALTH AND SAFETY ................................................................................................................................... 14

HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ......................................................................................................... 15

INDIA .............................................................................................................................................................. 15

INSOLVENCY .................................................................................................................................................. 15

INSURANCE .................................................................................................................................................... 15

INSURANCE COMPANIES .............................................................................................................................. 15

INSURANCE COMPANY ................................................................................................................................. 16

INSURANCE INDUSTRY ................................................................................................................................. 16

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY .......................................................................................................................... 16

ISLAM .............................................................................................................................................................. 16

LIABILITIES .................................................................................................................................................... 17

LIABILITY INSURANCE.................................................................................................................................. 17

LIFE ASSURANCE ........................................................................................................................................... 17

LIFE INSURANCE ........................................................................................................................................... 17

LUCK ............................................................................................................................................................... 18

vii

MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................................................... 18

MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION STRUCTURE ............................................................................................ 19

MIDDLE EAST ................................................................................................................................................. 19

MUTUAL LIFE OFFICE ................................................................................................................................... 19

NETHERLANDS .............................................................................................................................................. 19

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH ............................................................................................................................. 19

OPTIMAL REINSURANCE .............................................................................................................................. 20

ORGANISATION AND METHODS .................................................................................................................. 20

PART VII / PART VIII TRANSFERS ............................................................................................................... 20

PENSION FUND ADMINISTRATION ............................................................................................................. 21

PHILOSOPHY .................................................................................................................................................. 21

PLANNING ...................................................................................................................................................... 21

POLICYHOLDERS PROTECTION ................................................................................................................... 22

PRICING .......................................................................................................................................................... 22

PROFESSIONAL BODIES ................................................................................................................................ 22

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ............................................................................................................................ 22

PROFIT AND LOSS ......................................................................................................................................... 22

PROJECT MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................. 23

PROPERTY INSURANCE ................................................................................................................................ 23

REGULATION ................................................................................................................................................. 23

REPUTATION RISK ........................................................................................................................................ 24

RISK ................................................................................................................................................................. 24

RISK MANAGEMENT ..................................................................................................................................... 25

RISK MEASUREMENT .................................................................................................................................... 26

RUIN PROBABILITY ....................................................................................................................................... 26

SAUDI ARABIA ............................................................................................................................................... 26

SCOTLAND ...................................................................................................................................................... 27

SOLVENCY ...................................................................................................................................................... 27

viii

SOLVENCY II ................................................................................................................................................... 27

SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................................................................................................... 27

STOCHASTIC PROCESSES .............................................................................................................................. 27

TAKAFUL INSURANCE................................................................................................................................... 28

TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS ......................................................................................................................... 28

TECHNOLOGY ................................................................................................................................................ 28

TRENDS .......................................................................................................................................................... 29

UNDERWRITING ............................................................................................................................................ 29

UNITED KINGDOM ......................................................................................................................................... 29

UNITED STATES ............................................................................................................................................. 29

YEARBOOKS ................................................................................................................................................... 30

1

ACTUARIAL EDUCATION You won't be BAMboozled : Student page. Paines, Stephen Staple Inn Actuarial Society, - 1 pages. [RKN: 72084] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2010) Jan / Feb : 40.

Stephen Paines asks if CT9 'creates and captures value' http://www.theactuary.com/archive

ACTUARIAL PROFESSION

Careers: Breaking the actuarial ceiling. Stefan, Michael Staple Inn Actuarial Society, [RKN: 72013] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2010) January

Michael Stefan analyses the skills, experience and development opportunities for actuaries looking to progress to senior management roles Special online only edition for January 2010 http://www.theactuary.com/archive

Careers: Face to face. Manson, Louis Staple Inn Actuarial Society, [RKN: 72014] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2010) January

Louis Manson provides top tips for that all important interview Special online only edition for January 2010 http://www.theactuary.com/archive

Code of professional conduct. Institute of Actuaries of Australia (2009). Institute of Actuaries of Australia, 2009. - 10 pages. [RKN: 71929]

http://www.actuaries.asn.au/NR/rdonlyres/60AF0A2B-3E13-406F-AE7E-9DE9568F28E8/5495/CodeofProfessionalConductNov2009.pdf

The influential actuary: how actuaries and other technically-oriented professionals set themselves apart. Miller, David C (2010). - Winsted, CT (USA): Actex Publications, 2010. - vi, 247 pages. [RKN: 44518] Shelved at: AA/EZD (Lon)

International: The Middle Eastern actuary. Staple Inn Actuarial Society, [RKN: 72015] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2010) January

The Middle East is not often thought of as a first-choice destination for actuaries but the presence of actuarial resources is growing. We asked four readers to offer a glimpse of life and career prospects in the region. Special online only edition for January 2010 http://www.theactuary.com/archive

ADVISERS

Cost of providing financial advice : Identifying and quantifying the cost of the key components of a full advice service. Malcolm, Kyla; Wilsdon, Tim; Xie, Charles; Charles River Associates (2010). Association of British Insurers, 2010. - 56 pages. [RKN: 72504]

The aim of the research is to identify the key components of a “full advice” service and to quantify the time and costs associated with each individual component. This also enables us to set out the minimum value of premiums that can be profitably served and the associated market size of potentially profitable customers. http://www.abi.org.uk/Publications/ABI Publications Cost of Providing Financial Advice ABI Research Report No22 2010 b44.aspx

ASSET VALUATION

The role of asset consulting in transforming investment decision-making: The integration of environmental, social and governance considerations into corporate valuation. Knight, Eric; Dixon, Adam (2009). University of Oxford: School of Geography and the Environment, 2009. - 36 pages. [RKN: 71708]

This paper seeks to address a gap in the professional services literature around theoretical conceptualisations of the role of investment consultants in pension fund decision-making. This role is considered in light of recent moves within the finance community to integrate environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations into corporate valuation analysis; a move which has gained momentum following the shortcomings in financial model making elucidated by the global financial crisis. Using survey data collected by the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative to develop theoretical arguments, this paper portrays the consultant in a conflicted position as both thought-leader with direct access to trustee board decision-making, and as corporate follower where client demands prevail. It is suggested that higher levels of expertise and knowledge strengthen consultants' ability to take a leadership position in the adviser-client relationship. In cases where consultants have superior expertise, they are able to build more influential relationships with their clients and colleagues, and overcome systemic and cultural barriers to new investment approaches within the investment community Keywords: ESG, Corporate governance, investment consulting, financial crisis, environment, finance. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1507133

2

ATTITUDES

Characterizing Risk Attitudes of Industrial Managers. Harrison, Glenn W; Moritz, Sebastian; Pibernik, Richard (2010). - Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2010. - 38 pages. [RKN: 73335]

We study the risk attitudes of an important segment of the economy: managers. We conduct artefactual field experiments with 130 managers from 12 industrial companies. Our analysis is particularly careful to evaluate alternative models of decision-making under risk. In general, we find that the managers in our sample are moderately risk averse. Assuming a standard EUT model they exhibit similar risk attitudes as other sample populations. However, we find some differences within our sample. Superiors exhibit a higher level of risk aversion than team members that work for them in their department. Comparing purchasing managers with a random sample of non-purchasing managers from different corporate functions such as controlling, sales, engineering and so on, we cannot conclude that they differ from each other. We show that alternative theories of risky behavior provide complementary information on the risk attitude of industrial managers. While an expected utility theory model only characterizes managers as globally risk averse, we learn from a prospect theory model that the managers in our sample are only risk averse for a certain range of payoffs. For other payoffs, they even exhibit risk-seeking behaviour. The reference point that determines which outcomes are to be viewed as losses and which as gains is not that induced by the task frame. We show that subjects had implicit expectations about their earning in the experiment, and used these expectations to evaluate the lotteries presented to them. Remarkably, the managers in our sample did not weigh probabilities and they did not exhibit a hypothetical bias in their decisions. http://cear.gsu.edu/files/Characterizing Risk Attitudes of Industrial Managers.pdf

AUSTRALIA

The Decision to Demutualise: An Analysis of the Pressures for Change. The case of life insurers in Australia and South Africa a comparative perspective.. Keneley, M J; Verhoef, G (2010). Accounting History International Conference, 2010. - 35 pages. [RKN: 73326]

Since the 1980s a wave of demutualisations have occurred across a range of industries from stock exchanges to building societies, savings and loans associations and insurers. In both Australia and South Africa this has had a marked effect on the life insurance markets which had been dominated by mutual life insurers for 150 years. This paper adopts a case study approach to analyse the key drivers of organisational change. It examines the experiences of the Australian Mutual Provident (Australia‟s oldest and largest life insurance mutual) and Sanlam (the second largest mutual life office in South Africa) as they proceeded down the path to demutualisation. It suggests a complex array of factors combined to place pressure on the existing mutual structures. http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/6ahic/Publications/6AHIC-18 FINAL paper.pdf

BAHRAIN



BANKRUPTCY

The Omega model: from bankruptcy to occupation times in the red. Gerber, Hans U; Shiu, Elias S W; Yang, Hailiang [RKN: 44850] Shelved at: online only European Actuarial Journal (2012) 2(2) December : 259-272.

Ruin occurs the first time when the surplus of a company or an institution is negative. In the Omega model, it is assumed that even with a negative surplus, the company can do business as usual until bankruptcy occurs. The probability of bankruptcy at a point of time only depends on the value of the negative surplus at that time. Under the assumption of Brownian motion for the surplus, the expected discounted value of a penalty at bankruptcy is determined, and hence the probability of bankruptcy. There is an intrinsic relation between the probability of no bankruptcy and an exposure random variable. In special cases, the distribution of the total time the Brownian motion spends below zero is found, and the Laplace transform of the integral of the negative part of the Brownian motion is expressed in terms of the Airy function of the first kind. Available via Athens: Springer -- Published online, December 2012 http://www.openathens.net

3

BANKS AND BANKING

Banking: Mind the gap. Rolland, Gail Staple Inn Actuarial Society, - 2 pages. [RKN: 71741] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2009) December : 36-37.

Gail Rolland asks whether a knowledge gap exists between banks and institutional investors and looks at what can be done to narrow it http://www.theactuary.com/archive

BENCHMARKING

Resilience Benchmarking – Insurance Sector. (2010). - London: Financial Services Authority, 2010. - 14 pages. [RKN: 72489]

The UK insurance industry contributes significantly to the economy. It is essential to individuals and businesses who wish to manage risks and recover losses in the face of the unexpected. Therefore, the sector‟s resilience and recovery capability in the event of a major operational disruption (such as a terrorist attack, severe weather or a flu pandemic) is vital. The Resilience Benchmarking Survey for the insurance sector was developed to provide an initial assessment of how prepared the insurance sector is for disruptions such as these. It sought to address three main questions: How resilient would the insurance sector be if faced with a major operational disruption? How quickly could it recover? What needs to be done to improve its resilience? http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/fsc/Pages/resiliencebenchmarking.aspx

BIOGRAPHY

Who's who in Scotland 2010. (2010). - Mauchline: Carrick Media, 2010. - 555 pages. [RKN: 61355] Shelved at: REF 920 WHO

BONUS SYSTEMS

Do U.S. insurance firms offer the “wrong” incentives to their executives?. Milidonis, Andreas; Stathopoulos, Konstantinos - 30 pages. [RKN: 74868] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 643–672.

We examine the relation between executive compensation and market-implied default risk for listed insurance firms from 1992 to 2007. Shareholders are expected to encourage managerial risk sharing through equity-based incentive compensation. We find that long-term incentives and other share-based plans do not affect the default risk faced by firms. However, the extensive use of stock options leads to higher future default risk for insurance firms. We argue that this is because option-based incentives induce managerial risk-taking behavior, which seeks to maximize managerial payoff through equity volatility. This could be detrimental to the interests of shareholders, especially during a financial crisis. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

Earnings smoothing, executive compensation, and corporate governance : Evidence from the property-liability insurance industry. Eckles, David L; Halek, Martin; He, Enya; Sommer, David W; Zhang, Rongrong - 30 pages. [RKN: 74872] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 761–790.

Unlike studies that estimate managerial bias, we utilize a direct measure of managerial bias in the U.S. insurance industry to investigate the effects of executive compensation and corporate governance on firms‟ earnings management behaviors. We find managers receiving larger bonuses and stock awards tend to make reserving decisions that serve to decrease firm earnings. Moreover, we examine the monitoring effect of corporate board structures in mitigating managers‟ reserve manipulation practices. We find managers are more likely to manipulate reserves in the presence of particular board structures. Similar results are not found when we employ traditional estimated measures of managerial bias. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

The sad saga of Equitable Life : Letters to the editor. Webber, Donald M Staple Inn Actuarial Society, - 1 pages. [RKN: 71747] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2009) December : 6.

Webber comments on reporting in the November 2009 edition of The Actuary on the latest happenings with the situation with Equitable Life. He describes the reporting as "unbalanced", as he suggests that the downfall of Equitable Life was due to a "flawed" judgment from the Law Lords in 2000, rather than due to any actions of the Government Actuary's Department. http://www.theactuary.com/archive

4

BUSINESS

Commercial liability: A challenge for businesses and their insurers. Swiss Reinsurance Company - Zurich: Swiss Reinsurance Company, - 34 pages. [RKN: 71956] Shelved at: JOU Sigma (2009) 5

http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma5 2009 en.pdf

The Cost Efficiency of Takaful Insurance Companies. Kader, Hale Abdul; Adams, Mike; Hardwick, Philip - 21 pages. [RKN: 73303] Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance (2010) 35(1) : 161-181.

This study examines the cost efficiency of non-life Takaful insurance firms operating in 10 Islamic countries. Non-parametric data envelopment analysis is used to compute cost efficiency scores and a second-stage logit transformation regression model is then estimated to test the influence of corporate characteristics on these efficiencies. We find that non-executive directors and separating the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman functions do not improve cost efficiency. However, board size, firm size and product specialisation have positive effects on the cost efficiency of Takaful insurers. In contrast, the regulatory environment is found not to be statistically significant in terms of improving cost efficiency. We conclude that our results could have important commercial and policy implications. Available via Athens: Palgrave MacMillan http://www.openathens.net

Economics for business. Sloman, John; Hinde, Kevin; Garratt, Dean (2010). - 5th ed. - Harlow: FT Prentice Hall, 2010. - 742 + web appendix + glossary + index pages. [RKN: 39553] Shelved at: JA (Lon) JA ref (Lon) Shelved at: 330 SLO

This classic and successful text combines Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, International Economics and Business Economics and Strategy in one user-friendly book and is ideal for anyone studying economics with a business perspective. This 5th edition has an updated format and more recent examples in a number of places - in particular, updating to include reference to the recent banking and credit crises. The 5th ed. has an updated format and more recent examples in a number of places - in particular, updating to include reference to the recent banking and credit crises, than the 4th ed. The September 2010 CT7 exam paper has been drafted to reflect the 4th edition. However, as the theory covered is the same, students who use the newer version should not be disadvantaged. For the 2011 exams the 5th edition of Economics for business only will be used. -- 4th ed. available: RKN 38420 http://www.myilibrary.com?id=327529&Ref=Athens

Impact of underwriting cycles on the solvency of an insurance company. Trufin, Julien; Albrecher, Hansjörg; Denuit, Michel (2009). Society of Actuaries, 2009. - 21 pages. [RKN: 71631] Shelved at: Per: NAAJ (Oxf) Per NAAJ (Lon) Shelved at: NOR/AME North American Actuarial Journal (2009) 13 (3) : 385-403.

This paper studies the solvency of an insurance firm in the presence of underwriting cycles. A small or medium-size insurance company with a price-taker position in the market is considered. Its premium income is assumed to obey an autoregressive process with cycles. Specifically, the premium income for a specific calendar year is influenced by the market experience of the last couple of years. Under this classical AR(2) dynamics governing the premium income, an explicit expression for the ultimate ruin probability is derived, using a martingale approach, in the light-tailed claims case. Furthermore, the logarithmic asymptotic behaviour of the ultimate ruin probability as well as the typical path to ruin are investigated. Then a comparison is made with the classical case where the same company operates on a market without such cycles. Asymptotically, the presence of market cycles is shown to increase the risk for the company. Numerical illustrations are performed on Canadian motor insurance market data and support the theoretical analysis. http://www.soa.org/news-and-publications/publications/journals/naaj/naaj-detail.aspx

Knowing your clients and identifying opportunities [copies of slides]. Le Beau, Peter (2009). Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, 2009. [RKN: 73444] Shelved at: Online only Shelved at: Online only

The U.S. Property and Liability Insurance Industry: Firm Growth, Size, and Age. Choi, Byeongyong Paul - 15 pages. [RKN: 73284] Shelved at: RIS/MAN Risk Management and Insurance Review (2010) 13 (2) : 207-224.

The relationship between firm size, age, and growth is tested for the U.S. property and liability (P-L) insurance industry, and the determinants of firm characteristics on firm growth are analyzed. Using Heckman's two-stage methodology, this article examines the relationship between corporate growth and firm size. The relationship between firm growth and firm age is also investigated. Furthermore, to determine time-varying effects, the analysis is conducted for the different subperiods. The results of this article strongly support Gibrat's Law in the U.S. P-L insurance market for the testing periods. The results are consistent for longer time periods and for shorter subperiods. It also finds that young firms grow faster than old firms during the sample periods. Related to the determinants of firm characteristics on firm growth, insurers using less input cost tend to grow fast. Economies of scope are positively related to firm growth as well. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

Visions For The Future Of The Life Insurance Sector. (2009). Society of Actuaries, 2009. - 32 pages. [RKN: 71690] The top 10 essays selected from those submitted by members of the Society of Actuaries in response to: Life Insurance 2020 Foresight – A Call for Essays. Each author submitted a short essay in response to the following questions: What is your vision of a financially sound, operationally efficient, growing and profitable company operating in the life insurance sector in the year 2020? What are the critical issues that this company must address between now and 2020? http://www.soa.org/library/essays/life-essay-2009.pdf

5

You won't be BAMboozled : Student page. Paines, Stephen Staple Inn Actuarial Society, - 1 pages. [RKN: 72084] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2010) Jan / Feb : 40.

Stephen Paines asks if CT9 'creates and captures value' http://www.theactuary.com/archive

BUSINESS CYCLES



The trouble with markets : Saving capitalism from itself. Bootle, Roger (2009). - London: Nicholas Brealey, 2009. - xi,276 pages. [RKN: 39366] Shelved at: EB/JNH (Lon)

The trouble with markets : Saving capitalism from itself. Bootle, Roger (2011). - 2nd ed. - London: Nicholas Brealey, 2011. - 322 pages. [RKN: 74777] Shelved at: 330.12

In this completely revised and updated edition of his prescient and widely acclaimed book, Bootle extends his analysis to include the current sovereign debt crisis, the plight of the euro, the intensity of the squeeze on public spending and consumer incomes, and the boom in commodity prices and gold. Beyond this, Bootle offers not only a serious critique of the free-market mindset, but also a plan for radical reform of the system and a way out of the economic mess: the growth solution. Reviewed in The Actuary, November 2011

BUSINESS ENTERPRISE

Business continuity management. Guidance on human aspects of business continuity. British Standards Institution (2010). 2010. [RKN: 73319] - PD 25111:2010. Shelved at: 658.4056.22 BUS

PD 25111 gives guidance on the planning and development of human resource strategies and policies for the key phases following a disruption: Coping with the immediate effects of the incident Managing people during the period of disruption (the continuity stage) Supporting staff after recovery of normal operations. This PD supports business continuity, as covered in BS 25999, highlighting the needs of people who could be involved in, or affected by, a disruption. This PD is not a definitive guide to managing an incident, but a review of the implications for managing the impacts on staff and others who could be affected.


Scottish Business Insider deals and dealmakers yearbook. Scottish Business Insider (2012). - 2011 ed. - Edinburgh: Insider Group, 2012. - 168 pages. [RKN: 62711] Shelved at: 650 SCO

2010-

BUSINESS FORMATION AND LIQUIDATION


2010-

6

CAREERS

Careers: Breaking the actuarial ceiling. Stefan, Michael Staple Inn Actuarial Society, [RKN: 72013] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2010) January

Michael Stefan analyses the skills, experience and development opportunities for actuaries looking to progress to senior management roles Special online only edition for January 2010 http://www.theactuary.com/archive

Careers: Face to face. Manson, Louis Staple Inn Actuarial Society, [RKN: 72014] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2010) January

Louis Manson provides top tips for that all important interview Special online only edition for January 2010 http://www.theactuary.com/archive

CATASTROPHE



Resilience Benchmarking – Insurance Sector. (2010). - London: Financial Services Authority, 2010. - 14 pages. [RKN: 72489] The UK insurance industry contributes significantly to the economy. It is essential to individuals and businesses who wish to manage risks and recover losses in the face of the unexpected. Therefore, the sector‟s resilience and recovery capability in the event of a major operational disruption (such as a terrorist attack, severe weather or a flu pandemic) is vital. The Resilience Benchmarking Survey for the insurance sector was developed to provide an initial assessment of how prepared the insurance sector is for disruptions such as these. It sought to address three main questions: How resilient would the insurance sector be if faced with a major operational disruption? How quickly could it recover? What needs to be done to improve its resilience? http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/fsc/Pages/resiliencebenchmarking.aspx

CHANGE

Successful Delivery of Large Scale Actuarial Change Programmes : Perceptions and Reality [copies of slides]. Jones, Sam; Fox, Joel (2009). Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, 2009. [RKN: 73455] Shelved at: Online only Shelved at: Online only

COMMUNICATION SKILLS


Who's who in the zoo? Building credible business relationships [copies of slides]. Strange, Judith; Dalziel, Shirley (2009). Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, 2009. [RKN: 73453] Shelved at: Online only Shelved at: Online only

COMPETITION

What Effect Did AIG's Bailout, and the Preceding Events, Have on Its Competitors?. Egginton, Jared F; Hilliard, James I; Liebenberg, Andre P; Liebenberg, Ivonne A - 25 pages. [RKN: 73285] Shelved at: RIS/MAN Risk Management and Insurance Review (2010) 13 (2) : 225-249.

We examine the effect of American International Group's (AIG) bailout, and the events leading up to it, on its insurance industry rivals. The reaction of rivals to AIG-related events depends on the relative strength of two competing effects. The contagion effect implies that rival returns will decrease following negative events affecting AIG. In contrast, competitive effects will occur if

7

investors expect that rivals will be able to benefit from AIG's downfall. Using three-factor multivariate regression model event study methodology, we find evidence of both effects around several key dates in AIG's decline. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

COMPLIANCE

Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age. Bamberger, Kenneth A [RKN: 73334] Texas law review (2010) (4) : 669-739.

Legal scholarship has been silent about a phenomenon with profound implications for governance: the automation of compliance with laws mandating risk management. Regulations - from bank capitalization rules, to Sarbanes-Oxley‟s provisions on financial fraud and misrepresentation, to laws governing information-privacy protection - frequently require regulated firms to develop internal processes to identify, assess, and mitigate risk. To comply, firms have turned wholesale to technology systems and computational analytics that measure and predict corporate risk levels and “force” decisions accordingly. In total, the third-party market for compliance-technology products - known generally as “governance, risk, and compliance” (GRC) software, systems, and services - alone grew to $52 billion last year, and this growth is poised to increase exponentially. While these technology systems offer powerful compliance tools, they also pose real perils. They permit computer programmers to interpret legal requirements; they mask the uncertainty of the very hazards with which policy makers are concerned; they skew decision making through an “automation bias” that privileges personal self-interest over sound judgment; and their lack of transparency thwarts oversight and accountability. These phenomena played a critical role in the recent financial crisis. This Article explores these developments and the failure of risk regulation to address them. While regulators have lauded the turn to technology, they have ignored its perils. By contrast, the Article investigates the accountability challenges posed by these and other technologies of control, and suggests specific reform measures for policy makers revisiting the governance of risk. It argues for more activist regulator oversight backed by sanctions before disaster has occurred. But it also emphasizes collaboration in developing risk-management systems, drawing both on the granular expertise of firms and the broader vantage of administrative agencies. Most importantly, it seeks better to reflect the human decision-making element at both levels: to recognize the ways in which technology can hinder good judgment, to reintroduce human inputs in the decision process, and to reflect the limits of both human and computer reasoning. Keywords: Technology, Compliance, Automation, Administrative Agencies, Regulation, New Governance, Risk Management, Accountability, Judgment, Automation Bias, Organizational Decisionmaking, Financial Services Regulation http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1463727##

CONSULTANCY



CONSUMER PROTECTION

A fresh vision. Wallace, Isobel Staple Inn Actuarial Society, [RKN: 73704] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2011) November : 28.

Isobel Wallace reports back from Next Generation Vision, a project to improve public perception of the UK financial services industry over the next 10 to 15 years http://www.theactuary.com/

CORPORATE STRATEGY

Chief Executive officer incentives, monitoring, and corporate risk management : Evidence from insurance use. Adams, Mike; Lin, Chen; Zou, Hong - 32 pages. [RKN: 74865] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 551-582.

Corporate governance and risk management issues have received prominent publicity in recent years following several major

8

company failures such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. While prior studies have examined this issue within the context of derivatives‟ trading, little is known regarding the linkage between corporate governance and alternative corporate risk management activities such as insurance. Using a detailed firm survey conducted by the World Bank (2004), we examine the impacts of various governance monitoring mechanisms and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on the corporate insurance decision. Overall, our results suggest that both monitoring mechanisms and managerial incentives induce the corporate purchase of property insurance. However, the purchase of property insurance for managerial self-interest is only prevalent in firms subject to lax monitoring, and the determinants of insurance purchases are more in line with the prediction of the economic theory in firms with strong monitoring. In addition, our study contributes a number of new insights into the determinants of corporate purchase of property insurance. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

Harvard Business Review on managing external risk. (2009). [pbk]. - Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2009. - 218 pages. [RKN: 63329] Shelved at: 658.155 22 HAR

"Businesses today are operating amid unprecedented uncertainty. The greater the uncertainty, the more ominous and numerous are the threats to your company. To manage external risk, you'll need to select the right analytical tools and incorporate risk into your strategic decision making. This collection shows you how, providing powerful frameworks, tools, and examples for mastering this crucial competency."

The impact of CEO turnover on property–liability insurer performance. He, Enya; Sommer, David W; Xie, Xiaoying - 26 pages. [RKN: 74866] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 583-608.

Chief executive officer (CEO) turnover has long been an important topic in the academic literature. Previous research has focused mostly on the rationale for CEO turnovers, or circumstances that lead to CEO changes, with much less attention paid to how CEO turnovers affect future firm performance. We extend the literature regarding the impact of CEO turnover on performance using data for U.S. property-liability insurers. Measuring firm performance with cost efficiency (CE) and revenue efficiency (RE) scores, we find strong support for the hypothesis that firms with a CEO turnover, especially those with a nonroutine turnover, experience more favorable performance changes than firms without a CEO turnover. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

A Resource-Based Perspective on Business Strategies of Newly Founded Subsidiaries: The Case of German Pensionsfonds. Berry-Stölzle, Thomas R; Altuntas, Muhammed - 21 pages. [RKN: 73282] Shelved at: RIS/MAN Risk Management and Insurance Review (2010) 13 (2) : 173-193.

Diversification by firms into unfamiliar areas of business is achieved either by acquisition of an existing business in the destination industry or a greenfield start-up. This article focuses on the business strategy of greenfield start-ups. We theorize and find that firms entering a market by establishing a new subsidiary rely solely on their own preexisting internal resources, making it favourable to align the business strategy of the start-up with the firm's value-generating competencies. Our empirical results, which are based on a sample of German Pensionsfonds and their parent companies, are consistent with the view that the business strategy choice of a newly founded subsidiary is substantially directed by the internal resources and competencies of the parent firm. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

COST CONTROL



CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

Banking: Mind the gap. Rolland, Gail Staple Inn Actuarial Society, - 2 pages. [RKN: 71741] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2009) December : 36-37.

Gail Rolland asks whether a knowledge gap exists between banks and institutional investors and looks at what can be done to narrow it http://www.theactuary.com/archive

Knowing your clients and identifying opportunities [copies of slides]. Le Beau, Peter (2009). Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, 2009. [RKN: 73444] Shelved at: Online only Shelved at: Online only

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Who's who in the zoo? Building credible business relationships [copies of slides]. Strange, Judith; Dalziel, Shirley (2009). Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, 2009. [RKN: 73453] Shelved at: Online only Shelved at: Online only

DECISION MAKING



DEFINED BENEFIT SCHEMES

Pension risk disclosures by FTSE 100 companies. O'Brien, Christopher D; Woods, Margaret; Billings, Mark (2010). - Edinburgh: Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 2010. - 55 pages. [RKN: 73145]

This research summary outlines the findings of a survey of the information included in the annual reports of FTSE 100 companies concerning the risks associated with their provision of a DBPS. The analysis covers all 88 companies in the FTSE 100 on 31st December 2009 which operate a DBPS, of which 80 have a UK based scheme. The aim was to gain a better understanding of current disclosure practice in relation to pension scheme risks, and use that knowledge to provide informed comment upon the ED, thereby using academic research as a tool to inform policy making. http://www.icas.org.uk/site/cms/download/res/Woods Report Sep 10.pdf

DICTIONARIES


DISCLOSURE



ECONOMICS

Economics for business. Sloman, John; Hinde, Kevin; Garratt, Dean (2010). - 5th ed. - Harlow: FT Prentice Hall, 2010. - 742 + web appendix + glossary + index pages. [RKN: 39553] Shelved at: JA (Lon) JA ref (Lon) Shelved at: 330 SLO

This classic and successful text combines Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, International Economics and Business Economics and Strategy in one user-friendly book and is ideal for anyone studying economics with a business perspective. This 5th edition has an updated format and more recent examples in a number of places - in particular, updating to include reference to the recent banking and credit crises. The 5th ed. has an updated format and more recent examples in a number of places - in particular, updating to include reference to the recent banking and credit crises, than the 4th ed. The September 2010 CT7 exam paper has been drafted to

10

reflect the 4th edition. However, as the theory covered is the same, students who use the newer version should not be disadvantaged. For the 2011 exams the 5th edition of Economics for business only will be used. -- 4th ed. available: RKN 38420 http://www.myilibrary.com?id=327529&Ref=Athens

ENVIRONMENT



FINANCIAL CRISES




We examine the effect of American International Group's (AIG) bailout, and the events leading up to it, on its insurance industry rivals. The reaction of rivals to AIG-related events depends on the relative strength of two competing effects. The contagion effect implies that rival returns will decrease following negative events affecting AIG. In contrast, competitive effects will occur if investors expect that rivals will be able to benefit from AIG's downfall. Using three-factor multivariate regression model event study methodology, we find evidence of both effects around several key dates in AIG's decline. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

FINANCIAL MARKETS

The trouble with markets : Saving capitalism from itself. Bootle, Roger (2009). - London: Nicholas Brealey, 2009. - xi,276 pages. [RKN: 39366] Shelved at: EB/JNH (Lon)



11

FINANCIAL REPORTS

The Future of Financial Reporting in the UK and the Republic of Ireland : Part One : Explanation. Accounting Standards Board (2010). Accounting Standards Board, 2010. [RKN: 73536] Shelved at: 657.3 ACC

https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/ASB/Revised-FRED-The-Future-of-Financial-Reporting-Alt/Revised-FRED-The-Future-of-Financial-Reporting-Par.aspx

The Future of Financial Reporting in the UK and the Republic of Ireland : Part Two: Draft financial reporting standards. Accounting Standards Board (2010). Accounting Standards Board, 2010. [RKN: 73537] Shelved at: 657.3 ACC [Box 48]

See also 73536 for Part One http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/ASB/FRED-The-Future-of-Financial-Reporting-Part-Two-Dr/Responses-to-FRED-%E2%80%98The-Future-of-Financial-Reporti.aspx

The Future of Financial Reporting in the UK and the Republic of Ireland : Appendices. Accounting Standards Board (2010). Accounting Standards Board, 2010. - 85 pages. [RKN: 73538] Shelved at: 657.3 ACC [Box 48]

See also 73537 for Part Two and 73536 for Part One http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/uk/1010fredappendices.pdf

FUTURE STUDIES

Visions For The Future Of The Life Insurance Sector. (2009). Society of Actuaries, 2009. - 32 pages. [RKN: 71690]

The top 10 essays selected from those submitted by members of the Society of Actuaries in response to: Life Insurance 2020 Foresight – A Call for Essays. Each author submitted a short essay in response to the following questions: What is your vision of a financially sound, operationally efficient, growing and profitable company operating in the life insurance sector in the year 2020? What are the critical issues that this company must address between now and 2020? http://www.soa.org/library/essays/life-essay-2009.pdf

GENERAL INSURANCE

CEO turnover and ownership structure: evidence from the U.S. property–liability insurance industry. He, Enya; Sommer, David W - 29 pages. [RKN: 74869] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 673–701.

This article examines the impact of ownership structure on the relation between firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in the U.S. property–liability insurance industry. Theoretical implications of stock versus mutual ownership structures on the performance–turnover relation are ambiguous. Our empirical results indicate that CEO turnover is less responsive to firm underwriting performance in mutual insurers compared to stock insurers. In fact, we find that while CEO turnover for stock firms is negatively related to prior performance, no such relationship is found for mutual insurers. These results hold while controlling for board structure and other relevant factors. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net


Corporate governance and risk management issues have received prominent publicity in recent years following several major company failures such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. While prior studies have examined this issue within the context of derivatives‟ trading, little is known regarding the linkage between corporate governance and alternative corporate risk management activities such as insurance. Using a detailed firm survey conducted by the World Bank (2004), we examine the impacts of various governance monitoring mechanisms and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on the corporate insurance decision. Overall, our results suggest that both monitoring mechanisms and managerial incentives induce the corporate purchase of property insurance. However, the purchase of property insurance for managerial self-interest is only prevalent in firms subject to lax monitoring, and the determinants of insurance purchases are more in line with the prediction of the economic theory in firms with strong monitoring. In addition, our study contributes a number of new insights into the determinants of corporate purchase of property insurance. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

Corporate governance and efficiency: evidence from U.S. property–liability insurance industry. Huang, Li-Ying; Lai, Gene C; McNamara, Michael; Wang, Jennifer - 32 pages. [RKN: 74864] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 519-550.

This study examines the relation between corporate governance and the efficiency of the U.S. property–liability insurance industry during the period from 2000 to 2007. We find a significant relation between efficiency and corporate governance (board

12

size, proportion of independent directors on the audit committee, proportion of financial experts on the audit committee, director tenure, proportion of block shareholding, average number of directorships, proportion of insiders on the board, and auditor dependence). We also find property–liability insurers have complied with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to a large extent. Although SOX achieved the goal of greater auditor independence and might have prevented Enron-like scandals, it had some unexpected effects. For example, insurers became less efficient when they had more independent auditors because the insurers were unable to recoup the benefits of auditor independence. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

Corporate governance and issues from the insurance industry. Boubakri, Narjess - 18 pages. [RKN: 74863] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 501-518.

In this article, we review the literature and empirical research on the nature and consequences of corporate governance. We particularly assess the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and risk taking. While the article analyzes the general literature on corporate governance in publicly listed firms, we also discuss issues pertaining to the insurance industry. The article identifies avenues for future research. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net



Earnings smoothing, executive compensation, and corporate governance : Evidence from the property-liability insurance industry. Eckles, David L; Halek, Martin; He, Enya; Sommer, David W; Zhang, Rongrong - 30 pages. [RKN: 74872] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 761–790.

Unlike studies that estimate managerial bias, we utilize a direct measure of managerial bias in the U.S. insurance industry to investigate the effects of executive compensation and corporate governance on firms‟ earnings management behaviors. We find managers receiving larger bonuses and stock awards tend to make reserving decisions that serve to decrease firm earnings. Moreover, we examine the monitoring effect of corporate board structures in mitigating managers‟ reserve manipulation practices. We find managers are more likely to manipulate reserves in the presence of particular board structures. Similar results are not found when we employ traditional estimated measures of managerial bias. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

An empirical examination of stakeholder groups as monitoring sources in corporate governance . Cole, Cassandra R; He, Enya; McCullough, Kathleen A; Semykina, Anastasia; Sommer, David W - 28 pages. [RKN: 74870] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 703-730.

Insurers are formally and informally monitored by a variety of stakeholders, including reinsurers, agents, outside board members, and regulators. While other studies have generally examined these stakeholders separately, they have not accounted for the fact that there is some relation among the stakeholder groups, and the presence of these groups is likely to be jointly determined. By empirically controlling for these potential interrelations, we create a more complete assessment of the impact of these stakeholders/monitors on insurers‟ risk taking. Specifically, we find that the presence of some stakeholders offsets the degree or presence of others, and that most stakeholders/monitors are associated with a reduction of overall firm risk. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net


Chief executive officer (CEO) turnover has long been an important topic in the academic literature. Previous research has focused mostly on the rationale for CEO turnovers, or circumstances that lead to CEO changes, with much less attention paid to how CEO turnovers affect future firm performance. We extend the literature regarding the impact of CEO turnover on performance using data for U.S. property-liability insurers. Measuring firm performance with cost efficiency (CE) and revenue efficiency (RE) scores, we find strong support for the hypothesis that firms with a CEO turnover, especially those with a nonroutine turnover, experience more favorable performance changes than firms without a CEO turnover. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

Institutional ownership stability and risk taking: evidence from the life–health insurance industry. Cheng, Jiang; Elyasiani, Elyas; Jia, Jingyi - 33 pages. [RKN: 74867] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 609–641.

13

We investigate the relationship between risk taking of life–health (LH) insurers and stability of their institutional ownership within a simultaneous equation system model. Three main results are obtained. First, stable institutional ownership of is associated with lower total risk of LH insurers, supporting the prudent-man law hypothesis. Second, when investors are sorted in terms of stringency of the prudent-man restrictions, their negative effect on risk holds for all, except insurance companies, as owners of LH insurers. Third, large institutional owners do not raise the riskiness of the investee-firms, as proposed by the large shareholder hypothesis. Regulatory implications are drawn. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

Managerial discretion and corporate governance in publicly traded firms : Evidence from the property-liability insurance industry. Miller, Steve M - 30 pages. [RKN: 74871] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 731-760.

We study the incremental impact of corporate governance in mitigating managerial discretion, controlling for incentive alignment of managerial ownership. We extend the managerial discretion hypothesis to predict that for firms with the same set of governance tools, those that utilize governance tools more stringently to control agency costs will command greater contracting cost advantages, leading them to specialize in business with greater managerial discretion. Using 72 publicly traded insurers from 1994 to 2006, we find evidence supporting our hypothesis. Our findings complement the finance literature that focuses on the role of financing policies in mitigating agency costs of managerial discretion. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

Restructuring of the Dutch nonlife insurance industry: consolidation, organizational form, and focus. Bikker, Jacob A; Gorter, Janko - 22 pages. [RKN: 74849] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (1) : 163-184.

Since the deregulation of the European insurance market in 1994, Dutch nonlife insurance firms have sized up and increased their focus. Concurrently, the stock organizational form has become increasingly dominant. This article investigates these 1995–2005 trends from a cost-efficiency perspective. We observe substantial economies of scale that are even larger for smaller firms. In line with the efficient structure hypothesis, both stocks and mutuals are found to have comparative cost advantages. Supporting the strategic focus hypothesis, we find that more specialized insurers have lower costs. Thick frontier efficiency estimates point to large cost X-inefficiencies that have moderately decreased over time. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

GERMANY

A Resource-Based Perspective on Business Strategies of Newly Founded Subsidiaries: The Case of German Pensionsfonds. Berry-Stölzle, Thomas R; Altuntas, Muhammed - 21 pages. [RKN: 73282] Shelved at: RIS/MAN Risk Management and Insurance Review (2010) 13 (2) : 173-193.

Diversification by firms into unfamiliar areas of business is achieved either by acquisition of an existing business in the destination industry or a greenfield start-up. This article focuses on the business strategy of greenfield start-ups. We theorize and find that firms entering a market by establishing a new subsidiary rely solely on their own preexisting internal resources, making it favourable to align the business strategy of the start-up with the firm's value-generating competencies. Our empirical results, which are based on a sample of German Pensionsfonds and their parent companies, are consistent with the view that the business strategy choice of a newly founded subsidiary is substantially directed by the internal resources and competencies of the parent firm. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

GOVERNANCE

Guidance on the 8th EU Company Law Directive - article 41 : Guidance for boards and audit committees. Federation of European Risk Management Associations (FERMA); European Confederation of Institutes of Internal Auditing (ECIIA) (2010). 2010. - 19 pages. [RKN: 73336]

The objective of this FERMA/ECIIA Guidance is to assist board members, particularly members of the audit committee, with the implementation of art. 41 of the 8th European Company Law Directive - “[…] the audit committee shall, inter alia: monitor the effectiveness of the company‟s internal control, internal audit where applicable, and risk management systems […].”. http://www.ferma.eu/about/publications/eciia-ferma-guidance/

Guidance paper on the treatment of non-regulated entities in group-wide supervision. Insurance Groups and Cross-sectoral Issues Subcommittee (2010). International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2010. - 24 pages. [RKN: 72466]

This guidance paper considers the scope of group-wide supervision and in particular the supervisory approaches to non-regulated entities – whether non-operating holding companies (NOHCs) or non-regulated operating entities (NROEs) – within the insurance group or financial conglomerate. It is recognised that non-regulated entities within and/or connected with the other prudentially regulated non-insurance financial groups are, in principle, the subject of regulations of the other financial sectors. This guidance paper does not directly address the treatment of cross-sector entities or groups within an insurance group but it does recognise a need for insurance supervisors to assess risks to an insurance group from links to cross-sector entities and where necessary to take measures to mitigate those risks. http://www.iaisweb.org/ temp/21 Final guidance on non-regulated entities.pdf

14






GOVERNMENT ACTUARY



HEALTH AND SAFETY

Healthy options. Tyler, Mike; Allaway, Sharon Staple Inn Actuarial Society, [RKN: 73703] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2011) November : 25-27.

Mike Tyler and Sharon Allaway take a look at the theories concerning employee health risk http://www.theactuary.com/

15

HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT



INDIA

Ebb and flow. Saxen, Sachin Staple Inn Actuarial Society, - 2 pages. [RKN: 72083] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2010) Jan / Feb : 36-37.

Sachin Saxena discusses the forces acting for and against merger and acquisition activity in the Indian life insurance industry http://www.theactuary.com/archive

INSOLVENCY

"Someone else's problem" : The failure of the Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company. Ferris, S - 65 pages. [RKN: 69234] Australian Actuarial Journal (2010) 16 (1) : 1-64.

http://www.actuaries.asn.au/Libraries/Information Knowledge/46305 AAJ v16i1 comp.sflb.ashx

INSURANCE

Resilience Benchmarking – Insurance Sector. (2010). - London: Financial Services Authority, 2010. - 14 pages. [RKN: 72489]

The UK insurance industry contributes significantly to the economy. It is essential to individuals and businesses who wish to manage risks and recover losses in the face of the unexpected. Therefore, the sector‟s resilience and recovery capability in the event of a major operational disruption (such as a terrorist attack, severe weather or a flu pandemic) is vital. The Resilience Benchmarking Survey for the insurance sector was developed to provide an initial assessment of how prepared the insurance sector is for disruptions such as these. It sought to address three main questions: How resilient would the insurance sector be if faced with a major operational disruption? How quickly could it recover? What needs to be done to improve its resilience? http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/fsc/Pages/resiliencebenchmarking.aspx

INSURANCE COMPANIES





16



Report of the independent expert on the proposed schemes to transfer the long term insurance business of CGNU Life Assurance Limited, Commercial Union Life Assurance Company Limited and Norwich Union Life (RBS) Limited to Norwich Union Life & Pensions Limited and to reattribute the inherited estates of CGNU Life Assurance Limited and Commercial Union Life Assurance Company Limited. Dumbreck, N J ([2009?]). Milliman, [2009?]. - 324 pages. [RKN: 72354]

http://www.aviva.co.uk/adviser/product-literature/files/gn/gn16187c.pdf


INSURANCE COMPANY

"Someone else's problem" : The failure of the Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company. Ferris, S - 65 pages. [RKN: 69234] Australian Actuarial Journal (2010) 16 (1) : 1-64.

http://www.actuaries.asn.au/Libraries/Information Knowledge/46305 AAJ v16i1 comp.sflb.ashx

INSURANCE INDUSTRY


We examine the effect of American International Group's (AIG) bailout, and the events leading up to it, on its insurance industry rivals. The reaction of rivals to AIG-related events depends on the relative strength of two competing effects. The contagion effect implies that rival returns will decrease following negative events affecting AIG. In contrast, competitive effects will occur if investors expect that rivals will be able to benefit from AIG's downfall. Using three-factor multivariate regression model event study methodology, we find evidence of both effects around several key dates in AIG's decline. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Intellectual property right - liability insurance. Qaiser, R [RKN: 38884] Shelved at: Per: Bimaquest (Oxf) Bimaquest (2009) 9 (1) : 1-8.

More and more intellectual property claims involving infringement of patent, copyright and trademarks are being filed. Patent cases top the list. A comprehensive cover that can address the concerns of various stakeholders is required.

ISLAM


This study examines the cost efficiency of non-life Takaful insurance firms operating in 10 Islamic countries. Non-parametric data envelopment analysis is used to compute cost efficiency scores and a second-stage logit transformation regression model is then estimated to test the influence of corporate characteristics on these efficiencies. We find that non-executive directors and separating the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman functions do not improve cost efficiency. However, board size, firm size and product specialisation have positive effects on the cost efficiency of Takaful insurers. In contrast, the regulatory

17

environment is found not to be statistically significant in terms of improving cost efficiency. We conclude that our results could have important commercial and policy implications. Available via Athens: Palgrave MacMillan http://www.openathens.net

LIABILITIES



LIABILITY INSURANCE







LIFE ASSURANCE

Report of the independent expert on the proposed schemes to transfer all of the business of Hamilton Life Assurance Company Limited and part of the business of Hamilton Insurance Company Limited to Aviva Life and Pensions UK Limited. Sanders, A J (2009). Watson Wyatt, 2009. - 86 pages. [RKN: 72353]



LIFE INSURANCE




18

LUCK

Little Bets: How breakthrough ideas emerge from small discoveries. Sims, Peter (2011). Random House, 2011. - 213 pages. [RKN: 74778] Shelved at: 658.409

In Little Bets, leading business consultant Peter Sims turns problems on their heads and outlines a counter-intuitive path to perfection. Using real-life case studies from the worlds of business, design, warfare and even comedy, he shows that it can be more rational to act first and think later, more efficient to fail and find out what doesn't work. It's a flexible philosophy that has both saved corporate giants such as Apple and Pixar and inspired the third-world microfinancing industry. Reviewed in The Actuary, September 2011

MANAGEMENT







Managing business in a Capital Constrained era [copies of slides only]. Joseph, Bryan (2009). Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, 2009. [RKN: 72994]

Wilful blindness : Why we ignore the obvious at our peril. Heffernan, Margaret (2011). - London: Simon & Schuster, 2011. - 391 pages. [RKN: 74779] Shelved at: 155.9

In the 2006 case of the US Government vs Enron, the presiding judge instructed the jurors to take account of the concept of wilful blindness as they reached their verdict about whether the chief executives of the disgraced energy corporation were guilty. It was not enough for the defendants to say that they did not know what was going on; that they had not seen anything. If they failed to observe the corruption which was unfolding before their very eyes, not knowing was no defence. The guilty verdict sent shivers down the spine of the corporate world. In this book, distinguished business woman and writer, Margaret Heffernan, examines the phenomenon of wilful blindness. Drawing on a wide array of sources from psychological studies and social statistics to interviews with the relevant protagonists she examines what it is about human nature which makes us so prone to wilful blindness. Taught from infancy to obey authority, and absorbing the importance of selective vision as a key social skill, humans exacerbate their tendency to become institutionalised by joining organisations which are run by like-minded people. Wilful Blindness looks at how hard-work and the information overload of the modern workplace add to the problem. And examines why whistleblowers and Cassandras are so very rare. Ranging freely through history and from business to science, government to the family, this engaging and anecdotal book will explain why wilful blindness is so dangerous in the globalised, interconnected world in which we live, before suggesting ways in which institutions and individuals can start to combat it. In the tradition of Malcolm Gladwell and Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Margaret Heffernan's thought provoking book will force open our eyes.

19

MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION STRUCTURE

CEO turnover and ownership structure: evidence from the U.S. property–liability insurance industry. He, Enya; Sommer, David W - 29 pages. [RKN: 74869] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 673–701.

This article examines the impact of ownership structure on the relation between firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in the U.S. property–liability insurance industry. Theoretical implications of stock versus mutual ownership structures on the performance–turnover relation are ambiguous. Our empirical results indicate that CEO turnover is less responsive to firm underwriting performance in mutual insurers compared to stock insurers. In fact, we find that while CEO turnover for stock firms is negatively related to prior performance, no such relationship is found for mutual insurers. These results hold while controlling for board structure and other relevant factors. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

MIDDLE EAST



MUTUAL LIFE OFFICE



NETHERLANDS



OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

Healthy options. Tyler, Mike; Allaway, Sharon Staple Inn Actuarial Society, [RKN: 73703] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2011) November : 25-27.

Mike Tyler and Sharon Allaway take a look at the theories concerning employee health risk http://www.theactuary.com/

20

OPTIMAL REINSURANCE

Optimal reinsurance with a rescuing procedure. Zeng, Xudong - 9 pages. [RKN: 72460] Shelved at: Per: IME (Oxf) Insurance: Mathematics & Economics (2010) 46 (2) : 397-405.

We consider a large insurance company whose reserve is modeled by a diffusion process. The management of the insurance company makes a decision on reinsurance in order to reduce the insurance risk. An optimal decision is the one which minimizes the expected time to reach a goal before the reserve reaches a ruin level. We introduce a rescuing procedure to deal with the case that the company is “too big to fail”. We disclose that the optimal decision of the management heavily depends on how much time the company needs to wait for rescuing when it gets in trouble. Keywords: Stochastic control; Stochastic differential equations; Controlled stochastic processes; Proportional reinsurance; Minimize expected time; Rescuing procedure; Bailout Available via Athens: ScienceDirect http://www.openathens.net

ORGANISATION AND METHODS



PART VII / PART VIII TRANSFERS

Independent expert report of Paul Cook on proposed insurance business transfer scheme : From QBE Insurance (Europe) Limited to Sagicor at Lloyd's Syndicate 44 under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Cook, Paul (2010). Grant Thornton, 2010. - 30 pages. [RKN: 72270]

http://www.qbeeurope.com/insurancebusinesstransfer/Documents/INDEPENDENT%20EXPERT%20REPORT%20Final%20signed%2011%20Jan%202010.pdf

Proposed Part VII transfers between Novae Insurance Company Limited (“NICL”) and Novae Corporate Underwriting Limited (as the sole member of Syndicate 2007 for the 2010 underwriting year) (“NCUL”) : [Supplementary Independent Expert's Report]. James, D (2010). - London: James, Brennan & Associates, 2010. [RKN: 73153]

Proposed Transfer of Business from Euler Hermes Guarantee plc to Euler Hermes UK plc : Report of the Independent Expert. Wells, Gary (2010). Milliman, 2010. - 31 pages. [RKN: 72617]

http://guarantee.eulerhermes.co.uk/en/documents/euler hermes transfer report 150310.pdf/euler hermes transfer report 150310.pdf

Report of the independent expert on the proposed insurance business transfer scheme from the UK branch of Sompo Japan Insurance Inc. to Transfercom Limited under Part VII of the Financial Services & Markets Act 2000. Fulcher, Graham (2010). Towers Watson, 2010. - 46 pages. [RKN: 72268]

http://www.sompo-japan.co.jp/english/news/download/20100205 2.pdf




Report of the independent expert on the proposed transfer of Indemnity Insurance Limited (formerly known as HIH Indemnity Insurance Limited) to Churchill Insurance Company Limited. Berryman, Malcolm (2010). - London: LECG Ltd, 2010. - 35 pages. [RKN: 73151]

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/70854075/Report-of-the-Independent-Expert-on-the-Proposed-Transfer-of-

21

Report of the independent expert on the transfer of the long term business of Prudential (AN) Limited and Prudential Holborn Life Limited to The Prudential Assurance Company Limited. Gilliespie, Oliver (2010). Milliman, 2010. - 46 pages. [RKN: 73155]

http://www.pru.co.uk/pdf/422658/586797/Oliver Gillespie Independen1.pdf

Scheme report for the transfer of policies pursuant to The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 From Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd. to Bosworth Run-off Limited : [Independent Expert's Report]. James, D (2010). - London: James, Brennan & Associates, 2010. - 32 pages. [RKN: 73154]

http://msi-bosworth-transfer.com/expertreport.pdf

Scheme report for the transfer of policies pursuant to The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 From Novae Insurance Company Limited (“NICL”) to Novae Corporate Underwriting Limited (as the sole member of Syndicate 2007 for the 2010 underwriting year) (“NCUL”) : [Independent Expert's Report]. James, D (2010). James, Brennan & Associates, 2010. - 31 pages. [RKN: 73152]

PENSION FUND ADMINISTRATION



PHILOSOPHY



PLANNING




22

POLICYHOLDERS PROTECTION



PRICING



General Stein-type Covariance Decompositions with Applications to Insurance and Finance. Furman, Edward; Zitikis, Ricardas (2009). - London, Ontario: Actuarial Research Group, Department of Statistical and Actuarial Sciences, University of Western Ontario, 2009. - 9 pages. [RKN: 72134]

A general decomposition of covariances is formulated and proved, and its usefulness in the context of financial risk measurement and pricing is demonstrated. Keywords: Covariance decompositions; insurance pricing; economic pricing; weighted allocations; capital asset pricing model. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1103333

PROFESSIONAL BODIES

Raising the value of professional body membership. Williams, Christina; Hannington, Amy; Hanson, William (2011). PARN, 2011. - 122 pages. [RKN: 74126] Shelved at: 658.048

This book continues a series of PARN publications on member services and relations. It is intended to support those concerned with the development, management and promotion of member services, those involved in recruitment and retention strategies, and anyone thinking strategically about membership value.

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Anti-bribery and corruption in commercial insurance broking : Reducing the risk of illicit payments or inducements to third parties. Financial Services Authority (2010). - London: Financial Services Authority, 2010. - 60 pages. [RKN: 36853]

This report describes how commercial insurance broker firms („broker firms‟) in the UK are addressing the risks of becoming involved in corrupt practices such as bribery. In particular, it sets out the findings of our recent review of standards in managing the risk of illicit payments or inducements to, or on behalf of, third parties in order to obtain or retain business. We published our interim findings in September 2009. Although this work focuses on commercial insurance brokers, many of the issues covered and our examples of good and poor practice are relevant to firms in other sectors who use third parties to win business. http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/anti bribery.pdf

Code of professional conduct. Institute of Actuaries of Australia (2009). Institute of Actuaries of Australia, 2009. - 10 pages. [RKN: 71929]

http://www.actuaries.asn.au/NR/rdonlyres/60AF0A2B-3E13-406F-AE7E-9DE9568F28E8/5495/CodeofProfessionalConductNov2009.pdf

PROFIT AND LOSS


Chief executive officer (CEO) turnover has long been an important topic in the academic literature. Previous research has focused mostly on the rationale for CEO turnovers, or circumstances that lead to CEO changes, with much less attention paid to how CEO turnovers affect future firm performance. We extend the literature regarding the impact of CEO turnover on performance using data for U.S. property-liability insurers. Measuring firm performance with cost efficiency (CE) and revenue

23

efficiency (RE) scores, we find strong support for the hypothesis that firms with a CEO turnover, especially those with a nonroutine turnover, experience more favorable performance changes than firms without a CEO turnover. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Making Project Management Work [copies of slides]. Holden, Julia (2009). Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, 2009. [RKN: 73452] Shelved at: Online only Shelved at: Online only

Successful Delivery of Large Scale Actuarial Change Programmes : Perceptions and Reality [copies of slides]. Jones, Sam; Fox, Joel (2009). Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, 2009. [RKN: 73455] Shelved at: Online only Shelved at: Online only

PROPERTY INSURANCE



REGULATION

A fresh vision. Wallace, Isobel Staple Inn Actuarial Society, [RKN: 73704] Shelved at: Per: Actuary (Oxf) Per: Actuary (Lon) Shelved at: SIA/ACT The Actuary (2011) November : 28.

Isobel Wallace reports back from Next Generation Vision, a project to improve public perception of the UK financial services industry over the next 10 to 15 years http://www.theactuary.com/

The Future of Financial Reporting in the UK and the Republic of Ireland : Part Two: Draft financial reporting standards. Accounting Standards Board (2010). Accounting Standards Board, 2010. [RKN: 73537] Shelved at: 657.3 ACC [Box 48]

See also 73536 for Part One http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/ASB/FRED-The-Future-of-Financial-Reporting-Part-Two-Dr/Responses-to-FRED-%E2%80%98The-Future-of-Financial-Reporti.aspx

The Future of Financial Reporting in the UK and the Republic of Ireland : Appendices. Accounting Standards Board (2010). Accounting Standards Board, 2010. - 85 pages. [RKN: 73538] Shelved at: 657.3 ACC [Box 48]

See also 73537 for Part Two and 73536 for Part One http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/uk/1010fredappendices.pdf



Pre-application: Reflections from the practitioner and the reviewer [copies of slides only]. Martin, Paul; Desai, Vishal (2010). Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, 2010. [RKN: 73532]

http://www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/documents/pl6-pre-application-reflections-practioner-and-reviewer

24



Wilful blindness : Why we ignore the obvious at our peril. Heffernan, Margaret (2011). - London: Simon & Schuster, 2011. - 391 pages. [RKN: 74779] Shelved at: 155.9

In the 2006 case of the US Government vs Enron, the presiding judge instructed the jurors to take account of the concept of wilful blindness as they reached their verdict about whether the chief executives of the disgraced energy corporation were guilty. It was not enough for the defendants to say that they did not know what was going on; that they had not seen anything. If they failed to observe the corruption which was unfolding before their very eyes, not knowing was no defence. The guilty verdict sent shivers down the spine of the corporate world. In this book, distinguished business woman and writer, Margaret Heffernan, examines the phenomenon of wilful blindness. Drawing on a wide array of sources from psychological studies and social statistics to interviews with the relevant protagonists she examines what it is about human nature which makes us so prone to wilful blindness. Taught from infancy to obey authority, and absorbing the importance of selective vision as a key social skill, humans exacerbate their tendency to become institutionalised by joining organisations which are run by like-minded people. Wilful Blindness looks at how hard-work and the information overload of the modern workplace add to the problem. And examines why whistleblowers and Cassandras are so very rare. Ranging freely through history and from business to science, government to the family, this engaging and anecdotal book will explain why wilful blindness is so dangerous in the globalised, interconnected world in which we live, before suggesting ways in which institutions and individuals can start to combat it. In the tradition of Malcolm Gladwell and Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Margaret Heffernan's thought provoking book will force open our eyes.

REPUTATION RISK

Determinants of Insurers’ Reputational Risk. Kamiya, Shinichi; Schmit, Joan T; Rosenberg, Marjorie A (2010). Society of Actuaries, 2010. - 28 pages. [RKN: 73361]

When purchasing coverage, insurance consumers are unable to observe an insurer‟s ultimate performance on the explicit and implicit promises incorporated into their policy. As a result, these consumers must rely on an insurer‟s reputation to evaluate the offered coverage when deciding which insurer‟s product to purchase. In fact, others (e.g., Klein and Leffler, 1981) have demonstrated that consumers will pay a premium to purchase coverage from a highly reputable insurer. Maintaining that good reputation, however, is costly. Whether or not it is profit maximizing to meet a consumer‟s expectation associated with an insurer‟s reputation, therefore, depends on a variety of factors, such as the size of expected profits from maintaining a good reputation, the discount rate into the future, and the efficiency of information sharing that would affect the speed of change in an insurer‟s reputation. We believe these factors can help us identify determinants of reputational risk. Our empirical results indicate that the level of capital holding and the efficiency of belief updating are strongly associated with insurers‟ reputational risk takings, which the literature suggests eventually cause loss of reputation. The results also indicate that reputational risks are more likely to be taken when market rate of return is high. http://www.soa.org/research/research-projects/risk-management/research-determinants-insurers.aspx

RISK


This guidance paper considers the scope of group-wide supervision and in particular the supervisory approaches to non-regulated entities – whether non-operating holding companies (NOHCs) or non-regulated operating entities (NROEs) – within the insurance group or financial conglomerate. It is recognised that non-regulated entities within and/or connected with the other prudentially regulated non-insurance financial groups are, in principle, the subject of regulations of the other financial sectors. This guidance paper does not directly address the treatment of cross-sector entities or groups within an insurance group but it

25

does recognise a need for insurance supervisors to assess risks to an insurance group from links to cross-sector entities and where necessary to take measures to mitigate those risks. http://www.iaisweb.org/ temp/21 Final guidance on non-regulated entities.pdf



RISK MANAGEMENT


Corporate governance and risk management issues have received prominent publicity in recent years following several major company failures such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. While prior studies have examined this issue within the context of derivatives‟ trading, little is known regarding the linkage between corporate governance and alternative corporate risk management activities such as insurance. Using a detailed firm survey conducted by the World Bank (2004), we examine the impacts of various governance monitoring mechanisms and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on the corporate insurance decision. Overall, our results suggest that both monitoring mechanisms and managerial incentives induce the corporate purchase of property insurance. However, the purchase of property insurance for managerial self-interest is only prevalent in firms subject to lax monitoring, and the determinants of insurance purchases are more in line with the prediction of the economic theory in firms with strong monitoring. In addition, our study contributes a number of new insights into the determinants of corporate purchase of property insurance. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net





An empirical examination of stakeholder groups as monitoring sources in corporate governance . Cole, Cassandra R; He, Enya; McCullough, Kathleen A; Semykina, Anastasia; Sommer, David W - 28 pages. [RKN: 74870] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 703-730.

Insurers are formally and informally monitored by a variety of stakeholders, including reinsurers, agents, outside board members, and regulators. While other studies have generally examined these stakeholders separately, they have not accounted for the fact that there is some relation among the stakeholder groups, and the presence of these groups is likely to be jointly determined. By empirically controlling for these potential interrelations, we create a more complete assessment of the impact of these stakeholders/monitors on insurers‟ risk taking. Specifically, we find that the presence of some stakeholders offsets the degree or presence of others, and that most stakeholders/monitors are associated with a reduction of overall firm risk. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

Establishing a risk management culture: Taking a pragmatic approach [copies of slides only]. Tilman, Jonathan (2009). Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, 2009. [RKN: 72927]

Guidance on the 8th EU Company Law Directive - article 41 : Guidance for boards and audit committees. Federation of European Risk Management Associations (FERMA); European Confederation of Institutes of Internal Auditing (ECIIA) (2010). 2010. - 19 pages. [RKN: 73336]

The objective of this FERMA/ECIIA Guidance is to assist board members, particularly members of the audit committee, with the implementation of art. 41 of the 8th European Company Law Directive - “[…] the audit committee shall, inter alia: monitor the effectiveness of the company‟s internal control, internal audit where applicable, and risk management systems […].”. http://www.ferma.eu/about/publications/eciia-ferma-guidance/

26



Institutional ownership stability and risk taking: evidence from the life–health insurance industry. Cheng, Jiang; Elyasiani, Elyas; Jia, Jingyi - 33 pages. [RKN: 74867] Shelved at: Per: J.Risk Ins (Oxf) Shelved at: JOU Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011) 78 (3) : 609–641.

We investigate the relationship between risk taking of life–health (LH) insurers and stability of their institutional ownership within a simultaneous equation system model. Three main results are obtained. First, stable institutional ownership of is associated with lower total risk of LH insurers, supporting the prudent-man law hypothesis. Second, when investors are sorted in terms of stringency of the prudent-man restrictions, their negative effect on risk holds for all, except insurance companies, as owners of LH insurers. Third, large institutional owners do not raise the riskiness of the investee-firms, as proposed by the large shareholder hypothesis. Regulatory implications are drawn. Available via Athens: Wiley Online Library http://www.openathens.net

RISK MEASUREMENT

General Stein-type Covariance Decompositions with Applications to Insurance and Finance. Furman, Edward; Zitikis, Ricardas (2009). - London, Ontario: Actuarial Research Group, Department of Statistical and Actuarial Sciences, University of Western Ontario, 2009. - 9 pages. [RKN: 72134]

A general decomposition of covariances is formulated and proved, and its usefulness in the context of financial risk measurement and pricing is demonstrated. Keywords: Covariance decompositions; insurance pricing; economic pricing; weighted allocations; capital asset pricing model. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1103333

RUIN PROBABILITY



The Omega model: from bankruptcy to occupation times in the red. Gerber, Hans U; Shiu, Elias S W; Yang, Hailiang [RKN: 44850] Shelved at: online only European Actuarial Journal (2012) 2(2) December : 259-272.

Ruin occurs the first time when the surplus of a company or an institution is negative. In the Omega model, it is assumed that even with a negative surplus, the company can do business as usual until bankruptcy occurs. The probability of bankruptcy at a point of time only depends on the value of the negative surplus at that time. Under the assumption of Brownian motion for the surplus, the expected discounted value of a penalty at bankruptcy is determined, and hence the probability of bankruptcy. There is an intrinsic relation between the probability of no bankruptcy and an exposure random variable. In special cases, the distribution of the total time the Brownian motion spends below zero is found, and the Laplace transform of the integral of the negative part of the Brownian motion is expressed in terms of the Airy function of the first kind. Available via Athens: Springer -- Published online, December 2012 http://www.openathens.net

SAUDI ARABIA



27

SCOTLAND


2010-


SOLVENCY





SOLVENCY II

Pre-application: Reflections from the practitioner and the reviewer [copies of slides only]. Martin, Paul; Desai, Vishal (2010). Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, 2010. [RKN: 73532]

http://www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/documents/pl6-pre-application-reflections-practioner-and-reviewer

SOUTH AFRICA



STOCHASTIC PROCESSES

Optimal reinsurance with a rescuing procedure. Zeng, Xudong - 9 pages. [RKN: 72460] Shelved at: Per: IME (Oxf) Insurance: Mathematics & Economics (2010) 46 (2) : 397-405.

We consider a large insurance company whose reserve is modeled by a diffusion process. The management of the insurance company makes a decision on reinsurance in order to reduce the insurance risk. An optimal decision is the one which minimizes

28

the expected time to reach a goal before the reserve reaches a ruin level. We introduce a rescuing procedure to deal with the case that the company is “too big to fail”. We disclose that the optimal decision of the management heavily depends on how much time the company needs to wait for rescuing when it gets in trouble. Keywords: Stochastic control; Stochastic differential equations; Controlled stochastic processes; Proportional reinsurance; Minimize expected time; Rescuing procedure; Bailout Available via Athens: ScienceDirect http://www.openathens.net

TAKAFUL INSURANCE


This study examines the cost efficiency of non-life Takaful insurance firms operating in 10 Islamic countries. Non-parametric data envelopment analysis is used to compute cost efficiency scores and a second-stage logit transformation regression model is then estimated to test the influence of corporate characteristics on these efficiencies. We find that non-executive directors and separating the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman functions do not improve cost efficiency. However, board size, firm size and product specialisation have positive effects on the cost efficiency of Takaful insurers. In contrast, the regulatory environment is found not to be statistically significant in terms of improving cost efficiency. We conclude that our results could have important commercial and policy implications. Available via Athens: Palgrave MacMillan http://www.openathens.net

TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS



Independent expert report of Paul Cook on proposed insurance business transfer scheme : From QBE Insurance (Europe) Limited to Sagicor at Lloyd's Syndicate 44 under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Cook, Paul (2010). Grant Thornton, 2010. - 30 pages. [RKN: 72270]

http://www.qbeeurope.com/insurancebusinesstransfer/Documents/INDEPENDENT%20EXPERT%20REPORT%20Final%20signed%2011%20Jan%202010.pdf

Report of the independent expert on the proposed insurance business transfer scheme from the UK branch of Sompo Japan Insurance Inc. to Transfercom Limited under Part VII of the Financial Services & Markets Act 2000. Fulcher, Graham (2010). Towers Watson, 2010. - 46 pages. [RKN: 72268]

http://www.sompo-japan.co.jp/english/news/download/20100205 2.pdf




TECHNOLOGY


Legal scholarship has been silent about a phenomenon with profound implications for governance: the automation of compliance with laws mandating risk management. Regulations - from bank capitalization rules, to Sarbanes-Oxley‟s provisions on financial fraud and misrepresentation, to laws governing information-privacy protection - frequently require regulated firms to develop internal processes to identify, assess, and mitigate risk. To comply, firms have turned wholesale to technology systems and computational analytics that measure and predict corporate risk levels and “force” decisions accordingly. In total, the third-party market for compliance-technology products - known generally as “governance, risk, and compliance” (GRC) software, systems, and services - alone grew to $52 billion last year, and this growth is poised to increase exponentially. While these technology systems offer powerful compliance tools, they also pose real perils. They permit computer programmers to interpret legal requirements; they mask the uncertainty of the very hazards with which policy makers are concerned; they skew decision making through an “automation bias” that privileges personal self-interest over sound judgment; and their lack of transparency thwarts oversight and accountability. These phenomena played a critical role in the recent financial crisis. This Article explores these developments and the failure of risk regulation to address them. While regulators have lauded the turn to technology, they have ignored its perils. By contrast, the Article investigates the accountability challenges posed by these and other technologies

29

of control, and suggests specific reform measures for policy makers revisiting the governance of risk. It argues for more activist regulator oversight backed by sanctions before disaster has occurred. But it also emphasizes collaboration in developing risk-management systems, drawing both on the granular expertise of firms and the broader vantage of administrative agencies. Most importantly, it seeks better to reflect the human decision-making element at both levels: to recognize the ways in which technology can hinder good judgment, to reintroduce human inputs in the decision process, and to reflect the limits of both human and computer reasoning. Keywords: Technology, Compliance, Automation, Administrative Agencies, Regulation, New Governance, Risk Management, Accountability, Judgment, Automation Bias, Organizational Decisionmaking, Financial Services Regulation http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1463727##

TRENDS

Visions For The Future Of The Life Insurance Sector. (2009). Society of Actuaries, 2009. - 32 pages. [RKN: 71690]

The top 10 essays selected from those submitted by members of the Society of Actuaries in response to: Life Insurance 2020 Foresight – A Call for Essays. Each author submitted a short essay in response to the following questions: What is your vision of a financially sound, operationally efficient, growing and profitable company operating in the life insurance sector in the year 2020? What are the critical issues that this company must address between now and 2020? http://www.soa.org/library/essays/life-essay-2009.pdf

UNDERWRITING



UNITED KINGDOM

Raising the value of professional body membership. Williams, Christina; Hannington, Amy; Hanson, William (2011). PARN, 2011. - 122 pages. [RKN: 74126] Shelved at: 658.048

This book continues a series of PARN publications on member services and relations. It is intended to support those concerned with the development, management and promotion of member services, those involved in recruitment and retention strategies, and anyone thinking strategically about membership value.

UNITED STATES



30


YEARBOOKS


2010-