bush policy ir project

8/9/2019 Bush Policy Ir Project

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US POLICY ON THE IRAQ WAR AND THE GULF REGION UNDER 44 TH

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH JR.

(Term paper towards partial fulfilment of the assessment in the subject of Contemporary

World Relation)

SUBMITTED TO : S UBMITTED BY:

DR . O M P RAKASH BADAPBIANG T. D KHAR -819

ASSISTANT P ROFESSOR D I A DE ARSHA -8!!

F ACULTY OF P OLICY SCIENCE STUDENTS B.P. S C" LLB

#HONS $

NATIONAL LAW UNI ERSITY

JODHPUR

SUMMER SEMESTER !%1&


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We would like to express our gratitude to Dr. Om Prakash, for allotting us with such a

promising topic and for the guidance he has given us, without which it would have been

impossible for us to accomplish this task.

We would also wish to thank the library staff of the college for their help and cooperation in

compiling material for our project. We wish to take the opportunity to thank each other for

the team work and cooperation and our parents and friends who have always given us a lot of

support and inspiration in all our endeavours.

-Badapbiang T. !har and i"a e"arsha


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TABLE OF CONTENT

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). / # ( )/$/( /# O /$ %1PO+(/#& ! O0#(+/% ..............................................................7

i. #merican $bjecti"es % &olicies .........................................................................7

ii. '. . and ran .................................................................................................8

iii. ' and ra* ............................................................................................... 9

i". ' and audi #rabia ..................................................................................... 11

%P(%')%+ 22 #D (-% )0 - DO!(+/#% ..............................................................13

) 0 - DO!(+/#% .................................................................................................... 13

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i. Realist &erspecti"e ........................................................................................ 20

ii. 3iberalism .................................................................................................. 21

iii. deological influences .................................................................................21

(-% *(%+' (- ................................................................................................... 22

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B. W $R3 T R B'0#3 $0 R#8 ..................................................................................23

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

AREA :

&ulf policy of 0nited tates of merica under 33 th President &eorge W. )ush ;r.

T OPIC :

0 Policy on the /ra< war and the gulf region 0nder 33 th President &eorge W. )ush ;r.

SUBJECT :

!ontemporary World +elations

O BJECTI ES :

(o analy=e the basis of the foreign policy of 0nited tates towards the &ulf +egion under the

administration of &eorge W. )ush ;r. (he most emphasis has been put on the /ra< war and the

after math.

R ESEARCH Q UESTIONS :

2. What was the basis of the )ush ;r. administration policy in the &ulf region>7. What was the status of relationship of 0nited tates with various prominent &ulf

#ations namely audi rabia, /ran and /ra9. What was )ush?s strategy of dealing with the menace of terrorism emanating from the

&ulf +egion>3. What is the concept of )ush?s xis of %vil and strategy leading to /ra< War>@. What are the various theoretical perceptions of /ra< invasion>A. Whether the 0nited #ations Doctrine of /nternational $aw was followed in the /ra<

war>

H YPOTHESIS :

We have basically analy=ed &eorge W. )ush?s Policy with respect to &ulf +egion with more

emphasis on prominent energy player nations. We have come up with the hypothesis that the

major changes with respect to the Policy under )ush ;r. +egime were related to the energy

control keeping in mind that (he &ulf region is the biggest producer of !rude Oil and #atural

&as. We have examine his various strategy and the method of his policy making, linking it

with the various theories of World +elations. nd as it is known that &ulf region is no threat

to 0nited tates of merica as far as security is concern. -ence our clear hypothesis

concluded to the 0 need of control on energy Producing and %xporting #ations as 0 has

the largest population of consumers.


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SOURCES :

Secondary in the nature of reports, documents, reviews, articles, etc. !ollections are made

from journals, websites to present a holistic view of the current scenario.

DATA :

/nferences have been drawn with the help of international conventions, scholarly articles,

government websites and books.

R ESEARCH TECHNIQUES FOR DATA COLLECTION :

%xamination of theories and strategic policies through analysis of various decisions taken

under &eorge W. )ush ;r.:s administration.

M ETHODOLOGY TO BE ADOPTED :deductive approach will be followed in the project wherein the research has been

conducted by taking certain generali=ed notions into account and drawing specific inferences

in the light of the fact situations.

M ODE OF CITATION B

uniform mode of citation shall be adopted and followed consistently throughout this

project. (he style of footnoting shall be as per the citation followed at N'()*+', L'

U+) /0 )(2" J*3 560 .


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presence in the region and its widespread support of authoritarian regimes in the bid to secure

oil supply has led to the rise of anti4 merican sentiments and anti4Western movements. (his

has similarly exacerbated the situation, pushing up energy costs and prices. @

i. American Objectives & Policies%nergy has always had a special place in the 0 foreign policy. During the World War //, 0

officials were extremely concerned over the potentiality of falling huge energy resources of

Persian &ulf into the hands of their enemies. Price hikes of the 2C 8s and rising demand for

oil in the industrial nations intensified the so4 called anxieties. During the period, 0 crushed

nationalist movements and fought against the intrusive policies of former oviet 0nion in

order to secure and stabili=e its own regional position and those of its %uropean allies,

especially %ngland. fter the withdrawal of )ritish troops from the ue= !anal, the 0 became the only force in charge of the security of oil supply to the industrial world.

$ater on after the inclusion of terrorism as a subject of concern with respect to foreign policy,

we can see how the 0nited tates Policy reflects strategic importance of terrorism in various

forms. /n 0. . Policy towards the &ulf region, democrati=ation as a response to terrorism is

based on a pessimistic cultural assessment of the societies concerned. A (he strategic vision of

the 0 administration under )ush ;unior was based on considering terrorism as an existential

threat, preventive intervention, transatlantic co4 operation, forced changes in other countries

and poor international legality.

ii. U.S. and Irans we all know, the 0. . policy vis4 4vis /ran was marked by a highly confrontational

attitude. (he *ebruary 22, 2C C, fall of the hah of /ran, a key 0. . ally, opened a deep and

ongoing rift in 0. .4/ranian relations. lthough 0. . concerns about /ran and its nuclear

program are longstanding, /srael:s threat to use military action against /ran:s nuclear facilities

Hwith or without 0. . backingHhas made 0. . policy toward /ran an urgent issue. 'any of

the policy options being implemented or under consideration are the same options that have

faced the 0nited tates since 2C C. With the exception of a 0. . ground invasion of /ran,

virtually no policy option has been ruled out.

5 "nights, 'ichael J788AK F(roubled Waters, *uture 0 ecurity ssistance in the Persian &ulfG. (heWashington /nstitute for #ear %ast Policy. Policy *ocus.

6 +oberto liboni, %urope:s +ole in &ulfB (ransatlantic Perspective, Paper presented at the seminar

on F%04 &ulf +elationsB %nhancing %conomic, Political and ecurity !o4 operationG, in co4 operationwith the &ulf +esearch !enter Rome9 7A #ov. 788@


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/ran has an interest section in Washington, D!, under the auspices of the %mbassy of

PakistanM it is staffed by /ranian mericans. (he 0. . interest section in (ehranHunder the

auspices of the %mbassy of wit=erland thereHhas no merican personnel stationed there.

(here has been occasional 0. . consideration of re


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enator ;oseph )iden to the * 788 defence authori=ation bill supported the dministration

joining nuclear talks with /ran. 28 (he )ush dministration did not offer /ran an unconditional,

direct 0. .4/ran bilateral dialogue on all issues of 0. . concern. -owever, some say the )ush

dministration Fmissed an opportunityG for a Fgrand bargainG with /ran on its nuclear

program and other issues of concern by rebuffing a reported comprehensive overture from

/ran just before the 'ay 27, 7889, +iyadh bombing. (he Washington &ost reported on

*ebruary 23, 788 , that the wiss ambassador to /ran in 7889, (im &uldimann, had informed

0. . officials of a comprehensive /ranian proposal for talks with the 0nited tates. 22

-owever, tate Department officials and some %uropean diplomats based in (ehran


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*ollowing the terrorist attacks of 22 eptember 7882 the )ush administration devoted

considerable attention to asymmetric threats which, in its view, had multiplied since the

demise of communism in %urope. /n his tate of the 0nion address in ;anuary 7887 President

)ush spoke of an axis of evil, comprising states that sought the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction and supported international terrorism. -e named /ra< as one such state. 'r

)ush said,

F tates li!e these9 and their terrorist allies9 constitute an a:is of e"il9 arming to threaten the

peace of the world. By see!ing weapons of mass destruction9 these regimes pose a gra"e and

growing danger. They could pro"ide these arms to terrorists9 gi"ing them the means to match

their hatred. They could attac! our allies or attempt to blac!mail the 'nited tates. n any of

these cases9 the price of indifference would be catastrophic .G29

/n eptember 7887 President )ush published a new security doctrine, (he #ational ecurity

trategy of the 0nited tates of merica. (his gave greater priority than in the past to the

concept of pre4emption. 23 /t discussed terrorist threats, including the possibility that terrorists

might obtain weapons of mass destruction. $ater, on 27 eptember 7887 President )ush

spoke to the 0# &eneral ssembly, and said that ;my nation will wor! with the '0 ecurity

Council to meet our common challenge< in respect of /ra


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failure to provide an accurate, full, final and complete disclosure of its W'D and prohibited

missile programmes, as re /t became so serious that the (reasury Department and the *)/

sei=ed all the financial documents of Prince )andar in the embassy in an attempt to track

down where audi money had been going inside the 0. . (his is an extraordinary thing to

have happened. (hey were concerned that the audis were financing terrorists or

fundamentalists inside the 0. ., tracking down what the charities were doing.

$ater the 0. . invasion of /ra< in 7889 was a major trauma for audi rabia. While the

audis were worried about the balance of power in the &ulf, the 0. ., their ally, came in and

installed a pro4/ranian hiite government in /ra


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UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1441

0nited tates manipulation of the 0nited #ations is a primary factor in the origin and

maintenance of economic sanctions on /ra< and the accompanying military campaigns during

the regime of )ush enior .78 /ra< no longer threatened international peace because the 0nited

#ations pecial !ommission J0# !O'K confiscated and destroyed its major weapons of

mass destruction while sanctions devastated the /ra


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'nder the new inspection regime established by the resolution9 the 'nited 0ations

onitoring9 5erification and nspection Commission ('0 $5 C) and the nternational

#tomic /nergy #gency ( #/#) would ha"e ;immediate9 unimpeded9 unconditional and

unrestricted access< to any sites and buildings in ra*9 including presidential sites. They

would also ha"e the right to remo"e or destroy any weapons9 or related items9 they found.

The Council demanded that ra* confirm9 within se"en days9 its intention to comply fully with

the resolution. t further decided that9 within HA days9 ra*9 in order to begin to comply with

its obligations9 should pro"ide to '0 $5 C9 the #/# and the Council a complete

declaration of all aspects of its programmes to de"elop chemical9 biological and nuclear

weapons9 including chemical9 biological and nuclear programmes it claims are for purposes

not related to weapons production or material.

#ny false statement or omission in the declaration will be considered a further material

breach of ra*,s obligations9 and will be reported to the Council for assessment.< >H

B. I NTERNATIONAL R EACTIONPresident )ush welcomed the passage of +esolution 2332, declaring thatB

;The resolution appro"ed today presents the ra*i regime with a test I a final test. ra* must

now9 without delay or negotiations9 fully disarmJ welcome full inspections9 welcome full

inspections9 and fundamentally change the approach it has ta!en for more than a decade.<

(he *rench Prime 'inister, ;ean4Pierre +affarin, welcomed the unanimous vote in the

ecurity !ouncil, stressing that the +esolution would ;facilitate disarmament by peaceful

means.< >F +ussian Deputy *oreign 'inister uri *edotov said that the wording of the

+esolution was Fnot ideal but coming from a difficult compromiseG, adding that the main

thing is that compromise is reached and the world community has managed to avert a real

threat of war. (he way for political and diplomatic settlement of the /ra


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that his government had played a key role in convincing Washington to address the /raK

(he audi cabinet urged /ra< to accept the +esolution so as to avoid inflicting harm on the

/ra


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BUSH S A7IS OF E IL AND STRATEGY LEADING TO THE IN ASION OF IRAQ

A. B USH ’ S A R U!"#$ % $ H" "$"RR"#'" O( # U')"AR * AR +

(he F xis of %vilG was announcement by President )ush in his tate of the 0nion ddress

on ;anuary 7C, 7887, 98 which generated wide reactions and unfavourable remarks. (he

President identified /ra


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0 . (he war according to )ush was for the protection 0 or to increase homeland

security. )ush has played his cards very well as he had succeeded to get 0":s support in

waging war against oil rich country /ra


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presented a powerful message about the need to be resolute, decisive and relentless against

the menace of l 6aeda. (he President reportedly told his staff that everything was different

after eptember 22 and he made it clear that the sole organi=ing principle of his

administration was the fight against terror .9L

(hus, the )ush dministration moved supposedly in a manner largely consistent with

international law, citing the principle of self4defence under rticle @2 of the 0# !harter.

Despite the prohibitions against the use of force in rticle 7J3K, international law allows for a

limited use of force in self4defence in the event of an armed attack, 9C until the ecurity

!ouncil has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 38

On the other hand, although there wasn?t any connection between /ra


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rticle 7J3K of the 0# !harter does not prohibit only Tuse of forceT, but also Fthe threatG of

force, Fagainst the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other

manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 0nited #ationsG 33

merican and )ritish military aircrafts attacked many times /ra


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political environment in which each state fears the actual or potential hostility of other states.

$eaders rationally calculate war:s costs and benefits in terms of their state:s power and

security .3

/n realist terms, the invasion was a rational means for the 0. . to achieve its primary goal of

demonstrating its power to allies and competitors alike, and of avoiding the appearance of

post4CI22 decline. s well, it was intended to prevent /ra


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-ussein. 'ore over as pointed out several times in this article the 0 used democracy as an

excuse to wage war on /ra< to lay its hands on oil.

iii. Ideolo2ical in3luences

#eoconservative belief in efficacy of unilateral force, orientalist beliefs about 'iddle %astern peoples, and evangelical !hristian beliefs concerning /srael 5engeful 0. . nationalism after

CI22. With the widely felt psychological need to administer punishment unashamed by the

invasion of fghanistan, and with )in $aden still at large, the administration may have seen

in addam -ussein a scapegoat for the CI22 attacksB -e was, like the perpetrators, an rab

'uslim and could readily fill the role of evildoer .@8

(his perspective would help explain why )ush administration policy makers on /ra<

generally excluded tate Department personnel with first4hand experience of the region and

knowledge of its politics and history. (he )us administration infused a feeling of religious

combat, the mighty good !hristians against evil doer /slamists. (o us this seem


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(he subse


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B. * OR) $ RIBU#A) O# I RA0

'any weeks before the 0 had declared war on /ra


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W. )ush was a mere tool to invade /ra< for the 0." and 0. : own economic interest in this

oil rich nation. /n pursuit of their agenda on oil, the )ush and )lair governments blatantly

ignored the massive opposition to the war expressed by millions of people around the world. A7

(his is a clear cut action against justice and morality that these nations so commonly use in

their tactics to gain control over this oil bearing nation.

(he main contentions against the 0" and 0. &overnments that led the war on /ra< were

based upon the 0# doctrine on international law. (he charges were on crime against

humanity and the contravention of 0nited #ations !harter and the #uremberg Principles.

/"idence for this can be found in the lea!ed owning treet emo

of >Hrd =uly9 >AA>9 in which it was re"ealed1 G ilitary action was

now seen as ine"itable. Bush wanted to remo"e addam through

military action9 justified by the conjunction of terrorism and

W . But the intelligence and facts were being fi:ed around the

policy.G ntelligence was manufactured to will fully decei"e the

people of the ' 9 the '79 and their elected representati"es. KH

0sing disproportionate force and weapon systems with indiscriminate effects, such as cluster

munitions, incendiary bombs, depleted uranium JD0K, and chemical weapons. Detailedevidence that leukaemia had risen sharply in children residing in those areas that had been

targeted by D0 weapons.

ubjecting /ra


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0" led alliance, including holding more than @88 people at &uantanamo )ay. A3 Denying

legal protection, and using Fextraordinary renditionsG to send people to be tortured in other

countries known to commit human rights abuses and torture prisoners. ll of which has been

stated in the W(/ report.

;# good case can be made that propaganda is a more important

means of social control in open societies li!e the 'nited tates

than in closed societies li!e the late o"iet 'nion... This system of

thought control is not centrally managed... t operates mainly by

indi"idual and mar!et choices9 with the fre*uent collecti"e ser"ice

to the national interest arising from common interests and

internalised beliefs.<K?

4 %dward -erman

-owever it is rather sad to know that this was a losing battle to fight against such war

crimes. blanket of almost total media silence covers )ush and )lair:s crimes in /ra


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challenge against the limits of 0nited #ations system regulating the use of force. On the other

hand, the weapons of mass destruction Jthat have been cited as the main reason of the war by

the 0 and the 0" within the context of pre4emptive self4defenseK haven?t been found in

post4war /ra< yet. 'oreover, following the collapse of )a?th regime, /ra< has became a

?heaven? for transnational terrorism under the merican4)ritish occupation, despite the fact

that the invasion was materiali=ed as a part of ?war against terrorism?. #o matter what the

outcome of its involvement in /ra


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

O( /0 A6( *0)()/

!harter of the 0nited #ations, available atB

httpBIIwww.un.orgIenIdocumentsIcharterIchapter .shtml Jlast visited ep. 22, 78292A

Deputy Defence ecretary Wolfowit= J0nited tates Department of Defence, 7889K............2L

$ibrary +esearch Paper /ra


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A, 7887M F ddress at Whitehall palace, $ondonG, #ovember 2C, 7889. ll speeches are

accessible through Rwww.whitehouse.govS........................................................................22

President &eorge W. )ush, tate of the 0nion ddress J;an. 7C, 7887K, a"ailable at1 ...........2@

(ext of the President:s tate of the 0nion address, 7C ;anuary 7887, from the White -ouse

web site at...............................................................................................................................L

(he )P tatistical +eview of World %nergy 7883G, available atB www.bp.cmI statistical

review.....................................................................................................................................3

World (ribunal on /ra


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0#Press +elease !I @A3, L #ovember 7887,

httpBIIwww.un.orgI#ewsIPressIdocsI7887I ! @A3.doc.htm................................................29

World (ribunal on /ra

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