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BurgmannJournal

R e s e a R c h D e b a t e O p i n i O n i s s u e i i , 2 0 1 3

Burgmann Journal is a multidisciplinary, peer-reviewed publication of collected works of research, debate and opinion from residents and alumni of Burgmann College designed to engage and stimulate the wider community.

Published by ANU eView The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at http://eview.anu.edu.au

ISSN 2201-3881 (Print) ISSN 2201-3903 (Online)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Opinions published in the Burgmann Journal do not necessarily represent those of The Australian National University, Burgmann College, or the Editors.

Front cover by Burgmann resident Hilary Hanrahan. According to Hilary, ‘This artwork was created through Photoshop using my own photograph of some new Bougainvillea buds growing on campus. The spray of flowers hanging over the fence looked good enough to eat’.

Printed by Griffin Press

This edition © 2013 ANU eView

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Editorial Team:

Patrick CarvalhoEditor-in-Chief

Matthew CalvinEditor

Roderick MurchisonEditor

Ella RelfEditor

Wen-Ti SungEditor

Associate Editors:

Vincent Margerin

Matthew Randall

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Academic Referees:

Dr Shiro ArmstrongResearch FellowInternational Development EconomicsThe Australian National University

Dr Gregory BartonSenior Research FellowCentre for Environmental HistoryThe Australian National University

Dr Luke GlanvilleResearch FellowCentre for Governance and Public PolicyGriffith University

Mr Nishank MotwaniBurgmann AlumniMA Security Studies – ANUPhD Candidate – UNSW

Dr Mark NolanAssociate ProfessorCollege of LawThe Australian National University

Dr Lindy OrthiaLecturerCentre for the Public Awareness of ScienceThe Australian National University

Mr Aires PereiraPsychologistTripsi Clinica de Psicologia

Dr Michael PlatowProfessorResearch School of PsychologyThe Australian National University

Dr Marian SawerEmeritus ProfessorSchool of Politics and International RelationsThe Australian National University

Dr Dale StephensAssociate ProfessorLaw SchoolThe University of Adelaide

Dr Colin TatzProfessorSchool of Politics and International RelationsThe Australian National University

Dr Katerina TeaiwaCo-Convener of Pacific StudiesSchool of Culture, History and LanguageThe Australian National University

Ms Erin WalshPhD CandidateResearch School of PsychologyThe Australian National University

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Authors:

Brodie Buckland, a former Dean at Burgmann College, is a final year JD student at theANU College of Law, and Senior Resident of Burgmann College. He holds a BA in Historyfrom Harvard University and a Diploma in Legal Studies from Oxford University. He iscurrently writing his JD Honours Thesis on the defence power in the Constitution. Outsideof his academic life, Brodie currently works for the ACT Government Solicitor in their CivilLitigation and Government Law areas, and hopes to continue to hone his interest in public lawin the years to come.

Charles Deutscher, a Burgmann resident from 2004 to 2007, is completing a Master ofPublic Policy at the University of Oxford. His present research in South Sudan centres aroundthe provision of support by UN entities to non-UN security forces. He holds Bachelors ofArts (International Relations / French) and Laws (First Class Hons.) from the ANU, and hasworked in various capacities for the UN in Dakar and New York, and in private legal practicein Sydney. In 2014, he will commence work as a Delegate for the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC).

Lewis Hirst is in his third year of a Bachelor of Asia-Pacific Studies, with an academicfocus on the societies and economies of Northeast Asia. Lewis is currently a Policy Analystin international affairs for the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), and afounder and Project Director of The Monsoon Project, an ANU-based Asian Studies publishinginitiative. Lewis has been a resident of Burgmann College since 2011.

Kevin Llewellyn had 14 years of experience as a Norwegian Government employee beforemoving on to academia in 2010. Upon completing two Bachelor degrees, in Crisis Managementat Hedmark University College and in Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen, Kevinchose ANU for his postgraduate studies. After the ANU exchange program with BjørknesCollege/PRIO, Kevin has been a Burgmann College resident since the beginning of 2013 and isexpected to complete his double Masters in IR and Diplomacy by mid-2014.

Daniel McKay is a current resident of Burgmann College and is in his third year of a Bachelorof Arts/Bachelor of Laws degree, majoring in History and Political Science. His interests inhistory and politics have been a lifelong passion, and he is contemplating postgraduate studiesand a career which captures these interests. The theme of his essay was particularly inspiredby his experiences growing up on the family property during one of the worst droughts on record.

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Mimi-Cecilia Pascoe is a current resident of Burgmann College in her second year of aBachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Laws degree, majoring in European History and French. Followingthree further years of Arts/Law, she hopes to complete Honours in French, focusing on Frenchliterature, before venturing into the legal field.

Emma Roberts is currently in her second year of a double Bachelor degree in Asia-PacificStudies and Law. She is majoring in Indonesian and Pacific Studies and hopes to work in oneof these regions in the future as an advocate for the rights of oppressed peoples, particularlyin the areas of gender equality or customary land ownership. Emma has already studied andvolunteered in Indonesia on two occasions and will complete some fieldwork in Samoa at theend of 2013. She has been a Burgmann resident since the beginning of 2012.

Ana Stevenson is currently undertaking her PhD at the University of Queensland, where herinterdisciplinary thesis investigates the social reform movements of nineteenth-century America.As an undergraduate, she pursued her interest in media and cultural studies through a Bachelorof Communication (dist.) (CQU), and extended her interest in American history during Honours(Class I) (UQ). Ana was a resident of Burgmann College (2009-2010) as a Summer Scholar inthe College of Arts and Social Sciences at the ANU.

Marina Tavleski has been a resident of Burgmann College since 2012, and she is currentlycompleting her Honours in Psychology at the ANU. She has a Bachelor degree in Economics andPolitical Science from the University of Melbourne, and has more recently obtained a GraduateDiploma in Psychological Studies from the ANU. Marina is working towards a career in researchand clinical psychology.

Sophie Taylor is a current resident of Burgmann College in her third year of a Bachelorof Science/Bachelor of Laws degree majoring in Neuroscience. She hopes to pursue a careerin international public health, with a specific focus on improving health policies in developingcountries.

Tan Haur was the Artist-in-Residence at Burgmann College from 2006 to 2007. He is an MAgraduate (Distinction) of the Australian National University majoring in digital imaging andalternative photographic processes & printing. As a pioneer of the local and regional DigitalArt Community, Tan has been actively involved in many of the global digital art activities andresearch projects. He has received the first prize award in France + Singapore PhotographicArts Competition 2012 as well as the silver award in PX3 Prix de la Photographie, Paris 2011.

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Foreword:

One should never judge a book by its cover we are told. One suspects this may apply even

more so to an Annual Journal published in 2013 for the second time only.

However, Volume Two of the Burgmann Journal goes beautifully beyond its charter of

“Research Debate Opinion”. It is bookended by the fabulous photoshopping of ANU

Bougainvillea by current resident Hilary Hanrahan on the cover, and the renowned work of

alumnus and celebrated Singapore artist, Tan Haur’s Global Eyes series in the final pages. This

seems to me to be most fitting, because bound within is a flow of writing worthy of such a wrap,

and mature beyond its years.

One might normally expect such an academic journal to be the product of the more

experienced academic and yet, in only its second outing, the Burgmann Journal resounds with

the energy of youth from no less than five current undergraduates and several others who may

be considered young alumni or postgraduates of the College. More importantly, and more

engagingly, it resounds with academic rigour, intellectual strength and vitality of interest and

analysis.

As Principal of Burgmann College, am I entitled to be proud of this production and its many

producers? I hope so. It says so much about the direction and the future of Burgmann, its

academic culture and strength in this fully flowering return volume.

Burgmann College owes Editor-in-Chief Patrick Carvalho, his team, the academic referees,

the authors and contributors, a great debt of gratitude. This journal is a true sample of the

great intellectual riches of Burgmann residents, past and present. The range and rigour of the

College’s current research output will be felt both within the Australian National University

and well beyond.

Dr Philip Dutton BA, MEd, PhD, MACE, AFAIM, MAICDPrincipal

Burgmann College

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Editorial:

It is with great pleasure that we present the second issue of the Burgmann Journal. Back

in its inception, the venture was designed to showcase the rich and colourful academic output

of the broader Burgmann community. The project, however, already transcends its original

blueprint of “collected works”. The Burgmann Journal has become ultimately a work in itself;

borrowing from Koffka’s maxim, a whole that is other than the sum of its parts. Each individual,

peer-reviewed paper and artwork, ranging from philosophy to physical sciences, from history to

psychology, from anthropology to law and political studies, presents – and represents – the

academic endeavours of a high-quality standard. Taken in its entirety, the Journal is the

embodiment of the Burgmann College community, which aims to capture the imagination and

to stimulate its members to be their best at their own pace.

Such achievement is the fruit of hard work and dedication throughout the year, from a

diverse pool of undergraduate and postgraduate Burgmann residents and alumni. Authors,

academic referees, editors, and many other contributors, are the true force behind the Journal.

In particular, I would like to thank the thorough input – and, at heart, the trust – of Dr Philip

Dutton and Ms Sally Renouf, respectively, Principal and Deputy Principal of Burgmann College.

For every project to thrive, a leadership vision is vital to ensuring a courageous and productive

environment.

Lastly, I sincerely hope that the reader appreciates and, in the end, is moved by the contents

of this edition. Certainly, this second issue of the Burgmann Journal is an invitation to the

wonderful and mysterious world of creative research. Enjoy!

Patrick CarvalhoEditor-in-Chief

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Contents

Section I – Articles

The Legislative Capacity of Federal Parliament to Protect EconomicNational SecurityBrodie Buckland pp. 1–7

What does it mean to be a ‘humanitarian leader’ in the 21st century?Charles Deutscher pp. 9–13

‘Juku Culture’: The Impacts of Supplementary Education on EducationalEquality and Employment Opportunity in JapanLewis Hirst pp. 15–21

International Relations – Lost in PrevaricationKevin Llewellyn pp. 23–31

Dust and Bluster: An historical evaluation of the political discourse ondrought in AustraliaDaniel McKay pp. 33–39

Intentionalism and Functionalism: Explaining the HolocaustMimi-Cecilia Pascoe pp. 41–46

It seemed too good to be true and it was: The exploitation of Pacific IslandLabourers in ‘White Queensland’Emma Roberts pp. 47–51

Making Gender Divisive: ‘Post-Feminism’, Sexism and MediaRepresentations of Julia GillardAna Stevenson pp. 53–63

So Bad That It’s Good: The Role of Negative Emotions in HappinessMarina Talevski pp. 65–70

Criminal Minds: The Influence of the Monoamine Oxidase AGenotype and Environmental Stressors on Aggressive BehaviourSophie Taylor pp. 71–77

Section II – Artworks

Global Eyes (new series 2)Tan Haur pp. 79-80

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Brodie Buckland | The Legislative Capacity of Federal Parliament

The Legislative Capacity of Federal Parliament to Protect Economic National

Security

Brodie Buckland

At its broadest, “national security” as a notion encompasses the protection of a country from threatsto its continued existence. This concept is no longer limited to freedom from invasion or military attacks,but has expanded to include a range of topics. Can the Commonwealth Consitution, a static writtendocument, adapt to these changes? This paper examines the ability of the Australian Federal Parliamentto legislate with respect to economic national security, which, as an aspect of the broader modernunderstanding of national security, may require immediate attention in the future. The corporationspower, trade and commerce power, defence power, and implied executive or ‘nationhood’ power are allanalysed, and the extent to which each of these constitutional heads of power can support measuresto protect Australia’s economic future is examined. This paper concludes that a variety of potentiallegislative measures are possible, depending on the nature and extent of the proposed statute.

National security, in its simplest form, is theprotection of the state and its citizens from threatsthat endanger its continued existence. Historically,the primary concern of national security wasan armed attack by a foreign power, with theengine of the military-industrial complex devoted toprotecting national borders and citizen lives throughconventional warfare. The advent of the digital ageand the migration of many vital human activitiesto computer based systems has, however, addedanother theatre to the possible battlegrounds thatwar may be fought in. While the nature of war haschanged, the text of the Commonwealth Constitutionremains much the same as it was when it was enactedin 1901, leaving open the question of the abilityof the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate tocounteract this threat.

Given the decision of the High Court inThomas v Mowbray (“Thomas”),1 which will bediscussed in greater detail below, there is a clearability for Parliament to legislate in response toconcrete threats that fall outside the conventionalunderstanding of warfare. Yet however different theenemies and battlegrounds of the war on terror maybe to conventional warfare, both types of war are stillfought in the physical world. While Thomas clearlyenlivened the power of Parliament to act in responseto new tactics, it did not speak to the ability ofthe Commonwealth legislature to respond to newsecurity paradigms. The advent of the digital agemeans that war will be fought not in the fields noreven on the busy street-corners of civilian capitals,but on the hard-drives of computers storing vitaldata around the world.2

This change in theatre of war has led to achange in targets and tactics. Elements of economicinfrastructure, in addition to digital portions of moretraditional infrastructure targets, are now potentialtargets. A denial-of-service (DOS) attack on a majorbank could prevent customers from accessing funds

and shut down entire portions of the economy.3

This development in technology means that sometargets that serve a purely economic function are nowvulnerable to strategic attacks from hostile entities.

This development raises the simple, ifconfounding, legal question: to what extentcan the Commonwealth Parliament enact laws forthe sole purpose of protecting economic nationalsecurity? Since national security is concerned withresponses to potential threats, two categories ofpurely economic situations will be discussed. Thefirst threat is the danger posed by a cyber attackon private institutions that form the backbone ofthe Australian economy. Such an attack could havethe effect of destroying assets, delaying importanttransactions or even halting commerce altogether.The second threat is more amorphous than a cyberattack, but no less dangerous – threats to theAustralian economy that arise as by-products ofthe integration of economies around the world.National security is concerned with preventing andmitigating threats no matter their origin, and an“economic natural disaster”4 could certainly pose agreat threat to economic national security.

Within the confines of these hypotheticalsituations exist a variety of scenarios. Broadlyspeaking, the myriad threats posed by each ofthe two situations above can be separated bytheir imminence and scale, with different responsespossible for different iterations of the same type ofcrisis. The more immediate the threat of a specificattack, the more likely certain powers are going tobe enlivened. Similarly, the larger the threat posedby a situation, the greater the scope there will befor Parliament to respond. The variety of potentiallegislation that could be enacted to prevent, protectand combat threats to Australia’s economic securitymeans that a variety of potential legislative powersneed to be discussed. To that end, the ambit ofthe corporations power, the trade and commerce

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Burgmann Journal II (2013)

power, the defence power and the implied incidental(or “nationhood”) power will be discussed in thecontext of various iterations of the two categoriesof threats to economic national security previewedabove. The current total capacity of Parliament tolegislate with respect to economic national securitywill then be evaluated against economic threats, withsome necessary evolutions of that power outlined.

Corporations Power

Section 51(xx) of the Constitution states thatParliament shall have power to make laws withrespect to, “foreign corporations, and trading orfinancial corporations formed within the limits of theCommonwealth.” Since the present concern is notregulating corporations per se but rather using thispower for national security ends, the jurisprudentialscope of this provision remains a question – howclosely must a law relate to the activities of a“trading or financial” corporation in order to besupported by this legislation?

The scope of this power to supportCommonwealth legislation was the subject ofmuch litigation and jurisprudence in the 20thcentury.5 This debate was settled in New SouthWales v The Commonwealth (the Work ChoicesCase)6 in which a 5:2 majority of the High Courtestablished that the words of s 51(xx) oughtto be given broad operation. In the processof rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention that thecorporations power could only support legislationwhose “distinctive character or discriminatoryoperation” focused on constitutional corporations,their Honours afforded a wide ambit to the power.7

For the present purpose, however, it is sufficentto note that their Honours emphatically affirmedthat s 51(xx) supported legislative provisionsthat, “either single out constitutional corporationsas the object of statutory command. . . or, likethe legislation in Fontana Films, are directed toprotecting constitutional corporations from conductintended and likely to cause loss or damage to acorporation.”8

The case of Actors & Announcers EquityAssociation v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (“FontanaFilms”)9 that their Honours mention in this quoteis particularly relevant for the present purposes.In that case, the High Court said that not onlyare laws directed at corporations themselves withinpower, but also those laws which operate to protectthe trading activities of trading corporations.10 Nostatement could be more important for the purposesof using the corporations power to protect economicnational security, as any law that can properlybe construed as designed to protect the tradingactivities of a trading corporation is likely to besupported by this foundation in Fontana Films.

When considering possible strictures that mayneed to be enacted to protect the cyber-securityof corporations, it is clear that any legislation thatimposes a requirement on corporations to deal withcustomer data in a secure way will be supported.And, as highlighted in Fontana Films and endorsedin Work Choices, this includes any provision thatoperates to protect the trading activities of atrading corporation, and as such could requirethose engaging in commerce with corporations tohandle their data in a secure fashion. Given thisbreadth, the corporations power would support afairly broad-reaching scheme of data security thatcould bind both corporations and those dealing withthem.

Any potential cyber-security scheme based onthe corporations power would face two limitations.Firstly, the constitutional fact that this actionwas required to protect the trading activities oftrading corporations would have to be established.Given that banks worldwide spend an estimatedUSD$25 billion a year defending against cyberattacks, moderate measures which shore up theresistance of banks to hacks and exploitationsare likely to be supported. Whether thereare sufficient constitutional facts to support awhole-scale realignment of data security and storageremains to be seen. Secondly, any system thatproposes that banks store their customer informationwith Commonwealth authorities may run afoul ofthe just terms acquisition stricture contained ins 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. Such a measuremay be neither necessary nor desirable: customerbank details being held by a third party would bepotentially contentious and most likely unnecessary.

It is clear on the face of High Court considerationsof the corporations power that a wide breadth ofpotential measures requiring data protection foreconomic security reasons would be supported bythis power. What is more difficult is decidingwhether drastic and immediate action to protectAustralia from an economic natural disaster issupported by the corporations power. The stimuluspackage enacted in Pape was one such response,but to order corporations to engage in commercialactivities in order to stimulate the economy wouldclearly violate s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.A restriction that would restrain financial andtrading corporations from dealing in assets that areconsidered too dangerous to hold would also be indanger of falling afoul of the s 51(xxxi) restraints.What might be possible, in a similar fashion to themeasure that was the subject of discussion in Pape,is a grant of funds to corporations to help themstave off economic ruin. Whether this is the mosteffective response to an economic crisis is doubtfulsince it is unclear whether these payments would

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be spent by corporations and thus bolster economicactivity. Clearly, while the corporations power iswell suited to support legislation related to datasecurity, the framing requirements illustrated abovemake it ill suited to supporting legislative responsesto economic natural disasters.

Trade and Commerce Power

Section 51(i) provides that the Commonwealth hasthe power to enact laws with respect to, “tradeand commerce with other countries, and amongthe States.” Whereas the corporations power is apersons power in that it gives Parliament authorityto enact laws with respect to the legal entitiesin question, the trade and commerce power is asubject matter power. This difference has resultedin substantially different principles of constitutionalinterpretation being applied to s 51(i). Firstly, ifa law can be said to be a law with respect tointerstate and overseas trade and commerce butalso achieve a regulatory end not within power, theprinciples of dual characterisaion dictate that thelaw is nonetheless constitutionally valid.11 Secondly,and most importantly for the present purposes, isthe distinction made between the core and incidentalareas of operation of the trade and commerce power.

Broadly, laws that operate within the core areaof the trade and commerce power will be supportedby s 51(i) while provisions that operate withinareas incidental to the core power will only besupported if they are necessary to effectuate thecore purpose. A good example of the relationshipbetween these two areas comes from Airlines of NewSouth Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2)(“Second Airlines”).12 It was necessary, as a resultof the physical integration of air navigation, thatstandards promulgated for the purposes of ensuringsafe air travel between states and overseas be allowedto operate within states.

The Second Airlines case is important whenevaluating the extent of the trade and commercepower, as two limitations were placed on theoperation of this head of power in the incidentalarea. Firstly, the nature of the physical integrationof air travel meant that it was “sui generis amongmethods of transport, and indeed among all formsof trade and commerce.”13 The operation of thesafety regulations on air transport within a statewas a necessary consequence of their operation toprotect interstate and overseas trade and commerce,and were only permitted for that reason. Air travelwas one of a kind, which makes the potential forbroad uses of the trade and commerce power limited.Secondly, Kitto J opined that economic, as opposedto physical, interference with interstate and overseastrade and commerce was not sufficient for s 51(i) tosupport the operation of legislation within a state.14

The ability of the trade and commerce powerto support legislative measures designed to protecteconomic national security through increased cybersecurity is unclear. On one hand, the limitationsplaced on the incidental operation of s 51(i) inthe Second Airlines case are quite stringent, andit would be difficult to argue that there wasany specific physical threat posed by the failureof cyber security legislation to operate withinstates. Legislation prescribing specific data handlingprocedures for interstate and overseas financialtransactions would be almost totally ineffective ifsimilar data handling standards were not adoptedfor the transmission of data within states, yetsuch an economic exigency is clearly not a validbasis for the intra-state operation of the trade andcommerce power. On the other hand, however, it ispossible that the integration of data circuits acrossborders could be analogized with air travel to permitthe prescription of safe data handling procedures.Just as air travel is the physical manifestation ofinternational economic integration, the close tiesbetween intrastate, interstate and international datarepositories and communications could allow foruniform regulation of digital communication by theCommonwealth. Such an analogy would still facethe problem of overcoming the physical/economicthreat distinction established by the High Court, ahurdle that would require the establishment of somespecific constitutional facts linking economic threatsto physical safety. In spite of the strong evidencethat hostile foreign powers are using cyber-securitytactics to disrupt the global economy for strategicreasons,15 it is unlikely that they will be viewedas important as physical safety is to air navigation,thus making legislation of this type not an act withrespect to s 51(i).

Whereas cyber-security legislation would mostlikely be supported by the corporations power, thestrict interpretation of the trade and commercepower by the High Court makes the ability of s 51(i)to support data protection procedures less clear.Provisions that require persons to handle their datain a specific way when transmitting it overseas orinterstate would clearly be allowed, but the abilityfor that system of regulation to operate within astate and thereby create a uniform system of dataregulation remains unclear. Yet where it would bedifficult to utilize the corporations power to supportlegislation designed prevent the occurrence of orrespond to an international economic disaster, thenature of the s 51(i) as a subject matter powerwith respect to trade and commerce means that itcould easily be used to respond to economic dangersarising overseas.

The dual characterisaion principles ofconstitutional interpretation could operate to

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allow Parliament to rely on the trade and commercepower to regulate economic natural disasters.Trading in certain kinds of “toxic assets” could berestricted or outlawed under this power, as couldthe ability for foreign investors to own Australianassets (including shares). As long as the law couldbe characterised as one with respect to interstate oroverseas trade and commerce it would be validlysupported by this power. Where the potential forthis power to support laws is unclear is the extentto which it authorises positive action to be takenin response to economic threats. A grant of fundssimilar to that in Pape16 is unlikely to be authorisedgiven the fact that it would primarily operate inthe incidental area of the power without a necessaryconnection to the core subject of interstate andoverseas trade and commerce. It is also probablethat the limitations on ownership of overseas assetsthat would be supported by this power wouldviolate s 51(xxxi) if effected an acquisition ofproperty held prior to the date the provisions of theact came into force.

Generally speaking, both the trade and commercepower and the corporations power would be morelikely to support legislation directed at preventativeeconomic national security than mitigating existingeconomic national security threats. The power ofParliament to enact preventative measures, both interms of cyber security and in terms of more generalprotections from dangerous worldwide economicconditions, could quite possibly be derived fromits powers within ss 51(xx) and 51(i). Yet thelimitations on these powers mean that they arepossibly ill-suited to responding to existing economicnational security threats, and as such other potentialbases of Parliamentary legislative power need to becovered.

Defence Power

Section 51(vi) of the Constitution provides thatParliament has power to make laws with respect to,“the naval and military defence of the Commonwealthand of the several States, and the control of theforces to execute and maintain the laws of theCommonwealth.” Recent Commonwealth legislativeresponses to terrorism have tested the ambit of thispower, with the High Courts ultimate conclusioncontaining a spectrum of interpretations. Unlikethe corporations or trade and commerce powers,however, the defence power is heavily dependentupon the establishment of constitutional facts inorder to enliven its operation.

The decision of the High Court in Thomas vMowbray (“Thomas”) is a recent examination ofthe content of the defence power.17 That caseconcerned a challenge by Jack Thomas, an admittedterrorist associate, of the interim control order

placed upon him by an order of Mowbray FM underDivision 104 of the Criminal Code (Cth).18 Thearguments before the High Court focused notably onthe validity of the legislation, including the questionof whether this legislation was supported by thedefence power. The judgments in this case rangedbroadly on their interpretations of the defence power,with a majority regarding s 51(vi) as capable ofsupporting the impugned sections of the Code.19

Within this chorus of assent, however, there were abroad variety of perspectives on the defence power,with the perspectives shown in the judgments ofCallinan J and Hayne J worth noting for the presentpurpose. The lack of traction of the dissent of KirbyJ is also telling in terms of the proper constructionof the defence power.

Within the judgments delivered by the High Courtin Thomas, the judgments of Kirby J and Callinan Jsit at opposite ends of the spectrum of perspectiveson the defence power. Kirby J construes s 51(vi)very narrowly, stating that other sections of theConstitution limit its operation to the marshalingof conventional military forces against a foreignaggressor operating outside Australia’s borders.20

Paradoxically, His Honour states that the defencepower only authorises action to defend the “bodiespolitic” that make up the Australian federation,and cannot support the protection of individualcitizens.21 If this perspective had been adopted bythe majority, then s 51(vi) would not be discussed inthis paper. The other justices of the Court, however,held that the defence power was sufficient to supportthe operation of the legislation in question, withCallinan J supporting a sweeping interpretationof s 51(vi). After discussing the importanceof establishing constitutional facts in order toenliven this power,22 His Honour commented on theCommunist Party Case23 in his judgment, criticizingthe distinction made by Dixon J between timesof peace and serious armed conflict, and internaland external threats.24 Crucially for the presentpurpose, Callinan J recounted with approval thedissent of Latham CJ in the Communist Party Case,stating that the Chief Justice was more, “alive tothe gravity of direct and indirect internal threatsinspired externally, and the different manifestationsof war and warfare in an unsettled and dangerousworld.”25

Given the scope of the hypothetical legislationconsidered by this paper, the words of CallinanJ appear to support a wide range of protectiveactions, assuming that the necessary constitutionalfacts had been established. While His Honour wasin the majority in his conclusion on the abilityof the defence power to support the provisions ofDivision 104 of the Code, the statements madein the course of his judgment go well beyond

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the scope of afforded to s 51(vi) by the otherjustices. Hayne J in particular presented a reasoned,cautious approach to the defence power, by discretelyanalyzing the concepts of war and terrorism thennoting the overlap between the two.26 His supportfor the notion of war as, “the pursuit of a nation’spolitical objectives by other means”27 could providea possible basis for advancing s 51(vi) in supportof the proposed legislative measures. This potentialevolution in the defence power is bolstered by HisHonours observations that tactics and battlefieldshave changed over time,28 indicating the possibilitythat the ambit of s 51(vi) could be expandedto support legislative responses to threats notcontemplated at the time the Constitution wasdrafted.

A literal reading of s 51(vi) would be unlikely tosupport legislation designed to take proactive stepsagainst economic threats from other nations, norprovisions requiring enhanced cyber-security. Yetthe majority justices in Thomas were willing toevolve the scope of the defence power to supportlegislation that combatted a novel threat to nationalsecurity. If it were possible to characterize theresponses to economic national security threatsin the same light and, crucially, establish theconstitutional facts that the legislation in questionwas required to respond to a danger within the statusquo, then it is likely that this legislation would besupported. If an adverse view towards economicnational security threats was taken by the Court,however, then it is not likely that the defence powercould be utilized to support legislative measuresdesigned to safeguard economic national security.

Nationhood Power

Unlike the three other constitutional legislativeheads of power discussed in this paper, thenationhood power is a combination of the generalincidental power in s 51(xxxix) and the statement ins 61 that the executive power of the Commonwealth,“extends to the execution and maintenance of thisConstitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.”High Court jurisprudence on this matter tells us thatParliament has the power to legislate with respectto matters, “peculiarly adapted to the governmentof a nation and which cannot otherwise be carriedon for the benefit of the nation.”29

The 2009 case of Pape v Commissioner ofTaxation (“Pape”)30 is directly on point for thepresent task. In that case, an attempt to combat theeffects of the global economic crisis in 2008 by thepayment of cash bonuses to taxpayers was challengedon the basis that there was no legislative powerenabling the appropriation of those funds from theConsolidated Revenue Fund. In a 4:3 split, the HighCourt held that the payment of the bonuses was

supported by the nationhood power. In his separatejudgment as part of the majority, French CJ statedthat it could:

hardly be doubted that the currentfinancial and economic crisis concernsAustralia as a nation. Determiningthat there is the need for an immediatefiscal stimulus to the national economyin the circumstances set out above issomewhat analogous to determining a stateof emergency in circumstances of a naturaldisaster. The Executive Government isthe arm of government capable of andempowered to respond to a crisis be it war,natural disaster or a financial crisis on thescale here.31

This statement makes it clear that legislationnecessary to combat imminent, large-scale threatsto economic national security would be supportedby the nationhood power. In one sense, thiscase established that the nationhood power is theconverse of the corporations or trade and commercepowers – where those powers could more likely beused to support legislation directed at preparatorymeasures, the nationhood power is more likely toenable a response to an impending threat.

Whether the nationhood power would, however,support legislation directed at preventing breachesof Australia’s non-governmental cyber-security isunclear. The language used by French CJ suggeststhat unless a sufficiently grave and imminent threatwas established, the nationhood power would apply.There are other cases, though, that have seen thenationhood power support establishment of regionalcouncils for social development,32 a regulatoryscheme for certain words and phrases surroundingAustralia’s bicentennary,33 and pharmaceuticalbenefits scheme.34 The primary connection betweenthese disparate legislative provisions is that all ofthem could not otherwise be carried out for thebenefit of Australia unless the Commonwealth wasable to do them. The necessary hurdles for anystatutory scheme to clear in order to be supportedby the nationhood power, then, is that it is (1)necessary and (2) unable to be carried out by anyother body. Thus for a particular legislative schemedesigned at mitigating or preventing economicnational security threats to be supported by thenationhood power all that would have to be shownis that there was a threat great enough that itwarranted Commonwealth involvement.

Conclusion

The scope of Commonwealth legislative powercanvassed in the four sections above ranges from

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certain persons to specific subjects, from the powerto defend a nation to the power to act for its generalwelfare. In terms of economic national security, it isclear that Parliament has the power to make bothpreventative and mitigating laws. The corporationspower and the trade and commerce power couldbe used to support laws that prevent the negativeeffects of cyber-security breaches and toxic debts,while the defence power could be enlivened byan economic threat of sufficient magnitude. Thenationhood power could potentially support bothtypes of measures, as long as the action proposed wassufficiently unique to the character of Australia as anation to require federal executive action. Overall, itis clear that at least an arguable constitutional basisexists for Parliament to enact laws with respect toeconomic national security – the only question iswhether it considers such action necessary. Giventhat the Commonwealth is already taking stepsto protect its own data,35 it is not a stretch toimagine that measures to safeguard private as wellas public data will become necessary in order toprotect Australia’s economy. Balancing the intrusionof the government into previously private economicmatters against the need to protect that ownershipis a paradox at the heart of national security, butthat is ultimately a political question and outsidethe purview of this paper. What is clear is that,regardless of the merits, Parliament has the powerto enact legislation intended to protect Australia’seconomic national security.

Notes1Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307.2For more background see [Economist, 2012, p. 56-57].3A denial of service attack shut down the entire Estonian

state in 2007, including its banks: Ibid at 57. Therecent computer glitches that have plagued NAB and otherAustralian banks demonstrate the disruptive effects of suchvulnerability on commerce. See, for example, [Zappone, 2012].

4 This wording intentionally mimics the language used bythe High Court to describe the GFC’s advance on Australiain Pape. Pape v Commissioner of Taxation and Another(2009) 238 CLR 1, at [233].

5See Work Choices Case, (2006) 229 CLR 1, at [136]-[178].6(2006) 229 CLR 1.7Ibid per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and

Crennan JJ at [198].8Ibid.9(1982) 150 CLR 169.

10Ibid per Mason J at 205.11See, for example, Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v

Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1, in which the majorityupheld a provision allowing the Minister of State for Mineralsand Energy to consider the environmental impact of a projectbefore granting written approval to export certain materials.

12(1965) 113 CLR 54.13Ibid at 155 per Kitto J.14Ibid. This point was also supported by the High

Court in Attorney General (WA) (Ex rel Ansett TransportIndustries (Operations) Pty Ltd) v Australian NationalAirlines Commission (1976) 138 CLR 492, in which economicexigencies were not sufficient to permit an air service created

by the Commonwealth to operate primarily within WesternAustralia.

15Cyber security experts believe that the real threat fromIran will not be a nuclear program but rather its usage ofcomputer techniques to attack Western powers. See theEconomist, above n 2 and [Gorman, 2012].

16 Pape v Commissioner of Taxation and Another (2009)238 CLR 1. See discussion into Pape and the nationhoodpower below.

17Thomas, above n 1.18Ibid.19Ibid.20Ibid at [245-251].21Ibid at [251].22Ibid at [523]-[533].23Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83

CLR 1.24Ibid at [589].25Ibid.26Ibid at [421]-[422].27Ibid at [422]. This brings to mind Carl von Clausewitz’s

classic quote – “War is the continuation of policy by othermeans,” [Clausewitz, 1984, p. 87].

28Ibid at [438].29Victoria v Commonwealth (AAP Case) (1975) 134 CLR

338, at 397 per Mason J.30Pape v Commissioner of Taxation and Another (2009)

238 CLR 1.31Ibid at [233].32AAP Case, above n 29.33Davis v The Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79.34Attorney-General (Vic) v The Commonwealth

(“Pharmaceutical Benefits Case”) (1945) 71 CLR 237.35[Nicholson, 2012].

Bibliography

A Cases

Actors & Announcers Equity Association v Fontana FilmsPty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169

Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales(No 2) (1965) 113 CLR 54

Attorney-General (Vic) v The Commonwealth(“Pharmaceutical Benefits Case”) (1945) 71 CLR237

Attorney General (WA) (Ex rel Ansett Transport Industries(Operations) Pty Ltd) v Australian National AirlinesCommission (1976) 138 CLR 492

Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83CLR 1

Davis v The Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79

Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1

New South Wales v The Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1

Pape v Commissioner of Taxation and Another (2009) 238CLR 1

Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307

Victoria v Commonwealth (AAP Case) (1975) 134 CLR 338

B Legislation

Australian Constitution

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C Other

Carl von Clausewitz. On War [Vom Kriege]. New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1984. Michael Howard andPeter Paret, eds.

The Economist. ‘Cyber-Warfare: Hype and Fear’. London,8-14 December 2012. Pp. 56–57.

Siobhan Gorman. ‘Iran Renews Internet Attackson U.S. banks’. The Wall Street Journal, 17October 2012. URL http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578063063201649282.html.

Larissa Nicholson. ‘High-tech bunker to guard governmentdata’. The Canberra Times (Canberra), 14 December 2012.p. 7.

Chris Zappone. ‘NAB struggles with tech glitch’. SydneyMorning Herald, 10 February 2012. URL http://www.smh.com.au/business/nab-struggles-with-tech\\-glitch-20120210-1seaq.html.

99

Charles Deutscher | What does it mean to be a ‘humanitarian leader’ in the 21st century?

What does it mean to be a ‘humanitarian leader’ in the 21st century?

Charles Deutscher

What does it mean to be a humanitarian leader in the 21st century? This essay suggests that it meansbeing both ethical and effective. Being ethical requires a leader to have a moral compass – personaland institutional – rooted in a bedrock of humanitarian principles. Being effective requires the capacityfor sound judgment, guided by an ethical moral compass and progressively refined through experienceand intellectual exertion. The essay concludes that the best humanitarian leaders are those whosemoral compass and judgment afford them the personal authority and credibility required to achievehumanitarian outcomes in trying circumstances.

“It is not the critic who counts. . . The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whoseface is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again andagain, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming. . . ”

— Theodore Roosevelt, Sorbonne, Paris, 23 April 1910.

Considering what it means to be a humanitarianleader in the 21st century is germane both tohumanitarian policy and practice. It encouragesdeeper reflection about the desirable role that suchleaders should be expected to fulfil and, in thatsense, is a step on the way to better humanitarianleadership and action. Just as judges apply andadapt age-old legal principles to novel legal casesbefore them, the essence of humanitarian leadershipinvolves applying and adapting humanitarianprinciples to concrete situations ‘in the field’ withthe overall aim of alleviating or preventing humansuffering. This necessitates a constant processof innovation and adaptation to context [Bettset al., 2012, Ramalingam et al., 2011, HarvardHumanitarian Initiative, 2010].

I would like to suggest that while there isno prescriptive set of Weberian characteristicsrequired for humanitarian leadership,1 whateverthe context, being a humanitarian leader2 meansbeing ethical and effective [Nye, 2010]. Beingethical requires a leader to have a moral compass –personal and institutional – rooted in a bedrockof humanitarian principles, including humanity,neutrality, impartiality and independence. Aleader’s commitment to these principles is testedin the sometimes extreme circumstances in whichthey are required to lead. Being effective requires thecapacity for sound judgment, guided by an ethicalmoral compass and progressively refined throughexperience and intellectual exertion.

First, however, Part I contends that whatdistinguishes humanitarian leadership – andtherefore humanitarian leaders – from leadershipin other contexts is its focus primarily on in-countryoperations and on the victims of humanitariansituations. With this in mind, Parts II and IIIthen explore in more detail what it means for a

humanitarian leader to be ethical and effective.The paper concludes that the best humanitarianleaders are those whose moral compass and judgment– developed through experience and intellectualreflection – afford them the personal authorityand credibility required to achieve humanitarianoutcomes in trying circumstances.

Part I – Distinguishing humanitarian leaders

Applying one’s principles to practice is not uniqueto humanitarianism. But the contexts in whichhumanitarian leaders work – often characterisedby acute human suffering, insecurity, unreliableinformation, inadequate resources, shiftinggovernance dynamics and lack of institutionalsafeguards against bad decisions – accentuate theconsequences of doing so. Humanitarian leadershipis primarily operational in nature: the leader isin-country directing and performing humanitarianactivities. Here, a humanitarian leader mustbroker regular and meaningful access to affectedpopulations in order to understand their needs andact accordingly. Yet they must also be comfortablein diplomatic fora at ‘headquarters’, communicatingthe nuance of a particular situation to donors,governments and bodies which have great power toinfluence humanitarian programs at political andfinancial levels. Romeo Dallaire’s failed attemptsto persuade the Security Council to authoriseUNAMIR3 to take measures to prevent the 1994Rwandan genocide is perhaps the most egregiousexample of the potentially dire consequences ofleadership decisions in humanitarian contexts. Theexample also highlights how humanitarian leaderscan be set mandates or given resources which fallwoefully short of expectations vested in them andof what is required to achieve desired humanitarianoutcomes (in this case, implementing the Arusha

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Accords and facilitating the wider peace processbetween Hutus and Tutsis).

Humanitarian leadership might also bedistinguished from other forms of leadershipby the fact that alleviating or preventing thesuffering of victims of humanitarian situations is– or should be – at its heart. While humanitarianleaders must cater to many stakeholders – includingdonors, host governments and other humanitarianorganisations – their primary responsibility is tothese victims. Indeed, Kofi Annan has said that“[his] mission as secretary-general was built arounda vision of bringing the organisation closer to thepeoples whom it was founded to serve, and toplace each individual’s aspirations for security,development, health, and human rights at the centreof everything [it] did” [Annan and Mousavizadeh,2012, xi.]. So while the above extract from PresidentRoosevelt’s Citizenship in a Republic speech isan apt metaphor for the environments in whicha humanitarian leader may be required to work,it is well to recall the etymological roots of the‘humanitarian’: a humanitarian leader works notfor victory in a battle, but for human dignity andwellbeing.

This victim-centred focus is particularlyimportant in the 21st century, where individuals– not just organised groups or governments – candirectly impact or even create a humanitariansituation in unprecedented ways throughmass-communication technology, such as Twitter.4

Even humanitarian actors with good localconnections, such as the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC), were surprised by the speedof the 2010 Arab Spring and have subsequentlyhad to react to rather than proactively seek tocomprehend the factors leading to humanitariansituations in countries across the Arab world (e.g.the rising price of basic commodities in Tunisia,high unemployment and disenchantment amongyouth in Egypt and Yemen, and the collapse ofcentralised public service provision in Libya andSyria) [Grant, 2012, Oxfam, 2011, United NationsDepartment of Public Information, 2012, p. 10-12].Even if there is no clearly ‘right’ course of action,increasingly, it is important for humanitarians to‘do good’ and be seen to do good.

These two distinguishing features haveimplications for what it means to be a humanitarianleader, which one may see personified in SergioVieira de Mello, a prominent and charismaticBrazilian diplomat who many considered a likelycandidate for UN Secretary-General before his tragicdeath in the bombing of UNAMI5 headquartersin Iraq. The first is that a humanitarian leader’sgreatest asset may be their power to persuade, asdurable humanitarian progress relies heavily on

the consent and ownership of affected populations[Neustadt, 1980]. Though easier said than done,they must work with the people they are tryingto serve. Given their limited coercive powers andthe non-hierarchical nature of the humanitariansystem,6 a humanitarian leader is likely to be betterserved by a ‘relational approach’ [Arendt, 1972]focussed on building consensus and credibility thanby a ‘heroic approach’ [Carlyle, 1995] focussed oncommand.

In Cambodia, for example, de Mello was thefirst and only UN representative (then UNHCRsSpecial Representative) to negotiate with the KhmerRouge. He saw negotiating sufficient ‘humanitarianspace’ as a precondition to repatriating more than300,000 refugees at rate of nearly 1000 per day,one of the UN’s largest-ever logistical operations[Sergio Vieira de Mello Foundation, 2009, HBO,2010]. This of course does not mean that everydecision must involve consensus-building – de Mellomade decisive operational decisions overseeing therepatriation process – but humanitarian leadershipdoes require an especially high degree of staminaand persistence.

Second, a humanitarian leader requires“contextual intelligence” [Nye, 2010, p. 85, 141]or sensitivity to context. This, in turn, requiresa certain humility, intellectual curiosity and anopenness to challenging one’s own assumptions, forexample, about ‘victims’ of armed conflict, who maybe engaged as part of a solution to the conflict but– acting in self-interest to satisfy their basic needs– may equally be part of the problem [Baines andPaddon, 2012]. Hence, de Mello spent his entire firstmonth as SRSG7 in Iraq listening to and learningfrom Iraqis to ensure the UN’s work centred aroundtheir actual needs rather than a version of theirneeds preconceived in a mandate. Further, he wasable to translate humanitarian needs into languagepolicymakers could understand, for example, whenhe met with US President George W. Bush at theWhite House (although the actual impact of suchefforts is difficult to quantify after his death) [Power,2008, p. 249-346].

Yet deeper than these preliminary observationsabout the nature of humanitarian leadership, beinga humanitarian leader means being both ethical andeffective.

Part II – Ethical humanitarian leadership

Being ethical means having a strong moral compassoriented towards alleviating human suffering basedat least in part on core humanitarian principles,including humanity, neutrality, impartiality andindependence [International Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement, preamble and art. 5(a),Forsythe, 2005, ch. 5, Barnett and Weiss, 2008,

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p. 1-48, Barnett, 2011, p. 1-46]. Humanitarianleaders are under constant pressure, bombarded withnew information from a myriad of actors and events,and must steer multidimensional and often unwieldyoperations. In this environment, a moral compasshelps the leader cut through the sensory overload ofinformation, interests and influences that affect theireveryday decision-making and allows them to leadwith conviction and clarity of purpose. Developinga moral compass requires a humanitarian leader tothink deeply about the principles which motivatethem, for often the real test of their commitmentto them comes when the stakes are high. While deMello’s approach might to some have pushed theboundaries of what was ‘ethical’, he was a staunchadvocate of humanitarian principles, which provideda clear guiding force throughout his leadership.

However, de Mello is but one humanitarianleader, and to the extent there was ever a collectiveunderstanding of and approach to core humanitarianprinciples, that is certainly not the case in the 21stcentury. Adherence to these principles is ultimatelyquestion of degree, and in the case of a humanitarianleader, this will be determined by their own moralcompass as well as the moral compass – enshrinedin mandates – of the organisation(s)/government(s)they represent. Even back in the 1994 Great Lakesrefugee crisis, interpretations differed. MedecinsSans Frontieres (MSF) adopted a deontologicalinterpretation of the neutrality principle in providingmedical care and ‘bearing witness’ to sufferingin refugee camps; UNHCR’s interpretation wasmore practical, maintaining that it was better tocontinue providing assistance – despite being unableto consistently distinguish between genuine refugeesand genocidaires – than to abandon operationson principle alone. Although the crisis sparkedintense debate within each organisation regardingappropriate responses, these interpretations – orinstitutional moral compasses – culminated in theirdecisions to leave and stay respectively [Barnett andWeiss, 2008, Weiss, 2013, p. 111-122].

Thus, a humanitarian leader must be comfortablewith dissent. They should be able to tolerate theirown moral compass being redirected slightly byan institutional moral compass, as both shouldin theory be pointed towards the alleviation ofhuman suffering. Where personal and institutionalcompasses point in opposite directions, however,they must have the courage to speak out, as thenUN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator inSudan, Mukesh Kapila, did in the face of inaction toprevent mass-atrocities in Darfur [Kapila and Lewis,2013]. Doing so cost him his job. Irrespective of theshrewdness of his approach, his actions evidence acommitment to humanitarian principles regardless ofcareer path and amidst an increasingly risk-averse

humanitarian bureaucracy [Buchanan-Smith andScriven, 2011, p. 4-8, 58-64 and 69-76]. Plainly,however, ethics alone are insufficient for robusthumanitarian leadership.

Part III – Effective humanitarian leadership

It has been said that “judgment in leadership is like‘location’ in real estate” [Keohane, 2005, p. 705, 710].Ultimately, it is a leader’s judgment calls that definethem, and we have seen how the consequences ofbad judgment can be more severe in unforgivinghumanitarian contexts than in other, morestructured leadership settings. So a humanitarianleader must also be effective: they must actuallyachieve or facilitate the achievement of desiredhumanitarian outcomes, even if the outcomesthemselves are less-than-ideal. Job descriptions forhumanitarian leadership positions tend to suggestsound judgment derives from technical competenceand professionalism [Buchanan-Smith and Scriven,2011, p. 62, Featherstone, 2010, p. 6-7 and 10].While this is undoubtedly true, the real foundationof sound judgment is the leader’s moral compassand experience.

As de Mello’s repatriation operation demonstrates,a leader’s moral compass is as relevant at the ‘micro’level of their own judgments as it is at the ‘macro’level of providing strategic direction and mobilisingstakeholders. It helps them develop an intuitivesense of good judgment which, according to Nye,relies as much on EQ and practical knowledge as IQand technical competence [Nye, 2010, ch. 4-5 andp. 147-148].

The capacity for sound judgement is alsodeveloped through experience – professional andpersonal – from leading operations to familiaritywith the languages, customs and history of aparticular locale. For example, drawing onhis diplomatic experience, Dag Hammarskjoldrecognised the need for a peace keeping mechanismafter the Cold War and was instrumental indeveloping the UN’s first peacekeeping mission(UNEF8) in 1956, later using his good offices inthe field to personally facilitate a peaceful resolutionto the Suez crisis [Nobel Foundation, 2013]. LakhdarBrahimi’s good judgment – developed through hisexperience leading UN missions and Middle Eastnegotiation processes, such as in the Lebanese civilwar – is manifest in the influential Brahimi Report[Brahimi, 2000] on the state of UN peacekeeping andin his pivotal role in negotiating a new governmentfor Afghanistan in 2002 [Sebenius and Schneeman,2002]. And Gro Brundtland’s rapid issuing of thefirst ever global health alert regarding SARS – adecision shaped by her academic background inand progressive approach to public health as WHO

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Director-General – is widely credited with helpingprevent a pandemic [Scientific American, 2003].

These examples strongly suggest that a leader’spersonal authority and credibility is a determiningfactor in effective humanitarian leadership, atboth operational and policy levels. Because ahumanitarian leader’s power and authority comesmore from the legitimacy they are afforded by keystakeholders – not least affected populations – thanany official position in a leadership hierarchy, theirpower is necessarily relational and reciprocal. Theycan only be truly effective if they are credible. So asimpressive as such decisive individual contributionsmay be, humanitarian leaders – particularly thosein the field – do well to retain a degree of humilityby remembering that they can rarely achieve desiredoutcomes without the endorsement of the peoplethey are trying to serve.

Of course, being a good leader in any context –humanitarian or otherwise – requires good judgment,but a humanitarian leader must seek to exercisetheir judgment in particular ways, adapted tothe relational constraints on their power and theoften-rapidly changing operational exigencies of ahumanitarian environment.

Conclusion

Since the turn of the century in particular, there hasbeen increasing recognition in humanitarian circlesof the importance of individual leadership to theachievement of desired outcomes [Taylor et al., 2012,Buchanan-Smith and Scriven, 2011, Featherstone,2010]. There can be no definitive list of qualitiesthat a good 21st century humanitarian leader mustpossess. But by now, my hope is that the imperativefor a humanitarian leader to be both ethical andeffective is clear. Although the tension betweenprinciple and practice can never be definitivelyresolved, they must have a moral compass based onhumanitarian principles and, through the exerciseof sound judgment, be able to effectively apply andadapt these principles to specific contexts in thefield to achieve desired humanitarian outcomes.

In some ways, this imperative is no differentto that required of good humanitarian leadersin centuries past, but this century presentsnovel challenges which current and future leadersmust confront. The humanitarian necessityto ‘do something’ is no longer self-evident (asit was to some during the ‘golden age ofhumanitarianism’ in the 1990s [Barnett and Weiss,2008]), mass-communication technology providesavenues for citizens to rapidly galvanise anddirectly force change in the course of humanitarianresponses, and humanitarian operations arebecoming increasingly complex and intertwined withpolitical and developmental processes. In striving

for better humanitarian leadership, therefore, letus hope more individuals heed this clarion call tobecome leaders of substance, for the benefit of thosein desperate need.

Notes

1For Max Weber – one of the fathers of modern socialscience – being a good leader was largely about one’scharacter, in particular, demonstrating a passion for a cause,a feeling of responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions,and the capacity for poised judgement. See [Weber, 1946].

2In terms of a working definition of “humanitarianleader”, I have in mind leaders who hold senior positionsin governments or humanitarian organisations, suchas Humanitarian Coordinators, Directors-General, andSpecial-Representatives of the Secretary General. Thoughone does not have to hold such a position to be a humanitarianleader – especially given the non-hierarchical nature ofthe humanitarian system – and though it is conceivableto be a humanitarian leader without being a leader inhumanitarianism, for the purposes of this paper, I willfocus on leaders who, by virtue of their position/office ina government or humanitarian organisation, are required tolead.

3United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.4While technology presents challenges, it also presents

opportunities for better humanitarian action. RapidFTR, anelectronic registration and data storage system to expediteFamily Tracing and Reunification, is an example. Seekingto replace a cumbersome paper-based system, UNICEF iscurrently piloting RapidFTR in Haiti, Uganda and SouthSudan. See [Humanitarian Innovation Fund and UNICEF,2012].

5United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq.6That is, individuals commonly assume roles outside of

official positions according to exigencies on the ground andtheir own competency.

7Special Representative of the [UN] Secretary-General.8United Nations Emergency Force.

References

Kofi Annan and Nader Mousavizadeh. Interventions: a lifein war and peace. New York: Penguin Press, 2012.

Hannah Arendt. Crises of the Republic. New York, HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, 1972.

Erin Baines and Emily Paddon. ‘This is how we survived’:Civilian agency and humanitarian protection. SecurityDialogue, 43(3):231–247, 2012.

Michael Barnett. Empire of humanity: a history ofhumanitarianism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,2011.

Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, editors.Humanitarianism in question: politics, power, ethics.Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, and Naohiko Omata.Humanitarian innovation and refugee protection.University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre WorkingPaper Series No. 85, 2012.

Lakhdar Brahimi. Report of the Panel on United NationsPeace Operations (The Brahimi Report). United NationsDoc A/55/305-S/2000/809, 2000.

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Margie Buchanan-Smith and Kim Scriven. Leadershipin Action: Leading Effectively in HumanitarianOperations. Active Learning Network for Accountabilityand Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)Report, 2011.

Thomas Carlyle. On great men. London: Penguin, 1995.

Andy Featherstone. Fit for the future? Strengthening theleadership pillar of humanitarian reform. The NGOs andHumanitarian Reform Project, 2010.

David P. Forsythe. The humanitarians: the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2005.

Mark Lyall Grant. ‘The UN’s response to the Arab Spring andthe evolving role of the Security Council’. Speech deliveredat the UN All-Party Parliamentary Group, London, 2 May2012.

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. Evaluation AndImplementation Science, 2010. URL http://hhi.harvard.edu/programs-and-research/evaluation-and-implementation. [Accessed 29 May 2013].

HBO. Timeline - Sergio Vieira de Mello, 2010. URL http://www.sergiothemovie.com/the-man/timeline. [Accessed1 June 2013].

Humanitarian Innovation Fund and UNICEF. RapidFTR,2012. URL http://www.rapidftr.com/. [Accessed 1 June2013].

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red CrescentMovement. Adopted by the 25th International Conferenceof the Red Cross at Geneva in October 1986 and amendedin December 1995 and in June 2006.

Mukesh Kapila and Damien Lewis. Against a tide of evil: howone man became the whistleblower to the worst genocideof the twenty-first century. Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2013.

Nannerl O. Keohane. On leadership. Perspectives on Politics,3(4):705–722, 2005.

Richard E. Neustadt. Presidential power and the modernpresidents : the politics of leadership from F.D.R. toCarter. New York: Wiley, 1980.

The Nobel Foundation. Dag Hammarskjold - Biographical,2013. URL http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/peace/laureates/1961/hammarskjold-bio.html. [Accessed2 June 2013].

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The powers to lead. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2010.

Oxfam. Power to the People? Reactions to the EU’s responseto the Arab Spring. Oxfam Briefing Note, 15 November2011.

Samantha Power. Chasing the Flame: One man’s fight tosave the world. New York: Penguin, 2008.

Ben Ramalingam, Kim Scriven, and Conor Foley.Innovations in International humanitarian action. ActiveLearning Network for Accountability and Performancein Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) 8th Review ofHumanitarian Action, 2011.

Scientific American. Highlights from the 2003 ScientificAmerican 50: Biographies of the three Leaders ofthe Year, plus the complete list of winners, 2003.URL http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=highlights-from-the-2003&page=2. [Accessed 2 June 2013].

James Sebenius and Kristen Schneeman. GreatNegotiator 2002: Lakhdar Brahimi. HarvardLaw School Program on Negotiation, 2002. URLhttp://www.pon.harvard.edu/shop/great-negotiator-2002-lakhdar-brahimi-2/. [Accessed 2 June 2013].

Sergio Vieira de Mello Foundation. Timeframe 1991-1993,2009. URL http://www.sergiovdmfoundation.org/wcms/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=69&Itemid=92&lang=en. [Accessed 1 June 2013].

Glyn Taylor, Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, KatherineHaver, Paul Harvey, Kathryn Barber, Lisa Schreter, andConstance Wilhelm. The State of the HumanitarianSystem, 2012 Edition. Active Learning Network forAccountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action(ALNAP) Report, 2012.

United Nations Department of Public Information. UnitedNations Peace Operations: Year in Review 2011. UnitedNations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2012.

Max Weber. Politics as a vocation. In From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press,1946.

Thomas G. Weiss. Humanitarian business. Cambridge, U.K.:Polity, 2013.

1515

Lewis Hirst | ‘Juku Culture’

‘Juku Culture’: The Impacts of Supplementary Education on Educational

Equality and Employment Opportunity in Japan

Lewis Hirst

This paper argues that the Japanese education system, epitomised by an obsession with supplementaryeducation, is ill-equipping youth for the challenges facing 21st century Japan, and is responsible forperpetuating elitism and social inequality. This widespread ‘juku culture’ is seen to be impacting theability of the Japanese public education system to lead educational change, inhibiting students’ access tohigh quality education, and ultimately limiting the range of skills developed by high school graduates.

In a society recovering from recent, widespreaddisaster, with a low potential GDP growth rate ofaround one percent per annum [Oxford Economics,2013] and burdened by a national fiscal debt toppingthe OECD nations [Yoshikawa, 2012], never beforehas Japan been faced with such mounting pressureto reinvigorate its economy and stimulate growth.However, faced with the demographic headwindof an aging, now declining population [StatisticsBureau of Japan, 2012], the struggle to maintaintotal factor productivity is becoming increasinglymore difficult [Roach, 2011, p. 96], and Japansbusinesses are struggling to remain competitive,especially as Japan is competing in a region ofhigh economic growth East Asia. Given the sheermagnitude and obvious systemic nature of theseadverse social and economic trends, it could beargued, and indeed has been [Fensom, 2012, Shibata,2011], that Japan needs a new generation of leadersto champion innovation. However, rather thanassuming the mantle and acquiring the label ofdynamic, forward-thinking leaders, the Japaneseyouth have been seen to embrace a ‘stagnantmentality’ and ‘isolationist drift’ [Shibata, 2011,p. 336], which are working against the stimulationof passion and drive. This generation of supposedlydisconnected and uninspired young people is aphenomenon born out of a changing social andeconomic climate; no longer is the school-to-worktransition a guarantee, and life-long employment isa culture that seems incongruous with a stagnatedeconomy. With this in mind, many scholarsand social commentators [Brinton, 2008, Fensom,2012, Genda, 2013, Shibata, 2011] believe that‘uninspired’ youth are not equipped with the rightskills to lead change in this challenging time inhistory. Surely, it is amongst the mandate ofthe Japanese education system to facilitate theacquisition of these skills, for the benefit of society;at the very least schools should not be inhibitingthe development of future innovators and leaders.However, Japan’s education system appears to bestruggling to engage young people and to equip themwith the right tools to champion the issues plaguingJapan. Most significantly, the Japanese schooling

system is being hampered by an obsession withsupplementary education, which is impacting theability of the public education system to provideeducational leadership and address inadequacies.Not only this, supplementary education is alsoresponsible for the growing inequality in students’access to elite universities, and is shifting focusaway from other non-academic pastimes. Giventhe challenging modern contexts, this paper willdiscuss the role that this supplementary educationindustry, specifically juku [‘cram school’; commercial,formalized supplementary education], plays inpreparing high school students for entry into highereducation and employment opportunities. It willbe argued that it is the parasitic, not symbiotic,nature of juku, in its relationship with the formaleducation system, which is perpetuating pooreducational practice and, in fact, disenfranchisingmany Japanese students. In particular, it isjuku’s manipulation of the ‘effort over ability’ or‘Ganbarism’ ethos, its magnifying effect on the lackof true egalitarianism in Japanese education, and itsnegative impact on ‘whole person education’ whichare partly responsible for the current, pervasiveculture of disengagement and disenfranchisementseen in Japanese youth. Juku culture may havestoked the fire of efficiency in Japan’s rise toeconomic prominence, when growth was a givendue to consistent increases in population and theeasy import of technological advancements; thepopularity of juku may have helped ingrain theimportance of education in Japan’s nation-buildingefforts, and assisted in instilling strong workethic in students. However, given the currentsocial and economic environments, juku is now ananachronism, stifling the ability of Japan’s youth tolead innovation, and isolating many able studentsfrom the higher education system. With thisargument in mind, and in order for it to be easilyunderstood, firstly, one must be aware of juku’ssanctioned purpose within the broader Japaneseeducation system, as well as the historical contextfrom which it has emerged.

Fundamentally, what is juku, and what role doesit play in the modern Japanese education system?

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Often colloquially translated into English underthe misnomer that it means simply ‘cram school’,juku has been described in an equally misleadingmanner by the term ‘shadow education’ in academictexts [Baker and LeTendre, 2005, p. 68, Bray, 2009,Mori and Baker, 2009]. However, this term leadsto the misappropriation of the connotations thatsurround the term ‘shadow economy’ that dontnecessarily apply to this, entirely legal, industry.The juku system in fact does not function as atrue ‘black market’; it simply echoes the curriculaof mainstream education. In this manner, unlikethe private tuition systems of many other nations[Baker and LeTendre, 2005, p. 58], Juku appears towork almost wholly in the shadow of the formalsystem of education, apparently bolstering theteaching of the same curricula. Thus, as wouldbe expected from a supplementary system thatoften mirrors government-approved content, jukuis mostly employed for remedial purposes [Bakerand LeTendre, 2005, p. 69]; students who are notperforming to a desired benchmark are more likely toreceive juku schooling, as opposed to high-achievingstudents desiring to further their studies. Jukufunctions simply to supplement the teaching in theformal education system.

Secondly, where does the modern concept of jukuoriginate? To place the system in its historicalcontext, juku is hardly a modern invention; it hasexisted in many forms in Japan and NortheastAsia for more than eight hundred years [Mehl,2005, p. 3], being imported via the Chinesemethodology of Buddhist teaching. However, thecurrent cultural practice surrounding Japanesesupplementary education has been developed mainlyover the last fifty years, after the post-war reforms ofthe Japanese education system. It was in the middleof the last century that juku was first transformedfrom simply a side-note to beyond-curricula teaching;however, the evolution of juku to the great behemothof supplementary education that it is today is a storywhich can be told primarily through discussion ofthe history of education reform in Japan. The rise ofjuku occurred predominantly over three rapid growthperiods: the early 1960s, late 1970s and mid 1980s[Komiyama, 2000]. Each of these growth periodswas due to a variety of social, political and economicfactors, most notably the 1968 curriculum changes[Komiyama, 2000] and Prime Minister Nakasone’seducation reforms [Hood, 2004, p. 105]. Arguably,the biggest cultural reason for the growth of thesupplementary education sector in Japan is thehigh value that is placed on attainment of academiccredentials by Japanese employers in comparisonto employers in other labour markets [Schomburgand Teichler, 2002], a reality that will be unpackedbelow. However, regardless of the reasons for its

development, over the last sixty years, juku hasgrown into a $US12 billion dollar a year industry[Dawson, 2010] and now services over 65% of allmiddle school students in Japan [Bray, 2009]; it iswidely consumed and accounts for approximately0.2% of GDP [METI, 2012]. Thus, due to itscurrent immense scope and scale, the social andcultural impact of juku cannot be underestimated;it is far-reaching and well entrenched.

Having gathered that juku culture mirrors theformal education system, is used mainly for remedialpurposes and is widely pervasive, even consideringthe extra financial burden on families, it couldreasonably be concluded that the success of jukupossibly highlights a failing of the formal educationsystem. This may not be entirely accurate, however,for juku’s success seems to be independent of,and unaffected by, government changes to thecurriculum. Although several broad curriculumchanges have occurred in Japanese schools duringthe last two decades, juku’s popularity has remainedreasonably constant [Bray, 2009]. In the past, thewidespread nature of juku has been attributed tothe general desire of parents to supplement ‘anintense public education’ [Rohlen, 1980]. Yet, jukuhas endured the recent ‘relaxed education [yutorikyoiku]’ movement, and in fact juku spokespeoplehave been quoted as believing the education reformsto be a ‘business opportunity’, rather than a threatto the establishment [Roesgaard, 2006]. This pointsto two pressing, observable facts: firstly, that thereis an entrenched belief that the public educationsystem alone is inadequate to help students reachthe desired standard, regardless of the curriculum,and secondly, that there is a potential threat tothe egalitarian schooling ethos due to the scale andcontinued prevalence the supplementary educationsystem.

In regards to the perceived inadequacy of Japan’sformal system of education, Roesgaard argues thatthe Japanese Constitution guarantees the rightto an ‘adequate education’, in accordance witha student’s abilities [Roesgaard, 2006, p. 123],and believes that the widespread demand for jukuteaching indicates that the government is notupholding its constitutional obligation to provideproper remedial support to assist students inentering higher education. However, it couldbe countered that popularity of juku stems frombeyond simply a practical need for better education,and in fact is part of a deeper-rooted culturalconcern. Juku’s rapid rise occurred decades beforethe implementation of the 1998-2002 educationalreforms, when Japanese education was seen as theinternational standard of ‘pressure cooker’ intensity[Dawson, 2010]; the rise appears not to be a resultof relaxed, or intense, formal education. Instead,

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this steadfast belief in the supplementary educationsystem appears to stem from an entrenched lackof faith in the formal education system. Itcould be argued that it is a manifestation ofthe Japanese concept of Ganbarism or the ‘effortover ability’ ethos; it may be that, regardless ofthe schooling environment, there exists a generalcultural tendency to perform extra study. Theverb ganbaru, loosely translates into English as‘doing one’s best and hanging on’ [Davies andIkeno, 2002, p. 83] and represents a philosophypeculiar to Japan and the Japanese school system,a cultural belief in the importance of personaldetermination and that effort always should takeprecedence over natural ability. This Ganbarism,and the merit-based aspirations the school systemimbues within its students [Okano, 2009], generatesan underlying culture of competitiveness [Daviesand Ikeno, 2002]. Therefore, rather than schoolsgenerally being unable to facilitate an adequatelearning environment, it appears that there is aninherent element of Japanese educational culture,possibly stemming from parental influence [Daviesand Ikeno, 2002], that encourages extreme ambitionwithin, and outside of, the classroom. The originsof this culture may never be fully understood;however, in the modern context, it is surely beingfuelled by high competition for graduate positions,which are more often filled by students fromprestigious universities [Schomburg and Teichler,2002], and by extension, by students who were ableto outstandingly perform on the university entranceexaminations. Thus, there is an ethos, perpetuatedby the juku industry, which dictates that studentsmust participate in supplementary education toperform well on these examinations; they createa ‘club-like’ environment, which may not necessarilyfacilitate better learning, but creates a belief heldby students, and parents, that those who choose notto participate in juku are disadvantaged. Therefore,the juku industry could be seen to be capitalizing onthis cultural trait, taking it out of the regulatedschool environment and away from appropriate,government-set standards of length and intensityof education. If all students are provided with thesame educational tools, and similar environments,then a culture of Ganbarism can help equitablysupport a meritocratic education system. However,the private sector, in the form of juku, takesadvantage of the hard-work ethos by marketingservices that shadow the equitably managed schoolcurriculum, creating the belief in students that theirGanbarism must extend beyond the defined schoolday and curriculum. Students then participate ina self-sustaining cycle of competition, catalysed byjuku, in which they feel pressured to participate instudy beyond the controlled school environment, and

find themselves in the unregulated, non-standardisedprivate sector.

Furthermore, this ‘club-like’ environment alsohelps explain the threat juku poses to equalopportunity education. Juku are manifestations ofthe private sector; they are regulated by the Ministryof Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), not theMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (MEXT), which governs the schoolingsystem [Dierkes, 2008, p. 230]. When it comes tothe supplementary education sector, it is the freemarket that determines access to juku resources andthe prices they charge for their services. Especiallydue to the rising uncertainty surrounding the publiceducation system, and the general public opinionthat the curriculum is not as rigorous as it once was[Dierkes, 2008, p. 238], there is rising pressure onthe juku industry to capitalize on these perceivedshortcomings and to absorb the unmet demand. Inthis market, the quality of the education deliveredis directly comparable to the price demanded;thus, families in lower socio-economic brackets areexcluded from the best education. This, in theory,contravenes Article 3 of The Fundamental Lawof Education: Equal Opportunity of Education[Okadaa, 2006], which stipulates that all Japaneseshould be guaranteed access to ‘adequate’ education,regardless of ‘economic position’. However, manywould argue that the formal education system stillprovides adequate education, enough to preparestudents to enter, and function effectively in, broadersociety.

Conversely, recent economic data from the OECDmay indicate that the government spending oneducation is significantly lacking. Japan has beenfound to have the lowest public expenditure oneducation in the OECD [OECD, 2012]. Thisindicator alone would seem unimportant, possiblysuggesting that Japan has a more efficient educationsystem; however, damningly, Japan has thethird highest private expenditure on educationas a proportion of total spending on education[OECD, 2012]. This figure indicates that thegovernment’s lack of educational expenditure isbeing counterbalanced by large private investmentin education; Japanese families are compensatingfor the governments shortfall. This trend of highpublic expenditure on education, coupled with lowlevels of financial aid, large class sizes and decliningteacher salaries [OECD, 2012] indicates a weakeningpublic education system, and a possible overrelianceon private education. The real issue behind thistrend is its impact on social inequality, specificallyin access to tertiary education.

Without entertaining a debate on the functionof education, it may be asserted that one purposeof the formal public education system is to prepare

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students for entry into tertiary education; however,it appears that the current Japanese public schoolingsystem fails to equip students to successfullyenter top Japanese universities, creating a relianceon the supplementary education industry, andultimately exacerbating social inequality. Thisis a fatal flaw in the current Japanese systemof education, and further disadvantages studentsfrom lower socio-economic backgrounds, possiblycompounding over generations. In accessing tertiaryeducational institutions, students sit the NationalCenter Test for University Admissions (NCTUA),administered by the National Center for UniversityEntrance Examinations, the primary examinationthat dictates entry into public universities. However,almost all private universities require the sitting ofseparate, university-specific examinations. Theseexaminations assess students’ abilities based ondifferent criteria and using different testing styles;they also act as gateways to Japans privateuniversities, which account for about 75% ofall universities in Japan [Aoki, 2012]. Becausethe content covered by these examinations isindependently controlled and highly varied, it isimpracticable for the formal education systemto adequately prepare students for these exams.Therefore, with that reasoning in mind, studentsaiming to enter the private university system mustattend juku, whose teaching is tailored to specificexaminations. If juku is thus seen as necessaryfor access to university, it can be seen that theformal education system is not performing to an‘adequate’ standard. Thus, students are on anunequal playing field, depending on whether or notthey attend juku. With this in mind, apart fromdisadvantaging the less affluent in the short-term,there is real potential for the development of agenuinely polarized system of education, wherebythe public system provides merely a basic education,and the supplementary industry controls eliteeducation, preparing students for university entrance[Roesgaard, 2006]. Ultimately, this threatens theauthority of the public system, and hampers itsability to provide educational leadership [Russell,2002]. For example, the ‘teaching in advance’methodology embraced by many juku, wherebyelements in the formal school curriculum aretaught to students several months prior to theirintroduction in schools, transforms the publiceducation system into something akin to mandatoryrevision [Harnisch, 1994]. Also, teacher quality inthe public education system could be threatened byhigher wages offered by private tutoring institutions,as we have seen recently on a large scale in SouthKorea [Dawson, 2010]. In fact, Japan’s issues withthe supplementary education industry are similar ina number of ways to Korea, both culturally within

the industry itself, as well as on a macro-economiclevel in the nations’ private and public spending oneducation [OECD, 2013]. Moreover, there appearsto be significantly more research being conducted inthe Korean context, where governments and socialcommentators are very vocal about the issues inaccess to education and long-term social mobility,which stem from the overpowered supplementaryeducation industry [Koo, 2007]. Although Japanis not dealing with as large a private educationindustry as in Korea, where private tuition accountsfor almost three percent of the nation’s GDP [Jones,2013], the similarity in social trends stemming froman overreliance on private supplementary educationare worth noting. However, in any society embracinga free-market, a power play between the private andpublic sectors is always going to be a factor worthpolitical, and academic, consideration; education issimply an industry of heightened sensitivity in sofar that, unlike many other services, it forms oneof the perceived fundamental rights of individualsand needs to be addressed separately. Nevertheless,the current situation in Japan is leading towardthe development of a ‘two-tiered’ education system,which removes the ability of schools to provideeducation that is necessary for students to succeedin accessing the majority of tertiary institutions.More importantly, this disenfranchises less affluentstudents who would otherwise benefit from eliteuniversity education.

Finally, beyond the potential threat juku posesto educational equality, Juku already negativelyimpacts ‘whole person education’. ‘Whole personeducation’ refers to the development of skills outsidethe realm of conventional academic instruction;sport, music and art, as well as other extra-curricularclubs and societies represent activities that facilitate‘whole person education’ [Sato and McLaughlin,1992]. The term denotes the development of socialskills as well as creativity, leadership and othersoft-skills [Lewis, 1995, p. 36]. This is an area ofstudy that often remains unaddressed in academicliterature and government statistics on education;however, student participation in extra-curricularactivities and development of soft-skills has beenseen as important in the Japanese educationalsystem [Okano, 2009]. Traditionally, a greateremphasis is attached to non-academic activitiesin Japan, in comparison to the schools of theAnglo-West. Until recently, these activities wereincorporated into the curriculum, facilitated bylonger school hours [Sato and McLaughlin, 1992].However, the ‘relaxed education’ movement ofthe past two decades has seen a reduction ofschool-mandated extra-curricular activities with theshortening of the school week [Nishino and Larson,2003]. Also, with the rise in juku’s popularity, more

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time outside of school hours is being devoted tofurther academic work, as opposed to activitiesthat facilitate ‘whole person education’. Moreover,although juku is voluntary, students report verynegative feelings towards participation including‘stress’ and ‘tenseness’ [Nishino and Larson, 2003];juku does not provide the same level of personalfulfilment and enjoyment as other extra-curricularactivities. Therefore, not only does juku attendancelower the mood and increase the stress of students,it detracts from time that could be spent pursuingother activities that would facilitate ‘whole personeducation’. This is important because the lessonsthat can be learned from a variety of extra-curricularactivities are seen as factors in building leadershipcapabilities important in job applications andperformance [Chiaa, 2005] and show connectionsto enhanced creativity in the workplace [Marsh andKleitman, 2002]. Thus, for graduates to lead andinnovate in the workplace, it may be important forthem to devote time to extra-curricular activitiesin school, time which is currently being devoted tojuku.

In summary, therefore, juku’s popularityand associated culture is a reaction to theperceived inadequacies of the formal schoolingsystem; supplementary education manipulates theGanbarism ethos to coerce students into studying ina semi-formal system beyond school. However, moreseriously, from the perspective of private universityexaminations, juku is essential to gaining accessto many higher education opportunities, whichthreatens the authority of the formal system, anddisenfranchises students from lower socio-economicbackgrounds. In turn, juku also detracts fromstudents’ ability to participate in extra-curricularactivities. It is for these reasons combined thatjuku can be seen as responsible for the elitism andlack of emphasis on ‘whole person education’ in theJapanese education system.

Thus, it can be seen that the ability for the Jukuindustry to exploit Japan’s evident addiction tothe culture of ‘intense education’, itself a hangoverfrom a previous educational climate, is extraordinary.Moreover, evidence suggests that juku culturenegatively impacts students, and possibly the qualityand equity of the formal education system as awhole. Yet, juku’s prevalence and effect on equalopportunity in education as well as its markedimpact on students’ mental health and exposureto ‘whole person education’, could be seen as merelysymptomatic of broader societal issues, such asthe current hyper-competitive job market. It isevident that the juku industry panders to thedesires of families who are ultimately concernedwith the future happiness and employability oftheir children. Thus, as long as the graduate job

market continues to be dominated by graduates ofspecific universities, which have specific exam-basedentrance requirements, there will continue tobe a demand for supplementary education toequip students with the skills to perform wellin those exams. Lamentably, in that process,the equality ethos of schools may be eroded,further disenfranchising students from less affluentbackgrounds, and many students will continue tomiss out on the extent of ‘whole person education’that they require to develop leadership skills andenhanced creativity. Instead, juku will foster typesof learning that are less applicable in the workplaceand prevent able students from accessing the system.One way to tackle these issues, mitigating theimpacts of juku, is to unify the university entranceexamination system across the private and publicuniversities, and implement a school curriculum thatteaches to the examinations. In this manner, thegovernment, guided by industry, would be able toregain control of the curriculum, and set the areasof emphasis themselves, rather than allow privateuniversities and the juku industry to dictate thefocus of high school students’ education. Thus, theformal system could successfully equip students withthe necessary skills to both pass the examinations,and lead and innovate in the workplace, as wellas re-engage students from low socio-economicbackgrounds.

As the Japanese economy cries-out for innovation,it appears that the very businesses that arestruggling to take on this challenge are, throughtheir hiring practices based on university graduatepreferences, indirectly responsible for the lack ofinnovative spirit and leadership capabilities amongstyouth. It is the current employment environmentthat is maintaining the prevalence of juku culture,and ultimately negatively impacting the integrityof the formal Japanese education system as well asimpairing the equality of access to higher education.Although juku culture may be necessary in students’attempts to ensure their employability, it ultimatelynot only impacts social equality, it also detractsfrom the popularity of other activities that couldbetter equip all students for the current challengesfacing Japan. Thus, it can be seen that, currently,only those from high socio-economic backgroundsare gaining an ‘elite’ education, and many morestudents are being impacted by the detrimentaleffects of juku attendance; this is clearly not themost effective way to breed leaders that will bringabout innovation and revive the Japanese economy.To re-ignite the economic fires of Japan, this systemmust be changed, and the effects of the damagingjuku culture extinguished.

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References

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D. Baker and G. LeTendre. National differences, globalsimilarities: World culture and the future of schooling.Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

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Kevin Llewellyn | International Relations – Lost in Prevarication

International Relations – Lost in Prevarication

Kevin Llewellyn

International relations as an academic discipline provide insights, knowledge and understanding ofglobal politics and relations among nations. The unfolding civil war and genocide in Syria suggeststhat this discipline’s output have had little bearing on the international community in order to preventthese mass atrocities. The presented critique deliberates on the school of international relations’ lackof impact upon policy in acute humanitarian crisis. There is an inconsistency between the incentivesof the discipline creation and its normative purposefulness. Reality in Syria at present and empiricalevidence in previous literature indicates a stasis in the international political landscape. It is imperativethat this is addressed and that the international relations scholarly toolbox can be better utilized, soas to counteract prejudiced selectivity in deciding how and when to save the lives of strangers. Thisessay discusses how the discipline can be retooled within the United Nations political system in order tomeet the goals that the international relations discipline originally sought to achieve, the confinement ofconflict magnitudes. Such changes are necessary within the international political system in order tostop human rights violations and selective human rights protection.

Has the discipline of international relations

failed Syria?

First, this essay addresses an apparent lack ofpractical significance of the international relationsdiscipline in the acute dimension of internationalpolitics. That is to say its response to the prodomesof potential crisis scenarios and then the ability toinfluence policymakers in order to prevent them fromoccurring, i.e. war and suspected mass atrocities.Similarly when these symptoms have manifestedinto an actual humanitarian crisis, as in Syria, thediscipline seems extraneous and unable to limitenduring calamities. The argument is based onthe abolishment of war success criteria, as in howeffective the sway of international relations disciplineis in reducing conflict and of protecting civiliansaffected by them.

The argument will not focus upon, or attributeany theory in particular, but rather on thenormative aspect as a completing factor, whethertheory aim to objectively explain, or provideinterpretive understanding. The normative outputof international relations theory is here seen asthe collective sum of a spectrum of theories, e.g.ranging from neorealism/neoliberalism, realism,liberalism, English school, constructivism, criticaltheory and post modernity, and where moralapproaches range between the amoral, to havingsome ethical considerations and then having moralimperatives. Subsequently, international relationstheory is not a coherent homogenous monolith, buta continuum of significant diversity and rivallingconceptions of world politics. However, at thesame time, this interdisciplinary field of study canbe perceived as having taken shelter within theIvory Tower and where the moral output of all theSaruman’s and Gandalf’s combined signify the statusquo of the international relations normative authority

upon international politics. This essay critiques thevehicle of international relations theory of becominglost in academia and in so doing having become lesspolicy relevant.

By analysing the United Nations as the principalinternational institution of the international politicalsystem, this article argues how not intervening inSyria is the outcome of processed demand andsupport, the output being a product of a functioningpolitical system as envisioned. In all practicality theresult has not been as intended, and for Syria theoutcome has been particularly dysfunctional.

Notwithstanding, one can convincingly argue howthe world has moved towards greater human rightsand moral universalism, at least formally, as reflectedin evolving international law, although biased andselective. Therefore, a Kantian perspective is hereapplied to the question of humanitarian interventionand where humanity and Ius Cosmopolitanism - thelaw of world citizenship - constitutes a universaldimension of equal rights [Kant, 1795]. Howeverin the present case of Syria, cosmopolitan securityseems to have come to a standstill. Second, the paperexamines the current non-intervention regime andthe pros and cons within the intervention dilemmathrough the lens of international relations praxis.Third, the article then deliberates a hypotheticalshift within an intervention versus non-interventioncontinuum, so as to discuss the current responsibilityto protect centre of gravity. Fourth, the articleproposes how the international relations domaincan better influence policy-making by encouragingnormative and cosmopolitan thickening. Finally, theessay concludes by summing up the status quo of theinternational community’s responsibility to protect.

International relations and Westfailure

The realm of international relations does notconstitute the acute dimension of current

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foreign affairs, nor can it be reduced tocorresponding political analysis [Devetak, 2007,p. 2]. Consequently, the unfolding Syrian civilwar does not fall within the realm of internationalrelations theory. Nonetheless, the Syrian death tollhas surpassed one hundred thousand. Nearly 2million refugees have fled the country and 4 millionare internally displaced according to UN reports.These empirical facts show that the past andpresent are embryonically linked. Still, a century ofacquired knowledge seem to have had scarce impactupon the present.1

Furthermore, use of force in a humanitarianintervention is human rights advocacy in extremis;hence it represents a means of last resort.Nevertheless, the question of when and whatinitiates such recourse remains an unsolved puzzle.After the Great War, the war supposed to end allwars, the gruesome truth of the destructivenessof men spun the normative desire to change thepotential consequences of conflict and to prevent thehorrid outcome of war. Subsequently, the conceptionof international relations as an idiosyncratic fieldof study took place in the University of Wales, atAberystwyth in 1919 [Devetak, 2007, p. 4]. Also,foreign affairs and reciprocal relations betweenautonomous nations are generally accredited to theWestphalia system of 1648. The great paradox is howthe Responsibility to Protect (R2P) must instigateWestfailure by reciprocal sovereignty contravention[Strange, 1999, p. 345]. Thus, states cannot hidebehind the classical idea of sovereignty when theyfail to protect its citizens.2,3

Moreover, the international community’s failure toact and respond so as to protect civilians from massatrocities is ethically inadequate, albeit the reasonwhy this usually epitomizes reality is thoroughlyexplained by international relations theories. Hence,unveiling global trends in international relationsprovide insights of transactions between statesand addressing conflict increases our understandingof any belligerences between them, but thisassertiveness hardly provides pragmatic guidance soas to prevent them from reoccurring. It shows howthere is a gap between the academic internationalrelations scholarship’s professed normative missionand its lack of influence upon actual policy. Inlight of the atrocities and human rights violationsof the enduring Syrian genocide this paper discussesintervention versus non-intervention, as well as theneed for rethinking responsive actions within the UNas a political system. Additionally, it address thesupport needed from the discipline of internationalrelations, so as to be both more potent and relevantin the hour of need.

International relations praxis

The acute case of Syria implies that internationalrelations are lost in prevarication. There is both amismatch between cause and effect, and betweentheory and practice. In a way this seems to bounceback to the infamous utopia versus reality antithesis,as introduced by E.H. Carr [Carr, 1939/1995,p. 10]. This idealism and reality dichotomy hasbeen revived in contemporary political discoursewhere developments indicate how liberal ideals, oncecontested by traditionalist as unrealistic, are nowin fact being realized. The spread of democracy,transnational economic cooperation and free trade,international law and human rights were all withinWilsons’ League of Nations vision and is the currentcentre of world attention. [Richardson, 2001,p. 70-71].4 However, this is not addressed here assuch, rather the declining relevance of internationalrelations expertise upon policy. And so what I aimto discuss is whether international relations theoryand theorists can retool their efforts so as to bedo-good players, i.e. a beneficial and essential forcein international policymaking, as opposed to havetheir influence confined within the walls of the IvoryTower.

The question remains, how? Additionally, isit the case that international relations lacks theelement of innovation and has lost the normativemomentum it initially had? A question that echoesthe words of Martin Wight, “I believe it can beargued that international theory is marked, not onlyby paucity, but also by intellectual and moral poverty”[Wight, 1960, p. 38]. Moreover, Wight was notalone in taking a pessimistic view of empiricalfacts, as emphasized by Laurie M. Johnson withthe phrase: “There is nothing new in internationalpolitics and philosophy since the time of Thucydides’account of the Peloponnesian War” [Bagby, 2000,p. 21]. Joseph Nye shared this sentiment andremarked that; “Although the world has changed interms of globalization and at an increasingly rapidpace, questions concerning war, security challengesin-between actors balancing power and peace remainintact” [Nye, 2008, p. 2]. Whereas Jack Donnellyis hardly optimistic regarding the development ofhumankind when he claims: “Human nature hasnot changed since the days of classical antiquity”[Donnelly, 2000, p. 9]. These statements giveaccount for a stasis in the international politicalarena. The underlying message is that thisvery lack of progress shows how the academicstudies of international relations have not had agame changing effect upon world politics. Andso the diemetral connection between knowledgeabout international relations and implementationremains underdeveloped at best [Reus-Smit, 2012,

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p. 539-540].

It would seem as if the scholarly study ofinternational relations has become increasinglyintroverted, as in abstract theory being constructedfor the purpose of academia, as opposed to policyrelevance [Walt, 2005, p. 25]. As for the normativeissues, they have long been ignored as a resultof the feuds within the realm, although anysegregation between empirical and normative theoryis constructed, rather than intrinsic, because bothdimensions are deeply interconnected [Reus-Smitand Snidal, 2008, p. 6]. Hence, “we cannot answerthe question of how we should act without someappreciation of the world in which we seek to act (theempirical) and some sense of what the goals are thatwe seek to achieve (the normative)” [Reus-Smit andSnidal, 2008, p. 7]. Therefore, since “theory is alwaysfor someone and for some purpose” [Cox, 1981,p. 127], we must redefine the purpose of internationalrelations so as to gain renewed situational awarenessthat allow for new approaches, new areas of inquiryand questions that at times have been suppressed,or neglected in the past [Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008,p. 26].

David Easton’s behavioralist political systemtheory illustrates schematically how a theoreticalretooling process can be obtained within theinternational political arena. Thus by addressingthe process of global political decision-makingwithin the UN and in the environment of theinternational community, the theory demonstrateshow the discipline of international relations can beredefined so as to evoke cosmopolitan realisation andthereby spurring binding commitment and action.

Easton’s simplistic model describes politics asconstant in flux and provides a theoretical frameworkthat organizes generalizable data deductively. In sodoing, axioms and assumptions provide predictivepolitical behaviour. By distinguishing the politicalsystem from that of other systems, using boundariesin form of a defined environment and units ofpolitical actions the result can provide causalexplanations of the process driving the system[Easton, 1957, p. 385]. His focus on isolating thepolitical system has been critiqued, since manydomains, or systems, such as the social system, couldbe seen to eclipse the political. However, Eastonacknowledged the interrelationships of differentconcepts, that when unambiguously defined, candistinguish political from social behaviour [Evans,1970, p. 117]. I intend nonetheless, despite thesimplicity of the framework, to apply Easton’smodel to the environment of the internationalcommunity, as illustraded in Figure 1. Therebyanalysing its input value in the political processwithin the United Nations system when consideringthe input and output in the question of intervention

versus non-intervention. This is a difficult andcomplex task of course, having to generalize theprocessed input of all member countries’ nationalinterests. Still, the ever-present output representsthe status quo in this question. Accordingly there isa demand for international relations practicality, aswell as a normative cosmopolitan consciousness ofresponsibility. The support refers to the energy andeffort that is directed towards this aim and also thebehaviour of actors playing the game in favour ofthe system [Easton, 1957, p. 386-387].

The case of Syria is a good example of Easton’stheory in practice. The UN system operates anaffirmative consensus rule by at least nine membersof the Security Council’s fifteen members, includedthe permanent members (P-5) in decisions onintervention, although one can abstain from voting.As we know, two permanent actors, China andRussia, vetoed an intervention so as to protect theSyrian population from Bashar al-Assad’s regime,and so the output is non-intervention. Still, bothChina and Russia utilized the system whilst playingby the rules. Hence the system, per definitionis functional. On the other hand, if one were tointervene without a UN Security Council resolution,one would undermine the system, thus making itdysfunctional. One could of course question thesystem denomination; rather I intend to focus on therealm of international relations as a potential gamechanger influencing policy and decision-making,as well as the feedback process of evaluatingimplementation. Only first, is international relationsaccurately described as having had limited bearingupon policy?

Intervention or non-intervention - is that the

question?

The debate over human rights and humanitarianinterventions has preoccupied a world of thoughtcorresponding to the conflicts giving root cause.According to John Locke the principle foundationbehind any society is to secure individual rights[Locke, 1690]. His classic liberal thought pavedthe way for a social contract between those thatgovern and the governed [Brown, 2007, p. 511].Nevertheless, all the time that this contract is inexistence, it risks being violated, externally andinternally. Yet, meddling in other peoples’ conflictspose great hazards for the intervening party [Bass,2008, p. 42]. Similarly, Westfailure infringing onthe defining mark of reciprocal sovereignty [Wheeler,2002, p. 22] could potentially lead to less controlover intervening actors, hence producing greaterrisk of the concept being misused and utilizedfor the purpose of subjective interests [Brown,2007, p. 509]. Undoubtedly, “the foulest invasionshave been justified by the invader as serving the

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Figure 1: The political system [Easton, 1957, p. 384].

noblest ends” [Bass, 2008, p. 39]. Nonetheless,moral universalism of human rights has movedtowards Kantian cosmopolitanism where humanrights obligations are not bound by state boundaries,but are universally reciprocal, both politically andlegally [Beitz, 1979, p. 409] and [Wheeler, 2011].R2P is a norm firmly rooted in international lawand the United Nations Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights Article 3, justifying an internationalcommunity response when it is violated.5 Onthe other hand there has been less developmenton building consensus on what justifies actualhumanitarian intervention. J. S. Mill emphasisesthe relevance of this assessment in his 1859 essay onnon-intervention.

“To go to war for an idea, if the war is aggressive,not defensive, is as criminal as to go to war forterritory or revenue: for it is as little justifiable toforce our ideas on other people, as to compel themto submit to our will in any other respect. But thereassuredly are cases in which it is allowable to goto war, without having been ourselves attacked, orthreatened with attack: and it is very important thatnations should make up their minds in time, as towhat these cases are.” [Mill, 1984, p. 118].

Particularly the last sentence pertains to the stasisand nature of humanitarian intervention, hence thelack of progress.6 As it stands, nations have onlymade up their minds of two circumstances justifyingintervention, a United Nations Security Councilresolution and that of self-defence [United Nations,1963, United Nations, 1945]. Notwithstanding, thereis no consensus as to generic action. And so theconsequential utilitarian dilemma of interventionversus non-intervention remains a conundrum.

Mill, though he was committed to liberty, favourednon-intervention over intervention for the purpose ofestablishing cosmopolitan, global democracy. Thishe based on three variables [Doyle, 2010, 0:15:30].First, if the local liberals lack sufficient support,then when the intervening party leaves the despoticopposition will challenge the liberal regime and causecivil war. There is evidence to this that transcends

to recent interventions, such as in Libya in 2011,when after the international community respondedto what was perceived as an imminent humanitariandisaster (UN Resolution 1973), violent riots filled thevoid after the killing of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.7

Still, whether the intervention and alleged missioncreep caused more horror than good is impossibleto assess, not knowing the alternative outcome.8,9

Second, in order to win over the opponent forces,the transitional liberal regime might supress theopposition. Thus an intervention would replacedespots with new despots. Third, the invading partymight realize that the client nation is not yet ableto rule on its own. Hence the invaders stay on andeffectively colonizing the client state, as opposed toimposing liberal democracy.

However, even Mill permits deviation from thenon-intervening norm in particular situations. Ineffect this is the de facto norm and where theSecurity Council members cast their votes on acase-by-case basis. The R2P doctrine, like Mill’sformulation, sees the only morally relevant andjustifiable reasons for intervention as self-defenceand the utilitarian thought, as in the greatergood, of saving strangers [Wheeler, 2002, p. 43].10

Except, Mill also saw civil war as part of astruggle for self-determination and that imposeddemocracy is not authentic and consequently notpolitically sustainable [Doyle, 2010, 0:17:30]. Hencea liberal democracy that has not evolved by itsown right through protracted struggle and processis inauthentic and could cause more horror thangood [Doyle, 2010, 0:12:30]. Subsequently, Mill waspresenting a paradox of what the greater good is andfor whom. At least the greater good is questionableby the civilian population caught in the hostilitiesof the unfolding Syrian genocide.

An altered perspective paradox

The practised norm of R2P stands fornon-intervention as a general rule and thatany humanitarian intervention implicating use ofmilitary force should only come about as a result of

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case-by-case assessment and affirmed vote by theSecurity Council. In order to reach agreement onintervention consensus is required by the permanentmembers so as to reach the use of force end point.Usually however there is lack of consensus, as isthe case of Syria, in which China and Russia bothopposed to a humanitarian intervention involvingthe use of coercive force. Hence the fallout isnon-intervention and the end point of diplomacy,mediation and soft power sanctions. The level ofconsensus in every case thus represents the R2Pcentre of gravity within the intervention equilibrium,as shown in Figure 2.11

Still, as it stands, whenever there is ahumanitarian crisis of suspected mass atrocities,there is always a demand for and predominant focustowards the other side of the continuum, onto theintervention endpoint. Therefore, hypothetically,if the R2P centre of gravity was to shift withinthe continuum, from that side of non-interventiontowards the intervention side, as a result of increasedconsensus on the contrasting equilibria end points,an altered perspective paradox emerges. Meaningthat a guaranteed response of intervention ifany government choses to commit mass atrocitycrimes against its citizens and the deterring effectcould potentially constrain state leaders having torecognize that they have to justify their actionsaccording to the rules [Wheeler, 2002, p. 23].Moreover, if non-intervention were to be seen asthe anomaly, one could consequently argue thatthe prevalent focus would be reversed back ontodiplomacy. Henceforth, a fixed and immediateintervention regime could eradicate interventionresponses, thus make diplomacy more potent interms of resolving conflict by peaceful means.Naturally such logic is rooted in the utopian sideof E. H. Carr’s anti-thesis of utopia and reality,as in avoiding conflict and achieving peace by therule of force. Still, it evokes an awareness of theirinterdependence [Carr, 1939/1995, p. 10].

In any case, a fixed universal policy of interventionhardly seems relevant, or pragmatic. Merely thehypothesis’s rhetoric suggests how a shift of theR2P centre of gravity could reach more pragmaticmiddle ground. Perhaps one that takes into accountthe law of world citizenship - Ius Cosmopoliticum.12

Kantian cosmopolitanism understands humanityas a universal dimension of human interactionrelationships and of mutually shared rights [Kant,1795]. In effect this changing view of the referentobject from the nation-state onto the individualcould be interpreted as legitimizing intervention soas to save strangers.

Contemporary cosmopolitan thickening comes asa result of joint international efforts, mainly UNdriven multilateralism [Richardson, 2001, p. 70-71].

One example is the outset of human security, aninnovative human rights concept crafted by Mahbubul Haq [UNDP, 1994, p. 24]. The Human SecurityReport stressed the need for more resilient andsustainable human development and emphasizedindividuals’ ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom fromfear’ as key components of global security.13,14

Thus the holistic concept of human securityencompasses all aspects of security with theindividual as the referent object. This is notunproblematic in the sense that making humansecurity involve everything, it effectively meansnothing [Paris, 2001, p. 93]. Nonetheless, thereis great potential through bringing fields, such ashuman rights and humanitarian affairs, developmentand security together [Oberleitner, 2005, p. 197].The R2P incentive a decade later bears witness tocosmopolitan ‘thickening’ and growing human rightsuniversalism, although when it comes to puttinghallowed words into action the world is still veryreluctant. One must therefore question, like Milldid, whether coercive intervention is an adequateand meaningful response.

Si vis pacem, para bellum

Vegetius words “If you want peace, prepare for war”could be rephrased so as to describe the internationalcommunity’s responsibility to protect, “If you don’twant to intervene, prepare for intervention.”15

Taking into account the alternative perspectiveparadox, could defining a lower threshold totrigger an early humanitarian intervention actuallyeradicate such a response? For example a thresholdmirroring the Uppsala definition of conflict?16 Infact this was more or less the case in 2006 whenthe Security Council passed resolution 1690, andlater resolution 1703 on East Timor, as a result oferuptive violence killing 25 civilians in May 2006[BBC News, 2013, United Nations, 2006]. However,the UN system is not constructed for generic action,but rests on a case-by-case scrutiny.

In theory international consensus already allowsfor collective preparations to use force and toobtain a willingness and high readiness to act. Inreality humanitarian intervention is not normativelypermissible for the purpose of saving strangers,not to mention rarely effective and not considereda duty by international law. Subsequently, thepolarization, yet interdependency between thenon-intervention and intervention modus operandiis what defines and constrains further cosmopolitanprogress towards greater human rights universalism.Only by challenging the status quo, i.e. the currentunderstanding and practise of non-intervention, canthe R2P become relevant. And so, if not bychanging the system framework, how can the systembe improved by reorganization and with the help

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Figure 2: The non-intervention vs. intervention continuum.

of the scholarly study of international relations?Since disagreements about international policyusually rest on more fundamental disagreementsabout the forces that shape outcomes [Walt,1998, p. 29], I turn to Easton’s model. Eventhough political realism and national self-interestremain the most general framework withincontemporary international politics, policymakersshould keep an equal awareness of both utopiaand reality in their conceptual toolbox [Walt, 1998,p. 42-43]. Notwithstanding this is not an executiveresponsibility alone, as it rests also on the intellectualcontribution and the will and ability within academicexpertise to be part of the cause. Stephen M. Waltsuggests a reorientation within the discipline, so as tosupport policy with theory [Walt, 2005, p. 28]. Waltpoints out four variables of contribution; diagnosis,prediction, prescription and evaluation, as seen inFigure 3.

By integrating the four variables into Easton’sframework, as part of the support arrow withinthe political system of the UN shown in figure 1,the loop within the loop outlines the retooling intheory. In praxis I believe it has great potentialserving as a cognitive corrective, both empiricallyand normatively, to the national self-interests ofmember states, i.e. advocating the interests ofmankind over that of self-interest. By contributingin diagnosing, international relations theory canhelp by pinning down and interpreting the exactphenomenon needed addressing [Walt, 2005, p. 29].Thus, as time is often a crucial factor in internationalaffairs, narrowing down the most relevant concepts,possibilities and interpretations could make theorganizational output more potent and relevant.Furthermore, if policymakers were to be assistedin anticipated future events, such predictions couldgenerate measures and responses that could makean intervention unnecessary. This however impliesalso a retooling of the existing international relationsparadigm, which does not allow for much focus onwhat has not yet happened. Moreover, as policyactions rest on believed causality, that decisions will

produce a desired outcome, the intellectual toolboxof international relations should help to objectivelyprescribe the most plausible and desirable choiceof actions [Walt, 2005, p. 32]. Finally, andperhaps most importantly and closest to the core ofinternational relations, the realm should contributein evaluating whether implemented policies areachieving the desired results and provide constantfeedback so as to produce corrective strategic adviceand earliest possible warning on policy discoursefrom defined criteria of success or failure [Walt, 2005,p. 34].

Conclusion

The discipline of international relations is lost inprevarication. Not because it has not to some extentcontributed in advocating human rights, impactedon policy, or normative incentives in the developmentof humankind in the past, which it has. Howeverit fails to impose direct bearing in current affairs,as well as future perceived outcomes of formerand present policies. Even so, since the inceptionof the realm of international relations, the worldorder has changed with some evidence of greaterhuman security and human rights advocacy. Theintervention in Libya bears witness of some practicalresponsibility to protect achievement. Nevertheless,at the same time the international community canbe perceived as partners in crime whilst observinggenocide unfold in Syria.

The paradox is real enough, it would be impossibleto attain consensus within the internationalcommunity as long as the system favours reciprocalsovereignty over human rights. Both Mill and Kantare equally relevant today in terms of understandingcontemporary human rights development as theiranalysis emphasize the stasis of the presentnon-intervention versus intervention conundrum.

This essay has focused predominantly on the needfor a systematic change within the system, i.e. betterutilization of the international relation discipline insupport of the acute dimension of global politics.Still, as the UN political system remains rigid and

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Figure 3: Retooling the International relations realm so as to support UN policy.

the decision-making process remains unchanged, anyintervention releasing R2P will be as a result of acase-by-case affirmative vote by the Security Council.This shows that despite any shift in the centre ofgravity towards intervention the question remains,as to when one does intervene and why, in orderto save the lives of strangers. Thus a systemictransformation, that of the system itself is necessaryin order to divert from the R2P status quo, i.e. howthe UN choose to embody its authority. However,as pointed out by the late neorealist KennethWaltz, “Changes within the structure of the systemhappens continuously at the unit-level, however thesystem itself does not change” [Waltz, 2008, p. 197].This quote resonates reciprocal sovereignty overindividual, human security, and therefore amoralnational self-interest as the predominant view ininternational politics. Simultaneously, the exercisedSecurity Council system also represents a means ofchecks and balance in the international world order,thus preventing anarchy resulting from unilateral useof force. Thereby the system exercises a normativeoutput when functional. However, since this moraldoes not comprise the victims of genocide, the ethicalvalue is limited and extremely selective.

Within the realm of international politics agrowing thickness of cosmopolitan principles andmoral utilitarianism could potentially form afoundation of future world policy architectureenabling greater merging of normative incentivesin international relations theory. However, if theprinciples of responsibility to protect are to becomemore universally potent, use of force is necessaryin order to stop human rights violations, albeitunprejudiced of national interests. The recentUN resolution on disarming Syria of chemicalweapons has undoubtedly strengthened the moralauthority of the UN, as well as the political system’sfunctionality. Still, the diplomatic breakthroughcomes at a very steep price and for so many toolate. It also remains to be seen whether the effect ofexecuting the resolution will impact on the conflictin favour of the Syrian people. Therefore, as long asthe international community and the UN political

system do not include the people of Syria, the resultis not only biased intervention practice, but alsoselective human rights protection.

Notes1There are several past examples of both failed

interventions and lack of a UN Security Council mandateto protect civilians caught in hostilities: e.g.: Rwanda,Bosnia and Somalia. Following these experiences and thecomprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeepingoperations in all their aspects introduced in the ‘BrahimiReport’ of August 21st 2000, use of force where no longerreserved self-defence, but more importantly in defence ofthe mandate. This change reflected the notion of humansecurity and a shift of focus from the referent object of statesovereignty onto the individual. This shift both challengesreciprocal sovereignty and also relates to the idea of Kantiancosmopolitanism. The United Nations General AssemblySecurity Council: Report of the Panel on United NationsPeace Operations, [United Nations, 2000].

2The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a UN incentive of2005 setting out three pillars of principles aimed at preventinggenocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethniccleansing. The content of the three pillars challenge thesovereignty of nations. The R2P is not manifested by law,but applied as norm by the Security Council and the GeneralAssembly on a case-by-case basis, when deciding action takenin crisis of suspected mass atrocities. The United NationsOffice of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.Responsibility to Protect, [United Nations, 2012].

3The Westphalia system is the international politicalsystem of states claiming exclusive authority and monopolyof legitimate violence within territorial limits. AlthoughSusan Strange (1999) coined the term Westfailure fromthe international political economy perspective of capitalistmarket economy, the term is here referring to the Max Weberdefinition of state sovereignty, i.e. monopoly on the legitimateuse of physical force.

4President Woodrow Wilson was a great supporter of theLeague as reflected in his Fourteen Points for Peace, howeverthe US never joined the organisation. Although Wilsoncampaigned nation wide for the US to enter the League,he ultimately failed to win support, especially from theRepublican Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William EdgarBorah. There were a number of reasons for this outcome. TheUS did not want to get entangled in European Politics afterWWI, nor did the US want to commit to an organizationthat could potentially conflict with national interests. Givenwhat lay ahead the incentive, both of the League and thediscipline of international relations, was justifiable and theUS position not to join can only be seen as unfortunate.

5The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948)as proclaimed by the general assembly, Article 3: “Everyonehas the right to life, liberty and security of person,” [UnitedNations, 1948].

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6The intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is one example ofstasis in progress, in terms of unilateral use of force carriedout by the US without Security Council authorization. Suchactions could possibly undermine the UN system, thus makingit dysfunctional. On the other hand the intervention havealso been considered successful as a liberal intervention sinceit contributed in bringing down the Milosevic regime, [Joyner,2002].

7UN Security Council Resolution 1973, [United Nations,2011].

8As the UN legal blueprint of resolution 1973 authorizedthe use of ‘all necessary measures’ to enforce the resolution, itequally excluded the use of foreign troops on Libyan territory.As the air campaign progressed there was a growing concernthat the resolution would be reinterpreted constituting amission creep result, [Guardian, 2011].

9In relation to the 2011 Libya intervention, the 1973resolution provided both moral and legal clarity, thusrepresenting a landmark of international efforts in protectingcivilians from mass atrocities, [Glanville, 2013].

10Nicholas Wheeler’s four threshold criteria aimed atcategorizing interventions as humanitarian [Wheeler, 2002,p. 34]. These principles are, 1) Supreme HumanitarianEmergency - just cause. 2) Last resort and when all crediblemeans have been explored. 3) Proportionality calibratedtowards a humanitarian end [Wheeler, 2011]. 4) A positivehumanitarian outcome, primarily in the short term stoppinghuman rights violations, but also in a long-term perspective.

11The humanitarian intervention in libya in 2011 maysuggest a shift within the non-intervention versus interventionregime towards the use of force end point at the time, [Welsh,2011].

12Kant also introduced the concept of “cosmopolitan law,”suggesting a third sphere of public law - in addition toconstitutional law and international law - in which bothstates and individuals have rights, and where individualshave these rights as ”citizens of the earth” rather than ascitizens of particular states, [Kleingeld and Brown, 2006].

13The freedom from fear and freedom from want restson seven categorical pillars. 1) Economic security, hencefreedom from poverty and the right of public finance and abasic income. 2) Food security, in terms of access and theright not to starve. 3) Health security, meaning protectionfrom disease and the right to clear water. 4) Environmentalsecurity and the right protection from disasters, man made ornatural. 5) Personal security, that of protection from violenceand crime. 6) Community security, thus protection fromsectarian and ethnic suppression. 7) Political security meantto secure human rights in general [Paris, 2001, p. 90].

14The UNDP report builds on former human rightsinducements, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906,-29 and -49, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907,The League of Nations incentives in 1919, the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights in 1948, subsequently followedby several resolutions (not binding) all on issues on humanrights. The Ottawa Anti-personnel Landmine Treaty of 1997marks a victorious landmark in terms of human security[Hampson et al., 2001, p. 20-24]. The Ottawa convention,along with the statute of the International Criminal Courtand the protocol to the Convention on Rights of the Child,are seen as ‘human security treaties’, both in substance andin relation to norm making [Oberleitner, 2005, p. 195].

15The original Latin quote, “Igitur qui desiderat pacem,praeparet bellum” originates from the 5th century Latin writer,Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, and his work “Epitoma ReiMilitaris”. Has since been adopted by the likes of NapoleonBonaparte and Carl Von Clausewitz “To secure peace is toprepare for war.”

16An armed conflict is defined when there are at least 25battle-related deaths within a calendar year and within theconflict dyads, or 25 deliberate killings of civilians, [UppsalaUniversity, 2013].

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United Nations. Office of the Special Adviser on thePrevention of Genocide. Responsibility to Protecturl,2012. URL http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml. [Accessed 3 September 2013].

Uppsala University. Uppsala Conflict Data Program(UCDP). Department of Peace and Conflict Research.Definitions, 2013. URL http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/. [Accessed 6 September 2013].

Stephen M. Walt. “International Relations: One World,Many Theories”. Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition:Frontiers of Knowledge, pages 29–46, 1998.

Stephen M. Walt. “The Relationship between Theory andPolicy in International Relations”. Annual Review ofPolitical Science, 8:23–48, 2005.

Kenneth Neal Waltz. Realism and International Politics. NewYork and London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2008.

Jennifer Welsh. ‘Civilian Protection in Libya: PuttingCoercion and Controversy Back into RtoP’. Ethics& International Affairs, Carnegie Council forEthics & International Affairs, 25(3):1–8, 2011.URL http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/Welsh%20Civilian%20Protection%20in%20Libya.pdf. [Accessed 8September 2013].

Nicholas J. Wheeler. Saving Strangers: HumanitarianIntervention in International Society, chapter“Humanitarian Intervention in International Society”,pages 23–52. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Nicholas J. Wheeler. University of Surrey: Saving Strangers:Reflections in the Light of Experience - Professor NicholasWheeler. Online Lecture, 2011. URL http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTdXcKmtQlo. [Accessed 14 March 2013].

Martin Wight. “Why is there no International Theory?”.International Relations, 2(1):35–48, 1960.

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Daniel McKay | Drought and Australian Politics

Dust and Bluster:

An historical evaluation of the political discourse on drought in Australia

Daniel McKay

The experience of drought has long had an influence on the Australian consciousness, as so powerfullyevoked in Dorothea McKellar’s famous poetic description of Australia as a “land of droughts andflooding rains”. Yet droughts are more than just climatic variations, and can be defined in terms of theirimpact on human systems and patterns of life. Since colonisation the gulf which existed between theexpectations and assumptions made by Europeans about the Australian environment and the reality ofits capacity to sustain those expectations - has led more than once to tragedy. As this essay examines,the political response to the ‘Federation Drought’ of 1895-1903 and the ‘Big Dry’ of 1982-3 reflectboth continuities and changes of this paradigm. It is argued that political responses to drought can beprimarily characterized by ‘bluster’ and a superficial search for popular and short-term solutions, like‘nation building’ schemes. Yet, at the same time the historical record shows that the limitations of theseresponses have resulted in an evolution of the political discourse on drought in Australia, respondingnot just to broader trends - but a growing consciousness of the Australian environment and a change ofattitudes to what we can expect of it.

In 1944 John (Jack) McDonald, the VictorianMinster for Water Supply who was well known to‘talk about water at the drop of the hat’, ruefullydeclared to the parliament that “it’s a peculiar fact,but when a drought is over we forget all aboutit”[McKernan, 2005, p. 171]. McDonald had goodreason not to forget about drought, though, havingemigrated with his family in 1912 from Scotland, andwhere within a few short years they had built upand lost an entire dairy herd. Drought led himin 1916 to falsify his age and enlist in the AIFaged only seventeen [Costar, 2000]. He had losta lung in the war, but as Army records show, he wasable to support his family at home with the regulararmy wage [McKernan, 2005, p. 171]. Drought hadprecipitated this and yet, as one soldier settler fromKulwin in Victoria put it to a roving Argus reporter,“I would sooner do ten years at the war than one inthe Mallee” [Argus, 1931, p. 19].

Droughts have long been part of Australian historyand experience, yet like rainfall their impact on thecollective memory of the nation since colonisationhas been intermittent. McDonald’s frustration wasclearly evident when he addressed the parliament,and with good reason. Political responses todrought in Australia seems to have been far morereactive than responsive, extending with limitedeffect beyond individual droughts and hinderingthe ability to see droughts in the context with ourenvironmental conditions. Politicians believed thatdrought could be solved with the grand panaceasof ‘nation building’ or ‘drought proofing’. Some ofthese ‘solutions’ would persist in drought debatewell into the twentieth century and beyond. Thehistorical record shows that two distinct patternsof political engagement with drought exist. Firstly;

the short-term, often highly emotive reaction to theeffects of drought, and secondly, a more gradualresponse to the structural implications of droughtas underpinned by evolving attitudes, assumptionsand policies. Both of these two-speed reactionsto drought are evident in the experiences of the‘Federation Drought’ of 1895-1903 and the ‘Big Dry’of 1982-3, both of which will be the focus of thisstudy.

Historical understandings of drought vary acrosscontexts, highlighting that definitions of thephenomenon are dependent on the nature of theintersection between human and environmentalsystems. Indigenous people lived with theunpredictability of the seasons long before Britishcolonisation; their complex land managementpractices were based on a subtle and reciprocalrelationship with the land [Gammage, 2011, p. 48].These practices were intensely connected to theprotection of resources like water, as has beenexplored by Bill Gammage who found thatpre-colonial Aboriginal land management practiceswere varied across the country and climates.Gammage found for example, that some indigenouspeople cultivated specific species of grass as a wayof maintaining ground moisture during long dryperiods [Gammage, 2011, p. 107]. Drought forIndigenous people was the extent to which their landmanagement systems and social structures couldcope with climatic variations. The introductionof intensive European farming practices such asgrazing and cropping would have an importantrole in transforming native water systems andvegetation, and thereby change the nature of droughtin Australia. Gammage highlights the relativity,even subjectivity, of the term ‘drought’, noting that

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changing environmental conditions and expectedoutputs are such that “rain which broke a drought [in1788] does not now” [Gammage, 2011, p. 107]. LindaCourtenay-Botterill similarly writes, “the definingfeature of drought is its impact on human activityit is essentially socially constructed” [Botterill,2003, p. 62]. During the drought of 1864-6, thesechanged circumstances were to have a noticeableeffect on indigenous people, with many traditionalwater sources muddied and destroyed by thirstyanimals. Such was the poverty of water supply that apetition was sent to the South Australian Parliamentseeking assistance for local Aboriginals [Garden,2009, p. 34]. Throughout the nineteenth century,political pressure and developments in technologyincreased the investment in rural industries andinfrastructure, boosting yields and expanding areasof land committed to agriculture. The arrival ofrailways in northern Victoria and western New SouthWales connected their wheat fields to internationalmarkets [McKernan, 2005, p. 29]. Intense lobbyingof colonial legislatures resulted in the proliferationof smallholding farmers as large pastoral leaseswere subdivided and crown lands further openedup for sale. As Michael McKernan writes, “[l]andselection was social engineering without the benefitof knowledge or understanding” [McKernan, 2005,p. 27]. Without any real experience or record of thevicissitudes of the Australian climate, the early smallfarmers were hit hard, especially by the droughtyears of the 1880s.

Subsequently, drought in the nineteenth centurywas largely unanticipated, both by the settlerswho had limited experience or understanding ofAustralian climates, and the Indigenous people whohad to quickly adapt to significant environmentalchanges. Though droughts had occurred in theearly colonial years, they were seen as aberrations,with good years following bad, as indicated by thepolitical reactions [Evans, 2012, p. 24]. KathrynEvans describes this as the result of the colonists’‘cultural bias’, arguing that Tasmania was viewedas an ‘antipodean England’ [Evans, 2012, p. 24]. Inother places it is clear that settlers tried to recreatethe motherland in name and appearance, leading tounrealistic expectations of a country very differentto the one of cultural memory. Droughts werethus met with ‘indignant surprise’ [McKernan, 2005,p. 18]. Initially, provincial newspapers pointed to thefailings of local politicians, for their lack of foresightin providing appropriate infrastructure and makingplots too small [McKernan, 2005, p. 44]. Outsideof rural areas, people often perceived droughts associal Darwinism in action; only the strongest wouldsurvive [McKernan, 2005, p. 45]. The politicalresponse of the 1880s was the move by politiciansto ‘drought proof’ country areas. This was the

first step towards a long-term response to drought,albeit for economic rather than humanitarianconsiderations. Alfred Deakin strongly advocatedplans for irrigating large parts of the Goulburnand Wimmera valleys [Shann, 1927, p. 9]. Thisbegan a long tradition; politicians have, for much ofthe last two hundred years, considered irrigationa panacea for drought-stricken areas. Figure 1shows a graphic representation of the number oftimes an article mentions the word ‘drought’ (blue)and ‘irrigation’ (red) in contemporary digitizedAustralian newspapers.1 The peak of the redline around 1890 coincides with the building ofDeakin’s Goulburn Weir (1887-91) demonstratinga reasonably high degree of correlation betweendiscussion of irrigation during and immediatelyfollowing major droughts.

The Federation drought precipitated two changesin politics; firstly, the degree of suffering in ruralcommunities and the extent to which the governmentshould give aid; and secondly, a general questioningof government expenditure itself when so muchof the community was in the thrall of drought.The ‘Federation Drought’ of 1895-1903 remains oneof the severest on record. Despite its name, the“drought” was actually the product of three tightlyconsecutive dry El Nino systems [Garden, 2009,p. 237]. The droughts’ effects were heavily felt asthe colonial expansion of the preceding decade wasseverely tested. The sheep population in 1890s wasapproximately 100 million but by 1902 this haddropped by more than half [Blainey, 1985, p. 5]. Inone district, the Central Tablelands of New SouthWales, sheep stocks declined from 7.6 million in 1891to 2.2 million in 1902 [Butzer and Helgren, 2005,p. 6]. The Bathurst Free Press asked, in a ratherexasperated tone, “[w]hen the sheep become invisiblewhat are we to expect of the trade and income?”adding that it would be prudent for the authoritiesto attempt irrigation for “salvation of the west”[Bathurst Free Press and Mining Journal, 1902, p. 2].No longer considered within colonial boundaries,drought stretched across states, becoming one of thefirst ‘national’ political issues. The Brisbane Courierwent so far as to blame the drought for havingenfeebled Queensland into agreeing to Federation,but grudgingly admitted the new order would atleast rein in state and federal expenditure [BrisbaneCourier, 1902, p. 4]. In Victoria, the beleagueredfarming community of Kyabram was incensed by theperceived extravagance of the Peacock Government,and created what became known as the KyabramReform Movement [Bossence, 1963, p. 78]. Theydemanded that “the number of members be reducedto 46, and Ministers of the Crown to five, andthat the salaries of both Ministers and Members bereduced to one-third” in order to defeat the drought

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[Bossence, 1963, p. 81]. Victorian MP WilliamIrvine united forces with the Kyabram movementand successfully supplanted Alexander Peacock asPremier in 1902. The momentum spread to NSWwhere George Reid, who had been elected to the newfederal parliament, declared that “apart altogetherfrom the drought, there has been no sort of prudencemanifested in the management of the financial affairsof this state” continuing a prediction that there couldbe a “real live Kyabram movement in New SouthWales” [Bathurst Free Press and Mining Journal,1903, p. 2]. Though this threat never materialisedas anything more serious, it demonstrated thatthe drought had focused the dissatisfaction of theelectorate, forcing governments and politicians torespond.

The response, however, was very much focusedon popular short-term initiatives like institutingnew irrigation schemes rather than belt-tighteningas the answer to drought. In the words ofGeoffrey Blainey,“irrigation schemes, as simple asthey were, had glamour” [Blainey, 1984, p. 143].New South Wales’ answer to the Goulburn Weir wasthe Murrumbidgee Irrigation system, initiated in1906 after much debate by the Barren Jack andMurrumbidgee Canals Construction Act [SydneyMorning Herald, 1910, p. 11].

Yet the immediate financial plight ofdrought-affected communities was a far morefractious issue, adding emotively-charged questionsto the debate regarding who in the new nationwas responsible for giving aid. On a visit homefrom Britain in 1902, the opera prima donna NellieMelba was shocked by the conditions she saw in thedrought-ravaged countryside of Victoria, saying, “Ihave seen heart-rending proofs of the misery causedby the drought”. She was so moved that she evenpersonally wrote an “appeal” to a few “friends inEngland and America who happen to be blessedwith wealth and influence” [Argus, 1902a, p. 5].Melba’s entreaty to thirty of her most intimatemillionaire friends appears to have roused theembarrassment of the government, with the newPrime Minister Edmund Barton cabling London toclarify that the opera singer’s appeal was a private,rather than national one. The new nation seems tohave been anxious that it might appear to the restof the world as pleading for charity like the ‘IndianFamine’; and that Australia could look after itself,as one strident Argus editorial asserted [Argus,1902b, p. 4]. Consequently the Lord Mayors ofMelbourne and Sydney began a drought appeal, inwhat became an inter-city contest [McKernan, 2005,p. 94-95]. The Sydney Morning Herald decriedthe lack of generosity in New South Wales incomparison to Victoria [McKernan, 2005, p. 94-95],and meanwhile, Paddy Crick, the NSW Minister

for Lands, denounced the drought relief appeal as“nonsense and humbug”, claiming that “the bushcould look after itself” [Brisbane Courier, 1903,p. 5]. Drought had become not just a political issue,but an emotive one as well, tied to the burgeoningself-conscious identities of the new nation and itscitizens, though old divisions between bush and city,and between the states can still be seen in play.

The response to drought in first half of thetwentieth century followed much of the pattern thathad been developed in the nineteenth; politiciansand public opinion would continue to ignore or feedoff the emotive content of individual droughts, ratherthan the phenomena itself. Yet none received thecoverage that the federation drought had receivedin terms of volume, and drought received littlemedia coverage when compared with ‘federation’and ‘Boer’ (as shown in Figure 2).2 This is inpart due to factors that skewed the importance ofdrought on the national agenda. The two worldwars for Australia were both shadowed by deepand destructive droughts; the drought of 1911-6was so severe that the Murray River dried up[McKernan, 2005, p. 173]. The country at warfelt the effects of drought just as in peace time,but with added exigency. As McKernan speculates,the high level of initial enlistments from ruralareas was a result of the drought [McKernan, 2005,p. 178]. Prime Minister Billy Hughes, convincedthat his referendum for conscription would pass,issued the call up prematurely. In rural areas, thisresulted in the overburdening of the ExemptionCourts where their inability to excuse younger sonsworking on the farms from service caused openhostility towards conscription [McKernan, 2005,p. 179]. In Bordertown in South Australia, ofthe 94 who received the call up, 87 requestedexemptions [McKernan, 2005, p. 179]. Further, thewar would also change the way rural industries andtheir communities were perceived. Agriculture andself-sufficiency came to be viewed as vital industriesfor national and imperial security. There was awidespread view that the farms of the Empire hadcontributed to Britain’s victory. The endowment ofagriculture and rural communities with a sense ofpride contributed to the rise of ‘countrymindedness’;a feeling of shared purpose in rural communities[Bongiorno, 2006]. This was particularly strongduring the 1920s and 1930s, during which no majordrought occurred. Irrigation and water schemes werestill posited as the cure for drought, the Queensland‘Bradfield Plan’ proposed redirecting northern riversinland, and only the cost had it shelved [Wooding,2008, p. 59].

The Second World War again saw rural industrieshighly valued in the war effort, with exemptions nowmade for younger sons to remain working on the

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farms. The Women’s Land Army stepped in to fillthe labour shortages, particularly during the droughtof 1939-1945. The post-war period had a markedlydifferent trajectory, however, as the decade-longdrought of 1958-68 dispelled the nostalgic glowof bountiful harvests and tennis parties from theinterwar period. Lack of preparation for droughtwas no longer an excuse, as it became more widelyaccepted that droughts were a recurrent featureof the Australian climate. Even Country Partypoliticians grew less sentimental; the Member forOrange and Deputy Premier Charles Cutler saidthat, “[t]oo many farmers rely on luck, theirneighbours or on the government to overcome theproblem of the drought” [McKernan, 2005, p. 215].City people also seemed less generous, with the1965 Sydney Lord Mayor’s Appeal led by Labor MPHarry Jensen raising only $8806 [McKernan, 2005,p. 104, 225]. A similar appeal in 1902 had raisedover £23,454, an equivent of $249,119 in 1965.3 TheCountry Party in coalition with the Liberal Partycould afford to be a little stricter in their criticism offarmers’ lack of financial or environmental foresight.Yet the government was still conciliatory. In1965 Robert Menzies told the parliament that theCommonwealth would cover “whatever deficit [thestates] might have in their budgets as a resultof drought measures”.4 The rapid developmentand growing nationalism of the 1960s precipitateda revision of attitudes towards the Australianenvironment and the impact of farming [Dunlap,1993, p. 34]. Environmental Historian ThomasDunlap writes, “[Australian’s] new ecologicalknowledge sharpened and focused their experienceof pollution and environmental degradation, andprovided the intellectual framework of developmentas usual” [Dunlap, 1993, p. 42]. What the post-warperiod reflects is a sharpening of political responsesto drought in line with a growing environmentalawareness. There also seems to be a distinct changein how people empathised with the issue.

Attitudes continued to change into the 1980swhen environmental concerns were combinedwith ‘economic rationalism’. The drought of1982-3, for instance, marked a significant changein the development of political responses todrought. Although the drought was of relativelyshort duration, its intensity caused widespreaddestruction, totaling approximately $3000 millionin losses to the economy [Australian Bureau ofStatistics, 1988]. Also, the financial effects of thedrought were exacerbated by a simultaneous globaleconomic downturn. Economics became central tothe drought debate for the first time, as Farmersbegan to be viewed not just as victims, but alsoas business people, in an industry with knownvolatile risks. This change of emphasis had begun

in the late 1970s, and resulted in the reorganisationfarmers’ political lobbying groups. This included theVictorian Farmers and Graziers Association (1979),the first meeting of which was attended by formergrazier, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser [McKernan,2005, p. 238-239]. The National Farmers Federationwas formed in the same year, with the intention ofbringing economics rather than a ‘bleeding heart’ topolicy debate. McKernan compares the importanceof the formation of these lobbies to the formationof the Country Party in the 1920s [McKernan, 2005,p. 238-239]. Fodder subsidies were criticised by theNFF for rewarding those whose careless farm andbusiness management practices had placed themdire circumstances, whilst disadvantaging those whohad been responsible [McKernan, 2005, p. 259].Criticisms were also made about their practicalusefulness for alleviating dire farm circumstances; afarmer from Cowra complained that bales had gonefrom $2.50 to $3.80 following the announcement ofthe subsidy. Yet despite these criticisms, droughtrelief continued. By January 1983, Governmentpayments in excess of $4 million were being paidto farmers in NSW alone. This demonstrated thatwhile economics changed the emphasis of the issue,the old political paradigm of popular short termmeasures still had a powerful hold, particularly overthe coalition. When Malcolm Fraser was defeatedin 1983, the new Hawke government pursued adifferent program. Despite the drought aid, Fraserhas since identified the drought as being one of thereasons for his defeat and his 1982 budget reliedon predictions that the drought would break: “Thedrought did not break and within six weeks nearlyevery forecast was proved to be very, very wrongand Australia was clearly headed downhill”.5 In1989, the Finance Minister Peter Walsh, who washimself a farmer, announced that drought would nolonger be considered a natural disaster, and removedit from the National Disaster Relief Arrangementsscheme. This was in part due to changed economicand environmental considerations, resulting in ageneral questioning of whether structurally unviableagricultural businesses should be supported, andalso, as Walsh fumed, because the QueenslandGovernment was using drought relief “as a sortof National Party slush fund”.6 Yet the Hawkegovernment’s decision to change the classification ofdrought and change the way relief was distributedrepresented a much longer evolution of Australianattitudes to drought and our political reactionto them. Though, as the drought of the 2000swould demonstrate, we could not entirely escapeour history.

Successive droughts since the 1860s have beenquickly labeled ‘the worst in history’, each imaginedas drier and more destructive than the last. This was

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no less the case for the excruciatingly long droughtof 2000-2012. Drought has been integral to thepolitical discourse in Australia since the colonialperiod, especially in debates over development,management of water and interaction with theenvironment. Droughts are natural crises whereour human systems are shown to be inflexible orunequipped to deal with their reality. For much ofour history, political reactions have been focused onthe short term, with policy predisposed to ‘bluster’or easy panaceas like ‘nation building’ schemesor the ‘drought proofing’ of affected areas. Theemotive impact of suffering resulting from drought,and other issues of identity further added blinkersto our ability to look at the bigger picture. Atthe same time, there has been a clear evolutionand maturation in attitudes towards drought. Thepolitics of drought has particularly benefitted froma more realistic public discussion about the waywe respond to the vicissitudes of the Australianenvironment. Whilst this essay has focused primarilyon the experience of drought in the nineteenthand twentieth century, many of the continuities inpolitical response to drought can be analogised tothe present day. If it has taken over two centuriesto recognise the structural implications of natural,recurrent climatic factors like drought, then thereare serious implications for political engagementwith longer-term issues like climate change, andenvironmental sustainability.

Notes

1See Appendix. Subject to limitations of sampling data,graph demonstrates trends only.

2See Appendix. Subject to limitations of sampling data,demonstrates trends only.

3Based on estimates by the Reserve Bankof Australia Pre-Decimal Inflation Calculator.(http://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/annualPreDecimal.html)

4The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Menzies, MP, “DroughtAssistance: Ministerial Statement” (CommonwealthParliamentary Debates (CPD), House of Representatives, 7December 1965), p. 3647. In [Botterill, 2003, p. 63].

5Malcolm Fraser quoted in [Stewart, 2012].6Senator the Hon. Peter Walsh, “Questions without notice:

Natural Disaster Relief”, (CPD, Senate, 1 March 1989), p. 189.In [Botterill, 2003, p. 64].

References

The Argus. “MADAME MELBA AND THE DROUGHT”.(Melbourne, Vic. : 1848 - 1956), 3 Nov 1902a. URLhttp://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article9078273. [Accessed 3Jun 2012].

The Argus. “[No heading]”. (Melbourne, Vic. : 1848 - 1956), 4Nov 1902b. URL http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-page331117.[Accessed 3 June 2012].

The Argus. “TRAGEDY OF THE MALLEE”. (Melbourne,Vic. : 1848 - 1956), 25 April 1931. URL http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article4383715. [Accessed 2 Jun 2012].

Australian Bureau of Statistics. ‘Drought inAustralia’ - Year Book Australia 1988, 1988.URL http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/[email protected]/0/068f13bccd03f27bca2569de001f1072?OpenDocument.[Accessed 9 May 2012].

Bathurst Free Press and Mining Journal. “Daily FreePress. “Magna est veritas et prevalebit.” WEDNESDAY,OCTOBER 22, 1902”. (NSW : 1851 - 1904), 22 Oct1902. URL http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article64338949.[Accessed 3 Jun 2012].

Bathurst Free Press and Mining Journal. “MR. REIDON THE SITUATION”. (NSW : 1851 - 1904), 16 Feb1903. URL http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article63821371.[Accessed 3 Jun 2012].

Geoffrey Blainey. Our side of the Country: The Story ofVictoria. North Ryde, Sydney: Methuen Haynes, 1984.

Geoffrey Blainey. ‘Australia: A Bird’s-Eye View’. Daedalus:Australia, Terra Incognita?, 114(1):1–27, 1985.

Frank Bongiorno. ‘Chapter Twenty - Politics’. In AlanAtkinson, J.S. Ryan, Iain Davidson, and Andrew Piper,editors, High Lean Country: Land, People and Memory inNew England, pages 233–244. Crows Nest, Sydney: Allen& Unwin, 2006.

William Henry Bossence. Kyabram. Melbourne: TheHawthorn Press, 1963.

Linda Courtenay Botterill. ‘Uncertain Climate: The RecentHistory of Drought Policy in Australia’. Australian Journalof Politics & History, 49(1):61–74, 2003.

The Brisbane Courier. “The Brisbane Courier”. (Qld. :1864 - 1933), 30 Apr 1902. URL http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article19129972. [Accessed 3 Jun 2012].

The Brisbane Courier. “SYDNEY, MARCH 13”. (Qld. :1864 - 1933), 16 Mar 1903. URL http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article19231666. [Accessed 3 Jun 2012].

Karl W. Butzer and David M. Helgren. ‘Livestock, LandCover, and Environmental History: The Tablelands ofNew South Wales, Australia, 1820–1920’. Annals of theAssociation of American Geographers, 95(1):80–111, 2005.

B. J. Costar. ‘McDonald, Sir John Gladstone Black(Jack) (1898–1977)’. Australian Dictionary of Biography,National Centre of Biography, Australian NationalUniversity, 2000. URL http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mcdonald-sir-john-gladstone-black-jack-10933/text19425. [Accessed 2 June 2012].

Thomas R. Dunlap. ‘Australian Nature, European Culture:Anglo Settlers in Australia’. Environmental HistoryReview, 17(1):25–48, 1993.

Kathryn Evans. “Antipodean England’? A History ofDrought, Fire and Flood in Tasmania from EuropeanSettlement in 1803 to the 1960s’. PhD thesis, Universityof Tasmania, 2012.

Bill Gammage. The Biggest Estate on Earth: How AboriginesMade Australia. Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 2011.

Donald Garden. Droughts, Floods & Cyclones: El Ninos thatShaped Our Colonial Past. North Melbourne: AustralianScholarly Publishing, 2009.

Michael McKernan. Drought: the red marauder. Sydney:Allen & Unwin, 2005.

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Edward Owen Giblin Shann. The Boom of 1890 - And Now.Syndey: Cornstalk Publishing Company, 1927.

Cameron Stewart. ‘Libs brought down by wages push, secondoil shock and bad drought, says Malcolm Fraser’. TheAustralian, 2nd January 2012.

The Sydney Morning Herald. “BARREN JACK SCHEME”.(NSW : 1842 - 1954), 7 Sep 1910. URL http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article15207832. [Accessed 3 Jun 2012].

Robert Wooding. ‘Chapter Six - Populate, parch and panic:two centuries of dreaming about nation-building in inlandAustralia’. In John Butcher, editor, Australia UnderConstruction: nation-building - Past, Present and Future,pages 57–70. Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008.

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Appendix

Figure 1

Figure 2

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Mimi-Cecilia Pascoe | Intentionalism and Functionalism

Intentionalism and Functionalism: Explaining the Holocaust

Mimi-Cecilia Pascoe

Historians the world over have long sought to provide an adequate explanation for the atrocitiescommitted by Adolf Hitler during what is now commonly known as the Holocaust. The debate over itscause has become split in two: some prefer the ‘intentionalist’ explanation, which focuses largely onthe idea of Hitler specifically intending to commit genocide, naming him as the most significant figure.Others prefer the ‘functionalist’ position, which maintains that the Holocaust was the result of a chaoticpolitical atmosphere, which was preyed upon by opportunists. The intentionalist position suffers greatlyfrom a lack of adequate evidence, and consequently cannot prove Hitler’s intentions beyond reasonabledoubt. On the other hand, the functionalist position is better able to compensate for the lack of evidence,and thus provides a more solid historical explanation for the Holocaust.

As one of the most horrific occurrences in modernhistory, the Holocaust has perplexed many whoattempt to ascertain why any human being wouldbring such cruelty upon others. In determining theunfolding of the Holocaust, historians have naturallyattempted to turn to evidence of Hitler’s intentions,coupled with the actions of other prominent Nazileaders. However, this has proved a complextask because of the destruction of considerable‘physical and documentary evidence’ indicatingHitler’s precise intentions [Draper, 1999, p. 14].Nevertheless, historians have attempted to overcomethis problem with the help of what evidence remains,with focuses on the evolution of Nazi ideologyand the changing political atmosphere in Germany.Accordingly, a debate between two schools ofthought has been born. Both schools attemptto explain the methods by which the Holocaustdeveloped and they have come to be known as‘intentionalist’ and ‘functionalist’ respectively.

I The Debate

Timothy Mason developed the terms in an essaywritten with the aim of drawing focus away fromHitler as the sole explanation of the Holocaust.A functionalist himself, Mason held that it wasimportant to consider the ‘dynamics of Nazibarbarism’ as institutionally and economicallymotivated, without insisting that Hitler’s will must‘carry the main burden of explanation’ [Mason,1995, p. 216]. Mason, in accordance with otherfunctionalists, maintains that it is necessary toexamine the factors in the development of theHolocaust on a broader scale, beginning with theeconomic situation of Germany in the 1930s [Mason,1995, p. 216]. He argues that multiple socialand economic factors led to a chaotic politicalatmosphere, amidst which opportunists seized thechance to instigate genocidal programs [Mason, 1995,p. 213]. In this sense, functionalists place greatsignificance on the ‘machinery of government andits effect upon decision-making in the Third Reich’[Mason, 1995, p. 213].

Conversely, intentionalists argue that Hitler andother high-ranking officials launched a ‘murderouswar of genocide and destruction of human life’simply because they desired it [Mason, 1995, p. 213].They insist that the Holocaust was a result of the‘distinctive murderous will of the Nazi leadership’[Mason, 1995, p. 215].

I argue that while the intentionalist position issuccessful in demonstrating that Hitler possessed ahomicidal attitude towards the Jewish people, itsuffers significantly from a lack of evidence andthus does not succeed in proving beyond reasonabledoubt that Hitler’s hatred of the Jews led directly togenocide. I will show that unless an adequate link isfound to exist between Hitler’s hatred and the actualactions of the Nazi party, the functionalist argumentprovides a more solid historical explanation for theway the Holocaust unfolded.

II The Intentionalist Argument

It has been suggested that it is significantly easierto define the intentionalist argument than thefunctionalist [Mason, 1995, p. 212]. In general, theargument promotes the idea that the destruction ofJewish people was ‘inspired by Nazi racial ideology’which resulted from Hitler’s intentional actions[Draper, 1999, p. 14]. As such, intentionalistsfocus on Hitler as the most significant figure in theinstigation of the Holocaust. This is supported byevidence deduced from ‘British decodes of [German]radio transmissions’ that ‘Jews were the principaltargets of large-scale Nazi violence against civiliansfrom the start’ [Draper, 1999, p. 14]. Even as early as1922, in Mein Kampf Hitler labelled Jews as a targetin suggesting that had thousands of them been killedduring World War I, lives of German soldiers mayhave been saved [Hitler, 1943, p. 679]. Further, in1936, Hitler prepared the German military for waragainst Russia in order to eliminate the “250 millionJews”, a figure derived from equating 250 millionBolsheviks with Jews [Hitler, 1939]. Also amongstthe limited evidence is Hitler’s announcement in 1939that if ‘Jewish financers within and outside Europe

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should succeed. . . in plunging the nations. . . into awar, the result will be. . . the annihilation of theJewish race in Europe’ [Hitler, 1939]. This suggeststhat from the beginning, Hitler intended to carryout genocide.

Similarly, it is argued that Hitler, alongwith prominent Nazi leaders, wanted to commitgenocide [Mason, 1995, p. 216]. This isdemonstrated by examining the early manifestationsof ‘Weltanschauung’, or world view [Mason, 1995,p. 216]. This assists in defining the ultimate goal ofthe Third Reich as genocidal, as the ideas expressedin the Nazi party’s Weltanschauung appear similarto the actual actions taken by Hitler during the war[Mason, 1995, p. 216].

In order to prove Hitler’s intentions, historiansportray Hitler as an evil, calculating man, which,in the absence of significant concrete evidence as tohis intentions, assists in making the argument moreconvincing. In fact, they dedicate significant effortto combatting the shortage in evidence. They alsoassert that the roles of Himmler and Goering duringthe war are significant in proving Hitler’s intentions.As early as 1936, Goering announced that Germanywould deal with the Jews “one way or another”.

A Characterization of Hitler

Many historians portray Hitler as a man whosought only to exact vengeance upon the Jewishpeople he held responsible for all Germany’shardships during and following WWI. Many arguethat a man with Hitler’s history of anti-Semitismmust undoubtedly have developed the requisiteintention for genocide. As a young man, thereevolved in Hitler an anti-Semitism that was‘traditionally inspired’ and ‘racialistic’ in form, whichhe then converted to ‘goal-oriented’ as his politicalcareer grew more significant [Fleming, 1984, p. 29].As early as 1921, it is held that Hitler desired thatthe ‘Jewish dominion that had afflicted the nationsince 1918’ be ended [Fleming, 1984, p. 14]. In1922, Josef Hell claimed that Hitler, in response to aquestion regarding the fate of the Jewish peopleresponded with a highly graphic account of hisbrutal intentions [Hell, 1922, p. 5]. However, thisargument, despite its seemingly conclusive proofof the likelihood that Hitler intended genocide, isweakened by the fact that all its evidence relieson others’ interpretations of Hitler’s thoughts andproclamations.

Regardless of any proof of Hitler’s intentions, hewas not alone in his discriminatory views. Early20th century Europe was full of similarly mindedanti-Semites, thus Hitler’s attitude alone is aninsufficient explanation for genocide. However, adistinction must be made between Hitler and other

anti-Semites, for while they shared violent views,Hitler was the only one radical enough to initiategenocidal programs.

B Lack of Evidence

In order to pursue the intentionalist position, ithas become important for historians to find methodsof surmounting the lack of concrete evidence ofHitler’s intentions. Many argue that such a dearthdoes not hinder investigation into Hitler’s pre-warintentions. Some even take advantage of it tofurther characterize Hitler as ‘evil’. They suggestthat the absence of evidence proves indisputablythat Hitler was a deceptive, lying man who wouldresort to anything to achieve his goal of thedestruction of Jews [Weizsacker, 1950, p. 199].Fleming, too, persists in his argument that Hitlerdecided at an early stage to commit genocide andalso characterizes Hitler as a secretive man who‘[refused] to confide in others’, hence the dearthof evidence. Fleming veers slightly towards thefunctionalist debate in suggesting that other Naziofficials, unaware of Hitler’s plans, ‘pursued differentpolicies for years’ [Fleming, 1984, p. 18]. Flemingtakes into account the absence of written evidenceand turns instead to Hitler’s verbally articulatedplans, focusing on his relations with Himmler. Heargues that Hitler conveyed his desire for destructionof the Jews to Himmler who, given his role in theparty, was then able to ‘set in motion the machineryof death’ [Fleming, 1984, p. 18].

C Role of Himmler

Like Fleming, many historians support the ideathat Himmler was also significantly involved withNazi plans for genocide. It has been argued thatevidence provided by Himmler explicitly depictsHitler’s genocidal intentions. Himmler reportedthat in 1941 Hitler made an order regarding theirretrievable resolution of the ‘Jewish question’saying that ‘every Jew that we can lay ourhands on is to be destroyed’ [Hoss, 1995, p. 351].Himmler and Hitler’s interactions are held to besignificant in demonstrating the progression ofHitler’s intentions. As leader of the SS, Himmlergreatly assisted it to be come ‘a racial-ideologicalelite’. He assisted in promoting racial superioritythroughout Germany by instigating ‘racial entrancerequirements for members’ prior to the beginningof World War II (WWII), which demonstrates thatfrom the outset of Hitler’s political life, he intendedracial discrimination within Germany [Fleming,1984, p. 34]. This entire argument is severelyweakened for two reasons. Firstly, there is thefact that any testimony provided by Himmler may

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be considered unreliable, given the high likelihoodof him attempting to offload his responsibility[Draper, 1999, p. 14]. Secondly, the aforementionedunreliability of Himmler’s evidence means that thereis not a sufficient link between Hitler’s negativeattitude towards Jews and his decision to commitgenocide.

D Flexibility of Intentionalism

The intentionalist argument does, however, allowfor varied interpretations. It makes room forarguments examining a variety of time periods,and is not so structured as to hinder progressivetheories. Some historians focus on Hitler’s genocidalintentions as being developed prior to the war, whilesome view it as originating during the war. Browningmaintains that Hitler’s specific intentions were themost significant cause of the Holocaust, but suggeststhat the decision was not defined until mid-1941[Browning, 1985, p. 22]. He also suggests that whileHitler did indeed eventually develop an intention tocommit genocide, this was not ‘high on [his] agendaearly in the war’ [Browning, 1985, p. 22]. This is ademonstration of the flexibility of the intentionalistposition that, in its flexibility and thus wider scopeof evidence, asserts a more convincing argument.

E Criticisms of Intentionalism

Possibly the most evident criticism of theintentionalist argument relates to difficultiesexperienced in terms of proving that Hitler’sgenocidal intentions were solely responsible for theHolocaust. The lack of conclusive evidence leads toa more vague interpretation of Hitler’s intentions, asit is highly necessary to demonstrate a link betweenhis view of the Jewish people and his genocidalintentions, without which the argument is futile[Mason, 1995, p. 220]. Conversely, it could be arguedthat the lack of evidence is suffered by both sides ofthe debate and is thus not a significantly adequatereason to not conform to a certain argument. Also,a lack of evidence does not necessarily mean thatspecific events did not occur, a fact that appears tostill be incomprehensible to some functionalists.

Breitman argues that it is incorrect to lookgenerally at Hitler’s political ideology prior to WWII,link such evidence with speeches made during thewar regarding the destruction of the Jews, andthen claim that this is direct evidence of Hitler’sintentions [Breitman, 1991, p. 25]. He suggests thatthis is too broad a view, and does not allow for anuanced examination of other aspects of Hitler’sasserted intentions including relocation of Jews[Breitman, 1991, p. 25].

III Functionalist Argument

Functionalists maintain that at the beginning ofWWII, Hitler and his officials had not made anydecisions as to how to approach the ‘Jewish Problem’[Draper, 1999, p. 14]. In fact, it is argued by manythat Hitler’s main goal was in fact economicallyfocused [Mason, 1995, p. 215]. The ‘cumulativeradicalization’ of Nazi policy that ultimately led togenocide was a result of the ‘way in which the Nazileadership conceived of political power’ [Mommsen,1976, p. 179, Mason, 1995, p. 214]. Functionalistsdepict this as a multiple step process, beginningwith the ascendancy of Hitler as the sole leaderof Germany, followed by the political void createdas a result of his weakness and his subsequentmanipulation by other Nazi leaders, and finishingwith the achievement of the Nazi party’s ‘NationalSocialist’ goal.

A Political Transformation

According to the functionalist argument, policyis the key to determining the unfolding of theHolocaust. Looking at original Nazi policy,it can be ascertained that fundamentally, theleadership in the Third Reich ‘[strove] towardspolitics without administration’ [Mommsen, 1976,p. 179]. Hitler, and prominent Nazi leaders suchas Himmler and Goebbels, saw the characteristicsof an administratively focused political organism as‘constraints on their power’ [Mason, 1995, p. 214]. Toavoid this, the leaders sought to instigate inadequatepolicies, in the sense that they ‘disrupted existingpolicies. . . and had unforeseen administrative andpolitical results’, which led to a later construction of‘further ill-considered decisions’ including the Polishoccupation policies [Mason, 1995, p. 214].

The disintegration of the Nazi government into‘increasingly ill-coordinated special task-forces’, witha clear lack of coordination between ministers,resulted in increased powers being awarded to Hitleras the sole leader of Germany [Mason, 1995, p. 214].Division within the Nazi party was exacerbatedby the fact that Hitler discouraged collaborationbetween members of the party, as he regularlycreated ‘new organs of state’, leadership of whichwas given to ‘men who were loyal to/dependent uponhim’ [Mason, 1995, p. 215].

B Weakness of Hitler

Hitler’s weakness as a leader contributed to thepoisonous political situation in Germany prior toWWII. It both constricted ‘the regime’s freedomof action’ and led other prominent Nazi leader’sto assume excessively powerful positions [Mason,

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1995, p. 215]. His fear of diminishing his popularitythrough unpopular decisions resulted in governmentinaction with regards to policy-making. This meantHitler’s power as leader of Germany was reduced,as the scope of his policies was narrow. Further tothis, Hitler’s attitude towards other leaders withinthe Nazi party also weakened his leadership powers.His ‘deference to the senior leaders’, coupled withhis unrelenting trust of their political instincts wascrucial in exacerbating his inability to efficientlyand effectively exercise ‘government policymakingprocedures’ [Mason, 1995, p. 215]. As a result,space was left for high-ranking officials to influencepolitical decisions. Hitler encouraged this power, ashe gave them significant freedom of reign, includinggranting their requests for jurisdictional extension[Mason, 1995, p. 215].

C Role of Powerful Officials

This leads to the idea that the weakness of Hitler’spower meant that those who were responsible for theHolocaust’s initiation (namely other high-rankingofficials within the Nazi Party) acted independentlyof Hitler [Draper, 1999, p. 14]. These leaderswere guided by racial ideology, and merely sawJews as enemies in a ‘practical sense’, in terms ofenemies who were preventing them from achievingtheir goal [Draper, 1999, p. 14]. The powerfulofficials were not an united, organized group ofpoliticians with a range of common goals. Rather,there existed considerable internal tension withinthe government, with prominent leaders focusingsolely on their respective jurisdictions [Mason, 1995,p. 216]. However, the various officials were united inone crucial goal: ‘making Germany. . . more NationalSocialist’ [Mason, 1995, p. 216].

D National Socialist Goals

The vagueness of the Nazi party’s ‘NationalSocialist’ goal led to the radicalization of policy,which inevitably resulted in genocide. The goal wasvague, and there is no evidence of any decisive stepsoutlined by the party as to its achievement [Mason,1995, p. 216]. It is likely that a general agreementwas made that the best way to address the aim wasto generically seek ‘persecution of the designatedenemies of the cause’ [Mason, 1995, p. 216]. Theabsence of an explicit and practical goal led toissues being treated in the most radical of ways,as these were the ‘most National Socialist’, and itwas by these means that prominent Nazi leaders,compensating for Hitler’s reticence to formulateunpopular policy, could create some semblance ofpolicy goals [Mason, 1995, p. 216].

Such resorting to political improvisation due toa lack of policy ‘rested upon the deployment ofextreme violence’ [Draper, 1999, p. 14]. The Nazileadership found itself responsible for ‘territorieswith large Jewish populations’, thus enemies ofthe cause, and as such they ‘improvised. . . separate“solutions” that became increasingly murderous’[Draper, 1999, p. 14]. This idea is supported byfunctionalist Schleunes who suggests that between1933-1939, Nazi policy regarding persecution ofJews varied greatly, even in terms of restrainingviolence, and involved the introduction of ‘onepiece of legislation after another’ [Schleunes, 1970,p. 261]. The fact that it was the actions of prominentNazi leaders other than Hitler that defined Nazipolicy entails that Hitler was not necessarily the‘self-conscious and purposeful author’ of the violentpolicies.

E Criticisms of Functionalism

Many intentionalists argue that the functionalistargument is inadequate as it allows Hitler to berelieved of some responsibility, given that directionof focus away from his specific will. However,as asserted by Mason, the functionalist argumentdoes not involve a denial of Hitler as a ‘morallyresponsible political leader who made choices whichwere inspired by distinctive malevolent intention’ butrather that a focus on his will alone is insufficientfor explaining such genocide [Mason, 1995, p. 220].

Some anti-functionalists suggest that functionalistarguments not only diminish Hitler’s responsibilityfor the Holocaust but also underrates ‘the capacityof Nazi leaders for premeditated evil’ and, contraryto the view accepted by society at large, that theregime was not as horrific as it is known to have been[Mason, 1995, p. 217]. However, it is necessary toconsider whether we are too careful of ‘underrating’the Holocaust to the point where we are unableto adequately determine its origins, and are thushistorically hindered. Historians must be wary ofdeveloping a leaning towards the intentionalist viewout of a desire to lay blame on those commonlyviewed as brutal and inhumane. This could lead tohistorians blinding themselves to other explanations.

Functionalists themselves find their own argumentcomplicated, due to difficulties in clearly replacingthe notion of Hitler intending the Holocaust withanother plausible explanation. Historians havebeen demonstrably capable of discovering evidenceshowing that some ‘Nazi officials. . . had no inklingof a master plan for the Jews’ and that within theparty there were examples of opposition to massmurder’ [Breitman, 1991, p. 25]. Aside from this,however, functionalists are conflicted in terms ofdeciding whether a plan was developed at all, or

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if it followed ‘critical initiatives’ on the part of theNazi leadership [Breitman, 1991, p. 26]. Similarly,Breitman highlights the fact that, in writing aboutHitler’s crimes, various historians neglect to specifywhen the crimes were committed, and succeed onlyin proving Hitler’s significant role in them [Breitman,1991, p. 27].

As suggested earlier, functionalists must also bewary of their interpretations of the lack of concreteevidence regarding discussions of the exterminationof the Jews. Mommsen’s argument that the lack ofevidence of such discussion indicates its completeabsence is shallow and does not demonstrate anuanced approach to the way Nazi leaders madedecisions [Mommsen, 1991, p. 110].

IV Reichstag Fire

The two most prominent interpretationsof this event exemplify both sides of theintentionalist/functionalist debate. It is anexample of how the absence of reliable evidence asto the origins of the fire resulted in the developmentof separate arguments. An examination of this eventassists in proving which of the schools of thoughtare more successful in explaining Holocaust-relatedevents and, by consequence, the origins of theHolocaust. On 27th February 1933, the Reichstagbuilding was set on fire [Tigar and Mage, 2009,p. 32]. Following this, Germany saw a wave of massarrests of prominent people including ‘Communistleaders and Reichstag deputies. . . Social Democrats,leading left-wing intellectuals, and trade unionleaders’ [Tigar and Mage, 2009, p. 32]. In 1934,prominent communist Marinus Van des Lubbe wasexecuted for having been found responsible for thefire [Tigar and Mage, 2009, p. 32]. To this day,however, his execution remains controversial and asdoes the identity of the arsonist.

The intentionalist argument rests on the idea thatthe arsonist was a Nazi, which supports the viewthat the Holocaust originated from ‘evil’ intentionson the part of Nazi leaders. Intentionalists advocatethat the fire was part of the Nazi plan to firmlyestablish a dictatorship [Mason, 1995, p. 217]. Itwas necessary in paving the way for the achievementof the party’s goals. Conversely, the functionalistargument relies on the Reichstag fire’s arsonist notbeing a Nazi. Rather, functionalists argue that thefire was a demonstration of the human ability toact with ‘violent improvisation’ and ‘seize that mainchance regardless of wider consequences’ [Mason,1995, p. 217]. Here it is evident that the functionalistposition benefits from the lack definitive proof andcan even take advantage of it. Without proof that aNazi was responsible for the fire, functionalists aremore capable of providing a convincing argument.

V Conclusion

Ultimately, the intentionalist argument as ahistorical explanation is highly favourable as a resultof its flexibility and the fact that it conforms tothe most popular societal view of Hitler. However,the functionalist position does not rely solely oninconclusive evidence, as the intentionalist positionlargely does, and despite a wealth of criticisms, amore convincing argument based on the evidenceat hand. Furthermore, functionalism is aided bythe fact that genocide is not necessarily contingenton finding a ‘smoking gun’ document ordering thedestruction of a people. Rather, systematic attackson a target group’s essential foundations are enough.

Thus, functionalism may be seen as the mostaccurate depiction of the origins of the Holocaust.

References

Richard Breitman. The Architect of Genocide: Himmler andthe Final Solution. London: The Bodley Head, 1991.

Christopher R. Browning. Fateful Months: Essays on theEmergence of the Final Solution. New York: Holmes &Meier Publishing, 1985.

Roger Draper. Decoding the Holocaust. New Leader, 82(2):14–15, February 1999.

Gerald Fleming. Hitler and the Final Solution. Berekely:University of California Press, 1984.

Josef Hell. “Aufzeichnung”. Institut fur Zeitgeschicte ZS 640,1922.

Adolf Hitler. “The Jewish Question”. Speech, Berlin,Germany, Holocaust Research Project, January 301939. URL http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/holoprelude/jewishquestion.html. [Accessed 27 April 2013].

Adolf Hitler. Mein Kampf. Boston: Houghton MifflinHarcourt Publishing Company, 1943. Translated by RalphManheim.

Rudolph Hoss. “In the summer of 1941. . . ”. In YitzhakArad, Israel Gutman, and Abraham Margaliot, editors,Documents on the Holocaust: Selected Sources on theDestruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland,and the Soviet Union. Lincoln: University of NebraskaPress, 1995.

Timothy W. Mason. Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Hans Mommsen. “National Socialism. Continuity andChange”. In Walter Laqueur, editor, Fascism: A ReadersGuide, pages 179–210. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,1976.

Hans Mommsen. “The Realization of the Unthinkable: TheFinal Solution to the Jewish Question in the Third Reich”.In From Weimar to Auschwitz, pages 110–114. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1991. Translated by PhilipO’Connor.

Karl A. Schleunes. The Twisted Road to Auschwitz:Nazi Policy Toward German Jews, 1933-1939. Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1970.

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Michael E. Tigar and John Mage. “The Reichstag Fire Trial,1933-2008: The Production of Law and History”. MonthlyReview, 60(10):25–49, March 2009.

Ernst Von Weizsacker. Erinnerungen. Munich: Regnery andList, 1950.

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Emma Roberts | The exploitation of Pacific Island Labourers in ‘White Queensland’

It seemed too good to be true and it was:

The exploitation of Pacific Island Labourers in ‘White Queensland’

Emma Roberts

Between 1869 and 1906 more than 60,000 islanders from the South-West Pacific were recruited to workon sugar plantations in Queensland. For many this plantation work provided economic opportunitiesunavailable to them in their home countries and they came willingly; others were kidnapped by recruiters.This paper will argue that the labour trade overall was a scheme by the Queensland government to exploitislanders as an inexpensive means for agricultural development with minimal concern for their health,welfare and living conditions. Upon Federation the Commonwealth government ordered that all islandersbe returned to their homelands but about 2500 were able to avoid deportation. The descendants of these‘South Sea Islanders’ reside in Australia today as a marginalised and forgotten people, with the effortsof their ancestors mostly unacknowledged. This year (2013) they have called on the CommonwealthGovernment to make a formal apology for the hardships endured by their ancestors.

“It’s a sad story, but at the same time, I’m proud of the contribution that our families have made tothe fabric of this nation. . . ”1

This year, 2013, is an important milestone forAustralia’s South Sea Islander population (ASSI).It is exactly 150 years since the first of over60,000 Pacific islanders were bought to Australia asindentured labourers in 1863. While most of theselabourers died, returned to their home countries atthe expiration of their contract or were deportedafter Federation, ASSI are the direct descendants ofthe 2500 islanders who were either forced or choseto remain in Australia after the implementation ofthe White Australia policy in 1906.2

The labourers, who were mostly from the SolomonIslands and New Hebrides (present day Vanuatu),came to Australia on three-year contracts and werenicknamed “Kanakas,” a Hawai’ian term meaning‘human being’ [Saunders, 1976, p. 39, Maclellan,2012]. During the 1860s and 1870s Kanakas wereemployed in both sheep stations and agriculturalsites, however from 1884 legislation was passedconfining Melanesians to tropical and subtropicalagriculture [Corris, 1970, p. 45]. This article willfocus on sugar plantation labourers post-1884.

With Kanakas comprising about 85% ofQueensland’s sugar workforce in the 1890s, thegovernment was heavily dependent upon theirlabour [Megarrity, 2006, p. 8]. However, thegovernment and plantation owners were quick toregard the islanders as “expendable units withintropical undertakings” [Saunders, 1976, p. 50]which is evidenced by the often forceful manner ofrecruitment, appalling working conditions and thefailure to account for islanders’ health or culturalrequirements. Further, despite their invaluablecontribution to the establishment of Queensland’s

sugar industry, the efforts of these islanders are toooften unacknowledged; rather, praise is frequentlyattributed to European labourers.3

1 Context surrounding islander

recruitment

The majority of islanders were recruited toQueensland’s sugar industry during the ‘WhiteQueensland’ policy, which began in 1880 and lasteduntil Federation. This was a “powerful racial idealsimilar yet subtly different to the White Australiapolicy pursued by the Commonwealth after 1901”[Megarrity, 2006, p. 1], and was described by SirThomas McIllwraith4 as the idea that Queenslandshould remain a “white man’s colony influencedby white men and owned by white men” with aMelanesian labour force performing jobs which thewhite man would not.5

Kanakas were regarded as “loyal but childlikeexploitable workers” [Mercer, 1981, p. 38] and firsttime recruits were usually paid £6 a year (whichwas extremely low considering white ploughmenearned about £66 annually) [Megarrity, 2006, p. 2].Islanders were also forced to assume subjugatedpositions in society through segregation; trainshad carriages specifically for non-Europeans, andislanders had to purchase goods from “Kanakastores” [Mercer, 1981, p. 37]. Despite attemptsto ban the labour trade by Sir Samuel Griffith,6

many farmers continued to employ Pacific Islandlabourers up until Federation, as the hard manuallabour for little return remained unattractive towhite workers.7

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2 Why islanders came to Queensland

A “Blackbirding”

Mainstream literature refers to the time of islanderrecruitment as the “Blackbirding” [Anonymous,2011, p. 39] era, with academic articles alsocontending that in the trade’s early years manyislanders were kidnapped [Scarr, 1967, p. 5]. Insome cases islanders were seized from canoes as theycame alongside ships to trade [Scarr, 1967, p. 5].On less drastic occasions “there was only a fine linebetween the energetic recruiting agent, sensitive tothe wishes of the would-be recruit, and the outrightkidnapper” [Scarr, 1967, p. 19]. In 1870 Queenslandappointed government agents onto recruiting shipsto ensure islanders came willingly [Scarr, 1967, p. 13].However, as discussed later, the control of thesegovernment agents was often overridden by ships’masters.

B An opportunity for economic prosperity?

Islanders who were not “Blackbirded” came toQueensland in pursuit of economic opportunityand global engagement, and thus many scholarshave argued that the labour trade was beneficial toislanders [Corris, 1970, p. 49]. Of those recruitedfrom the Solomon Islands, over 50% came fromMalaita, a highly disadvantaged socio-economicarea, as the work abroad offered an opportunity forremuneration which did not exist in their homeland[Allen, 2005, p. 63]. Also European goods, especiallyfirearms, were greatly coveted by the islanders.8

Nevertheless, even if it can be established thatislanders came at their own agency, the Kanakas hadno choice of employer and were not afforded manyrights and liberties enjoyed by Europeans [Munro,1998, p. 939].

It has also been asserted that Kanakas did notarrive in total ignorance of what to expect, as the‘old hands’ (time-expired labourers) informed the‘new chums’ about plantation life [Corris, 1970, p. 49].However, while this may have been the case formain recruitment areas, labour supply from theSolomon Islands and New Hebrides diminished inthe 1880s and the nearly 5000 islanders recruitedfrom new areas did not have this benefit and wereoften misinformed by recruiters [Saunders, 1976,p. 40].

Although about half of islanders signed on fora second term and many campaigned against thedeportation order of 1906 [Corris, 1970, p. 54, Munro,1998, p. 935], their desire to stay was not alwaysentirely voluntary. Some had gambled away all theirearnings and therefore stayed on rather than facingthe humiliation of returning home empty handedand others were unable to settle back into home

communities so returned to Queensland [Corris,1970, p. 53, 55]. Employers also offered incentives(higher salaries and living standards) to islandersfor them to reengage as they sought men who wereexperienced [Corris, 1970, p. 55]. These factorsindicate that the choice of many islanders to remainin Queensland is not substantial evidence to validatethe view that the Queensland labour trade offeredempowerment, rather than exploitation, to islanders.

3 Aspects of exploitation during the labour

trade

As is discussed above, many islanders did indeedcome willingly to work on Queensland’s plantations.However this section will discuss the poor conditionsencountered by Kanakas during their indenture,which reiterates the exploitation experienced bythe workforce overall, including those who were not“Blackbirded.”

A Dangerous journey to Queensland from

the Pacific

The journey to Queensland was so treacherousmany islanders died before even commencingplantation labour, with little sympathy from ships’masters. If heavy weather set in, Kanakas wereconfined below the deck which encouraged thespread of diseases, often with fatal consequences.The Queensland governor had openly declared thatthe life of a white man is more sacred than thatof a black man [Saunders, 1976, p. 40], whichmeant ships’ crews were largely indifferent to theloss of these “expendable” [Saunders, 1976, p. 35]people. To compound this tragic situation, thegovernment agents who were appointed to ensurethe islanders’ welfare were often overruled by shipmasters who were mostly “men of inferior charactergenerally drunkards, and not infrequently of theworst possible moral habits” [Scarr, 1967, p. 10].Although the actual deaths of Kanakas en routeto plantations cannot be directly condemned asgovernment exploitation, the lack of concern bythe recruiters demonstrates that the Australiangovernment was not seeking to give opportunityto the islanders in recruiting them but rather soughtto exploit them for their cheap labour.

B Poor working conditions

In 1880 two doctors, Wray and Thomson,conducted a study of plantation labourers andfound the kind of work performed too strenuous foryoung recruits, with a high potential for mortality[Saunders, 1976, p. 32-33]. The working hourswere extremely long (generally 6 a.m. to 6 p.m.)

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and the huts (which Melanesians often constructedthemselves from grass) were overcrowded and poorlyventilated; breeding grounds for disease [Corris, 1970,p. 43, Saunders, 1976, p. 32-33]. Also, the sortof food given to the labourers, mostly unpalatablemeat with carbohydrates such as white bread or rice,was deemed unsuitable for the natives who werecommonly vegetarians in their home communities[Saunders, 1976, p. 32-33]. This study, along withthe high recorded death rates, clearly highlightsthe ordeal of many islanders during their time inQueensland, of which most were not fully awarewhen they agreed to recruit.

C Death by disease

A high risk of infection, primarily due to poorliving and working conditions, was very prevalenton plantations. The mortality rate of Kanakas (ofwhom a majority were young males) was five tosix times higher than the rate amongst the wholeEuropean population.9 If islanders survived theirfirst year they did have a much greater chanceof surviving subsequent years [Scarr, 1967, p. 8],however even those who had grown resistant to manydiseases were still at risk of contracting tuberculosis,and almost all fell victim to it eventually [Scarr,1967, p. 9].

Insufficient medical care for islanders greatlyescalated the problem of disease. As alreadymentioned, the white community was generallyunconcerned about islander deaths. In 1876 thePacific Islanders Inspector at Maryborough allegedthat some planters did not attempt to diminishthe mortality rate as Melanesian deaths meantthey were able to keep the deceased’s earnings andsave the cost of transporting them back home.10

However, even when sympathetic plantation ownersdid request hospital treatment for their workers itwas often refused [Saunders, 1976, p. 36]. Thefew hospitals which treated labourers had strictsegregation policies, where Melanesians were treatedoutside in ‘rotten tents’, even in seasons of severerain, and were forced to lie on the often floodedground in saturated clothes and blankets [Saunders,1976, p. 37]. Islanders were all grouped together,irrespective of whether they had a broken legor contagious infection, encouraging the rampantspread of disease [Saunders, 1976, p. 37]. Eventuallyit was conceded that separate hospitals should bebuilt for the islanders, however these were mostly“ill-conceived, hastily erected, and maintained withan eye to minimum expenditure rather than to thepatients welfare” [Saunders, 1976, p. 50]. The PacificIslanders’ Hospital in Mackay sustained a death rateof about 35% in 1884 [Saunders, 1976, p. 45]; for thisreason, there was a common fear among Melanesians

of being sent to hospitals, many of them contending“I might as well die here [on the plantation].”11 Theindifference throughout Queensland towards islanderhealthcare clearly demonstrates that Kanakas wereviewed as expendable units, and thus were exploitedfor their labour.

D Abuse by employers

In addition to health problems, Kanakas weresometimes subjected to violence and injustice bytheir employers. William Robert Goodall, thepolice magistrate at Mackay, confirmed there wasmuch intimidation and violence suffered by theMelanesians at the hands of white men.12 Thisexisted in forms such as beatings, withdrawal of food,deprival of leisure time and separation of couples[Mercer, 1981, p. 37]. Some Kanakas recall beingslapped, rudely roused in the morning, shouted at orhaving their ears tweaked if work was not perceivedto be satisfactory [Corris, 1970, p. 51]; howeveras only the most experienced Kanakas understoodpidgin, the language of trade, it was often difficultfor others to scope what was expected of themand they were punished accordingly [Mercer, 1981,p. 44]. Pacific Islander Inspectors were generallyquite sympathetic and understanding to islanders’complaints,13 however these inspectors’ concerns forthe islanders were not always acknowledged by theQueensland government.

E Legal injustice

The injustice encountered by many islandersby the wider colonial legal system is also worthnoting. Although many “old hands” were awareof their rights and proactive in enforcing themthrough the courts, the islanders’ low statusmeant they had limited success [Mercer, 1981,p. 48]. Europeans commonly believed that islanders“bore the curse of Canaan,” [Corris, 1970, p. 58]with this widely-felt suspicion reflected in themore-than-adequate punishment for the rare cases ofKanaka criminality [Corris, 1970, p. 58]. Even moreunjust was that the islanders generally had a verylimited understanding of criminal procedures andthus did not receive fair trials, which is especiallyalarming where the death penalty was applied. Onesuch case was that of Gosaro (a Malaitan foundguilty in 1905 of murdering a European), who wasbelieved by a clergyman who visited him just beforehis death to have had no understanding of his trialor the significance of his confession [Corris, 1970,p. 58-59]. Another unfair aspect was that althoughkilling of a European was undoubtedly murder, thehomicide of an islander often equated to only amanslaughter charge [Corris, 1970, p. 58]. However,

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it was only very erratically that inquests into thedeaths of islanders even took place [Saunders, 1976,p. 36]. Notwithstanding the considerable variationin treatment of islanders before the law (whichwas dependent upon factors such as the characterand energy of the local inspector, the attitudesof the magistrates in the courts and the islanders’awareness of their legal rights [Mercer, 1981, p. 37]),it is clear that islanders experienced much injusticeat the hands of the so called “justice system.”

F Failure to account for ethnic oppositions

The Queensland government often failed toadequately account for the ethnic antagonismbetween islander groups, and thus left the islandersopen to danger or ill-treatment at the hands ofhostile communities. While New Hebrideans andSolomon Islanders were kept apart where possiblewith accommodation, the work parties themselveswere decided according to the physical conditionand experience of workers, [Corris, 1970, p. 51]and fights between men, which sometimes resultedin serious injury or death, were not uncommon[Corris, 1970, p. 57]. There was even an incidentin 1883 in which people from antagonistic tribeswere locked into a ‘hospital’ room overnight withno medical attention; the result in the morning wasone fatality and several serious injuries [Saunders,1976, p. 35]. Another consequence of ethnic mixingwas that majority island groups on plantationsattempted to assert their superiority over othersby monopolising better jobs or rations [Corris, 1970,p. 57]. Queensland’s inability to account for racialdivides again emphasizes that the government wasnot concerned with the islanders’ wellbeing, butpurely with what labour they were able to provide.

The lack of appreciation for islanders’ culturealso caused problems in the return of time-expiredKanakas to their home communities. Coastlineswere closely divided into territories of mutuallyhostile communities, so if a man from one communityaccidently landed in enemy territory he was likelyto be robbed of his earnings and killed [Scarr, 1967,p. 9]. Most of the time the recruiters were attentiveto this, memorising locations of their recruits’ homesand ensuring they were returned there. But toooften ships would just land where it was mostconvenient [Scarr, 1967, p. 10]. In the worst cases,islanders were told that they would have to comeback to Queensland if it was believed too difficultto reach the islanders’ homeland [Scarr, 1967, p. 10].This demonstrates clear coercion and exploitationof islanders’ liberties.

4 The end of the labour trade

The Commonwealth government passed legislationafter Federation declaring that all Pacific Islanders

would be deported by 31 December 1906, whichformed part of the new ‘White Australia’ policy.14

Most of these islanders were forced to leave, howeverabout 2500 managed to stay behind (both legallyand illegally), often by marrying into Aboriginalcommunities [Maclellan, 2012].

Despite protests from the Queensland governmentthat the sugar industry would collapse if islanderswere not used as labour, its profits increasedsignificantly during the 1910s15 and by 1912 theindustry was operated almost solely by whiteworkers. For this reason the contribution of theKanakas is often forgotten. The extent of thisnon-recognition is clear in an official history ofQueensland published in 1909: “European brainsand European labour have brought into being aflourishing [sugar] industry, and converted [tropicalQueensland] into one of the healthiest portions ofAustralia.”16

5 Australian South Sea Islanders today

There are approximately 40000 South Sea Islandersin Australia today, a third of who reside in NorthernQueensland [Munro, 1998, p. 931].

ASSI are primarily a marginalised and forgottenpeople [Munro, 1998, p. 931-932], living mostly onthe outskirts of towns. They suffer from manyof the same problems as Australian indigenouspeople; however receive only a fraction of thegovernment support given to Indigenous Australians[Ingram, 2013]. For many years ASSI traditionallyencountered difficulty in finding employment, withmen hunting to provide for their families and womenadopting subservient positions in white households[Munro, 1998, p. 935-936]. Until 1942, they were noteligible for old-age pensions. Children have oftenbeen segregated in schools, which has contributedto the community’s overall poor education [Munro,1998, p. 935-936]. Nevertheless, the Christian faithintroduced to these islanders by missionaries suchas Mrs. Mary Goodwin and the Queensland KanakaMission [Corris, 1970, p. 60-61] has allowed thecommunity to maintain some vigilance [Munro, 1998,p. 936].

In honour of the 150th anniversary since thefirst indentured labourers arrived in Queensland,ASSI have united this year to demand a formalapology from the Australian government. It hasbeen two decades since Prime Minister Paul Keatingrecognised ASSI as a distinct group and Kevin Ruddacknowledged their contribution to Australia earlierthis year, yet many Australians remain unaware ofthis aspect of Australia’s past or the presence ofASSI in Australia today. Ralph Regenvanu, formerActing Prime Minister of Vanuatu, has expressedhis belief that formal recognition of the past bythe Australian government would help ASSI to

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feel “more Australian” and move forward [Ingram,2013]. It is yet to be seen whether the Australiangovernment will go forward with this apology andwhat impact this would have on improving the livesof ASSI.

6 Conclusion

Discussion of the conditions endured by islandersduring indenture in Queensland clearly demonstratesthat although not all islanders were “Blackbirded,”they encountered varying forms of brutality andinjustice during their indenture. While it can beargued that “an islander’s ‘Queensland experience’was determined by the time at which he wentthere, his age and personality, the kind of work andemployer to which he was assigned, the district inwhich he worked and. . . the length of his stay in thecolony,”[Corris, 1970, p. 45] it must nonetheless becontended that the labour trade in Queensland wasexploitative of islanders’ common rights and liberties.Although the initial offer of global engagement andWestern goods such as firearms in exchange forplantation work was very attractive for islanders,the appalling conditions experienced by Kanakasduring their indenture and the continued sufferingof ASSI today suggests that this offer really was toogood to be true.

Notes1Emelda Davis, National Body for Australian South Sea

islanders, quoted in [Ingram, 2013].2Registrar-General’s reports, Votes and Proceedings of the

Legislative Assembly, 1870-1907 (Brisbane: Public Libraryof Queensland), cited in [Scarr, 1967, p. 5]; [Munro, 1998,p. 931].

3 Anon., Our First Half-Century (1909), 137 cited in[Megarrity, 2006, p. 12].

4Sir Thomas McIllwraith was the Premier of Queenslandfrom 1879-1883.

5Sir Thomas McIlwraith quoted in The Australian SugarPlanter: A Monthly Journal (June 1883), cited in [Megarrity,2006, p. 3].

6McIlwraith’s successor, Premier of Queensland 1883-1888.

7[Megarrity, 2006, p. 8]; Pacific Island Labourers Act of1880 Amendment Act of 1885, 49 Vic. No. 17, s. 11, cited in[Megarrity, 2006, p. 5].

8Palmer Bevan, Winifred, 21-24 October 1886, cited in[Scarr, 1967, p. 7].

9O.W. Parnaby, Britain and the Labour Trade in theSouthwest Pacific (North Carolina: Durham, 1964), 146,cited in [Scarr, 1967, p. 8].

10R.B. Sheridan, Inspector of Pacific Islanders atMaryborough, to Immigration Agent, 28 January 1876, citedin [Saunders, 1976, p. 30].

11D. Clark, Maryborough, Pacific Islander HospitalCommittee to Colonial Secretary, 11 January 1886, citedin [Saunders, 1976, p. 47]

12Goodall to Immigration Agent, 31 January 1876, citedin [Saunders, 1976, p. 33].

13Archibald Forbes, “The Kanaka in Queensland,” NewReview, XXXVII (1892), 643, cited in [Corris, 1970, p. 52].

14[Saunders, 1976, p. 39]; Pacific Island Labourers Bill 1901(Cwth), cited in [Megarrity, 2006, p. 10].

15D. Wright, “The Expulsion of the Kanakas fromQueensland”, Queensland Heritage, 1:10 (1969): 14, cited in[Megarrity, 2006, p. 12].

16[Megarrity, 2006, p. 12]; Anonymous, Our FirstHalf-Century (1909), 137 cited in [Megarrity, 2006, p. 12].

References

Matthew Allen. “Greed and Grievance: the role of economicagendas in the conflict in Solomon Islands”. PacificEconomic Bulletin, 20(2):56–71, 2005.

Anonymous. “Islanders used as ‘cheap labourers’ ”. TheDaily Mercury, 30 July 2011.

Peter Corris. “Pacific Island Labour Migrants in Queensland”.The Journal of Pacific History, 5(1):43–64, 1970.

Charmaine Ingram. “South Sea Islanders call for anapology”. Australian Broadcasting Authority, 9 February2013. URL http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2013/s3839465.htm. [Accessed 22 September 2013].

Nic Maclellan. “South Sea Islanders unite in Australia”.Inside Story, 27 August 2012. URL http://inside.org.au/south-sea-islanders-unite-in-australia/. [Accessed 22Septmber 2013].

Lyndon Megarrity. ““White Queensland”: The QueenslandGovernment’s Ideological Position on the Use of PacificIsland Labourers in the Sugar Sector 1880-1901”.Australian Journal of Politics & History, 52(1):1–12, 2006.

Patricia Mary Mercer. “The survival of a Pacific Islanderpopulation in North Queensland, 1900-1940”. PhD thesis,Australian National University, 1981.

Doug Munro. “Indenture, deportation, survival: Recentbooks on Australian South Sea Islanders” (review essay).Journal of Social History, 31:931–948, 1998.

Kay Saunders. “The pacific islander hospitals in colonialQueensland: The Failure of Liberal Principals”. TheJournal of Pacific History, 11(1):28–50, 1976.

Deryck Scarr. “Recruits and Recruiters: A Portrait of thePacific Islands Labour Trade”. The Journal of PacificHistory, 2(1):5–24, 1967.

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Ana Stevenson | Making Gender Divisive

Making Gender Divisive:

‘Post-Feminism’, Sexism and Media Representations of Julia Gillard

Ana Stevenson

The sexism inherent in media representations of Australia’s first female Prime Minister, Julia Gillard,has been well acknowledged. These discourses implied that women’s bodies were out of place in leadershiproles, making Gillard’s attempts to address gender-related issues appear politically manipulative. Asthe media played a role in making gender divisive, it is important to consider the role of the media andthe significance of media products - including newspaper, online sources, television programs and socialmedia - in the perpetuation of sexist political representations. However, new understandings of thisphenomenon can be drawn from thinking about the media paradigm, and its ‘post-feminist’ vision ofsociety, into which such representations were circulated. Within this ‘post-feminist’ paradigm, the mediaquestioned Gillard’s apparent failure to fundamentally change Australian politics at the same time asperpetuating a focus on gender, rather than policy, as the characterising element of her leadership.

In June 2010, Australia welcomed its first femalePrime Minister, Julia Gillard, with a flurry ofexcitement. The Age’s Michael Gordon laudedGillard as a “consummate parliamentary performer”who could “master a brief, communicate a message,demonstrate wit and go for the kill” [Gordon,2010]. However, by February 2011, a perceivedbroken promise surrounding the introduction ofcarbon pricing crystallised the media backlash thathad already begun, leading to increasingly hostilerepresentations of the Prime Minister. The Stalkingof Julia Gillard (2013), by federal parliamentarypress gallery journalist of 25 years Kerry-AnneWalsh, claims:

Gillard was continually cast as a liar andpolicy charlatan, and lampooned for herhair, clothes, accent, arse, even the wayshe walks and talks. If ever the deck wasstacked against someone, it was Gillard.[Walsh, 2013, xiii]

The discourses surrounding Gillard gained furthersignificance due to their preoccupation with gender,as they demonstrated the mainstream media’swidespread complicity in the creation of sexistpolitical representations. The media constantlyperpetuated myths that drew attention to the newly“gendered” prime ministerial body, suggesting thatwomen’s bodies continued to be out of place inleadership positions. Gender slurs, which wererepeated ad infinitum, became magnified as Gillardherself was repeatedly accused of using her gender forpolitical gain through the phrase “playing the gendercard.” As a result, gender itself became divisiveand political references to gender inequality wereseen as polemical. This discussion, however, wasgenerated within a media paradigm that assumeda “post-feminist” vision of Australian society, withpolitical implications not just for Gillard, but for

women in future leadership positions, political orotherwise. It is therefore necessary to investigatehow gender became divisive, and determine the roleof the media and the significance of media products- from newspaper and online sources to televisionprograms and social media - in the perpetuation ofsexist political representations.

The media perpetuation of genderedrepresentations of former Prime Minister JuliaGillard contributed to a divisiveness that shapedpublic political discourse. In the public sphere,politics is communicated via the mainstreamnational media and the imagined communitiesit creates. According to Benedict Anderson, thenation is imagined “as a community” because it is“always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”[Anderson, 2006, p. 7 and 167]. Within thiscommunity, the construction of national identity isinstilled “through the mass media, the educationalsystem, administrative regulations,” and so forth.The mainstream media inevitably conveys ideasabout the relationship between politics and gender,yet this is often understood in terms of a popular(as in, non-academic) “post-feminist” paradigm[Barrett, 2000, p. 46]. Cultural theorist and scholarAngela McRobbie suggests that ‘Post-Feminism’refers to “an active process by which feministgains of the 1970s and 80s come to be undermined. . . while simultaneously appearing to be engagingin a well-informed and even well-intended responseto feminism” [McRobbie, 2004, p. 255]. Themainstream media perpetuates the myth thatwomen can affect positive change within politics,according to communications scholar Mary DouglasVavrus, alongside this post-feminist vision that“encourages women’s private, consumer lifestylesrather than cultivating a desire for public lifeand political activism” [Vavrus, 2002, p. 2]. TheAustralian mainstream has media operated within

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a similarly imagined post-feminist paradigm, wherethe focus upon Gillard’s gender existed alongsidethe assumption that sexism and misogyny remaincharacteristics of the “unenlightened” past. Theconcurrent failure of women to be well-representedwithin politics, and their inability to fundamentallychange the political landscape, is thus framed notas the result of an ongoing patriarchal system ofpolitics, but rather as the failure of individualwomen. In this post-feminist media marketplace,discussions pertaining to gender or self-identificationwith feminism consequently incur media hostilityand, effectively, political punishment.

While post-feminist media assumes women’s“equality,” it concurrently presented Gillard as anaberrant political body because of her femaleness.According to Emeritus Professor of Political ScienceMarian Sawer, Gillard was “subjected to sexistmisrepresentation” in the Australian mainstreammedia and beyond [Sawer, 2013, p. 111]. Forexample, in 2010, The Australian suggested thatto improve Gillard’s appearance, her hairdressershould be sacked and she should get “smartclothes that fit her properly” when meetingPresident Barak Obama in 2011; while the HeraldSun reported that “Gillard blushes, like a highschool girl”; and Howard Sattler of 6PR radiorepeatedly questioned Gillard about the sexualityof her partner in 2013 [Savva, 2010, Carlyonand Vaughan, 2011, Robinson and Blake, 2013].These instances reveal not only how sexism andinstitutionalised misogyny work within the politicaland social landscape, but also demonstrate howlong-standing issues surrounding the “relationshipbetween feminism, female politicians, and thenews” remain problematic [Vavrus, 2002, p. 11].From 2010 onwards, the media sought to frameGillard’s disproportionately emphasised “failings”as beyond the realm of sexism, but rather aspersonal flaws - of character, personal bearing andauthority - unfit for a prime minister. Whilethe ongoing nature of the gender-related abuseexperienced by Gillard meant that it could notbe overlooked entirely, public attempts to addressthe issue were invariably and increasingly labelledas “playing the gender card” [Divine, 2012, Scott,2013, Smith, 2013]. Gillard’s legitimate claim tochallenge discriminatory treatment, however, meantthat the so-called “gender card” became anothermedia catchphrase, and sexist slurs against her wereframed as isolated incidents rather than sequences ofdiscriminatory language. This post-feminist visionmeant that the media constantly worked to makegender divisive, thus polarising attitudes towardGillard and the Labour Party in the eyes of theAustralian public.

Media constructions of gender, particularly

surrounding understandings of “appropriate” genderroles, have a fundamental influence upon publicperceptions of leaders. Sociological researchhas long reiterated that the media has “asignificant and sometimes controversial role” insetting the public agenda and determining publicviews.1 Modern democracy remains shaped bya male-dominated, heteronormative body politic,which became especially clear in the case of Gillard.The ideological marks of past exclusionary practicesremain, as “othered” bodies - for example, women,non-white and LGBTIQ people - remain rhetorically,and sometimes substantively, beyond full politicalinclusion and discourses of power.2 In 2009, TheAustralian’s Ross Fitzgerald used gendered languageto emphasise that, as Deputy Prime Minister,“Julia Gillard is the darling of the Canberrapress gallery.”3 However, when Gillard steppedbeyond this subordinate position of leadership,the discomfort toward women in positions ofultimate political leadership blatantly emerged. Thelinguistic questions that continue to surround themale partners of female leaders further demonstratethe patriarchal and heteronormative assumptions ofpolitics. In 2010, Gillard’s partner Tim Mathiesonbecame the “First Bloke,” guiding journalists toaccentuate his qualities as “a man’s man” in orderto demarcate this new-age style of masculinity. In anattempt to disrupt gender stereotypes, Kerry-AnneWalsh and Matthew Benns stated: “He’s wary ofthe tag ‘manbag’, can do a blow-wave at 4.30amwith one eye shut and is happy to cook and carefor his partner” [Walsh and Benns, 2010]. Yet byindicating that hairdressing and cooking continueto be unconventional male pursuits, this descriptionultimately continued to delineate acceptable formsof masculine and feminine behaviour. As a result,a variety of media perspectives still worked towardthe gendering of Gillard.

In spite of the record numbers of women inpolitical leadership during Gillard’s term - includingQuentin Bryce as Governor-General, Anna Blighand Kristina Keneally as Premiers of Queenslandand New South Wales respectively - her position asthe dominant Australian leader was still problematic.This growing female political presence is notyet “normalised,” Sawer suggests, because ofthe degree to which it remained “a matter ofdebate and controversy” [Sawer, 2013, p. 105 and109]. Prominent gender and leadership scholarAmanda Sinclair maintains that performances ofleadership remain entwined with the concept of“heroic masculinity”; as this is achieved through“tough, out-front decisiveness or ‘greatness,’ ” anadjective predominantly associated with men, itrenders women’s leadership beyond the norm.4

The discipline of history has often relied upon the

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rhetoric of male political leaders, while the scholarlyand media focus on “great men” has “obscuredthe voices of women and other minority groups”[Vonnegut, 1992, p. 31-32]. In an attempt to includeGillard within this existing linguistic paradigm,both positively and negatively, some journalistsendeavoured to perpetuate the possibility of womenbecoming political “heroines,” thus continuing todelineate assumptions of political power uponsupposedly post-feminist but clearly gendered lines[Shanahan, 2007, Kovac, 2012, lizodool, 2012]. Thismakes it important to further investigate the roleof the media in both revealing and shaping the“gendered nature” of politics [Sawer, 2013, p. 105].

The media complicity in the perpetuation ofgender assumptions meant that Gillard was unableto escape the derision of what Anne Summers,AO, has described as “the usual misogynist mediacrowd” [Summers, 2013a]. Such an accusation ofmisogyny exists jarringly alongside the post-feministmedia paradigm, but the two continue to informeach other. As a feminist editor, publisher, andformer head of Australia’s Office of the Statusof Women, Summers believes that “the misogynyfactor” in the mainstream media and beyond worksto “[deny] women inclusion, equality and respect”[Summers, 2013b, p. 10]. In the 2012 article,“Her Rights at Work: The political persecution ofAustralia’s first female prime minister,” Summersdemonstrated the depth of sexism and misogyny -via emails, private cartoons by Larry Pickering andother public but not publicised material - within thepolitical milieu.5 Despite the political vitriol thathas increasingly characterised “normal” politicaldebate, Summers outlined how Gillard experienceda specialised variety of maliciousness:

[W]hat is NOT normal is the way in whichthe Prime Minister is attacked, vilifiedor demeaned in ways that are specificallyrelated to her sex (or, if you like, hergender). There are countless examples [ofthis.] [Summers, 2012, p. 20]

However, these gender-based discourses were notrelegated to the sphere of politicians, but becameequally evident to the public via the mainstreammedia. From the “Ditch the Witch” and “JuLIAR. . . Bob Browns BITCH [sic]” placards that donneda rally outside Parliament House in 2010, to AlanJones’ highly personal remarks that Gillard’s father“died of shame” and indecent Liberal Party fundraisermenus, the gendered and highly sexualised natureof media and public commentary became vastlyapparent [Thompson, 2011, Aston, 2012, Jabour,2013]. Yet these discourses need to be contextualisedwithin the post-feminist media paradigm that

continues to attach traditional gender assumptionsto female politicians.

As the Prime Minister, the primary Australianfigure of authority, Gillard’s inability to fulfilacceptable political stereotypes and apparenttransgressions of “feminine” qualities caused anegative media backlash. Although media scholarsRachel Moseley and Jacinda Read indicate thepost-feminist potential to overcome out-dated andredundant distinctions between “feminist” and“feminine,” these parameters remain problematicin the political realm [Moseley and Read, 2002],as well as media representations thereof. Politicalscience scholar Kathleen Dolan suggests that votersinteract with political stereotypes to ascertainwhether certain characteristics render individuals“capable of governing or not,” but perceptions of“political gender stereotypes” continue to relate toexisting assumptions about women [Dolan, 2010,p. 70]. In addition, politicians often engagein gendered self-representation in regards to thepersona they present to the public [Herrnsonet al., 2003]. When women in leadership positionsemulate male behaviours, even if successfully,Sinclair suggests that the public still does notnecessarily view or judge women as leaders.6

Anticipated “feminine” behaviours include virtuessuch as passivity and truthfulness, while politicalattempts to emulate “masculine” behaviours arehabitually constructed by the media in termsof gender transgression. Therefore, the mediabecomes complicit in the process of creatingand perpetuating public outcry regarding in thepurported transgressions of gendered behaviour.

The public perception of Gillard’s activecollaboration in a political coup of the LabourParty meant that she was seen to have transgressedthe supposed womanly virtues of passivity andpoliteness, an infringement - or “failure” - to whichthe media drew incessant attention. Rhetoricscholar Karlyn Kohrs Campbell identifies passivity,alongside submissiveness and patience, as atraditional virtue of womanhood [Campbell, 1989,p. 13]. The post-feminist media paradigm perhapsdoes not expect complete passivity from women inpublic positions, but the ultimate subordination ofpowerful women to even more powerful men remainsan implicit political expectation. Regardless ofthe actual situation that precipitated the LabourParty’s desire for a new leader, Gillard’s firstpurported transgression was political activeness anda concurrent lack of desire to apologise, according toPaul Howes of The Australian, for the apparenttravesty of “dumping a sitting prime minister”[Howes, 2010]. In August 2010, The Courier-Mail’sNeale Maynard and Emma Chalmers emphasisedthe media and public interchange inherent in this

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situation. The article, “Readers vent anger atJulia Gillard’s partial apology for knifing KevinRudd,” drew attention to disillusioned readercomments, posted as public responses on thecouriermail.com.au, thus legitimising accusationsthat the Prime Minister was “a back-stabbing fake”[Maynard and Chalmers, 2010]. In hindsight, Walshemphasises that no matter what Gillard said tocounteract these claims, she would be disbelieved[Walsh, 2013, p. 6]. The public’s perspective onGillard’s statements post-controversy therefore ledto even more perceived transgressions regardingGillard’s version of the “truth.”

Popular understandings of politics give littleweight to the veracity of political statements, asthe public has little expectation that politicians willactually tell the truth. This was demonstrated bypolitical theorist Hannah Arendt, in a 1967 article,entitled ”Truth and Politics,” published in TheNew Yorker.7 However, because truth telling hasbeen weighted as a virtue more necessary in women,these popular assumptions coexist awkwardly whenit comes to women and politics. As have manyjournalists since 2010, The Daily Telegraph’s PiersAckerman questioned Gillard’s honesty in relationto the carbon tax, in an article entitled “PM’s minorattitude to the truth” [Ackerman, 2010]. In 2011,Deputy Opposition Leader Julie Bishop likewiselabelled the carbon tax “Gillard’s InconvenientTruth” [Bishop, 2011]. The idea that suchpolitical decisions do not have gendered implicationsnever held media sway, as Gillard’s actionswere constantly presented as transgressions ofacceptable feminine behaviour within a pre-existingpost-feminist paradigm. Moreover, legal scholarJulia Simon-Kerr has suggested that “basic questionsabout truthfulness have differed on gender lines” in amanner that is often connected with perceptions ofwomen’s chastity and sexual virtue [Simon-Kerr,2008, p. 1854]. In light of the media attentiongranted Gillard’s de facto relationship status, thisadds a new dimension to public interpretations ofher propensity for “truth-telling.” Such conclusionsmake it difficult to overlook Van Badham’s assertion,in The Telegraph, that Gillard’s primary problemwas that “from beginning to end, she remainedfemale” [Badham, 2013]. Yet the media complicityin foregrounding and perpetuating this genderedimage of Gillard remained the overarching problem.

The media’s constant use of the appellation“Julia,” rather than the more formal and respectful“Gillard,” was another linguistic choice thatsystematically emphasised womanhood rather thanpolitician. According to French linguistics scholarClaire Michard, the “use of a first name, asopposed to that of the patronymic, has the effectof immersing women in the class of females,” and

thus demonstrating contempt for (and the partialerasure of) female identity.8 For Gillard, expressionsof media contempt drew attention to her femaleness- and therefore aberrant political body and voice - inorder to juxtapose her presence in the traditionallymale office of prime minister. This was oftenachieved through linguistic puns surrounding thefeminine prenom “Julia,” which repeatedly workedto undermine her political authority. Moreover,articles such as The Australian’s “Why Julia isa heroine to creaky feminist gorgons,” by AngelaShanahan, emphasised informality as a tool ofridicule [Shanahan, 2007]. This was most startlinglyportrayed in the ABC television miniseries, At Homewith Julia (2011).9

A variety of gendered assumptions structure AtHome with Julia, from the emphasis on the titlecharacter’s lack of commitment to her personallife, to the show’s conclusion, and its reaffirmationthat women should place more importance on theirrelationship than their job. The lyrics of thetheme song, a love-letter sung by Julia (AmandaBishop) to Tim (Phil Lloyd), demonstrate thediscrepancy between her role as Prime Minister andthe significance of her personal life:

When I am down here on the floorYou give me something moreAnd I could sail around the world.When you’re here with meThere’s nothing I can’t be -You keep my sky from falling.You make it all come true;Oh oh, you come and see right through;You make it all worthwhile;You make it all worthwhile.10

This song suggests the possibility of a thoughtfulmeditation on the role of political “husbands,” inresponse to the significant cultural and scholarlyinterest that exists regarding the role of public wivesand first ladies.11 Yet instead, the show outlinesthe supposed post-feminist gender transgressions ofthe fictitious Julia as a romantic partner, and theresultant emasculation of the fictitious Tim.

At Home with Julia begins with Julia missing“date night” (again!), leaving Tim - or “Mr. Julia,”as the gardener (Michael Denkha) calls him -disappointed, lonely and even more bored in hisrole of stay-at-home “husband.” The gardener’sown name, Jesus, is used to comment upon thereal Gillard’s supposed “bogan” qualities, as Juliamispronounces Jesus (“jee-zus”) where Tim saysHasoos (“hay-zoos”).12 Tim quickly becomes thetarget of a group of neighbourhood boys, whoincessantly bully him with gendered taunts such as“first lady,” “Mrs. Prime Minister” and “handbag.”The realisation of his “emasculation” gives rise to an

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ongoing identity crisis, epitomised when a Canberranewsagent suggests that it would be easier registerTim’s address under the name “Gillard,” ratherthan “Mathieson.” Within their de facto relationship,Tim is disenchanted by the way he ultimately fulfilsthe “feminine” role, where femininity is constructedalong the traditional gendered lines of the publicwife [Scharrer and Bissell, 2000, p. 57-59]. WhenBob Katter (Drew Forsythe), Rob Oakeshot (JimRussell) and Tony Windsor (Peter Carmody) endup at The Lodge for dinner and negotiations, Juliaannounces that Tim is “PM of the kitchen,” furtherdelineating their relationship along reversed genderlines.13 Julia’s priorities are also questioned whenshe is late for Tim’s public hairdressing media event;the security team fear that she has been kidnapped,but Tim instead concludes: “she’s just late - shealways is for my stuff.”14 Although her latenessresulted from getting locked in the bathroom, Timis only too ready to view Julia’s her absence asyet another example of how she undervalues theirrelationship and privileges her job.

As the pair remains unmarried, the narrativefocuses upon the disillusionment Tim experiencesbecause he is only a “husband.” When thesupermarket meat salesman (Glenn Hazeldine) asksif Tim is shopping for a special occasion - a “weddinganniversary?” - Tim can only despondently answer“no. . . ,” establishing his ongoing narrative desire topropose to Julia. The overarching implication is thatif the pair were to become a committed, marriedcouple, their gender role ”confusion” would subsideand the gender hierarchy could be restored. Tim’sdissatisfaction would thus abate with the renewal ofhis “masculinity,” while Julia’s “femininity” couldbecome properly subordinated. This point isdemonstrated when Tony Abbott (Nicholas Cassim)asks Tim: “When are you finally going to make anhonest woman out of her - as much as you can of aLabour pollie!”15 The tension between the couple’sview of marriage is demonstrated when wires getcrossed regarding what could constitute a “change”in their relationship: Tim believes Julia would liketo get married, while Julia believes Tim would like tobe relieved of his jobless boredom, instating him asthe federal Headlice Taskforce Manager. As a result,the ambivalence Julia shows toward the institutionof marriage is framed as yet another undervaluationof their relationship.

The couple break up on account of thismisunderstanding, leading to the most problematicelement of the narrative. Julia loses her voiceas a result of this trauma and loss, leading toa political catastrophe and the need for a voiceimpersonator (Gabby Millgate) to fill her place fora radio interview with Alan Jones (Geoff Moxham).However, the way Julia’s loss of voice frames the

series’ narrative conclusion relates to broader issuesregarding women’s public speech. The “suppressionof women’s voices,” according to literary scholarGrace Farrell, is “a central form of patriarchalcontrol” [Farrell, 1996, p. 404]. The awkward soundsmade by Julia during this interlude create a negativecommentary regarding the deviant and discordantnature of women’s political voices. Moreover,the rediscovery of women’s public speech andrhetorical history is crucial, according to Campbell,because “for much of their history women havebeen prohibited from speaking” [Campbell, 1989,p. 1]. The narrative conclusion in which Julia isrendered near incapable of appearing on the ABC’sQ&A, with Kevin Rudd (Paul McCarthy) only toohappy to replace her, is highly contentious withinthe historical paradigm of women’s silenced politicalvoices.16 Therefore, the fact that Julia loses hervoice as a result of a relationship breakdown, andonly regains it when that relationship is restored,is problematic from both a political and personalperspective. At Home with Julia thus concludesby providing retribution toward women who areunable to fulfil their personal and work-relatedduties, without somehow neglecting both.

Interestingly, the media reception to this serieswas overwhelmingly negative and aghast. Whileother political satire of course exists - Clarke andDawe provide a prominent example - At Home withJulia defies previous boundaries with its emphasis onthe personal, rather than the political. Although theprogramme was “certainly disrespectful of the officeof PM,” John Warhurst of Eureka Street concluded,its lack of precedent meant that he could not see itas particularly different from the disrespect enduredby other prominent politicians [Warhurst, 2011,p. 23]. However, such a conclusion overlooked theovert sexualisation of Gillard throughout the series.The scene in which the fictitious Julia and Timare swathed in the Australian flag after intimaterelations in the Prime Minister’s office presented adefinitive departure from previous representations ofAustralian prime ministers. Should the hypotheticalshow At Home with John and Jeanette have depictedsimilar content, Walsh conjectures, it would havebeen considered “so heretical and disrespectful thatthe storm troopers in the Liberal Party would haveshut the ABC down overnight” [Walsh, 2013, p. 76].In spite of the criticism levelled, there was a generalconsensus that the show was “powerfully unfunny”without an interrogation of its gender-relateddiscourses [Carlton, 2011]. Furthermore, Walshhas identified the prevailing problem: the mediaoutrage surrounding At Home with Julia consistentlymanaged to outshine reporting on the actual PrimeMinister’s achievements during this period [Walsh,2013, p. 75-76]. This was a structural issue not

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limited to reporting of this television programme.

Repeatedly, media reports surrounding Gillardfrequently discussed trivial issues more prominentlythan political issues. This extended to a varietyof personal factors, demonstrating the media’scomplicity in the construction and maintenanceof gendered political assumptions. Gillard’schildlessness was constantly levelled against herand, as discussed by Sinclair, provided “evidence[that] ‘she doesn’t have much love in her’ ” [Sinclair,2012, p. 10]. When Gillard was the Deputy LabourLeader, prominent Liberal Senator Bill Heffernanmaintained that she was unsuitable to lead thenation because she remained “deliberately barren,”with no understanding of “the relationship betweenmum, dad and a bucket of nappies” [News.com,2007, Sawer, 2013, p. 111]. Although Heffernanretracted this statement, the original assertionwas reiterated in prominent news stories [Harrison,2007a, Harrison, 2007b]. Similarly, when MarkLatham drew attention to her purported lack ofempathy, due to childlessness, the media emphasisedhow Gillard’s own political milieu reiterated similarclaims [Kelly, 2011]. The existing focus on Gillard’sbody heightened when she became Prime Minister,as she was portrayed in a way that rendered her“less leader-like,” according to Sinclair, through a“public commentary of her hips, hair roots andwrinkles” [Sinclair, 2012, p. 10]. Haircuts fromover the years became newsworthy to the pointof ridicule, so much so that At Home with Juliapresented neatness of hair as a barometer of thefictitious Julia-Tim relationship.17 Throughout herprime ministership, Gillard’s “image” - make-upversus naturalistic appearance, glasses versus noglasses - also became a focus of media commentary.Upon Gillard’s announcement of the 2013 electiondate, The Advertiser claimed: “It was a spectaclethat threatened to overshadow the announcementof the federal election date: The Prime Minister isnow wearing glasses” [Advertiser, 2013]. Others,at least, attempted to point out the degree ofabsurdity, as did Karen Brooks’ article, “Focusingon Julia Gillard’s glasses shortsighted [sic],” in TheCourier-Mail [Brooks, 2013]. However, while the firstarticle purposefully attempted to draw attentionaway from and undermine Gillard’s announcement,the second article - in its attempt to negate thatposition - only brought more attention to thisongoing structural problem.

The constant heckling endured by Gillard, fromthe media and other politicians alike, resulted in hernow famous “misogyny speech” and the resultantpolarisation of the national versus the internationalmedia. In direct response to explicit text messagessent by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,Peter Slipper, but in a more general response to

the sexist attacks she continually faced, the PrimeMinister addressed Opposition Leader Tony Abbottin parliament:

I will not be lectured about sexism andmisogyny by this man, I will not. Andthe government will not be lectured aboutsexism and misogyny by this man. Notnow, not ever. The Leader of theOpposition says that people who holdsexist views and who are misogynists arenot appropriate for high office. Well, I hopethe Leader of the Opposition . . . wants toknow what misogyny looks like in modernAustralia, he doesn’t need a motion inthe House of Representatives, he needs amirror. [Gillard, 2012]

While Australian political commentators such asThe Australian’s Janet Albrechtsen, and membersof the Canberra press gallery more generally,showed ambivalence toward this speech, theinternational response proved the opposite [Walsh,2013, Albrechtsen, 2012]. The online clip of thespeech - in spite of its 15 minute length - wentviral, sparking an internet sensation and positivereviews worldwide regarding the substance of theAustralian Prime Minister. The New Yorker’sAmelia Lester suggested that Americans “mightbe wishing their man would take a lesson fromAustralia” [Lester, 2012]. While this internationaladulation often existed within a similar post-feministparadigm to that of Australian mainstream media,these reports sought to praise rather than demeanGillard at the same time as fostering an internationalself-congratulation on the progress of women. Anexception from the post-feminist media paradigmwas provided by the American feminist websiteJezebel, which reported: “Best Thing You’ll SeeAll Day: Australia’s Female Prime Minister RipsMisogynist a New One in Epic Speech on Sexism”[Morrissey, 2012]. The international media’ssympathetic perspective continued in 2013 (followingthe aforementioned menu and radio debacles). Forexample, Padraig Collins’ article in The Irish Times,entitled “Treatment of Julia Gillard shows the extentto which sexism is tolerated in Australia,” showeda willingness to accept the sexism inherent in thecase of Gillard in a way that national media wouldnot [Collins, 2013]. The differing perceptions ofGillard nationally and internationally demonstratedthe degree to which media representations shapedAustralians’ perceptions of their Prime Minister, inthe mainstream media and beyond.

Social media plays an expanding role in theperpetuation of mainstream media attitudes, makingit a problematic site for the further disseminationof political sexism and misogyny. In this new

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media space, social networks are built by individualinteraction through online communities, whereinindividuals create profiles that (re)present publicpersonas their networks to the greater onlinecommunity [Acquisti and Gross, 2006, p. 37].While social networks purportedly “democratise”the media, communications scholar Zizi Papacharissiargues that such technologies have the potential to“truly revolutionise the political sphere” at the sametime as reproducing the status quo [Papacharissi,2002, p. 9-10]. It has also been suggested thatfacebook and Twitter constitute a new form of“imagined community,” due to the ability of users tobe implicit in the creation process [Gruzd et al., 2011,Acquisti and Gross, 2006]. Political personas suchas Gillard, Rudd and Abbott have official facebookpages, along with a presence on other social mediasuch as Twitter, but satirical spin-off pages alsoappear. For example, a facebook page entitled “JuliaGillard - Worst PM in Australian History,” createdin July 2011, included numerous examples of sexisthate speech through Photoshopped images of nudity,references to menstruation and other crude, sexualsuggestions.18 Designated as facebook “CommunityPages,” more recent user-created and user-run satirepages such as “Jula Gilerd,” “Keven Rud” and “ToneAbet” likewise construct imagined communitiesof mutual interest and understanding.19 Herein,the dissemination of differing political views existsalongside the potential to foster hate speech andsexual vilification.

In light of the aforementioned mainstream mediarepresentations of Gillard, online satirical pages wereundoubtedly influenced by a pre-existing tolerancetoward sexism which was inevitably recreated- indeed, often surpassed - in the new mediasphere. Through an adapted version of Lolspeak, aninternet language most famously attributed to Lolcat“Kitty Pidgin” memes, the Gilerd, Rud and Abetpages engaged in cartoon political commentary.20

While the Abet page maintained a surprisinglylevel-handed comedic political commentary duringthe 2013 Gillard-Rudd leadership struggle, the Rudand Gilerd pages, upon Rudd’s re-election, becamequickly and overtly sexualised. The Rud pagedepicted a Star Wars: Episode VI - Return of theJedi (1983) spoof meme, based on the original movieposter, entitled “Return of the Rudd.”21 This memepresented Gilerd as the enslaved Princess Leia, withRud as Luke Skywalker and Abet as Darth Vader.Another photo collage meme, depicted from theperspective of Keven, was prefaced by a facebookheading: “Wach out jula im comin [sic].”22 Thephoto collage itself featured pictures of the realRudd (looking smug and smiling), placed behindthe real Gillard (looking surprised), alongside thememe’s caption: “bite the pillow im goin in dry

[sic].” The deplorable popular culture concept of“surprise sex” (as opposed to rape) was the premiseof this meme, with Gilerd as the victimised party.23

Yet the Gilerd page also presented sexually explicitcontent featuring Abet and Rud.24 A waist-upphotograph of the real Rudd and Abbott, the formerin front of the latter, was transformed into a memethrough cartoon hand-drawn additions that depicted(presumably) consensual sex between the two. Theseimages were based upon highly problematic sexistand homophobic assumptions directly related togender, sexuality and power, while demonstratingfacebook’s ongoing problem with gender-relatedhate speech [Smith, 2010, Johnston, 2013]. Allthree politicians were depicted in a sexually explicitmanner in these user-created memes from withinthe realm of online media. However, only Gilerdwas presented in terms of her ability to be sexuallypossessed, with an emphasis on a resultant lackof sexual and personal autonomy. Therefore, thephenomenon of new media demonstrates how thesexist tone of mainstream media can be taken as aplatform, and reproduced to the point of offensiveincongruity.

Following Kevin Rudd’s reinstatement asPrime Minister in June 2013, the mediacommentary surrounding Gillard saw animmediate transformation. The new approachwas characterised by a wistful discourse aboutGillard’s political achievements that existedalongside introspection regarding the gender-relatedcriticism she continually experienced [Australian,2013, Hinton, 2013]. While Clair Weaver of TheAustralian Woman’s Weekly maintained thatGillard “used gender as a means of underminingpolitical opponents,” other reports demonstratedan understanding of the difficulties surroundingmedia representations of a female leader [Weaver,2013]. Tanja Kovac of The Australian outlined how“heroic tales” confine women to the “bit parts ofvirgin mother and whore”; as Gillard was “noneof these,” the media did not know “what to dowith the flame-haired woman vying for the leadingrole in the story” [Kovac, 2013]. As media outletsbegan to admit the potential divisiveness of gender,Gillard’s farewell speech emphasised her belief that“it will be easier for the next woman and the womanafter that and the woman after that” [Gillard,2013]. As poignant as this may be, it cannot beunderestimated how much easier this process couldbecome if the media, too, was on board.

From 2010 onwards, the Australian mediaperpetuated a political commentary surroundingthe first female prime minister which, structuredas it was by gender-related comments and slurs,became the news that was Gillard. When policy diddominate discussions surrounding the carbon tax,

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media commentary continued to focus on genderedinterpretations Gillard’s supposed “lies” and theOpposition’s recurrent emphasis on her inability tobe an arbiter of the “truth.” The post-feminist medialandscape into which these myths about Gillardwere circulated further contributed to shapingher supposed “failure” - not because she was awoman, apparently, but because she transgressedessential feminine qualities such as political passivity,truthfulness, motherhood and legitimated sexuality.If and when Gillard did not live up to theseexpectations, it became acceptable to outline thePrime Minister as a female, and somehow lackingbecause of this immutable fact. In this way, theAustralian media worked to make gender divisiveand, rather than paying attention to policy, genderbecame the talking-point that characterised Gillard’sleadership.

Notes1[McCombs, 2004, viii]. See also: [McCombs and Shaw,

1972, Milburn, 1991, Rozell, 2003, Gale, 2004].2LGBTIQ: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex,

and Questioning. See [Sexual Orientation and the Law Blog,2007].

3[Fitzgerald, 2009]. Walsh also reiterates this point: “As[Kevin Rudd’s] deputy and a then-darling of the press gallery,Gillard was the only person in the frame to step up if theballoon went up”[Walsh, 2013, p. 167].

4[Sinclair, 2012]. The statistical emergence of the LabourParty’s supposed “bloke problem” under Gillard’s leadershipdemonstrates this ongoing difficulty. See [Green, 2013].

5[Summers, 2012]. See also [Sawer, 2013, p. 112].6[Sinclair, 2012, p. 3]. See [Rayner, 2013].7See [Arendt, 2005].8Claire Michard, Le Sexe en Linguistique: Semantique

ou Zoologie? (Paris: LHarmattan, 2001), 13. Translated byCatherine Orian in [Orian, 2013]

9At Home with Julia (Sydney: ABC television, 2011),television.

10Theme song, At Home with Julia.11See: [Caroli, 2003, O’Connor et al., 1996, Rosebush, 1987,

Bock, 2009].12Walsh relates a Question Time incident wherein Julie

Bishop questioned Kevin Rudd about his trip to Bouganville,Papua New Guinea as a metaphor: “ ‘Boganville’ is the formerprime minister’s searing private put-down of The Lodge’scurrent inhabitants” [Walsh, 2013, p. 22].

13Episode 1: “Date Night,” At Home with Julia.14Episode 2: “Code Ranga,” At Home with Julia.15Episode 3: “The Leaker,” At Home with Julia.16Episode 4: “Citizens’ Assembly,” At Home with Julia.17[Woman’s Day, 2010]. Episode 4: “Citizens’ Assembly,”

At Home with Julia.18[Sawer, 2013, p. 112]. A facebook page entitled “Tony

Abbott - Worst PM in Australian History” has recentlyemerged. While this page clearly fosters hate speech (althoughsomewhat tempered, in the greater scheme of things, asmoderators have made an effort to engage users in reasonablyrespectful debate), it is unlike its predecessor in that it isdevoid (so far) of sexualised or explicit themes and imagery.

19“Jula Gilerd,” facebook, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Jula-Gilerd/448164675274587?fref=ts[Accessed 29 June 2013]; “Keven Rud,” facebook,http://www.facebook.com/presedentofastralia[Accessed 29 June 2013]; “Tone Abet,” facebook,

http://www.facebook.com/TheRealToneAbet?fref=ts[Accessed 28 June 2013].

20[Fiorentini, 2013]. Interestingly, the Rud page is no longerin existence.

21“Rud,” facebook.22Ibid.23Surprise sex: “Unconsented intercourse that is

technically constructed as rape. When performed onyour girlfriend, it’s surprise sex. When performed onan even hotter chick, it’s rape.” “Surprise Sex,” UrbanDictionary, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Surprise%20Sex [Accessed 30 August 2013].

24“Gilerd,” facebook.

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Steven Scott. “Gillard must be careful playing hergender card”. The Courier-Mail, June 13, 2013. URLhttp://www.couriermail.com.au/news/opinion/gillard-must-be-careful-playing-her-gender-card/story-fnihsr9v-1226662731817. [Accessed 30 June 2013].

Sexual Orientation and the Law Blog. “Introduction- Defining ‘LGBTIQ’”, August 22, 2007. URLhttp://lawprofessors.typepad.com/lgbtlaw/2007/08/introduction---.html. [Accessed 5 September 2013].

Angela Shanahan. “Why Julia is a heroine to creaky feministgorgons”. The Australian, December 15, 2007. URLhttp://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/why-julia-is-a-heroine-to-creaky-feminist-gorgons/story-e6frg6zo-1111115116013. [Accessed 30 August 2013].

Julia Simon-Kerr. “Unchaste and Incredible: The Use ofGendered Conceptions of Honor in Impeachment”. TheYale Law Journal, 117(8):1854–1898, 2008.

Amanda Sinclair. “Not Just ‘Adding Women In’: WomenRe-making Leadership”. Seizing the Initiative: WomenLeaders in Politics, Workplaces and Communities, pages1–22, 2012. URL http://www.womenaustralia.info/leaders/sti/. [Accessed 26 June 2013].

Hortense Smith. “When It Comes To Women’sIssues, Facebook Still Hasn’t Figured Out How ToPlay Fair”. Jezebel: Celebrity, Sex, Fashion forWomen. Without Airbrushing, July 31, 2010. URLhttp://jezebel.com/5601414/when-it-comes-to-womens-issues-facebook-still-hasnt-figured-out-how-to-play-fair.[Accessed 30 August 2013].

Kyle Smith. “Aussie PM ‘playing the gender card’?”. DigitalJournal, June 25, 2013. URL http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/353096. [Accessed 30 June 2013].

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Anne Summers. “Her Rights at Work: The politicalpersecution of Australia’s first female prime minister”.Redress, 21(3):19–23, 2012. Also in The Economic andLabour Relations Review 23(4):115–126, 2012.

Anne Summers. “It’s Gillard’s right to fight back”.The Sydney Morning Herald, June 15, 2013a. URLhttp://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/its-gillards-right-to-fight-back-20130614-2o96z.html. [Accessed 27June 2013].

Anne Summers. The Misogyny Factor. Sydney: Universityof New South Wales Press, 2013b.

Jeremy Thompson. “Abbott addresses anti-carbontax rally”. ABC News Online, March 23, 2011.URL http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-03-23/abbott-addresses-anti-carbon-tax-rally/2646068. [Accessed 29August 2013].

Mary Douglas Vavrus. Postfeminist News: Political Womenin Media Culture. Albany: SUNY Press, 2002.

Kristin S. Vonnegut. “Listening for Women’s Voices:Revisioning Courses in American Public Address”.Communication Education, 41(1):26–39, 1992.URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03634529209378868.

Kerry-Anne Walsh. The Stalking of Julia Gillard: How themedia and Team Rudd brought down the Prime Minister.Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2013.

Kerry-Anne Walsh and Matthew Benns. “First bloke isa man’s man”. The Sydney Morning Herald, June 27,2010. URL http://www.smh.com.au/national/first-bloke-is-a-mans-man-20100626-zapz.html. [Accessed 28 June2013].

John Warhurst. “Rudd resurrection no miracle cure forLabor”. Eureka Street, 21(18):23–24, 2011.

Clair Weaver. “What is Julia Gillards legacy?”. TheAustralian Woman’s Weekly, June 26, 2013. URLhttp://aww.ninemsn.com.au/news/newsstories/8680749/what-is-julia-gillards-legacy. [Accessed 30 June 2013].

Woman’s Day. “Julia Gillard’s hair: how it’s changed”,June 24, 2010. URL http://womansday.ninemsn.com.au/style/stylewatch/135790/julia-gillards-hair-how-its-changed.glance. [Accessed 29 August 2013].

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Marina Talevski | So Bad That It’s Good

So Bad That It’s Good:

The Role of Negative Emotions in Happiness

Marina Talevski

This article integrates some of the current psychological literature on happiness. It begins byhighlighting how optimism and positivity have become synonymous with happiness. This sets thescene for a discussion of hedonism, and the issues associated with an exclusively hedonic conceptionof happiness. One of these issues is a decreased tolerance of negative emotions, and therein a denialof their usefulness as a source of eudaimonic growth. The argument is not that negativity ought to bepursued, but rather that we stand to benefit from experiencing a fuller range of emotions. In light ofthis argument, some future directions are briefly discussed, including an increased focus on emotionalcomplexity and acceptance, as well as more holistic and philosophically based therapeutic approachessuch as existential psychotherapy.

It is right it should be soMan was made for Joy & WoeAnd when this we rightly knowThro the World we safely go.

— William Blake, Auguries of innocence, circa 1803

Walking into the local bookstore, you are sureto find a book (or fifty) on how to increase yourhappiness. There is likely to be a whole section ofself-help books with shiny covers flaunting imagesof balancing pebbles or a magnified droplet ofwater. Within the covers, authors offer everythingfrom 5-step plans to 10 key rules for increasinghappiness. One of the most complex humanconditions is wrapped up, priced, and shelved readyfor consumption. But how about those of uswhose professional lives are too busy and simplycannot find time to read a book? Well, thatmarket is captured with an iPhone app offeringa happiness-boosting program. The interactiveand brightly coloured app prescribes a set of“scientifically supported” activities [Lyobomirsky,2008] to check off on your way to happiness. Andfinally, if the app is all too much work, merelypurchasing a mobile phone may suffice. According tothe marketing campaign of a newly released mobilephone, this “life companion. . . delivers a sense ofhappiness. . . to ensure a convenient, enriching life”[Samsung Electronics, 2013, para. 6]. The marketfor happiness is definitely bustling.

Many products designed and marketed to increasehappiness tend to have at least one thing incommon1. These products focus on what clinicalpsychologist Barbara Held [Held, 2002, p. 965] calls“the tyranny of the positive attitude”. Held (2002)is referring to the almost obsessive tendency toadvocate positive thinking as the solution to findinghappiness. For anyone who has ever attended amotivational seminar or heard the teachings of alife-coach, chances are that the advice includedcommon cliches such as “looking on the bright side”

and “seeing the glass as half full”. Some get a bitmore creative and promote phenomena such as “theperson who sends out positive thoughts activatesthe world around him positively and draws backto himself positive results” (Peale cited in [Klosterand Swire, 2009, p. 24]). There has been a growingculture of optimism in Western societies, echoingthe idea that to be happy, one must think positively.

Not only is positivity said to lead to happiness,but happiness itself is defined as positivity. Theprevailing view in product marketing campaigns andeven happiness research studies is that happinessmeans feeling good, having positive emotions, andexperiencing pleasure. The idea that happinessequals pleasure is known as hedonism and it hasroots in Ancient Greece [Kesebir and Diener, 2008]).Some Hellenistic philosophers, such as Aristippus,argued that “everything other than pleasure isunimportant” [Tatarkiewicz et al., 1976, p. 317],suggesting that hedonism is the route to the “good”life. That is, that the best way to live is to livehedonically by maximising pleasure and minimisingpain.

Hedonic views were also emphasised in the Ageof Enlightenment, particularly in Western cultures.This is reflected in Bentham’s utilitarian philosophyof the early 19th century. Utilitarianism is based onthe greatest happiness principle, where something isright or moral if it leads to the greatest happinessfor the greatest number of people. Bentham definedutility as happiness, and happiness as maximumpleasure over pain [Kesebir and Diener, 2008].Utilitarianism was strongly embraced in the field ofwelfare economics. The economic agent was definedas someone who seeks to maximise his or her utility

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by pursuing pleasures and satisfying desires. Thishedonistic paradigm is still the prominent one usedto explain the behaviour of consumers in modernwelfare economics.

There are problems associated with an exclusivelyhedonic conception of happiness. A majorissue is that it may not reflect the averageperson’s definition of happiness. For example,Delle Fave, Brdar, Freire, Vella-Brodrick andWissing (2011) asked 666 individuals from Australia,Croatia, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain andSouth Africa to define happiness in an open-endedquestion. Although positive emotions such asjoy, cheerfulness and pleasure were included, theprominent definition actually revolved aroundconcepts such as self-acceptance, serenity and innerpeace. The authors grouped these descriptions underthe category of “harmony/balance”, and explainedthat participants are not defining happiness asa static positive state. Rather, the lay personunderstands happiness as a process, and that tobe happy means to have the ability to maintainserenity in good and bad times [Delle-Fave et al.,2011]. These findings suggest that people lookbeyond hedonism when defining happiness.

Lay definitions of happiness go beyond hedonismbecause they include eudaimonic references.Eudaimonia (eu=good, daimon=true self) refersto the idea that to live a good life means tolive in accordance with one’s true self, and tofulfil one’s unique potential [Waterman, 1993]. Itemphasises the role of meaning and purpose in life,and argues that these aspects are more importantthan hedonistic pleasure. The lay definitions inthe Delle Fave et al. study highlighted eudaimonicdimensions such as meaning, engagement, fulfilmentand achievement. In fact, almost twice as manydefinitions of happiness revolved around eudaimonicconcepts as compared to hedonic concepts.

A major point of distinction between hedonismand eudaimonism is the role that each attributesto emotions. The very definition of hedonism laysout the role that emotions play in happiness. Thehigher the ratio of positive to negative emotions,the greater the level of happiness. By contrast,such simplicity is not to be found in eudaimonicwell-being. This is mainly because eudaimonismis not directly concerned with emotions. Theemotions are not the “ends” to happiness (asin hedonism). The eudaimonic end involvesmeaning, purpose and growth, and emotions arethe by-products/influential factors in the journeytowards these ends.

Unlike hedonism, eudaimonism requires bothpositive and negative emotions. According toFredrickson’s (1998) Broaden-and-Build theory[Fredrickson, 1998], positive emotions encourage

people to pursue a wider range of thoughts andactions, engage in life creatively, and build avariety of personal resources. All of these outcomesstrengthen eudaimonic happiness. Many empiricalstudies have confirmed the positive relationshipbetween eudaimonic happiness and positive emotions[Ryff, 1989, Sheldon et al., 1996, Ryff and Singer,1998, Huta and Ryan, 2010]. Interestingly, thepositive correlation may be bi-directional. Thatis, having a sense of meaning and purpose in life“feels good” and thus increases positive emotions[Ryan and Deci, 2001, Ryff and Singer, 1998].

The reason why eudaimonism also requiresnegative emotions is because in order to fulfilone’s potential, one must be challenged, exerteffort and overcome adversity [Diener et al., 2012,Vella-Brodrick et al., 2009]. These aspects ofgrowth all include negative emotions, at least inthe short-term. For example, when we reflect ona challenging time in our life, we may not exactlyfind ourselves dreamily grinning at the memory ofthe blood, sweat and tears that we shed, but wemay ultimately conclude that it was one of the mostrewarding experiences of our life. The challenge istherefore the source of the eudaimonic growth andhappiness, even though at the time it may bringus stress, anxiety and doubt instead of pleasure.Ultimately, positive health requires engagement inliving which in turn partly requires pain and struggle[Ryff and Singer, 1998].

There is emerging empirical evidence supportingthe connection between eudaimonic well-being andnegative emotions. A recent study by Vella-Brodricket al. (2009) found that higher levels of theeudaimonic concept of “meaning in life” wereassociated with higher levels of positive and negativeaffect in an Australian sample of 332 adults.The authors noted that the process of findingmeaning can invoke mixed feelings and includelife challenges, explaining the increase in negativeaffect [Vella-Brodrick et al., 2009]. There is onevery important implication from these findings.If negative emotions are required for eudaimonicgrowth/happiness, then the cultural trend towardsminimisation of negative emotions may actually beundermining rather than promoting happiness.

By framing happiness in an exclusively hedonicviewpoint, we are denying the usefulness of negativeemotions. Negative emotions are important forwell-being, and their position as a source ofeudaimonic growth is just one reason why. Negativeemotions can also act as a mechanism for effortallocation. To understand why, let us refer to theForaging Theory [Charnov, 1976] from behaviouralecology. Foraging Theory is based on the principlethat organisms will stay in the same “feeding patch”until the rate of return per unit decreases to the

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average rate of return over all patches. Whenthis principle is applied to humans, the “feedingpatch” resembles a goal being pursued. Humanswill continue pursuing a goal until the “rate ofreturn decreases to the average rate of return overall current goals”. Needless to say, we do not usedifferential calculus to inform our decision-making.Instead, negative emotions signal when it is no longerproductive to persist at a goal [Nesse, 2004].

For example, when a goal seems to be unavoidablyslipping away, an individual’s motivation decreasesand negative emotions are more likely to settlein [Carver and Scheier, 1990]. This acts as asignal to disengage from the unreachable goal anddivert efforts elsewhere or, at the very least, toreassess employed strategies. By denying, blockingor ignoring the negative emotions, the signal todisengage from the current goal can be lost orbecome “noise”. The possible outcome is wastedeffort, frustration and poorly allocated energy. Thusthe negative outcome which can ultimately result isactually worse than if the negative emotions wereaccepted and reflected upon in the first instance[Nesse, 2004]. In the same way that blocking fevermay prolong infections, blocking negative emotionscould lead to poorer outcomes (e.g. individual lessable to learn from mistakes) despite “feeling better”about it [Keller and Nesse, 2006].

There is also evidence that the types of negativeemotions experienced are specific to the nature ofthe precipitating situation. Keller and Nesse (2006)found that patterns of depressive symptoms differeddepending on what type of negative situation wasbeing faced. For example, guilt, rumination andpessimism were associated with failed efforts, whileanhedonia (inability to feel pleasure in activities),sleepiness and desire for company were associatedwith the winter blues. From an evolutionaryperspective, this supports a functional accountof the experience of negative emotions. Guilt,pessimism and rumination would have demotivatedour ancestors from pursuing their failing goals.These negative emotions may have encouraged themto reflect on their failing goals, change currentstrategies, or abort the goal altogether. Anhedonia,sleepiness and desire for company during wintercould have encouraged a period of hibernation;staying indoors to conserve warmth and energywould have been the adaptive thing to do when foodis relatively scarce and the weather is much harsher[Keller and Nesse, 2006]. These findings suggest thatnegative emotions may not exactly be pleasant, butthey have been necessary for our survival.

Even leaving aside evolutionary psychology, thereis further evidence for the utility of negativity.For example, defensive pessimism is a strategywhere individuals, usually with high anxiety

levels, set unrealistically low expectations in aperformance-based situation [Norem and Cantor,1986]. The low expectations act as preparationfor potential failure. However, the potential forfailure leads the individual to work harder in orderto avoid actual failure. Thus, the anxiety isnot eliminated, but harnessed [Norem and Cantor,1986]. Defensive pessimism is common in academia;straight-A students who assure themselves andothers that they will do poorly on the next exam,although they usually end up being the highestscoring student. If an anxious individual was tobe optimistic about the outcome, it may actuallymake him or her feel worse about the situation dueto higher expectations which can quickly becomeoverwhelming.

Despite their necessity and utility, the toleranceof negative emotions is diminishing. This isexemplified in the newest version of the Diagnosticand Statistical Manual (DSM-5) which has recentlybeen released. The DSM-5 is a type of handbookfor clinical psychologists. It categorises mentaldisorders by symptomology and provides a checklistfor diagnosis2. The criteria for depression havebeen changed so that even those individuals whoare grieving over the loss of a loved one can bediagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. Manycritics have explained that this is a pathologisationof a normal human process – grief. This denies evenbereaved individuals the permission to feel the fullrange of negative emotions which naturally occur insuch a difficult time [Stetka and Correll, 2013]. Itrepresents the resounding idea that to feel bad iswrong.

The intolerance of negativity at the societaland clinical level appears to be internalised byindividuals. The quick hands of some diagnosingclinicians are met with even quicker medical‘fixes’ that promise to return individuals positivenormality. At the same time, another publicationwill invariably assert that our negative emotionsare bad not only for ourselves, but even for thosearound us [Ehrenreich, 2010, Parkinson and Simons,2009]. These ideas are then adjusted for popularconsumption and distributed by life-coaches inthe form of catch-phrases such as “only surroundyourself with positive people” and “cut the negativepeople out”. It is no surprise then, that individualsmake such an effort to project a positive, bubblyand smiling image of themselves. [Diener and Suh,2000, p. 74] observe that North Americans “invest aconsiderable amount of effort to convince both theself and others that they are happy, self-confident,and in full control of their lives”. As a result, whenthe normal lows of life come about, individuals feelguilty and defective [Held, 2002]. The intolerance ofnegativity leads individuals into feeling bad about

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feeling bad [Held, 2002].

At least two potential consequences of “feeling badabout feeling bad” can be identified. Firstly, it canamplify negative emotions to the point where theysignificantly impair functioning. That is, althoughthe initial negative emotions may have been anormal emotional expression, by reflecting on themas a sign of abnormality, those initial emotionsare aggravated [Moberly and Watkins, 2008]. Forexample, if we feel sad over some action we take(e.g. spill some milk), then by thinking that sadnessis bad or abnormal (e.g. “I should not be cryingover spilt milk”), we end up feeling guilty andeven sadder because we believe we shouldn’t havefelt sad in the first place. Thus by demonisingnegative emotions, our meta-cognition can lead usinto a vicious cycle. Secondly, the intolerance ofnegative emotions can push individuals towards“cosmetic psychopharmacology”. The term explainsthe phenomenon of individuals taking medicationto “treat” what are normal human states. Forexample, an individual may take anti-depressantsto numb normal negative emotions because he/shehas come to believe that any negativity is notnormal. Cosmetic pharmacology represents awidespread drug culture where individuals canmedicate themselves into a more desirable emotionalstate or personality, despite the absence of pathology[Funder, 2012].

The preceding arguments have shown thatnegative emotions are necessary and useful, howeverthis does not form a case that negativity is always“good”. Certainly, the experience of extreme negativeemotions can be debilitating for an individual. Theargument is not that one should set out to pursuenegativity. Rather, the argument is that a full rangeof emotions needs to be experienced since this isan adaptive part of the human condition [Nesse,2004]. Emotional complexity refers to the tendencyto experience a wider range of emotions, bothpositive and negative [Lindquist and Barrett, 2010].Emotionally complex individuals at times holdboth positive and negative emotions simultaneously(“bitter-sweet” feelings) since they do not see the twogroups as direct opposites [Lindquist and Barrett,2010]. Since the broader definition of happinesspresented in this paper (i.e. hedonic and eudaimonichappiness) requires both positive and negativeemotions, emotional complexity may be a significantfactor in individual happiness. Although emotionalcomplexity has been associated with positive healthoutcomes [Koots-Ausmees et al., 2013, Lindquistand Barrett, 2010] more research is needed to assessits role in happiness.

To live emotionally complex lives, individuals firstneed to be willing to experience negative emotions.The degree to which an individual is willing to

experience negative emotions is known as acceptance.It reflects a type of transcendence, where thenegative emotion is identified and experiencedwithout rumination or aversion. By contrast,individuals who find negative emotions particularlyaversive and try to sidestep them are said to behigh in avoidance [Shallcross et al., 2010]. Priorresearch has shown that accepting, rather thanavoiding, negative emotions can be associated withdecreased depressive symptoms [Shallcross et al.,2010, Kashdan et al., 2009]. This indicates thatindividuals who are high in acceptance (i.e. willingto experience negative emotions) are buffered againstthe deleterious effects that negative emotions canhave. That is, with acceptance of negativity comesresilience to its effects.

However, even if we know that acceptance ofnegative emotions can benefit individuals, thereis still a systemic vilification of negativity tobe overcome. For example, the marketplacecan sell pleasures, fulfil desires, and generate anendless list of wants. However, individual meaning,purpose, growth, and contentment can be neithermanufactured nor sold. The economic systemis such that it requires consumers of hedonichappiness. Challenging hedonism would meanchallenging the underpinnings of economic growth.Additionally, the current psychological paradigmemploys the medical model which is tuned towards“curing” “patients” of “illnesses” brought aboutby maladaptive thoughts and behaviours [Elkins,2009]. Negative emotions are often the cornerstoneof maladaptivity, particularly in mood disorders.Reconsidering the role of negative emotions inhappiness and well-being would increasingly blur theline between normal and abnormal. Thus this wouldchallenge a system which strives for objectivity,boundaries of normality, and ever-more-refinedcategories and labels.

An alternative to the medical model is offeredby therapeutic approaches such as existentialpsychotherapy. In its broadest definition, existentialpsychotherapy is a philosophical discussion aboutlife customised to a client’s unique issues [Epp, 1998,Shumaker, 2012]. The focus is on “helping” the“client” to understand that “change” is possible. Themedical terminology is clearly aborted. The aimis not to “fix” people by replacing their apparentlyunhealthy worldviews with what the therapist deemsas healthy. Instead, the goal is to help the clientbecome aware of their perceptions, assess them, andthen decide whether he or she wants to change them[Himelstein, 2011]. The therapist and client are onthe same level, and the therapist is more of a “fellowtraveller” rather than a type of all-knowing expertor senior figure. Existential psychotherapist RolloMay (as cited in [Schneider et al., 2009, p. 420])

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describes how the overarching aim of therapy shouldnot be to “patch the person up” (i.e. relieve surfacesymptoms) because it is more important to get to thecore of the suffering. Addressing the fundamentalconcerns of human existence, such as death, freedom,isolation and emptiness (Yalom as cited in [Schneideret al., 2009]), approaches this core and encouragesindividuals to lead more fulfilling lives [Schneideret al., 2009]. Although no therapeutic approach canoffer the solution to all the worlds problems, it isto our advantage to further explore the benefitsof philosophical and holistic approaches such asexistential psychotherapy.

Clearly, the current cultural zeitgeist appearsto be tilted towards the veneration of positivityand vilification of negativity. This is reflected inthe hedonic conceptualisation of happiness whichprevails in research, clinical application, economicsand wider society. To be happy is to maximise thepositive and minimise the negative; a reduction ofhappiness to a simple optimisation problem. Thishedonistic paradigm allows little room for negativeemotions, even though they can be extremely usefulin shaping an individuals life and instilling it withmeaning and purpose. Thus an exclusively hedonicdefinition of happiness not only ignores eudaimonia,but may actively sabotage it. This is not to say thatnegative emotions are always helpful or that theyshould be somehow pursued. Instead, the argumentis that we stand to benefit from accepting negativeemotions and perceiving them as a normal part of thehuman condition. Pathologising, fearing or avoidingnegative emotions threatens our understanding andexperience of not only well-being, but also of whatit means to be human.

The Plug!

My current research is looking at the jointdynamics of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being,and in particular focusing on the role thatacceptance and emotional complexity play ineudaimonia. If you would like to participatein my research, please visit my websitehttps://sites.google.com/site/anuwellbeingstudy/or email me directly at [email protected].

Notes1In this article, the term happiness will be used in a

broader sense to indicate overall well-being. In some of theliterature happiness is used as a synonym for only hedonicwell-being.

2Although this approach itself deserves a critique, it isbeyond the scope of this paper to do so.

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Sophie Taylor | Criminal Minds

Criminal Minds: The Influence of the Monoamine Oxidase A

Genotype and Environmental Stressors on Aggressive Behaviour

Sophie Taylor

The notion that genes play an important role in many diseases has been widely accepted, but manypeople find it difficult to acknowledge a similar link between genetics and a predisposition to specificbehaviours, in particular aggressive criminal behaviour. Despite this scepticism, recent gene-environmentinteraction studies have found a significant correlation between a deficiency in the monoamine oxidaseA (MAOA) gene and an increased risk of aggressive behaviour, when exposed to adverse childhoodmaltreatment. However, many studies found that not all subjects with MAOA deficiency who weresubjected to childhood maltreatment developed aggressive behavioural problems. This paper reviewsstudies that investigate whether, at sensitive stages during development, changes in MAOA balancetriggered by severe environmental factors could disrupt monoamine-mediated brain development leadingtowards the expression of an aggressive phenotype.

Aggressive criminal behaviour has been reportedto be more common in individuals with certaintemperamental characteristics [Garpenstrand et al.,2002]. A consideration of the evolutionary,physiological and anthropological aspects ofaggression suggests that individual differencesin such behaviour will have important geneticas well as environmental underpinning. A seriesof studies concentrating on the serotonin andnorepinephrine metabolising enzyme, monoamineoxidase A (MAOA), have emphasised the necessityof examining gene by environmental interactionsto understand the contributions of individual loci[Caspi et al., 2002, Foley et al., 2004, Widom andBrzustowicz, 2006].

The Biology of Monoamine Oxidase A

The MAOA gene is located on the X chromosomeand encodes the MAOA enzyme [Shih andThompson, 1999]. MAOA catalytic activity residesin the mitochondria of the presynaptic terminalsin monoamine projection neurons throughout thebrain, having a critical role in regulating therelease and degradation of dopamine, serotonin andnorepinephrine. Due to the vital role that MAOAplays in the inactivation of neurotransmitters,MAOA dysfunction (too much or too little MAOAactivity) is thought to be responsible for a numberof behavioural traits. Following reuptake into thepre-synaptic neuron, MAOA has been shown todegrade neurotransmitters implicated in aggressiveand impulsive behaviour [Caspi et al., 2002].

However, genes do not operate independently,they function against a background in which otherfactors are crucial. This paper will focus on theepigenetics of MAOA and aggressive behaviour –changes in gene expression or cellular phenotype,caused by mechanisms other than changes in theunderlying DNA sequence. Childhood maltreatmenthas been shown to be a robust predictor of adult

antisocial behaviour. It is hypothesised that, atsensitive stages during development, changes inMAOA balance triggered by severe environmentalfactors could disrupt MAOA-mediated braindevelopment. This may lead to the expression of anaggressive phenotype. Based upon molecular geneticfindings, Caspi and colleagues (2002) proposedthat differences in MAOA genotype moderate therelationship between childhood maltreatment andlater aggressive behaviour. However, not all studieshave observed a genotype x environment, MAOAand maltreatment, interaction [Huizinga et al., 2006,Haberstick et al., 2005].

This paper will discuss evidence of interactionsbetween MAOA and risk factors in the developmentof aggressive criminal behaviour, and its impact onsociety and the field of neuroscience.

The History of Monoamine Oxidase A and

Trait Aggression

Like most complex traits, aggression has abiological basis in our evolutionary past as anessential characteristic for asserting dominance,challenging higher-ranking individuals and assertingan individual’s claim for scarce resources forsurvival. Recent studies show that criminalityoverlaps with aggressive trait behaviour [Breedloveet al., 2010, p. 175]. Since the expression ofgenes inuencing complex behaviour tends to beprobabilistic and often modulated by a host ofenvironmental interactions, the causal connectionbetween genes and aggression is likely to bedistanced by several levels of organisation. Ratherthan highlighting a direct connection between genesand crime, current models suggest that geneticvariants likely inuence neurotransmitter pathways inbrain regions associated with cognitive function andthe encoding of emotional intent. These, in turn,interact with a host of environmental factors that

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are hypothesised to predispose towards violent orantisocial behaviour.

Early studies of aggressive criminal behaviouron the basis of inherited genetic predispositionfocussed on phenotype rather than genotype. Inthe late 19th century, Lombroso attempted topredict criminality based on “primitive” physicalcharacteristics such as strong jaws, heavy brows,bloodshot eyes, thick lips and projecting ears[Lombroso, 2006]. Despite these characteristicshaving low correlates to some rare genetic syndromes,they were far from being a valid predispositionto criminal behaviour. Since this rudimentaryhypothesis of criminal behaviour, many researchershave studied families of criminals and found thatthere is a higher rate of criminal behaviour amongoffspring of criminals [Widom, 1989]. This suggestsa genetic component to criminality but does notsufficiently account for environmental influences.

With an increasing understanding of moleculargenetics and the completion of the human genomeproject, scientists are now able to isolate specificgenes. Most research surrounding the geneticpredisposition towards aggressive criminal behaviourhas focussed on genes affecting the functioningof major neurotransmitters such as serotonin anddopamine, and the proteins that influence theseneurotransmitters. Of this research, a potentialneurochemical target is Monoamine Oxidase A.

Monoamine Oxidase A Deficiency Studies

The pioneering study naming MAOA deficiencyas a genetic influence on human aggressionwas Brunner and colleagues’ study of a Dutchfamily notorious for extreme reactive aggressiondemonstrated by some of its males [Brunneret al., 1993]. This multigenerational phenotypeincluded mild mental retardation; a predispositionto aggressive outbursts, especially in response tofrustration, anger and fear; and violent impulsivebehaviour, such as rape, assault and attemptedmurder, arson and exhibitionism. In the affectedmales, a point mutation was identified in theMAOA gene which changed the amino acidglutamine into a termination codon, resulting inlower levels of MAOA. Therefore, isolated MAOAdeficiency in this family was associated with abehavioural phenotype that included impulsiveaggression. Subsequent similar studies demonstratedan aggressive impulsive phenotype in MAOA‘knock-out’ mice – genetically engineered mice inwhich researchers have inactivated, or “knocked out”an MAOA by replacing it with an artificial piece ofDNA [Cases et al., 1995] and in rat pups treated withthe MAOA inhibitor, clorgyline, during gestation[Whitaker-Azmitia et al., 1994].

Based upon these molecular foundations,Garpenstrand and colleagues (2002) investigatedwhether MAOA levels varied between imprisonedSwedish criminals and non-criminal controls totest the hypothesis that lower MAOA activitycan predispose a subject to display aggressivecriminal behaviour. The large majority of Swedishprisoners in the study were imprisoned because ofviolent criminality (homicide; assault or aggravatedassault; robbery or aggravated robbery; and rape oraggravated rape). The results of the study showedthat the group of imprisoned criminal offendershad significantly lower levels of MAOA activity,which the authors suggest leads to expression oftemperamental characteristics such as sensationseeking and impulsiveness.

Studies of Gene x Environment Interaction

However, correlation does not equal causation andthus other mutations (change of the nucleotidesequence of the genome) or polymorphisms (twoor more clearly different phenotypes existing in thesame population of a species) in the gene may alterthe expression of a gene or its structure and function.These changes are known as functional mutationsor functional polymorphisms. In addition, genes donot operate independently; they function againsta background in which other factors are crucial[Breedlove et al., 2010, p. 173]. Therefore exposureto different adversities may cause the range ofdifferences among those individuals with the MAOAmutation. This would occur, for example, whenthere is an independent effect of a high-risk genotypeand a high-risk environment. If the presence of bothfactors increases risk in a non-additive fashion thiswill be observed as an interaction. In this case,the high-risk environment potentiates the effectsof an already high-risk genotype, and vice versa.The risk associated with a specific genotype likeMAOA differs qualitatively in association to differentenvironments. Therefore the MAOA gene must beanalysed against a myriad of environmental factorsto substantiate these theories of MAOA mutationsinfluencing aggressive criminal behaviour.

Caspi and colleagues’ study [Caspi et al., 2002] wasbased on the premise that childhood maltreatmentincreases the risk of later criminality by about50%, yet most maltreated children do not becomedelinquents or adult criminals. They proposedthat this variability was due to vulnerability toadversities being conditional, depending on geneticsusceptibility factors. They specifically hypothesisedthat among children experiencing maltreatmentduring childhood individuals with reduced MAOAtranscription could be at higher risk for subsequentantisocial behavioural due to the lower efficiencyof neurotransmitter degradation, than individuals

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with higher levels of MAOA functioning. Thestudy therefore built upon the theories of Brunner(1993) and Garpenstrand (2002), using individualdifferences in the functional polymorphism in thepromoter of the MAOA gene to characterise geneticpredisposition to MAOA deficiency and to testwhether this predisposition modifies the influenceof maltreatment on children’s development ofaggressive behaviour. The results found no maineffect of the MAOA gene on aggressive behaviour butrather an interactive effect with early maltreatmentin the prediction of aggressive behaviour, suggestinga genotype and environment interaction.

In supporting this notion, Foley and colleagues[Foley et al., 2004] reported similar results in theirstudy of MAOA genotype-environment interactionthat predicted individual variation in risk forantisocial behaviour in a sample of 514 twin boysbetween the ages of eight and seventeen. Foleyand her colleagues assessed each child’s exposureto adversity and whether they had symptoms ofconduct disorder. Maltreatment in this study wasnot surveyed using the Caspi et al. (2002) definition(maternal rejection, repeated loss of a primarycaregiver, harsh discipline, physical abuse, andsexual abuse). Instead they defined adversity byexposure to three known risk factors for conductdisorder: inter-parental violence, parental neglect,and inconsistent discipline.

Although Foley’s study replicates earlier findings,it extends their research to suggest that specificgenotypes may be associated with increasing ordecreasing risks for aggressive behaviour, contingenton environmental exposures. Individuals with boththe low-activity MAOA genotype and maltreatmentaccounted for 12% of the birth cohort, but 44%of the cohorts violent convictions. This suggests agenotype-environment interaction may account for asignificant portion of individual variation in risk forantisocial behaviour. Interestingly, this study alsoshowed that in children who came from backgroundswith no maltreatment, the low-activity variant ofthe MAOA gene was associated with a lower risk ofconduct disorder.

Both Caspi et al. (2002) and Foley et al.’s (2004)findings provide initial evidence that a functionalpolymorphism in the MAOA gene moderatesthe impact of early childhood maltreatmenton the development of antisocial behaviour inmales. Furthermore, these findings are consistentwith reports from adoption studies describing anincreased risk of antisocial behaviour in boys inassociation with an interaction between aggregategenetic effects and exposures to adversity within theadoptive family. However, what these two studiesalso have in common is a limited range of subjects,studying Caucasian male youths.

Widom and Brzustowicz’s (2006) study overcamethe limitations of these studies of gene (MAOA)x environment (child abuse or neglect) interactionwith several advantages in their experimental design.Firstly, their design had a clear definition of childmaltreatment, using court cases with documentationof child abuse or neglect rather than self-reportingmeans. Secondly, they had a comparison groupmatched on the basis of age, sex, race/ethnicityand approximate social class background. Thirdly,their subjects were comprised of a more diversepopulation including whites, non-whites, males andfemales. Finally, this study was a longitudinal studyfollowing participants into adulthood to comparerisks for aggressive behaviour through childhood andadolescence and into adulthood.

The study replicates previous findings, showingthat the genotype associated with high levelsof MAOA activity buffers of protects childrenwho experienced childhood maltreatment from anincreased risk of violent or aggressive criminalbehaviour later in life. However, the study extendedthe finding of Caspi et al. (2002) and Foley et al.(2004) to show that the MAOA gene moderated theimpact of child abuse and neglect on the developmentof aggressive antisocial behaviours in both genders.Interestingly, the genotype associated with highlevels of MAOA did not appear to protect non-whiteabused and neglected children, instead it appearedto have the opposite effect. One explanation is thesubstantial evidence documenting the considerabledisparities in the childhoods of white and non-whitechildren [McCord et al., 2001]. This finding is ofcritical importance to the application of previous,homogenous studies of MAOA x environmentinteractions and challenges the generalising of theirresults on wider, more diverse populations.

Inconsistent Studies

However, two subsequent studies did not replicatethe finding of a MAOA-maltreatment interaction.In a study reported from a sample of youngadult males [Haberstick et al., 2005] and anotherstudy using a clinical sample of males referredfor substance abuse or conduct disorder problems[Young et al., 2006] a direct effect of maltreatmenton subsequent antisocial behaviour, but notMAOA genotype, was reported. Neither studywas able to replicate the interaction betweenMAOA activity and maltreatment with respect toa lifetime index of conduct problems, antisocialbehaviour, or a measure of conduct disorderseverity. Results from analyses using a measure ofviolent victimization during adolescence in place ofchildhood maltreatment [Haberstick et al., 2005] alsodid not replicate the interaction hypothesis of Caspiand colleagues (2002). Although they confirmed the

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association between childhood maltreatment andsubsequent development of conduct or antisocialbehaviours, they were unable to confirm thehypothesis that differences in the MAOA genotypeplays a moderating role in the relationship betweenmaltreatment as a child and conduct problems inadolescence and young adulthood.

Given these disparate findings, Huizinga andcolleagues (2006) addressed the limitations posedby small sample sizes and narrow behaviouralconstructs of childhood maltreatment. The resultsof the study provide some evidence of an associationbetween adolescent physical maltreatment andadolescent and adult antisocial behaviour and violentor aggressive offending. These results supportthose of Caspi et al. (2002) that variation inthe MAOA expression is not directly associatedwith maltreatment or antisocial behaviours laterin life. These findings also support those in the twoadolescent samples [Foley et al., 2004, Young et al.,2006] and the sample of young adults [Habersticket al., 2005].

Like Haberstick and colleagues’ study (2005),interaction between MAOA genotype andmaltreatment was not significant. This maybe because maltreatment was measured betweenthe ages of eleven and seventeen, instead of birthto eleven years like Caspi et al. (2002). Althoughthe influence of maltreatment during adolescenceis certainly not negligible, it is possible that themoderating effect of MAOA genotype on thelong-term consequences of maltreatment is agedependent. Therefore, this non-significance ofgene (MAOA) x environment (maltreatment) inHuizinga et al.’s study may reflect the age atwhich maltreatment was measured. Another factorthat may influence this result, is that the studiesemploying a childhood measure have all dependedon participant reports about their childhoodmaltreatment, requiring long retrospective recall ofquestionable accuracy.

However, regardless of the discrepancies betweenmaltreatment age and measurement, the findingsof these studies are inconsistent. The studiesusing childhood maltreatment have reached differentconclusions, as have the studies using adolescentmaltreatment. Therefore, the failure to replicatethe original findings in Caspi et al. (2002) does notresult simply from the age period of maltreatmentexamined. Huizinga et al.’s reliance upon asingle component of physical abuse to measuremaltreatment, in contrast to the multi-dimensionalmaltreatment measure employed in Caspi et al.(2002), may explain the failure to find a significantmaltreatment by MAOA interaction. However, thereis evidence to suggest that the two measures arenot entirely inconsistent. Both measures include

reported episodes of harsh physical punishment bya parent and both were correlated with adolescentand adult antisocial outcomes. Nonetheless, theadditional environmental indicators of maltreatmentor a wider stressful childhood environment used inCaspi et al. may have provided important details toexamine.

Multi-Risk Factor Hypothesis

These inconsistencies between studies have resultedin particular gaps in the literature pertaining tolevels of brain MAOA activity and its potentialinfluence on individual differences in behaviour andpersonality. In addition, recently published evidencesuggests that gene x environment interactionsinvolving MAOA in the development of antisocialbehaviour may not be confined to childhoodmaltreatment. For example, Wakschlag andcolleagues (2010) reported a significant genex environment interaction between MAOA andmaternal smoking during pregnancy [Wakschlaget al., 2010]. Similar to the MAOA x childhoodmaltreatment interaction studies, this study showedthat male carriers of the low-activity variant ofMAOA showed greater increases in conduct disordersymptoms following exposure to smoking duringpregnancy than the corresponding high-activityMAOA group. These findings open up thepossibility that environmental factors other thanchildhood maltreatment may interact with thelow-activity MAOA variant to produce antisocial, oraggressive behaviour. This suggests that childhoodmaltreatment and maternal smoking are specialcases of a more general gene x environmentrelationship in which the MAOA activity genotypeinteracts with multiple risk factors of aggressivecriminal behaviour.

To test the multi-risk factor hypothesis, Fergussonand colleagues explored the relationship betweenmultiple risk factors in the development of aggressivecriminal behaviour in a thirty-year longitudinalstudy of 1265 boys from New Zealand [Fergussonet al., 2012]. The risk factors considered includedmaternal smoking during pregnancy, family materialdeprivation, childhood IQ, childhood maltreatment,and school failure. Although the results of the studyvaried between outcomes, the overall findings suggesta clear tendency for those with the low-activityvariant of MAOA to be more susceptible to thenegative outcomes associated with environmentaland personal adversity. In all cases the findingssuggested that carriers of the low-activity MAOAgenotype showed greater increases in rates ofcriminal behaviour when exposed to adversity thanthe corresponding group with the high-activityvariant.

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The Influence of a Low MAOA Genotype

Alia-Klein and colleagues took a different approachand hypothesised that in healthy adult males thegenetically-determined level of MAOA in the brain,rather than the gene per se, would be associatedwith the regulation of the concentration of brainamines involved in aggressive behaviour [Alia-Kleinet al., 2008]. They proposed that the low MAOAgenotype is involved in developmentally-mediatedsusceptibility to aggression, whereas current brainMAOA activity provides a direct measurement ofthe enzyme activity and may therefore directlyaffect aggressive tendencies. The study measuredbrain MAOA activity in manually-drawn regionsthroughout the brain with PET and the radiotracerclorgyline [C11], which binds to catalytically activeMAOA [Fowler et al., 1996], in participants thatwere genotyped for MAOA polymorphism. Afterthe scan personality traits, including aggression,were assessed with the Multidimensional PersonalityQuestionnaire.

The findings of the study show, for the firsttime, that the lower the MAOA activity in corticaland subcortical brain regions, the higher theself-reported aggression. An approximate 15%reduction in brain MAOA was associated withelevated aggressive behaviour. MAOA regionalactivity is highly inter-correlated, and thus the studycould not conclude specific brain regions specificin trait aggression, although it appeared that thecorrelations are stronger in the cortical regions. Theresults also demonstrated that neither aggressivebehaviour nor brain MAOA activity differed as afunction of the MAOA genotype in the currentsample, suggesting that these gene-behaviour andgene-brain relationships may be developmentallymediated [Foley et al., 2004]. However, asthis study did not assess environmental factorssuch as childhood maltreatment, it cannot ruleout the potential interactive gene x environmentcontribution of the MAOA genotype to aggressivebehaviour. These findings highlight the involvementof MAOA enzymatic activity as a neurochemicaltarget with clinical implications for the treatmentof behavioural aggression.

Future Considerations and Implications

When considering clinical application of thesevarious studies, it is important to note thatbecause MAOA enzymatic activity is responsiblefor the regulation of central serotonergic activity interms of availability and subsequent extra-synapticdegradation, it would therefore follow that havinglow MAOA activity would result in high serotoninlevels. Previous studies have shown that MAOAknock-out mice have high circulating serotonin levels

[Cases et al., 1995]; however in studies of aggressivehumans and rhesus monkeys [Moffitt et al., 1998,Howell et al., 2007], serotonin levels are found tobe low. This may be a result of compensatorymechanisms in primates that have developed tocontrol high serotonin levels that could be neurotoxic[Baumgarten and Lachenmayer, 2004]. Futurestudies should therefore aim to test the interactionof serotonin and MAOA in the human brain in vivoto understand their functional role in aggressivebehaviour.

If genes primarily exert effects on risk foraggressive behaviour contingent on environmentalexposures, specifically disorders that lead to criminalactivity, this may explain the very limited successof studies directed at detecting the main effects ofgenes via traditional linkage or association studies.Given the importance of epigenetics in humanbrain development and the complexity of humanbehaviour repertoires, it should not be surprising ifcomplex genetic effects on aggressive phenotypes aremore readily discerned when relevant environmentalcontexts are taken into account.

These studies may have neuroethical andneurolegal implications. The more we learn aboutthe neurobiological causes of crime, the more difficultquestions arise concerning culpability, punishment,and freedom of will. Given the strong correlationbetween high adversity childhoods and aggressivebehaviour in relation to MAOA deficiency, therapyand preventative measures may be paramountto averting aggressive behaviour. For example,reducing the likelihood of a neglect and abusein childhood could be an effective preventativemeasure.

An additional neuroethical concern is that ofresponsibility and punishment. To what extentis a person with a low-activity MAOA subtypeand exposure to predisposing environmental factorsresponsible for their aggressive criminal activity?Future research will need to elucidate the neuralmechanism that controls moral decision-making.This research will have major implications for ourcurrent legal system. At the other end of thespectrum, society must ensure this evidence does noteradicate the notion of criminal accountability, asgenetic and environmental circumstances do not fullyexplain criminal behaviour. These challenges forthe emerging field of neurocriminology [Nordstromet al., 2011] must be met with consideration of socialtheories and evidence from neurological studies tobetter understand, and ultimately prevent aggressivecriminal behaviour.

Conclusion

Considering the multifaceted nature of humanaggression, MAOA activity in the brain provides a

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distinct and neurobiological intermediate phenotypethat is affected by various modifiers throughout lifeand is not as simple as a specific mutation of onegene. This and any gene x environment interactionwill likely have huge impacts on the criminal justicesystem, and on the broader field of neurologicalbases of behaviour in the future.

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Global Eyes (new series 2)

Tan Haur

Global Eyes (new series 2) is a digital photo imaging art series that provokes questions in the contextof present globalisation. Busy streets of people chasing time, unnoticed corners of places within businessdistricts and indicators on roads or pedestrian ways – Tan Haur takes us to a journey of the synthesisof city scenes and overlapping avenue photos of Melbourne and Singapore by his visual art making,producing a channel that causes boundaries separating the two nations to fade, or interlaced by a collageof two different places. The presence of globalisation in the art works becomes evident in the final visualeffect when pieces of still moments are thrown forward – simultaneously being captured in their stateof actuality; more than a photo journal of his photo-travelogue, they added thoughts that create thepictorial scrutiny of practice, nature and objects that have been adapted to a contemporary civilisation.

The negative photographic turnabout acts like preservatives to keep that place and time alive. Thevibrancy of base colours in digital print akin to magenta, cyan and yellow appear strategically to place adimension where two places meet. The deliberate distortion of colours as a depiction of state of the placeand time, or evoking emotions, is an indicator of post impressionism, and even an evolution of that artisticstyle due to the characteristics of implementing digital media – if one would allow the term that is notyet formalised but apparently imminent – is technically part of the existing mode of post-impressionismin digital.

Artist Tan Haur’s artworks appear pausing time and providing us the pictography and sense of itsspirit. It is thus not surprising that he sees his artworks as ‘time capsules’ of a never permanent reality,encapsulating the spirit of foreign spaces and then having the liberty to reposition them to another;leading to the second subject matter of his art series which examines local transformations to the stateof global change – glocalisation.1

1Text by Yu Benedict Tan.

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Global Eyes (new series 2)

Tan Haur