bureaucratic reform and issues of political responsiveness

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Public Management Research Association

Bureaucratic Reform and Issues of Political ResponsivenessAuthor(s): Glen Hahn CopeSource: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Jul.,1997), pp. 461-471

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BureaucraticReform and Issuesof PoliticalResponsivenessGlen Hahn CopeUniversityof Illinoisat Springfield

ABSTRACTManyof the conceptsand techniquesassociated withcon-temporary ureaucratic eformarefilled withimplications orpolitical responsiveness.Being entrepreneurialmayresult insavingsbutreducepolitical responsiveness.Service to customersis specificresponsivenesswhile service to all of the citizensisgeneralresponsiveness.Performance eviewsand entrepreneurialbudgetingmay strengthenbureaucracy nd electedexecutives,butwill also probablyweakenpolitical responsiveness.Managingand budgeting ystemsthat rame policy alternativesand drawthe citizensandtheirpolitical leadersinto comprehensiveolicy-

makingarepreferable o the conceptsand techniquesof bureau-craticreformas reinventing overnment.

J-PART7(1997):3:461-471

As the townmeeting s botha real and a metaphoricalrepresentationf democracy,so also state andlocal governmentorganizations re oftenthe exemplification f bureaucracyormanycitizens.Bureaucracy,writ smallin manylocal govern-ments,has boththe negativeconnotationshe wordhas acquiredin the nationalcontextand the positiveaspects,intendedby MaxWeber,of efficiency, impartiality, ndfairness(Weber1992).Althoughmuchrecentattentiono bureaucraticeform hasfocusedon the U.S. federalgovernment ndthe emergingdemocraciesof Easternand CentralEuropeandto some extentAsia, manystateand local governments mbracedbureaucraticreform,whetheror not calledby thatname,long beforepoliticalcandidatesandjournalistsbeganto campaignagainstWashingtonandthe "bloated ureaucracy." tate andlocal governmentswereearlyadoptersof the principlesof quality mprovement; ccount-ability;andcustomer,client, or perhapsmoreappropriately,citizen satisfaction.DavidOsborneand Ted Gaebler's nfluentialbook, ReinventingGovernment,or example,took most of itsexamplesof bureaucraticeformactivities-what they termedreinvention-fromlocal governmentOsborneandGaebler1992).461/Journalof Public AdministrationResearchand Theory


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The WaldoSymposiumSimilarly,the performance eviewprocess, which has receivedconsiderableattention ince it was embraced n the federalgovernmentby PresidentBill ClintonandVice PresidentAlGore, beganin the states(Gore 1993 and 1994).

Stateand local governments,becausethey arecloser to thepublic(thedemos of democracy),are microcosmsof the conflictbetweenthe democratic alues of politicalinclusion,equality,andliberty,and the bureaucraticalues of efficiency, rule-basedimplementationf policy, managerialeadership,andadministra-tive accountability.Conceptssuch as representativeness,quity,andindividualism,which are oftencited as values of democracy,also frequentlyaretraitscitizensexpectof government gencies,although here are conflicts between these values andthe charac-teristics of bureaucracy, s has been so clearlyelucidatedbyDwightWaldothroughout is career,andquitespecifically nTheEnterpriseof Public Administration1980).

Bureaucracytself historicallywas proposedandimple-mentedas a reformof the undemocratic, litist, andoftencorruptpoliticalandgovernmentalystemsthatpreceded t-systemscompletewithpatronage, pecialinterest nfluences, nefficiency,andhigh taxes. Bureaucracy ow is associatedoftenwith simi-larly pejorative onceptssuch as inefficiency,rule-bound ction,low productivity,ackof responsiveness,andhightaxes. Bureau-cratic reform often is cited as the way to ameliorate f noteliminate hese ills, to increasegovernment's esponsivenessothe public'sneeds, and to improvethe politicalaccountability fgovernmentagenciesandbureaucrats.Everythingoutedas bureaucratic eform s not as it seems,however.The muchballyhooedReinventingGovernment ndthereformmovement hatit spawneddo not proposea reformofbureaucracyo much as a substitution f an alternativemethodfor operatingwithinwhat remainsan essentiallybureaucratic

system.For example,as the book's subtitlesuggests,OsborneandGaebler'sversionof bureaucratic eformor reinventinggovernment roposesmakinggovernment ntrepreneurial. ntre-preneurship,n theirview, can save moneyandincreasegovern-ment'sresponsivenesso citizens'demands hroughchanging heway government gencies operate.Substitutinghe "expenditurecontrolbudget" or the traditionaline itembudgetpreviouslyused in Fairfield,California, or example,created ncentives orgovernmentmanagerso "save"moneyfrom theirannualbud-gets, presumably y beingmorefrugalin theirfinancialdecisionmaking,thuscreatinga year-endsurplus hattheycould thenkeepto use for otherpurposes pp. 119-22). The incentive n thissystemis clear:By spending ess than is appropriatedachyear,462/J-PART, July 1997


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The WaldoSymposiummanagers anobtain unds-not authorizedn theregularbudget-to purchase hingsor employ peoplethey believe they needinorder to do their obs better.

A numberof local governmentshathave adoptedsomeformof entrepreneurialudgetinghave foundthat this createsstrong ncentives o save money.It can increasethe cost effi-ciency of a government gencyand allow the agency'smanagersto accumulate pot of moneythat is availablefor use withvirtuallyno spendingcontrols.It also may createincentives ormanagerso overestimate r padtheirbudgetrequests o theextentpossiblewithoutdetectionby the budgetoffice or legis-lativebody in orderto createthe potential or savings.While thecause is different,this canhavethe sameresults as the oldbureaucraticmethodof cutting he nextyear's budgetbecausethefull amountwas not spent n the currentor previousyear, or thecivil servicepracticeof considering he size of a unit'sbudgetorthe numberof employeessupervised o determinepromotionsandmeritpay increases.Presumably,f a governmentagencyis ableto effect savingsin one year, its budgetshouldbe cut the nextyearto reflectits efficiencyof operations.The entrepreneurialbudgetschememay helpoffset the negative ncentives n thatpractice,since at leastthis year's savingscan be maintained venif the budgetfor nextyearis loweredin recognitionof the unit'sefficiency.Ultimately,however,to the extentthis practicereformsthebureaucracy y changing he incentivesystemsit also reducesthepoliticalresponsiveness f thatagencyandthe governmentas awhole. Since the budget s developed hrougha politicalprocess,changesmadein thebudgetby the bureaucracywithoutapprovalby or consultationwith thepoliticaldecisionmakerswho repre-sent the publicdetract romthe government's esponsivenessoits citizens. OsborneandGaeblerand theirsupportersuggestthatgovernment houldthinkof those it servesas customers

rather hanas citizens,andit shouldstriveto be responsive o itscustomers.Responsivenesso customerss different romresponsive-ness to citizens,however.To be responsive o customers,oneshouldprovidea product hatis desirable,well made,andasinexpensiveas possible.It is not necessaryfor all of thecustomers o like, or even approveof, the product,since itspurchase s voluntaryandin most casestherearecompetingproducts romwhich a customermaychoose. Pleasingthe cus-tomer tendsto be drivenby economics.For the manufacturero

breakeven or make a profit, it is sufficient hatenoughcus-tomerswant to buy theproductat the price offered.To respond463/J-PART,July 1997


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The WaldoSymposiumto citizens,on the otherhand,one shouldperforma serviceorproducea product hatthe majorityof citizens wantandapprovethrough he politicalprocess, since in manycases citizens are notbuyingthe productvoluntarilybutarepayingfor it throughtaxes, whichtheyarerequired o pay on penaltyof fines orimprisonment.This createsa specialresponsibilityor govern-ment not only to satisfyits immediate ustomersandoperate n acost-efficientmanner,but also to deliver services that its citizenshaverequestedhrough heirvotes and their electedrepresenta-tives. Ultimately, f government an operatemoreefficiently,therewardsystemshouldresultin lower taxesfor citizens, notjustincentives or publicservants o spendyear-endextramoneyinways thatwere not necessarilyauthorizedhrough he politicalprocess.

Performanceeviewis anotheractivitythat receivedcon-siderableattention s a bureaucraticeform n the earlyto mid-1990s. Performanceeviewis a processwhereby he cost effi-ciencyandeffectivenessof government perationsare analyzedby a team of evaluatorswhosejob it is to findways for govern-ment to operatemoreefficiently.The differencebetweenthe newversion of performance eviewandpreviousefficiencyevalua-tions is thatperformances now reviewedmostly by governmentemployeeswho areprogramevaluators ndpolicy analystsratherthanby task forcesof businesspeoplesuchas those who workedon earlierprojects e.g., the Grace Commissionat the federallevel in the 1980sand numerous tate-levelefficiencytask forcesin the 1970s). Performanceeviewoperatesbest when it servesas a conduit or the ideasdevelopedby government mployeesatall levels, who oftencan advisethe program eviewers(andcouldhaveadvisedtheirsupervisorsf asked)on ways to performthe organization'sunctionsmoreefficientlyand cost effectively.In this sense it can enhanceparticipatoryecisionmaking ngovernment gencies,andin manycases it actuallycan achievethe agency'sgoals of lower cost without oss of efficiencyoreffectiveness.

Performanceeview tendsto emphasizedevelopmentofquantitativemeasurements;t borrows n partfromthe statisticalcontrol echniquesof totalqualitymanagementnd from theprogram valuationmethodologies f sociology, politicalscience,andpolicyanalysis.Quantitativenalysis s conducivetoimprovementf efficiencyandcan informdecisionmakersofineffectiveness,but it is not as usefulin evaluationof the short-andlong-termnonquantifiablempactsof policies. Quantitativeperformancemeasurement,while it attemptso measure he effec-tivenessandimpactof programsandpolicies, cannotalwaysdoso becausethe realgoals of many programsandpolicies arenot464/J-PART, July 1997


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The Waldo Symposiumnecessarilymeasurable r countable n a quantitativeway. Quan-tifiableproxymeasuresoften are used to evaluatenonquantifiablepolicy results,whichmaydistortthe analysisor createbiases infavorof thoseactivitiesthat resultin betterproxyresults ratherthanin thebest achievementof the actualgoals. This emphasison measuringquantifiable esults, impacts,and, if possible, goalachievementeadsreviewers anddecision makers o focus on theprogrammaticutcomes.This leads to programmaticmprove-ment or reform n manycases, but not necessarilyany truebureaucraticeform.

The danger nherentn bothperformanceeview andthereinvention f governmenthroughentrepreneurialudgetingandrelatedactivities s that the views andopinionsof the policyelites-performancereviewers,agency experts, policy or budgetanalysts-may be substituted or those of the electedrepresenta-tives of the people. While this outcomewould not necessarilybeincompatiblewith the traditionalWeberiandeal of bureaucracy,it is not conducive o politicalresponsiveness ndmaythereforebe detrimentalo the democraticprocess.

Democraticprocessesrequire hat citizensbe able to makeinformedandmeaningful hoices. Citizensshouldbe able tochoose theirrepresentativesasedon informedudgmentandthrough heserepresentativeso selecttheir desiredpublicpolicies, methodsof implementation,ndthe taxesandbudgetsrequired o pay for them. In some cases citizenshave the oppor-tunityto determinepublicpolicy directlythroughNew Englandtownmeetingsor ballotreferenda,whichgives them an evengreaterneedfor access to information boutpolicy proposalsandtheir alternatives.Underwhatevercircumstances,democracyrequires nformationhatoftenhas to be developedby thebureaucracyn orderfor it to be madeavailable n usableform tothe citizens.

Simplyto say that citizensneedinformationn ordertomakeinformedchoices is not sufficient,however.Thatinforma-tion has to be in usableform, thatis, it has to be writtenorpresentedn a way thatis understandableo citizens,andthecitizens musthave access to it. A reportwritten n jargonthatisunfamiliar o the general publicis not usable even if it is mailedto eachcitizen'shome. Conversely,a well-written,easy-to-understand ocumentdoes not furtherdemocraticactionif voterscannot obtain t. Information bouta topicaloneis not enough,either.If votersdo not knowall the availableoptionsit isdifficultfor themto make informedchoices. Citizensalso need toknow aboutanypotentialcosts or benefits,informationhatmaynot be obviousfrom the information rovided.While it is not465/J-PART, July 1997


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The WaldoSymposiumpossibleto predictall the consequencesof policy choices, infor-mationaboutrelevantcausalrelationships nd theirpossibleinfluenceon particular olicy optionsis necessary f citizens andtheirelectedrepresentativesre to makeappropriatehoices.

Assuming hat voters have the informationheyneedtomakemeaningful hoices andthatthey are informedabout all thealternatives vailable o achieve a particular olicy goal-and anypotentialconsequences-democraticactionfurtherrequires hatvoters havethe abilityto communicateheirchoices to policydecisionmakers. Some citizensregularly nformtheirelectedrepresentativesf their views on subjects,othersbelongtogroups-such as the AmericanAssociationof RetiredPersons orthe AudubonSociety-that lobby legislaturesandCongress omake theirpositionsknown. Of course, in statesandcommunitiesthatconstitutionallyllow citizens the initiative o petitionforreferendaon policy issues, voters have the optionto participatein decisionmakingdirectlyand thuscommunicate heirwishes toelectedandappointed fficials. Less directly,citizensalso com-municate heirpoliticaldecisionsby votingfor or against egis-lators,city councilandcountycommissionmembers,schoolboardmembers,mayors,governors,senators,membersof Con-gress, the president,and other elected officials.If informations available o citizens andthey areable to

communicateheirchoices to policy decisionmakers,a furtherrequiremento ensurethatdemocracy s politicallyresponsive ocitizens is that it mustoperatewithina processthatgeneratesstandards f performance nd criteria or measurementf thesuccess or failureof a policy. Withoutsome standard f perform-ance, it is difficultfor constituents o hold electedofficialsor thebureaucracy ccountableor theiractions.This is one of the mostdifficultproblems or democracyandbureaucracy-howto setpolicy achievement tandardshataremeasurable n ways thatcitizens canunderstand nduse to hold electedofficialsandappointedbureaucrats ccountable.Without ome set of stan-dards,the bureaucracy as difficultyassessing ts own perform-ance, while electedofficialsandcitizens have even moreprob-lems evaluatinghe appropriateness,uccess,or failureofbureaucracy's olicy choices andactivities.

The difficultiescitizenshaveobtaining ufficient nfor-mation,identifyingpolicy alternatives, ommunicatingheirviews to electedrepresentativesndappointedofficials, andholdingtheseofficialsand bureaucrats ccountableo a standardof performance an lead to imperfectionsn the democraticandbureaucratic rocesses.For example,if citizenscannot nfluencepolicy makingandholdgovernment genciesaccountable,hen466/J-PART, July 1997


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The WaldoSymposiumbureaucracyan proceedas if there are no alternatives o theplansandprocedurest develops. Similarly,if governmentoffi-cials do not trustcitizenswith information,or if theyprovideinformationhatis not accessibleand usableby citizens, thenbureaucraciesan withhold nformation o thatpublic participa-tion in the democraticprocessis thwarted.A thirdimperfectionthatafflicts democraticand bureaucratic rocessesis thattheinability o define standards f performance learlyandpreciselyreducesthe effectivenessof performance ssessmentsby andaccountabilityo the public.These imperfections,however,arenot insurmountable;n some instances hey can be ameliorated ymeaningfulbureaucraticeforms.

Budgetreform s a subset of bureaucraticeform,intendedto addresssome of these bureaucraticnd democratic mperfec-tions. Amongthe purposesof budgetreforms that havebeenpro-posed since the beginningof the twentiethcenturyare the devel-opmentof policy or management lternatives nd the evaluationof agencyandprogrammaticerformancen order to accomplishpoliticalgoals more cost efficiently. Similarly,more recentreformproposals or bothbudgetsand annual inancialreportshaveemphasized heirpurposeas publicdocumentsand the infor-mationalbenefitstheycanprovideto citizens. While it is not all-encompassingandcertainlynot the only methodpossible, budgetreformas a type of bureaucraticeformcan help address heissues of politicalresponsivenesshathave been identifiedhere.

Severalbudgetreformshave emphasized he developmentofpolicy alternatives.As earlyas 1952, VerneB. Lewis proposedabudgetingsystemin which alternativeproposalswould bedeveloped n order to allow decisionmakers o evaluateoptionsand choose the one mostappropriatend cost effective (Lewis1952, 43-54). This procedurewas elaborated wo decades laterwhen PeterPyhrrproposedzero-basebudgeting or publicorgan-izations(Pyhrr1973; 1977, 1-8). In bothcases thesebudgetreformersproposed hatpublicagenciesshoulddevelopalterna-tive budgetproposalsaboveandbelow the targetedbudget evelto enable decisionmakers o assessthe quantityandqualityofservicesthat couldbe providedandto make informeddecisions.Planning-programming-budgetingPPB), which was introducednthe early 1960s in the defensebudget, applied o all civilianfederalagenciesin 1965-and subsequentlyo manystateandlocal governments-alsosuggesteddevelopmentof alternativepolicy proposals,especiallyfor new programs,although t didnot requireseparatebudgets o do so (Schick1966, 243-58).More recentbudgeting ystems,especiallythose developedbylocal and stategovernments,have included he alternative udgetdevelopmentdeas from thesebudgetreformsas a way to force467/J-PART,July 1997


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The WaldoSymposiumthe developmentof policy alternatives eforeresourceallocationdecisionsare made. If policy, program,or administrative lterna-tives aredeveloped n thebudgetprocess, they can be consideredby appointed ndelected officialswho makeresourceallocationdecisions,thusamelioratinghe bureaucraticendencyto consideronly the mostexpedientoptionstaff membershave identified.Similarly,when local governments oldpublicbudget hearingsthatare attendedby citizens,the latteralso have the opportunityto considerandproposevariouspolicy alternatives. n this waybudgetreformhas amelioratedhe bureaucraticendency oproceedas if therewereno necessityto consideralternativemethods,policies, or programs,and it has madebureaucracysomewhatmorepoliticallyresponsive.

The tendency or bureaucratso withhold nformationromthe public,or to provide t in a form that is not readilyunder-standable r usable,also can be somewhatoffset by recentreforms n budgetingand financialmanagement.While traditionalline-itembudgetsandannual inancialreportswere developedbyandfor accountants,making t difficult for even othergovern-mentofficials, let alonecitizens,to understand heircontents,currentpracticehas beenrapidlymovingin the oppositedirec-tion. The GovernmentFinanceOfficersAssociation,a profes-sionalassociationof state and local government inancialandbudgetofficers,has for a numberof yearsofferedcompetitionsto which stateand local governments,authorities, chool dis-tricts,and othersubnational overnment ntitiesmay submit heirannualbudgetsandcomprehensive nnual inancialreports(CAFR)for awardsandrecognition.The criteria or theseawards or outstanding udgetsor CAFRsincludereadability,understandability,ompleteness,andpresentationn ways thatarereadilyunderstandablend usableby the generalpublicas well asby specializedconstituencies uch as bondraters. These highlycovetedawardsusuallyare reproducedn the frontof the officialprintedbudgetsand CAFRsof the governmentshatreceivethem. Theyhavegiven strong ncentives o state andlocal gov-ernments o providerelevant inancial nformation nd to presentit clearly.

The presenceof C-SPANcameras n the U.S. Congresshasmadefederalbudget nformationomewhatmore available o thepublic,but in mostcases whatis broadcasts the politicaldebateor the publichearing,rather hanthe contentsof the budgetproposals.The federalbudget s very difficultfor the ordinarycitizento understand.t is difficultto follow and it is nearlyimpossible or the nonexperto reconcileprogrammatic iffer-ences from one yearto the next, even thoughseveral books thatdescribehow to understandhe federalbudgetas proposedand468/J-PART,July 1997


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The WaldoSymposiumprintedare writtenandupdatedannually.In the federalgovern-mentthe bureaucraticendency o withhold nformation ndtothwartpublicparticipations still operableand is aided andabettedby the sheer volumeof information.Budgetand financialreporting eformshave been much moresuccessfulin openingupinformation hannelsandincreasingpoliticalresponsivenessatthe local and statelevels thanin the nationalgovernment.

The necessityto developstandards nd criteriafor assess-ment of efficiency, effectiveness,andsuccesswithingovernmentagenciesandprograms s perhapsmostproblematicbecauseit isdifficultto developmeasurable riteria hatcan be understoodandused by citizensto holdthe bureaucracy ccountable.Budgetreformshave attemptedhis feat sinceperformancebudgetingwas proposed n local government y the Bureauof MunicipalResearch n New YorkCity in 1907, andin the federalgovern-mentby the first HooverCommissionCommissionon Organiza-tion of the ExecutiveBranchof the Government)n 1949. Devel-opmentof quantitative erformancemeasures o assess how effi-ciently governmentagenciesor programsare operatingand howtheirperformance ouldbe improveds the primarycharacteristicof performancebudgets.Oftenthesemeasuresare basedon per-formancestandards evelopedby professionalorganizations,(e.g., responsetimes for emergencycalls to police, fire, andemergencymedicalservicesdepartments, r caseloadsizes forpublicassistanceandchildwelfareworkers).PPB systemssimi-larly proposed he development f quantitativemeasures,butthesewere programmeasures hatemphasizedassessmentof goalattainment ndprogram ffectivenessrather hanefficiency.Entrepreneurialudgeting,as describedabove, is another n thisseries of budgetreforms.In emphasizing ost savingsand effi-ciency, it has broughtbureaucraticndpoliticalattentionbacktothe standards ndcriteriaof performance udgetingand measure-ment of efficiency, as has totalqualitymanagementwith itsemphasison statistical ontrol.As thesebudgetreformshavebeenadoptedby governments, speciallyat the local and statelevels, andthenadapted o eachparticular ircumstance, heyhavecontributedo the possibilityof criteriadevelopmentandaccountability ssessmentsby electedofficials andthe citizenswho elect them.

While thesebudgetreformshave hadan impactat thefederal andstatelevels, it is in local governmenthatthey havemost increasedpoliticalresponsiveness.Manylocal governmentsin the 1990shaveadapted he conceptsandproceduresof variousbudgetreformsto their needsandhave used themto respond ocitizen demands or participationn bureaucratic ndpoliticalprocesses.In a recentsurveyof U.S. cities andcounties, 18469/J-PART,July 1997


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The Waldo Symposiumpercentof approximately 400 respondentsused some aspectsofa performance udgetformat,35 percentused some type of pro-grambudgetformat the less formal successorto PPB),and6percentusedelementsof zero-basebudgeting Cope 1995, 42-52). More importantly,hese local governments eported hattheyuse programandperformancemeasures n theirbudgetpro-cesses and in othermanagement ctivities. Measuresof activity,performance, fficiency,effectiveness,andgoal attainment redevelopedpredominantlyy departmentalr program taffs (in87 percentof the respondent overnments) nd are reported othe manageror chief administrativefficer in 18 to 33 percentofthe local governments,o the electedlegislative body in 15 to 30percentof the governments,andto the publicin a publisheddocumentn 11 to 23 percentof thejurisdictions Cope 1995,49). While thesesurveyresultsare not overwhelming, hey doindicate hatmanylocal governments re attemptingo be morepoliticallyresponsiveby developingandreportingnformationthat thepubliccan use to make informeddecisionsabouttheperformance f the bureaucracieshatserve them.

Budgetreformas a type of bureaucraticeform s not apanacea.It can, however, increasethe politicalresponsivenessofgovernmentso their citizensthroughdevelopmentof alternativepolicyproposals,provisionof information,andmeasurement fperformance ndprogrammaticuccess. The budgetreformsthathave resulted n the budgetingsystemsof the 1990shave, espe-cially in local governments,helpedthe bureaucracyo becomemoreattuned o the informationalnd assessmentneedsof citi-zens and thus increased he potential or politicalresponsiveness.This is likely to improvepublicmanagementn the long runbyaligning t moreclosely with the idealsof the democraticprocess.All conflictis not resolvedthereby,however. Citizenexpecta-tions of responsivenessby the bureaucracyannotbe met simplyby increasinghe information eportedn the annualbudgetdocu-mentsandcomprehensive nnual inancialreports.Mostcitizensdo not read thosedocuments,although hey maywatchtelevisionnews reports hat use the informationheycontainor even readdetaileddescriptionsn the dailynewspaper.Any activitythathelps to reduce he inherentantidemocraticendenciesofbureaucracyhouldbe considereda favorablecontributor o thedemocraticprocess,however,even if it is slight.

Reductionof the conflictbetweenbureaucracy nddemoc-racy through ncreasedpoliticalresponsivenesss desirable,evenif completeelimination s not necessarilyachievable.Bureau-craticreform s one way to enhance his processthrough hemechanisms f budgetreformandthe increased nformation tcanmakeavailable o citizens. Some local governments ave470/J-PART, July 1997


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The WaldoSymposiumembarked n thispath,as have some stategovernments. tremains o be seen how muchimpactbudgetreforms will haveon politicalresponsiveness ndwhether hey canbe effective inimprovingpoliticalresponsivenessat any level of governmentfartherremoved rom citizensthanlocal government.REFERENCES

Commission on Organizationof theExecutive Branch of the Government.1949 Budgetingand Accounting.

Washington,D.C.: U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice.Cope, Glen Hahn.1995 "Budgeting or Performance nLocal Government."TheMuni-

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Gore, Al.1993 From Red Tape to Results:Creatinga GovernmentThatWorksBetter and CostsLess:Reportof the National Per-formance Review. Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice.

1994 Creatinga GovernmentThatWorksBetter and Costs Less:Reportof the National Per-formance Review: StatusReport.Washington,D.C.: U.S. Gov-ernmentPrintingOffice.

Lewis, Verne B.1952 "Towarda Theory of Budget-

ing." Public AdministrationReview 12:(winter):43-54.New York Bureau of MunicipalResearch.1907 Makinga MunicipalBudget.New York City.Osborne, David, and Gaebler, Ted.1992 ReinventingGovernment:Howthe EntrepreneurialSpiritis

Transforminghe Public Sector.Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Pyhrr, Peter A.1973 Zero-BaseBudgeting.NewYork:JohnWiley.1977 "The Zero-BaseApproachtoGovernmentBudgeting."PublicAdministrationReview 37:

(Jan./Feb.):1-8.

Waldo, Dwight.1980 TheEnterpriseof PublicAdmin-istration: A SummaryView.Novato, Calif.: ChandlerandSharp.

Weber, Max.1992 "Bureaucracy."n Jay M. Sha-fritzand Albert C. Hyde., eds.Classics of Public Adminis-tration, 3d ed., 51-56. Pacific

Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole.Reprinted rom From MaxWeber:Essays in Sociology,H.H. Gerthand C. WrightMills, ed. and trans. Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1946.

Schick, Allen.1966 "The Road to PPB: The Stagesof BudgetReform."PublicAdministrationReview26:(Dec.):243-58.

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