bulletin vol 52 no 04, first responders - department of justice

First Responders

Focus on First Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1By Stan Harris

An Overview of the Intelligence Research Specialist Program . . . . . . . . . . 3By Thomas C. Taylor

LEO and RISS Are a Virtual Single System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Reprint from CJIS Link

The National InfraGard Program: Partnership for the Future . . . . . . . . . 9Collective effort provided by the InfraGard Programs Staff

The Regional Inform ation Sharing Systems (RISS ™) and the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Collective effort provided by the Institute for IntergovernmentalResearch

Interoperability AGILE-ity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Reprint from TechBeat

Forensic Epidemiology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18By Francis D. Schmitz

PATRIOT–Counterterrorism Training Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20By Jim Greenlee, David Crews, Tom Bartlett, and Max Fenn

IMPACT—Intensive M arine Port Area Counter-Terrorism Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

By Stan Harris, Max Fenn, Robert J. Arndt, and Tom Bartlett

State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program . . . . . . . . . . 34By Domingo S. Herraiz

First Responders at the Cocoanut Grove Night Club Fire in 1942 . . . . . . 38By Beverly Ann Jones

USA PATRIOT Act: Responding to Library Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42By Stan Harris and Gaines Cleveland

July 2004Volume 52Number 4

United StatesDepartment of JusticeExecutive Office for

United States AttorneysOffice of Legal Education

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In This Issue

JULY 2004 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' BUL LET IN 1

Focus on First RespondersStan HarrisFirst Assistant U.S. Attorney and AntiterrorismAdvisory Council Coordinator United States Attorney's OfficeSouthern District of Mississippi

I. Introduction

In October 2001 the Attorney Generaldirected the district offices to form Anti-TerrorismTask Forces, now known as Anti-TerrorismAdvisory Councils or ATACs. Building on thewell-established training programs of the LawEnforcement Coordinating Committees (LECCs),and staffed with a new Intelligence ResearchSpecialist (IRS) in each federal judicial district,ATACs are designed to promote betterinformation sharing among federal, state, andlocal agencies and to help prevent future terroristattacks.

In addition to the Executive Office of thePresident and the federal court system, the U.S.Attorney's Office (USAO) is the primary outletfor federal agencies to combine efforts toprosecute criminal cases and assist in federal civilcases. ATACs ensure that an official appointed bythe President, and confirmed by the U.S. Senate,directly oversees day-to-day counterterrorismefforts in each judicial district throughout theUnited States and its territories. Each federaljudicial district is staffed with an IRS, who worksclosely with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs),led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

ATACs have become a major component inthe information sharing effort, specificallyreaching out to the broader first respondercommunity for a more holistic approach toprevention. ATACs, together with JTTFs and theDHS, work each day to foster better cooperationand coordination between traditional lawenforcement and other members of the firstresponder community.

This issue of the USA Bulletin focuses oninformation-sharing and outreach efforts to thefirst responder community. Traditionally, firstresponders are made up of the followingpersonnel:

• law enforcement agencies;

• fire fighters and emergency medical teams;

• public health, hospitals, and emergencymanagement agencies;

• hazardous material (haz-mat) teams;

• 911 operators;

• military security and force protection experts;and

• security professionals for privateinfrastructure facilities.

II. Contents of this issue

In this issue, you will find:

• An article by Assistant U.S. Attorney TomTaylor, who is presently assigned to theExecutive Office for U.S. Attorneys as theIRS program coordinator, giving an overviewof the new IRS program.

• An article by Dr. Mary Victoria Pyne,Communications Unit Chief for the FBICriminal Justice Information ServicesDivision, explaining the new relationshipbetween the two Department of Justice(Department) funded systems of LawEnforcement Online (LEO) and the RegionalInformation Sharing System (RISS™).

• Another FBI-sponsored information networkis discussed in an article about InfraGard, aprogram that provides access to sensitiveinformation for private sector securityprofessionals in an effort to protect theNation's critical, privately held infrastructure.The controlled inclusion of private securityprofessionals in the information-sharing arenais one of the most significant post 9/11changes, and is designed to enhanceinformation sharing and terrorism prevention.To become part of the network, InfraGardcompanies must fill out and submit a securityquestionnaire to facilitate a basic backgroundcheck.

• An article on RISS addresses the new Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX)program, which is designed to include a broadspectrum of first responder agencies.

2 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' BUL LET IN JULY 2004

• Other Department programs that address theinteroperability of first respondercommunications are outlined in an articlereprinted from Tech Beat about the AGILEprogram. This program has brought acoalition of experts together to address thiscritical issue.

• First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the EasternDistrict of Wisconsin and ATAC CoordinatorFrancis Schmitz writes about training firstresponders to work together. This articlehighlights the Forensic Epidemiology coursecurriculum that is available for use by anyATAC. This course is designed to train lawenforcement and health and medical officialson investigative responses to bioterrorism.The field delivery course is a partnershipbetween the Department and the Centers forDisease Control, U.S. Attorney Offices in theNorthern District of Georgia, the EasternDistrict of North Carolina, and numerousfederal, state, and local agencies in Maryland,North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, California,and Oregon.

• Training first responders to work together toprevent terrorism is the focus of the article,PATRIOT Counter-Terrorism TrainingProgram, which was written by U.S. AttorneyJim Greenlee, LECC/ATAC ChiefInformation Officer David Crews (N.D.Miss.), Antiterrorism Coordinator TomBartlett for the southern Regional PublicSafety Institute, and Intelligence ResearchSpecialist Max Fenn (S.D. Miss.). ThePreventive Anti-Terrorism Recognition &Interdiction Operational Techniques(PATRIOT) program is a collaborative effortled by the two Mississippi District ATACs.They used federal, state, and local officials toprovide premium quality field training to firstresponders.

• Tom Bartlett, the Antiterrorism Coordinatorfor the Southern Regional Public SafetyInstitute, assisted Bob Arndt, Port SecuritySpecialist for the Coast Guard Marine SafetyOffice in Mobile, Alabama in preparing anarticle on the IMPACT field training program.IMPACT (Intensive Marine Port AreaCounter Terrorism) is a prevention programled by the Coast Guard's Regional PortSecurity Committee, and the ATACs of theNorthern and Southern Districts ofMississippi, the Southern District of Alabama,

and the Northern District of Florida. Like thePATRIOT Program, IMPACT uses federal,state, and local officials to provide fieldtraining to a diverse first responder audience.IMPACT places special emphasis on portsecurity issues and features on-site port tours.

• Specialized Department counterterrorismtraining for law enforcement first respondersis presented in an article on the Bureau ofJustice Assistance State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program.Domingo S. Herraiz, Director of the Bureauof Justice Assistance, discusses both in-residence and field training programs whichare provided by SLATT to federal, state, andlocal law enforcement officials.

• An article on the Cocoanut Grove Night ClubFire provides a specific example of firstresponder involvement in a real-worldsituation. Written by Beverly Ann Jones,Executive Office for United States Attorneys,Employee Assistance Program (EAP), thearticle highlights the situations and solutionsthat first responders encountered in the firstdocumented major accident requiring thecooperation of all first responders.

• An article which identifies and answers someof the American Library Association'squestions concerning the USA PATRIOT Act,written by Assistant U.S. Attorney GainesCleveland of the Southern District ofMississippi, provides insight into thePATRIOT Act and how libraries areaddressing issues of information sharing andterrorist prevention. In so doing, Clevelandclears up several misconceptions concerningthe PATRIOT Act.

III. Conclusion

So much has been done since 9/11 to bettershare information and to improve lines ofcommunication among first responders. However,it is hoped that the information provided here willbe helpful to the men and women who will becalled on in the event of a disaster. Usefulreferences and points of contact are listedthroughout these articles.�


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

�Stan Harris began service as First AssistantUnited States Attorney for the Southern District ofMississippi on October 23, 2001. Harris serves asChief-of-Staff for U.S. Attorney Dunn Lampton,and serves as the Southern District’s Anti-Terrorism Coordinator.

Mr. Harris formerly served as Chief Counseland Deputy Chief-of-Staff for Senator Trent Lott,Minority Leader of the U.S. Senate.

Mr. Harris has handled cases and projectsinvolving virtually every federal department andagency, and has received numerouscommendations for work on behalf of local,county, state and federal government.

An Overview of the IntelligenceResearch Specialist ProgramThomas C. TaylorAssistant United States Attorney District of the District of ColumbiaCurrently on detail to the Executive Office forUnited States Attorneys

I. Introduction

The primary goal of the Department of Justice(Department) Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2001-2006 is to protect America against the threat ofterrorism. To implement this goal, the AttorneyGeneral articulated the following three-prongobjective for the Department:

• the prevention of future terrorist acts;

• the thorough investigation of threats andincidents; and

• the relentless prosecution of those whocommit crimes by terrorist means.

With prevention of future terrorist acts as thepreeminent goal, criminal intelligence-driven lawenforcement, and thus criminal intelligence-drivenprosecution, is the Department's principal methodto stop a terrorist incident before it happens. TheIntelligence Research Specialist (IRS) is thelinchpin between intelligence-driven policing andintelligence-driven counterterrorism prosecutionin the United States Attorneys' Offices (USAOs)

After the events of 9/11, the Departmentquickly saw the need to install an Intelligence

Officer in each USAO. This officer, the IRS, ischarged with obtaining, coordinating, analyzing,and disseminating information relating to thedetection and identification of terrorists, ofconspiracies to support or commit terrorism, andof terrorist acts. The IRS provides the U.S.Attorney with access to classified criminalintelligence, as well as unclassified "LawEnforcement Sensitive" intelligence. He or shecoordinates intelligence activities with andbetween the members of a district's Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) (formerlythe Anti-Terrorism Task Force) and the JointTerrorism Task Force (JTTF). The goal of thisintelligence effort is to share information andresources needed to detect terrorist networks andto arrest and prosecute terrorists before they act.

The IRS supports the ATAC under theguidance of each district's U.S. Attorney and theATAC Coordinator. The Attorney General statedthat ATACs "provide a central forum for agenciesto congregate and identify potential terrorismlinks among their investigations. As the entitiesthat work regularly with all enforcementagencies, [ATACs] are positioned to bringagencies together which would not otherwiseknow that their respective investigations arelinked." See Memorandum from the AttorneyGeneral to all United States Attorneys, September24, 2003, available at http://usanet/usa.doj.gov/site_index/ pdf_memos/atac.pdf. The AttorneyGeneral also recognized the role of the IRS in the


FBI's JTTF. He directed the IRSs to "provide[Joint Terrorism Task Forces] with intelligenceinformation generated by [Anti-TerrorismAdvisory Council] members who are not JTTFmembers, as well as intelligence obtained by theUSAOs from non-terrorism prosecutions andinvestigations." See id. The IRS not only supportsthe ATAC, but also works with the JTTF as arepresentative of both the ATAC and the USAO.The IRS is the linchpin between the ATAC andthe JTTF, as well as between the USAO, thenational intelligence community, and state andlocal law enforcement.

While the goals of an ATAC and the JTTF arethe same, the two entities have very differentfunctions. An ATAC is primarily organizational,emphasizing the sharing and dissemination ofcounterterrorism information. The JTTF is largelyoperational, dealing with intelligence collection,analysis, and investigation. An ATAC'smembership is expansive, including:

• federal, tribal, state, and local law and non-law enforcement agencies;

• first responders;

• industry leaders; and

• crisis managers.

The JTTFs have a more restrictivemembership, comprised primarily of federal,tribal, state, and local law enforcement agencies,and federal intelligence agencies. ATAC membersshare Law Enforcement Sensitive information.The JTTF has access to top secret nationalsecurity information. An ATAC gathersintelligence through local sources, while the JTTFgarners information from both local and nationalintelligence sources. Therefore, the two taskforces are complementary, not redundant. An IRSprovides advice, information, logistical support,and intelligence analysis to both. The IRS ispivotal to intelligence-driven prosecution and theDepartment's goal of preventing terrorist acts.

II. Responsibilities of the Intelligence ResearchSpecialists

An IRS is essential to every USAO'scounterterrorism program. Each district, however,is different and faces unique challenges. An IRS'duties vary depending on the composition of eachdistrict. For example, whether a district is large orsmall, coastal or inland, has a military base, alarge tourist attraction, or an international airport

hub, can affect how an IRS discharges hisresponsibilities. Nevertheless, the specialistsshare many common responsibilities.

All IRSs are tasked with identifying possibleterrorist-related incidents or cases in their districtand briefing their ATAC coordinator or U.S.Attorney. They review pending cases within theUSAO, looking for terrorist connections. Anapparently straightforward drug case may containan overlooked nexus with a conspiracy to providematerial support to a terrorist. The trail of moneyin a Social Security fraud case might leadoverseas to a foreign terrorist organization. IRSsreview declined cases to ensure that the subjecthas been checked against the proper databases forpossible terrorism connections or other currentwants or warrants. They also help identifyparticular defendants whose cases deserve closerscrutiny.

All IRSs are directed to analyzeinvestigations at the JTTF, searching forperplexing links in otherwise inscrutablerelationships. Well-versed in intelligence analysistools, data mining programs, and informationsources, IRSs have access to national intelligenceinformation contained in classified networks orreports. They compile local information, compareselected identifiers with large amounts of data,and select potential prosecution targets. They canreview Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) foractions that alone may be meaningless, but to aninformed eye are revealing. The IRSs may attendintake briefings, and they post summaries andreview case files to establish connections betweeninvestigations. The IRS is often a resourceavailable to the FBI, supplementing thecapabilities and supporting the efforts of newfield intelligence groups. An IRS' goal, in short,is to ensure that information within theDepartment is properly analyzed and referred tothe appropriate investigating agency.

All IRSs share Law Enforcement Sensitivecounterterrorism information with state, tribal,and local law enforcement. Some work primarilythrough the ATAC, while others producecounterintelligence bulletins for distribution.These bulletins focus on specific topic areas ofinterest to their district. Some specialists havecreated secure Web sites for regional alerts andfor Law Enforcement Sensitive informationexchange. IRSs may also participate in:


• Intelligence Fusion Centers, combining theresources of the Department of HomelandSecurity, National Guard, state police, andother national and state entities;

• State Information Sharing Centers;

• Joint Operations Centers;

• State Crisis Management programs;

• Security Task Forces; or

• Regional Intelligence Exchange networks.

Specialists work with their district's LawEnforcement Coordinating Committee (LECC),maintaining address rosters, phone trees, andadding counterterrorism training and informationto supplement other crime prevention programs.

All IRSs, in cooperation with the LECC, havea responsibility to provide counterterrorismtraining to tribal, state, and local law enforcementofficers. They organize conferences and classes onspecific counterterrorism subjects, teachingATAC members to:

• identify potential targets of attack in thedistrict;

• plan for contingencies;

• identify biological or explosive componentsof terrorists' weapons; and

• spot seemingly innocuous items andexpeditiously report suspicious activities tothe intelligence community.

IRSs also show local law enforcement officershow to identify threats, provide security, andgarner evidence, while working in the course oftheir daily duties. They encourage local lawenforcement agencies to build trust withinimmigrant communities and increase awareness ofcultural differences. An IRS enables local lawenforcement intelligence officers to contact otherregional, state, and international organizations,and create networks of counterterrorismintelligence, training, and assistance.

All IRSs are the U.S. Attorneys' liaison tonational intelligence agencies such as the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA), National SecurityAgency (NSA), and the FBI. They have access tosecure Law Enforcement Sensitive networks, suchas the Regional Information Sharing Systems(RISS) and the FBI's Law Enforcement Online(LEO). Many are establishing links to theDepartment of Homeland Security's Joint

Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES),and within a year, all IRS workstations will bedirectly connected with the Secret InternetProtocol Router Network (SIPRNET), a classifiedinformation sharing and distribution system.

Some districts with SecuredCompartmentalized Information Facilities willhave access to the Joint Worldwide IntelligenceCommunication System (JWICS). In a systemlike the SIPRNET, the JWICS is cleared for topsecret national security information. Throughtheir contacts with the intelligence community,the IRSs can brief the U.S. Attorney on currentthreat analysis and serve as a conduit ofinformation to other local law enforcementagencies' intelligence personnel and stateHomeland Security offices. The IRSs use thisinformation to research local groups that mayhave a relationship to terrorism and to contactinformants and cooperators to reveal otherwiseunknown links to terrorism. IRSs filter a plethoraof intelligence bulletins and alerts for distributionto the appropriate ATAC or JTTF members.Foremost, IRSs maintain an informal network ofUSAOs' Intelligence Officers, drawing on thecombined experience and talents of all.

III. Specific examples

The contributions of all the IRSs havelaunched an unprecedented move within theDepartment toward intelligence-drivenprosecution, and have enhanced the security of allAmericans. While acknowledging that equallyworthy programs are absent, a fewaccomplishments are noted here to demonstratethe contribution of the IRS to the Department'sgoal of prevention of terrorist attacks.

In one district with a large number of militaryinstallations, the ATAC identified the potentialthreat caused by the numerous Department ofDefense subcontractors who had access tomilitary bases. The ATAC wanted to curtail theability of a possible terrorist to acquire access tothe military facility and to identify individualsmaking and selling false documentation. TheIRS, under the operational control of the JTTF,spearheaded the Department of DefenseContractor Initiative, which received informationon military subcontractors and analyzed,combined, and summarized the large amount ofdata into formats that the JTTF could easily passto FBI Headquarters, the National CrimeInformation Center (NCIC), the Social Security


Administration, and U.S. Immigration andCustoms Enforcement. The program has alreadyresulted in the identification of fourteenindividuals with outstanding warrants, nineteenindividuals using false Social Security numbers,and seventy-seven individuals using SocialSecurity numbers issued to other individuals.

In another district, the ATAC supported thecreation of a Statewide Intelligence FusionCenter. The IRS helped to map and track leads forfurther investigation and analysis. The Centerproduces weekly Intelligence Summaries for bothlaw enforcement and non-law enforcementpartners. This cooperation has generated good willbetween the agencies and fostered intelligence-driven policing and prosecution at all levels.Similarly, an IRS in a large northern districtmakes quarterly visits to law enforcementagencies along the border with Canada, meetingwith local service personnel and border patrols toopen the lines of communication for local contactsto report any suspicious activity in an area remoteto the IRS and the JTTF.

The IRS in a large western district helpedorganize a General Aviation Working Groupwithin his ATAC. That working group, inpartnership with the U.S. Transportation SecurityAdministration, the State Department ofTransportation, and the Governor's Office ofHomeland Security, tackled the security concernsgenerated by the numerous smaller generalaviation airports throughout the state. Through theefforts of their General Aviation Security Project,the ATAC's participants developed aMemorandum of Understanding which addressedthe potential security concerns that would havebeen outside the scope of traditional federalsecurity measures. The agreement is currentlyunder review by the U.S. Transportation SecurityAdministration and could eventually be used as anational model.

In another large western district, the IRS isassigned as the analyst for the JTTF'sInternational Terrorism squad. On the daysdetailed to the JTTF, the FBI Supervisory SpecialAgent in charge of the International Terrorismsquad acts as the IRS's supervisor. In addition tohis other duties as an intelligence officer, the IRSis also the liaison to his state's AntiterrorismInformation Center and is the Assistant DistrictOffice Security Manager. This type of integrationis possible only through the support of the U.S.

Attorney, the District's ATAC Coordinator, andthe FBI's Special Agent in Charge.

IV. Conclusion

As top professionals in their field, theIntelligence Research Specialists are the latestarrivals in the USAOs. Most have moved to theDepartment of Justice after serving in the armedforces, the civilian intelligence community, orother law enforcement. There are also AssistantUnited States Attorneys, Certified PublicAccountants, and others assigned as IRSs. TheIRSs have, on average, fourteen to nineteen yearsexperience in intelligence and seventeen totwenty-four years in law enforcement. Althoughdiverse, they all share a common trait: adedication to their role in combating terrorism inAmerica. The IRSs remain the linchpin of a newmodel of information exchange, forging essentialrelationships with other law enforcementagencies, supporting the ATACs in their districts,representing the USAOs on the Joint TerrorismTask Forces, and enabling the USAOs to conductintelligence-driven prosecution in theDepartment's fight against terror.�

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

�Thomas C. Taylor serves as an AssistantUnited States Attorney for the District ofColumbia. He is currently detailed to theExecutive Office for United States Attorneyssupporting the Intelligence Research Specialistprogram, Law Enforcement Information Sharinginitiatives, and other counterterrorism efforts.a


LEO and RISS Are a Virtual SingleSystemThis article was reprinted from the CJIS Link,Volume 7, No 3 (April 2004) with permission fromthe FBI.

By now, nearly every member of lawenforcement is aware of a general national effortto increase information sharing and collaborationamong the various entities that bear theresponsibility for public safety. Since September11, 2001, the criminal justice community has set ahigh priority on improving and expanding itscommunications network as quickly as possible.But many may not be aware of the specificprograms in place to make that happen. Onesignificant advance occurred on September 1,2002, when the FBI's Law Enforcement OnLine(LEO) and the Regional Information SharingSystems (RISS) established an electronic interfacethat enables registered users to access bothsystems with a single log-on.

A major benefit of the LEO/RISS partnershipis a secure e-mail system for all users with ariss.net or leo.gov address. As the systemsexchange e-mail messages, the information isencrypted and then routed across a private circuit.Both LEO and RISS use the V-ONE SmartPasssoftware, which has made the task of developing atransparent interface less daunting. The twosystems update their virus scanning softwareevery hour, which provides another assurance ofsecurity.

LEO— background and resources

First established in 1995, LEO is a securesystem for e-mail communication, informationsharing and collaboration, and training designedexclusively for the law enforcement, criminaljustice, and public safety communities. LEOoffers e-Learning courses, chat rooms, andmembership in special interest groups (SIGs).SIGs are controlled-access areas for organizationsor disciplines in law enforcement to exchange anddisseminate information. For instance, many ofthe Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)Division's training manuals, handbooks, andtechnical and operational updates are available tousers on the CJIS SIG for downloading.

LEO experienced rapid growth in terms of thenumber of users and the amount of contentfollowing the terrorist attacks on September 11,2001. This growth occurred just as LEO wasreplacing its modem dial-up connectivity withVirtual Private Network (VPN) software, enablingusers to access the system through any Internetconnection. By December 2003, nearly 28,000individuals were logging on to the FBI's VPN.LEO provides access to a number of databasesthat are crucial to various groups in the lawenforcement community. Of note are the BombData Center, the Hostage/Barricade System, andthe Law Enforcement and Intelligence AgencyLinguist Access.

Additionally, LEO recently completedinterconnectivity with the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) Information Networkso that the DHS and the FBI can share tips. LEOhas also initiated a National Alert System thatprovides the law enforcement community withtime-sensitive alerts concerning national securityinformation within minutes of transmission fromFBI Headquarters.

Another recent enhancement was theinterconnectivity between LEO and theCounterterrorism Reporting on SuspiciousSurveillance system to capture cumulativeknowledge of suspicious surveillance incidentsreported by regional law enforcement andintelligence agencies.

RISS—background and resources

RISS, which was created by Congress in1974, consists of six regional centers that shareintelligence on various criminal enterprises thattypically operate across many jurisdictions. Eachof the centers operates within its own multistategeographic region by helping member agenciescombat terrorism, narcotics trafficking, organizedcrime, cybercrime, and other illegal activities.Together, the regional centers serve almost 6,800local, state, tribal, regional, and federal agencies,reaching all 50 states, the District of Columbia,U.S. Territories, Australia, Canada, and England.The RISS resources include, among others, theRISS criminal intelligence databases, othercriminal-specific and officer safety databases, an


investigative leads bulletin board, and analyticaldata visualization tools. Users access RISSresources via the secure Intranet, RISSNET, fornationwide law enforcement communication andinformation exchange.

During May 2003, RISS initiated the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (RISS ATIX) toprovide a secure means to disseminate nationalsecurity, disaster, and terrorist threat informationto an additional group of users. Participants in theATIX include governmental and nongovernmentalexecutives and officials involved with homelandsecurity, including but not limited to firedepartments, emergency management, utilities,the transportation industry, and law enforcement.

These users are provided access to specificresources available via RISSNET, including anonline real-time bulletin board for postinginformation, an ATIX Web site, and secure e-mail. In addition, all LEO and RISS lawenforcement users have access to the ATIXresources.

Conclusion

The LEO/RISS hookup received strongendorsements at the October 2003 conference ofthe International Association of Chiefs of Police(IACP). At the meeting, the U.S. AttorneyGeneral announced his approval of the NationalCriminal Intelligence Sharing Plan developed bythe Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG).(The GIWG operates under the auspices of theDepartment of Justice and the Global JusticeInformation Sharing Initiative [Global].) Includedin the Plan is a recommendation that LEO andRISS, functioning as a virtual single system,"provide the initial sensitive but unclassifiedsecure communications backbone forimplementation of a nationwide criminalintelligence sharing capability."

The FBI Director, the Secretary of the DHS,and other law enforcement agencies have publiclyendorsed the Plan. The DHS has announced plansto use RISSNET to post its daily reports andwarnings.

Importantly, the LEO and RISS connectionsupports bidirectional information sharing; that is,information flows seamlessly between the twosystems. The GIWG views this achievement as amajor step in the process of developingnationwide information sharing among lawenforcement and public safety agencies. A pilotproject is already underway to test a transparentinterface between RISS and the National LawEnforcement Telecommunications System, Inc.

The goal of the GIW G is to convince all local,state, tribal, regional, and federal agencies todevelop connectivity to this nationwide securecommunication network.

Last August, the FBI's National JointTerrorism Task Force (JTTF) program directedevery JTTF member, irrespective of the parentorganization, to acquire a LEO account. Further,the U.S. Attorneys, the Organized Crime DrugEnforcement Task Forces, and other lawenforcement agencies at every level have followedthe recommendation of the National CriminalIntelligence Sharing Plan: join both RISS andLEO in order to maximize information sharingand collaboration.

Law enforcement personnel interested inparticipating in LEO can contact Ms. StaceyDavis at (304) 625-2618 to request a LEO UserApplication Form or e-mail [email protected].

Agencies interested in participating in RISSshould contact their regional center. Contactinformation is available on the Internet at:www.iir.com/riss/RISS_centers.htm.�


The National InfraGard Program:Partnership for the FutureMultiple authorsInfraGard Programs Staff

I. Introduction

InfraGard is a Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) program that began in the Cleveland FBIField Office in 1996. The program began as alocal effort between the technology industry andacademia to gain support for the FBI'sinvestigative efforts in the cyber arena. Theprogram expanded to other FBI Field Offices and,in 1998, the FBI assigned the former NationalInfrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)responsibility for the national InfraGard program.Since then, InfraGard and the FBI have been seenas trustworthy and credible sources for theexchange of information concerning variousterrorism, intelligence, criminal, and securitymatters.

InfraGard, a partnership between the FBI andthe private sector, is an information-sharing andanalysis effort serving the interests of its membersand combining the knowledge base of a widerange of participants. InfraGard is an associationof businesses, academic institutions, state andlocal law enforcement agencies, and otherparticipants, dedicated to sharing information andintelligence to prevent hostile acts against theUnited States. InfraGard chapters aregeographically linked with FBI Field Officeterritories. Each InfraGard chapter is assigned anFBI Special Agent Coordinator who works closelywith Supervisory Special Agent ProgramManagers in the Cyber Division at FBIHeadquarters in W ashington, D.C.

While under the direction of NIPC, the focusof InfraGard was cyber infrastructure protection.After 9/11, NIPC expanded its efforts to includecombating physical, as well as cyber threats tocritical infrastructures. InfraGard's missionexpanded accordingly. In March 2003, NIPC wastransferred to the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS), which now has responsibility forCritical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) matters.The FBI kept InfraGard as an FBI sponsoredprogram, and will work with DHS in support of itsCIP mission, facilitating InfraGard's role in CIP

activities, and further developing InfraGard'sability to support the FBI's counterterrorism andcybercrime investigative missions.

II. Goals and objectives

The goal of InfraGard is to promote ongoingdialogue and timely communication betweenprogram members and the FBI. InfraGardmembers gain access to information that enablesthem to protect their assets; members in turn giveinformation that facilitates the government'sresponsibilities to prevent and address terrorismand other crimes. The relationship supportsinformation-sharing at national and local levelsand its objectives are to:

• increase the level of information and reportingbetween InfraGard members and the FBI onmatters related to counterterrorism, cybercrime, and other major crime programs;

• increase interaction and information sharingamong InfraGard members and the FBIregarding threats to the critical infrastructures,vulnerabilities, and interdependencies;

• provide members value-added threatadvisories, alerts, and warnings;

• promote effective liaison with local, state, andfederal agencies, including DHS; and

• provide members a forum for education andtraining on counterterrorism,counterintelligence, cyber crime, and othermatters relevant to informed reporting ofpotential crimes and attacks on the UnitedStates and its interests.

III. Local chapter activities

Each FBI Field Office has a Special AgentCoordinator who gathers interested companiesfrom a variety of industries to form a chapter. Anycompany can join InfraGard. Local executiveboards govern and share information within themembership. Chapters hold regular meetings todiscuss issues, threats, and other matters thatimpact their companies. Speakers from public andprivate agencies and the law enforcementcommunities are invited. Local chapters offervarious activities, including: training and


education initiatives, a local newsletter, and acontingency plan for using alternative systems inthe event of a successful large scale attack on theinformation infrastructure.

IV. InfraGard executive board

InfraGard members are represented nationallyby an elected board of seven representatives whoserve voluntary two-year terms. InfraGardExecutive Board (IEB) elections are held annuallyat the InfraGard National Congress. The IEBconducts weekly conference calls, and boardmembers travel to various chapters, participate inchapter activities, and attend conferencespromoting InfraGard and other issues pertinent tothe program.

The IEB established several committees toaddress membership, incorporation, andpartnership issues. Special Interest Groups (SIGs)have also been established to investigate thechallenges America faces in protecting itselfagainst criminal, terrorist, and intelligence threats.One such SIG involves InfraGard, the NationalInstitute of Standards and Technology (NIST), theSmall Business Administration, and the FBI.

V. InfraGard secure W eb site

The InfraGard secure Web site providesmembers with information about recent intrusionsand research related to critical infrastructureprotection. Members have the capability tocommunicate securely with other members.Louisiana State University has a contract tosupport the operation of a secure Virtual PrivateNetwork (VPN), which includes e-mail and a Website that enables InfraGard members and the FBIto exchange sensitive, but unclassified,information. Some of the Web site's featuresinclude: new items of interest, sector news,chapter news, discussion groups, archives andlibraries, contract information, and feedbackrequests.

VI. InfraGard public Web site

Please visit the InfraGard public Web site atwww.infraguard.net. This site provides the mostcomplete picture of the latest InfraGard initiativesand activities as well as helpful contactinformation for local InfraGard chapters acrossthe country.�

The Regional Information SharingSystems (RISS) and the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange(ATIX)Multiple authorsInstitute for Intergovernmental ResearchTallahassee, Florida

I. Introduction

Help has arrived! The Regional InformationSharing Systems (RISSTM) Program hasimplemented the Anti-Terrorism InformationExchange (ATIX). Following the terrorist attacksof 9/11, a need for a secure method to timelydisseminate information regarding terrorist threatsand homeland security information to governmentand nongovernmental executives and officials

became clear. To meet this need, RISS recentlyimplemented ATIX, available through its secureintranet, as the means to exchange nationalsecurity, disaster, and terrorist threat informationto law enforcement, first responders, and keycommunity officials.

RISS traditionally supports the investigativeand prosecution efforts of law enforcement andcriminal justice agencies. Six RISS centersoperate in distinct geographical regionsthroughout the country, assisting law enforcementand criminal justice member agencies withinvestigation and prosecution efforts. RISS


utilizes its secure intranet, RISSNETTM, as aninformation-sharing and communicationscapability for member agencies and participants ofother systems connected to RISSNET, such as theFBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system.

II. History of RISS

RISS began approximately twenty-five yearsago when cooperation and secure informationsharing among law enforcement agencies wasneeded to respond to specific regional crimeproblems. Since then, RISS has expanded,continuing to foster cooperation, communication,and information sharing between law enforcementand criminal justice member agencies throughoutthe country. RISS personnel share intelligence andcoordinate efforts to combat criminal networksthat operate across jurisdictional lines. Theregional orientation allows each center to offersupport services that are tailored to theinvestigative and prosecution needs of memberagencies, though the centers also provide servicesand products that are national in scope andsignificance. Typical targets of RISS memberagencies' activities are terrorism, drug trafficking,violent crime, cybercrime, gang activity, andorganized crime.

RISS is a federally-funded programadministered by the U.S. Department of Justice'sBureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). Each RISScenter must comply with the Department'sProgram Guidelines and the Criminal IntelligenceSystems Operating Policies, 28 C.F.R. Part 23(2003). The executive director and policy boardchairperson of each center make up the RISSDirectors National Policy Group, which has directcontrol over the policies and operations ofRISSNET and related resources.

Since inception, RISS membership has grownto serve nearly 7,000 law enforcement andcriminal justice agencies representing more than700,000 sworn officers. Membership includeslocal, state, federal, and tribal law enforcementmember agencies in all fifty states, the District ofColumbia, U.S. territories, Australia, Canada, andEngland.

In 1997, RISSNET was implemented. Today,many resources, in addition to the RISS databases,are available for electronic access by memberagencies. RISSNET features include online accessto a RISS bulletin board, databases, RISS centerWeb pages, secure e-mail, a RISS search engine,

and other center resources. Member agencyofficers must obtain a security package and enrollon RISSNET. As of April 2004, 16,000 usersnationwide have access to RISSNET.

During 1999, RISSNET expanded toelectronically connect state and federal lawenforcement agency systems in order to provideadditional resources to all users. In April 2004,sixteen High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas(HIDTAs), fifteen state agencies, and eight otherfederal and regional systems had establishedconnection to RISSNET.

The FBI LEO system interconnected withRISS in September 2002. In October 2003, theNational Criminal Intelligence Sharing Planrecommended the RISS/LEO system as the initialsensitive but unclassified (SBU) communicationsbackbone for implementation of a nationwidecriminal intelligence-sharing capability. The Planencourages agencies to connect their system toRISS/LEO.

Traditionally, RISS has focused on servinginvestigative and prosecution efforts of multi-jurisdictional criminal activity. In 2003 RISSimplemented ATIX to provide additional userswith access to homeland security, disaster, andterrorist threat information. RISS memberagencies, as well as executives and officials fromother first responder agencies and criticalinfrastructure entities, can access ATIX.

RISS has a long, established relationship withthe Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys and theU.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAOs). Both arecurrent members of RISS and have access toRISSNET and ATIX resources.

III. Overview of RISS ATIX

Utilizing RISSNET, ATIX provides a secureelectronic environment for executives andofficials to exchange ideas, documents, newsarticles, and the latest SBU information. Underthe National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan,the standards-based security methods employedby RISSNET have been approved and endorsedby the U.S. Attorney General, the Director of theFBI, the Secretary of the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security (DHS), and other officialsinvolved with law enforcement and homelandsecurity.


A. RISS-ATIX communities

Upon enrolling with RISS to use ATIX,participants choose an ATIX "community" group,which is tailored to their responsibilities inplanning and implementing prevention, response,mitigation, and recovery efforts related toterrorism and disasters. The current ATIXcommunities include:

• state, county, local, and tribal levels ofemergency management;

• law enforcement;

• government;

• utility services;

• the chemical industry; and

• the agriculture and food industry.

RISS is continually identifying additionalcommunities for access to ATIX, but current RISSATIX communities include:

• bioterrorism;

• fire departments;

C emergency medical providers;

C disaster relief organizations;

C special skill rescue units;

C state, county, local, and tribal public healthexecutives;

C environmental protection agencies;

C public and private utility services (water,power, and other);

C National Guard executives;

C agriculture and food industry organizations;

C banking and financing entities;

C chemical industries;

C education organizations (primary, secondary,and universities);

C hotel industries;

C postal and shipping organizations;

C private security industries;

C telecommunication industries;

C transportation industries;

C law enforcement or criminal justice agencies;

C certified police instructors;

C state, county, local, and tribal governmentexecutives;

C Federal Government executives and agencies;and

C state, county, local, and tribal emergencymanagement agencies.

B. All ATIX participants have access to secureelectronic bulletin boards, Web pages, and ane-mail account.

The electronic bulletin board provides aforum for participants to discuss terrorism,disaster, and homeland security information.Specific discussion conferences are maintained foreach ATIX community, and participants canimmediately view messages posted on the bulletinboard. This feature allows for rapidcommunication and response to breaking newsitems. Examples of postings include informationon items that people have attempted to passthrough security checkpoints and new securitymeasures that have been implemented.Additionally, the bulletin board has a chat feature,allowing for real-time discussion of current newsand events. Participants can also requestinformation from others visiting the bulletin boardor invite them to join a chat session.

The ATIX Web pages feature recent newsarticles, documents, a search capability, and thecurrent threat advisory level from DHS. Users areencouraged to submit information to the Webpage which would be of interest to otherparticipants, such as preparedness guidelines andplans for response to incidents. The Web pagesalso provide links to homeland security, terrorism,and disaster-related W eb sites. Links arecategorized by their corresponding ATIXcommunity and include national associations;police, fire, and public health agencies; andgovernment offices. Participants can subscribe tonewsletters published by other organizations toreceive additional information. Recently, DHSagreed to establish an interface with RISSNET topost its daily reports and warnings. A participant'scontact information is available on the Web pagein order to facilitate communication betweenparticipants within and outside of the USAOs.Contact information includes each participant'ssecure ATIX e-mail address, and informationregarding each ATIX state point of contact andRISS center.


All ATIX participants receive a secure e-mailaddress on RISSNET. E-mail can be directed to aspecific ATIX participant based on his geographiclocation, his role with respect to terrorismprevention and disaster relief, or his individualstatus within ATIX. Additionally, participants cansend secure, encrypted ATIX e-mail to all ATIXe-mail addresses and to any other secureRISSNET e-mail address.

IV. How to join ATIX

Currently over 16,000 individuals have accessto the ATIX resources. In order to facilitate thevital efforts to exchange information and promotehomeland security, participants should visit theATIX resources often to provide feedback andmake contributions that can be shared with otherparticipants.

For additional information regarding RISSand joining ATIX, please contact the ATIXcoordinator at the RISS center in your geographicregion:

Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized CrimeLaw Enforcement Network (MAGLOCLEN)serving Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan,New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, andthe District of Columbia. The center also hasmember agencies in England, and the Canadianprovinces of Ontario and Quebec, and Australia.

Phone: (215) 504-4910

E-mail: [email protected]

Mid-States Organized Crime InformationCenter (M OCIC) serving Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota,South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The center also hasmember agencies in Canada.

Phone: (417) 883-4383


New England State Police InformationNetwork (NESPIN) serving Connecticut, Maine,Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,and Vermont. The center also has memberagencies in Canada.

Phone: (508) 528-8200


Rocky Mountain Information Network(RM IN) serving Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and

Wyoming. The center also has member agenciesin Canada.

Phone: (602) 351-2320


Regional Organized Crime Information Center(ROCIC) serving Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, NorthCarolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, as well asPuerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Phone: (615) 871-0013


Western States Information Network (WSIN)serving Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, andWashington. The center also has member agenciesin Canada, Australia, and Guam.

Phone: (916) 263-1166


V. Conclusion

The ATIX services can be used to providesecure and rapid information sharing amongUSAOs and other participants. As breaking newsdevelops, the RISS-ATIX Web pages can bemodified to provide information relevant tocurrent events, including news articles and links toadditional resources. The ATIX bulletin boardallows for real-time communication among all theparticipants, and participants can direct questionsand information to individuals and communitiesof users using the secure e-mail feature.Participants should actively contribute valuableinformation, such as bulletins, guidelines, alerts,links, and information related to homelandsecurity, on the ATIX bulletin board and Web siteto aid other participants in their homeland securityand disaster-preparedness efforts.�

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

�Several staff members at the Institute forIntergovernmental Research (IIR) contributed tothis article. IIR provides training, research, andanalysis services to the Regional InformationSharing Systems (RISS) Program through thesupport of grant awards from the Bureau ofJustice Assistance.

IIR is a research and training organizationspecializing in law enforcement, juvenile justice,


and criminal justice issues. IIR is a nonprofitcorporation formed in 1978 and chartered inFlorida, with headquarters in Tallahassee, Florida.

IIR is specifically organized to conductnonpartisan research and management studiesregarding the role and function of the branchesand agencies of local, state, and FederalGovernment, and to support the development andenhancement of governmental effectiveness.a

Interoperability AGILE-ityReprinted From Fall 2002 TechBeat

T hirty-plus years ago, when police radioswere under-powered and cumbersome,one officer voiced his frustration about

his inability to communicate with fellow officersthis way: "Mission Control could talk toastronauts on the moon, but we couldn't talk toour partners around the corner, less than a blockaway."

Today police radios are certainly smaller andmuch more powerful. But improvements intechnology have not eliminated the issue ofinteroperability— the capacity of public safetyagencies at all levels to communicate acrossjurisdictions. This country's law enforcementagencies, emergency medical services, and firedepartments operate on different frequencies, usedifferent equipment, and follow different policiesand procedures, making communication andcoordination between agencies and acrossjurisdictions very difficult.

AGILE, a National Institute of Justice (NIJ)project, is trying to make interoperability muchless difficult.

"Interoperability is a complex situation thathas been evolving over the years," says TomCoty, AGILE program manager. "It's complex notonly because of the sheer number of agencies, butalso because they are in different points in the lifecycle of their equipment. One may have abrand-new system, while another nearby agencyhas equipment that is 15 to 20 years old."

According to Coty, most public safetyprofessionals would say they have experiencedproblems communicating with others in theirfield. Each agency, however, faces different

interoperability issues, such as outdatedequipment and no funds to buy new equipment;city police and fire department radios that operateon different frequencies; cell phones that allowdifferent agencies to talk to one another, but havesignificant access problems during critical events;and existing communication links betweenagencies, but no policies or procedures that coverwhen and how to use them.

For most public safety agencies, Coty says,the biggest problems stem from incompatibleradio frequencies and lack of funds to buy newequipment.

The Federal Communications Commission(FCC) licenses radio frequencies for allnon-Federal users of the radio spectrum, includingpublic safety agencies, commercial radio andtelevision stations, business radios, and more. Thespectrum is a range of frequencies used forcommunications. It is a finite resource dividedinto bands, 10 of which are for public safetyagencies' use. Within those bands, the FCClicenses the frequencies or channels used by eachagency. Frequency is measured in terms ofmillions of cycles per second, or megahertz(MHz).

No commercially available radio operates inall 10 bands available to the public safetycommunity. Some radios made by differentmanufacturers cannot even communicate witheach other within the same band. This leads totemporary "fixes," such as installing numerousradios in ambulances and patrol cars so theiroccupants can talk to everyone else in an area.Another commonly used fix, the dispatch relay,uses a third party to relay messages from oneagency to another. These solutions are


cumbersome and expensive. They use up precioustime that could allow a suspect to escape or a fireto spread.

Technology solutions to interoperabilityproblems are becoming more common. Onesolution employs a cross-band-repeater system,which receives a transmission on one frequencyand automatically retransmits it on a different one.Unfortunately, law enforcement and other publicsafety agencies often do not know which newtechnologies can help them, or even that thesetechnologies exist.

In 1998, NIJ's National Law Enforcement andCorrections Technology Center(NLECTC)–Rocky Mountain completed anintensive study of interoperability issues, Stateand Local Law Enforcement WirelessCommunications and Interoperability: AQuantitative Analysis. NIJ used the study tolaunch the AGILE program, which consolidatesall NIJ interoperability initiatives into acoordinated effort to help federal, state, and locallaw enforcement agencies communicate and shareinformation. AGILE, originally InteroperabilityAGILE-ity, stood for Advanced Generation ofInteroperability for Law Enforcement, but itstarget audience has expanded to include all publicsafety agencies.

"AGILE facilitates information sharing andprovides support to professionals, giving them theability to help themselves," Coty says. Nationally,that can mean providing support to public safetyassociations and their leaders; locally, it can meanoffering one-on-one technology assistance.AGILE uses a three-part approach to implementits mission:

• Research, development, testing, andevaluation of technology solutions.

• Standards identification, development, andadoption.

• Outreach and technology assistance.

No single fix can solve complexinteroperability issues for everyone, Coty says. Atany point in time, AGILE has more than 30projects and initiatives in various stages ofdevelopment. One of them may provide just thesolution an agency needs.

Interoperability Technology

Coty says public safety personnel often learnabout new technologies by viewing ademonstration at a conference or by reading aboutnew equipment in a journal. Agencies may notknow who developed the technology, whether itwill work with their systems, or where to find outmore about it. They can begin their research onthe AGILE website at www.agileprogram.org.

The AGILE site includes a section that listssite updates and the latest interoperability news.The site provides access to AGILE reports andprinted materials and offers information on grantsand funding, interoperability standards, theNational Task Force on Interoperability, and a listof related links. It also provides updates onAGILE research projects, including the following:

• ACU–1000 Testbed Program. The City ofAlexandria (Virginia) Police Department hasserved as a testbed for several potentialinteroperability communications solutions,including the ACU–1000, an audio gatewaysystem that ties together incompatible radiosystems. The ACU–1000 provided coverageat the inauguration of President George W.Bush, linking the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S.Capitol Police, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, and other agencies. Alexandriawill soon test two new systems: Lyric, aMotorola product to link Motorolatechnology, and Incident Command RadioInterface (ICRI), a Communications AppliedTechnology product. Although similar to theACU–1000, the portable ICRI system can runits briefcase-sized unit on AA batteries for upto 24 hours.

• CAPRAD. In the Balanced Budget Act of1997, Congress directed the FCC to reallocate24 MHz of spectrum in the 700 MHz band forpublic safety use. Now used by UHFtelevision channels 60 to 69, this spectrumwill become available within the next severalyears. In anticipation of the release of thisspectrum, the National Public SafetyTelecommunications Council (NPSTC) andthe Public Safety Communications Councilrequested the development of aComputer-Assisted Precoordination Resourceand Database (CAPRAD) to facilitateinterregional coordination in the allotment offrequencies. NLECTC–Rocky Mountainrecently completed this database, which will


have secure Internet access, and is nowworking on database distribution andorientation.

• CAPWIN. Several years ago, a manthreatened to commit suicide by jumping fromthe Capital Beltway's Woodrow WilsonBridge. Agencies from Maryland, Virginia,and the District of Columbia ran intonumerous interoperability problems whiletrying to coordinate rescue efforts anduntangle a rush-hour traffic jam. Thisincident, among others, triggered the requestto create the Capital Wireless IntegratedNetwork (CAPWIN). CAPWIN will integrateexisting data and voice communicationsystems into the Nation's first multistateintegrated wireless data network devoted totransportation and public safety. Research anddevelopment are now under way at theUniversity of Maryland, the University ofVirginia, and George Mason University. Thegoal is to make this network a model that canbe replicated in other regions of the country.

• COPLINK. Developed through a joint effortbetween the University of Arizona and theTucson Police Department, COPLINKKnowledge Management System softwareuses the Internet to link member databases.The COPLINK Connect module allowsreal-time information sharing across anetwork of records management systems thatuse different software and parameters. TheCOPLINK Detect module provides advanceddata analysis. For example, one can search forinformation on white two-door cars andinformation on sex offenders known tofrequent school playgrounds, then search formatches between the two.

• INFOTECH. INFOTECH, an NIJ researchand development project completed in FY2001, developed tools and technologies to tietogether disparate legacy systems to permitinformation sharing with appropriatesecurity/privacy. Software and data modelsfrom this project are freely available.INFOTECH uses Java™software andencryption to allow searching with a simpleInternet browser and offers real-time access tocriminal history information, motor vehicleregistration information, driver's licenseinformation, and local agency data.Participating agencies decide what

information to make available to othermembers. Sheriff's departments in Monroe,Broward, and Brevard Counties in Floridaprovided an early demonstration of thissystem. Virginia's Tidewater region; theCharleston, South Carolina, region; the Stateof Oregon; and the cities of San Diego andLos Angeles all have deployed INFOTECHbased solutions for their information-sharingneeds.

• Software-Defined Radios. AGILE staff arehelping to develop and evaluate a newgeneration of communications devices knownas Software Defined Radios (SDRs). SDRs,which can be quickly reprogrammed totransmit and receive on multiple frequenciesin different transmission formats, couldchange the way users communicate acrosswireless services and promote more efficientuse of the radio spectrum. In SDRs, functionsthat were formerly carried out solely byhardware, such as the generation of thetransmitted radio signal and the tuning of thereceived radio signal, are performed bysoftware. Because these functions are carriedout by software, the radio is programmable,allowing it to transmit and receive over a widerange of frequencies and to emulate virtuallyany desired transmission format.

Interoperability Standards

Just as the research and development portionof AGILE includes many components, itsStandards Project reviews and analyzes standardsrelated to all of the many facets ofinteroperability. The project's goal is to identifyand create comprehensive interoperabilitystandards for NIJ adoption. Coty says thatalthough some new standards may need to bedeveloped, most interoperability standards alreadyhave been created by such organizations as theTelecommunications Industry Association (TIA)through the development work of the Associationof Public Safety Communications Officers(APCO) and the Institute of Electrical andElectronics Engineers. AGILE is supportingseveral standards development projects,including—

• Project 25, an APCO effort that developed aninterface standard for digital radios withbackwards compatibility to analog andmanufacturers' legacy systems.


• Project MESA , is a TIA/EuropeanTelecommunications Standards Instituteinitiative to create specific requirements forbroadband transmission. Increased use ofbroadband transmission could allow rapidstreaming of videos and images to lawenforcement personnel in the field.

• XML-Based Standards for IntegratedJustice, jointly supported by the Bureau ofJustice Assistance and AGILE, is a project ofthe Infrastructure and Standards WorkingGroup of the Global Advisory Committee tofacilitate the sharing of justice informationand integration of justice information systemsamong Federal, State, and regionaljurisdictions; establish ground floorinformation standards; guide and assist justiceand public safety information systemsdevelopers; and further other efforts to sharejustice information.

Interoperability Outreach and Assistance

AGILE outreach, like research anddevelopment and standards development,encompasses many elements. Outreachcomponents include the website, conferencepresentations, and telephone assistance.Additionally, in response to requests from publicsafety agencies, AGILE dispatches experts toassess agencies' capabilities and proposesolutions, Coty says. "Often, a lot of the solutionsare fairly simple. For example, the agency may bedealing with vendors who sell new equipment. Wesend out an engineer who will sit at the table withthem during vendor discussions. This expert hasonly their interests in mind."

Technical experts also visit sites once theequipment is in place, Coty says. After theequipment is set up, it is important that the agencywork out agreements with other nearby units,develop a policy on use of the new equipment,and practice and train for its use. Outreach andassistance projects include—

• National Task Force on Interoperability. Inan effort to improve public safety radiocommunications, NIJ, supported by 17national associations, cosponsored the 2001National Public Safety WirelessInteroperability Forum in October 2001.Forum participants were predominantly Stateand local elected and appointed officials andrepresentatives from the public safety

community. Its goals were to raise publicsafety wireless interoperability issues to thenational level and to give participants theopportunity to develop a list of actions thatcould be taken to overcome the policy barriersto improving public safety wirelesscommunications.

The forum received such a positive responsethat NIJ continued the effort by funding thecreation of a National Task Force onInteroperability (NTFI). NTFI's vision is tofoster cooperation among Federal, State,regional, and local public safety agenciesthrough the development and use ofinteroperable communications systems. Itsmission is to help public safety agenciesachieve communications interoperability.NTFI serves as a conduit between State andlocal officials, their representativeassociations, Federal officials, and publicsafety and industry representatives to create aunified policy front and facilitate resultingactions. To accomplish this, NTFI willeducate State and local officials and theirrepresentative associations about the benefitsof interoperability, assist them in addressingthe policies needed to overcome currentbarriers, and provide a forum forpolicymakers to work with the public safetycommunity to address interoperability issues.

• NPSTC Support Office. AGILE also fundedthe creation of the NPSTC Support Office(NSO) in FY 2000. NSO fills the role ofsecretariat for NPSTC, a federation of 17associations that represents the national publicsafety community in wirelesscommunications.

• Interoperability Assessment for the State ofTexas. In conjunction with the Sheriffs'Association of Texas and the State of Texas,AGILE is surveying the existing infrastructureand proposing solutions to interoperabilityissues. In addition to building partnershipsamong associations throughout the State, thisproject will develop a how-to guide forinteroperability projects statewide.

Technology, standards, and outreach andassistance add up to AGILE's mission to solve theproblems related to interoperability, problems thatalso include a lack of available spectrum andfunding for new equipment. "Technology isn't thestumbling block," Coty says. "You can overcome


technology issues. The really hard task is workingout the policies and their day-to-day execution."

For more information on AGILE, visit theAGILE website at www.agileprogram.org.

The National Law Enforcement and CorrectionsTechnology Center System Your TechnologyPartner, www.justnet.org, 800–248–2742 �

This article was reprinted from the Fall 2002edition of TechBeat, the award-winning quarterlynews magazine of the National Law Enforcementand Corrections Technology Center system, aprogram of the National Institute of Justice underCooperative Agreement #96–MU–M U–K011,awarded by the U.S. Department of Justice.

Analyses of test results do not representproduct approval or endorsement by the NationalInstitute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice;the National Institute of Standards andTechnology, U.S. Department of Commerce; orAspen Systems Corporation. Points of view oropinions contained within this document are thoseof the authors and do not necessarily represent theofficial position or policies of the U.S.Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is acomponent of the Office of Justice Programs,which also includes the Bureau of JusticeAssistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, andOffice for Victims of Crime.a

Forensic EpidemiologyFrancis D. SchmitzFirst Assistant United States AttorneyEastern District of Wisconsin

I. Introduction

The anthrax attacks and other biologicalthreats and hoaxes that occurred throughout theUnited States in the fall of 2001 requiredunprecedented cooperation between lawenforcement, first responders, public safetyofficials, and public health agencies. Theresponses to such threats affirmed manysimilarities in the investigative methods used byboth law enforcement and public health officials,but the events also highlighted significantdifferences in the ways that each responderapproaches a problem. In order to increase theeffectiveness of responses to possible futurebiological threats, the United States Centers forDisease Control Prevention (CDC) thought itnecessary to foster improved understanding of theinvestigative goals and methods used by eachdiscipline and strengthen interdisciplinarycollaboration. In the spring of 2002, the Public

Health Law Program of the CDC, in partnershipwith the Department of Justice (Department) andother agencies, undertook to develop a course forthe joint training of law enforcement and publichealth officials. (Further information on the PublicHealth Law Program can be found atwww.phppo.cdc.gov/od/phlp). This course hasoften been referred to as the "ForensicEpidemiology" course.

II. How the course works

Once the course was developed, it pilotedsuccessfully in Chapel Hill, North Carolina;Jacksonville, Florida; Baltimore, Maryland; andLos Angeles, California.

Frank Whitney, the United States Attorney forthe Eastern District of North Carolina,participated in the first trial and is a strongsupporter of the course. He states, "by spending aday and a half working through bioterrorismscenarios with the North Carolina stateepidemiologist, I learned how critical it was thatwe team up the investigative resources of lawenforcement and public health. In the case of a


real bioterrorism incident, time is too precious tobe meeting and coordinating with your publichealth colleagues for the first time." E-mail fromFrank Whitney to Francis Schmitz (April 17,2003).

In April 2003 the Department's Office ofLegal Education sponsored a "Train-the-CourseManagers" program in Atlanta, Georgia. EachU.S. Attorney's Office was invited to send arepresentative, along with a public health officialfrom the state and a weapons of mass destruction(WMD) coordinator from each FBI Division.

The first training session used presentationsabout criminal and public health laboratories andFBI investigations of WMD to establish acommon understanding of the goals, methods, andvocabulary used by both law enforcement andpublic health officials. Afterwards, theparticipants broke into small groups consisting ofan equal mix of public health and lawenforcement officials and facilitators. The groupswere then presented with three scenarios basedupon actual incidents. One scenario involvedfinding a suspicious letter containing whitepowder in DeKalb County, Georgia; another dealtwith the anthrax scare in Florida; and the thirdrecreated an Oregon cult's salmonella poisoningincident. In small groups, the participantsaddressed key objectives on a variety of issuesthat included:

• conducting an epidemiological investigation;

• responding to public health concerns at acrime scene;

• meshing criminal investigative procedureswith epidemiological, laboratory, and otherscientific procedures; and

• combining law enforcement and public healthoperations and communications.

Finally, the attendees reconvened in the thirdsession to combine their new skills and develop apossible after-action plan.

During the course, each attendee received atraining package that included: a CourseManager's Guide in both cd-rom and paperformat, and an instructional template that can beused in any jurisdiction in the United States. TheGuide provides:

• detailed information on course planning anddesign;

• template presentations and case studies;

• supplemental reference material; and

• logistical information.

Additionally, sample agendas, suggestions onwhich participants to include, and discussions onhow to modify the course to meet particularjurisdictional needs are provided. In the past,AUSAs gave the law enforcement for publichealth presentation, but the course is flexibleenough to have a local law enforcement officermake the presentation.

III. Impact

As of April 2004, sixty-five courses havebeen conducted throughout the nation in twenty-six states. Over 5,000 individuals have beentrained, and many other courses are being plannedand scheduled. The CDC has contracted withScience Applications International Corporation(SAIC) to provide assistance to public health andlaw enforcement officials involved in the planningof future training. The SAIC representative is Ms.Carey Mitchell, who can be reached at 770-936-3620 or by e-mail at Elizabeth.C.M [email protected]. Ms. Mitchell is willing and able to assistin any course planning, and she keeps agendasand training materials on file. She can alsoprovide a Forensic Epidemiology CourseManager's Guide if needed. Ms. Mitchell hasdesigned a one-day course that is available todistricts. The instructional template made it easyto design the course in conjunction with state andlocal public health officials. In Wisconsin, thematerials were tailored to include a briefintroductory presentation on terrorism threats.This presentation benefitted public healthattendees who normally do not receive suchinformation. Dr. Richard A. Goodman, Co-Director of the CDC Public Health Law Programcan also be contacted for assistance at 770-488-2624 or [email protected].

At a recent ATAC Coordinator's conference,many said that the lack of funds hampered thedistricts' ability to conduct the training. The CDC,however, has graciously provided funding througha bioterrorism cooperative agreement with eachstate health department that will assist in planningand implementing this training. State officials areadvised to check award number U90/CCU116972-040 for funds.


IV. Conclusion

Most prosecutors, law enforcement officers,and public health officials have never had anopportunity to work with one another. This coursewill not only expose these disciplines to eachother, but it will also build relationships necessaryto successfully work together in the event of abioterrorist threat. Given the interest that terroristorganizations have shown in biological andchemical weapons, it is therefore important thatforensic epidemiology training be conducted inevery district, with the support of the ATAC.�

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

�Francis D. Schmitz is the First AssistantUnited States Attorney and ATAC Coordinatorfor the Eastern District of Wisconsin where he hasbeen employed for over twenty years. Prior to histenure as a federal prosecutor he served as a lawclerk for a Seventh Circuit Court of Appealsjudge.a

PATRIOT–CounterterrorismTraining ProgramJim GreenleeUnited States AttorneyNorthern District of Mississippi

David CrewsLECC/Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Chief-Information OfficerUnited States Attorney's OfficeNorthern District of Mississippi

Tom BartlettAnti-Terrorism Coordinator for the SouthernRegional Public Safety Institute

Max FennIntelligence Research SpecialistUnited States Attorney's OfficeSouthern District of Mississippi

I. Introduction

In a terrorism training seminar shortly after9/11, an officer posed a question that shivered thespines of those from the United States AttorneyOffices (USAOs) who were teaching. Thequestion drove home the need for a top-notch,practical approach to strengthening lawenforcement's ability to understand, prevent, andinterdict terrorist plans and attacks. The officerasked, "This is good information, but I really don'tneed to be here. I'm a patrolman. What doesprevention and intel have to do with me?" Basedon this simple misunderstanding, Mississippi's

USAO Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils(ATACs) and Law Enforcement CoordinatingCommittees (LECCs) developed a coordinated,content-driven, practical seminar givingpatrolmen and other first responders the toolsneeded to identify, report, and prevent possibleterrorist activities.

II. Course overview

The prevention-oriented anti-terrorismtraining was aptly named "PATRIOT," anacronym standing for Preventive, Anti-TerrorismRecognition and Interdiction OperationalTechniques. The training was conducted fromJanuary through September 2003, and over 3,000personnel attended, including officers from lawenforcement, fire, hazardous materials (haz-mat)teams, emergency management, emergencymedical services, and school resource officers.

Training for first responders traditionally hasconcentrated on how to respond to an event orcrisis. PATRIOT's core goal was to give officers,agents, and first responders the tools andintelligence information to help prevent andinterdict terrorism.

PATRIOT training focuses on the followingthree tiers of prevention:

• preventing an attack from occurring;


• if an attack occurs, preventing first respondersand civilians from becoming additionalvictims; and

• learning evidence recognition andpreservation skills so that rescue efforts alsocan preserve evidence as much as possible.

With proper evidence, perpetrators can bebrought to justice quickly, thereby preventingfurther terrorism through successful prosecution.

Training the first responders in Mississippistrengthened their ability to work together in acommon effort to recognize and prevent terrorism.The two-day PATRIOT seminar was taught acrossthe state of Mississippi. The training was a jointeffort sponsored by the ATACs of the U.S.Attorneys' Offices for the Northern and SouthernDistricts of Mississippi, and co-sponsored by thefollowing agencies:

• the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

• the Mississippi State Department of Health;and

• the State Fire Academy and the MississippiEmergency Management Agency.

The Mississippi Department of Public Safety,the Southern Regional Public Safety Institute, theMississippi National Guard, the MississippiDepartment of Environmental Quality, the U.S.Marshals Service, and the Mississippi Board ofStandards and Training also were involved inPATRIOT's development and presentation. Thecombined efforts of all of these agencies made thePATRIOT seminar not only successful, but alsocost effective.

The training was held in fifteen locationsstatewide so that first responders were notrequired to travel over forty-five minutes to attendthe training. The training was made as accessibleas possible in order to maximize participationamong agencies.

PATRIOT was designed to train firstresponders "in concert" so that each disciplinemight appreciate the other's significant role inpreventing and responding to terrorism. The keydifference between PATRIOT training and othertraining is that the core focus of the seminars wason threat recognition and interdiction in order tofoster prevention. The sixteen-hour courseincluded topics such as terrorist cell structure,terrorist financing, intelligence considerations,

databases, information-sharing systems and theintelligence cycle, evidence preservation, haz-matissues, and public health threats when a terroristuses chemical, biological, radiological, andexplosive agents, as well as a wide variety ofother topics.

From the inception of PATRIOT, theimportance of having quality instruction andmaterials was paramount. The finished productencompassed twelve modules including content-rich materials coordinated with the instructors'presentations. Each module was prepared andtaught by certified instructors and subject-matterexperts, so that appropriate credit was receivedupon completion. Each participant received theinstructional manual, which can be used as areference guide.

Fundamental to the curriculum integrity andpremium quality of PATRIOT was intensivereview and critique by an expert team of multi-discipline evaluators. From the beginning,developers sought input from the Center forDomestic Preparedness (CDP) in structuring thecourse. CDP helped advise PATRIOT developershow the PATRIOT multi-agency team could buildits own prevention-based curriculum. It was atCDP's suggestion that developers opted for thetwo-day curriculum, as this time framerepresented the best balance between content andthe ability of most first responders to attend.

Tom Bartlett served as primary coursedeveloper. In addition to his present service asAntiterrorism Coordinator for the SouthernRegional Public Safety Institute, Tom is a long-time law enforcement officer who has also servedas a fireman, emergency medical technician, and ahaz-mat team leader. He served on the adjunctstaff of the Center for Domestic Preparedness andalso taught for the Department of Defense andother agencies. Tom worked directly with agencypersonnel in preparing the curriculum.

A two-day dress rehearsal of the program washeld with a "blue ribbon" team of approximatelyfifty multi-discipline evaluators from M ississippi.Originally, PATRIOT was to be taught withseparate break-out sessions for different firstresponder disciplines. However, at the conclusionof the dress rehearsal, evaluators unanimouslyagreed that they wanted to train togetherthroughout the entire course.


National evaluators from the followingagencies were invited to attend:

• State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training(SLATT);

• the Regional Information Sharing System(RISS);

• the Office of Domestic Preparedness inWashington, D.C.;

• the Center for Domestic Preparedness inAnniston, Alabama; and

• the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys(EOUSA).

Additionally, course developers stayed incontact and consultation with coordinators atEOUSA and the Department of Justice(Department) Counterterrorism Section (CTS)throughout the process. In February 2004 theprogram's progress and success was briefed toCTS, EOUSA and ODP. At each step, developershave looked for ways to "hone and refine."

III. Remarks and concurrent training

United States Attorney Jim Greenlee (N.D.Miss.) said, "PATRIOT Training being firstresponder training makes our law enforcement,fire, and EMS personnel much more effective incombating terrorism—the President's, theAttorney General's and the Nation's top priority. Ithas the additional benefit of fostering cooperationand of strengthening skills that will help us inmany other areas as well." State Fire Academy,Pearl, Miss. (Sept. 30, 2003). United StatesAttorney (S.D. Miss.) Dunn Lampton noted that"It is imperative that our focus be on theprevention of terrorist acts, and this trainingmakes all of us more vigilant and skilled inprevention efforts. Combined field training amongfire, law enforcement, and EMS to preventterrorism was unprecedented before PATRIOT,and should become a model for future teamworkand training in our state and across the Nation."State Fire Academy, Pearl, Miss. (Jan. 27, 2003).

Both District Offices in Mississippi have helda variety of antiterrorism training sessions thathave delved into specialized topics such asintelligence, suicide bombings, complexinvestigations, and Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD). Among the instructors at these seminarshave been David Harel of the Israeli SecurityAgency, Kim Durham of Scotland Yard, Bill

Lowry of the Intelligence Special Branch ofNorthern Ireland, Dick Marquise of the FBI (whoheaded the Lockerbie/Pan Am 103 investigation),Dr. Ahmed Hashim of the U.S. Naval WarCollege and Central Command (CentCom),Detective Sergeant Bob Fromme who launchedthe Hezbollah investigation in North Carolina,Chief Detective John Short of Crime OperationsNorthern Ireland, FINCEN instructors, and manyothers.

IV. PATRIOT training modules and specialmaterials

Module 0 Registration

Module 1 Introduction, Information Sharing& OPSEC

Includes special articles as follows:

• Overview of Information Sharing

• Regional Information Sharing Systems

• 9/11 Exposed Flaws in Rescue Plan

• Do Fire Departments Need OPSEC?

Module 2 Agency Coordination & IncidentCommand/NIIMS


• Techniques for Dealing with MediaRegarding Security Issues

Module 3 Terrorist Recognition, Interdiction& Prevention


• Guidance for Terrorist Surveillance Detection

• FBI Bulletin–Indicators of Al-QaedaSurveillance

• Clues to Al-Qaeda Cells Operating in U.S.

• Bold Tracks of Terrorism's Mastermind

• FBI Bulletin–Lone Extremists

• FBI Bulletin–Using W omen to Facilitate Al-Qaeda Operations

• FBI Bulletin–Increasing Potential in HateCrimes Against Arabs, Muslims & SikhAmericans

Module 4 Target Recognition, Interdiction &Prevention


Module 5 Haz-mat Targets & Prevention

Module 6 Bomb/Burn Injury Recognition &Prevention

Module 7 Weapon Recognition, Interdiction& Prevention


• Homeland Security InformationBulletin— Potential Indicators of ThreatsInvolving Vehicle Borne ImprovisedExplosive Devices

Module 8 Immigration Docum ents &Interactive Panel Scenarios

Module 9A Public Health Update

Module 9B Evidence Recognition &Preservation

Module 10 Bio/Chem Recognition,Preparedness & Prevention


• Countering Bioterrorism and Other Threats toFood Supply

• Hazardous Chemical Web sites

Module 11 Personal Protective Equipm ent &Decontamination Planning

Module 12 Introduction to TerroristOperations, CounterterrorismStrategies & Tactical Options


• Biological and Chemical Agents- QuickReference Guide

• Al Qaeda Training Tape Assessment

• FBI Bulletin—Refinement in Al-QaedaOperational Capabilities

• Suspicious Inquiries about Chemical Agents

• Al-Qaeda Bio-Chem, Radiological, NuclearThreat and Basic Countermeasures

• FBI Bulletin—Improvised Chemical andBiological Agents

• FBI Bulletin—Potential Improvised ChemicalWeapons Threat

Module 13 Interactive Panel InterdictionScenarios

Appendices

Tab 14 War on TerrorismAccomplishments—Establishing thePriority of Prevention

Tab 15 Federal Statutes RE: Counterterrorism


• U.S. Code Provisions Applicable to Terrorism

• Current Counterterrorism Legislation andInformation Resources

Tab 16 National Strategy for CombatingTerrorism

Tab 17 Emergency Responder Guidelines

Tab 18 Terrorist Financing, Organizations,Operations

Tab 19 Anti-Radiation Public Safety Primer

Tab 20 Training and Technical Assistance

Tab 21 Antiterrorism Funding and Equipment


• Training and Technical Assistance Resources

• MEMA Training Section and Application

Tab 22 Homeland Security

Tab 23 Citizen Preparedness & Web sites


• Department of Homeland Security

• Advisory System Color Code Chart

• Mississippi Homeland Security

• DHS Citizen Preparedness

• FBI War on Terrorism

• Mississippi Dept. of Public Safety

• American Red Cross

• Individual Preparedness for Orange Alert

• FEMA Preparedness Website

• Security Related Consideration for M anagers

• Emergency Procedures for Disabled Persons

• CJCS "Antiterrorism Personal ProtectionGuide: A Self-Help Guide to Antiterrorism"


V. Program learning objectives

The sixteen-hour PATRIOT program ispresented at the awareness level for firstresponders who may be in a position to detect pre-incident indicators of a terrorist threat, andprevent initial or additional threats and acts ofterrorism. At the conclusion of this trainingprogram, the participant should be able to:

A. Understand the need for a local anti-terrorism prevention initiative, understand thegeneral characteristics of terrorist threats, andidentify terrorist recognition param eters.

• Identify the objectives of the United StatesAttorney's Office in preventing future terroristattacks through the Anti-Terrorism AdvisoryCouncil (ATAC) concept.

• Understand the significance of local firstresponders functioning as partners in theprevention of terrorist threats or acts.

• Identify past terrorist events and understandhow both foreign and domestic terrorismposes a potential threat to the United States.

• Understand suicide bomber motives andidentify potential terrorist recognition factors.

B. Recognize hazardous m aterials incidents.

• Understand what hazardous materials are, aswell as the risks associated with thesematerials in a terrorist or emergency incident.

• Identify if hazardous materials are present in aterrorist emergency incident.

• Know how to use the North AmericanEmergency Response Guidebook (NAERG)published by the U.S. Department ofTransportation to recognize potential terroristhaz-mat targets.

• Use the NAERG, or other available resources,to identify the hazardous material that mightbe targeted by terrorists.

• Understand the potential outcomes orconsequences of the terrorist event oremergency due to the presence of hazardousmaterials.

C. Know the protocols used to detect thepotential presence of Weapons of MassDestruction (WMD) agents or materials.

• Understand what WMD agents or materialsare and the risks associated with thesematerials in an emergency incident.

• Know the indicators and effects of WMD onindividuals and property. Be able to recognizesigns and symptoms common to initialvictims of a W MD-related incident.

• Know the physical characteristics orproperties of WMD agents or materials thatcould be reported by victims or other personsat the scene.

• Be familiar with the potential uses and meansof delivery of W MD agents or materials.

• Know locations or properties that couldbecome targets for persons using WMDagents or materials.

• Recognize unusual trends or characteristicswhich might be pre-incident indicators or anactual event involving WMD agents,destructive devices or materials.

D. Know and follow self-protection measuresfor WMD events and hazardous m aterialsevents.

• Understand the hazards and risks toindividuals and property associated withWMD agents and hazardous materials.Recognize the signs and symptoms ofexposure to WMD agents and hazardousmaterials.

• Understand the requirements and proper useof personal protective equipment (PPE) whichmay be issued to the responder. Understandthe limitations of this equipment in protectingsomeone exposed to WMD agents orhazardous materials.

• Understand the purpose and types ofdecontamination, the importance of isolatingcontaminated persons from those who are notcontaminated, and tactical considerationsduring the decontamination process.

• Understand the roles of different types of firstresponders, as well as other levels of responsein preventing and preparing for an emergencyas well as emergency responses.


• Be familiar with his agency's emergency planand procedures, the individual officer's role inthose procedures, the Incident CommandSystem (ICS), and integration of the FBI intothe event.

• Know what defensive measures to take duringa WMD or hazardous materials incident tohelp ensure personal and community safetythrough the ATAC and Joint Terrorism TaskForce (JTTF) concepts.

E. Know procedures for protecting a potentialcrime scene.

• Understand and implement procedures forprotecting evidence and minimizingdisturbance of the potential crime scene whileprotecting others. Understand the roles,responsibilities, and jurisdictions, of federalagencies related to a WMD event.

• Protect physical evidence such as bombfragments, contaminated clothing, relevantcontainers, and other potential evidence items.

• Recognize witnesses and bystanders anddocument for later interviewing.

F. Know and follow agency/organization'sscene security and control procedures forWMD and hazardous m aterial events.

• Understand the agency/organization's sitesecurity and scene control procedures forawareness level trained personnel. Followthese procedures for ensuring scene securityand for keeping unauthorized persons awayfrom the scene and adjacent hazardous areas.Such procedures include cordoning off thearea to prevent anyone from inadvertentlyentering the scene. Maintain scene securityand control until a higher authority arrives atthe scene.

• Be familiar with the agency's incidentcommand procedures.

• Know and follow the agency's procedures forisolating the danger area. Know how to dealwith contaminated victims until a higherauthority arrives.

• Recognize that the incident or event scenemay be a crime scene and that evidence mustbe protected and undisturbed until a higherauthority arrives and takes control.

G. Possess and know how to properly useequipment to contact a dispatcher or higherauthorities to report information collected atthe scene and to request additional assistanceor emergency personnel.

• Understand the need to contact the dispatcheror higher authorities to apprise them of asituation, at the scene, and to requestadditional assistance and personnel toproperly deal with the event.

• Understand how to accurately describe aWMD event.

• Have an awareness of the availableemergency assets within the affectedjurisdiction(s) nearest the event location.

• Know when to request additional help andfollow the agency's emergency planprocedures for establishing incident command

• Know how to notify the communicationscenter or dispatcher and to assess the degreeof hazard to obtain appropriate additionalresources.

VI. Course delivery w ith budget constraints

PATRIOT was developed and deliveredutilizing the Fiscal Year 2003 funding allotted toeach U.S. Attorney's Office. Acknowledging thatadditional ATAC monies will be unavailable inthe foreseeable future, districts need to utilizeinnovative strategies to deliver the training. Giventhat the PATRIOT curriculum templates arealready developed, only specific geographiccontent tailoring and future updates are needed toadapt the program to any federal judicial district.Of course, partnership with other key federal,state, and local agencies is both a key to costefficiency, as well as a significant program goal initself.

The incentive for partner agencies to provideinstructors free-of-charge is a relatively easy andhighly credible venue to educate first respondersabout particular capabilities and services. Withmany agencies working together, no one agencyhas to do too much, and instructors need onlyattend the sessions for which they are responsible.PATRIOT is also a way for partner agencies tosatisfy any outside training requirements theiragencies may have.

Teamwork and closer relationships are alsobuilt through pro bono use of public facilities forclassrooms and other training space. For example,


when a local government allows free use of itscommunity civic center, everyone is seen ascontributing to the global war on terrorism in ateam effort.

Printing course book materials typically is themost significant cost concern. In Mississippi, thisissue was satisfied by one of the primary trainingpartners, the Mississippi State Department ofHealth. Since the course included significantHealth Department training, conducted by HealthDepartment personnel, the Department alloweduse of its in-house printing shop, and the onlyexpense for other partners was the cost of paper.This example of partnership provided a dramaticcost savings while also helping create closerrelationships between the partner agencies.

Distributing the course book appendices on acomputer compact disc can also reduce printingcosts. While the entire course book could bereduced to compact disc, it is highlyrecommended that at least the PowerPointclassroom handout sheets be printed, so studentsmay refer to prior slides in class. Of course, if theclass size is small enough, a district might opt tophotocopy the materials on its own in-houseequipment. However, it is strongly recommendedto use an agency partner's in-house printer if theabove arrangement is possible in your jurisdiction.

ATACs should consult LECC managers,budget/procurement specialists, and ethicsadvisors to determine an appropriate process forfunding remaining expenses. A local agency oragency association may be willing to cover coursematerials and refreshments for a nominal fee.Depending on the expected size of the class andlocal government constraints, it may be possiblefor a local agency or agency association to serveas a sponsor and supply basic light refreshments.The program agenda for each training sessionshould then credit these agencies for their serviceand commitment.

VII. Program completion and availability

Work presently is underway to develop a"train-the-trainer" package for PATRIOT.Included in the complete course package will bean electronic copy of each template needed tosuccessfully tailor and deliver PATRIOT toaudiences in any federal judicial district. Includedwill be the following materials:

A. Overview/production notes

• Organizing Partnerships

• Recruiting Tips

• Site Location

• Working on a "Shoe String" or on a "Next-to-Nothing" Budget

• Choosing Sites

• Publicizing

B. Prom otional products

• Brochure/Registration Form

• E-mail/FAX Promo Flyer

C. Registration

• Sign-in Sheet

• "ID Required" Table Tent

• Name Tags

D. Press packet

• Program "Kick-Off" Sample Release

• Training On-Site Sample Release

• Tips on Working with Media

• Sample Video Clips

• Sample Press Clippings

E. Classroom posters

• JTTF/ATAC Comparison

• Sponsoring Agencies

• Title Poster

• State Map of Training Sites

F. Handouts and inform ation table

• ROCIC Publications (The RegionalOrganized Crime Information Center is acomponent of RISS, the Regional InformationSharing System)

• Information Table Tent

• Tips on Potential Agency Publications, etc.

G. Textbook inserts

• Color Cover & Spine

• Color Front page

• Front Text Sample Materials (Agenda,Contents, Key Contacts, etc)

• Supporting Articles

• Appendices


H. PowerPoint slides

• CD-ROM in numeric module order

• Instructor notes for PowerPoint slides

I. DVD set with videos of seasoned instructorsteaching each m odule

J. Completion Certificate

Instructor notes for PowerPoint slides arebeing generated as of this writing, and will beavailable in the near future. Additionally, thecourse will be submitted to the Office of DomesticPreparedness for ODP certification. It is theopinion of course developers that a partnershipbetween the key players of the ATACs, theprofessional education infrastructure of the ODP,and the Department's Office of Legal Education,is the best way to give IMPACT maximumavailability and ease of accessibility.

Should an organization be interested in thePATRIOT curriculum, this sixteen-hour course iseasily adapted for training sponsors, such asATACs, State Departments of Homeland Security,or other organizations interested in cohesive andjoint training geared toward prevention,interdiction, and coordination of first responders.The course's template can be tailored and adaptedto the needs and realities of any jurisdiction. Forfurther information, contact David Crews or PaulRowlett in the Northern District of Mississippi at(662) 234-3351, or Stan Harris or M ax Fenn inthe Southern District of Mississippi at (601) 965-4480.�

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

�Jim Greenlee serves as the US Attorney for theNorthern District of M ississippi. Prior to hisappointment, he served as an AUSA in the districtfor fourteen years.

�David Crews serves as the LECC Coordinatorand ATAC Chief Information Officer for theNorthern District of M ississippi. Prior toassuming that position, he was a U.S. Marshal.

�Tom Bartlett serves as the Anti-Terrorismcoordinator for the Southern Regional PublicSafety Institute in Long Beach, MS. He is acertified DOD/DOJ HAZMAT instructor.

�Max Fenn serves as the Intelligence ResearchSpecialist for the Southern District of M ississippi.Prior to his assignment in 2002, he servedseventeen years in the military, with tours in U.S.Marine Force Reconnaissance and U.S. ArmySpecial Forces.a


IMPACT—Intensive Marine PortArea Counter-Terrorism Program Stan HarrisFirst Assistant United States AttorneyUnited States Attorney's OfficeSouthern District of Mississippi

Max FennIntelligence Research SpecialistUnited States Attorney's OfficeSouthern District of Mississippi

Robert J. ArndtPort Security SpecialistU.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety OfficeMobile, Alabama

Tom BartlettAnti-Terrorism Coordinator Southern Regional Public Safety Institute(SRPSI)Long Beach, Mississippi(SRPSI is a division of the University ofSouthern Mississippi and the HarrisonCounty Sheriff's Department.)

I. Introduction

The attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and those of9/11 illustrate the susceptibility of maritime portsto direct attack, and to the illegal movement ofpeople and material supporting terrorist andcriminal activity. Additionally, the use of lawfulmaterials (e.g., fertilizer bombs) in domesticterrorism, frequent attempts to steal anhydrousammonia, and other increasing risks to port areainfrastructure, have made safeguarding our portsone of the top national priorities.

The specialized issue and limited resourcechallenges facing maritime ports show a criticalneed for teamwork among health, safety, andsecurity professionals. If these entities worktogether to share pertinent information, ports willbe better equipped to prevent terrorist threats.

The Intensive Marine Port AreaCounter-Terrorism Program (IMPACT) is afield-delivery training program focused onpre-incident indicators and prevention. The course

was developed through a cooperative effortbetween the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office(MSO) in Mobile, Alabama, and theAnti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs) ofthe Southern District of Alabama, the NorthernDistrict of Florida, and the Northern and SouthernDistricts of Mississippi. Mobile's MSO NortheastGulf of Mexico Regional Maritime SecurityCommittee includes representatives from each ofthe ATACs, and has subcommittees whichrepresent each of the major port areas in thesefederal judicial districts.

After the success of the PreventiveAnti-Terrorism Recognition and InterdictionOperational Techniques (PATRIOT) Program inMississippi, the ATACs decided to use remainingFiscal Year 2003 funds to implement IMPACT.The course was designed for:

• port health, safety, and security professionals;

• security guards;

• dispatchers, and managers of public andprivate facilities;

• fire, health, haz-mat, and emergencymanagers; and

• law enforcement officers.

IMPACT was intended to meet specific needsof both coastal and inland maritime ports. Thecourse may be taught alone or in conjunction withPATRIOT training. IMPACT trains port areaprofessionals to work together to implement keyprevention principles. They are taught what tolook for, whom to contact, and how to reportsuspicious activity. The training is cooperativelysponsored by federal, state, and localgovernments, and is offered free of charge. Whilethe program also enjoys strong private sectorcooperation, it has not accepted private financialsupport.

IMPACT's team of multi-disciplinary federal,state, and local officials provide an overview ofnew regulations under the MaritimeTransportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-295,116 Stat. 2064, and they teach others how torecognize terrorist conduct, potential local targets,


terrorist weapons, and pre-incident indicators.They also teach basic prevention and interdictionsteps to help avoid or minimize a successfulterrorist attack against targets in a local port area.

Participants who complete both days ofinstruction receive a multi-agency certificate ofcompletion. In addition, continuing education(CE) credit may be available from participatingstate certification agencies.

II. Development and delivery

The IMPACT program was designed topromote information sharing, one of the vital keysin preventing terrorism. It was developed as aresult of extensive research into existinggovernment training programs and nationalstandards, and the program became the firstcounterterrorism course of its kind specificallytailored to educate first responders and privatesecurity professionals. Previously, no governmentfield training counterterrorism program existed inwhich all first responders and private securityprofessionals could train together with anemphasis on prevention. With broad use ofpartnerships and funding from the ATACs,IMPACT was able to overcome the initialchallenges of finding funding, gaining agencysupport, preparing instructors, producing coursematerials, and arranging training schedules andlocations.

In September 2003 a two-day format wasdesigned in order to conform to agency fundingconstraints and personnel logistics. Typically, twodays is the most training time a first responderagency can devote for significant numbers of itspersonnel. The IMPACT curriculum was designedto compliment PATRIOT and a student canprofitably attend both programs. PATRIOT is ageneral counterterrorism training program;IMPACT focuses on the issues unique to maritimeport areas.

Tom Bartlett, the Antiterrorism Coordinatorfor the Southern Regional Public Safety Institute,served as the IMPACT professional coursedeveloper. Tom is a longtime law enforcementofficer who has also served as a fireman, anemergency medical technician, and a haz-matteam leader. He served on the adjunct staff of theCenter for Domestic Preparedness and taught forthe Department of Defense before serving as adeveloper and instructor for the PATRIOTProgram. His wealth of knowledge and experiencehas contributed to the success of IMPACT.

In November 2003 the full sixteen-hourIMPACT program was presented to a thirtymember review panel comprised of federal, state,and local agencies, as well as private sectorsecurity professionals, who critiqued a "dressrehearsal" of the entire two-day curriculum. Afterincorporating the panel's changes into thecurriculum, the course was presented fromNovember 2003 to January 2004 in:

• Mobile, Alabama;

• Panama City, Florida;

• Pensacola, Florida;

• Gulfport, Mississippi;

• Pascagoula, Mississippi; and

• Vicksburg, Mississippi.

Sixty-seven percent of the 400 participantswere federal, state, and local governmentemployees. The participants included:

• law enforcement officers;

• fire fighters;

• emergency medical service personnel;

• haz-mat teams;

• 911 operators;

• military security and force protectionprofessionals; and

• emergency management officials.

Approximately 33 percent of the studentswere security professionals from private industry.Since the course did not include members of thegeneral public, IMPACT highlights existing CoastGuard instructional programs, such as the"Community Coastal Watch Program" in Mobile,which are specifically designed to reach out tocommunity groups and individual members of thepublic.

The sixteen-hour original version of IMPACTaccomplishes the goal of creating flexible,scalable, exportable, field-level training, directedtoward first responders, security managers, andindustry personnel. In subsequent versions, theprogram can be useful to other specific audiences.

In February 2004 the Coast Guard's NortheastGulf Coast Regional Committee put together anIMPACT Task Force to review and refineIMPACT's curriculum in order to continue andexpand the program. The task force is also


looking into the possibility of releasing aspecifically tailored eight-hour version of thecourse for port line security officers.

A team of IMPACT developers traveled toWashington, D.C., and provided special briefingsto the CTS, the Office of Domestic Preparedness(ODP), and the Training Committee of the U.S.Maritime Administration (MARAD). Some of thekey developmental issues that made IMPACT asuccess include:

• comprehensive information collection;

• intensive curriculum development involvingreal-world officials;

• full dress rehearsal and workshop;

• evaluator presentations; and

• ongoing refinements.

Furthermore, the program accomplished itsgoals by successfully recruiting local agents asinstructors, creating a flexible and adaptableprogram, and making the course proactive ratherthan reactive. IMPACT proved to be costeffective, and it encouraged government andprivate industry interaction, as well as interagencycooperation. Despite initial challenges, the hardwork of team members and ATAC funding madeIMPACT surpass the expectations of the students,faculty, and reviewers.

III. The development/evaluation/sponsorshipteam

The quality of the course was made possibledue to diligent support and feedback from themany agencies listed below. Representatives fromthe following agencies and departmentsparticipated in the development of IMPACT byhelping to serve as contributors, evaluators,sponsors, and/or instructors:

• the U.S. Air Force;

• the Amtrak Police;

• the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;

• the U.S. Attorneys' Offices;

• Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils and LawEnforcement Coordinating Committees of theSouthern District of Alabama;

• the Northern District of Florida;

• the Northern and Southern Districts ofMississippi;

• the District of Vermont;

• the U.S. Coast Guard;

• the U.S. Coast Guard Haz-Mat Strike Team;

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection;

• the Office of Domestic Preparedness(including the Center for DomesticPreparedness);

• the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

• U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

• the U.S. Maritime Administration (M ARAD);

• the U.S. Marshals Service;

• the Naval Criminal Investigative Service;

• the Regional Information Sharing System(RISS) and its Regional Organized CrimeInformation Center (ROCIC);

• State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training(SLATT) (a division of the Institute ofIntergovernmental Research and funded bythe Bureau of Justice Assistance);

• the Transportation Security Administration;

• the Alabama Peace Officers Standards andTraining Commission;

• the Alabama Department of Transportation;

• the Alabama Marine Police; the AlabamaDepartment of Public Health;

• the Alabama State Port Authority;

• the Mobile County Emergency ManagementAgency;

• the City of Mobile;

• the M obile Fire and Rescue Department;

• the M obile Police Department;

• the Florida Department of Law Enforcement;

• the Florida Emergency Management Agency;

• the Florida Department of Health;

• the Florida Department of Transportation;

• the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission;

• the International Port School of the Universityof Southern M ississippi;

• the M ississippi Attorney General's Office;


• the Mississippi Emergency ManagementAgency;

• the Mississippi Department of EnvironmentalQuality;

• the M ississippi Department of Health;

• the M ississippi National Guard;

• the M ississippi State Fire Academy;

• the M ississippi Gaming Commission;

• the Mississippi Department of MarineResources;

• the M ississippi Department of Public Safety(including the Mississippi Highway Patrol andPeace Officer Standards & Training);

• the M ississippi Department of Transportation;

• the Mississippi Department of Wildlife,Fisheries & Parks;

• the M ississippi Water Resources Commission;

• the State Port at Gulfport;

• the Port of Pascagoula;

• P & O Ports;

• the Tennessee-Tombigbee WaterwayAuthority;

• the Southern Regional Public Safety Institute;

• the Harrison County Sheriff's Department;

• Signal International;

• the Kansas City Southern Railroad Police;

• the Mississippi Security Police; and

• Swetman Security.

IV. Course overview

This sixteen-hour training program ispresented for members of a port area's health,safety, and security community; for securityguards, dispatchers, and managers of public andprivate facilities; for fire, health, haz-mat, andemergency managers; and for law enforcementofficers. By training these professionals together,IMPACT helps build not only a sense ofcommunity, but it also enhances the knowledgeand understanding necessary in counterterrorismnetworks.

A. Primary objective

IMPACT's primary objective is to preventterrorism by enhancing awareness and reducingvulnerabilities in coastal and river port areasecurity. In particular, IMPACT focuses onsecurity requirements of the MaritimeTransportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-295, 116 Stat. 2064. The course is designedto jointly train members of the port area securitycommunity, and it should receive substantialsupport from port area professionals.

B. Documents

During the course, instructors distribute acourse manual and/or compact disc containinginstructional material. Additionally, a variety ofhandouts and supplementary materials are madeavailable.

C. Proceedings

IMPACT consists of fifteen training modules.The course material is presented by agencies suchas the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration &Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, State Marine Law Enforcement, andothers. The course includes exercises at the closeof each day, with a two-hour port area tourconducted prior to an Incident ManagementSession.

D. Course justification

Foreign and domestic terrorist groups andother criminals pose significant threats to politicaland economic systems in the United States and itsMarine Transportation System (MTS). With theintegration and worldwide interdependence ofnational economies, improvements in commercialtransportation infrastructure, and modalities tofacilitate international trade, terrorist and criminalorganizations can operate on an international scaleand increase the volume, speed, and efficiency ofillegal transactions. Any terrorist group can easilyexploit intelligence failures by selecting a portthat does not have the intelligence network,technology, and interdiction capabilities, of otherports.

A security failure could result in direct threatsto the economic and trade interests of theUnited States. Therefore, it is essential for theUnited States, and her maritime trading partners,to reduce criminal and terrorist exploitation ofcommerce in the international maritime tradecorridors by improving port and cargo security.


Continued training each year is necessary toimplement new regulations and trainingrequirements. Acquiring funding can be a difficultprospect for both government and privateindustry. The cost-effective success of theIMPACT training initiative depends on thecooperative engagement of area ports andgovernment agencies, as well as private sectorstakeholders with interests in port andtransportation systems.

E. Terrorist threats

This module is current, can be regularlyupdated, and is applicable to both cargo and cruiseport operations. Details are provided on how toanalyze a terrorist threat, and how to identify theterrorist mind-set, methods of operation,motivations of terrorists, and characteristics oftransnational terrorist organizations. Additionally,money laundering, cigarette smuggling, and othercrimes that support terrorist financing arediscussed.

F. Terrorist weapon recognition

This segment helps participants recognizeterrorist instruments such as weapons of massdestruction (WMD) and conventional explosives.The characteristics of explosive materials such asbomb components, precursor chemicals, reagents,and dissemination devices are presented.Additionally, trainees are taught to detect, as wellas to self-protect against three types of WMD,radiation dispersal devices (RDD), biologicalweapons, and chemical weapons.

G. Security challenges

Importation of terrorists, WMD, and othercontraband are the most pervasive threats facingports. The economic importance of ports and theMTS cannot be overlooked, and systems forcontinuously monitoring and challengingpersonnel working in the port are the basic toolsto counter internal conspiracies. Access control,physical security measures, and the involvementof multiple agencies contribute to this task. TheDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) ishaving a positive impact on these issues andIMPACT highlights key DHS changes.

H. Vulnerability assessment

IMPACT instruction centers on theexamination of threats, and weighing those threatsagainst port security and MTS vulnerabilities.Techniques of categorizing and prioritizing

security threats are presented, and a riskassessment matrix is demonstrated and discussed.Further, contingency planning for thedevelopment of prevention and responseoperations is explained.

I. Physical security

Port security guidelines are important to thedevelopment of physical security and accesscontrols. By addressing such services as portsignage, local law enforcement agency supports,badge systems, port gate operations, cruise shipterminal operations, and the inbound andoutbound escort of tanker trucks, the systemallows certain matters in the port to bedocumented and routed to the appropriatedepartment for response.

J. Personnel protective equipment anddecontamination

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) andDecontamination (DECON) is necessary duringport security interdiction operations that involve apotential or actual haz-mat issue or WMD. Thismodule provides introduction to the properunderstanding, selection, and use of PPE and,more importantly, it advises what not to do inthreatening situations. Tactical planning forimplementation of emergency decontamination inthe event of a terrorist weapon interdiction is akey component of this module.

K. Port protective operations

Port security operations conducted bygovernment authorities or private sector firmspresent significantly different limitations, andsecurity depends on adherence to documentedpolicies and procedures.

L. Cargo security

Various situations involving contraband,concealment techniques, unregistered containers,precursor chemicals, cargo discrepancies,diversion techniques, fraudulent documentation,and cargo theft are addressed in this module.Profiling characteristics and related issues are alsoexamined.

M. Container interdiction

Computerized identification systems, x-rayscanners, random vessel inspections, sealtampering detection, and other types of detectorsinstalled in surface traffic lanes have the potentialfor detection of WMD and terrorist smuggling.


X-ray, gamma-ray, scanning, random vesselinspections, dangerous cargo manifests, VICAS,GPS, E-Seals, RFID tags/stickers, seal tamperingdetection, and other prevention techniques arediscussed.

N. Imm igration fraud

Stowaways and illegal immigration presentgrave threats to port security. These threats can bemitigated by improving monitoring procedures forfreight carriers, cruise liners, and cargo ships.Prevention of illegal immigration, illegal export ofcurrency, and abuse of controlled goods, can bebetter improved by methods similar to those usedagainst drug smuggling.

O. Document fraud

The manufacturing, obtaining, and possessionof fraudulent documents are similar threats to portsecurity, which can be mitigated by superiormonitoring procedures. This crime can becountered with systems and measures that rangefrom detecting forged/false personaldocumentation in the port area, to helping preventthe hijacking of shipments in road/rail transit aftergoods leave the port.

P. Port tour f ield trip

The two-hour port tour is made possible bythe combined effort of senior managementofficials from the host port, the Coast Guard,representatives of port area industries, and otheragency officials. The tour is an ideal opportunityto highlight the unique aspects of particular ports.During the tour, key agency officials and industryrepresentatives sit near the front of the bus, anduse the public address system to speak to thegroup when the bus nears areas of their expertise.Even professionals who have spent many yearsworking in one facility of a port area may havelittle knowledge of other areas of the port.

The tour is another excellent opportunity todiscuss local information-sharing networkopportunities. Technical insight is often gainedfrom observation of participants. Most studentsagree that the port tour is one of the best parts ofthe field training program.

Q. Incident management

The National Incident Management System(NIMS), the Unified Command System usedduring a terrorist or weapon interdiction operationor emergency response, Crisis Managementresponse, and Coast Guard and National Response

Team integration are discussed during thismodule. The module may be taught by arepresentative of the State EmergencyManagement Agency.

R. Prevention and incidentscenarios/interactive panel-led exercises

During this session a fictional terroristincident is presented to foster interactivediscussion regarding strategies and tacticalconsiderations during the response. Total timeallotted for these exercises should be one hour atthe end of each day.

S. Certificates and closing comments

It is important to gather course evaluationsfrom students prior to issuing certificates.Evaluations should always be reviewed in an"after action" process.

T. Handouts and resource material

Materials can be obtained from the RegionalInformation Sharing System (RISS) and fromsponsoring agencies. An effective way toemphasize key information is to have tables set upfor material distribution, and visible postersdisplayed throughout the training area.

U. Scheduled media opportunity

Press releases are an effective way todistribute information regarding the schedule andlocation of training sessions. Media opportunitiesmay be used to promote public awareness of theCoast Guard and its programs.

V. Train-the-trainer products

A complete "train-the-trainer" package iscurrently being developed. The training packagewill include information sets and templates for thefollowing:

• color promotional brochure;

• registration kit with name tags;

• classroom posters;

• PowerPoint slides with instructor notes;

• media kit;

• completion certificates;

• digital video disc set with video of seasonedinstructors teaching each module;

• student course book; and

• RISS and other suggested handouts.


VI. Contacts

Roy Sawyer (SD AL): (251) 415-7166John Peaden (ND FL): (850) 444-4000Ginger Golden-Bouk (ND FL): (850) 444-4008Dave Crews (ND Miss): (662) 238-7671Max Fenn (SD Miss): (601) 973-2841

VII. Conclusion

As noted, the Coast Guard's Northeast Gulf ofMexico Regional Maritime Security Committeepresently has a task force reviewing IMPACT andworking with ATACs to create a train-the-trainerpackage and other templates targeted at specificaudiences. These will include up-to-date andimproved, "user friendly" curriculum modules.The task force is also making recommendationsregarding IMPACT's potential to serve as atemplate for port security partnership training inother jurisdictions.

The program is thought to be flexible enoughto adapt to all local areas, and has proven effectivein creating bonds between federal, state and localagencies, industry, and private-sectorcommunities. IMPACT will soon be presented tothe (ODP) for official ODP course certification.

IMPACT's goal of partnering communities forprevention and sharing information can beachieved with great benefit to those whoparticipate. It is necessary to use every availableand appropriate tool to prevent future terroristacts. In so doing, many agencies are finding thatcloser relationships and better information sharingare already having a tremendous impact on theirdaily activities in the real world of maritimeports.�

ABOUT THE AUTHORS




�Max Fenn serves as the Intelligence ResearchSpecialist for the Southern District of M ississippi.Prior to his assignment in 2002, he servedseventeen years in the military, with tours in U.S.Marine Force Reconnaissance and U.S. ArmySpecial Forces.

�Robert J. Arndt serves as the Port SecuritySpecialist for the U.S. Coast Guard Marine SafetyOffice in Mobile, Alabama.

�Tom Bartlett serves as the Anti-TerrorismCoordinator for the Southern Regional PublicSafety Institute (SRPSI) in Long Beach,Mississippi (SRPSI is a division of the Universityof Southern M ississippi and the Harrison CountySheriff's Department). He is a certified DOD/DOJHAZMAT instructor. a

State and Local Anti-TerrorismTraining (SLATT) ProgramDomingo S. HerraizDirector, Bureau of Justice AssistanceOffice of Justice ProgramsDepartment of Justice

The State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training(SLATT) Program is funded by the United States

Department of Justice, Bureau of JusticeAssistance (BJA), through a grant to the Institutefor Intergovernmental Research (IIR) incooperation with the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation. It is a training and research programproviding pre-incident awareness, preparation,investigation, prevention, and interdiction training


and information to state and local lawenforcement in the areas of terrorist and criminalextremist activity. This focus distinguishesSLATT from "first responder" and other relatedweapons of mass destruction/nuclear, biological,chemical, and radiological response trainingprovided to emergency service personnel.

The SLATT Program was implemented in1996 in response to the bombing of the Alfred P.Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,Oklahoma, and the rising militia movement in theUnited States. At the time of its introduction,responding to pressing concerns, SLATT focusedprimarily on domestic terrorism and special-interest/single-issue extremist groups. However,as the new millennium approached, officialsrecognized the need to broaden the program'sscope. Research and training topics were added,including the threat of foreign-inspired terrorismon American soil. Unfortunately, the need to sharethis expertise was called on within the span of afew short years.

On September 11, 2001, America entered anew phase in the fight against terrorism. TheSLATT Program was poised and ready to addressmost current, critical counterterrorism issues, suchas detection, intervention, investigation, andprevention. SLATT quickly increased trainingofferings in foreign-inspired terrorism,encompassing specific groups and organizationsbelieved to be involved in the attacks. In additionto the increased training emphasis on foreign-inspired terrorism, SLATT research also identifiedan increase in violent acts linked to certainspecial-interest groups. Once again, SLATTcourse offerings were increased to address thisemerging area as well.

A key challenge in addressingcounterterrorism efforts was the realization thatAmerica's law enforcement was facing a newenemy. Unlike traditional criminals that are oftendriven either by greed or emotion, terrorists aredriven by ideology. This necessitates a differentapproach in investigation, infiltration, andintervention, as well as an increased need to shareinformation and intelligence. It also requiresdifferent skills than those needed to battle moretraditional criminals. When state and local lawenforcement became the front line in protectingthe homeland, the skill sets and training necessaryfor success became even more imperative.

Because SLATT is an investigation andprevention-oriented counterterrorism trainingprogram, the demand for SLATT workshopsincreased dramatically following the 9/11 attacks.With over 20,000 law enforcement agenciesemploying in excess of 650,000 officers, the taskof responding to all training requests andproviding counterterrorism training to everyofficer became a daunting challenge.

In an effort to get critical counterterrorismtraining information to the field in a timelyfashion, specialized SLATT workshops weredeveloped for, and delivered through, theUnited States Attorneys' Offices (USAOs), theRegional Information Sharing Systems (RISS)Intelligence Centers, state police chief andsheriffs' associations, and other law enforcementorganizations. Over 40,000 law enforcementprofessionals have been trained across thecountry, with more than 3,400 individuals trainedduring specialized workshops conducted for theUSAOs, and over 3,000 trained through the RISScenters during annual conferences.

In addition, BJA requested that a SLATTTrain-the-Trainer program be developed toenhance the multiplying effect of delivering basicterrorism orientation and awareness training. Afocus group of subject-matter experts, experiencedpolice trainers, and some of the nation's leadingcriminal justice academics, was convened to assistin identifying the basic elements necessary for asuccessful terrorism Train-the-Trainer program.As a result of this feedback, a complete Train-the-Trainer package was assembled consisting of over350 PowerPoint slides, lesson plans, learningobjectives, and four CDs of video clips, to offer acomplete program necessary for the success ofthis critical effort. Delivery of these workshopsbegan in late 2002.

As of March 2004, fifteen Train-the-Trainerworkshops have been delivered to almost 700experienced law enforcement trainers from theFederal Bureau of Investigation, RegionalCommunity Policing Institutes, criminal justicetraining academies, and state and local lawenforcement agencies. These trainers have, inturn, trained over 73,000 officers nationwide. Themultiplying effect of this training effort isstaggering. The SLATT Train-the-Trainerprogram has been very successful in delivering avaluable and constantly changing training tool forlaw enforcement. Successful participants of thisprogram are given access to a secure W eb site


where updated presentation materials are availablein order to assist the trainer in presenting the mostup-to-date material, and to leverage the researchcapabilities of the SLATT research unit.

Because the needs vary in relation to threat,groups, resources, and geography, SLATT offersvarious training formats in order to effectivelyrespond to state and local law enforcement needs.These include, but are not limited to:

Investigative/Intelligence Workshops

Designed for state and local law enforcementinvestigators, intelligence officers, and analyticalpersonnel, this workshop includes topics related tothe unique aspects inherent in the investigationand prosecution of terrorist and criminal extremistactivity. This workshop is four days and includestopics such as:

• Terrorism Overview;

• Investigating Religious Terrorism;

• International Terrorism and ExtremismGroups;

• Domestic Terrorism;

• Understanding the Terrorist Mindset;

• Terrorist Financing;

• Interview Techniques;

• Special-Interest/Single-Issue Terrorism;

• Explosives and Explosive Devices; and

• Role of Intelligence.

Specialized Training Events

This training is designed to provide aneffective, flexible response to state and local lawenforcement training needs. Training topics,locale, and course length are tailored to thespecific requirements of the requesting agency.Course length typically varies from four hours totwo days.

Train-the-Trainer Workshops

Designed for qualified law enforcementtrainers, this workshop is intended to assistagencies in developing in-house counterterrorismtraining capabilities, and provides lawenforcement trainers with the ability andinformation (i.e., lesson plans, sample notebooks,presentation materials, reference materials, etc.) totrain other law enforcement personnel. Thisworkshop is two days and includes topics such as:

• Terrorism Overview;

• Law Enforcement Roles;

• Domestic Terrorism;

• International Terrorism;

• Terrorism Indicators;

• Officer Safety Issues; and

• Community Partnerships.

Narcotics Task Force Antiterrorism Briefings

Designed for multijurisdictional narcotics taskforce personnel, this briefing combines terrorismawareness and investigative training with theexpertise, experience, and contacts of narcoticstask force groups to aid in the investigation,interdiction, and prevention of terrorist- andextremist-related crimes. This briefing is eighthours and includes topics such as:

• Introduction—Why Narcotics Officers;

• Terrorism: What Is the Threat;

• Recognizing Terrorist Indicators and WarningSigns;

• Explosives and Explosive Devices;

• Officer Safety Issues;

• Who Is Responsible for Follow-Up?; and

• The Future.

Discovering, monitoring, and delivering themost current terrorism-related information isintegral to the mission of the SLATT Program. Tothat end, the SLATT research component iscritical, providing ongoing research on terroristgroups and ideologies; criminal extremistmovements, strategies, alliances, goals, trends,and threat potential; and other related areas.SLATT researchers rely upon public databasesand media scans. SLATT research supports theinformation and training needs of the program. Itmakes analyzed information obtained from thepublic domain available through its products,which include:

• Specialized publications;

• Chronologies of terrorist events;

• Resource CDs (over 18,000 distributed sinceJanuary 2002); and


• Other multimedia applications presented viatraining classes, the RISS secure intranet, andother appropriate means.

Due to the continued high demand for SLATTtraining since 9/11, requests for assistance aresometimes met most expeditiously and efficientlythrough the dissemination of these resourcematerials.

The key to the success of the SLATT Programis a cadre of instructors who possess extensiveterrorism-related law enforcement experience atthe local, state, and federal levels, many of whomare nationally recognized experts from theacademic community. This combination ofterrorism-related experience at all levels allowsSLATT to combine real-world experience withthe continual research necessary in the dynamicarea of anti-terrorism training in the 21st century.

SLATT staff also provides specialized supportto the Counter-Terrorism Training CoordinationWorking Group (CTTWG). The CTTWG wasestablished in November 2002 by the Office ofJustice Programs' (OJP) Assistant AttorneyGeneral to aid law enforcement in meeting thechallenges of terrorism in furtherance of themission of OJP to develop the nation's capacity toprevent and control crime. The Working Groupwas tasked with analyzing counterterrorismtraining offered or contemplated by anycomponent of the U.S. Department of Justice(Department), minimizing duplication, identifyingtraining to recommend to the field, anddetermining the most effective method ofdelivery. Since its inception, many other agencieshave joined the Working Group, and the Grouphas expanded its focus to include training beyondthe offerings of the Department.

A major initiative of the W orking Group isthe implementation and facilitation of theCriminal Intelligence Training CoordinationStrategy (CITCS) Working Group. The mission ofthe CITCS is to coordinate intelligence traininginitiatives to avoid conflicting messages, toestablish and promote mutually agreed-uponintelligence training objectives, and to further thetraining goals as outlined in the Global JusticeInformation Sharing Initiative's National CriminalIntelligence Sharing Plan. The CITCS, whichfunctions in cooperation with Global IntelligenceWorking Group (GIWG) membership, is in theprocess of coordinating an effort to bring togetherthe various organizations developing or offering

intelligence training, in an atmosphere ofcooperation, goal identification, and resourcesharing, to address federal, state, local, and tribalcriminal intelligence training coordination issues.The final product of the CITCS will be a set ofintelligence training standards for varying levelsof law enforcement that will be presented to theCTTWG, vetted through the GIWG, andpresented to the Global Justice InformationSharing Initiative for adoption. These intelligencestandards will provide an invaluable tool for lawenforcement across the country.

In addition to providing support to theCTTWG and the CITCS Working Groupmeetings, SLATT staff researches, develops, andprovides content management for the CTTWG'sCounter-Terrorism Training and Resources forLaw Enforcement Web site, http://www.counterterrorismtraining.gov, which providesinformation on promising couterterrorisminitiatives and programs, available technicalassistance and training, and other relatedinformation.

For additional information about the SLATTProgram and related services, please contactEileen M. Garry at [email protected] [email protected].�

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

� Domingo S. Harraiz was unanimouslyconfirmed by the United States Senate as BJA'snew Director on March 8, 2004. President Bushsigned his commission on March 9, and he wasofficially sworn in on March 15. Before joiningBJA, he was the Director of the Ohio Office ofCriminal Justice Services, the state criminaljustice planning agency. From 1986 to 2000, M r.Herraiz was the Executive Director of the OhioCrime Prevention Association. While in thatposition, he served as Executive Committee Chairof the Crime Prevention Coalition of America,where he designed a national crime preventionmodel and the McGruff the Crime Dog campaignfor the Department and the National CrimePrevention Council.a


First Responders at the CocoanutGrove Night Club Fire in 1942Beverly Ann JonesEmployee Assistance ProgramExecutive Office for United States Attorneys(EOUSA)Department of Justice

September 11, 2001, gave the world an in-depth look at the heroic but harrowing work thatis done by "first responders" every day in thiscountry and around the world. Not a day went byduring the first month after 9/11 without millionsof people witnessing the brave police officers,firefighters, emergency services workers,excavation teams, medical teams, and mentalhealth teams doing their jobs at Ground Zero orthe Pentagon. First responders, and their verycritical role, were indelibly engraved into ourconsciousness after the terrorists' acts. Yet, fromtime immemorial, there have always been peoplewilling to put their lives on the line to respond tomass tragedies. In the past they were known asrescuers. Their jobs were no less dangerous andno less traumatizing than the brave people whowere called to duty almost three years ago. Thefollowing is an account of the roles that rescuersor "first responders" played in the CocoanutGrove Nightclub fire in November 1942.

On November 28, 1942, Holy Cross Collegeplayed an afternoon football game against BostonCollege and won. Boston was alive withexcitement and with fans celebrating the victory.Many fans from the game were among the 1,000people reveling at the popular Cocoanut GroveNightclub in the midtown theater district ofBoston. On that night, the club admitted 400people over its occupancy limit.

The country was in the midst of World WarII. Together at the nightclub with the revelersfrom the football game were Marines, soldiers,sailors, and Coast Guard personnel. There wereyoung men getting ready to join the army fortraining, military personnel getting ready to beshipped abroad to fight in the war, and militarypersonnel on leave from their units just havingfun. There was a wedding party in the club thatnight, as well as a large number of local hospitalpersonnel.

Shortly after 10:00 p.m., a fire started in thedimly lit basement of the nightclub. A busboy,replacing a light bulb that had been removed as aprank by one of the celebrating patrons, struck amatch in order to see the outlet. The matchtouched one of the artificial palm trees in the barand flames began to spread throughout thebuilding. Because of the large number offlammable decorations and silk draperies in theclub, the fire spread rapidly, engulfing thenightclub.

The nightclub did not have clearly markedemergency exits. The two revolving doors at thefront of the building opened inwardly rather thanoutwardly. In a panic, people attempted to leavethe nightclub the same way they had entered. Asthe hordes moved through the roaring fire incomplete darkness, they jammed against therevolving doors. Just about one half of the clubpatrons escaped the Cocoanut Grove fire.Approximately 492 patrons were killed during thefire. Many others were injured. Near the frontentrance of the club, where the doors jammed,witnesses said that bodies were stacked six feethigh.

The nightclub had several other exit doors,but the patrons had no knowledge of them. Oneexit door's panic bar had been welded shut. Therewere no clear directions to another exit door,which was well-hidden behind decorations anddrapes.

A full battalion of rescue workers ("firstresponders") was called into duty that night. Therewas a mobilization of police and firefighters. Civildefense personnel (medical personnel) and air raidwardens were asked to maintain order and/or togive first aid to people suffering from smokeinhalation and burns. Soldiers who escaped thefire went to work trying to help with the recoveryefforts. Priests participated in the rescue andrecovery operation by administering last rites tothe dying.

In 1942 rescuers did not have the luxury ofmodern technology. Fire apparatus and rescuevehicles were parked adjacent to patrons' cars.This slowed down the rescue operation. The


rescue was carried out without cell phones, whichhad not yet been invented. Much of thecommunication was done by people willing to goon foot or by car to deliver messages.

Firefighters eventually entered the revolvingdoors, and found the front area of the night clubpiled high with bodies. It took firefighters justover an hour to put the fire out completely.Thereafter, they began to remove people from thenightclub. Many of the firefighters weretraumatized by the conditions of the bodies theyfound and by the contorted positions in whichthey found them. In one account, a firefighterstood screaming hysterically at the sight thatunfolded before him.

An article by Roger C. Evans and RupertEvans, Accident and Emergency Medicine, 68POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE J, 714-34 (1992),describes how deaths from trauma usually happenin one of three distinguishable periods. The "firstpeak" occurs within seconds/minutes of the injury,where only prevention of the accident could haveavoided deaths. The "second peak" happens in thesecond to fourth hours post injury, ("goldenhour") which results in 35% of deaths fromtrauma in countries with advanced traumaservices. The "third peak" occurs severaldays/weeks after the initial injury where deathresults from sepsis or multiple organ failure.

Rescuers in 1942 did not have the knowledgeabout mass traumatic injuries that "firstresponders" in the study above had. By 1942Boston, like other cities in the country, had beenpreparing for war and for soldiers returning homefrom battle. Boston Massachusetts General andBoston City Hospital had established burn units inpreparation for an enemy attack with massive fireand war casualties. The two hospitals had alreadyestablished wartime protocols. As a result,Massachusetts General Hospital was able to savethirty-nine people who had been in the fire.Boston City Hospital saved 131. Advances in thetreatment of fire-related injury and trauma weremade because of the treatments administered tosurvivors of the Cocoanut Grove fire. Some of theprocedures and techniques were used in thetreatment of injured soldiers returning from thewar.

Charles C. Kenney is a retired firefighter whohas studied the Cocoanut Grove Nightclub fire.He was a seventeen-year-old sailor in the U.S.Navy on his way to London on that night. His

father was a firefighter who helped with rescue onthe night of the fire. This writer spoke to Mr.Kenney, who now lives in Harwich,Massachusetts. He recalled talking at length tophysicians, firefighters, police officers, andpatrons who survived that night. Mr. Kenneyrecounted how it took firefighters only two tothree minutes to respond to the fire because theywere just around the corner answering anotheralarm. He believes that his father, like otherrescuers, put everything on "automatic" and wentto work doing their jobs "clinically" and"dispassionately." It was only later that hebelieves they experienced "depression" and othertraumatic symptoms.

While Boston City Hospital andMassachusetts General Hospital saw most of thepatients, other patients were being transported byambulances and taxis to emergency facilities.Emergency facilities and hospitals were forced todesign makeshift morgues to accommodate thedead. Because of the sheer number of dead, somemedical staff refused to begin counting them untilthe next morning. Garages were used astemporary morgues. Witnesses reported that thehuge concrete bays were emptied of vehicles andfilled with the deceased.

This is from a commentary that Bernard DeVoto wrote about the Cocoanut Grove Nightclubfire for Harper's [Magazine] in "The UneasyChair," February 1943:

The fire at the Cocoanut Grove was a single,limited disaster, but it exhausted Boston'scapacity to deal with an emergency. Hospitalfacilities were strained to the limit andsomewhat beyond it. If a second emergencyhad to be dealt with at the same time itsvictims would have had to wait some hoursfor transportation and a good many hours fortreatment. If there had been three such fires atonce, two-thirds of the victims would havegot no treatment whatever in time to do themany good. Boston is an inflammable city andit has now had instruction in what to expect ifa dozen hostile planes should come over andsucceed in dropping incendiary bombs. Thecivilian defense agencies which were calledon justified themselves and vindicated theirtraining. The Nurses' Aid in particular did amemorable job; within a few hours there wasa trained person at the bed of every victim,many other Aids worked to exhaustionhelping hospital staffs do their jobs, and in


fact more were available than could be put touse. Nevertheless it was clearly demonstratedthat the civilian agencies are nowhere nearlarge enough to take care of bombings ifbombings should come. There were simplynot enough ambulances: Railway ExpressCompany trucks had to be called on to takethe injured to hospitals and the dead tomorgues. The dead had to be stacked like cordwood in garages because the morgues couldtake no more; the dying had to be laid in rowsin the corridors of hospitals because theemergency wards were full. The drainage ofdoctors into the military service had leftBoston just about enough to care for as manyvictims as this single fire supplied. Sixmonths from now there will be too few tohandle an equal emergency; there are far toofew now for one twice as serious. One plane-load of incendiaries would start more firesthan the fire department and its civilianassistants could put out. There would be moreinjured than there are even the most casuallytrained first-aids to care for. Hundreds wouldbe abandoned to the ignorant assistance ofuntrained persons, in streets so blocked byrubble and so jammed with military vehiclesthat trained crews could not reach them evenwhen trained crews should be free. Boston haslearned that it is not prepared to take care ofitself. One doubts if any community in theUnited States is.

Id. at 334.

Boston was in no way prepared for thetragedy that took place at the Cocoanut GroveNightclub. The fire was unprecedented andresulted in the worst loss of life in a fire in thehistory of the city of Boston. The club had nofireproof fixtures. It had neither a sprinkler systemnor clearly marked exits. At the time, Boston'slegal occupancy laws were not applicable tonightclubs. The fire led to major fire preventionefforts and to the imposition of controls for placeswhere large numbers of people gathered. Thedisaster led to modern fire code regulations as partof what was called the "Life Safety Code."Emergency lighting, exit lights, and occupantsafety capacity were required by law. New firecodes were implemented which included theelimination of certain flammable decorations.There was a requirement that doors in such anestablishment had to open outwardly. Laws alsoeliminated smoking in theaters.

Although the fire was not set intentionally,people were angry because there was a feelingthat this was a disaster that was caused bynegligence, and that it could have been avoided.The busboy was blamed, but a bigger blame wasplaced on those whose responsibility it was to takedeliberate measures to save lives.

De Voto further comments:

Deeper implications of the disaster have nodirect connections with the war. An outragedcity has been confronting certain matterswhich it ordinarily disregards. As a place ofentertainment the Cocoanut Grove was garishbut innocuous and on the whole useful. It hadbeen called "'the poor man's Ritz;'" for yearspeople had been going there to have a goodtime and had got what they were looking for.With the naive shock customary in such cases,the city has now discovered that these peoplewere not receiving the minimum protection intheir pleasures to which they were entitled andwhich they supposed they were receiving. . . .For the responsibility is the public's all alongand the certain safeguard—a small amount ofalertness, civic courage and willingness tolose some money— is always in the public'shands. That means not the mayor's hands, butyours and mine.

Id. at 334-35.

Natural and man-made disasters haveoccurred throughout history. According to theAmerican Psychiatric Association, collectivestress reactions were examined by researchers andclinicians as early as the nineteenth century, whenthere were massive railway accidents in England.The Association found that it was not until the1900s that research was done on post traumaticstress reaction in rescuers. In 1914 and in 1918,Dr. Angelo Hesnard, a French psychoanalyst,examined the side effects in rescuers after twoship explosions. Angelo Hesnard, Nervous andPsychic Disorders Following Naval Catastrophes:Contribution to the Study of EmotionalPsychoneuroses, 18 REV DE PSYCHIAT, 139-52,(1914); Nervous and Psychic Disorders FollowingWar at Sea , 106 ARCH MED PHARM NAV, 241-89(1918).

Mass trauma is defined by the Centers forDisease Control and Prevention as the injuries,death, and emotional disability caused by acatastrophic event. ("Mass Trauma Preparednessand Response," Center for Disease Control,


http://www.cdc.gov/masstrauma/default.htm.)After the Cocoanut Grove Nightclub fire, Dr. EricLindemann and Dr. Stanley Cobb, atMassachusetts General Hospital, studied thepsychological impact of the tragedy on some ofthe patients who survived the fire. They assessedand treated patients with crisis interventiontechniques and concluded that the survivorssuffered from "acute grief." In June 1943 Dr.Cobb and Dr. Lindemann published an initialreport on their findings from working withseventeen patients who were admitted to thehospital on the night of the fire. Stanley Cobb andEric Lindemann, Neuropsychiatric ObservationsDuring the Cocoanut Grove Fire, 112 ANNALS OF

SURGERY, 814-24 (1943). In September 1944 Dr.Lindemann wrote a more detailed account of hiswork with those suffering from acute grief and itsmanagement in Eric Lindemann, TheSymptomatology and Management of Acute Grief,101 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY, 141-48(1944). (Read at the Centenary Meeting of theAmerican Psychiatric Association, Philadelphia,Pa., May 15-18, 1944).

The survivors in Dr. Lindemann's study allshowed similar reactions to surviving the fire. Hediscovered the following patterns of traumaresponses in his patients:

• somatic distress;

• preoccupation with the image of the deceased;

• guilt;

• hostile reactions;

• loss of patterns of conduct (an inability tofunction as competently as they did prior tothe fire); and, sometimes,

• the appearance of traits of the deceased in thebehavior of the bereaved, especiallysymptoms shown at the time of the tragedy.

Id. at 142.

Dr Lindemann also found that the duration ofa grief reaction depended upon the success withwhich the traumatized person did "grief work" andregained a sense of equilibrium in their lives. Thiswork was done in three stages:

• emancipation from the bondage to thedeceased;

• readjustment to the environment from whichthe deceased is missing; and

• the formation of new relationships in theworld. When a person tried to avoid thedistress caused by the grief experience, he didnot move through the three stages quite aseasily and regain stability in daily functioning.

Id. at 143.

Dr. Alexandra Adler, at Boston City Hospital,assessed fifty-four of the survivors. She followedup with forty-six of the fifty-four over a nine-month period. Dr. Adler, like Dr. Lindemann, sawsome of the same symptomatology in patientswho had witnessed and survived the violentdying. She, unlike Dr. Lindemann, did not treatanyone's psychological symptoms. Dr. Adlertermed the symptomatology "post traumaticmental complications". ("NeuropsychiatricComplications in Victims of Boston's CocoanutGrove Disaster," 123 AMERICAN MEDICAL

ASSOCIATION, 1098-1101 (1943).

According to the findings of Dr. Adler's 1943study at Boston City General Hospital and Dr.Cobb and Dr. Lindemann 's initial study atMassachusetts General Hospital in 1943, and Dr.Lindemann's more in-depth discussion of theearlier research on the survivors in 1944, one yearlater, fifty percent of the survivors showedsymptoms of sleep disturbance, increasednervousness, anxiety, guilt related to survival, andfears related to the Cocoanut Grove Nightclubfire. "Survivor's guilt," characterized by thesurvivor's confusion over having lived and themeaning of that survival, was for the first timeidentified by Drs. Cobb and Lindermann after thismajor disaster. The survivor questions why he isstill alive and other people died instead. Thesurvivor may feel total responsibility for the deathof another.

What are the lessons that professionalsworking as first responders can learn from theCocoanut Grove Nightclub fire in 1942? CitizenCorp, a group of volunteers who help to maketheir communities safer by preparing for disasters,offers the following lessons:

• Major disasters can overload the capability of"first responders," especially during the firstcritical twelve to seventy-two hours of anevent;

• Communities can train individuals inemergency preparedness and basic responsetechniques in order to supplement the work of


firefighters, police, public health and safetyworkers; and

• It is also critically important that electedofficials engage "first responders" indiscussions about the vital role that they playin local disasters. They are trainedprofessionals. Asking for and valuing theirinput helps to ensure that local governmentsaddress the needs of "first responders,"citizens, and communities during times ofmass disasters, man-made and natural.

Trauma shatters our belief systems. Itsnatches from us a sense of having immunity fromdisaster. It shatters the illusion that we will alwaysbe safe. Trauma destroys people's belief that theycan always control their lives and theirenvironment. That was true on 9/11, and that wastrue on November 28, 1942. When a disasteroccurs, the traumatic symptoms that result areusually normal (albeit unsettling) responses toabnormal events. Dr. Lindemann, and othertrauma specialists, discovered that many witnessesto mass disaster can only begin to heal when theytalk about what they saw, heard, felt, and smelled.It is the recalling of the tragic incident in detailthat provides catharsis and returns them to morestable functioning. If this is the case, and itcertainly seems to be so, "first responders" canfind relief from the gut-wrenching work they dodaily. However, that relief must take place in asafe and supportive environment with supportivepeers and professionals who give value andcredence to the demanding job that they are calledto perform.�

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

�Beverly Ann Jones is a licensed clinical socialworker who began working at EOUSA's EAP inNovember 2002. Prior to that, she worked threeyears in the areas of trauma/grief/loss. During thesame time, she had a private therapy practicewhere she worked with children, adults, andfamilies in the areas of: substance abuse, trauma,child abuse, domestic violence, reentry back intothe community from prisons, and chronic mentalillness.a

USA PATRIOT Act: Responding toLibrary Concerns

Stan HarrisFirst Assistant U.S. Attorney & ATACCoordinator Southern District of Mississippi

Gaines ClevelandAssistant U.S. AttorneySouthern District of Mississippi

I. Introduction

In working with community groups, includingfirst responders who are not routinely part of thefederal law enforcement process, questions mayarise about the Uniting and Strengthening Americaby Providing the Appropriate Tools Required toIntercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USAPATRIOT) Act. Several provisions of the Act arescheduled to terminate on December 31, 2005,


and because of this the Act has receivedsignificant media attention. Given the fact thatmuch misinforma- tion and unfair criticism of theAct has been published, communicating accurateinformation to the public has become a matter ofgreat importance. Excellent materials are availableat a public Internet site maintained by theDepartment of Justice athttp://www.lifeandliberty.gov.

The library community is one of the groupsexpressing concern about the Act. Their concernsmirror those of other organizations. Earlier thisyear, our office was invited to speak to the Friendsof the Gulfport Libraries—part of one of thelargest public library systems in Mississippi. Wewelcomed the opportunity to provide backgroundon the Act and to answer concerns.

Prior to the library meeting, we learned thatthe American Library Association (ALA) hadadopted a resolution raising various concernsabout the Act. We found a variety of materialsdiscussing the Act on the ALA Web site,including the ALA resolution, a CongressionalResearch Service (CRS) analysis, and an ALAanalysis of the Act as it relates to libraries.

II. Background of the Act

The law was enacted to strengthen theeffectiveness of law enforcement in the aftermathof the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The legislationreceived overwhelming Congressional supportfrom both parties.

The Act:

• gives terrorism investigators the same toolsthat federal agents have long employed inordinary criminal cases, but which had beenunavailable in national security cases;

• helps our laws catch up with technologicaladvances that have handicapped lawenforcement because the laws were outdated;and

• promotes the sharing of important informationwithin and among law enforcement agencies,which had previously been discouraged.

The Act also directly benefits libraries andothers subject to victimization by computerhackers by allowing law enforcement to assistvictims in monitoring computer trespassers. Thisis something that was not clearly authorized underthe prior law. In addition, the Act shields remotecomputer service providers who volunteer

information about suspected terrorist activitiesand other threat emergencies from civil liability.

III. CRS: Act not aimed at libraries

According to the CRS report, Libraries andthe USA PATRIOT Act (Feb. 26, 2003), availableat http://www.ala.org, the Act "contains noprovisions specifically directed at libraries or theirpatrons." (Emphasis added). However, the Actdoes have "several provisions...that might apply ina library context" (emphasis added) (the mostoften mentioned is Section 215).

The CRS Report made important observationsworth bearing in mind when considering the Act:

• "Although the library community stoutlydefends the importance of library-patronconfidentiality, federal law has yet torecognize its privileged status...."

• "As a general rule, libraries must comply withfederal grand jury subpoenas, search warrantsand court orders."

Thus, information concerning library patronshas long been subject to disclosure in federalcriminal cases, even before the USA PATRIOTAct was enacted.

In order to consider the ALA's specificconcerns, we turned to the ALA's Analysis of theUSA Patriot Act Related to Libraries, available athttp://www.ala.org/ala/oif/ifissues/usapatriotactlibrary.htm. The document is divided into two partsexamining individual provisions of the Act:"Enhanced Surveillance Provisions AffectingLibrary Confidentiality" and "Other ProvisionsThat Do Not Directly Affect Libraries."

IV. ALA focus on three provisions

In addressing the impact of the surveillanceprovisions on libraries, the ALA singled out threeprovisions of the Act, in order of importance tothe library community: Section 215, Section 216,and Section 214.

A. Section 215: Access to records and otheritems under the Foreign IntelligenceSurveillance Act (FISA)

This section, which has received considerablemedia attention, has been largely misunderstoodand, in fact, has been rarely, if ever, used. USAPATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat.272, effective October 26, 2001.


Long before the USA PATRIOT Act,ordinary grand juries were able to issue subpoenasfor all records relevant to criminal inquiries,including library records. An example of lawenforcement's need for such records is theUnabomber case. That investigation involved amulti-year manhunt and, prior to the arrest of TedKaczsinski, included the FBI's obtaining recordsfrom a Utah public library regarding thecirculation of books dealing with explosivedevices similar to those Kaczsinksi used. At thesame time, federal intelligence agents were onlyauthorized to obtain a limited category ofdocuments, such as car rental, travel, storagefacility, and hotel accommodation records. Noother documents were obtainable, even thoughthey were needed to give the agents a completepicture of the potential threat. The USAPATRIOT Act seeks to remedy this problem.

Section 215 authorizes the FBI director or asenior FBI official to apply to the ForeignSurveillance Intelligence Court "for an orderrequiring the production of any tangible things(including books, records, papers, documents andother items)." USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, effective October 26,2001. The application must specify that therecords are sought for an authorized investigation"to obtain foreign intelligence information notconcerning a United States person or to protectagainst international terrorism or clandestineintelligence activities." The application also mustcertify that it is not directed at "a United Statesperson solely upon the basis of activities protectedby the first amendment to the Constitution of theUnited States." Id.

Section 215 requires that the Departmentregularly account to Congress regarding the use ofthe Act, and provides for Congressional oversight.As of September 18, 2003 (the latest date forwhich information has been declassified), norequest under this provision had yet beenissued—to libraries or anyone else.

The ALA's principal concern is that thissection of the USA PATRIOT Act allows the FBIto compel the production of any tangible thing,including library circulation and Internet userecords, stored in any medium. However, this isno different than what the FBI can obtain bymeans of a grand jury subpoena or court-authorized search warrant in ordinary criminalcases. The provision simply gives the FBI thesame powers in conducting a national security

investigation as in investigating fraud or drugtrafficking.

A second ALA concern is that Section 215includes no requirement to demonstrate "probablecause" (which the ALA describes as "theexistence of specific facts to support the beliefthat a crime has been committed or that the itemssought are evidence of a crime"). Analysis of theUSA Patriot Act Related to Libraries, supra . Whatthis concern disregards is that no such showing isrequired for grand jury subpoenas. The probablecause standard is reserved for search warrants andarrest warrants, not investigative subpoenas. Whatthe Act does require is a certification, which is notrequired for grand jury subpoenas, that the recordsare sought to protect against internationalterrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.

The last concern the ALA expressed is thatSection 215 prohibits recipients of FISA requests(including libraries) from disclosing the existenceof the request. The USA PATRIOT Act did notinvent this requirement. It was already the law forother types of investigations, particularly bankfraud and other financial fraud investigations.

The ALA's commentary fails to mention anumber of safeguards in Section 215. First, theapplication must come from a senior FBI official.Second, the agent must apply to a federal court,which is not required for ordinary grand jurysubpoenas. Third, the agent must certify theproper purpose of the investigation. Fourth, theinvestigation of a United States person is not to beconducted solely on the basis of activitiesprotected by the First Amendment. Finally, theprovision requires regular reporting andCongressional oversight.

B. Section 216: Expanded use of Pen Registerand Trap-and-Trace Devices

Federal law long has permitted courts to issueorders for pen registers and trap-and-trace devices.A "pen register" is a device that keeps a record ofthe numbers dialed from a telephone. Much as acellular telephone bill lists numbers dialed, a penregister gives this same information to lawenforcement. A "trap-and-trace device" keeps arecord of the telephone numbers of incomingcalls. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, effective October 26, 2001.

Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, orders forpen registers and trap-and-trace devices werevalid only in the issuing court's jurisdiction. They


were basically limited to telephone lines, and itwas unclear if they were applicable to the Internet.Thus, the law failed to address the realities ofmodern technology. As new means ofcommunication became available, the law did notkeep pace.

Section 216 serves to correct thesedeficiencies in two ways. First, courts may issuesuch orders and they are valid "anywhere in theUnited States." Id. Thus, law enforcementofficials no longer need rely on officials in otherjurisdictions, where the communications facilitiesmay be based, to obtain these orders. Secondly,the law makes clear that these provisions apply tofacilities other than telephone lines, such as theInternet. This change recognizes the reality thatpeople now use the Internet much as they do thetelephone.

The ALA is concerned that the Act extendsthe telephone monitoring laws to include routingand addressing information for Internet traffic.The law specifically says "that such informationshall not include the contents of anycommunication." Id. That is, information in thetext or subject line of an e-mail would not bedisclosed.

The ALA complains that agents seeking thisinformation need only affirm that it is relevant toa criminal investigation. That is the samerequirement that exists under the present law.Under Section 215, an agent must also allege thatthe records requested relate to an ongoinginvestigation. The ALA notes that state lawenforcement officials can get access to theserecords, but that was equally true of the old law.

The ALA also says the Act requires recipientsof monitoring orders to provide cooperation tolaw enforcement and not disclose the order.Neither of these requirements is new. There aresimilar provisions in the prior law.

Finally, the ALA warns that "[l]ibraries thatprovide access to the Internet and e-mail...maybecome the targets of a court order requiring thelibrary to cooperate in the monitoring of a user'selectronic communications sent through thelibrary's computers or networks." Analysis of theUSA Patriot Act Related to Libraries, supra.According to the Act, however, such orders areonly directed at providers of "wire or electroniccommunication service." USA PATRIOT Act of2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, effectiveOctober 26, 2001. This portion of the Act is

directed at telephone and Internet serviceproviders and the like—not libraries.

C. Section 214: Pen Register and Trap-and-Trace Device authority under FISA

This provision streamlines the process forobtaining pen registers and trap-and-trace devicesby intelligence agents. It helps place terrorisminvestigations on the same footing as other lawenforcement investigations in obtaining orders forpen registers and trap-and-trace devices.

The ALA complains that agents seeking suchorders need only affirm that the informationsought is relevant to terrorism or intelligenceactivities. This simply parallels similar provisionsthat apply for ordinary criminal investigations.Why should investigations into terrorism andforeign intelligence activities be treated anydifferently?

V. Other provisions with no direct affect onlibraries

After discussing the three provisions of theAct considered most significant for libraries, theALA addressed four other provisions that do notdirectly affect libraries: Section 218, Section 219,Section 220, and Section 206.

A. Section 218: Foreign intelligenceinformation requirement for FISA authority

The sum total of this provision is to amendFISA to provide that law enforcement may obtaina surveillance order or request physical items ifforeign intelligence gathering is a "significantpurpose" of the investigation—rather than "thepurpose" as provided under the old law. USAPATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat.272, effective October 26, 2001 (emphasis added).The ALA says this provision relaxes the legalstandard for FISA surveillance. In reality, thechange simply serves to reduce the need toevaluate whether an investigation is for criminalor intelligence purposes, and allows greatercooperation among agencies. The formerrequirement that the sole purpose for court-approved surveillance was to obtain foreignintelligence information discouraged informationsharing and hampered efforts to root out terrorists.

B. Section 219: Single jurisdiction warrants forterrorism

This provision allows federal courts to issuesearch warrants that are valid in other districts for


investigations involving terrorism. This helpsexpedite the process for obtaining search warrantsin time-sensitive, multi-district terrorisminvestigations. Plus, it lets the judge who is mostfamiliar with the case issue the warrant. Lawenforcement agents still must satisfy the court thatthere is probable cause to justify a search.

C. Section 220: Single jurisdiction searchwarrants for electronic evidence

Like Section 219, this provision permitsfederal courts with jurisdiction over aninvestigation to issue search warrants for certainelectronic communications (unopened e-mails thatare less than six months old) stored by providersin other districts. The provision recognizes thatmost Internet service providers are located inCalifornia and Virginia, and allows courts in otherjurisdictions to issue such warrants. As withSection 219, this section clears outdatedjurisdictional roadblocks.

D. Section 206: Roving surveillance authorityunder FISA

The Act updates the law to provide what iscalled "roving" authority for electronicsurveillance approved by the FISA court. The Actrecognizes that in an era of disposable phones,easily available e-mail accounts, and endlesscommunications options, it is more effective tofollow a suspect, rather than a communicationdevice. Such roving surveillance authority haslong been available in drug and racketeeringinvestigations. The Act extends this authority toFISA warrants, but only if the FISA court findsthat the actions of the target may thwart theidentification of the target.

VI. Safeguards in the Act

The USA PATRIOT Act is subject to anumber of important safeguards, such as:

• the requirement of court approval for certainlaw enforcement tools authorized under theAct and the availability of judicial scrutiny forviolations of the Act;

• the provision for the Department of JusticeOffice of the Inspector General, which reportsto both the Attorney General and to Congress,to investigate and respond to claims regardingcivil rights or civil liberties violations underthe Act; and

• the provision that Congress is required toreceive periodic reports on the

implementation of the Act and Congress'exercise of oversight responsibilities, withfrequent interaction with the Department ofJustice about the Act's impact.

These safeguards help assure that the Actfocuses on its intended targets.

We appreciate the assistance and support of KellyShackelford of the Executive Office for U.S.Attorneys and Barry Sabin, Linda Bizzarro, andJerry DeMaio of the Justice Department'sCounterterrorism Section in addressing USAPATRIOT issues in our district and in thepreparation of this article.�

ABOUT THE AUTHORS




�Gaines Cleveland is an AUSA in the SouthernDistrict of Mississippi. He previously practicedlaw in Washington, D.C. and served as anAssistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District ofNew York from 1990-1995.a


NOTES

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