building momentum in negotiations: time-related costs and action-forcing events

In Theory

Building Momentum in Negotiations:Time-Related Costs and Action-Forcing Events

Michael Watkins

Using the negotiations over the future of Northern Ireland and other caseexamples, the author develops a conceptual framework for analyzing hownegotiators seek to build momentum and overcome stalemate. The frame-work focuses on the choices negotiators face between taking action andwaiting in the hope that counterparts will make concessions, exploring theimportance of perceptions of time-related costs and action-forcing events inshaping decision making. The framework highlights the uneven, nonlinearnature of the flow of negotiation processes from initiation to agreement orbreakdown, and focuses on the ways negotiators seek to influence the flowby shaping perceptions of time-related costs, structuring action-forcingevents, and creating linkages among sets of negotiations.

Michael Watkins is associate professor of management at the Harvard Business School, 139 MorganHall, Soldiers Field, Boston, Mass. 02163.

Early on the morning of Friday, 10 April 1998, word began to leak out thatnegotiators in Northern Ireland had reached a landmark peace accord. The"Good Friday" agreement emerged only after the contending parties hadnegotiated far into the night and made wrenching concessions. Republicanleaders confronted the hard truth that their dream of a united Ireland wouldbe deferred, perhaps indefinitely. On the Unionist side, grudging acceptancewas given to a North-South Ministerial Council that many feared would bethe thin edge of the nationalist wedge.

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Scarcely a month earlier, prospects for settlement had looked bleak.Talks were proceeding at a glacial pace, mired in seemingly endless roundsof consultation. Unionist negotiators were refusing even to speak to repre-sentatives of Sinn Fein (the nationalist political party linked to the IrishRepublican Army). Participants seemed more focused on getting their oppo-nents ejected from the process than on reaching agreement.

Then, in the final few weeks, momentum toward agreement began tobuild. Not coincidentally, a deal was struck just hours after a deadline set byGeorge Mitchell, the former U.S. Senator turned peacemaker. Concernedthat the parties would not make the May, 1998 target date for completion ofthe peace talks, Mitchell decided to set a firm cutoff point for his involve-ment. Speaking of his long experience in the U.S. Senate, Mitchell wasquoted as saying "I had plenty of practice listening to long debates, seeingpeople waste time, stall and delay."1 He also was concerned that splintergroups would seek to undermine the talks if they were given time, possiblyby assassinating a key political figure. With the backing of the governmentsof the United Kingdom and Ireland, Mitchell established his deadline as theday before the beginning of the Easter holiday, Thursday April 9. He latertold reporters that he had always found scheduling Senate votes just beforethe summer break a good way to focus people on making action.

Mitchell's success is a dramatic example of an everyday experience:negotiations that appeared deadlocked get settled "on the courtroom steps."More deeply, it is an example of how action-forcing events can impel nego-tiators to make choices they would rather avoid making. Examples of suchhard choices include:

• taking an initial position when one might have preferred to avoiddoing so;

• choosing sides in a dispute when doing so will inevitably damage somerelationships;

• making a concession beyond some psychologically important threshold;and

• deciding either to accept a marginal agreement or walk away from thetable.

In existing models of decision making in negotiation, parties makechoices by evaluating their alternatives through the lens of their interests:agreement is reached only when available terms are more attractive than no-agreement alternatives. But these models tend to be static. They do notaccount for why negotiators decide to make hard choices at particular pointsin time. What is it, for example, that triggers the tabling of a serious offer?Why do negotiators decide to reach closure rather than continue to negoti-ate? Put another way, what prevents negotiators from stalling, delaying,stonewalling, obfuscating and generally doing nothing in the hope that theircounterparts will make the first move?

Michael Watkins Building Momentum in Negotiations242

Negotiators make hard choices only when they lack more attractivealternatives and doing nothing is not an option. So long as negotiatorsbelieve that the costs of action outweigh the potential benefits of inaction,they cannot be expected to act. Success in claiming value in negotiationtherefore often involves strategic efforts to eliminate "do nothing" as anoption for other parties. At the same time, negotiators attempt to preservetheir own ability to avoid making painful choices.

Negotiators (and outside intervenors such as Mitchell) seek to buildmomentum toward agreement in two interrelated ways: by shaping counter-parts' perceptions of time-related costs and by structuring action-forcingevents. Suppose that two negotiators tabled initial offers, but then talks dead-locked. Now they are jockeying to see who will make the next move. If onenegotiator can convince the other that delay is practically costless for her,and if her counterpart is incurring substantial costs as time passes, then wewould expect the more "patient" party to extract large concessions to closethe deal. If she succeeds in doing this, it is because she shaped her counter-part's perceptions of time-related costs. Note that there was no specificevent that triggered action. Rather, rising tensions caused by accumulatingcosts eventually led to movement.

Contrast this with the deadline set by George Mitchell, a classic exam-ple of an action-forcing event. Action-forcing events are clear "break points"that confront some or all of the participants with the need to make hardchoices or incur substantial costs. These break points may be established byoutside forces, as was the case in the Northern Ireland negotiations, orthrough the actions of the negotiators.

Regardless of whether negotiators do it by slowly ratcheting up pres-sure or by establishing specific action-forcing events, the ultimate goal is tobuild momentum in favorable directions. In the remainder of this article, Ishall present a conceptual framework for understanding how negotiators dothis. This framework consists of four interconnected elements: (1) a cost-benefit model of the choices negotiators face, one that incorporates thechoice between doing something and doing nothing; (2) a nonlinear view ofthe flow of negotiation processes, in which the process evolves throughlong periods of apparent inaction punctuated by "surges" of movementtoward agreement; (3) strategies that negotiators and outside intervenors useto shape perceptions of time-related costs and structure action-forcingevents; and (4) an exploration of how linkages among negotiations can beused to stimulate action.

A Model of Decision MakingNegotiators seek to reach agreements that are favorable to them and accept-able to their counterparts. As Lax and Sebenius (1986) noted, they do so byshaping counterparts' perceptions of their choices in ways that help them toadvance their interests. To gain favorable agreements, negotiators mustunderstand how their counterparts perceive their options at a given point in

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244 Michael Watkins Building Momentum in Negotiations

time and what criteria they use to make their decisions. More deeply, theymust understand how other negotiators' perceptions are formed and howthey can be transformed.

According to Ikle (1964), negotiators face a "continual three-foldchoice" to: (1) accept currently available terms (i.e., proposals from counter-parts); or (2) break off talks with no intention of resuming them; or (3)continue negotiating in the hope of securing better terms. If the negotiatorchooses Option 3, she faces a subsidiary choice between (a) offering hercounterpart better terms (i.e., making a concession or finding a way to makea mutually beneficial trade that creates additional joint value); or (b) waitingin hope that her counterpart will offer her better terms. Option 3(b) is the"do-nothing" option: while the negotiator may engage in dialog, the basicsubstance of her proposals does not change. This choice is illustrated in theform of a decision tree in Figure 1.

How do negotiators decide what to do at a given point in time? Why dothey decide to accept available terms, or break off talks, or continue negoti-ating? In the simplified model of decision making presented here,negotiators make choices based on cost-benefit assessments. These assess-ments, in turn, are shaped by their perceptions of alternatives, interests, andaspirations.

AlternativesIn Getting to YES, Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991) assert that negotiatorsshould enter into agreements only if doing so yields them more value thantheir perceived Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). Theynote that: "People think of negotiating power as being determined byresources like wealth, political connections, physical strength, friends, andmilitary might. In fact, the relative bargaining power of two parties dependson how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement." (Fisher,Ury, and Patton 1991: 102).

Figure 1Model of Decision Making

BATNAs are what happens if the negotiators are unable to reach agree-ment. The stronger a negotiator's best outside alternative, the higher thethreshold of value that must be met in order for him or her to enter into anagreement. Better BATNAs, therefore, contribute to stronger bargaining posi-tions. Examples of BATNAs include going on strike in a labor-managementdispute, having a good offer from another potential buyer in a corporatedivestiture, or going to war in an international dispute.

InterestsAt any point in time, negotiators have the three options mentioned previ-ously — they can accept currently available terms, decide to go with theirBATNAs, or continue to negotiate in the hope of improving available terms.Negotiators can assess the subjective "value" of their options by looking athow well each option advances their interests — taking into account uncer-tainties and attitudes toward risk. Interests are the parties' desires or goalsand are, as Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991) note, distinct from the positionsthey take. Obviously, negotiators have an interest in getting a good deal onthe substance — i.e., on the issues that are the immediate subject of a nego-tiation. However, they are also likely to have interests in preserving andenhancing their "negotiating capital," i.e., their reputations, relationships,and other factors that influence their ability to do well in future negotiations.

AspirationsSuppose that a negotiator concludes that her counterpart's current proposalyields more value to her than her best alternative. Will she accept those terms?Not necessarily, but one can be certain she will not break off negotiations.Likewise, the fact that currently available terms are less valuable to her thanher BATNA does not necessarily mean that she will walk away from the table.

Instead, the negotiator's choices will depend on: (1) her own aspira-tions and consequent desire to continue negotiating; and (2) assessments ofher counterpart's aspirations and willingness to improve on the terms he iscurrently offering. So the key question is not, "Are available terms betterthan my BATNA?" Rather it is, "Do the potential benefits of continuing tonegotiate outweigh the potential costs?" If the answer is no, then the nego-tiator will compare available terms to her BATNA, make an assessment ofvalue, and either accept the terms or break off the negotiations. If theanswer is yes, and her counterpart feels the same, then negotiations will con-tinue. The fundamental objective, therefore, is to convince others thatagreeing to terms favorable to you is preferable both to no agreement and tocontinued bargaining.

Assessing Costs and BenefitsAssuming that negotiators decide to continue to negotiate, how do theymake the choice between offering better terms or holding firm in the hopetheir counterpart will do so? To sharpen the question, why should a negotia-tor not wait to see if her counterpart will blink? The answer is that thischoice is shaped by negotiators' assessments of the relative costs and bene-

Negotiation Journal July 1998 245

fits of allowing more time to pass. Note that the costs in question mayinclude the out-of-pocket or transaction costs of continuing to negotiate, aswell as the opportunity costs of not moving on to other things. The benefitsare estimates of the value of future concessions that counterparts will make.

If a negotiator believes that the passage of time is likely to weigh moreheavily on his counterpart, and if he believes his counterpart has the abilityto make concessions that are worth more to him than his own costs, then hewill choose to wait (i.e., Option 3b). If not, then he will choose to sweetenavailable terms (i.e., Option 3a). As noted earlier, it is the perception of rela-tive time-related costs that is important here, and negotiators therefore seekto convince each other that delay is not costly.2

The Surging Flow of NegotiationThere is a pressing need to develop dynamic models of negotiation. Goodmodels would provide insight into the drivers of decision making over time,helping us to understand characteristic patterns in the evolution of negotia-tion processes. As a starting point for developing such models, we mustaccept that negotiations are strongly nonlinear phenomena (for an accessiblediscussion of nonlinear systems, see Gleick (1987)). As such, they exhibitclassic nonlinear dynamics including:• sensitivity to early events — the way that negotiations begin can pro-

foundly influence every thing that happens thereafter;• irreversibiltty — actions negotiators take often have irreversible impacts

that create barriers to agreement;

• threshold effects — a small push in some direction may have no apparenteffect, but a slightly larger push may lead to very large change; and

• feed-back loops — once dynamics get going, they can become self-rein-forcing. The result may be virtuous cycles that build momentum towarddesired outcomes, or vicious cycles that are difficult to overcome.

For our purposes, a nonlinear view helps us to understand what causalobservation of negotiation processes reveals: movement toward agreementtends to proceed in "surges" rather than in an even flow. In particular, nego-tiations proceed through cycles in which protracted periods of inaction arepunctuated by short bursts of substantial movement until agreement isreached or breakdown occurs. The events in Northern Ireland are a goodexample of this, but the phenomenon is pervasive.

In a typical negotiation, discussions begin and negotiators may succeedin making initial progress toward agreement. But inevitably, points arereached where some or all the parties face very difficult choices, for exam-ple, whether to make concessions that will disappoint key internalconstituencies. At such points progress stalls and tensions rise. The negotia-tions remain at a stalemate until accumulating time-related costs become toogreat, or an action-forcing event, such as a deadline, causes some or all par-

246 Michael Watkins Building Momentum in Negotiations

ticipants to make concessions or break off negotiations. If the parties decideto improve available terms, accumulated tensions get released and theprocess flows toward agreement. This process is illustrated in Figure 2.

I find it helpful to think about negotiators' efforts to influence the flowof the process by drawing upon a hydraulic metaphor. Negotiators may seekto advance their interests by damming the flow of the process, loosing it,and channeling it in desired directions. The flow toward agreement can bedammed by, for example, purposefully engineering impasses. Tension can bereleased and channeled by proposing a new formula or face-saving compro-mise for moving forward. In the process, the more patient and creativenegotiator may be able to create and claim substantial value. Naturally it isimportant to avoid having tensions build to the point where the negotiationbreaks down. So managing the flow in negotiation involves walking the"knife's edge" between promoting movement toward agreement and trigger-ing breakdown. Speaking of the need to exercise judgment in setting

Negotiation Journal July 1998

Figure 2The Flow of Negotiation

247

deadlines, Avi Gil, one of the key Israeli architects of the Oslo peace process,put it this way:

The deadline is a great but risky tool. Great because without a deadline it'sdifficult to end negotiations. [The parties] tend to play more and more andtry to squeeze more and more and try to push more and more, becausethey have time. Risky because if you do not meet a deadline, either theprocess breaks down, or deadlines lose their meaning.5

The hydraulic metaphor also highlights fundamental limits on partici-pants' ability to control the flow of negotiation processes. Like a powerfulriver, the flow of a negotiation can be slowed down and speeded up, anddiverted from its course to some degree. But, it cannot be turned off and onlike a faucet. Negotiation processes have inertia. As they gain momentum, itbecomes increasingly difficult to change direction. Good negotiators there-fore move quickly to channel the flow in desired directions early in theprocess. Naturally their counterparts seek to blunt their efforts, and so theprocess of influencing the flow is inescapably interactive.

Shaping Perceptions of Time-Related CostsMany studies have shown that time pressure produces faster concessions andfaster agreement.4 Sometimes the impact of time pressure is symmetrical — itacts on all the negotiators. Often however, time pressure is asymmetrical andresults from the strategic actions by negotiators or outside intervenors. In TheArt and Science of Negotiation, Raiffa (1982) cites the following examples ofstrategic efforts to shape perceptions of time-related costs:

When the United States negotiated with the North Vietnamese toward theclose of the Vietnam War, the two sides met in Paris. The first move in thisnegotiation game was taken by the Vietnamese: they leased a house for atwo-year period. The party that negotiates in haste is often at a disadvan-tage. The penalties incurred in delays may be quite different for the twoparties, and this discrepancy can be used to the advantage of one side. . .Insome negotiations, the tactic might be to delay negotiations indefinitely.For example, environmentalists can often discourage a developer throughprotracted litigations. In a civil liabilities suit, an insurance company canuse delays in bringing a case to court in order to get the plaintiff to accepta more favorable (to the insurance company) out-of-court settlement(Raiffa 1982: 16).

In each of these cases, the objective was to ratchet up pressure graduallyon a counterpart until they reach a breaking point. There are many ways nego-tiators can "dam the flow" of the process. They can, for example, find excusesfor delay or engineer an impasse. Clarifying meetings and internal "ratifica-tion" discussions within organizations often serve this function. Alternatively,they can erect procedural barriers to progress, as was done in the cases of theenvironmentalists and the insurance company cited by Raiffa.


Negotiators shape perceptions of time-related costs by either convinc-ing their counterparts that they have all the time in the world or by raisingcounterparts' concerns about their own costs. In renting the house in Parisfor two years, the North Vietnamese sent a very powerful signal: We are notin a rush. . .what about you? The Vietnamese knew that U.S. leaders werefacing increasing domestic opposition to the war and that time was, to somedegree, on their side.

As noted previously, one reason negotiators experience time pressure isbecause of accumulating transaction and-or opportunity costs. That is, fur-ther delay in reaching agreement may be costly because the process eats upvaluable resources (e.g., travel expenses) or because it prevents participantsfrom moving on to other important activities.

Alternatively, negotiators may experience time pressure because theybelieve that their alternatives to agreement (i.e., BATNAs) will get worse astime passes, or their counterparts' BATNAs will get better. Pruitt andCarnevale (1993: 59) cite the example of negotiating over the sale of fruitthat will spoil if much time is permitted to pass. In this case the fruit is a"wasting asset." Another example is a small entrepreneurial company that isnearly out of funds negotiating for a make-or-break contract with a largecompany. In other situations, the passage of time may permit counterparts toget organized and accumulate resources, such as the support of allies, thatstrengthen their bargaining positions. Once again, the issue is perceptions ofthe relative costs and benefits of permitting time to pass.

As Lax and Sebenius (1986) note, negotiators can take actions "awayfrom the table" to influence counterparts' perceptions of their BATNAs.Such actions often are intended to influence counterparts' perceptions oftime-related costs. In seeking to end the war in Bosnia, for example, NATOinitiated a bombing campaign in the late summer of 1995 aimed at punishingthe Bosnian Serbs for their attacks on civilians in Sarajevo and reducing theirmilitary capacity (for details, see Rosegrant and Watkins 1996b). As damageaccumulated, the Serbs became increasingly anxious to end the bombing lestit fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region. So they becameopen to negotiations, and the resulting talks led to the end of the siege ofSarajevo.

Often negotiators combine inaction at the table with actions away fromthe table to increase time-related pressures on their counterparts. At thetable, negotiators may delay, engineer impasse, and seek to convince coun-terparts they are in no rush. Away from the table, they may work tostrengthen their own BATNA and weaken the BATNA of their counterparts.Obviously, good negotiators must be cautious in applying this strategy: If allthe participants in a process succeed in convincing each other that delay iscostless, then the result inevitably will be delay. Likewise, negotiators mayend up overcommited to a "you-concede-first" position that contributes toimpasse (for a discussion, see Raiffa 1982: 80-85). Finally, in situations of bit-ter conflict, the contending parties may not care that they are suffering high


costs themselves, just so long as they are inflicting damage on "the enemy"(for a discussion of strategic, psychological, and institutional barriers toagreement, see Arrow et al. 1995). In all these cases, collective value isdestroyed.

Structuring Action-Forcing EventsAction-forcing events are specific breakpoints in the process which forcenegotiators to consider costs. Prior to the event, the cost of inaction may below. But permitting the event to pass without taking action results in someor all negotiators incurring substantial costs. Had the political parties ofNorthern Ireland allowed Mitchell to withdraw, for example, the conse-quences could have been devastating for all involved

Once again, distribution of the costs associated with an action-forcingevent may be symmetrical or asymmetrical. In the former case, all partici-pants are affected, while in the latter, failure to act prior to the deadlineaffects some negotiators substantially more than others. Consider, for exam-ple, a union strike deadline. In symmetrical situations, both the companyand union members suffer substantial costs if the deadline passes withoutagreement. But if the company is able to maintain operations usingnonunion labor, or the union has accumulated a large strike fund, then costsassociated with failure to agree prior to the deadline may be asymmetrical.

Action-forcing events may be imposed on the negotiators by externalcircumstances or they may result from internal strategic moves. If the latter,then they may emerge consensually from the negotiation process or be uni-laterally imposed by some negotiators on others.

Externally Imposed EventsNegotiators often face important externally imposed time limits, such as theprospect of losing important options or resources. Suppose, for example,that a commercial real estate developer is negotiating with a prospective ten-ant over occupancy of a building he wishes to construct. The developer hasan option to buy the piece of land on which the building will be built, andthe option expires in a few weeks. The developer cannot risk exercising theoption unless he can successfully conclude negotiations with the tenant.Thus the option deadline imposes a real external constraint on the devel-oper's actions. Note, however, that the prospective tenant may not be awarethat the developer faces the deadline and the developer may succeed (atleast for a while) in masking his anxiety.

Likewise in conflict situations, outside intervenors may seek to imposedeadlines on contending parties. Intervenors with coercive power may backthese deadlines up with threats to impose a settlement (for a discussion ofapproaches to intervention, see Watkins and Winters [1997]). In seeking tostop fighting among the warlords of Somalia, for example, the U.S. deployeda large military force in 1992. Robert Oakley, the political head of the U.S.mission, effectively used threats of military intervention to bring the parties


to the table (see Rosegrant and Watkins 1996a). The NATO bombing of theSerbs in Bosnia provides another example.

Even if they lack coercive power, outside intervenors can establishdeadlines that force contending parties to make hard choices. As was thecase with George Mitchell, they may do this by placing time limits on theirown involvement in the process. The contending parties then have todecide whether to permit the mediator to withdraw and the process to failor make the necessary compromises. As with all threats, this works only if itis perceived as credible by the parties and if the associated costs to the com-batants are high. In the case of Northern Ireland, the costs of failing to meetMitchell's deadline included loss of a historic opportunity for a deal, proba-ble return to bloodshed, as well as the political costs of being seen asresponsible for failure.

Note that "spoilers" — i.e., outside parties who seek to underminenegotiations — also may use action-forcing events to advance their goals.When terrorist groups stage attacks in the Middle East, for example, theyoften do so with the intention of undermining moves toward peace. Moregenerally, action-forcing events can cut both ways: they can be used to pro-mote movement toward agreement or to provoke a breakdown.

Internally Imposed EventsInternally, negotiators may agree on deadlines as a way of forcing themselvesto reach closure. This is a form of mutual commitment. As such, it worksonly if both sides truly cannot avoid incurring costs if they fail to meet thedeadline.

Negotiators also may unilaterally set up action-forcing events in aneffort to constrain their counterparts' choices. Two notable examples of thiswere North Korea's decision to announce its withdrawal from the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty and the Bush Administration's request to send ahigh-level delegation to Saudi Arabia soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitin 1990.

In early 1994, promising low-level talks between the United States andNorth Korea over the latter's nuclear program broke down in alarming fash-ion (see Rosegrant and Watkins 1995). The North Koreans announced theirintention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) afterthe 90-day waiting period required by the treaty. By doing this, the NorthKoreans effectively forced the U.S. into direct, high-level negotiations.Legally, the North Koreans were permitted to withdraw, but if they had doneso, they would have seriously damaged prospects for upcoming negotiationsover the renewal of the NPT and undermined U.S. efforts to prevent prolifer-ation of weapons of mass destruction. Crucially, the U.S. was given time toreact to the North Korean move. The 90-day time limit allowed time for pres-sure to build and negotiations to resume. The existence of a deadline alsoprovided a focus for media attention, increasing pressure on the Clintonadministration to react.


The second example illustrates a related action-forcing dynamic. Havingdecided to oust Iraq from Kuwait, the administration of President GeorgeBush engaged in vigorous efforts to build a supportive coalition (see Roseg-rant and Watkins 1994). It was essential that the U.S. get the support of thegovernment of Saudi Arabia early on. After some conversations betweenPresident Bush, the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. and King Fahd, the Saudisrequested that the administration send a low-level technical team to discusspotential military deployments. The Bush Administration countered by press-ing King Fahd accept a high-level delegation led by Defense SecretaryRichard Cheney. In accepting, the King effectively committed himself to sup-porting the deployment, since such a delegation could not be sent awayempty-handed. At the same time, the arrival of a high level U.S. delegationpermitted King Fahd to catalyze internal decision making within Saudi Ara-bia, forcing the debate of over U.S. involvement to closure.

Building Momentum through LinkageOften negotiations are connected to other negotiations in a larger linked sys-tem (for a discussion see Watkins and Passow [1996]). When negotiationsare linked, events in one set of negotiations can act to force action in linkedsets. Three types of linkages exist among negotiations: sequential, competi-tive, and reciprocal. Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the three types oflinkages.

Sequential LinkageNegotiations are sequentially linked if (1) outcomes of past negotiationsaffect current negotiations or (2) outcomes of current negotiations affectnegotiators' scope for action in future negotiations. In sequentially-linkednegotiations, the conclusion of one set can act to impel negotiators to beginanother set, and constrain their options in the process. In legislative situa-tions, for example, leaders may call a preliminary nonbinding vote as a wayof forcing members to go on the record as being for or against a particularlaw. The outcome of this vote shapes the starting point for subsequent nego-tiations over binding votes.

The need to complete a current set of negotiations before beginning animportant upcoming set also can be used to stimulate action. In the case ofthe United States and North Korea, the U.S. was constrained to act becauseof upcoming negotiations over the renewal of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty. These negotiations were fast approaching, and the U.S. could notallow the North Koreans to withdraw without badly damaging prospects forrenewal.

The need to complete one set of negotiations before commencinganother set also can be used as an excuse for delay. By delaying completionof the current negotiations, negotiators can effectively delay the subsequentlinked negotiations.


Figure3Sequential, Competitive and Reciprocal Linkage

Competitive LinkageTwo sets of negotiations are competitively linked when they occur in paral-lel and if agreement in one set precludes agreements in the other. Consider,for example, negotiations over the sale of a house in which a buyer and aseller have tabled initial offers and then deadlocked. Now suppose a secondpotential buyer shows up and makes a somewhat better offer than the first.The seller's negotiations with the two buyers are competitively linked sinceonly one set can reach fruition. The offer from the second buyer may serveto force action in the first set of negotiations, leading the first buyer tosweeten her offer.

Reciprocal LinkageTwo negotiations are reciprocally linked when they take place in parallel andif agreement must be reached in both in order for agreement in either totake place. To return to the home-buying example, suppose you have beenoffered a job in another city and have to move in three months. You there-


fore want to sell your current home and buy a new one. You have an offeron your house, but it is substantially less than the one you hoped to get. Atthe same time, you found a new house you like and made an offer whichwas tentatively accepted. But you cannot close on the new house until yousell your current house. These two negotiations are reciprocally linked. Theneed to close on the new house may serve to impel you to accept the cur-rent offer on your old house. More generally, the need to get closure in oneset of negotiations may act to force action in reciprocally-linked ones.

Internal-external negotiations are a special class of reciprocally-linkednegotiations. When negotiations go on between groups, or organizations, ornations, "external" negotiations often interact with "internal" decision mak-ing (for a discussion of internal-external negotiations as "two-level games,"see Putnam [1988]). Thus, overall agreement is reached only when there issome critical threshold of support inside each of the collectives.

Internal-external negotiations provide rich opportunities to use linkageto force action. In international affairs, for example, one reason that leadersschedule summit meetings is to impel their respective bureaucracies to com-plete negotiations on important issues. By raising expectations of agreement,leaders commit themselves to concluding an agreement by a specified date.Failure to do so results in an unacceptable loss of credibility. More generally,representatives may operate under instructions from their principals thatrequire them to complete negotiations by a specified time, and use this con-straint to force action.

Likewise, negotiating representatives may "collude" to set deadlines inorder support their efforts to "sell" difficult choices to their respective con-stituencies. To return to the Northern Ireland example, Mitchell's deadlinewas in some senses quite artificial. It forced action in part because ofMitchell's commitment and in part because it was convenient for politicalleaders in Northern Ireland to treat it as binding. Each could go back to hisrespective constituency and say "we can't afford to let this process go downthe drain, so we have to make some hard choices."

Implications for PracticeThe framework presented here has practical as well as theoretical implica-tions. Specific prescriptions that flow from the analysis include:

Shape perceptions of time-related costs. Success in convincing counter-parts that delay costs you little and them a lot can augment your perceivedbargaining power. One's own verbal style and body language are importanttools for doing this, for example by conveying a calm and relaxed demeanor.Negotiators can also send signals about their attitudes toward time, such asthe North Vietnamese move to rent the house in Paris for two years. If coun-terparts' aspirations seem out of line, it may even be advantageous toengineer an impasse.


Structure action-forcing events. Advantage also may be gained by uni-laterally setting up action-forcing events. This is especially important whennegotiators face accumulating time-related costs that they believe to begreater than their counterparts'. Success in establishing a deadline may helpto level the playing field.

Seek to relax time-related constraints. It sometimes is possible to findways to lower one's time-related costs or to neutralize the impact of action-forcing events. Returning to the example of the commercial real estatedeveloper with the expiring option, suppose that it was possible for him torenegotiate and extend the option. Success in doing this removes an impor-tant time-related constraint on his negotiations with potential tenants.

Use linkages to force and delay action. When negotiations are dead-locked, it sometimes is possible to set up linkages (e.g., competing bids) thatincrease the pressure on counterparts to make concessions. If the objectiveis delay, then it may be advantageous to create entangling linkages so thatcounterparts have to deal with multiple negotiations in parallel.

Be skeptical about deadlines. Finally, it is always worth being some-what skeptical about deadlines, which often are arbitrary. What is it thatmakes a particular deadline binding? What are true costs of failing to takeaction before the deadline? What might be done to reframe the situation, sothat commitments to deadlines can be undone?

NOTES

1. This quote and other details related to the Good Friday Agreement are drawn from a 12April 1998 New York Times article, "Can-do American's patience paid off with an Ulster pact," byWarren Hoge.

2. Note that other sorts of costs and benefits also may influence decision making. Negotiatorsmay already have invested a great deal in the process and these sunk costs may shape decision mak-ing, perhaps even to the point of seriously biasing judgment. Success in getting a counterpart deeplyinvested in negotiations may therefore serve to spur them to make concessions later in the process.On the other hand, if negotiators are incurring little or no cost for letting time pass, then naturalinertia and the opportunity to concentrate on other, more pressing matters may reinforce the strate-gic rational for playing wait-and-see. Studies of group decision making, for example, have revealedthat teams tend to allow roughly half the time between the announcement of a deadline and itsarrival to pass with nothing happening and then suddenly spring into action. See Gersick (1989).

3. Interview with Avi Gil, 4 May 1998.4. See, for example, Pruitt and Drews (1969); Yukl (1974); Smith et. al (1982); Roth et. al.

(1988); and Cramton and Tracy (1992) .

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Michael Watkins Building Momentum In Negotiations256

building momentum in negotiations: time-related costs and action-forcing events

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