The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 18 | Issue 7 | Number 3 | Article ID 5386 | Apr 01, 2020

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Building Holistic Resilience: Tokyo’s 2050 Strategy

Andrew DeWit, Riyanti Djalante, Rajib Shaw

Abstract: The paper examines Japan’s capitalcity of Tokyo’s “Zero Emission Tokyo Strategy.”Our work shows that Tokyo’s strategy isparticularly important in light of the 2030Agenda’s emphasis on greenhouse-gasemissions reduction, equitable sustainability,and building holistic resilience against allhazards. The data indicate that Tokyo’sambitions are built on a track record of globalleadership in resource efficient water systems,transi t networks, and other cr i t ica linfrastructure. Moreover, Tokyo is part ofJapan’s zero-emission communities, smartcities, all-hazard resilience, and othermultilevel and silo-breaking collaborativep lat forms. Our ana lys is a l so makesrecommendations for bolstering Tokyo’sstrategy, to enhance co-benefits fromintegrating climate change mitigation andadaptation, in addition to strengtheningpandemic response.

Introduction

On December 27, 2019, Japan’s capital city ofTokyo committed itself to a “Zero EmissionTokyo Strategy.”1 The strategy aims to achievenet zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.Like all other climate strategies, Tokyo’s is awork in progress. It has yet to adequately detailco-benefits from integrating climate changemitigation and adaptation, notably in the areaof human health. But Tokyo’s example isimportant for a host of reasons. First, Tokyo isthe world’s largest megacity. What it doesinfluences other Japanese municipalities andindeed other global cities. Second, Tokyo’s

strategy is multi-sectoral and pragmatic, ratherthan overly reliant on idealistic energy visions.Third, Tokyo is investing heavily in the peopleand critical infrastructure essential to realizingits ambitions. Its increasingly aggressive andsmart fiscal policy affords a benchmark for anage of economic and ecosystem disruptioncoupled with accelerating technologicalinnovation. As many unprepared cities andnations are discovering, well-targetedpreparatory investment is particularly essentialin the face of COVID-19 and future pandemics.Fourth, Tokyo emphasizes integrated andinclusive governance, which enhances theprospects for implementation and continuedpolicy evolution. Fifth, studying Tokyo’sstrategy opens windows on the platformcollaborations that Japanese “silo-breakers”2

have been building since 3-11, to maximizeholistic resilience. In this paper, we review theevidence and make three key points. We arguethat Tokyo’s ambition is credible, in large partbecause it already deploys resilient anddecarbonizing critical infrastructure networksthat simultaneously mitigate and adapt toclimate change, resource crises, and otherchallenges. We also argue that Tokyo’sintegrated and well-funded strategy offers amodel, not just for melding the ParisAgreement, Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs), and the Sendai Framework for DisasterRisk Reduction, but also keeping them on trackin the face of unprecedented uncertainty. Andin our conclusions, we urge Tokyo to adoptseveral recommendations to bolster its strategyin light of emerging needs and opportunities.

Tokyo’s 2050 strategy

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Key to Tokyo’s zero emission strategy(hereafter “TMG 2050”) is integration. TMG2050 builds on an institutional legacy ofmetropolitan governance and a multiplicity ofpast and present initiatives in energy, disasterrisk reduction, waste, transport, and otherareas. Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s (TMG)transport, sewerage, and other planningsuccesses have made it one of the world’s mostenergy- and material-efficient city-regions.What is new is TMG 2050’s integration ofclimate mitigation and adaptation towardsachieving zero emissions. TMG 2050 thusdiffers from previous sector-specif icenvironmental initiatives. It puts cross-sectoralinitiatives at the heart of comprehensive cityplanning by focusing planning, finance, andcollaboration on zero emissions.

Figure 1: TMG 2050 and TokyoMetropolitan Government (Click to

enlarge)

Figure 1 shows that TMG 2050 also melds the“hard” infrastructure of technology with the“soft” infrastructure of inclusive governance.The figure outlines the six main sectorsinvolved in reducing emissions towards the

2050 target. The first sector is energy(electricity and heat), globally responsible forjust under a third of greenhouse gas GHGemissions. Yet note that TMG 2050 does notrely on glib promises of achieving 100%renewable energy in power and heat in adecade or even by 2050. Such bold pledges arecommon, according to the American Council foran Energy-Efficient Economy, but generally notmonitored for progress or actual GHGreductions.3 Incredibly, even Boston, the top-ranked US zero-emission city, does not have a“quantitative municipal energy goal.”4 And thecity of Berlin, the heart of Germany’s “energytransition,” is ostensibly committed to 100%renewables by 2050, but is evidently doinglittle to get there. The most current data fromthe German Federal Renewable EnergiesAgency show that by 2016 Berlin had achievedonly 4% renewables in primary energy (2.5% ingross electricity consumption), only a marginalincrease from 3.7% in 2013. And Berlin’s per-capita CO2 (not GHG emissions in total)emissions had only declined from 5.3 tonnes in2013 to 4.7 tonnes in 2016.5

It therefore seems commendable that TMG2050 does not rely on 100% renewables toachieve decarbonization commitments, butinstead aims at achievable, cross-sectoral goalsthat link technology and inclusive governance.The figure shows that TMG 2050 positionsrenewable energy as a “major energy source”rather than the only source. In fact, the detailsof TMG’s energy planning show that relianceon renewable energy is to be roughly doubled,from 14.1% in 2017 to 30% by 2050.6

Simultaneously, looking at the second and thirdsectors outlined in figure 1, TMG 2050 plans adrastic cut in emissions from the building andtransport sectors. These sectors are majorsources of GHG emissions, not just throughconsumption of liquid fuels but also the use ofpower for lighting, thermal comfort, and otherbuilding operations. TMG 2050’s aims in thesetwo sectors are a significant acceleration of the

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GHG reductions it has already achieved since2015, which marks TMG’s post-Fukushimapeak of GHG emissions.7 In other words, TMG’sratcheting-up of ambitions credibly builds ondemonstrated prior performance.

In the resource/industry sector, 4th in figure 1,TMG aims to ramp up its already aggressivepolicies of reduce, reuse and recycle (3Rs),particularly in plastics, food waste andfluorocarbons. These latter two – food wasteand fluorocarbons – are especially importantfor any viable strategy of drawing down GHGemissions.8

The fifth sector in the figure is “climate changeadaptation.” TMG 2050 positions adaptation asan explicit part of achieving zero emissions.Indeed, green infrastructure and myriad otheradaptation initiatives also enhance mitigation,thereby multiplying co-benefits, reducing per-unit costs, and maximizing societal agreementon action.9

Finally, figure 1’s sixth sector of “engagementand inclusion” outlines a programme ofworking with civil society, other levels ofgovernment, and international subnationalgovernments and non-state actors. Thisinstitutional and societal collaboration isembedded in TMG’s role as a metropolitangovernment, integrating 23 special wards and39 municipalities. It is also evident in themultiple collaborative platforms – SDG cities,smart cities, national resilience – we describelater below.

TMG 2050 and Tokyo Resource-Efficiency

We suggested earlier that TMG 2050 is notmere virtue-signaling, but rather builds onTMG’s strengths. A few examples shall suffice.TMG’s per-capita energy, water and wasteflows are considerable below the average ofsuch peers as Shanghai, New York City,London, Paris, and others.10 TMG also installed

Japan – and the world’s – first urban cap andtrade scheme that includes the commercial andindustrial sector, “including office buildings,which are often concentrated in megacities.”11

TMG and other large Japanese cities – notableFukuoka – are generally built in a compactmanner that fosters efficient resource use andlimits urban sprawl.

The importance of TMG-style resource-efficiency is seen in the UNEP’s InternationalResource Panel (IRP) 2018 report on “TheWeight of Cities: Resource Requirements ofFuture Urbanization.” The IRP calculate thehistoric trajectory for urban sprawl to be about2%/yr, a pace that – if continued - would seeurban land use expand from 1 million km2 atpresent to 2.5 million sq2 by 2050. That extra1.5 million sq2 of urban space would beapproximately 3 times the 506,000 km2 area ofthe entire country of Spain. In tandem withthat, urban material consumption is on track togrow from 40 billion tonnes in 2010 to 90billion tonnes by 2050.

Those numbers are daunting. But the IRP arguethat “compact, resource-efficient cities” couldreduce these totals by 36-45%. As a benchmarkfor better performance, the IRP report notesthat “Japanese cities have the densest and mostconnected street patterns,” with Tokyo’s “levelof transit connectivity and intensity of use”being the highest in the world. These structuralfactors give Japan “the highest world energyproductivity (ratio of energy consumption toadded value), close to three times the globalaverage.”12 Zooming in on TMG, we see oneclear example of this resource-efficiency. TheTokyo Metro transit network’s 382 kilometersof track is far less than Shanghai’s 639kilometers, and even New York’s 401kilometers; but in 2018 its annual ridership of3.463 billion was the world’s largest, dwarfingthat of second-ranked Moscow (2.369 billion),3rd-ranked Shanghai (2.044 billion), and 6th-ranked New York City (1.806 billion).13

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TMG’s water supply is another area ofdemonstrated resilience and resource-efficiency. As in any city, TMG’s water-relatedsystems (e.g., sewerages) are energy-intensiveand crucial to public health. Moving aroundhuge volumes of water (for TMG, a dailyaverage of 4.13 million cubic liters in 2018),whether for consumption or for waste-treatment, requires prodigious amounts ofenergy. And poorly designed or badly managedwater systems pose enormous health anddisaster risks, in addition to wasting preciousresources.14 TMG’s replacement of its leakylead and iron pipe network with stainless steelbrought its water loss down from 17% in the1970s to an incredibly low 2% in the 2010s. Atpresent, TMG’s rate of water loss is well underthe double-digit leakage rates that OECDreports on “Water and Cities” indicate arecommon even in developed countries.15 TMG’scapacity to plan and operate its water networkson a metropolitan scale - coupled withinstitutionalized consultation with its specialwards and cities - allows expert informationand other scarce resources to be focused onthe macro-level management challenge. Ratherthan leaving each local actor to – as it were –reinvent the wheel on its own, strongmetropolitan governance affords the capacityto devise and deploy best-practice solutions.

The importance of collaborative governanceneeds to be underscored in light of globalsustainability challenges. Experts on urbansystems argue for a ‘one-water approach.’ Keyto this approach is integration of governanceand technology, as it “seeks to integratevarious water supply, treatment andmanagement infrastructures into a singleinfrastructure system perspective thatconsiders the ful l l i fe cycle of waterprovisioning in urban areas, [that] cansimultaneously deliver livability, resilience andsustainability benefits.”16 TMG does this withits water networks and other crit icalinfrastructure, scaling up the “system ofsystems” cross-sector integration that is core to

TMG 2050.

TMG 2050 and Public Finance

TMG also puts its money where its mouth is, soto speak. Its commitment to TMG 2050 is seenin the scale and focus of its multi-year fundsand annual budgets. As to the former, since FY2017 TMG has adopted a triad approach torolling out modernized urban amenities: “safetycity,” “smart city,” and “diver-city” (the latter acombination, in Japanese script, of “diverse”and “city”). To support these initiatives, TMGamalgamated its multi-trillion yen funds,17

under these three rubrics of safe, smart anddiverse. Well before the unfolding globalpandemic, TMG had targeted roughly JPY 1trillion in spending on these initiatives, outsideof the annual budgets, between 2017 and2020.

In 2019, TMG further sharpened the focus oncategories critical to TMG 2050. It createdthree new special purpose funds in 2019,totaling JPY 110 billion. Of this total, JPY 50billion is devoted to realizing a Society 5.0-type1 8 smart city, JPY 30 billion to zeroemissions projects such as fuel-cell vehicles,and JPY 30 billion to greening of TMG.Moreover, these new financing vehicles bringthe cumulative total (at end of FY 2020) of therelevant funds to JPY 1.77 trillion. Of this JPY1.77 trillion total, fully JPY 733.2 billion is to bespent within FY 2020 alone for modernizedcritical infrastructure (waterworks, transport,communications, medical, and other areas),disaster resilience, pandemic response, andother public goods. These investment areas areall pertinent to achieving TMG 2050’s cross-sectoral goals.19

The annual spending in TMG’s general accountis JPY 7.3 trillion. As in previous years,spending from the FY 2020 general accountalso features the triad of “safety city,” “smartcity,” and “diver-city.” But in comparison to

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previous years, the FY 2020 investments showdramatic increases.20 The summary details areas follows:

The safety-city budget overall is JPY 3281.billion (versus JPY 300 billion in FY 2019)centred on disaster-resilient waternetworks and bolstering structuresagainst seismic threats and risks ofcascading fires.

The smart city component of the FY 20202.budget totals JPY 654.8 billion, doublethe JPY 326 billion total in 2019. Much ofthis spending focuses on building uptransport efficiency by integrating tele-work, transit-demand management andother smart initiatives. The most strikingaspect is the 8-fold increase over theprevious year in spending on 5G wirelesstransmission and other core technologiesof a “Smart Tokyo.”

The diversity-city aspect totals JPY 550.53.billion, a dramatic increase from 353billion in 2019. Significant investmentsare focused on foreigners, the disabled,and other potentially vulnerablemembers of the community. And fully JPY174 billion is devoted to augmenting thenational government’s initiativesprov id ing f r ee ch i l d - ca re andkindergarten education. To someobservers, these items may seemextraneous to climate objectives. Butrelieving child poverty, increasingwomen’s opportunities, enhancing work-life balance are in fact crucial elementso f e m i s s i o n s r e d u c t i o n a n dsustainability. 2 1

TMG has also been quick to fill in safety-citygaps in pandemic response. As the COVID-19pandemic threat emerged and then worsened

from January of 2020, TMG responded rapidlywith supplementary budgets. On February 18of 2020, TMG announced that an initial JPY 6.4billion in countermeasures, added to the FY2019 budget, would be more than quintupled toJPY 33.7 billion as a special addition to FY2020. Both of these spending packages aredirected at a spate of measures, including testsand other supplies in addition to alleviating theeconomic impact on small firms. Comparingthese two supplementary spending measures,we see that the largest increase is the JPY 10million to JPY 2.6 billion rise for stockpilingmedical supplies, readying medical facilities,and other measures.22

In summary, TMG’s investments belie the hoarydepiction of Japanese public works as “bridgesto nowhere.” They also provide an importantmodel. In the face of COVID-19, most countrieshave moved rapidly towards very activist fiscalpolicy. As of this writing, the G-20 total forfiscal countermeasures is USD 5 trillion, whichis roughly the size of the Japanese economy.23

In many countries, the initial focus onsupporting businesses and households in theface of simultaneous supply and demand shockswill almost inevitably move to infrastructureinvestment. For example, analysts indicate thatthe broad range of categories encompassed bysmart cities are likely to become an even strongfocus of public and private investment.24 TMG’sfiscal data suggest that it already offersmultiple yardsticks of how to invest so as toachieve multiple decarbonizing co-benefitssimultaneously.

TMG 2050 and Other Japanese Cases

In pursuing zero-emissions, TMG is not aloneamong Japanese subnational governments.Indeed, one prominent area of collaboration inJapan is its national alliance for 2050 zerocarbon cities (with the Ministry of theEnv i ronment , bu t as par t o f l a rger

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horizontal/vertical collaboration). As of March24, 2020, 86 o f Japan’s subnat ionalgovernments – representing 48.5% of thecountry’s population – had adopted thestrategy. Figure 2 displays most of the 26prefectures (of Japan’s total 47 prefectures)that have adopted the strategy, and also showsthat many large and small cities are actingindependently of their prefecture. One exampleis the city of Koriyama’s commitment to thestrategy, in advance of any announcement bythe prefecture of Fukushima. At nearly theopposite end of the archipelago, the prefectureof Kumamoto has essentially organized 18 of its45 municipalities into a coordinated bloc.

Figure 2: 2050 Zero Carbon Cities in Japan(as of March 24, 2020)

Source: MoE, 202025

Within this nexus of collaboration, increasinglyambitious but doable targets are emerging. Forexample, on December 25 of 2019, GunmaPrefecture announced a 5-zero by 2050programme.26 The goals include the following:

zero deaths due to disasters 1.

zero emissions, especially through hydro2.and forest biomass

zero blackouts due to disasters, via use3.o f m icrogr ids and o ther smar tinfrastructure

zero plastic waste, through recycling and4.reduction of use

zero food loss , par t icu lar ly by5.repurposing food that currently goes intothe waste stream

Like TMG 2050, Gunma’s goals build onmultilevel collaborations detailed below,including SDGs, smart city, and nationalresilience.

Other Multilevel Collaborations in Japan

TMG has been a global f irst-mover onimplement ing the UN’s Susta inableDevelopment Goals (SDGs), a major part of the2030 Agenda.2 7 But so has the nationalgovernment, via the cabinet office and otheragencies. Developed countries tend to view theSDGs as a template to guide assistance todeveloping countries. However, Japan’s CabinetOffice has quite deliberately28 built a platformfor subnational (prefectural and municipal)models of “local revitalization” SDGs.29 Since2017, the multi-level collaboration has beenusing the 17 goals and 169 targets of the SDGsas means to focus Japanese initiatives to copewith myriad domestic challenges whilesimultaneously enhancing opportunities foroverseas engagement and contributions. Withinthe Cabinet Off ice’s faci l i ty, Japan’ssubnational governments compete to be one of

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the 100 designated SDG initiatives. TheJapanese platform distills the multiplicity ofSDG goals into 8 areas: inclusiveness andgender-equality, health and longevity,economic growth with innovation, sustainableand resilient critical infrastructure, resilientand decarbonizing energy, biodiversity andecosystem conservation, global peace andsecurity, and global engagement for promotingthe SDGs. In tandem, the national governmenthas linked its Society 5.0 industrial policy andrelated initiatives to the SDGs as a means offostering silo-breaking policy coherence intandem with expanded global collaboration.30

A related multi-level platform approach appliesto Japan’s smart city collaboration. Since itscreation in 2019, Japan’s Smart City platformhas grown to 570 members and 170 industrialpolicy initiatives. The members are composedof 113 local governments, 356 firms andresearch institutes (including universities), 11central agencies, and 2 economic associations.Like the SDGs platform, the Smart Cityplatform is a locus for integrating governanceand technology, a venue for facilitatingcollaborative learning and diffusion of best-practice solutions to domestic and globalchallenges. TMG’s projects are prominent inthe platform, and are thus well-positioned asmodels for other local governments.31

Perhaps most importantly, the nationalgovernment, TMG and other subnationalgovernments are also closely linked in anexpanding portfolio of national and subnational“National Resilience Plans” (NRPs) that havelegal precedence over other plans.32 Thisp l a t f o r m h a s s e v e r a l y e a r s o finstitutionalization. Japan’s NRP is based onthe National Resilience Law passed by the Dieton December 4 of 2013. 3 3 The NRP iscomprehensive, inclusive and transparent. It isaimed at bolstering the country’s resilience tonatural disasters and other hazards, as well asfostering the capacity to recover from suchdisasters when they occur. It is also explicitly

addressed to demographic and otherchallenges. Based on national and internationalevidence, it evaluates risks and vulnerabilities,selects and prioritizes countermeasures, andthen monitors progress on these measures. Asshown in figure 3, the NRP are umbrella plans:as of 2019, 46 other national plans refer to theN R P . T h e s e p l a n s i n c l u d e e n e r g y ,environmental, city-planning, ageing society,forestry, space, and other plans. An additional18 plans are slated to be added to the list,including the Comprehensive InnovationStrategy, the Global Warming Counter-Measures Plan, and the Basic Plan on OceanPolicy.34 The broad reach of the NRP allows itto address disaster, demographic and otherhazards. Comprehensive and integratedplanning also allows the NRP cycle toemphasize cost-effective, cross-sectoraladaptation to multiple risks while alsoachieving broader socio-economic sustainabilityand decarbonization.

Figure 3: Planning and Japan NationalResilience

Source: Japanese Cabinet Office (Click toexpand)

As figure 4 indicates, the NRP is also a “wholeof government” approach to planning. In 2014,the NRP was worked up into a plan by thegoverning LDP politicians and disaster-resil ience technocrats in the CabinetSecretariat’s National Resilience Promotion

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Office (NRPO). It was also studied by theNational Resilience (Disaster Prevention andReduction) Deliberation Committee (NRDC).The NRDC first met on March 5, 2013 and hadits 53rd meeting on March 23, 2020. It hasplayed a prominent role in overseeing 2iterations (2014, 2018) of the NRP Basic Planas well as 6 annual action plans that decide andthen monitor the PDCA planning cycle and theachievement of Key Performance Indicators(KPI). These KPIs include hard measures, suchas reinforcing water-treatment systems, andsoft measures, such as skill-building and meansto break down governance silos. In the 2019revision of the original 5-year NRP basic plan,the number of KPIs had increased to 179.These KPIs cover a very broad range of hardand soft measures to secure holistic andinclusive resilience.

The NRDC’s membership is drawn primarilyfrom the top ranks of Japanese academe,business, and subnational government. Itsspecialists advise on ageing, primaryindustr ies, local communit ies, localadministration, risk communication, industrialstructure, the environment, disasterprevention, finance, national lands, andinformation services. These people andinstitutions are silo-breakers, in that theircollaboration brings together often balkanizedsectors. Their silo-breaking role is clear fromstudying the plans they have built and continueto refine. Indeed, in a laudable exercise intransparency, the minutes from NRDCmeetings and the materials it deliberates areuploaded to its dedicated web site, generallywithin a week of its 7-9 meetings each year.35

Figure 4: Whole of Government andNational Resilience

Source: Japanese Cabinet Office (Click toexpand)

A key test of any such ostensibly collaborativeinitiative is how well it diffuses and howpurposefully engaged the actors are. By thatmeasure, national resilience is even moresuccessful than the SDGs and Smart Cityplatforms described earlier. By March 1 of2020, all of Japan’s 47 prefectures had adoptedtheir own regional versions of the NRP.Moreover, 1,355 of Japan’s 1741 cities andtowns had either adopted their own localversions of the NRP or were formulating plans.This number of cities, towns and villages doingNRPs was more than a quintupling of the 196total from June of 2019.36 That startling rate ofincrease, in well under a year, was testament tothe rapid spread of risk-awareness in Japan.Recent years of repeated typhoons, floods andother disasters have led to a consensus on theneed for comprehensive planning andintegrated counter-measures.

As to subnational engagement, that is evidentin the content of the ir p lanning andimplementation. All the prefectural and localplans are formulated on the basis of local riskassessments, built on the advice of localexperts, open meetings, and responsiveness topublic comments on planning proposals. Inother words, the local plans are not “cookie-

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cutter” versions of the national plan, merepassive compliance with central-governmentdirectives in order to maximize public works.Japanese resilience is certainly well-funded, atroughly JPY 5 trillion per year. But theinvestments finance soft and hard measures inaddition to training and internationalengagement. The national and subnationalplans, budgets, committee representation, andother aspects are all open to inspection andinput from civil society. Spending categoriesand performance indicators are presented ingraphic and tabular formats.37

In addition to the above platforms on SDGcities, smart cities, and resilience, we couldhave outlined Japan’s platforms for compactcities, green infrastructure, and other elementsof holistic resilience. But we think the examplessuffice to show that TMG’s policymakers workin a variety of multilevel collaborations. Most ofthese platforms include al l levels ofgovernment and reach deeply into civil society.

TMG’s Broader Significance

Japan seeks to export its collaborative, resilientand resource-efficient urbanization. Oneindicator of this is seen in Japan’s cooperationwith the World Bank on disaster-resilient urban“lifeline” infrastructure. The World Bank haslong argued that compact design affords moregreen space, enhances the efficiency ofmaterial use, and reduces disaster and otherrisks. In June of 2019, the World Bankquanti f ied the benefit of this kind ofurbanization, in low and middle-incomecountries, as potentially USD 4.2 trillion inavoided costs from damage and disruptions.The ratio of initial investment cost versusavoided costs was calculated at 1:4, meaninginvestment in resilient infrastructure more thanpaid for itself over the lifecycle.38

Japan’s active collaboration with the WorldBank came in tandem with its securing G20

agreement, in June of 2019, to Principles forQuality Infrastructure Investment that includecomprehensive quantification of lifecycle costs.These principles are non-binding but meldenvironmental, societal, fiscal and other modesof sustainability. Close observers of G20processes regard them as one of the keydevelopments in 2019.39 Indeed, it is difficult toexaggerate the significance of bringing the2030 Agenda into the highest levels of decisionmaking on global infrastructure, which isroutinely assessed to represent a cumulativeUSD 80 trillion in investment by 2040.

One example of the prodigious body of researchhighlighting the importance of resilientinfrastructure is the October , 2018collaboration between Oxford University andthe United Nations Office for Project Services,in their report “Infrastructure UnderpinningSustainable Development.”40 They placeinfrastructure investments in a broader mix ofcritical public goods. These latter includeinvestments in health, education and foodsecurity, underpinned by sustainablemanagement of water resources. Like TMG2050, these integrated initiatives offer no-regret pragmatism: in the face of climate,geopolitical and business uncertainty, there canbe no doubt that providing children with cleanwater and other public goods will improve theirhealth and alleviate pandemic risks.

Further Integrated Resilience and the TMGParadigm

We have seen that TMG 2050 is part of a largerparadigm of platforms. Japan offers lessons ingovernance and the integration of technology,to help cope with multiple challengessimultaneously. Climate change is a wickedproblem and very likely an existential crisis.Assessing and addressing climate change isalways fraught with disagreements anddistractions, because short-term thinking is sogreatly advantaged over long-term planning.

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The unfolding pandemic and economic crisisseem likely to worsen that structural problemby impeding “super year” 2020’s multipleimportant negotiations over biodiversity, theoceans, and COP 26.41 But Japan’s examplesuggests powerful coalitions can be built byincluding a variety of no-regret “solutions”framed in terms of the 2030 Agenda.

Figure 5: Global Spread of Coronavirus (asof March 26, 2020)

Source: Financial Times, March 26, 2020(Click to expand)

Yet in light of COVID-19, it is imperative thatthere be tighter integration of pandemic risk-reduction and response in TMG 2050 and othermultilevel collaboration. Though Japan’sresponse to COVID-19 has generally beenderided in international and domestic mediareports, the country appears – as of this writing– to have minimized COVID-19’s spread. Thisresult is unexpected, particularly becauseJapan’s aging, population density and otherimportant variables exceed those of heavilyimpacted Italy. Figure 5 shows that after the10th recorded death from the coronavirus,Japan seems to have nearly flattened theupward curve of infection. The figure suggeststhat South Korea is leading in flattening thecurve, with Japan, Hong Kong and Singaporenot far behind. Japan may be in a much betterposition than most of Europe and North

America, not to mention Brazil, India, Indonesiaand other populous countries. The US appearsto be in particularly dire straits, which isespecially surprising in light of its 2019 rankingas the world’s most advanced case of healthsecurity.42

Whether Japan’s current comparatively lowlevels of COVID-19 infection, hospitalization,and mortality are due to good policy, good luckor simply poor data cannot yet be conclusivelydetermined. In any event, there are many areasfor improvement. On this, Japan’s 26 nationalresilience working groups include a high-level“STOP Pandemics 2020 Strategy Committee.”43

The Committee is chaired by highly respectedProfessor Kaku Mitsuo of Tohoku Medical andPharmaceutical University and lead author ofthe February 25, 2020 “Citizen’s Handbook” onavoiding COVID-19 infection.44 In a February10, 2020 forum, the working group made anumber of recommendations concerning betterintegration of pandemic risks into all-hazardN a t i o n a l R e s i l i e n c e . I t a l s o m a d erecommendations on risk-communication,preparedness, and related items.45 It is slatedto provide further recommendations in April,with presumably more specific protocols inaddition to how to better integrate pandemicrisk-reduction into Japan’s resilience paradigm.

But requisite reforms go beyond Japan’sdomestic protocols, platforms and paradigms.We have argued elsewhere46 that the pandemicresponse could be bolstered by greater use ofthe WHO framework on health-emergencydisaster-risk management (Health-EDRM). TheWHO descr ibes Health-EDRM as the“systematic analysis and management of healthrisks, posed by emergencies and disasters,through a combination of (1) hazard andvulnerability reduction to prevent and mitigaterisks, (2) preparedness, (3) response and (4)recovery measures.”47 WHO’s current technicalguidance has not incorporated the Health-EDRM.

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Also, one would have expected the pandemic tohave galvanized the international disaster-riskreduction (DRR) community. Certainly the UNOffice for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)issued a March 12 press release exhortingdisaster management agencies to “prioritizebiological hazards.” The UNDRR duly observesthat natural hazards are the focus for nationaldisaster management agencies. It encouragesthem to include health emergencies as a toppriority, because they clearly lead to cascadingsystemic breakdown in such cr i t icalinfrastructure as health care and financialservices. Yet we are now 5 years out from 2015adoption of the Sendai Framework on DisasterRisk Reduction, in tandem with the ParisAgreement and the SDGs. Sendai explicitlyincorporates climate change, health risks, andthe urgency of acting in advance rather thanwaiting and then responding. Surely thepresent crisis should produce a more

substantive response, particularly in such animportant year for further institutionalizing andintegrating the 2030 Agenda.

We argued that TMG’s example, and its TMG2050, suggests that robust and integratedgovernance can help cities maximize mitigationand adaptation. TMG 2050 deserves closeattention because it is a very democratic,collaborative benchmark built on impressiveresults, smart industrial policy, aggressivefiscal policy, and an emphasis on equity andinclusivity. We also pointed out that TMG 2050is not acting on its own, but rather in an “all ofgovernment” array of platforms and throughinternational engagement. Japanese silo-breaking is leading to substantial progress inintegrating the three key elements - Paris,SDGs, and Sendai – of the 2030 Agenda. Wecan only hope Japan contributes to keeping the2030 Agenda on track in this potentiallydistracting, disruptive and divisive year.

Andrew Dewit, Professor in the School of Economic Policy Studies, Rikkyo University, Japan.dewit@rikkyo.ac.jp (https://apjjf.org/mailto:dewit@rikkyo.ac.jp)

Riyanti Djalante, Academic Programme Officer, United Nations University- Institute for theAdvanced Study of sustainability (UNU-IAS), Japan.djalante@unu.edu (https://apjjf.org/mailto:djalante@unu.edu)

Rajib Shaw, Professor, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University.http://www.rajibshaw.org Science Committee Member, Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR)

Notes1 Tokyo’s Zero Emission Strategy is available at the following URL:https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/en/about_us/zero_emission_tokyo/strategy.html2 Silo-breakers are individuals and institutions that break down the walls – or “silos”- thatseparate public-sector governance, business management, and other areas. For their role indisaster risk reduction and climate adaptation, see “Silo-breakers: Asia and the Pacific callsfor integrating climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction,” United Nations Office ofDisaster Risk Reduction, September 6, 2019:https://www.undrr.org/news/silo-breakers-asia-and-pacific-calls-integrating-climate-adaptation

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-and-disaster-risk3 On this lack of monitoring, see “US Cities Boost Clean Energy Efforts, but Few on Track toMeet climate Goals,” American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, July 24, 2019:https://www.aceee.org/press/2019/07/us-cities-boost-clean-energy-efforts-04 See the US city database and assessments at “State and Local Policy Database,” AmericanCouncil for an Energy-Efficient Economy, March, 2020:https://database.aceee.org/city-scorecard-rank5 The Berlin City data are available (in German) at “Berlin (B),” German Federal RenewableEnergies Agency:https://www.foederal-erneuerbar.de/landesinfo/bundesland/B/kategorie/top%2010/auswahl/289-anteil_erneuerbarer_/#goto_2896 Tokyo’s 2017 level of 14.1% renewable energy is displayed (in Japanese) on p. 124 of theTokyo Environmental White Paper, 2019:https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/basic/plan/white_paper/100200a20191031132600879.files/2019zenbun.pdf7 Tokyo’s GHG emissions data can be referenced (in Japanese) on p. 125 of the TokyoEnvironmental White Paper, 2019:https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/basic/plan/white_paper/100200a20191031132600879.files/2019zenbun.pdf8 On this point, note that “Project Drawdown” has assessed refrigerantmanagement/alternative refrigerants and reduced food waste as among the top actions ineffective GHG emissions reduction potential. See their comparative table on the scale ofpotential cuts: https://drawdown.org/solutions/table-of-solutions9 On green infrastructure in Japan, see Andrew DeWit “Is Japan a Climate Leader? SynergisticIntegration of the 2030 Agenda,” Japan Focus, February 1, 2020:https://apjjf.org/2020/3/DeWit.html10 These results were reported by what appears to be the first ever comparison of energy andother resource flows in megacities. See Kennedy, C. et al “Energy and material flows ofmegacities,” Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2015 May 12:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4434724/11 See “Creating a Sustainable City: Tokyo’s Environmental Policy,” Tokyo MetropolitanGovernment, September 2018:http://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/about_us/videos_documents/documents_1.files/creating_a_sustainable_city_2018_e.pdf12 See p. 109 “The Weight of Cities: Resource Requirements of Future Urbanization,”International Resource Panel, 2018, available at the following URL:http://www.resourcepanel.org/reports/weight-cities13 The data are compiled by the International Association of Public Transport, and publishedas “World Metro Figures 2018”:https://www.uitp.org/sites/default/files/cck-focus-papers-files/Statistics%20Brief%20-%20World%20metro%20figures%202018V4_WEB.pdf14 For example, Project Drawdown assess “water distribution efficiency” as representing anopportunity to halve water loss (currently 30.3 billion cubic liters/yr), reduce GHG emissionsby, and save between USD 250-350 billion:

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https://drawdown.org/solutions/water-distribution-efficiency15 On these items, see the OECD’s work on Water and Cities: Ensuring Sustainable Futures:http://www.oecd.org/water/water-and-cities.htm16 See p. 109 “The Weight of Cities: Resource Requirements of Future Urbanization,”International Resource Panel, 2018, available at the following URL:http://www.resourcepanel.org/reports/weight-cities17 These kinds of funds (kikin) are not peculiar to TMG, and are financed via such measures asaccumulated savings from cost-cutting, unanticipated tax and related revenue increases, debtfinance, and other items. Japanese subnational governments use these funds to smooth outannual budgeting as well as target special purposes (notably building municipal structures,supporting primary industries, and coping with aging). On these funds, and their strikingincrease in recent years, see (in Japanese) Tatsuoka Kenjiro, “Why Have Local GovernmentFunds Increased?” JRI Review, 5(66), 2019:https://www.jri.co.jp/MediaLibrary/file/report/jrireview/pdf/11084.pdf18 On Japanese Society 5.0’s integration of cyberspace and physical space, see “Society 5.0,”Japanese Cabinet Office, nd: https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/society5_0/index.html19 See (in Japanese) p. 20-21 of “Tokyo Metropolitan Government Budget Summary, FY 2020,”Tokyo Metropolitan Government, February:https://www.zaimu.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/syukei1/zaisei/20200124_reiwa2nendo_tokyotoyosanangaiyou/2yosanangaiyou.pdf20 Concerning TMG’s FY 2019 and FY 2020 budgets, see (in Japanese) summaries at TokyoMetropolitan Government finance website: https://www.zaimu.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/zaisei/21 Within an already voluminous literature on these matters, see “Christina Kwauk et al.,“Girls’ education in climate strategies,” Brookings Working Paper, December 10, 2019:https://www.brookings.edu/research/girls-education-in-climate-strategies/22 The supplementary budgets are outlined (in Japanese) in detail “Concerning additions to theFY 2019 and FY 2020 supplementary budgets,” Tokyo Metropolitan Government News,February 18, 2020:https://www.zaimu.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/yosan/20200218_hoseiyosanan_tsuika.pdf23 See “G-20 Nations Pledge $5 Trillion to Spur Global Economic Recovery FromCoronavirus,” Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2020.24 One recent assessment of the pandemic’s implications for the smart city is seen in “TakingStock of COVID-19: The Short- and Long-Term Ramifications on Technology and EndMarkets,” ABI Research White Paper, March 18, 2020:https://www.abiresearch.com/press/covid-19-pandemic-will-force-companies-around-world-radically-rethink-how-they-operate-and-embrace-technological-investment/25 The Ministry of Environment “Zero Carbon Cities in Japan” mapping is available in Englishand regularly updated:http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/cc/2050_zero_carbon_cities_in_japan.html26 The details of Gunma Prefecture’s programme are available (in Japanese) at “GunmaPrefecture announces a 5-zeros by 2050 plan,” Gunma Prefecture, December 25, 2019:https://www.pref.gunma.jp/04/e01g_00147.html27 The use of the term “2030 Agenda” derives from the fact that the UN’s three landmarkagreements – the SDGs, the Paris Agreement and the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk

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Reduction - all cover the 2015-2030 period. On the effort to enhance synergies among thethree agreements, see Handmer, et al. “Achieving risk reduction across Sendai, Paris and theSDGs: International Science Council Policy Brief, May, 2019:https://council.science/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ISC_Achieving-Risk-Reduction-Across-Sendai-Paris-and-the-SDGs_May-2019.pdf28 On the Japanese Cabinet Office’s strategic approach to using the SDGs, see (in Japanese)Seki Sachiko “Concerning the Promotion of Japanese-Style SDGs,” Governance, October,2019.29 The platform is described (in Japanese) at: http://future-city.jp/sdgs/30 The categories are described in detail (in Japanese) at “SDGs Action Plan 2020,” CabinetOffice, Government of Japan, December 2019:https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sdgs/dai8/actionplan2020.pdf31 The Smart City platform’s website (in Japanese) is here:https://www.mlit.go.jp/scpf/index.html32 The central government’s National Resilience plans for 2014-2019 are available (inJapanese) here: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kokudo_kyoujinka/kihon.html33 The National Resilience Plan and related materials are available (in Japanese) at thefollowing internet URL: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kokudo_kyoujinka/34 The list of plans is available (in Japanese) at “Concerning other national plans in regard tonational resilience,” Cabinet Office, March 25, 2019:https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/resilience/dai47/siryo3-3.pdf35 The membership, minutes and materials studied by the National Resilience (DisasterPrevention and Reduction) Deliberation Committee are available (in Japanese) at thefollowing internet URL: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/resilience/36 Links to Japan’s subnational National Resilience plans are available (in Japanese) here:https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kokudo_kyoujinka/tiiki.html37 The plans, budgets, committee data, and other relevant information are available via theCabinet Secretariat’s dedicated website: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kokudo_kyoujinka/38 On this, see “Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity,” World Bank, June 17,2019:https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2019/06/17/lifelines-the-resilient-infrastructure-opportunity39 One example is Center for Strategic and International Studies Senior Vice-PresidentMatthew P. Goodman in his “Parsing the Osaka G20 Communique,” Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, July 3, 2019:https://www.csis.org/analysis/parsing-osaka-g20-communiqué40 The report can be accessed at the following URL:https://www.itrc.org.uk/infrastructure-underpinning-sustainable-development/41 On this, see Fermin Koop, “Coronavirus hits crucial year for nature and climate,” ChinaDialogue, March 19, 2020:https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/11915-Coronavirus-hits-crucial-year-for-nature-and-climate42 See the first-ever “Global Health Security Index,” developed by the Economist, the NuclearThreat Initiative, and the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. The Index is the world’s

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first, and in addition to getting the US wrong, lists Japan as 21st and Singapore as 24th. TheIndex is a very important initiative, but clearly needs silo-breaking revision of underlyingassumptions and other factors. The Index is available at:https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-Global-Health-Security-Index.pdf43 The working group’s membership and other details are (in Japanese) here:http://www.resilience-jp.biz/wg/wg24/44 The handbook (in Japanese) was updated on March 15 and is here:http://www.hosp.tohoku-mpu.ac.jp/info/information/2326/45 These are detailed (in Japanese) in “2020 Committee proposes 7 commitments,” NikkeiMedical, February 12, 2010:https://medical.nikkeibp.co.jp/leaf/mem/pub/report/t344/202002/564278.html46 See Riyanti, Djalante, Rajib Shaw, and Andrew DeWit, “Building resilience againstbiological hazards and pandemics: COVID-19 and its implications for the Sendai Framework,”Progress in Disaster Science, Vol. 6 April, 2020:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S259006172030017X47 See “Emergency Risk Management for Health: Overview,” World Health Organization, May2013:https://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/preparedness/risk_management_overview_17may2013.pdf