building community resilience to disasters in wash (water, sanitation … · 2016-08-26 · post...
TRANSCRIPT
BuildingcommunityresiliencetodisastersinWaSH
(Water,sanitationandhygiene)duringrecovery
ThisthesisissubmittedforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyatthe
UniversityCollegeLondon
SnehaKrishnan
July2016
DepartmentofCivil,EnvironmentalandGeomaticEngineering
UniversityCollegeLondonGowerStreetLondon
WC1E6BT
2
‘I,SnehaKrishnanconfirmthattheworkpresentedinthisthesisismyown.Whereinformationhas
beenderivedfromothersources,Iconfirmthatthishasbeenindicatedinthethesis.'
Signed:_______________ Date:______________
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Abstract
Recurring andmultiple disasters affect water and sanitation facilities and disrupt services. The
frequentdisplacementanddisasterlossesinfluencehygienebehaviourandrecoverypriorities.Post
disasterwater,sanitationandhygiene(WaSH)recoverysupportbygovernmentandNGOsandits
linkages with development are under-researched areas. This research explores approaches for
building community resilience in WaSH during recovery using two case studies from Eastern
India,AssamandOdisha.ParticipatoryLearningandAction(PLA)tools,semi-structuredinterviews,
participant observations,photographs and documents are used to gather qualitative data. The
analysis provides an understanding of WaSH during recovery at different scales including
households,communities,governmentsandhumanitarianagencies.
InAssamandOdisha, therewere changes in hygienepractices, access and availability ofWaSH
facilities,achievedthroughexperientiallearningandagencysupport.Learningwithinhumanitarian
NGOs occurred during implementation, mainly from the communities and technical experts.
Government agencies in Assam focused on flood protectionmeasures, which forced the flood-
affected populations to relocate without any resettlement support. In Odisha, the government
undertook effective evacuation and reliefmeasures and planned for reconstruction, but largely
ignored sanitation. During recovery watersupply was prioritised over sanitation and hygiene,
overlooking gender aspects and menstrual hygiene. Thus, an opportunity during recovery to
influenceWaSHpracticesandtoaddressopendefecationchallengeismissed.Thehumanitarian
actionisfragmentedacrosssectorsthatemphasise,prioritiseproductiveassetssuchaslivelihoods,
andshelteroverWaSHsystems.
Thisresearcharguesforlonger-termandintersectoralrecoveryprogrammesthatreflectcommunity
prioritiesthroughincreasedparticipation.Thiswillhelpintransformingpre-existingWaSHpractices
andattitudestowardssanitation.Thisthesisconcludesthatintegratedapproachesshouldconsider
the pre-disasterpractices, recovery and development plans for effective programming. The
recovery programmes should factor learning and effective participation for building community
resilienceandbringingabouttransformationalchanges.
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Acknowledgements
InMumbai,myhomewasfloodedduringthedelugein2005.Inmymaster’sthesisfromTISS(Tata
InstituteofSocialSciences),Ihadattemptedtounderstandflood-risks.Thishasbeenthefoundation
ofmyacademicandprofessionallife,whichtookmetotheriverplainsofBihar,Assam,andWest
Bengalinmyinitialyears.ThepresentstudyisdedicatedtothosefamiliesfromAssamandOdisha
whohaveenrichedme,and inspiredme toundertake this research.Most importantly, I extend
sincere gratitude to all the villagers, involved in this study, for their time, patience, openness,
hospitality and generosity. I hope that this research contributes in someway to their lives, by
improvingtheirconditionsandreducingtheirvulnerabilitytothemyriadhazardstheyface.
MyheartfeltandhumblegratitudetoDrsJohnTwiggandCassidyJohnson,whoguided,supported
and ensured I undertake credible research and meet their highest standards. Without John’s
support, this project would not have taken off, for his dedication and mentoring helped me
overcomemanyhurdlesduringthePhD:allowingmetotransferfromvisitingtofull-timestudent
andencouragingmetotakeanothercasestudywhenmyvillageinMorigaonwaswashedaway.
Cassidyhasbeenpatientwithme;herkindnessanddedicationhasinspiredmeendeavourinthe
process.The insightsandunderstandingtheyhavehelpedmedevelophavehelpedmenavigate
throughthisresearchprojectdespitemanyobstacles.ThankstoTakuFujiyama,MarcoFederighi,
andUCLGradSchoolforsupport.IthankBipulBorahandhisfamilyfortheirhospitalityandinsights
intoAssameselifeandculture.Ahugethankyoutodepartmentfriends:Martha,Oriana,Rukaya,
Carina,Viviana,Natalie,Rachna,LeeandAlejandro.KateCrawford,whohelpedmeputthepuzzle-
pieces togetheratcrucial stages,deserveshuge thanks. Ialso thankmy friendsDeepshikhaand
Rahulforstandingwithmethroughout.Myheartfeltgratitudetoallmyhostfamilies:Ranju,Baba
andMainNagaon,RajuuncleandRajiauntyinBlackburn,Amarjeet,Erin,andCassidyinLondon.
ThankstoJanviGandhi,whoprovidedendlesssupportandisafantasticsoundingboard.
Lastly,withoutmyparents-GirijaandH.KrishnanandSharan’slove,affectionandbeliefinme,and
understanding,supportandpatience.
Idedicatemythesistothesethreecheerleadersofmylife.
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AbbreviationsACF–ActionContrelaFaim
ADB–AsianDevelopmentBank
ALNAP–ActiveLearningNetworkforAccountabilityandPerformanceinHumanitarianAction
ANM–AuxiliaryNurseMidwives
APHED–AssamPublicHealthEngineeringDepartment
ARWSP–AcceleratedRuralWaterSupplyProgramme
ASDMA–AssamStateDisasterManagementAuthority
ASHA–AccreditedSocialHealthActivist
AWW–Anganwadiworkers
BBB–BuildBackBetter
BBSR–Bhubhaneshwar
BCC–BehaviourChangeCommunication
BDO–BlockDevelopmentOfficers
BWTU–BulkWaterTreatmentUnits
CATS–Communityapproachestototalsanitation
CBO–Communitybasedorganisations
CDPO–ChildDevelopmentProjectOfficers
CFW–Cashforwork
CGI–CorrugatedGalvanisedIron
CHAST-Children'sHygieneAndSanitationTraining
CLTS–CommunityLedTotalSanitation
CSO–CivilSocietyOrganisations
DDMA–DistrictDisasterPreparednessAuthority
DDMP–DistrictDisasterManagementPlans
DIPECHO–DisasterPreparednessECHO(EuropeanCommunityHumanitarianAidOffice)
DRDA–DistrictRuralDevelopmentAuthority
DROP–DisasterResilienceofPlace
DRR–DisasterRiskReduction
DWL–dailywageslabour
DWSM–DistrictWaterandSanitationMissions
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ECHO – European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (formerly,
EuropeanCommunityHumanitarianAidOffice)
EWB–EngineerswithoutBorders
EFSL–EmergencyFoodSecurityandLivelihoods
FFW–FoodForWork
FGDs–FocusGroupDiscussions
FREMAA–FloodandRiverErosionManagementAgencyofAssam
GB–GreatBritain
GO–Governmentorganisations
GoA–GovernmentofAssam
GoI–GovernmentofIndia
GoO–GovernmentofOdisha
GP–GramPanchayat(GaonPanchayatinAssam)
GRO–Grassrootsorganisations
OSB–OrissaStateBranch
OSDMA–OdishaStateDisasterManagementAuthority
HP–HygienePromotion
IAG–InterAgencyGroup
IDS–InstituteofDevelopmentStudies
IEC–Information,EducationandCommunication
IFRC–InternationalFederationoftheRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties
IHHL–IndividualhouseholdLatrines
IIED–InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment
IMD–IndiaMeteorologicalDepartment
INEE–Inter-AgencyNetworkforEducationinEmergencies
INGO–InternationalNon-governmentalorganisations
INR–IndianNationalRupees
IRC–InternationalRescueCommittee
IRCS–IndianRedCrossSociety
KAP–Knowledge,attitudesandpractices
Kg–kilograms
Kmph–Kilometersperhour
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LA–LocalAgencies
LRRD–Linkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopment
MII/MIII–Mark2orMark3handpumps
MDG–MillenniumDevelopmentGoals
MDWS–MinistryofDrinkingWaterandsanitation
MEAL–Monitoring,evaluationandLearning
MGNREGS–MahatmaGandhiRuralEmploymentGuaranteeScheme
MNP–MinimumNeedProgramme
MoU–MemorandumofUnderstanding
MSF–MédecinssansFrontières
NBA–NirmalBharatAbhiyan
NDMA–NationalDisasterManagementAuthority
NFIs–Non-FoodItems
NIDM–NationalInstituteofDisasterManagement
NGO–Non-governmentalorganisations
NGP–NirmalGramPuraskar
NOC–No-ObjectionCertificates
Novib–AgencyA’saffiliatepartnerfromNorway
NRDWP–NationalRuralDrinkingWaterProgramme
OCHA–UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs
ODF–OpenDefecationFree
ODI–OverseasDevelopmentInstitute
OFDA–OfficeofU.S.ForeignDisasterAssistance
ORC–OdishaReliefCode
ORS–OralRehydrationSalt
OSWSM–OdishaStateWaterandSanitationMission
PDM–PostDistributionmonitoring
PDPN–Pre-disasterPreparednessNetwork
PHAST–ParticipatoryHygieneandSanitationTransformation
PHE–PublicHealthEngineering
PHED–PublicHealthEngineeringDepartment
PHP–PublicHealthPromotion
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PLA–ParticipatoryLearningandAction
PMandE–ParticipatoryMonitoringandevaluation
PoUWT–Point-of-usewatertreatment
PUR–waterpacketsbyProctorandGamble
PVC–Polyvinylchloride
PWSS–PipedWaterSupplyScheme
PWD–PublicWorksDepartment
RCC–ReinforcedConcreteCement
RedR–RegisteredEngineersforDisasterRelief
R&DM–RevenueandDisasterManagement
RDD–RuralDevelopmentDepartment
RO–ReverseOsmosis
RRF–RapidResponseFacility
RTE–Real-TimeEvaluations
RWH–RainWaterHarvesting
RWSN–RuralWaterSupplyNetwork
RWSSS–RuralWaterSupplyandSanitationSchemes
SanCoP–SanitationCommunityofPractice
SBA/SBM–SwachhBharatAbhiyan/Mission(AlsoreferredasCIM–CleanIndiaMission)
SC–ScheduledCaste
SEM–Self-EmployedMechanics
SFDRR–SendaiFrameworkforDisasterRiskReduction
SHGs–SelfHelpGroups
ST–ScheduledTribes
SuSanA–SustainableSanitationAlliance
TF–TaskForce
TOT–Trainingoftrainers
TSC–TotalSanitationCampaign
VDCs–VillageDevelopmentCommittees
WaSH–Water,SanitationandHygiene
WEDC–Water,EngineeringandDevelopmentCentre
WHO–WorldHealthOrganisation
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WRD–WaterResourcesDepartment
WSSO–Watersupplyandsupportorganisation
UCT–UnconditionalCashTransfers
UKAID–UKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(formerlyknownasDFID)
UNCRPD–UnitedNationsConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities
UNHCR–UNHighCommissionerforRefugees
UNICEF–UnitedNationsChildren’sFund
UNCESCR–UNCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights
UNCRPD–UnitedNationsConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities
VDC–VillageDevelopmentCommittees
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Glossary
Ahom:LocalindigenouspeoplefromAssam
Anganwadi:courtyardshelterusedasschoolsfor0-6yearsoldchildren
Baanpani:floods
Bodo:Assameseindigenoustribes
Borakhun:heavyrains
Chappals:footwear
Chaporis:Assamesetermforchars–unstableandtemporarylandformationsintheriver
Chars:fertilepatchoflandgeneratedintheriverinBangladesh,atermcommonlyusedinAssam
Chotai:matsmadeofjute
Chullas:traditionalruralcookingstove
Crèches:spaceforbabiesandyoungchildrenforcareduringtheworkinghours
Crores:tenmillion(10,000,000)
deuterolearning:theskillinhandlingandinfluencingcapacitiesforself-organisationby‘learningto
understand’
hectares:ametricunitofsquaremeasure,equalto100acres
jobcard:arecordcardundertheMGNREGSgivingdetailsofthetimetakentodoapieceofwork
Jhali:nettedfilter
jhadoo:broom
Kaccha:temporary
Kacharigaon:campsettlement
Kolshi:traditionalwaterpotsmadeofaluminium
Lakh:ahundredthousand
Log frame: tool for improving the planning, implementation, management, monitoring and
evaluationofprojects
Mishing:alocaltribelivinginupperreachesofBrahmaputra,alsocalledasfloodpeopleofAssam
Mistry:Technician,artist
NaDCC–SodiumDichloroisocyanurate(TrocloseneSodium),aformofchlorinefordisinfection.
Nagmagic:Brandoftoiletsquatslabs
Panchayat:avillagecouncil
Paakghar:traditionalAssamesekitchen
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pH:ameasureofhowacidic/basicwateris
Purdah:gender-basedsegregationandseclusionnormswherewomencovertheirfaceswithveils
Pukka:concrete,permanent
Rabi:wintercrops
Saree:Indianwomen’sattirethatwomendrapearoundthebody
Sahis:hamlet,smallerunitofavillageinOdisha
Sarpanch:Villageheadman
Setu:bridge
Sitreps:situationreports
1GBP=100INR
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TableofcontentsAbstract.........................................................................................................................................................3
Acknowledgements...................................................................................................................................4
Abbreviations.............................................................................................................................................5
Glossary.....................................................................................................................................................10
Listoftables.............................................................................................................................................16
Listoffigures............................................................................................................................................17
Listofimages...........................................................................................................................................18
Listofannexures.....................................................................................................................................20
Chapter1:Introduction........................................................................................................................211.1ResearchTopicandcontext....................................................................................................................211.1.1Assamcasestudy.....................................................................................................................................................231.1.2Odishacasestudy.....................................................................................................................................................231.1.3Landscapeofhumanitarianaidintheregion..............................................................................................231.1.4Implementinginstitutionsintheregion........................................................................................................24
1.2ResearchQuestionsandObjectives......................................................................................................261.3ThesisOutline..............................................................................................................................................27
Chapter2:Literaturereview..............................................................................................................292.1Post-disasterrecovery..............................................................................................................................292.1.1Multidimensionalityofrecovery.......................................................................................................................292.1.2ContextofRecovery................................................................................................................................................312.1.3Disasterrecoveryobjectives...............................................................................................................................342.1.4Recoveryapproachesandstrategies...............................................................................................................39
2.2Water,SanitationandHygiene...............................................................................................................432.2.1AccesstoWater,Sanitation,andHygiene.....................................................................................................432.2.2EmergencyWaSH.....................................................................................................................................................482.2.3WaSHduringrecovery...........................................................................................................................................57
2.3ChapterSummary.......................................................................................................................................60
Chapter3:Conceptualframework....................................................................................................613.1Theconceptofresilience.........................................................................................................................613.1.1Vulnerability,RiskandCapacity........................................................................................................................61
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3.1.2Communityresiliencetodisasters...................................................................................................................623.2Systemsthinkingandresilience............................................................................................................703.3ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery.........................................................................723.4Learningandknowledge..........................................................................................................................733.5Institutionalcapacities.............................................................................................................................773.6Participation.................................................................................................................................................783.7Integration....................................................................................................................................................803.8ChapterSummary.......................................................................................................................................81
Chapter4:Methodology.......................................................................................................................824.1Researchstrategy.......................................................................................................................................824.1.1ResearchProcess.....................................................................................................................................................834.1.2Casestudyapproach...............................................................................................................................................884.1.3Selectionofcasestudies.......................................................................................................................................89
4.2DataCollectionMethods...........................................................................................................................934.2.1ParticipatoryLearningandAction(PLA)tools...........................................................................................944.2.2Interviews...................................................................................................................................................................994.2.3Documents...............................................................................................................................................................1014.2.4 Participantobservationandphotographs............................................................................................101
4.3Roleofpractitionerinresearch...........................................................................................................1024.3.1Biasesandethicsasresearcher......................................................................................................................104
4.4AnalyticalStrategy...................................................................................................................................106
Chapter5:AssamCaseStudy............................................................................................................1095.1 Assamfloods2012-13......................................................................................................................1095.2HouseholdWaSH.......................................................................................................................................1135.2.1Pre-disasterWaSH................................................................................................................................................1135.2.2ImmediateImpactofdisasteronWaSH......................................................................................................1155.2.3WaSHfacilitiesinreliefcamps........................................................................................................................1185.2.4ImprovedWaSHsituation.................................................................................................................................1225.2.5Recurringdisasters’impactonhouseholdWaSHsystemsduringrelocation............................124
5.3CommunityPost-DisasterRecovery...................................................................................................1305.3.1Changesatthecommunitylevel.....................................................................................................................1305.3.2Communityprioritiesforrecovery...............................................................................................................137
5.4LocalinstitutionsinAssam....................................................................................................................1395.5 GovernmentAgencies’response..................................................................................................1425.5.1WaSHresponse......................................................................................................................................................142
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5.5.2Longer-termrecoverymeasures....................................................................................................................1445.6HumanitarianAgencies’response......................................................................................................1475.6.1AgencyAWaSHResponseProgramme.......................................................................................................1475.6.2Institutionalapproachesandcapacities.....................................................................................................1535.6.3Consortium-basedandcollaborativeefforts............................................................................................157
5.7ChapterSummary.....................................................................................................................................159
Chapter6:OdishaCaseStudy...........................................................................................................1606.1CyclonePhailinandfloods,2013........................................................................................................1606.1.1Timelineofevents................................................................................................................................................162
6.2HouseholdWaSH.......................................................................................................................................1656.2.1Pre-disasterWaSH................................................................................................................................................1666.2.2ImmediateImpactofdisasteronWaSH......................................................................................................1716.2.3WaSHfacilitiesinreliefcamps........................................................................................................................1746.2.4ImprovedWaSHsituation.................................................................................................................................176
6.3CommunityPost-Disasterrecovery....................................................................................................1836.3.1Changesatthecommunitylevel.....................................................................................................................1836.3.2Communityprioritiesforrecovery...............................................................................................................185
6.4LocalinstitutionsinOdisha...................................................................................................................1876.5GovernmentAgencies’response.........................................................................................................1906.5.1WaSHresponse......................................................................................................................................................1906.5.2Immediatereliefandrehabilitationmeasures.........................................................................................1916.5.3Recoveryandreconstructioninitiatives.....................................................................................................192
6.6HumanitarianAgencies’response......................................................................................................1936.6.1AgencyAResponseProgramme.....................................................................................................................1936.6.2Integratedapproachesinrecovery...............................................................................................................1996.6.3Consortium-basedapproachesinOdisha...................................................................................................201
6.7ChapterSummary.....................................................................................................................................205
Chapter7:Discussion..........................................................................................................................2067.1HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedtoincorporate
resilienceinWaSH?Furthermore,howcanthesepoliciesbeeffectivelytranslatedinto
practice?..............................................................................................................................................................2067.1.1IssuesinWaSHmeasuresduringRecovery..............................................................................................2067.1.2PoliciesandschemesrelatedtoWaSHandRecovery...........................................................................2087.1.3HumanitarianWaSHprogrammingandrecovery..................................................................................214
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7.2Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthe
windowofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?......................................................2167.2.1LearningapproachesinWaSHduringrecovery......................................................................................2167.2.2Knowledgeapproaches......................................................................................................................................2227.2.3Participatoryapproaches..................................................................................................................................224
7.3Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewithlong-
termdevelopmentacrossdifferentsectors?..........................................................................................2277.3.1LRRDapproachandpreparedness................................................................................................................2277.3.2Inter-sectorintegration......................................................................................................................................229
7.4Reflectingontheresearchframeworkandquestions.................................................................2317.5Emergingthemesfromtheempiricalevidence..............................................................................2357.5.1WaSHTrajectoriesduringRecovery............................................................................................................2367.5.2GenderedrecoveryprocessesinWaSH......................................................................................................2427.5.3Coproductionofknowledge.............................................................................................................................245
Chapter8:Conclusions.......................................................................................................................2468.1AnsweringtheResearchQuestions....................................................................................................2468.1.1HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedtoincorporate
resilienceinWaSH?Furthermore,howcanthesepoliciesbeeffectivelytranslatedintopractice?
..................................................................................................................................................................................................2468.1.2Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthewindow
ofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?....................................................................................2488.1.3Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewithlong-term
developmentacrossdifferentsectors?...................................................................................................................2508.1.4Howeffectivelydodifferentapproachestowaterandsanitationfacilities,andhygiene
practices,duringpost-disasterrecoverypromotecommunityresiliencetodisasters?...................2518.2TheoreticalImplications........................................................................................................................2538.3Contributiontoknowledge...................................................................................................................2558.4Keyrecommendations............................................................................................................................2568.5Issuesforfurtherresearch....................................................................................................................258
Bibliography...........................................................................................................................................260
Annexures...............................................................................................................................................279
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ListoftablesTable2.1:State-of-artofrecoveryliteratureonobjectivesandapproaches(Source:Author)......38
Table2.2:CriteriaoftheHumanRighttoWaterandSanitation(Source:Greene,2014)..............47
Table2.3:SphereIndicatorsforWaSH(Sphere2011)....................................................................48
Table4.1:ResearchDesign:Timelineofactivities..........................................................................84
Table4.2:SelectioncriteriawithinAssam......................................................................................91
Table4.3:SelectioncriteriainOdisha.............................................................................................92
Table4.4:ResearchmethodsusedinAssamandOdisha...............................................................94
Table4.5:Summaryofinterviewsacrosscasestudies.................................................................100
Table5.1:Theconsecutiveflood-wavesin2012and2013(ASDMA2012b)................................109
Table5.2:DisasterdamagesinSonitpurandMorigaondistricts(Source,ASDMA).....................111
Table5.3:Changesinwaterandsanitationatcommunitylevel...................................................134
Table5.4:CommunityprioritiesinSolmariandBoramari,2013..................................................137
Table5.5:Localactors’responseinAssamandroleforlong-termrecovery...............................141
Table 5. 6: Monetary compensation to damaged households in Sonitpur, Assam 2012 (Source:
BiswanathCircleoffice,2012)........................................................................................................144
Table6.1:TimelineofeventsinOdisha,October2013-March2014(Source:AgencyA)...........162
Table6.2:TypologyofstudyvillagesinPuriandBalasore(Source:AgencyA,2014)...................166
Table6.3:ImmediatewatersupplymeasuresbyAgencyA(October–December2013)............177
Table6.4:ChangesinWaSHpracticesinPuriandBalasorevillages(author’sinterpretation).....184
Table6.5:CommunityprioritiesinstudyvillagesinPuriandBalasore.........................................186
Table6.6:Localactors’responseinOdishaandroleforlong-termrecovery...............................189
Table6.7:AgencyACycloneandfloodresponse2013-14,Odisha...............................................193
Table6.8:WaSHmeasuresinOdishaason21stFebruary2014...................................................195
Table6.9:Integratedactivitiesincashforwork(CFW)andWaSH...............................................200
Table7.1:GapAnalysisofWaSHanddisastermanagementpoliciesinIndia(Source:Author)...209
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Listoffigures
Figure2.1:Ladderofcommunityparticipation(Davidsonetal.2007)........................................422
Figure2.2WaSHinterventionscategories(AdaptedfromFewtrelletal.,2005)............................49
Figure2.3:Diseasetransmissionpathwaysoffaeco-oraldiseases(Prüss-üstünetal.n.d.)...........55
Figure2.4:HygieneimprovementframeworkSource:Sphere(2011)............................................56
Figure3.1:Aspectsofresilienceconceptualisation(Author’sinterpretation)................................66
Figure3.2:CommunityResilience:ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery..................73
Figure4.1:Integrationofdifferentmethods..................................................................................93
Figure4.2:Listofactorsinvolvedinwater,sanitation,andhygieneservicesinSolmari...............96
Figure5.1:Flood-affecteddistrictsin2012(AdaptedfromIFRC,2012).......................................110
Figure5.2:Mapofaffectedarea inBiswanath,Sonitpur(Source:NaduarCircleOffice,Sonitpur)
........................................................................................................................................................111
Figure5.3:ImpactoffloodsonWaSHfacilities(Source:PHED,Sonitpur2012)...........................142
Figure6.1:MapindicatingaffecteddistrictsinOdishabycyclonePhailinandfloodsandAgencyA
interventionareasin2013-14(AdaptedfromMapAction,28October2013)..............................160
Figure6.2HouseholdkititemsandquantityofNFIkitsprovidedbyAgencyA............................164
Figure7.1:CommunityResilience:ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery................232
Figure7.2:HouseholdTrajectoriesinWaSHduringrecovery........................................................237
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ListofimagesImage5.1:Kolshiatraditionalpotusedforwatercollectionandstorage(Image:Solmari,14-01-13)
............................................................................................................................................................4
Image5.2:Awomenusing the floodwaters forhouseholdpurposes (Image: Sonitpur, 13-07-12)
........................................................................................................................................................115
Image5.3:Watersourcesinthevillagesafterthefloodsin2012(Image:Morigaon,08-01-13).117
Image5.4:Householdlatrineswithtemporarywalls(Image:Sonitpur,11-07-12)......................119
Image5.5:Waterstoragesystemarelockedinschoolreliefcamp(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12).119
Image5.6:Flood-affectedfamilieslivinginaschoolrunasreliefcamp(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)
........................................................................................................................................................119
Image5.7:Makeshiftsheltersinthecampsettlementsonembankment(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-
12)..................................................................................................................................................121
Image5.8:Installationofhandpumpsontheembankment(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)............121
Image5.9:Hygienemessagesdisplayedontheemergencylatrineneartheembankment(Image:
Solmari,05-01-13)..........................................................................................................................121
Image5.10:AyoungdisplacedgirlinSolmariusesmirrorgivenbyAgencyA(Image:Sonitpur,23-
09-13).............................................................................................................................................121
Image5.11:Newlyinstalledhandpumponaraisedplatform(Image:Boramari,09-01-13).......123
Image5.12:Womenusingarehabilitatedhandpump(Image:Morigaon,13-09-13)..................123
Image5.13:Usingnetsasawaterfilter(Image:Morigaon,14-01-13).........................................126
Image5.14:Kacchalatrinesself-builtbyhouseholds(Image:Morigaon,04-01-13)....................126
Image5.15:Womenandchildrenbathinginponds(Image:Solmari,28-09-13).........................127
Image5.16:Lockeduplatrinesontheraisedplatform(Image:Solmari,28-08-13).....................128
Image5.17:Communitybuiltaccessroadsduringrecovery(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)..........132
Image5.18:Theaboveaccessroaddestroyedin2013floods(Image:Boramari,04-09-13).......132
Image5.19:IntermediatemobilesheltersconstructedbyAgencyA(Image:Solmari,15-01-13)136
Image5.20:Sheltersconstructedonraisedplinth(Image:Boramari,29-01-13).........................136
Image5.21:Self-builtextensionsfortheshelters(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)..........................136
Image5.22:BoramariwomenmembersengaginginfootballaspartofPHPcampaigntopromote
keyhygienemessages(Imagecourtesy:AgencyA,15-01-13).......................................................150
Image5.23:RaisedhandpumpbyAgencyAA(Image:Sonitpur,17-01-13).................................158
Image6.1:Artesianwells,withnon-stopwaterflow(Image:Brahmapur,27-02-14)..................167
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Image6.2:Pre-existingtubewellbuiltunderSpanishRedCrossprojectasapreparednessmeasure
afterthe1999supercyclone(Image:Pirosahi,08-11-13).............................................................168
Image6.3:Pre-existingopenwellbyPanchayat(Image:Gopinathpur,28-10-13).......................168
Image6.4:Deterioratingconditionsofthewaterpumpsintheislandvillage(Image:Khirisahi,27-
10-13).............................................................................................................................................169
Image6.5:Pre-disasterhouseholdlatrine(Image:Gombhoria03-03-15)....................................170
Image6.6:SubmergedIndiaMark-2handpump(Image:Brahmapur,28-10-13)........................171
Image6.7:Pre-existingprotectedopenwellssufferedstructuraldamageduringthecyclone(Image:
Gopinathpur,28-10-13).................................................................................................................173
Image6.8:Debrisnearhandpumps(Image:Gopinathpur,24-10-13)..........................................173
Image6.9:Openwellwithdebris(Image:Sanpatna,20-10-13)..................................................175
Image6.10:Womencollectingwater(Image:Khirisahi,28-10-13)..............................................175
Image6.11:Solecommunalhandpumpandbathingfacilityfor28householdsprovidedbyAgency
A(Image:Chadamankhana,03-03-14)...........................................................................................178
Image6.12:Householdcandlewaterfilters(Image:Sanpatna,28-01-14)...................................178
Image6.13:CommunalVestagaardfiltersinstalledimmediatelyafterthecyclone(Image:Sanpatna,
15-11-13)........................................................................................................................................179
Image6.14:Sharedfamilylatrine(Image:Gopinathpur,05-02-14).............................................179
Image6.15:Self-builtlatrinesinGombhoria(Image:03-03-14)...................................................182
Image6.16:Self-builtlatrineinGombhoria(Image:03-03-14)....................................................182
Image6.17:Rehabilitatedtubewellandbathingfacility(Image:Gopinathpur,28-02-14)...........183
Image6.18:Constructionofsemi-permanentfamilylatrinesinPuri(ImageSource:AgencyA).198
(Allimagesaretakenbytheauthor,unlessotherwisespecified)
20
ListofannexuresAnnexure1:StateofartofWaSHprogrammingandevidence
Annexure2:Definitionsinresilience
Annexure3:MethodologyMatrixbasedonconceptualframework
Annexure4:Interviewguideforexpertfeedback
Annexure5:Summaryreportoftheexpertinterviews
Annexure6:InformedConsentFormforParticipantsinResearchStudies
Annexure7:Lineofinquiry
Annexure8:ToolsusedinAssamandOdisha
Annexure9:InterviewGuide
Annexure10:Sampleofamindmap
Annexure11:BiswanathCircleHouseholdAssessmentData
Annexure12:Listofdocumentsused
Annexure13:DistrictMaps
21
Chapter1:Introduction
1.1ResearchTopicandcontext
Throughinvestigationofwater,sanitationandhygiene(WaSH)systemsduringdisasterrecovery,
thisthesisexaminesapproachesforpromotingcommunityresilience.TwocasestudiesfromEastern
India, in Assam and Odisha, are explored to understand post-disaster recovery processes,
technologies,andapproachesusedinWaSHprogrammingtopromotecommunityresilience.The
impactofadisasterisdeterminedbythelevelofresilienceandpreparednesswithinasociety,its
infrastructure and its government (Bosher and Dainty 2011). Resilience is a ubiquitous term in
disasterriskmanagement,anincreasinglyprominentconceptindiscussionsaboutthepost-2015
policylandscapebutriddledwithcompetingmeaningsanddiversepolicyimplications(Matyasand
Pelling 2015). Disaster recovery is seen as a crucial aspect of disaster risk management, with
boundariesthatcannotbeclearlydefined(Raju2013).Recoveryismorethansimplyre-establishing
the physical or built environment; it is a social process that begins before a disaster and
encompassesdecisionsaboutemergencyresponse,restoration,andreconstructionactivities(Nigg
1995).The‘development’approachesinapost-disasterenvironmentcanbringeitherprogressor
destitution,bychoiceorinevitability,duetothecomplexityof‘disasters’(Collins2013).
Theconceptofresilienceinsciencehasbeencloselyrelatedtosystemstheory(Alexander2013).
Thesystemsapproachallowsacomprehensiveandcross-disciplinaryviewofthemanyapparently
separatefacetsofacomplexreconstructionprocess(Johnsonetal.2006).Systemsthinkingisuseful
tostudycomplex‘living’systemsundergoingnumerousdynamicexchangesatanygiventime(da
Silvaetal.2012).Resilienceisachievedatmultiplelevelsofanalysisandintervention(individual,
community,city,regionalandnational),multipletimescales(prevention,emergency,rehabilitation,
reconstruction and long-term development), and multiple sectors of intervention (emergency
action,physical reconstructionandhousing) (Lizarraldeetal.2014).Systemsthinkingguidesthe
developmentofframeworks,methodologiesandapplicationsthatfacilitatelearningaboutallthese
aspects (Checkland 1985). This research adopts systems thinking to study different system
componentsandparts,theirinteraction,networksandflows(Korhonen2007).Thisresearchadopts
aninterdisciplinaryapproachthat isabletomanagethecomplexityofadisastercontext(Mileti,
1999).Thethesisexploresmultipleperspectives,atvarioustimescales,levelsandsectors.
22
Inthisthesis,WaSHsystemscollectivelyrefertoemergencyprogramming,provisionofwaterand
sanitation facilities, service delivery, and hygiene practices. There are emergency and
developmentalWaSHapproaches.Diseasesoccurringafterdisastersare linkedtoan inadequate
watersupplyorpoorsanitationandhygienepractices(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).Environmental
sanitationprogrammesarevital for tacklingdiseases,andensuringhumandignity inemergency
situations(HarveyandReed2005).Themostcommoncausesofdeathinyoungrefugeechildren
are diarrhoea, pneumonia andmalnutrition (Davis and Lambert 2002). The challenge inWaSH
programmingisthetransitionfromemergencyresponsetorecovery,whichaffectsthenatureand
scopeofimplementation(King2015).TheconventionalemergencyWaSHapproachesaresupply-
driven to fulfil life-saving needs, whereas recovery, it is argued should focus on demand-led
approaches (Luff 2013). Thesedemand-ledapproaches, integratedwith livelihoods-basedWaSH
interventionshelptoreducethedependencyofcommunitiesonagenciesduringtransitionfrom
relieftodevelopment(Scott2013a).Thisresearchreviewsexistinggreyliterature–agencyreports,
briefing notes, conference proceedings, inter-agency consultation reports, and training
programmes–tounderstandthestateofartinWaSHduringrecovery.1Theliteratureonrecovery
mainlyfocusesonhousingandshelteringoptions,whileWaSHduringrecoveryremainsacritical
gapinknowledgeandpractice.
TheimpactofdisastersonprogressofWaSHinthedevelopmentcontextandpost-disasterchanges
areunder-researched.Accordingtothe2011census,67%ofruralhouseholdsinIndiadefecatein
theopen,despitedecadesofgovernmentspendingonlatrineconstruction(Coffeyetal.2014).This
thesis explores the policies in India pertaining to disaster recovery and WaSH: the Disaster
Management Act (2005), water and sanitation schemes [Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC), later
renamedasNirmal BharatAbhiyan (NBA) and recently as SwacchBharatAbhiyan (SBA)]. Prime
Minister Narendra Modi’s Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Campaign), was launched on 2
October2014,withtheaimtomakeIndiacleanby2019(Kumar2014).Thisresearchusestwocase
studiesfromAssamandOdisha,whichwereaffectedbydisastersintherecentyearsandhadhigh
opendefecationrates.
1ReferAnnexure1:StateofartofWaSHprogrammingandevidence
23
1.1.1Assamcasestudy
Assam,inNorth-EasternIndiaisahighrainfallregionwithanaverageannualrainfallof2,546mm.
Itreceivesabout60to70percentofthemonsoonrainfromMaytoAugust(Hazarika,2006).This
resultsinmultiplefloodwaveswithinagivenyear.Assamfacedrecurringfloodsin2000,2004,2008,
and2012(AASCn.d.;Goswami2000;Hazarika2006).StudiesshowthatfloodsaffectWaSHsystems:
watersourcesaredamaged,qualityofdrinkingwaterdeteriorates,andpeopleusefloodwatersand
practise open defecation, which poses challenges for women and adolescent girls (Prasad and
Mukherjee2014).Thisresearchfocuseson2012and2013floodsinSolmarivillage–onthenorthern
banksofBrahmaputra–underSonitpurdistrictandBoramariKacharigaonvillage–onthesouthern
bank lower reachesofAssam–underMorigaondistrict.Sonitpurhasa totalpopulationof1.92
million(0.99millionmalesand0.93millionfemale);populationdensityis370peoplepersq.km.
andsexratiois946femalesper1000malesand(Census,2011).Morigaonhasatotalpopulationof
957,423(486,651malesand470,772females);populationdensityis617peoplepersq.kmandsex
ratiois967femalesper1000males(Census,2011).
1.1.2Odishacasestudy
Odisha faces multiple disasters such as floods, cyclones and droughts, and faces poverty,
unemployment,and lowper capita income (Ray-Bennett2009a).Odishahas the lowest levelof
household toilet access in India: at an 84.7 per cent open defecation rate (MHA, 2011 cited in
MommenandMore,2013).Between1993and2011,toiletcoverageinOdishaincreasedfrom1.4
percentto14percent–anannualincreaseofaround0.7percent(MommenandMore,2013).
ThisresearchfocusesonPuriandBalasoredistrictsafterthecyclonePhailinandsubsequentfloods
in2013.In2011,Purihadapopulationof1,698,730(865,380malesand833,350females),thesex
ratio is 963 females per 1000 males and population density is 488 per sq. km; Balasore has
populationof2,320,529(1,185,787malesand1,134,742females)withahigherpopulationdensity
(610persq.km)andsexratiois927femalespermale(Census,2011).
1.1.3Landscapeofhumanitarianaidintheregion
TheDisasterManagementActofIndia(GoI2005)providestheoverallpolicyframeworkandguides
humanitarianNGOstointerveneineventofdisastersisguidedbythewhichwasadoptedasapolicy
24
in2009. InAssamandOdisha, thehumanitarianaid landscapewasunique. InAssam, theNGOs
workedtogetherundertwoconsortiaunderECHOto implementanearlyrecoveryprogrammes.
AgencyA,aspartoftheconsortiumledbyAgencyAAalongwithAgencyCA,implementedtheearly
recoveryprogrammeinSonitpurandMorigaondistricts.AgencyAworkedwiththeirlocalpartners:
AgencyB inSonitpurandAgencyC inMorigaon. InSonitpurAgencyBhad limitedexperience in
disastersbutforgedanewpartnershipwithAgencyAwithahumanitarianmandate.InMorigaon,
AgencyCwasalong-termDRRpartnerandwaspartofthe2007floodsresponse.Theycontinued
toengagewithAgencyAafterthe2012floods.ECHOfundedanotherconsortiumledbyAgencySC
andotherregionalNGOsinAssam.Besideshumanitarianpartnershipsandconsortia,therewere
regionalNGOsandcivilsocietyorganisationsundertakingdevelopmentprogrammes,civilrightsand
conflictresponseinAssam.
InOdisha,thedonoragencies–UKAIDandECHO–replicatedtheconsortium-modelforresponse
andrecovery.UndertheUKAIDprogramme,AgencyCAandAgencySCweretherespectiveleads
fortwoseparateconsortiaforemergencykitsdistributionfortheaffectedpopulation.Theaimwas
to provide humanitarian assistance to cyclone- and flood-affected districts inOdisha. Agency A
workedwiththeAgencyCA-ledconsortiumalongwithfourotherNGOs.UndertheECHO-funded
consortia,AgencyAAandAgencySCledtwoconsortiatoprovideshelter,waterandsanitation,food
securityandlivelihoodssupport.AgencyAworkedwiththeAgencyAA,CAandotherNGOs.The
localpartnerNGOsincludedAgencyDinPuri,AgencyEinGanjamandAgencyFinBalasore.These
partners were long-term DRR partners with Agency A and had undertaken preparedness and
evacuation measures once cyclone warnings were disseminated. These partnerships facilitated
early and successful evacuation, efficient warehouse and logistics, relief and community
mobilisationeffortsinthedistricts.
1.1.4Implementinginstitutionsintheregion
InIndia,thereareanumberofstateinstitutionsrelatedtodisastermanagement–national,state
and district disaster management authorities, different line departments – Central Water
Commission, Indian Meteorological Department, Public Health Engineering, Water Resources,
Sanitation, Rural Development, Revenue and Disaster Management, Land Resettlement and
Rehabilitation,andPublicWorksDepartmentundertakingdifferent functionsbefore,duringand
25
afterdisasters.Inthisthesis,PublicHealthEngineeringDepartment(PHED)iscloselyfollowedas
the key government body implementing national and state-level water supply and sanitation
schemesandprogrammes(Section5.5and6.5).Revenue&DisasterManagementDepartmentin
Assamisin-chargeofrecoveryandrehabilitation.RuralDevelopmentDepartmentundertookwater
supplymeasuresinruralOdishaandOSDMAcoordinatedreconstructionprogrammesupportedby
WorldBank-AsianDevelopmentBank.
Thepublicpolicysphereindisastermanagementwitnessedalandmarkchangein2005,withthe
passingofDisasterManagementAct,2005(GoI,2005).Itlaiddowntheguidelinesforestablishment
ofNational,StateandDistrictDisasterManagementAuthorities.NDMAwasresponsibleforlaying
down policies, plans and guidelines for disaster management to ensure timely and effective
responsetodisasters.SDMAsdevelopandimplementthestatedisastermanagementplans,which
include vulnerability in the region, capacity building, prevention and mitigation measures, and
mainstreamdisasterriskreductionwithdevelopment.Inthedistricts,DistrictMagistrate/Collector
istheprimeauthorityfordisasterpreparedness,responsecoordinationandrecovery.DDMAacts
astheplanning,coordinatingandimplementingbodyfordisastermanagementandtakesmeasures
aspertheDistrictDisasterManagementPlans.
ASDMAdevelopedtheAssamStateDisasterManagementPlantoensurethatallcomponentsof
DisasterManagementareaddressedtofacilitateplanning,preparedness,operational,coordination
andcommunityparticipation(ASDMA,2012a).Itincludesfollowingaspects:1)Preventionofdanger
or threat of any disaster, 2) Mitigation or reduction of risk of any disaster or its severity or
consequences;3)Capacity-building;4)Preparednesstodealwithanydisaster;5)Promptresponse
toanythreateningdisastersituationordisaster;6)Assessingtheseverityormagnitudeofeffectsof
anydisaster;7)Evacuation,rescueandrelief;8)Rehabilitationandreconstruction(ASDMA,2012a).
InOdisha,anumberofchangeswereinitiatedafterthe1999supercyclone:GovernmentofOrissa
draftedaDisasterManagementBillforthestateandinauguratedOSDMA(on28December1999),
which was taskedwith dealing exclusively with disastermitigationmeasures in the state (Ray-
Bennett 2009). OSDMA’s brief was to coordinate with local and international NGOs and
multinationalorganisationsduringdisasters,andimplementdisasterpreparednessandmitigation
measures.
26
1.2ResearchQuestionsandObjectives
ThisinterdisciplinaryresearchexplorestheexistingWaSHapproaches,technologies,interventions
andlinkagesduringrecovery.
Toaddressthistopic,themainresearchquestioninthisthesisis:
How effectively do different approaches to water and sanitation facilities, and hygiene
practices,duringpost-disasterrecoverypromotecommunityresiliencetodisasters?
Thequestionisrefinedfurtherintothreesub-questions:
1. How can the existing policies in WaSH and recovery be strengthened to incorporate
resilience in WaSH? Furthermore, how can these policies be effectively translated into
practice?
2. Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthewindow
ofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?
3. Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewithlong-term
developmentacrossdifferentsectors?
Aconceptualframeworkwasdeveloped,basedonthereviewofliteratureonrecovery,WaSH,and
resiliencethinking.Theframework–WaSHduringrecovery–consistedoflearningandknowledge,
participation,integrationandinstitutionsasconceptualthemesidentifiedfromexistingliterature
ondisasterresilience (Twigg2007;Manyena2006;Bahaduretal.2010;VossandWagner2010;
Schilderman and Lyons 2011). The framework was further expanded based on interviews with
experts inrecoveryandWaSHprogrammes(Annexure5).Afterfurthermodifications, Iusedthe
frameworkasaguidetodevelopdatacollectiontoolsforgatheringempiricaldataonWaSHduring
recoveryandanalysis.ThisresearchfocusesontwodisastereventsinIndia,andanalysesthepost-
disaster changes in WaSH systems during recovery, and response measures by households,
communities, agency programming strategies and actions by local actors and government
institutions.InAssam,Icollecteddataduringseveralvisitsfrom2012-13.In2012,Iparticipatedin
emergencyneedsassessmentcommissionedbyaUNagency.IfirstvisitedSolmarivillageinSonitpur
districtwhenthefloodsoccurredin2012.In2013,IundertookascopingstudywithAgencyAasa
27
volunteer.AgencyAimplementedtheirprogrammeinSonitpurandMorigaondistricts.Iundertook
themainfieldworkasanindependentresearcherinAugust-October2013inSolmariandBoramari
villagesinSonitpurandMorigaonrespectively.Odishawasincludedasasupplementarycasestudy
whentheCyclonePhailinandfloodsoccurredin2013.IwasdeployedwithAgencyAfromOctober
2013-March2014.
My associationwithAgencyA inAssamandOdisha enabledme to access thedisaster-affected
areas,andtostudytheresponseandrecoveryefforts.InOdisha,Iparticipatedasateamleadfor
AgencyAinPuridistrictforsixmonthsimmediatelyafterthecyclone.Ivisitedtheflood-affected
areasinBalasoreinMarch2014,6monthsafterthefloodsoccurred.Comingfromahumanitarian
practitionerperspective, this researchattempts tounderstand thepracticalitiesofWaSHduring
recovery,andconnectstheexistingtheoriesandconcepts.Accordingly,myroleasapractitioner
duringthisresearchhasinfluencedthedevelopmentofresearchquestions,withanaimtoaddress
gaps in theories and practice. This research begins by developing a conceptual and theoretical
understandingofWaSHduringrecovery, followedbyempiricalexplorationusingtheabovecase
studies. While undertaking fieldwork, the close association with the implementing agencies
provided a critical perspective on what external agencies can achieve in terms of behavioural
changeswithin the programme duration. As a practitioner, I have interactedwith the affected
communities, understood their recovery processes, and witnessed post-disaster changes. This
unique position of a reflective practitioner has influenced how the research has progressed to
identify gaps in concepts, theories and practices. Initially I wanted to investigate agency
interventions to promote community resilience, which gradually evolved to understand how
agenciesrecoveredafterdisasterswithorwithoutexternalinterventionstofinallyunderstanding
how households change their behaviour practices inWaSH and link this knowledge to existing
policies.Thisresearchinterpretstheempiricalevidenceinlightofexistingtheoriesandconcepts
relatedtoresilience,recoveryandwaterandsanitationtechnologies.
1.3ThesisOutline
Thisthesisisorganisedintoeightchapters.Chapter2reviewsliteratureondisasterrecovery,and
WaSHindevelopmentandemergencycontexts.Itprovidesanaccountofvariousperspectivesand
approachesinrecovery.Itidentifiesinterdisciplinarythemestounderstandpost-disasterchanges
28
and impactsonWaSHsystems.Chapter3describesapproaches to resilience thinking inapost-
disaster context. Itdevelopsa conceptual frameworkusing systems thinking including themes–
learning and knowledge, participation, institutional capacities and integration – identified from
literature. Chapter 4 describes the research methodology and case study approach, using
participatory research tools. It presents the ethical considerations, and the analytical strategy.
Section4.3explains therationale foranonymising theworkofAgencyAandotherparticipating
NGOsinthisthesis.
Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings from Assam at various scales: the households,
communities,localactors,andgovernmentandhumanitarianagencies’.Thischapterdescribesthe
changesovertimeinWaSHsystems,andagencies'actionstoinfluencethesechanges.Itdescribes
institutionalcapacities,andconsortium-basedapproachesinAssam.Chapter6presentsdatafrom
Odisha, ofworkingwith Agency A in the recovery programme. This chapter describes different
perspectives of households, communities, local actors, government and humanitarian NGOs. It
explains the integrated and consortium-based approaches in Odisha. Chapter 7 discusses the
empirical findings from the case studies to answer the research questions. It reflects on the
challenges in using the conceptual framework for data collection and analysis, and discusses
emerging themessuchasWaSHtrajectories,genderedrecoveryprocessesandco-productionof
knowledge. The final chapter provides conclusions and recommendations, the theoretical
implicationsofthefindings,andcontributiontoknowledgeinmethodological,practicalandpolicy
aspects.ThischapteralsoidentifiesissuesforfurtherresearchinWaSHduringrecovery.
29
Chapter2:Literaturereview
Thisinter-disciplinaryresearchexploresthelargelyunder-researchedareaofWaSHimplementation
during post-disaster recovery. This chapter reviews existing literature on recovery and WaSH
(Water,SanitationandHygiene),tounderstandthetheoreticaldevelopmentandpracticalevidence
ofrelevantissuesandapproachesinWaSHandrecovery.Section2.1reviewsrecoveryliterature
andunderstandsdisasterrecoveryasaprocess,andthecontext,objectivesandapproachesusedin
recovery.Section2.2focusesonWaSH:approaches,interventionsandchallengesinpost-disaster
WaSHprogrammes.
2.1Post-disasterrecovery
Disastersoccurasaproductofnaturaleventsandthesocial,politicalandeconomicenvironments
(Wisneretal.,2004).Disasterisdefinedas‘Aseriousdisruptionofthefunctioningofacommunity
orasocietycausingwidespreadhuman,material,economicorenvironmentallosseswhichexceed
theabilityoftheaffectedcommunityorsocietytocopeusingitsownresources’(UNISDR2009p.9).
When disasters occur the underlying fractures of discrimination, marginalisation and political
neglect are magnified (Oliver-Smith 1996). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
(SFDRR)2015-2030 identifiesrecoveryasapriorityaction,statingthatdisasterpreparednessfor
resilientrecoveryisessentialto‘BuildBackBetter’(UNISDR2015).Recoveryisacomplex,multi-
facetedconcept(OlshanskyandChang2009;Chang2010),butistheleastunderstoodphaseofthe
disastermanagementcycle(Mileti1999).
2.1.1Multidimensionalityofrecovery
Thereareinconsistenciesandconfusionregardingtheusageandmeaningoftheterm‘recovery’
(Dynesetal,1989;Quarantelli,1989).Quarantelli(1999)mentionsfrequentlyusedtermstoindicate
variousaspectsofrecoveryasfollows:
• Reconstruction(post-impactrebuilding)• Restoration(re-establishingpre-disasterphysicalandsocialpatterns)• Rehabilitation(restorationtoincludemorepeopleandthings,perhapstoanimproved
levelthanpre-disaster)• Restitution(restorationoftherightfulclaimantsofownersandimplieslegalactions)
30
• Recovery(attemptingtobringsomelevelofacceptabilitytothepost-disastersituation)(Nigg,1995;Quarantelli,1999;Mileti,1999;Sword-Daniels2014)
Disaster response is a more extensively researched phase than disaster recovery (Mileti, 1999
p.220). It includesemergencyshelters,searchandrescue,medicalassistance, firefighting,debris
removal,needsanddamageassessmentandreliefassistance(Mileti,1999;Sphere,2011).Post-
disaster responseentailsactionorassistancebasedoncorehumanitarian rights,2standardsand
principlesofhumanity,neutrality,impartialityandindependence(OCHA2012).Thehumanitarian
imperativebindsagenciestoprovidebasicservicessuchasfoodandnutrition,water,sanitation,
education,shelter,protectionandhealth(Sphere2011).Disasterrecovery‘oftenseemstoimply
attemptingtoand/orbringingthepostdisastersituationtosomelevelofacceptability.Thismayor
maynotbethesameasthepre-impactlevel’(Quarantelli,1999,p.3).Itisviewedasaprocessthat
encapsulates all activities, processes andplanning that followanydisaster, including short-term
activitiestorestorevitalsupportsystemsandlonger-termactivitiestoreturntonormallife(Dynes
andQuarantelli 1989;Nigg 1995;Mileti 1999;Quarantelli 1999; Rathfon 2010). It encompasses
decisionsaboutrestorationandreconstruction:howthosedecisionsaremadeandbywhom;what
aretheconsequencesofthosedecisionsonthecommunity;andwhobenefitsandwhodoesnot
benefit fromthosedecisions (Nigg1995).Recoveryalso includesaspectsofhealing,andmoving
towardsahealthystateandsocialchange(DynesandQuarantelli1989).
Thedifferentconceptualisationsofrecoveryexistduetothegapsinexpectationsbetweenwhat
Cannon(2008)termsasthe‘outsiders’–thosewhocometohelp–and‘insiders’–whoareaffected
by disasters. The outsiders often prioritise natural hazards higher than ‘insiders’, whomay not
distinguish between shocks or daily life struggles (Cannon 2008). Recovery literature draws
attentiontotheperspectivesoftheaffectedpeoplewhoexperiencerecoverydifferently(Mileti,
1999).Suchstudiesconceptualiserecoverytoencompassperceptions,expectationsandstruggles
oftheaffectedcommunities,anddeterminestheirthresholdsforrecovery(VossandWagner2010;
WisnerandGaillard2012;ShresthaandGaillard2015).
2TheHumanitarianCharterdefinebasicrightforthewelfareofthoseaffectedbydisastersorwar,torighttolifewithdignity,therighttoreceivehumanitarianassistanceandtherighttoprotectionandsecurity.
31
2.1.2ContextofRecovery
The conventional approach to disaster recovery has been critiqued as band-aid relief that
perpetuatesorcovers-uptheunderlyingcausesofdisaster,withoutbreakingthecycleofrecurring
disasters(IFRC,2001).Humanitarianreliefandaidprovisionshouldbereframedtoprioritiselocal
principlesandvalues(Roseetal.2013).Recoveryisperceivedasacomplexandextendedprocess
fromanoutsider’sperspective(Barenstein,2008;Cannon2008,Davis,2011).Itoperateswithinan
emotional, reactionary, time-sensitive, expensive and politically charged atmosphere (Natural
HazardsCentre,2001,p.2-2).Thereischaos,duetoinherentconfusions,conceptualvaguenessand
involvementofdifferentactorswithvariedinterests(Lizarraldeetal.2009).Thesechallengesplace
conflictingdemandsonlimitedavailableresourcesandexternalfunds(ibid).Enormouslocaland
external resources are required to support the recovery process (Lizarralde et al, 2010) and
capacities of those involved in the process (Kenny 2005). The chaotic atmosphere results in
duplicationofagencyeffortsaswitnessedafter the2005Kashmirearthquake (Nabi2014). The
problemofineffectivecoordinationisseeninallthephasesofdisasterresponse–rescue,relief,
andrehabilitation(Raju2013).
Nigg(1995)foundthatcommunityresponsetodisastershasconsequencesforfamilies,businesses,
andlocalgovernment.InBangladesh,socialrelationsandvulnerabilitiesofthoselivinginhazardous
environmentsinthefloodplainsandcoastalareaswerechallengedandreproducedbythegendered
and classed coping strategies and adaptation measures (Sultana 2010). In Sri Lanka, tsunami-
affected communities reorganised their lives, strategically and subjectively to fit the categories
introducedbygovernmentalandnon-governmentalagenciesforaiddistribution(Thurnheer2009).
Barenstein(2015)undertooklongitudinalstudyofrecoveryfromthe2001earthquakeinGujarat,
wheresheexaminedpeople’sstrategiesandpatternsofadaptationafterrelocation.Shearguesthat
affected populations are not passive recipients of external agencies' often culturally insensitive
projects, instead they transformtheexternally imposednotionsofappropriatehousing tomeet
theircultural-andlivelihood-specificneeds(Barenstein2015).
Recoverybecomesalengthyandextendedprocessbecauserestoringcriticalservicesandrebuilding
assetscouldtakemonthsorevenyears(NaturalHazardsCentre,2001).Existingstudiesperceive
recovery as a non-linear andmultidimensional process. There are three perspectives regarding
temporaldimensionsofrecoveryprocesses:techno-centricapproach,socialconstructionismand
32
systemsapproach.Thetechno-centricapproachtonaturalhazards,firstelaboratedbyHaasetal.
(1977), provided an initial comprehensive view of reconstruction. They claimed that ‘the
reconstruction process is ordered, knowable, and predictable’ (p. 261), and suggested phased
planningtofirstmeettheimmediateneeds,followedbyrestoration,thenreplacementandlastly
commemorative reconstruction (Haas et al. 1977). The technocratic approaches emphasised
preventive and mitigation aspects of disaster management (Mileti 1999; Olshansky and Chang
2009).Thisapproachwascritiquedbyvulnerabilitystudiesthatcontestedthelinearityofphases
and event-focused actions from a social and anthropological perspective ( Oliver-Smith 1996;
Cannon2008).Davis(1978)arguesthatrecoveryisnotalinearprocesswithdiscretestagesandend
products;insteadcommunityrecoveryactivitiesareincrementalinstagesandprogressisgradual,
dependingontheircapacitiesandpriorities. In thecountriesaffectedby the2004 IndianOcean
Tsunami,physicalrecoveryoccurred instagesoverthe10yearsbutchallengesforpsychological
recoveryremaintobeaddressed(Shaw2015).
Themorerecentsystemsapproachtorecoveryplanningfocusesonthelinkagesandinteractions
betweenelementsandimpactsofdisastershocksonthesesub-components(Sword-Daniels2014).
The systems approach can be used to understand temporal and spatial aspects of recovery. It
includes multiple perspectives, which accordingly define recovery as a household, economic,
planning, management or a housing problem (Olshansky and Chang 2009). These perspectives
emerge from the number of actors involved in recovery including communities, governmental
agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private industry (Meskinazarian 2011;
Rathfon2010;Sword-Daniels2014;King2015).Effectivecoordinationbecomeschallengingwhen
multipleactorsareinvolved;establishingcommoninterests,goalsandplansofactionbecomesa
challengefor‘harmonisation’ofnationalandinternationalhumanitarianaid(Kenny2005,p.212).
Post-tsunami research in Tamil Nadu emphasises the role of the government, knowledge
networking,andorganisationalmandatesandgoalsforengagingwithdonorsinlong-termrecovery
(RajuandBecker2013).
Theliteraturedrawsattentiontothefactthatrecoveryoccurswithintheexistingsocio-economic
conditions, cultural and geographical factors. Vulnerability studies question the ‘naturalness’ of
disastersbecausedisastersareaproductofsocial,politicalandeconomicenvironments(Wisneret
al.2004,p.6).Thepoorindevelopingcountrieswhoaredifferentiallyimpactedbythehazardsand
33
developmentprocessesoften liveorwork in dangerous andhazardous locations (Wisner et al.,
2004).Therearedifferentialimpactsbasedonrace,ethnicity,class,andgender(Oliver-Smith1996).
These differences depend on pre-existing socio-economic and environmental inequalities and
geographicalunevennessofdisasterimpacts(Walkeretal.2006).ThetraditionalAetacommunities
inthePhilippinesafterthe1991MtPinatuboeruptionhaddifferentialcapacitiesandtheresultant
culturalchangeswereinfluencedbydifferenthazardtypes,availabilityofspacetorelocate,pre-
disastersocio-culturalvulnerabilityandgovernment’spost-disasterrehabilitationpolicies(Gaillard
2006).Relocationwasanotherpolicyapproachduringrecovery:aftertheYungay,Peruearthquake
and avalanche in 1970, processes of relocation and resettlement decisions were insensitive to
communities’ attachments to environment and cultural values, and increased community’s
dependenceonaid(Oliver-Smith1979).
In her comparative study of post-tsunami Tamil Nadu and post-earthquake Gujarat, Barenstein
(2008) found that top-down contractor-driven approach to reconstruction was insensitive to
environmentalandsocio-culturalaspects,whiletheowner-drivenapproachallowedcommunities
tochoosebetweendifferentrelocationandresettlementstrategies,constructionapproachesand
supportingagencies.Inthe2010Haitiearthquake,socialcapitalenhancedaccesstoshelter-related
resourcesforthosewithconnections,butaccentuatedpre-existing inequalitiesandcreatednew
inequalities among displaced Haitians (Rahill et al. 2014). Schilderman (in Lyons et al., 2010)
rightfullyclaimsthatdisasterreconstructiondoesnottakeplacein‘vacuum’butwithinthecontext
of pre-disaster socio-economic development (p.33). Hence understanding the pre-disaster
developmentcontextandpoliciesisessentialforplanningrecoveryeffortsandunderstandingthe
potentialsocio-economicimpactsofdecisionstakenduringrecovery.
Recoveryprogrammesarelengthyandresource-extensive,andstruggletostrikeabalancebetween
time,speed,andqualityconcerns.Duringrecoveryanumberoftrade-offsindecision-makingare
madebasedonprogrammeproposalsandcontextualneeds.Theurgentneedforactioninashort
spanoftimeprovescounterproductivetosustainablerecovery(Barakat,2003).Recoveryagencies
struggle to strike a balance between the quality of their programmes and the quantity of their
interventions and achievements because of funding constraints, programming timeframes,
organisational capacities andurgencyof immediate action (Twigg2006). Speed is important for
rapidprogrammedelivery,repairingandrebuildingofinfrastructure(Chang2010;Rathfon2010).
34
Greater speed and quality of recovery depend on productive intergovernmental relationships,
effectiveuseofresourcesandbetterdecisionmakingatcommunitylevel(Rubin1985).Agencies
involvedinpost-tsunamireconstructioninAceh,Indonesiawereblamedfordelayedprogramming
becauseprogrammesweredesignedonunrealisticinitialexpectations,withoutfactoringthetime
required for community mobilisation, for resolving land issues, and establishing offices and
warehouses, and logistics (daSilva, 2010).Delaysoccurdue to structuralbarriers like shattered
economic and political structures, and organisational barriers like relief culture, competency,
knowledge,attitudes,politicalwillandsecurity issues (IFRC,2001).Hence, theexistingevidence
showsthatcurrentapproachesinrecoveryhaveshortcomings.
2.1.3Disasterrecoveryobjectives
What thenare theobjectivesof the recoveryprocess?Wouldbringingabout ‘normalcy’ include
reconstructingconditionsthatmadethepopulationvulnerabletotheimpactofdisasterinthefirst
place?A“good”disasterrecovery isholistic recovery,wherethecommunity’sbest interestsare
considered (Natural Hazards Centre, 2001, p.2-2) or include sustainability (Mileti 1999; Rathfon
2010).Studieshavefoundthatcommunitiestrytore-establishthemselvespost-disaster inways
thatarefamiliartothem,asinpre-disasterpatternsofsocialnetworks,livelihoodsandliving(Davis,
1978;Twigg,2006).Theresultingcontinuityandfamiliarityisessential,becauseitenhancestheir
psychological recovery (Mileti, 1999). This section describes three key conceptualisations and
objectivesofrecoveryfromrecoveryliterature:tobuildbackbetter(BBB),tolinkrelief,recovery
anddevelopment(LRRD)andtomaximisethewindowofopportunity.
BillClinton,whileoutliningtheresponsestrategyastheUNSecretary-General’sSpecialEnvoyfor
Tsunami Recovery, argued that ‘“building back better” (BBB) means making sure that, as you
rebuild,youleavecommunitiessaferthantheywerebeforethedisasterstruck’(Clinton2007,p.1).
For this required capacity building of institutions; expanding access to health and education
services; reducing poverty and strengthening livelihood security; advancing gender equality;
empoweringandopeningupspacesforcivilsocietyexperiences(Fan2013).Inrecovery,‘resources,
influenceandpoliticalstrengthtendtoweakenwhenthememoryofthedisasterbeginstovanish’
(Davis2007p.3).Recoveryplannersshouldaimtoaddressunderlyingrequirementsofemployment,
economic opportunity, sustainable livelihoods, resumption of food supplies, reconstruction of
publicinfrastructure,andcommunityvitality(Davis2007).People-centredrebuildingcontributesto
35
breaking the cycle of poverty and dependence and reduces people's vulnerability to disasters
throughrenewedthinkinginthefieldsofhousing,participationandlivelihoods(Lyonsetal.2010).
Fan(2013)arguesthatBBBapproachdoesnotprovidethetoolstohelpaddresscriticalquestions,
andthecriteriaagainstwhichagenciescanassesstheprosandconsofadoptingthisapproach.In
herdoctoralstudyofHaitianresponsefollowingthe2010earthquake,King(2015)foundthatthe
over-enthusiasticBBBapproachdisregardedrentalsupportoptionsasatemporary,non-sustainable
measure,andoverlookedthevalueofrentalsupportinmarketstimulationandencouragementfor
owner-driven repair and reconstruction for the new rentalmarket demand. The BBB approach
needs planning, capacities and investments in contextually relevantmeasures (King 2015). Fan
(2013)foundthatduringhumanitarianandreconstructionprogrammes,agenciesdidnothavethe
capacitiesor theorganisationalmandate toaddressstructural issues.Othersvouch for ‘building
backsafer’,whichprovidesaclearergoalforpost-disastersettlement(Kennedyetal.2008,p.33).
Akeyquestionraisedinthisdebateis:Whomdowebuildbackbetterfor?Irrespectiveoftheterm
used–saferorbetter–theconceptshouldmovebeyonditsemphasisonthephysicalaspectsof
reconstruction,shelterandhousingprovidedbyexternalactors.Thecontestationsofpowerand
politics of recovery and integration of common objectives across silos of humanitarian and
developmentprogrammingposechallengesforrecovery(MitchellandHarris2012).Thisresearch
arguesthatarenewedBBBapproachcouldconsiderneedsandaspirationsofthelocalcommunities
and their vision for recovery that link from pre-disaster to post-disaster and thereafter.
Humanitarian assistance should change its approaches to build local resilience and reduce
vulnerabilitytodevelopcommunitiesthatarecapableofbouncingforwardafteradisasterthrough
transparency,accountabilityandparticipationfromlocalcommunities(Roseetal.2013).
ThenormativeLRRDdiscourseindicatesrecoveryisoftengovernedbydiverseandinharmonious
normativeaims(Christoplosetal.2010).LRRDemergedasanimportantideaduringtheanalysisof
thefoodcrisesinAfricainthe1980s(IFRC,2001).Therewasagrowingrealisationthatthe‘grey
zone’between‘phases’ofassistancewasconsistentlyunder-funded(Ramet2012,p.4).Theearly
concept of a linear ‘continuum’ from relief to development evolved into a ‘contiguum’ so that
rehabilitation and development can occur alongside relief activities (Fan 2013, p.1). There are
challenges forachieving this,dueto lackofdefinitionalandconceptualclarityandconsensusof
36
LRRD,andchallengesforaddressingmacroeconomicandpoliticalfactors,andrealisinggovernance
andinstitutionalchanges(Buchanan-SmithandMaxwell1994).Thereisanoperationalgapbetween
reliefandrecoveryduetoshort-termorganisationalmandatesanddifferentinterestsandcapacities
tomanagethetransition(Lloyd-Jones2006).ToachieveLRRD,clarityamongdifferentstakeholders
about their roles and responsibilities in relief and development is crucial, but there are rigid
boundaries between old institutions, finances, and attitudes in development and relief (Twigg,
2006).InthecaseofHurricaneMitchinNicaragua,aidresponseandrecoveryeffortsweredriven
bythebroadertrends,includinghousehold,communityandgovernmentinitiativesandthewider
economicandmarket-relatedcontext(Christoplosetal.2010).
TounderstandLRRD,thisresearchexplores linkages intherecoveryprocessesatthehousehold,
community,governmentandNGOsfrompre-topost-disastersituations.Studieshaveinvestigated
these linkagesandhaveofferedvariousapproachesand solutions tobridge thesegaps through
different approaches: pre-disaster recovery planning (Becker and Sauders 2007), reframing risk
through disaster mitigation and preparedness (Christoplos et al. 2001), sustainable hazard
mitigation(Mileti1999)andresilienceapproachestoachieveLRRDpost-disasters(Manyena2009;
King2015).DRRmeasuresandsystemsforLRRDcanbeinstitutedthroughgovernmentandNGO
action(Lloyd-Jones,2006).Thereislittleevidenceofhowagenciesmakethetransitionfromrelief
torecoverygiventheexistingbarriersandcomplexnatureofrecovery(King2015).
Disasterstudiesclaimrecoveryprovidesopportunitiesforchangingpre-disasterconditions(Mileti,
1999;Rubin,2009;Changetal.,2011).Theopportunity to spearheadchangesand improve the
conditionsthatledtodisasterinthefirstplaceisprovidedduetotheinfluxofresources,mediaand
internationalattention,andrenewedinterest(Christoplos2006).Thisideathatdisastersrepresent
anopportunityforchangeandrenewalisnotnew:recoveryfrom1923,GreatKantoearthquake
aimedtomaximisethis‘windowofopportunity’totriggerwidersocialreformprocesses(Fan2013,
p.2).Howeverlittleguidanceisavailableonhowtomaximisethiswindowofopportunity.‘Theory
ofchange’isusedasanapproachfordesigningandevaluatingsocialprogrammes,andtoelaborate
anddocumentviewsonthelonger-termchangessought,thechangesrequiredandwhy,thecontext
forchangeandtheactors,andhowthedevelopmentprogramme’sstrategy,activitiesandoutputs
couldcontributetolong-termchange(Vogel2012).Forpost-disasterprogrammes,‘contributionto
change’ is used to document the household level changes over time, identify how effectively
37
agenciespromotedrecovery,andtheextenttowhichresources,assets,livelihoodsandwell-being
havebeenstrengthenedinrecovery(Fewetal.2013).
From the policy perspective, disasters act as focussing events, leading to a rethink in policy
initiatives,publicgroupmobilisationandagendasetting(Birkland1998).Focusingeventsserveas
importantopportunitiesforpoliticallydisadvantagedgroupstochampionmessagesthathadbeen
effectivelysuppressedbydominantgroupsandadvocacycoalitions.Sucheventscanthereforebe
animportanttoolforgroupsseekingpolicychange(ibid).Afocusingeventisaneventthatissudden;
relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of
potentiallygreaterfutureharms;itsharmsthatareconcentratedinaparticulargeographicalarea
orcommunityof interest (Birkland,1998p.54).Disasterscancatalysestructuraland irreversible
changesby creatingnewconditionsand relationshipswithinenvironmental, socioeconomicand
politicalstructures, institutionsandorganisations(Birkmannetal.2008).Theresultantchanges-
positiveornegative-provideopportunitiestopushpolicyagendas,initiatestructuralchangesand
increase participation (Lyons et al. 2010;Meskinazarian 2011). Recovery planning poses unique
challenges for practitioners and researchers, as time compresses, stakes increase, additional
resourcesflow,andpublicinterestisheightened(OlshanskyandChang2009).Theconceptofthe
rarebutbriefwindowofopportunityiscloselyassociatedwitheffectinglastingchange,buthowcan
local governments effectively meet the time-sensitive needs of housing, economic and social
recovery(OlshanskyandChang2009)?
Thisdiscussiononchangeemphasisesevent,actionandresponse:howchangeismanifested,who
effectschangeandwhatistheresponseofeachactorinresponsetotheevent.Manyena(2009)
discusses two approaches to social change: the radical or conservative and non-interventionist
approaches. In the former,communitiesactaschangeagentsandareempoweredto transform
institutionalandlegislativepolicies,whileinthenon-interventionistapproachesthepractitioners’
capacitiesarestrengthenedforworkingwithinthestatusquo(Manyena2009p.238).Birklandetal.
(2008)arguedthatchangeswereformalorinformalinnature,andwereproactiveandcouldalso
be sloworrapid,linearornon-linear, planned or unplanned andmaymanifest inmany aspects
across society. The evidence is not adequate to demonstrate how tomaximise the window of
opportunity and bring about transformational changes. Disaster recovery is the product of a
38
cumulativesetofdecisionstakenover longperiods,andthechoicesandprocessesarethefocal
pointforpotentialchange(Comfortetal.1999).
Thereislittleresearchonthecharacteristicsoflonger-termchangesafterdisasters(Birkmannetal.
2008). Post-disaster changes occur after small-scale and regular disasters; these are neglected
depending on frequency, magnitude, uncertainty, and the reactive response to each disaster
(Wisner and Gaillard 2012). There is no resolution or reductionmeasures after chronic hazard
conditions – recurring floods, landslides and erosion, lack of adequate access to water and
sanitation,andmalnutrition–leadingtofailureofsustainabledevelopmentpracticesanddisaster
riskreduction(GuppyandTwigg2013).VossandWagner(2010)foundthatlearningopportunities
wereavailableaftersmall-scaledisasters,throughparticipationandexperientiallearning(Vossand
Wagner2010).However,Birklandetal. (2008)believedthatsmall-scaledisastersdonot leadto
significantchanges.Researchershavearguedthattheamountandqualityofrecoveryresearchis
not adequate formeeting current and future recovery planning and implementation challenges
(Rubin2009).Thereisverylittleevidenceofhowchangesinrecoverycanbeachieved,measured
andreplicatedunderdifferentconditions,independentofscale,agent,magnitudeorresponseto
disasters(seeTable2.1).
Table2.1:State-of-artofrecoveryliteratureonobjectivesandapproaches(Source:Author)
No Themes:Objectivesandapproaches Articles/Studies1 Community response: diversity, knowledge and self-
organisation(Berkes2007)
2 Communityresilience:Capacitybuilding (Manyena,2006)3 Technological/Housing: Local building practices for safer
constructionpractices(Twigg,2006;daSilva,2010)
4 LRRD:DRRandMitigation (Christoplos,2006;Manyena,2006;Lloyd-Jones2006;Davis,2007)
5 ResourceInfluxandimprovedaccess (Lizarraldeetal.,2010;Changetal.,2011)
6 Sustainable Hazard Mitigation: Availability of externalfinancialandtechnicalassistance
(Mileti,1999)
7 Sector:Livelihoodandemployment (Twigg2006;Lyonsetal.2010)8 Technology: New appropriate technology-culturally
acceptableandrelevanttolocalvernaculartechnology(Jigyasu,2010)
9 Organisational learning: Structural and functional changesandselforganisation
(Quarantelli,1989,Alesch,2005)
10 Housing:re-establishlostassets,betteraccommodation (Barakat,2003)
39
2.1.4Recoveryapproachesandstrategies
Theexistingliteraturefocusesonconventionalapproachestorecoverythroughshelter,livelihoods
and critical sectors, and use of participatory approaches for recovery. Holistic and sustainable
recovery allows communities to choose from a range of goals and aspirations to envision their
recovery priorities (Natural Hazards Centre 2001). The planning approaches emphasise
sustainability, hazardmitigation and smart growth through comprehensive plans addressing all
relevant andnecessary sectors that impact community lives, and sustain changespost-disasters
(Natural Hazards Centre 2001). Community recovery can be organised into eight sectors:
demographics, housing, critical infrastructure, natural environment, economy, education, health
andwell-being,andcommunityidentity(Rathfon2010p.12).Nigg’s(1995)studyoffamilyrecovery
processes found that the needs and types of families varied depending upon their access to
resources and reliance on social capital. The focus on household or community provides a
microscopic view, while a holistic and systems view provides understanding of various needs,
interconnectionsandinterdependence,whichshouldbedevelopedinsyncwitheachotherduring
recovery (Alesch et al., 2009). Although the primary focus of this research is inWaSH systems
(section2.2),thereviewincludesstudiesonhousing,livelihoodsandcriticalservicestoexplorethe
interdependenciesandprimaryprioritiesatthehouseholdlevelforsafeshelteranditsrelationto
WaSHandhealthsystemsandlivelihoodopportunities.
Mostliteratureonrecoveryfocusesonhousingreconstructionincludingemergencyandtemporary
sheltering options (Davis 1978; Quarantelli 1991; Johnson 2007), implementation mechanisms
(Johnson 2002; Barenstein 2008; Jigyasu 2010; Rathfon 2010) and shelter reconstruction
programming(Barakat2003;Lloyd-Jones2006;daSilva2010;Jhaetal.2010).Quarantelli(1991)
proposes housing recovery after a disaster occurs in four stages: (1) emergency shelter, (2)
temporaryshelter,(3)temporaryhousing,and(4)permanenthousing(Quarantelli1991).Shelter
studies have reviewed approaches, technologies and strategies such as owner-built, contractor-
driven, subsidisedorparticipatoryapproaches (Barakat,2003;Barenstein,2010;daSilva,2010).
Studiesonshelterandreconstructioncomparethetraditionalknowledgeandconstructionpractices
withmodernconstructiontechniquesfordemonstratingresiliencetoearthquakes(Jigyasu2010;
Audefroy 2011). Although the above studies engage with critical debates on housing and
reconstruction,theylackaholisticunderstandingofdifferentsectoralneedsduringrecovery,and
do not provide longer-termempirical evidence to guide complexities and challenges posed by
40
fundingandtimescales,andapproachestoovercomeprogrammaticbarriersforLRRDandBBB.This
chapterdoesnotexhaustivelyreviewthesestudiesbecausetheydidnothelpaddresstheresearch
questiondirectly, and were notrelevant to the investigation ofapproaches in WaSH during
recovery.
Vulnerabilitystudiesexploringdisasterimpactsandeconomicdecline,havearguedforalivelihoods
approach to reduce vulnerabilities (Anderson 1985). Lyons et al. (2010) argue that rebuilding
people’s livelihoods is equally important as building safer houses. There are studies on cash
transfers for shelter, cash forwork (CFW), or food forwork (FFW) projects that provide labour
opportunities through participatory projects that are externally funded (ACF 2009). Support to
livelihoodsindisasterresponseisstillarelativelynewapproach(Kennedyetal.2008;Uyetal.2011).
Itislargelyconfinedtosupportforagricultureandfoodsecurity-forexample,distributionofcash,
seeds and tools as part of agricultural support packages - or to providing short-termassistance
throughfoodforwork(FFW)andcashforwork(CFW)projects(Twigg2006).Theemergencyfood
programmingandlivelihoodsstrategiesadoptedbyagenciesinrecentyearshavehighlightedthat
incentive-basedactivitieslikeCFWandFFWprogrammesensurejobopportunitiesfortheaffected
communities, and help in kick-starting the economy devastated by the impact of emergencies
(Harvey et al., 2010; Sphere, 2011). These cash and material incentives influence community
participation,decision-makingandpowerrelationswithincommunities(Manyena,2006).
Thelivelihoodinitiativessuchascashtransfersprogrammehadapositiveimpactonfoodaccess
andreducingvulnerabilityinthefamine-affectedTillaberyregion,inNiger,butdidnotcontribute
towardslongerlastingimpactonhouseholds’foodsecuritystatus(Tumusiime2015).Uyetal.(2011)
foundthatpoorhouseholdsandcommunitiesinAlbayprovinceinthePhilippinesfacedchallenges
of limited access to alternative livelihoods and income opportunities. Post-tsunami research in
Nagapattinamfoundthatmerelydistributingboatstofishinggroupsforrestoringlivelihoodsfailed
toimproveequityorchangingsocietalnorms(Jordanetal.2015).TheimplementingNGOsleftthe
disaster-affected area after project completion, and did not understand the longer-term
implicationsoftheirlivelihoodinterventions(ibid).
Therearestudiesthatevaluateperformanceofcriticalservicesimpactedbydisasters.Thelifelines
orcriticalinfrastructuresystemsthatsupportactivities,suchaselectricpower,health,naturalgas,
water,telecommunications,andtransportationareessentialforholisticrecovery,becausewithout
41
energyandwater,householdsareforcedtorelocate(OlshanskyandChang2009).Recoveryinvolves
muchmorethansimplyrestoringthebuiltenvironment,ascommunitiesstruggletoachieveviability
inthenewly-emergingenvironmentwithinwhichtheyexist,and,totheextenttheyareable,to
shapethatenvironment(Alesch2005).Rebuildingandstrengtheninghealthsystemsisanimportant
humanitarian intervention, requiring effective engagement and planning for service delivery,
production,distributionandfinancing(Newbranderetal.2011).Asurveyofrecoveryindicatorsin
Nagapattinam, found that community infrastructure, includingwater systems, sanitation, roads,
andotheramenitieswereimportantfactorsinlong-termrecoveryoutcomes(Jordanetal.2015).
Although studies have demonstrated impacts on specific sectors, the understanding of
comprehensiverecoveryprocessesacrossallsectorsismissingintheliterature.
Participatory approaches in reconstruction are important for exploring the linkages between
disasters and development (Lyons et al., 2010). Davis (2007) recommends participation for
successful recovery and sustainability of programmes, as people aremore open to changes for
bettermentpost-disasters.Agencyguidelinesandframeworksemphasisetheroleofcommunities
inprovidingsustainablesolutions(UNDRO1982;PracticalAction2010;Sphere2011).Community
involvementinreconstructionprogrammesstrengthenstheirphysical,emotional,practicalability
toresistdisasters,andfacilitatesreconciliation,improvesinstitutionalresourcesanddevelopstheir
socialcapital(Barakat,2003).Participatoryprocessesinvolvingvulnerablepeoplehelptoidentify
and prioritise urgent needs and vulnerable groups (Twigg 2006). The process itself may be as
important as the outcome of participatory approaches (Mileti, 1999, Manyena, 2009). During
reconstructionthechallengesofscalingupandovercomingtimeandresourcespressurescanbe
overcomethroughparticipatoryandinclusiveapproachesinhousingandlivelihoods(Lyonsetal.
2010;SchildermanandLyons2011).
Therearechallengesinemployingparticipatoryprocessesintheimmediateaftermathofdisasters
becausetheurgentconcernsaretoaddressimmediatebasicneeds(NaturalHazardsCentre,2001).
Davidsonetal(2007)usedasystemsapproachtocomparefourcasestudiesofpost-disasterhousing
reconstructionprojects(oneeach inColombiaand inElSalvador,andtwoinTurkey).Thisstudy
showsthatthereisacontinuumofpossibilitiesforparticipationaslabourersononeend,orasactive
decision-makersandprojectmanagersontheotherend,whichisrarelyobtained(seeFigure2.1).
Often community capabilities are ignored in recovery programmes, therefore community
42
participationremainsamyththatishardlyputintopracticeintherightmannertoensureresilience
(Davidsonetal.2007).
Participatory approaches that empower people in important decision-making roles or offer
collaborationwithcommunitiespromotecommunitycontrolovertheproject,whereasbeneficiary
consultations on needs and wants (with no assurance that these concerns will be taken into
account), and merely informing them about the programmes cannot really be classified as
‘participation’(Davidsonetal.2007).Twigg(2006)advocatesagainstusingmeagreconsultations
withaffectedpopulations,as theydonotprovide long-termsolutionsor successandeventually
communities revert to unsafe conditions. Agencies should involve, engage, and empower
communitiestoundertakereconstructionactivities,sothattheiraspirationsandnotionsofresilient
communitiesarerealisedandtheyareabletocontributewiththeirknowledgeandskills(Jhaetal.,
2010).
Figure2.1:Ladderofcommunityparticipation(Davidsonetal.2007)
Tomeetrecoveryobjectives,itisessentialthatparticipationofallrelevantactorsinthedecision-
makingisensuredandtheirrolesandresponsibilitiesaredefined,includingthelocal,regionaland
nationalgovernment,civicbodiesandimplementingagencies(Barenstein2010;Alexander2012;
Sword-Daniels2014).Studieshaveanalysedgovernancemechanismsduringrecovery(Barenstein
2010;Meskinazarian 2011;Alexander 2012), the role of civil society in reconstruction following
43
earthquakesinTurkey(Johnson2011);andformationofnewauthoritiestooverseereconstruction
inItalyandIndia(Barenstein2010;Alexander2012).GujaratStateDisasterManagementAuthority
wasformedafter2001earthquake,andtheEarthquakeReconstructionandRehabilitationAuthority
was constituted after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. It is argued that community is not a
homogenous identity: instead there are diverse interests, needs and capacities, and underlying
aspectsofpowerandpoliticsindecision-making,whichoftenresultinconflictsdelayingdecisions
andaffectingthepaceandimpactofreconstruction(seeJhaetal.2010;Barenstein2010;Fan2013).
2.2Water,SanitationandHygiene
WaSHcollectivelyreferstoservicedeliveryandprogrammingforwaterandsanitationfacilities,and
hygienepractices.Inthisresearch,waterindicatesresearchandpracticearoundwatersourcesand
supply, treatment and use; sanitation refers to defecation practices and excreta disposal
mechanisms;andhygiene includespractices relatedtohandwashing,sanitation, foodandwater
handling,environmentalandpersonalcleanliness,andmenstrualhygiene.HygienePromotion(HP)
orPublicHealthPromotion(PHP)referstocommunitymobilisationandparticipation,information,
education and communication (IEC), behavioural change communication (BCC) and hygiene kit
distribution (Bastable and Russell 2013). WaSH literature includes development and
humanitarian/emergencyWaSH,environmentalandpublichealth.
2.2.1AccesstoWater,Sanitation,andHygiene
Morethan700millionpeoplelackaccesstoimprovedsourcesofdrinkingwaterandmorethanone
thirdoftheglobalpopulation–some2.5billionpeople—donotuseanimprovedsanitationfacility,
andofthese1billionpeoplestillpracticeopendefecation (WHO/UNICEF2014).Anestimated4
billioncasesofdiarrhoeaoccureachyear,causing1.8milliondeathsmainlyamongchildrenunder
fiveyearsofage,duetounsafedrinkingwater,poorsanitation,andpoorhygiene(Lantagneand
Clasen 2012). There are stark disparities across regions, between urban and rural areas, and
betweentherichandthepoorandmarginalised(WHO/UNICEF2014).GovernmentsandNGOsare
looking for solutions to tackle thedevelopmentproblemofonebillionpeopledefecating in the
open,addressbehaviourchangeandmonitorprogress(WijesekeraandThomas2015).
TheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDG)relatedtodrinking-waterandsanitation(MDG7,Target
7c)aimsto:“Halve,by2015,theproportionofpeoplewithoutsustainableaccesstosafedrinking-
44
waterandbasicsanitation”(WHO/UNICEF2014).Withtherenewalofdevelopmentgoalsin2015,
international donors and agencies are revaluating investments inWaSH tomeasure access and
monitorprogress(Sparkman2012;Pritchettetal.2013).Accesstodrinkingwaterismeasuredby
theproportionofapopulationusinganimproveddrinking-watersource:asourcethat,bynature
ofitsconstruction,adequatelyprotectsthewaterfromoutsidecontamination,inparticular,from
faecal matter; while unimproved drinking water sources include unprotected dug wells,
unprotectedsprings,surfacewater,vendor-providedwater,bottledwaterorwaterdeliveredby
tanker(WHO/UNICEF2014).Accesstosanitationismeasuredbythepercentageofthepopulation
using an improved sanitation facility, which hygienically separates human excreta from human
contactincludingsewerconnections,septictanksystems,pourflushlatrines,ventilatedimproved
pitlatrinesorapitlatrinewithaslaborcoveredpit(ibid).Unimprovedsanitationfacilitiesinclude
pitlatrineswithoutslabsorplatforms,openpitlatrines,hanginglatrines,bucketlatrinesandopen
defecation(ibid).
Thespreadofwater-relateddiseasesdependsonenvironmentalconditionsandhumanbehaviour
that determine control andpreventionof diseases (Connolly et al. 2004). Studies onwater and
sanitation-relatedimprovementsevaluatedtheirimpactsondiarrhoealandotherinfections(Esrey
etal.,1991).Itwasfoundthatchildmortalityfellby55%,whichsuggeststhatwaterandsanitation
haveasubstantial impactonchildsurvival,andsanitationfacilitiesdecreasediarrhoeamorbidity
andmortality(Esreyetal.1991).Fromthepublichealthandepidemiologicalperspectives,provision
of WaSH impacts population health outcomes, economic benefits and livelihood opportunities
(Connollyetal.2004).Systematicreviewandmeta-analysisimpactstudyshowsthatdevelopment
interventions in drinking water, sanitation facilities, and hygiene practice improvements
significantlyreducedtherisksofdiarrhoealillnesses(Fewtrelletal.2005).
Accesstowaterandsanitationisasinequanonforthefulfilmentofbasichumanrights(UN2002).
InhisdiscussionoftheconceptofarighttosafetyformainstreamingDRRindevelopment,Twigg
(2003) states: ‘Everyone has the right to the highest attainable standard of protection against
naturalandman-madehazards’(Twigg2003p.2).Therighttowaterandsanitationformsanintegral
part of a right to safety andhelps in improved accountability, increased focus onmarginal and
vulnerable groups, increased participation in decision-making and enabling individual and
community empowerment through sanitation (COHRE et al. 2007). Human right to water is
45
indispensible for leading a life in human dignity and for realisation of other human rights,
particularlytherightstolife,andtoadequatestandardofliving,housing,foodandhealth(UN2002).
In2002,theUNCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsdeclaredwaterasahumanright
whereby all individuals are entitled to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and
affordable water for personal and domestic uses (UN 2002). It includes affordability, non-
discrimination,inclusionofvulnerableandmarginalgroups,accesstoinformation,participationand
accountability (UN2002). In2010, theUNGeneralAssemblyandUNHumanRightsCommission
declaredthatthehumanrighttosafedrinkingwaterandsanitationisderivedfromtherighttoan
adequatestandardofliving,andinextricablyrelatedtotherighttothehighestattainablestandard
ofphysicalandmentalhealth,aswellastherighttolifeandhumandignity(UN2010)3.General
Comment No. 15 states that: ‘States parties should take steps to ensure that: Groups facing
difficulties with physical access to water, such as victims of natural disasters, persons living in
disaster-proneareasareprovidedwithsafeandsufficientwater.’(UN2002p.7)
Thehumanrighttowatersupplyandsanitationhasbeenrecognisedbygovernmenttreatiesand
legislation,thereforeobligatingcountriestochalkoutnationalstrategiesandplanstoensurethese
rightsarerealised(WHO/UN-Water2012).Thetreatiesrelatedtowaterare:
i. UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(1948),initsArticle25,clearlystatesthateveryone
hasarightto‘astandardoflivingadequatelyforhealthandwell-being’includingfoodand
housing,andaccesstowater(UN1948).
ii. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) specifies a number of rights
whichareessentialforfulfillingtheneedtoaccesstowater,implyingmainlythatnoperson
canbedeprivedoftheirownmeansofsubsistenceandthateveryhumanbeinghasinherent
righttolifeasmentionedinArticle6(UNHCR1966).
iii. InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights,toorecognisesthisrightto
waterimplicitlyinitsarticles11and12,asarighttoadequatestandardoflivingandrightto
thehighestattainablestandardofphysicalandmentalhealth(COHREetal.,2007).
3Theresolutionwasadoptedduringthe64thsessionoftheUNGeneralAssemblyon3rdAugust2010
46
iv. TheConventionforRightsofChildren(1989),article24,statesthatchildrenhavearightto
thehighest attainable standardofhealth, guaranteed interalia through theprovisionof
adequateandcleandrinkingwater(Unicef2011).
v. TheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities(2006)requires
‘equalaccessbypersonswithdisabilitiestocleanwaterservices,andtoensureaccessto
appropriate and affordable services, devices and other assistance for disability-related
needs’(COHREetal.2007p.70).
In humanitarian contexts,WaSHminimum standards and indicators for delivery are developed
undertheSphereProject(McDougalandBeard2011).SphereStandards(theHumanitarianCharter
andMinimumStandardsinDisasterResponse)outlinehumanitarianprinciples,standardsofservice
delivery and indicators (Sphere 2011). These are rooted in rights-based and people-centred
approaches (Brown et al. 2012);with useful parameters to ensure adequate access, safety and
accountabilitymeasures inemergencyprogramming (McDougalandBeard2011).Theminimum
standardsforwatersupply,sanitationandhygienepromotion(WaSH)areapracticalexpressionof
thesharedbeliefsandcommitmentsofhumanitarianagencies,andofthecommonprinciples,rights
anddutiesgoverninghumanitarianactionsetoutintheHumanitarianCharter(Sphere2011).
The key criteria to ensure the human right towater and sanitation are presented in Table 2.2
(Greene2014,p.6).
Table2.2:CriteriaoftheHumanRighttoWaterandSanitation(Source:Greene,2014)
Key
principles
Description
Sufficient Watersupplyandsanitationmustbecontinuousandsufficientforpersonalanddomestic
uses. This includes drinking water, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food
preparationandpersonalandhouseholdhygiene
47
Safe Thewaterrequiredforpersonalordomesticusemustbesafe,thereforefreefrommicro-
organisms,chemicalsubstancesandradiologicalhazardsthatconstituteathreattohealth.
Measuresofdrinkingwatersafetyareusuallydefinedbynationaland/orlocalstandards.
WHO’s Guidelines for drinking-water quality provide a basis for the development of
nationalstandardsthat,ifproperlyimplemented,willensurethesafetyofdrinkingwater.
Everyone is entitled to safe and adequate sanitation. Facilitiesmust be situatedwhere
physical security can be safeguarded. Ensuring safe sanitation also requires substantial
hygieneeducationandpromotion.Thismeanstoiletsmustbeavailableforuseatalltimes
of thedayor night andmust behygienic;wastewater andexcreta safely disposed and
toilets constructed to prevent collapse. Servicesmust ensure privacy andwater points
shouldbepositionedtoenableuseforpersonalhygiene,includingmenstrualhygiene.
Acceptable Watershouldbeofanacceptablecolour,odourandtasteforpersonalordomesticuse.All
waterandsanitationfacilitiesandservicesmustbeculturallyappropriateandsensitiveto
gender, lifecycle and privacy requirements. Sanitation should be culturally acceptable
ensuredinanon-discriminatorymannerandincludevulnerableandmarginalisedgroups.
Thisincludesaddressingpublictoiletconstructionissuessuchasseparatefemaleandmale
toiletstoensureprivacyanddignity
Physically
accessible
Everyone has the right to water and sanitation services that are physically accessible
within, or in the immediate vicinity of, their household, workplace and educational or
health institutions. Relatively small adjustments to water and sanitation services can
ensurethattheneedsofthedisabled,elderly,womenandchildrenarenotoverlooked,
thusimprovingthedignity,health,andoverallqualityforall.AccordingtoWHO,thewater
sourcehastobewithin1,000metresofthehomeandcollectiontimeshouldnotexceed
30minutes.
Affordable Waterandsanitationfacilitiesandservicesmustbeavailableandaffordableforeveryone,
eventhepoorest.Thecostsforwaterandsanitationservicesshouldnotexceed5%ofa
household’sincome,meaningservicesmustnotaffectpeoples’capacitytoacquireother
essentialgoodsandservices,includingfood,housing,healthservicesandeducation
Sphere (2011) provides indicators for provision of adequate WaSH facilities, appropriate
mechanisms for informationdissemination,knowledgeandunderstandingamongst theaffected
populationforpreventingwater-andsanitation-relateddiseases,andformobilisingcommunities
inthedesignandmaintenanceofWaSHfacilities(Table2.3).
Table2.3:SphereIndicatorsforWaSH(Sphere2011).
48
WaterSupplyIndicators ExcretaDisposal HygienePromotion
• Averagewaterusefordrinking,
cookingandpersonalhygienein
any household is at least 15
litresperpersonperday.
• The maximum distance from
any household to the nearest
waterpointis500metres.
• Queuingtimeatawatersource
isnomorethan30minutes.
• There are no faecal coliforms
per100mlofwateratthepoint
ofdeliveryanduse
• Any household-level water
treatment options used are
effective in improving
microbiological water quality
and are accompanied by
appropriatetraining,promotion
andmonitoring
• All excreta containment
measures,areat least30metres
away from any groundwater
source.Thebottomofanylatrine
or soak-away pit is at least 1.5
metresabovethewatertable.
• In flood or high water table
situations, appropriatemeasures
aretakentotackletheproblemof
faecal contamination of
groundwatersources
• Drainage or spillage from
defecation systems does not
contaminate surface water or
shallowgroundwatersources
• Amaximumof20peopleuseeach
toilet.
• Toilets arenomore than50mts
fromdwellings.
• Allhaveaccess tohygiene items
andtheseareusedeffectivelyto
maintainhealth,dignityandwell-
being
• All women and girls of
menstruating age are provided
with appropriate materials for
menstrual hygiene following
consultation with the affected
population
• All have access to information
and training on the safe use of
hygieneitemsthatareunfamiliar
tothem
• Information on the timing,
location, content and target
groupsforanNFIdistributionfor
theaffectedpopulation
2.2.2EmergencyWaSH
Diarrhoealdiseasesaccountformorethan40%ofdeathsintheacuteemergencyphase;over80%
ofdeathsoccur inchildrenunder2yearsofageamongstpeople living incamps(Connollyetal.
2004). This is due to the synergistic interaction between certain risk factors that promote
communicable disease transmission (Connolly et al. 2004). During emergencies, clean drinking
water, effective sanitation and good hygiene practices are vital for saving lives and reducing
suffering(ClasenandSmith2005)byeffectivelycontrollingconditionssuchasdiarrhoea.Usinga
systematicreview,Connollyetal(2004)identifiedriskfactorsthatpromotecommunicablediseases
incomplexemergencies.Theseincludemasspopulationmovementandresettlementintemporary
locations, overcrowding, economic and environmental degradation, impoverishment, scarcity of
safewater,poorsanitationandwastemanagement,absenceofshelter,poornutritionalstatusasa
49
resultoffoodshortages,andpooraccesstohealthcareorthecollapseoroverwhelmingofpublic
healthinfrastructureorabsenceofhealthservices(Connollyetal.2004).
ThisresearchadaptstheframeworkusedforselectionofinterventionsbyFewtrelletal(2005),for
analysingthevariouspost-disasterWaSHinterventionsincludingwatersupply,watertreatmentand
safety,sanitationandhygiene(Figure2.3).
Figure2.2WaSHinterventionscategories(AdaptedfromFewtrelletal.,2005)
The common sources of infection in outbreaks of communicable diseases are: polluted water
sources(faecalcontaminatedsurfacewaterenteringopenorsurfacewatersources);contamination
ofwaterduringtransportorstorageduetocontactwithfaecalmatter;sharedwatercontainersand
cookingpots;scarcityofsoapforhandwashingandconsumptionofcontaminatedfood(Connollyet
al.2004).Thechallengesofpost-disasterWaSHwererecentlyevidentintheexperiencefromthe
2010earthquake inHaiti,where1.5millionhomelesswere living inthousandsof IDP(Internally
displacedpopulation)andmakeshiftcampssetup inPortauPrincewithoutaccess toadequate
sanitationfacilities;anepidemicofcholeracomplicatedthereliefandrecoveryeffortsthesame
yearaffecting300,000peopleandkilling7000(Kingetal.2011).Thesituationwascomplexsince
reportedly theNepaliUNworkershad introduced the cholera. Thehumanitarianagencieswere
operatingtrucksoftreatedwatertocamps,anexpensiveundertakingonavastscale,formorethan
twoyears(BastableandLamb2012).Thesewatersupplymeasuresdidnotaccountforpre-existing
networksofwatervendorswhohadsubstantialcapacitytodeliverandmanywhocouldstartup
theirbusinesswithalittleextrasupport(King2015).Thesanitationmeasuresincludeddefecation
WaSHinterventionspostdisaster
WaterSupply
Communityinterventions
Householdprovision Waterstorage
Watersafety
Treatmentatsource
Treatmentathouseholdlevel
Sanitation Hygiene
Education Handwashing
50
insingle-use,biodegradableplasticbags(Colonietal.2012),orthe‘Peepoo’bagsmarketedasan
improvementupontraditionalbagsusedfordefecation(Pateletal.2011).
EmergencyWaSHfacesnumerouschallengesinwatersupply,latrinesandsolidwastemanagement,
hygienepromotionandprogrammingexitstrategies(BastableandRussell2013).Whileanecdotes
of individual andagencyapproachesexist, there is anurgentneed for field-based researchand
development into emerging technologies and pragmatic approaches to fill gaps and meet the
challenges of adequate and appropriate sanitation systems (Patel et al. 2011). The pre-existing
practices,accessandequityissuesinfluenceWaSHduringrecovery.Theliteraturereviewswater
supply,sanitationandhygienecomponentswithinWaSH.
Humanitarian water supply entails three essential sub-components: community water supply,
householdwatersupplyandprovisionofwaterstoragefacilities(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).Often
communities access rainwater, surface water from lakes, ponds, streams and rivers, which are
microbiologically unsafe (ibid). The groundwater from wells, springs tends to be of a higher
microbiologicalqualitydependinguponthedepthofthehandpump(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).
Externalagenciesoftenprovidesharedhandpumpsasitensuresincreasedvisibility,coverage,with
minimumassistanceorcommitmentforinstallation(ibid).Thereisariskofcontaminationinshared
facilities due to bad design, and rapid deterioration because of heavy use, disrepair, non-
involvementof communities in site selection, and lackof technical assistanceand capability for
operationandmaintenance(McGarry1980).Itisrecommendedthatmaterialselectionanddesign
oftechnologyforhouseholdmaintenanceandrepairbythelocalcommunities is includedinthe
long-termplantomeetpopulationneedsforsafedrinkingwater(ibid).
Emergencywatersourceinterventionsincludeprotectionofwells,diggingofnewboreholesatthe
communal level, anddistributionofwater throughpublic tap stands in campareas.There isno
documentedevidenceofhousehold-levelpipeddistributioninitiatedduringemergencyreliefphase
(ClasenandSmith2005).Repairofwaterdistributionnetworks and leakages in thedistribution
systemsareundertaken to resumenormalwater supplyquickly after anemergency (Parkinson,
2009;Smith,2009).Temporarywatersupplysolutionsareexpensiveandunnecessaryunlessitis
forvulnerablegroupswithlimitedornoaccesstocommonwatersources(Smith2009).
51
Duringemergenciesandmasspopulationdisplacement,waterquantityusuallytakespriorityover
water quality (Atuyambe et al., 2011). Studies indicate effectiveness of interventions may be
influenced by the environmental, behavioural and cultural practices of the affected population
(Atuyambeetal.,2011).Studieshavefoundthatwomen,primarilyresponsibleforwatercollection,
werehesitanttousetreatedwaterduetotasteissuesafter2010landslidesdisplaced5000people
inUganda(Atuyambeetal.,2011).Instead,thepreferenceforriverandtraditionalwatersources,
consideredtobeunsafeanduntreatedbytheagenciesprovidesvaluableinsightsonrecognising
traditionalbeliefsandpracticesonwatergovernance,andgenderedaspectsofwatercollection,
defecationandhygienepracticeswhencommunitiesaredisplacedbydisasters.
Participatory approaches for ensuring community ownership and long-term sustainability are
essential; and technological solutions need testing and feasibility studies before directly or
immediatelyreplicatingindifferentcontexts(Brownetal.2012;BastableandRussell2013). It is
necessarytodocumentinstitutional,financial,environmentalandsocialconstraintslimitingaccess
towaterinfrastructureservices,onceinternationalattentioniswithdrawnintherecoveryphase,to
informfutureprogrammedesign(Brownetal.,2012).Inpost-earthquakePakistan,AminandHan
(2009)studiedrainwater-harvesting(RWH)systemsasasupplementtoexistingwatersystemsand
distributionnetworksenabling low-cost infrastructure investmentsandefficientmanagementof
economicresourcesduringrecovery.InruralMuzaffarabad,socio-economiccontextanalysiswas
themost importantfactorforsustainabilityandsuccessfuluptakeofnewwatersupplyfacilities,
alongwithdueconsiderationofpre-existingsystems,designandmaterialoffacilities,ownershipof
sources,protectionandfinancialcosts(MicangeliandEsposto2010).Participatoryapproachesin
community-ledrehabilitationprojectshelpedtoreachouttovastlyspreadcommunitiesthatdid
nothaveaccesstowater(ibid).Howeversuchtechnologicalinterventionsdependuponpeople’s
attitudes,behaviourandinvolvementintheprogrammes(AminandHan2009).
Fromadevelopmentperspective,Boydell(1999)arguesthatruralwatersupplyandsanitationcan
be sustained through demand-driven approaches, wherebymanagerial decisions about service,
locationoffacilities,andcostsharingaremadelocally.Principally,thisapproachfavourscommunity
demandoverexternallydeterminedneed,andselecting levelsofservicetobeprovided(andby
implication,technologiestobeemployed),basedonthecommunities’desireorwillingnesstopay
insteadofanexternalperceptionofaffordability(Boydell1999).Theapplicationoftheseprinciples
52
inemergencieshasbeenexplored–forexamplecostsharingofWaSHfacilitiesinHaiti(Visser2012)
–butneedsfurthersubstantiation.
FewstudiesinemergencyWaSHdrawattentiontowardswatertreatmentmeasures.Brownetal
(2012)arguethatbothsufficientwater(quantity)andsafety(quality)arecriticalfor interrupting
disease transmission in humanitarian settings. There are two methods of water treatment –
treatmentat sourceand treatmentatpointofuse.Thedrinkingwater responseafter the2004
tsunami in Indonesia includedmobile treatmentplantsand installation, repairand rebuildingof
emergency storage and distribution systems, distribution of bleach (sodium hypochlorite),
bleaching powder (calcium hypochlorite), chlorine tablets (NaDCC, halazone), PUR sachets
(combined flocculants and disinfectant products by Proctor andGamble), and alum (flocculent)
(ClasenandSmith2005).Itemergedthathousehold-basedapproachesinwatertreatmentdidnot
playasignificantroleintheinitialphasesoftheresponse,withthepossibleexceptionofboiling
(ClasenandSmith2005).Afterthe2010floodsinKashmir,bulkwatertreatmentunits(BWTU)were
deployedtosupplyadequateandaccessiblewatertolargenumberofusers(LuffandDorea2012).
Although different options for household treatment (referred as PoUWT: Point of Use Water
Treatment) exist for small-scale, non-acute, andhighdiarrhoeal disease-risk emergencies, these
requiresubstantialtrainingandmaterialstorecipients,adequatepre-placedstocksinemergency-
proneareas,andknowledgeofappropriatechlorinedosage(LantagneandClasen2012).Sphere
(2011) recommends selecting culturally acceptable PoUWT options and using locally available
productsforcontinueduseinthelonger-term.Afterthe2003floodsinHaiti,ceramicfiltersystems
weredistributed,wheretheuserslikedthefiltersfortheirhealthbenefits,butwerenotwillingto
payforthemorbearreplacementcosts.Distributionofaquatabswithoutadequatetraining,and
reportedlackofuseduetoconcernsovertasteandunwillingnesstopayinthelongrunhavebeen
documented(LantagneandClasen2012).
ComparisonofBTWUsandPoUWTsshowseffectivenessdependsoncostofmaterials,trainingand
followup:BWTUsneedhighlevelsoftechnicalsupport,highcapitalcostsandcertainconditionsfor
optimumuse;andPoUWToptionsrequirehygienepromotionandusermessagingwithfollowup
foreffectivebyhouseholdsforunfamiliarmethods(LuffandDorea2012).Evenifthewatersource
canbetestedandtreatedformicrobiologicalcontamination,waterremainsatriskofcontamination
duringtransportationfrompointofsourcetopointofuse (LuffandDorea2012).Forsuccessful
wateruseandsafety,availabilityoftrainedvolunteersisessentialtoundertakecleaningatpointof
53
use immediately after disasters and provide technical assistance in regular monitoring and
surveillance (Smith 2009). There is a need for stronger evidence for low-tech solutions for
beneficiaries,sustainabletreatmentsolutionsathouseholdlevel,andinvolvingwomeninusingand
maintainingwaterfilters;andissuesaroundthecost,sustainabilityandacceptabilityofdifferent
waterfilters(BastableandRussell2013).
AppropriatesanitationtechnologiesinemergencyWaSHarecritical.Focusingonsanitation,studies
indicatethatthebenefitsofawaterqualityinterventioncompletelydependuponthesanitation
andhygieneconditions:ifsanitationconditionsarepoor,waterqualityimprovementshaveminimal
impact(Eisenbergetal.2007).Adequateinfrastructuralprovisionandsufficienttechnicalcapacity
andfinancialresourcesarerequiredtomeetthedemandforsanitation,namelyforexcretaremoval,
treatmentanddisposal(WHO/UN-Water2012).Emergencysituationsarechallengingenvironments
forWaSH implementation, and recent experience fromHaiti andelsewherehashighlighted the
limitationsofcurrentemergencysanitation(Shultzetal.2009;Brownetal.2012;Kingetal.2013).
BastableandLamb(2012)presentsanitationoptionsforhumanitarianworkersincludingsquatting
slabs, plastic sheeting, and hygiene promotion materials and equipment. The geographical
challengesanddisastersrequireappropriatesanitationtechnologiesinchallengingenvironments.
ThiswasdemonstratedbyastudyinIndonesia,wherecommunitieslivingoncoastalland,swamps
andoverestuariesandriverswereaffectedbyregularfloods,andfacedphysicallimitationstosafe
sanitationduetolackofland,accessroadsandavailabilityofwaterthatisnotpolluted(Djonoputro
etal.2010).Thisstudyindicatesthatthepre-disasterphysicalenvironmentinfluencessanitation
practicesandfacilitiesduringdisasters,andinrecovery.
InBiharaftertheKosifloods,agenciesundertookDRRmeasuresinsanitation,tocountertheimpact
offloodsonfacilitiesandaccessduringdisasters,byconstructinglatrinecomplex(consistingoffour
single-pitpour-flushlatrines)alongwithonehandpumponraisedplatforms(Shekharetal.2010).
InBangladesh,andotherflood-pronecountries,toiletsareconstructedabovethehomesteadlevel,
topreventregularfloods(Khurshid2008).Forrapidinstallationduringdisasterstherearefinancial
costs for building raised platforms, which is twice the price of a normal pit latrine, and time-
consuminginunstablesoils;itisalsocostlytoprovidequickliningstopreventpitortrenchcollapse
(Bastable and Lamb2012). In diverse conditions, the use andmaintenance of latrines becomes
challenging,affectingthefunctioningofcommunitymanagementcommittees–theagenciescannot
54
paybillsfordesludgingforlong,andpoorhouseholdscannotbeartheoperationalcosts(Bastable
andLamb2012).
There are some concernsover usingdevelopmentprinciples in emergency contexts: ‘improved’
sanitation provision emphasises the value of shared latrines based on functionality rather than
techno-centricapproach(Sparkman2012;Mazeau2013).Duringcholeraoutbreaksincampsettings
inKenya,multiplehouseholdsusingthesamelatrinewerefoundtobebreedinggroundsforfecal–
oraltransmissionofcholerathroughoutthecommunity(Shultzetal.2009).Althoughtheresearch
indicatesspreadofdiseasesincamp-settingsduetolivingandsanitaryconditions,moreresearchis
required for understanding local perceptions and cultural barriers towards shared latrines
(Rheinländeretal.2015).Thisresearchbuildsontherelevanceofsanitationanditsimportance,as
perceived by communities that are frequently affected by floods, and are regularly displaced.
Despiteyearsofpracticeandliterature,concernsremainregardinghumanitariansanitationchoices
andsustainability:“Isitsufficientjusttodigahole,putaplasticslabonit,diginfourpoles,and
wrapsomeplasticsheetingaroundit(BastableandLamb2012,p.81)?”
InWaSH,inclusiveapproachesareusedtounderstandandrespectcommunityconcernsongender
and sharing toilets betweendiverse groups includingwomen, children,disabledand theelderly
(Pineraetal.2005).Duringthe2005earthquakeresponseinPakistan,women’sneedsforprivacy
andsecuritywereaddressedbyprovidingseparateandscreenedtoiletsandbathingblocksasa
resultofparticipatoryandconsultativeapproacheswiththewomen(Nawazetal.,2010).Afterthe
2003Bamearthquake,Oxfam’sWaSHresponsewasbasedoncontextualneedsandaholisticview,
including showers and latrines, cleaning materials and trained human resources in recovery
programming(Pineraetal.,2005).Theone-size-fits-allapproachtosanitationcannotwork inall
contexts(Jones2013),especiallypost-disasterwhenthereisneedforspeedy,timelyandculturally
inclusiveandappropriatetechnologicalsolutions(BastableandLamb2012).
55
Figure2.3:Diseasetransmissionpathwaysoffaeco-oraldiseases(Prüss-üstünetal.n.d.)
Hygienepromotionprojectsduringemergenciesareeffective,alongwiththeotherinterventions.
Meta-analysis and synthesis studies show that hygienepromotion is themost effectiveway for
reducingtheincidenceofdiarrhoea(Parkinson,2009).Researchontheimpactofrigorouspersonal
cleanlinessandcareineatinganddrinkinghabitsonreducingrisksofwater-bornediseaseshasbeen
carriedoutinvarioussettings(Feachemetal.1983;Noji1992;GomaEpidemiologyGroup1994;
MaraandFeachem1999).Theprovisionofappropriateandsufficientwatercontainers,cooking
pots,andfuelandsoapforhandwashingwasfoundtobeeffectiveinreducingtheriskofcholera
(Connollyetal.2004).Hygieneeducationorpromotionmeasuresarebasedonthef-chartofFigure
2.3 (Prüss-üstün et al. 2004). The pathogens are transmitted through a complex set of
interdependentpathways,includingbothcontaminatedfoodandwateralongwithhousehold-and
community-levelperson-to-personroutes(Eisenbergetal.2007).Thehygienemessagesaddress
thesepathways:watermaybecontaminatedduringdisasters,exposingindividualsthroughdrinking
Management actions concerning water supply and sanitation ofteninvolve water resource management, including the control of insectvectors of disease (such as malaria) and soil-borne helminths (such asascaris). Similarly, environmental management to control disease vectorsimpacts directly upon water supply and sanitation. Furthermore, accessto improved water sources has a significant impact on exposure to agentsof some water-based diseases (such as schistosomiasis) and diseases withwater-related insect vectors, and improved sanitation reduces certainvector-borne diseases such as trachoma. These intimate interconnectionsof exposure pathways and control mechanisms suggest that treatingwater, including supply and resource management, as an integral part ofthe risk factor unsafe WSH is rational.
1.2 Definition of risk factors
Unsafe WSH adversely affects health through multiple routes.
1. Transmission through contact with water that contains organismssuch as Schistosoma spp.
2. Transmission through vectors proliferating in water ecologies relatedto dams, irrigation schemes and other water resources projects (e.g. malaria, schistosomiasis, lymphatic filariasis). This should beincluded although it is currently unclear how or whether it can bequantified.
1324 Comparative Quantification of Health Risks
Human excreta
Water-borne sewage
Hands Soil
Animal excreta
Surface water Humans
Flies Dry sanitation involving reuse
Food
Ground- water
Drinking water
Non-recycling latrines
Pathogensource
Medium Environment Interface
Figure 16.1 Transmission pathways of faecal–oral disease
56
waterorrecreational,bathing,orwashingactivities,andfoodmaybecontaminatedeitherthrough
infected animals or from contact with contaminated water or soil. Soil may be contaminated
through impropermanagement of excreta (poor sanitation) (Curtis and Cairncross 2003; Prüss-
üstünetal.n.d.;Eisenbergetal.2007).
CurtisandCairncross(2003)foundthatriskofdiarrhoealdiseaseassociatedwithnotwashinghands
couldbereduced;implyingthathandwashingcouldreducediarrhoeariskby47%.Hygienepractices
are categorised as practices related to personal hygiene, water hygiene, domestic hygiene and
environmental hygiene (IFRC, n.d.). Handwashing helps in preventing faeco-oral disease
transmission and handwashing stations or personal hygiene kits may increase uptake and
consistency of handwashing, but their use in humanitarian responsewarrants further research
(Brownetal.,2012).Sphere(2011)advocatedfortheHygieneImprovementFramework(Figure2.4)
that places equal emphasis on the enabling environment, hygiene promotion and access to
hardwareforreducingdiseasesinemergencies.
Figure2.4:HygieneimprovementframeworkSource:Sphere(2011)
There is little evidence of what approaches work in effecting behaviour change post-disasters,
making it difficult for practitioners to take effective decisions regarding allocation of resources
(Brownetal.,2012).Thereareareas related toschoolWaSHandmenstrualhygiene,whichare
underexploredwithinemergencyWaSHliterature.BastableandRussell(2013)foundthathygiene
promotiontochildreninschoolscouldbepartoftheinterventionstrategy.Inpost-earthquakeHaiti,
themajorityoftheschoolswerefoundtobe lacking insafedrinkingwater,sanitationandhand
washing facilities, anddidnot invest in instruction forhygienepromotionandhealtheducation
57
(Giardinaetal.2011).Schoolsactasaninstitutionalvehicletoreachtheyoungergenerationand
stimulatehygieneandsanitationpracticeswhicharesustainedbeyondtheperiodofanintervention
(Giardinaetal.2011).Althoughguidelinesformeetingmenstrualhygieneneedsexist(e.g.Sphere
standards),morework isneededtocharacteriseappropriatestrategies tomeetneeds (Sommer
2012). Menstruation is a taboo subject, yet within same communities there are differences in
practices between younger and older women (Nawaz et al. 2010). In Pakistan women were
supportedwithsanitarynapkins,andspecialmenstruationunitsinadditiontobathingunitsthrough
careful involvement and sensitised approach to specific needs of women (Nawaz et al. 2010).
Howeverapproachestoeffectchangesduringrecoveryarelessdocumented.
2.2.3WaSHduringrecovery
There are challenges for WaSH during recovery in terms of knowledge gaps, and contextual
challenges in WaSH and relevant programming approaches during recovery. Emergency WaSH
research and practice show improved WaSH strategies adopted during disasters, and call for
innovative, on-the-job approaches during implementation. The understanding ofwhatworks in
emergenciesinWaSHinterventionsremainstacitknowledge,neithersystematicallydocumented
orpublishedinacademic,peer-reviewedjournals(Brownetal.2012).Insufficientevidenceexistsof
what innovations work in the emerging processes, technologies and approaches adopted in
humanitarianWaSHservicedelivery(Brownetal.2012;BastableandRussell2013).Theexisting
knowledge gap can be explored by documenting what technological choices, processes, and
approachesareimplementedoradoptedduringrecoveryandhowtheyallowfortransitiontowards
moresustainablesolutions.
The tacit knowledge is presented in a handful of technical journals (e.g. Waterlines, Water
Alternatives), by WaSH professionals working in international donor agencies (e.g. WHO and
UNICEF), or international humanitarian agencies (e.g Oxfam, ACF, MSF, IRC, Practical Action),
internationalresearchthink-tanks(e.g.ODI,IIED,WEDC,IDS),deploymentagencies(e.gRedRand
EWB) and communities of practice (such as SanCoP, Sphere, RWSN, SuSanA and GlobalWaSH
cluster). 4 Although worldwide technical forums exist, region-specific forums that deal with
4WHO –World Health organisation, ACF – Action Contra la faim, MSF –Medecins sans Frontiers, IRC – International RescueCommittee,ODI–OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,IIED–InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment,WEDC–Water,EngineeringandDevelopmentCentre,IDS–InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,RedR–RegisteredEngineersforDisasterRelief,EWB–EngineerswithoutBorders,SanCoP–SanitationCommunityofPractice,RWSN–RuralWaterSupplyNetwork,SuSanA–SustainableSanitationAlliance
58
prevalentcontextandprovide locallysustainablesolutionsneedtobedeveloped. Implementing
agencies have refrained from publishing what actually transpired during the programme: the
failures in implementation, and failure to learn and document experiences (Jones et al. 2013).
Institutionsstruggleduetoweakmechanismsforlessonlearning,implementingandsharing,which
constitute a brake on innovation and progress. As a result practitioners rely on standardised
guidelines,institutionalmemoryandtrialanderror(Brownetal.2012).
TherearechallengesposedbyrecoverycontextforsuccessfulimplementationofWaSHapproaches.
ThepracticalguidelinesforrecoveryWaSHadvocateforintegrationwiththedevelopmentprocess
(WisnerandAdams2002).Theenvironmentalengineers,policy-makersandprogrammemanagers
areencouragedtoavoidrelianceonfixedmaterialresourcesandinsteadfocusonPHPactivities,or
communityhealth-workertrainingtoenablecommunitiestomakeinformedchoicesaboutsource
andsiteselectionforwatersupplyandlatrines(WisnerandAdams2002).Humanitarianinitiatives
toimprovewatersupplyorsystemsshouldincorporatelongtermsustainability(Smith2009).The
emergencyresponsemeasuresinWaSHareprescribedfromthedevelopmentsectorinwhichthe
contextandchallengesdifferfromthoseofemergenciesandrecovery(Parkinson2009).Recovery
posesdifferentcontextualandprogrammingchallenges,becausetheshort-termactivitiesarenot
wellintegratedintolong-termdevelopmentprocesses:addressingdemographicchanges,returning
populations,integrationofdisplacedcommunitieswithhostcommunitiesandresettlementtosafer
locations(WisnerandAdams2002).Restorationofsanitationservices,distributionandaccessto
basic facilities such as toilets and showers allows communities to maintain their standards of
hygiene,preventcommunicablediseases,improvelivingconditionsandqualityoflifebyrepairing
andreconstructingexistingstructures(Pineraetal.2005).
There is littleevidenceofwhatprogrammingapproachesand strategiesareemployed inWaSH
duringrecovery.King’s(2015)researchinpost-earthquakeHaitifoundthatagencyWaSHservices
were short-term and expensive, hadweak participation and ownership, leaving services poorly
maintainedduetoweaktransitionmechanismsandexitstrategies.Agenciescontinuedtodeploy
expensivetruckingwater,wherepre-existingpracticeofthecommunitiesdependedonvendorsand
market for water pouches, moreover agencies who offered support in maintaining kiosks and
repairing the water supply network (standpipes and storage reservoirs) lacked the capacity,
expertise and guidance for undertaking long-term measures (King 2015). To support adaptive
resilience and combat programmatic barriers demand-led, participatory, neighbourhood
59
rehabilitationapproachesareessential(ibid).Interventionsshouldbebasedonneedsassessment
inreliefandrecovery,allowingdecision-makingtobeinthehandsoftheaffected,strengthening
ownership,andusinglocalcapacityandmanagingexpectations(ibid).
Transitionalapproachesareessentialtolinkrelieftodevelopmentwithadefinitivechangefroma
supply-driven to demand-driven approaches such as Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation
Transformation (PHAST) approach in camps, training WaSH committees, Community Led Total
Sanitation (CLTS) in resettlement or disaster-affected populations (Scott 2013b). Using social
indicatorssuchasneedsanddemand,localparticipation,capacitybuildingfromlocaltonational
actors,alliancesandpartnerships,governanceandaccountability, livelihood linkages,household
finances and agency economic resources a transitional log frame was proposed to achieve
sustainableWaSHservices(Scott2013a).
The systems approach to WaSH and recovery has gained impetus. Parkinson (2009) proposed
systemstheorytointegratepublichealth,environmentalandsocialprocessesthataffectdisease
transmissiontocollateandanalysedataobtainedfromthedisparatebutrelevantfieldsofstudy
involved.Forjustifiedandappropriateresourceallocationanddecision-making,systemsthinking
wasfoundtoberelevant(Parkinson2009).Tostudysuchinterconnectionsandinterdependencies,
Neely(2013)proposedtheuseofcomplexadaptivesystemstheoryandsocialnetworkanalysisto
understandWaSH in communities. Such tools help to bring the perspective of end-users: for
example,womencanaccordimportancetofactorssuchastimespentonwalkingtowaterpoints
(Neely2013).Chapter3investigatestheevidence-baseforsystemsapproaches.
ThedevelopmentalWaSHliteraturefocusesoncommunityparticipationapproaches,integrationof
appropriate technologies with local knowledge to address open defecation challenge, and
interventions towards sustainable access to safe water supply and sanitation facilities. The
humanitarian WaSH studies focus on practical challenges faced by agencies to balance the
humanitarianneedsof theaffected communitieswith longer-termdevelopmentobjectives.Not
only do humanitarian agencies have to provide WaSH service delivery that is speedy, timely,
appropriateandcost-effective,buttheyalsohavetodevelopstrategiesforsustainablewatersupply
andsanitation,operationandmaintenanceofWaSHfacilitiesandhygienebehaviouralchanges.This
researchinWaSHattemptstobridgeexistinggapsinknowledgeandpracticetounderstandwhat
strategiesworkandcanaidtransitionfromrelieftodevelopment.
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2.3ChapterSummary
Inthischapter,Ihavereviewedliteratureontworesearchthemesrelatedtodisasterrecoveryand
WaSHindevelopmentandhumanitariancontexts.Thisreviewhasdemonstratedtherelevanceof
the research rationaleset inChapter1. In relation to recoveryapproaches, there is inadequate
empiricalevidenceonhowexistingtheoreticalandpracticalapproachesforbuildingbackbetter,
linking relief recovery and development and maximising the window of opportunity
afterdisasters.Theliteraturedrawsattentiontothefactthatrecoveryoccurswithintheexisting
socio-economic conditions, cultural and geographical factors,whichwill be explored using case
studiesfromEasternIndia(Chapter4).Thereviewoftheliteraturerelevanttothesecondresearch
theme for WaSHapproachesidentified participation, post-disaster access and technological
interventions as some of the practical issues in the humanitarian WaSH.
During recovery, the issuesof inadequateaccess toWaSH facilitiespost-disasters,inappropriate
WaSH technologies and ineffective post-disaster interventions exacerbate healthand
environmentalrisks.TheunderstandingofbehaviouralchangesinWaSHafterdisastersemergedas
acriticalknowledgegap,whilelackofsystematicempiricalevidencefortransitionalapproachesin
WaSHduringrecoveryemergeasagapinpolicyandpractice.
Giventhechallengesinpromotingchangesduringrecovery,itwillbeusefultoframethisresearch
withinrecoveryandWaSHdomainsusingresilienceobjectives.Chapter3willestablishthevalue
andrelevanceofusingresilienceconceptasaguidingtheoreticalframeworkforthisresearch.
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Chapter3:Conceptualframework
Thischapterexploresliteratureonresiliencetodevelopaframeworktoguidetheresearchdesign
(Chapter4)andtoguidethedatagatheringandanalysis(chapters5-7).
3.1Theconceptofresilience
The recovery literature debates the feasibility of reconstructing the conditions that led to the
disasterinthefirstplace(Section2.1).Thisresearcharguesthatdisastersarenotjustdisruptionof
normal routine (Oliver-Smith, 1998), but are a socially-constructed phenomena (Wisner et al.,
2004). Recovery of systems, infrastructure and community should notwarrant returning to the
previousstateofequilibriumbutstrivefortransformation.Thissectionfurthersunderstandingof
recovery by reviewing theories and related concepts such as vulnerability, risks, capacities and
transformation.Theevolutionofresiliencethinkingandtheseconceptualisationsformthecoreof
theresilienceframeworkforthisresearch.
3.1.1Vulnerability,RiskandCapacity
Earlydefinitionsofvulnerabilityfocusedonthequantitativedegreeofpotentiallossintheeventof
a natural hazard (UNDHA, 1992). The physical hazards perspective of disasters considered
vulnerabilityasapre-existingconditionbasedongeographicallocations(Cutter1996).Disastersare
not unexpected events but a result of interactions between the physical environment, built
environment and the communities that livewithin these (Mileti 1999; Bosher 2008; Godschalk
2003).Studiesfocusingonpoliticaleconomyandsocialconstructionofdisastersfocusedonthepre-
existing conditions in the society that interact with hazards to cause disasters (Cannon, 1994).
Disastersareviewedasproductsofeverydayhardships,wherethoseaffectedaregeographically,
politically and socially marginalised (Wisner et al., 2004). The socio-political perspectives on
disasters view vulnerability as ‘the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that
influencetheircapacitytoanticipate,copewith,resistandrecoverfromthe impactofanatural
hazard(anextremenaturaleventorprocess)’(Wisneretal.,2004,p11).
Vulnerabilityconceptualisationhasbeencriticisedforimposingcategoriesofvulnerablegroupsthat
brand and typecast women, children, elderly, and disabled, and economically insecure groups
(Furedi, 2007). ‘Vulnerability couldbeviewedasa reflectionof the intrinsicphysical, economic,
62
socialandpoliticalpredispositionorsusceptibilityofacommunitytobeaffectedbyorsufferadverse
effectswhenimpactedbyadangerousphysicalphenomenonofnaturaloranthropogenicorigin’
(Manyena, 2009, p.30). This supply-driven model failed to recognise the capacities within
communities,organisationsandinstitutionstowithstandtheimpactofdisasters,prepareandplan
fordisasters,acceptcertainlevelsofriskandusetheopportunitiesprovidedbydisasterstoimprove
theirconditions(Manyena,2006).Withtheriseofthenumberandseverityofdisasters,andwith
theincreasingexposureofasignificantnumberofpeopleinhazardouslands,riskperceptionisan
importantfactorinthesocialconstructionofrisksanddisasters(Cannon,2008).Therehavebeen
attemptstodefine,differentiate,conceptualiseandestablishtherelationshipsbetweenadaptation,
resilience, adaptive action, coping, copingmechanismsand coping strategies (Kleinet al., 2003;
Cutteretal.,2008).Adaptationeffortsaimtoreducetheimpactofenvironmentalhazardsandto
addressequityconcernsinherentinsustainabilitydiscourses(Cutteretal.,2008).
Someauthorshavedistinguishedcopingcapacityastheabilityofaunittorespondtoanoccurrence
ofharmandtoavoiditspotentialimpacts,andadaptivecapacityastheabilityofaunittogradually
transformitsstructure,functioningororganisationtosurviveunderhazards(KellyandAdger2000).
Thecritiqueofvulnerabilityconceptsfocusesattentiontointrinsiccapacitiesofcommunities,based
onunderstandingofcopingandadaptation(Pelling2011).Thisresearchunderstandscapacityas
‘…theresourcesandassetsthatpeoplepossesstoresist,copewithandrecoverfromdisastershocks
they experience’ (Wisner et al., 2012, p28). In this research, coping capacity is interpreted as
surviving within the prevailing systems (Pelling 2011). Building on the social, physical and
organisationalelementsofasystemthisresearchexploressocialconstructionofdisastersandtheir
impact on essential services (Wisner et al., 2004). Resilience is intrinsically linked to, and
underminedbyvulnerability(Manyena2006).
3.1.2Communityresiliencetodisasters
‘Building Resilience’ has been invoked as a new organising principle by various international
organisations,UNbodiesandgovernmentagenciestoassess,monitorandreportontheprogress
andoutcomesofvariousinterventionsworldwide(Levineetal.2012,p.1).Theincreasingnumber
and impact of disasters have encouraged a growth in research on resilience, and on enabling
communities to recoverwithminimal external assistance (Mileti 1999).A resilienceapproach is
63
more positive than a vulnerability approach, because it focuses on improving and augmenting
capacities,ratherthanfocusingonproblems,howtoreduceorcopewiththem(Manyena,2006).
ThewordresilienceoriginatesfromtheLatinword‘resiliere’whichmeansto‘leapback’(Holling,
1973)or‘jumpback’(Kleinetal.,2003).TheOxfordEnglishDictionarydefinesresilienceas(i)the
actofreboundingorspringingbackand(ii)elasticity(Kleinetal.,2003).Conceptually,resilience
hasmultipleinterpretationsbasedondifferentdisciplinaryperspectives.Holling(1973)isattributed
tohavefirstusedtheterm‘resilience’fromanecologicalperspective(Manyena,2006;Cutteretal.,
2008)asthemeasureoftheabilityofanecosystemtoabsorbchangesandstillpersistandreturn
toitsstateofequilibriumafteratemporarydisturbance(Holling,1973).Indisasterstudies,Kleinet
al.(2003)notethatTimmermanin1981firstadoptedthetermasameasureofasystem’scapacity
toabsorbandrecoverfromhazards(Kleinetal.,2003;Mayunga,2007).
Resilience is variously studied inecology (GundersonandHolling, 2001;Carpenteret al., 2001);
psychology(Patonetal.,2005;Truffino,2010);ecosystemrenewal(Holling,1973);riskmanagement
(Mitchell and Harris, 2012); hazard mitigation (Mileti, 1999; Tobin, 1999; Burby et al., 2000);
pathwaystosustainabledevelopment(Vogeletal.2007);builtenvironmentandlandusestudies
(Burbyetal., 2000;Bosher,2008);public infrastructure (McDanielsetal., 2008); coastal studies
(Adger et al., 2005; George, n.d.; Oliver-Smith, 2009), and urban studies (Stevens et al., 2010).
Authorshavefoundresiliencetobeausefulconceptforholisticandsustainabledisasterrecovery
(Berke,2006),linkingdisasterriskreductionwithdevelopment(Manyena,2006;Twigg,2007)and
climatechangeadaptation(Adgeretal.,2003;SchipperandPelling,2006;Cutteretal.,2008;Pelling,
2011).
It ishighlyprobable that the term ‘resilience’emerged in reaction to the conceptof a ‘disaster
resistantcommunity’ (McEntireetal.2002,p.269).The latterwascoinedbyGeis (2000)as ‘the
safestpossible community thatwehave the knowledge todesignandbuild in anatural hazard
context’ (p.152). It is ameans to assist communities inminimising their vulnerability to natural
hazards by applying the principles and techniques of mitigation to their development and/or
redevelopment decision-making process through earthquake-resistant buildings (Geis 2000).
Resiliencefocusedontheinterconnectionsandrelationshipsbetweenphysicalandsocialsystems
at various scales (Tobin, 1999;Godschalk, 2003). Resilience is an active process of self-righting,
64
learnedresourcefulnessandgrowth;theabilitytofunctionpsychologicallyatalevelfargreaterthan
expected, given the individual’s capabilitiesandpreviousexperience (Patonetal., 2005,p.173).
Since an individual or groupor communitypossesses resilienceof varyingdegreeoverdiffering
periods, it isdifficult todescribeorgainconceptual consensusabout resilience (McEntireetal.,
2002).
There are different conceptualisations of resilience. Resilience approach has added value in
mobilisingfasteractionsforrapidandsuccessfuldelivery(Schwabetal.1998).Twigg(2007)argues
thatreducingpre-existingvulnerabilities,buildingcapacitiesandincreasingdisasterriskreduction
(DRR) measures are steps towards increasing resilience. Some conceptualise resilience as an
outcome (‘bounce back’, ‘withstand’, and ‘absorb negative impacts’) or as a process that
incorporatesadaptivecapacity,changeandlearning(Manyena,2006).Differentstudiesexplorethe
linkagebetween recovery, vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacities (Comfort et al. 1999;
Manyena2006;Cutteretal.2008;Kingetal.2013).Norrisetal(2008)findcommunityresilienceis
aprocesslinkinganetworkofadaptivecapacities(resourceswithdynamicattributes)toadaptation
afteradisturbanceoradversity,whenusedasametaphor,theoryorsetofcapacities(Norrisetal.
2008).Gaillard(2007)describesthreeperspectivesofresilience:asacomponentofvulnerability,as
theflipsideorpositivesideofvulnerability,andasthecapacityofasystemtoabsorbandrecover
fromahazardousevent.
There are numerous existing conceptual models for resilience. Twigg (2007) considers
characteristicsofresilientcommunitiesasgovernance,riskassessment,knowledgeandeducation,
riskmanagementandvulnerabilityreduction,anddisasterpreparednessandresponse.Manyena
(2009)analysesresiliencewithinthethemesofintegratingdisastersanddevelopment,community
participation, social learning and livelihood security. From an adaptive governance perspective,
Djalanteetal(2011)investigatefourcharacteristicstoincreaseresiliencetonaturalhazards,namely
polycentric andmulti-layered institutions, participation and collaboration, self-organisation and
networks,andlearningandinnovation.IntheDROP(DisasterResilienceofPlace)modelproposed
by Cutter (2008), resilience is both an inherent or antecedent condition and a process. The
antecedent conditions are viewedas a snapshot in timeor as a static state and thepost-event
processes in themodel are dynamic (Cutter 2008). The Panarchy framework looks at the links
between human and natural systems in temporal and spatial dimensions using a hierarchical
65
structure,linkingthesystemsinnon-stopadaptivecyclesofgrowth,accumulation,restructuring,
andrenewalinacoupledhuman-environmentalsystem(GundersonandHolling2001).
Paton and Johnston (2001) base their conceptual model on risk perception and risk reducing
behaviourthroughaction-outcomeexpectancies(i.e.considerationofwhetherriskmaybereduced)
andself-efficacy judgments (i.e.whether the requiredactionsarewithin thecapabilitiesof the
individual).Thismodelarguesthatpeoplemakeassumptionsaboutthepossibleconsequencesof
actionbeforeconsideringengaginginthatbehaviour;henceaction-outcomeexpectanciesprecede
efficacyjudgments(PatonandJohnston2001).Tobin(1999)proposedamodelsuitableforapost-
disasterrecoveryenvironment,basedonstructural-functionalviews,conflicttheory,competition
for resources, and other geo-sociological and anthropological principles for understanding
community resilience. This model highlights internal (i.e. structural, situational and cognitive
factors) and external influences (i.e. mitigation and recovery) on overall structural-functional
characteristicsofresilience(Tobin1999).Bahaduretal.(2010)listsresiliencecharacteristicsashigh
diversity, effective governance/institutions/control mechanisms, acceptance of uncertainty and
change, community involvement and inclusion of local knowledge, preparedness, planning and
readiness,highdegreeofequity,socialvaluesandstructures,non-equilibriumsystemdynamics,
learning,andadoptionofacross-scalarperspective.
For this research the applicability of resilience as a concept in the post-disaster recovery
environmentwas explored (Manyena, 2006; Cutter et al., 2008; Bahadur et al., 2010). The key
questionsforreviewingresilienceliteraturewere:
1. Howhastheauthorconceptualisedresilience?Whoseresilienceandagainstwhat?Forwhat
purposesandhowitcanbeachieved?
2. Whatelementsofthedefinitionofresiliencecanbeeasilytranslatedforoperationaland
practicalactionindisasterresponseandrecoveryprogrammes?
Theabovequestionsarenotnew,andhaveoftenbeendiscussedintheliterature(Carpenteretal.
2001;MitchellandHarris2012;Pelling2011).Addressingthesetwoquestionshelpsinuncovering
certainaspectsoftheresearchquestion,tounderstandcommunityresponseandapproachesfor
resilience.Thefigure3.1summarisesthekeyelementsof theresilienceconceptualisations from
existingliterature.
66
Figure3.1:Aspectsofresilienceconceptualisation(Author’sinterpretation)
Firstly,resilienceisdefinedforsystemsandcommunities(Aguirre2006;Twigg2007;Cutteretal.
2008;UNISDR2009);societiesandindividuals(Patonetal.2005);groups,organisationsandactors
(Pelling2011);andecosystems(Holling1973).Resilienceisseenasacapacityorcapability(Manyena
2006)toactinresponsetoanyformofdisturbanceorperturbations(Holling1973;Carpenteretal.
2001);stressorenvironmentalshocks(Manyena2006);destructiveforcesordisasters(Twigg2007;
Cutter et al. 2008; UNISDR 2009); potential exposure to hazards (UNISDR 2009); unanticipated
dangers, extreme natural events (Mileti 1999); and externally or internally induced demands
(Aguirre 2006). Various propositions on achieving resilience are put forth depending on
characteristicsof theunitoractor, including inherentcapacities, learning,organising, innovating
and changing. From an ecological perspective emphasis is on resistance andmaintaining basic
characteristicswhileanotherperspective calls for a transformational changeorevolution intoa
betterperformingunitwhichcandealwithfuturerisksanddisasters(Bahaduretal.2010).Within
thedynamicsystemssomeputitasbounceforwardabilitywithmoreoptimismsignallingforward
change(Manyena,etal.,2011;IPCC,2012;MitchellandHarris,2012).
Whoseresilience?
•Systems•Communities•Societies•Individual•Groups•Organizations•Ecosystems•Anyactor
Whatisresilience?
•Capacity/abilityto:•Absorbstress•Respond•Recoverorbounceback•Absorbimpacts•Copewithevent•Reducelossesanddamages•Adaptexistingresourcesandskillstonewsystemsandoperatingconditions.•Withstandandrebuild
•Action:•Anticipateandplanforfuture•Managebasicfunctionsandstructures
Resiliencefromwhat?
•Stressorshocks•Destructiveforces•Disasters•Potentialexposuretohazards•Unanticipateddangers•Extremenaturalevent•Externallyorinternallyinducedsetofextraordinarydemands•Environmentalshocks
Howsystemsbecomedisaster-
resilient?
•Capacitybuildingofcommunitiesandlocalorganisations•Self-organisation/reorganisationofsystems,localactors•Learning•Innovate,anddevelop•Nochangeinfundamentalcharacteristics•Maintainsustainabilityoflivelihoods•SocialCapital
67
The traditionalviewof resilienceas ‘bounceback’hasbeencritiquedas itdidnot lead towards
transformationalgains(Dodmanetal.2013).Theformulationofresilienceasthe‘bounce-forward’
abilityofcommunities fromdisasters iscloselyrelatedtothe ideaof transformationalnatureof
disasters(Manyena,etal.,2011,Pelling2011).Fromtheecologicalperspective,resilienceisseenas
thecapacitytowithstandchangeforsometimebutalso,pastacertainpoint,totransformwhile
continuingorregainingtheabilitytoprovideessentialfunctions,services,amenities,orqualities
(WalkerandSalt2006;Moser2008).Manyenaetal(2011)elaboratethat‘..the“bounceforward”
notionencapsulatessocialengineering,ifnotcommunityagency,inchangeprocesseswithinthe
contextofnewrealitiesbroughtaboutbyadisaster.’ (p.419).Thedistinctionbetweenresilience
andtransformationpost-disaster,andhowbothcanbeachievedisunclear;therehasbeenlittle
discussionanddebateabouttheselinkages.Pelling(2011)statesthatresilienceisseekingchange
‘… thatcanallowexisting functionsandpractices topersistand in thiswaynotquestioning the
underlyingassumptionsorpowerasymmetriesinsociety.’(p.50).Transformationis‘indicatedby
reforminoverarchingpolitical-economyregimesandassociatedculturaldiscourses’(ibid).
‘Transformation is conceptually nascent but drawing on insights from it provides potentially
valuableopportunitiesforthosedesigningresilienceinitiatives’(Bahadur2014,p.73).Resilienceand
transformation are differentiated by the scope and range of changes to values, institutions,
behaviourandassetsachieved(Pelling2011).Resiliencethinkingisusefulforthinkingaboutlong-
termtransformation;itisnotjustbouncingbackafterdisturbancebutalsoabouttransformation
and theusefulnessof transformation (Leach2008).‖Transformationprovidesaneffectivesetof
principleswithwhichtorectifythechargeof‘incrementality’levelledatresiliencethinking(Bahadur
2014, p.74). Pelling (2011) proposes transformation as one of the three pathways, along with
resilience(maintainingstatusquo),andtransition(incrementalchange).Transformationrefersto
irreversible regimechanges,basedon the recognition thatparadigmsand structural constraints
impedewidespreadanddeepsocialreform(Pelling2011).Sincetransformationisfundamentally
linked to issuesofpowerandpolitics, ithelps in reframing resilience thinking,andcontests the
failureofresiliencetoincludevaluesandpoliticalcontextofdecision-making(Leach2008).
Secondly, this researchframeworkadoptsaspectsofexistingresilienceframeworksandmodels,
wherebytherecurringthemesareincludedintheconceptualframework(Section3.3).Resilience
highlights the role of agency or actorwho is affected, impacted, or influenced by post-disaster
68
changes,itincludesthesetofactionstobetakentomitigate,absorbtheimpactsandtoanticipate
andprepareforfuturedisasters.Thereisaneedforeffectiveinstitutionsandinstitutionalstructures
for resilience (Mayunga2007;Djalanteet al. 2011). Trust, normsandnetworks in a systemare
important;perhapsmanifestedthroughalargenumberofcrediblecivilsocietyinstitutionssuchas
religiousorganisationsandrecreationalclubsthatareanintegralformofsocialcapital(Mayunga
2007p.7).Closelyassociatedwiththisnotionofeffectiveinstitutionsistheideaofself-organisation
orreorganisationthatemergesasakeyrecurringthemeinresiliencethinking(Carpenteretal.2001;
OstromandCox2010).Theabilitytoself-organiseisrelatedtotheextenttowhichreorganisation
is endogenous rather than forced by external drivers (Holling 1973; Carpenter et al. 2001;
GundersonandHolling2001;).Self-organisationisenhancedbycoevolvedecosystemcomponents
andthepresenceofsocialnetworksthatfacilitateinnovativeproblemsolvingthroughalearning
approach(Carpenteretal.2001).
Thiscloserelationoflearningapproacheswithself-organisation,isofinterest,asreiteratedbythe
UNISDR’s(2005)definitionthatresilienceisdeterminedbythedegreetowhichthesocialsystemis
capableoforganising itself to increase thecapacity for learning fromdisasters forbetter future
protection and to improve risk reduction measures. This defines the scope for learning and
innovation(Pahl-Wostl2007;PellingandHigh2005;VossandWagner2010;Djalanteetal.2011).
Foster(2006)describestwotypesofresilience:preparationresilienceincludingregionalassessment
andreadiness,andperformanceresiliencecomprisingeventresponseandrecovery.Thesestages
are continual and overlap in terms of regions and scale and starting point (Foster 2006). The
resiliencestudiesarecommonintheirunderstandingofdiversity,redundancyandhigh levelsof
integration required between natural and social systems and therefore consider resilience
approachestostudysocial,ecologicalandsocio-ecologicalsystems(Bahaduretal.,2010).
Researchers, analysts, managers and theorists have reviewed, analysed, rephrased resilience
discussions and debated the usefulness and challenges of using the concept (Godschalk, 2003;
Cutter et al., 2008;McDaniels et al., 2008; Bahadur et al., 2010). The conceptual and practical
challenges define the nature of resilience and its implementation (Manyena, 2006). Resilience
definitionsareambiguousandincoherentacrossdisciplines,increasinglydifficulttogainconsensus
fordefining,measuring,assessingand/ormappingresilience(Mayunga2007).Resiliencethinkingis
multi-disciplinary,limitedtotheoreticalunderstanding,andlacksempiricalevidence(Bahaduretal.
69
2010).CannonandMuller-Mahn(2010)arguethatresiliencethinkingderivedfromanecosystems
approachfocusesonnatureandnaturalsystemsratherthansocio-economicsystems;therefore
thehumanactionis‘‘blamed’’fortheproblems.Anunclearresilienceapproachisindangerofa
realignment towards interventions that subsume and neutralise politics and economics, and
depoliticises the causal processes inherent in putting people at risk (Cannon andMüller-Mahn
2010).
Bahadur et al (2010) conclude that there is little guidance for developing indicators for specific
situations and for data collection. The challenge with the existing frameworks and models of
resilienceisoperationalizationduringrecovery.Agencyguidelinesandstandardsforhumanitarian
responsemaynotexplicitlyadoptoradheretoresiliencethinking.ArecentblogpostbyWhittallet
al(2014)generateddebatesfromhumanitarianprofessionalsengagedinWaSHonhowresilience
couldaddvalueinpost-disastercontext.Theconceptofbuildingresilienceisoftenatoddswitha
corehumanitarianapproachtocrisesduetothechallengesofdealingwiththestatethatrequires
timevs.addressingimmediateneedsofvulnerablegroups(Whittalletal.2014).
Levineetal(2012)statethat
‘though recovery is normally assumed, there is a dearth of evidence on just how this
happens. The preference for simplicity also means that frameworks cannot assist in
answeringcriticalquestions,suchaswhatisitthatmakespeoplemoreorlesssensitiveto
crisis,becausethesedimensionsareleftasunexplained“blackboxes”’(p.2).
Thedesiretoquantifyresilienceisobvious:toassesscomparativeneed,targetresources,measure
impactandjudge‘valueformoney’(Levineetal.2012,p.4).Thetrade-offbetweenshort-termand
long-termrecovery recurs in resilience literature,where immediatedecisionsaremade toavert
imminent threats. Resilience thinking stemming from diverse epistemic foundations makes
particularjudgementsbasedonvaluesattachedtoeithersocial,technologicalorecologicalsystems
(Bahadur2014).Similarlytrade-offsaremadeonthefunctionalisticperspective, inensuringthat
thesystemmaintainsitsbasicfunctioninginthefaceofdisaster(Twigg2007;UNISDR2009),without
addressingthestructuresinplacethatmakethemvulnerabletodisastersinthefirstplace.Thereis
limited evidence of how resilience addresses power issues at various scales – individual, or
70
household or community – and how these are reflected in policies and practice without
acknowledgingthepoliticalcomplexities(CannonandMüller-Mahn2010;Griffin2012).
Asasystemattribute,resiliencedoesnotclearlydistinguishsystemasanentity,itsboundariesand
relationwithitsenvironment(Mayunga,2007;Bahaduretal.,2010).Resiliencemayjustreinforce
thefocusonhazardorshock,attheexpenseofvulnerability(MitchellandHarris,2012).Itdiverts
attentionawayfromtheroleofagency,powerandpolitics;disbanding,destroyingormodifyinga
givensystemorsomepartssothatpresenceofcertainotherparts,orsystemsismoredesirableand
resilient(MitchellandHarris,2012).Hencetoanswer‘resilienceforwhat,againstwhom?’resilience
isboththecapacityofasystemtoreactappropriatelytomomentsofcrisesthathavenotbeen
entirelyanticipated,and itsability toanticipate thesecrisesandtoenact, throughplanningand
recovery, changes in the systems that will mitigate disaster impacts (Aguirre, 2006). Residual
uncertaintyisinevitableinadaptingtochangingcircumstances(PellingandHigh,2005),therefore
"cultures of safety" can be developed that provide patterns of anticipated effects, actions, and
strategies as well as templates for response, recovery, andmitigation (Aguirre 2006, p.2). It is
obvious that anyopportunity to increasepeople’s ability should be seized (Levine et al., 2012).
Despite concernsofblindlyadopting resilienceasa concept (McEntireetal. 2002; Furedi2007;
MitchellandHarris2012,Levineetal.,2012),thisresearchadoptsresilienceasanapproachthat
providesanopportunityto‘workacrosssilos’(Levineetal.2012,p.1)andtobreakdownthebarriers
betweendisciplinaryghettos.
3.2Systemsthinkingandresilience
‘Resiliencethinkingissystemsthinking,’(WalkerandSalt2006p.31).Therearemanyparallelsin
resilienceand systems thinking. Systems theoryhasa far-reaching influencewith itspromiseof
providingamechanism to integrate the social andnatural (Pelling2011). Itprovides theoretical
precisiononsociallearningandself-organisation.Pelling(2011)arguesthatusingsystemsapproach
inresiliencedrawsattentiontothepowerdebatesandasymmetries,whichdetermineforwhom,
where and when the disaster impacts are felt, and the scope for recovery. Systems thinking
incorporateschanges insocio-politicalsystemsdrivenfromactionsofpeopleatrisk,buildingon
existing social andpolitical reformmovements (Pelling 2011). Foster (2006) found that systems
thinkingapplies to thesystemasawhole,and itselements, suchas infrastructure, information,
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physical environment, civic organisations, governance and economic systems. A system that is
resilientononeelementmaynotnecessarilyberesilientonanother(Foster2006).Anurbanstudy
bydaSilvaetal(2012)exploredcomplex‘living’systemsundergoingnumerousdynamicexchanges
atanygiventime,andfoundthatchangesaresystemic(i.e.changesinoneelementofthesystem
mayinducechangesinanotherelement),anddynamic(theresultoffeedbackloops)(daSilvaetal.
2012).
Chapter2demonstratedrecovery is riddledwithcomplexities.Ramalingametal (2008)propose
systems theory concepts to dealwith these complexitieswith the help of 10 guiding concepts:
interconnectedness and interdependent elements and dimensions; feedback processes that
promoteand inhibitchangewithinsystems;systemcharacteristicsandbehavioursemerge from
simplerulesofinteraction;nonlinearity;sensitivitytoinitialconditions;phasespace–‘thespaceof
the possible’; attractors, chaos and the ‘edge of chaos’; adaptive agents; self-organisation; co-
evolution(Ramalingametal.2008).Systemsthinking isusedvariouslyasananalyticaltoolorto
organiseexistingknowledgeaboutresiliencecapacities,outcomesandactions(Wrightetal.2012).
Itstudiesissuesandinteractionswithotherpartswithinthesystem,withanexpandedviewofthe
situation,andanalysestheunitswithin(Foster2006).Inrecoveryitisusedforinformeddecision-
making,betterunderstandingofthesystem,theinterrelatednatureofelementsinthesystemand
identifying patterns of behaviour (Simonović 2011). In emergency WaSH, a systems theory
framework is useful to integrate and analyse data obtained from public health, environmental
healthandsocialdeterminantsaffectingdiseasetransmission(Parkinson2009).ComplexAdaptive
Systemstheoryisusedtoinvestigatetheunpredictabilityofoutcomesforcommunitywatersupply
projectsinEastTimor(Neely2013).
Thisresearchidentifiessystemsthinkingasafoundationtoorganiseactorsatvariousscalesand
studytheirinterconnections,usefultostudyWaSHfacilities,governancemechanisms,community
practices and agency interventions during recovery. Building on Simonović’s (2011) approach,
systems thinking studiesdynamicsduring recovery,particularly inhygienebehaviour andWaSH
practices, understanding the structures and elements of the system, the interactions between
actorsacrossdifferentscalesthroughfeedbackandlearningmechanisms.Thisapproachwilladd
valuetoexistingknowledgeandprovideafoundationtodevelopaframeworkforexploringand
gatheringempiricalevidenceandpractitionerfeedback.Thisresearchincorporatessystemsthinking
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intotheframeworkbyinvolvingdifferentstakeholders–individuals,householdsandcommunities,
localandexternalactorsandtheirinterdependenciesovertime,scaleandsectorsorcomponents.
Theframeworkaddressesthemultipleinterpretationsbydifferentactorsinasystembyincludinga
scalar perspective to seek understanding of how people, groups and organisations frame their
resilience (Leach 2008). Such a framework reflects multiple recovery priorities, aspirations and
capacities.
3.3ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery
Thisresearchunderstandscommunityresilienceasthecapacityoflocalcommunitiesandrelated
systemsandinstitutionstoabsorbstressduringdisastersandrecoverfromthem,withtheabilityto
perform their essential functions and develop their inherent capacities to prepare for future
disastersandrecoverfromsuchdisasterswithleastexternalassistance.Thisconceptualisationof
communityresilienceviewscommunityasanactiveagent,andstudiestheirinteractionswithWaSH
systems.Basedonthereviewofresilience,recoveryandWaSHliterature,learningandknowledge,
participation,integrationandinstitutionsareadoptedasconceptualthemestostudyresiliencein
WaSHduringrecovery(Manyena2006;Twigg2007;Bahaduretal.2010;VossandWagner2010;
Lyonsetal.2010;Whatley2013).Thethematiccomponentsincludesub-themesandspecificWaSH
indicators. The framework is validated through expert interviews and feedback from 12
humanitarian and development WaSH professionals including public health engineers and
promoters, DRR practitioners and academics using an interview guide (annexure 4). The final
frameworkincorporatedtheirfeedbackontherelevanceofthesub-themes,thepotentialindicators
andtheirdescription,thepotentialtoolsforgatheringempiricalevidencerelatedtothatindicator
and potential sources of evidence (annexure 5). Practitioners’ inputs on the framework and its
feasibility proved instrumental in choosing indicators forWaSHand appropriate tools to gather
empiricalevidence.Theoverallfeedbackwasthattheframeworkcomponentswererelevantand
useful,butdidnotfactororrepresenttime,scaleandprocesses.
Figure3.2showstheframeworkforWaSHduringrecoveryanditsfourkeythemes;thethemesare
discussedinsections3.4-3.7.
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Figure3.2:CommunityResilience:ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery
3.4Learningandknowledge
Manyenaetal.(2011)arguethatnewapproachesforlearningatthecommunityandorganisation
levels are required for resilience. This research explores themes of learning and knowledge to
understand resilience.The framework includes social learningunder the themeof learning,and
technologicalinterventionscomplementinglocalknowledgeunderknowledge.Theindicatorsrefer
toaspectsoforganisationallearningwithinlearningtheme.SociallearninginWaSHduringrecovery
isexploredthroughhygienebehaviourchangesandsocio-culturalpractices.
From a development perspective, Guijt (2007) proposed learning for social change based on
people,powerandprocesses for transformation and redistribution of power. Assessment and
learning are processes of on-going reflection about vision, strategies and actions that enable
continualreadjustment(Guijt2007).Manyena(2009)foundthathumanitariananddevelopment
programmes included institutional and community learning for promoting resilience to future
disasters.Cutteretal(2008)distinguishbetweenprogrammesemploying‘‘lessonslearned’’atthe
endofaprogrammeand learning for resilience.The former includesprogrammedebriefings,or
LearningandKnowledge
InstitutionalCapacities
Participation Integration
74
lessons identified on what went right or wrong and suggestions for course-corrections, while
learning for resilience emphasises critical reflections on these lessons based on organisational
valuesandpractice(Cutteretal.2008).
Learningtheoriesrefertothreeloopsoflearning:first,secondandthirdlooplearning(Boydetal.
2014).Firstloopisimprovingwhatisalreadybeingdone,secondloopmeanslearningtochangethe
mechanismsusedtomeettheobjectives,andthirdloopinvolveschangingunderlyingvaluesthat
determine goals and actions (Argyris and Schön 1996). Voss andWagner (2010) furthered the
theory:insingle-loop-learning,goaldivergenceandadaptationerrorsarerecognisedandcorrected.
Double-loop-learninggoesbeyondsimpleerrorcorrection, todevelop learning for improvement
thatquestionsunderlyingcausesandtriggersadditionallearning(VossandWagner2010).Vossand
Wagner(2010)callthethird-loop‘deuterolearning’–theskillinhandlingandinfluencingsingle-and
double-loop-learning–or‘learningtounderstand’,whichfocusesonfactorspromotingorinhibiting
learningandsecuringcapacitiesforself-organisation.
Itisarguedthat:
‘Knowledge of past failures in practice and learning is gathered, its communicationencouraged and consequently a process of (self-) reflection of the adequacy oforganisational knowledge, structures and rules of behaviour is institutionalised. By thismeanstheresponsecapacityoftheorganisationorthenetworkoforganisationsisenhancedwithregardstounpredictablesocietalandenvironmentalchange(VossandWagner2010p.663)’.
Analternativeapproach, includingdifferentexperts,risk-bearersand local communities, involves
knowledgeandpracticebeingcontested,co-producedandreflectedupon(Vogeletal.2007).Co-
productionofknowledgefordecision-makingandpolicycontextinvolvingvariousstakeholders–
experts,bureaucratsandprimary stakeholders–producesnew insights, informationandexpert
knowledgebycontestingandnegotiatingwiththelocalindigenousknowledge,inthecreationof
newknowledge(Edelenbosetal.2011).Vogeletal(2007)findthatthepracticalimplementationof
such learning approaches and tools for gaining consensus by various stakeholders remains a
knowledgegap.Acombinationofscientific/technicalandtraditionalknowledgebasesisnecessary
for building resilience (Berkes 2007). Within organisations, learning is a critical component for
effectiveness,whereastronglearningorganisationiscreatedthroughthedynamicsofstrongand
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committedlearners,afavourablelearningcultureorethos,andeffectivelearningmechanismsor
structures (Whatley 2013). The memories of experiences, skills, values, and decision-making
processes stored within institutions are called institutional memory or a knowledge system
(Djalanteetal.2011).Intheeventofsmall-scaledisasters,itisarguedthatlearninglessonsfrom
smalldisasters(forexample,aflashfloodinasmalltown)isextremelyimportantforinstitutionsto
helpreducepossibledamageduring futuredisasters (VossandWagner2010).There isa lackof
evidenceaboutthetechnologies,approachesandprocessesusedinWaSHprogrammes(Brownet
al.2012).
Pelling (2011) finds social learning to be a property of social collectives, their capacities and
processes through which new values, ideas and practices are disseminated, popularised and
becomedominantinsocietyorlocalcommunities.Withinliterature,ideasofsociallearninghave
been advanced in the context of adaptive governance as a collective activity,which entails the
cooperativeproductionofknowledgeconcerningsystemicaspectsofsociety–theprevailingsocial
andpoliticalconditions(Boydetal.2014).Sociallearningisoftenfacilitatedthroughaccumulation
of social-ecological learningandunderstanding,oftenreferred toassocialmemory (Folke2006;
Djalanteetal.2011).Withindisasterstudies,learningisinvestigatedthroughchangesinbehaviour:
for instancecycloneevacuationstudies inBangladesh foundthatpeople’sperceptions,previous
experiencesofhazards,andattitudesactedastheprincipaldeterrentsofevacuation (Pauletal.
2010). Another study found that past hazard experience influenced evacuation behaviour
depending upon the severity of previous impact experience, false alarms, and past evacuation
experienceincludingthequalityofthestayinareliefshelter(SharmaandPatt2012).Thisthesis
attemptstodevelopanunderstandingofhowsociallearningoccursandmanifestsintheformof
behaviourchangesinWaSHpracticesthroughexternalsupport.
Studiesshowthatpastexperiencesandattitudesinfluencebehaviouralchangesindisasters,but
littleguidanceisavailableonhowthesechangesareeffectedduringrecovery.Djalanteetal(2011)
claim that social learning is essentially accumulated experiences, values, debates, and decision-
makingprocesses thathavebeenusedas strategies tocontinuallydealwithchange. Indisaster
studies,ithasbeensuggestedthattheexperienceofrecoveryshouldbesituatedwithintheroleof
placeasareorientingframework,includingaspectsofsocialcapital,socialandcollectiveidentities
andnetworkstoreframethediscourseonrecoveryinterventionsbasedonexperiences(Coxand
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Perry2011). InWaSH,across-countriesstudyofhand-washingpracticesdividedthefactorsthat
determinehealth-relatedbehaviourintoplanned,motivatedandhabitualcategoriesforconceptual
understandingandresearch(Curtisetal.2009).Theyclaimedthatenvironment(social,physicaland
biological) and cognitive aspects (motivation, habits and planning) influenced handwashing
behaviour(ibid).Curtisetal(2009)foundthatmotivationwasoftentriggeredbydisgust,nurture,
status,affiliation,attraction,comfortandfear.Theinvestigationofpost-disasterchangeswillshow
howlearningoccurs.
In knowledge aspects, this research investigates technological interventions to find how these
complementlocalknowledge.Useofappropriatetechnologiescanbeenhancedbyunderstanding
how decisions onWaSH technologies are taken,who takes them and implements them. Social
learningtransformsthepotentialbehaviourofanactor–anindividual,aformalorganisation,an
informalgrouporevenanon-humanactantsuchaselementsoftechnologyornature–capableof
changing behaviour in response to experience (Pelling and High 2005 p.6). The application of
technologyenablestechnologicalevolution,newinformationexchange,informeddecision-making
anddocumentationofbestpractices,effectiveoutcomesofapproachesforupscalebygovernment
actionorreplication(Pelling,2011,p.56).Studiesonwatermanagementsystemsexplorecontinual
learning and improvement of interconnected technical systems and human systems, where
technologiesareembeddedinanetworkofsocialroutinesthatlinktechnologiestotheirfunction
(Pahl-Wostl2007).
Disaster studies consider local knowledge including community perceptions, beliefs,
understandings,andskillsusedorpotentiallyusedtocommunicateabout thephysicalandbuilt
environment(Wisner,2009).Anyexternalassistanceshouldbuildupontheknowledge,capacities
andexpertisewithinthecommunitytoreducedependencyandensuresustainablechanges(Pelling
and High, 2005). Emerging from the Gujarat reconstruction experience, it was argued that the
introduction of technology is a process, including appropriate design, and creation and
institutionalisation of delivery mechanisms, information, communication of technology and
capacity building of existing indigenous knowledge and practices (Jigyasu 2010). This research
explores the available technological options in WaSH, their technical feasibility in challenging
environmentsandcommunityorhouseholdadoptionofsuchtechnologies(Djonoputroetal.2010;
Brownetal.2012;BastableandLamb2012).
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3.5Institutionalcapacities
This research proposes study of institutional capacities andmechanisms for undertakingWaSH
during recovery. The relevant institutions include national, sub-national and local government
organisations (GOs), informal communitygroups, grassrootsorganisations (GROs)or community
basedorganisations(CBOs),CivilSocietyOrganisations(CSOs)andnon-governmentalorganisations
(NGOs).Inordertoclarifytheuseofterms,institutionsareunderstoodtobeorganisationsthatare
heldtogetherbyandproducerules,normsandarrangements(’rulesofthegame’),andagenciesor
organisationsarereferredasactors(’playersofthegame’)(Jones2013p.68).
Carpenter et al. (2001) underline the importance of institutions that can facilitate learning and
‘experimentinsafeways,monitorresults,updateassessments,andmodifypolicyasnewknowledge
is gained.’ (p.778) Experimentation is also seen as key tomaintaining the stability of a system
(BulkeleyandCastánBroto2013).Self-organisationisarecurringaspectofresilience,andPelling
(2001)conceptualisesitaspropensityforsocialcollectivestoformwithoutdirectionfromthestate
or high-level actors. This could include new canonical (formal) organisations such as registered
communitydevelopmentgroupsortradeassociations,orshadow(informal)organisationssuchas
networks of friends and neighbours (Pelling 2011 p.61). Training and technical expertise to
strengthen thecommunitycapacitiescanbesustained throughsuch institutionsand institution-
building(Manyena,2009).AdoctoralstudyofWaSHdevelopmentactorsandnetworksinMaliby
Jones(2013)bringsto lightthatapproachestounderstanding local institutions,emphasisingthe
importanceofimprovisationandadaptationacrossdifferentscales,shouldbeplacedwithinbroader
political economy analysis. Different approaches at community and at local government and
national levels are required: for the communities to drawupon traditionalWaSH practices and
agencyinfluencestoeffectbehaviouralandtechnicalchanges,andattheregionalleveltoadopt
‘bestpractice’ rather than ‘best fit’, andprovidingadditional resources tobuildabilitiesof local
governments to deliver sustainableWaSH services (Jones 2013). Although Jones’s (2013) thesis
focused on development WaSH, the importance of governance mechanisms in WaSH service
delivery are crucial in a post-disaster context for sustainable and changes and accessibleWaSH
facilities. This research investigates institutional pathways through representative institutional
mechanisms and policies; organisational mandate and capacities, facilities and infrastructure
studiedthroughresourceallocationanduseofinformationanddata.
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3.6Participation
Thisresearchproposescommunityparticipation,multi-stakeholderpartnershipsandparticipatory
monitoringandevaluationas indicators toexploreWaSHrecoveryprogramming.WaSHservices
andfacilitiesarecharacterisedbyalargerangeofstakeholdersandapoorunderstandingofthe
responsibilitiesofeachactor(Mazeau2013).Thislackofunderstandingcanbechallengingduring
recovery.Sanitationdevelopmentapproaches(suchasCommunity-LedTotalSanitation(CLTS)and
itsvariants,andSanitationMarketing)emphasisechangingtheattitudesofthosepractisingopen
defecationorusingsub-standard facilities,persuading themto improvesanitationpracticesand
encouraginghouseholdstoinvestinsanitationimprovement(Carter2015).Mara(2012)seesthe
poorstateofsanitationastheresultofalackofpoliticalwillandalackofexpertiseamongengineers
in transferringexisting technologies (Mara2012).Thesuccessoforganisationsdependsontheir
abilitytodesignthemselvesassociallearningsystemsandalsotoparticipateinbroaderlearning
systemssuchasanindustry,aregion,oraconsortium,asparticipationincommunitiesofpractice
facilitates learning (Wenger 2000). Pelling (2011) notes, ‘There is the potential for bottom-up,
aggregate transformational change through, for example, the promotion of stakeholder
participation in decision-making, leading to the inclusion of new perspectives and values in
emerging policy’ (p. 69). For transformation, it is essential that local communities actively
participate in decision-making about the implementation of the processes, programmes and
projectswhichaffectthem(Meskinazarian2011,p.101).
Section2.1.4described the typologiesofparticipationproposedduring recovery.Thereare two
approaches in participation, namely guided participation (instrumental in nature) and people-
centred participation (transformative) (Twigg et al. 2001). Pelling (2007) termed the former as
‘exploitative’approachandthelatter‘emancipatory’. Intheformerapproach, localcommunities
playakeyroleinthesuccessfulimplementationofrecoveryactions,whiletheprogrammedesign
anddecision-makinglieswithdonorsandNGOs.Thecommunityparticipationinrecoveryactionis
instrumentalinsuccessfulexecution.Theexternalagenciesundertakeassessmentstounderstand
needsoftheaffectedcommunitiesanddesignprogrammesbasedonassessedneedsandagency
mandates.Bycontrast,thesecondmodeladdressesissuesofpowerandcontrolwithinprogramme
planningandimplementation(Twiggetal.,2001).Hereexternalagenciestaketheroleoffacilitators
and communities take the lead in decision making in design, implementation and monitoring
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recoveryinterventions.People-centeredparticipationisfoundedonthebeliefthatordinarypeople
arecapableofcriticalreflectionandanalysis,andthattheirknowledgeisrelevantandnecessary
(Twigg,2004,p117).
Inthecontextofsanitation,thetop-downcentralisedplanningthatconsiderstoiletconstructionas
thefinalsolutiontosanitationhasbeencritiqued,insteadfocusisrecommendedtowardssustained
collectivebehaviourchange(Kar2012).Kararguesthat
‘The prevailing mind-set of planners, bureaucrats, donors and lenders is based on theassumptionthatpeoplearepoorandmustbegivenfreeorsubsidisedtoilets.Theyassumethat localpeopledonotunderstandthedangersofthefaecal–oralcontaminationandsohygieneeducation isessential.Localpeoplecannotconstruct toiletsontheirown;hencetoiletmodelsandtechnologicalknow-howmustbeprescribedtothem.Butthesetop-downattitudes combined with an excessive reliance on numbers and targets are part of theproblem.Solutionstocollectivehygienebehaviourchangewillnotcomethroughbuildingtoiletsorprovidingatechnologicalsolutionbyoutsidersbutbytriggeringademandthatmustcomefromwithinthecommunity.Whatisrequiredisadecentralisedbottom-upandcommunity-ledapproach’(Kar2012p.95)
ThemonitoringofprogressinsanitationisdiscussedindevelopmentalWaSHcontexts(Sparkman
2012; Mazeau 2013; WHO/UNICEF 2014). Monitoring changes due to the programme are
challenging inpost-disastercontext,hence thecurrent trends insanitationmonitoring requirea
holistic,people-centredapproachtofacilitate learning,andevaluationstrategiesforasanitation
system,incorporatingarangeofstakeholdersandperspectives(Sparkman2012).Manyena(2009)
commentsthattermssuchascapacity,learningandorganisingoftenindicatecommunityagency.
Participatory monitoring and evaluation (PMandE) approaches serve the functions of impact
assessment,projectmanagementandplanning,organisationalbuildingandlearning,understanding
andnegotiatingstakeholderperspectives,andpublicaccountability (EstrellaandGaventa1998).
Fourthgenerationevaluation,orparticipatoryevaluationmethods,arecharacterisedbynegotiation
betweenvariousstakeholders,participationineverystageoftheevaluationprocess,andafocuson
action(GubaandLincoln1989).Thereareevaluationmethodologiesappliedduringemergencies
(ALNAP2006;Vogel2012;Fewetal.2013).Theseareunclearontheextentofparticipationasit
meansdifferentthingstodifferentpeople(Manyena2009).Thisresearchexploresthescopeand
extentofcommunityparticipationandmulti-stakeholderpartnershipsinWaSHduringrecovery.
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3.7Integration
ThisresearchexploresintegrationofWaSHovertimefromreliefandrecoverytodevelopment,and
withothersectors.Theintegrationasapathwayincludesapproachesforlinkingrelief,recoveryand
development, and achieving multi-sectoral integration. Socio-ecological resilience relies on the
interconnectednessbetweenthevariouscomponentsofasystem;linkingpreparednessmeasures
tolivewithdisastersbybuildingredundancywithinsystems(Bahaduretal.2010).AsRichardCarter
observes,theWaSHsectorisconfrontedwith
‘..thechallengesoflinkingdisasterpreparednessandriskreduction,emergencyresponse,post-emergency rehabilitation, and long-termdevelopment.Getting this continuum righthas longbeen theholy grail ofbothdevelopmentworkers andhumanitarianemergencypractitioners.’(Carter2012)
TheLRRDapproachhighlightedaspectsoftemporalintegrationofrecoveryinterventions(Section
2.1.3.2). Collins (2013) argues that an integrated approach is action-oriented science, based on
experiencesof successful disaster anddevelopmentprocesses,whichdemonstratepathways to
wellbeingand linkingdisaster todevelopment.This researchexploreswaysof integratingcross-
sectorcollaborativemechanismsandreplacingculturesofcompetitionwiththoseofcooperation
tofurtheragreedactions(Collins2013).InWaSH,LRRDapproachhasbeenstudiedtoaddressthe
transitionalgapinrecoveryprogramming(King2015).Financingemergencyservicesandstrategies
to manage the people’s expectations of how much assistance they can receive under which
circumstancesareareasofconcerntoensurethathumanitarianenthusiasmformakingpotentially
life-saving interventions available does not undermine long-term sustainability (Luff 2013). The
understandingofpoliciesontariffs,taxes,subsidiesandinsuranceneedstobestrengthenedwith
moreresearch(Brocklehurst2013).Itshouldbeundertakenasanationallevelpolicyissue,thatis,
notjustpartofdonororexternalagencypolicy(Jones2013).
Thisresearchproposesintegrationasathemetounderstandmulti-sectoralapproachesinrecovery,
where integration is soughtbetweensectors includingshelter, livelihoods,educationandhealth
insteadofstand-aloneWaSHinterventions.It isunderstoodthatrecoveryatthehouseholdlevel
includesprimaryhealth,water,sanitation,educationandlivelihoods,andnotjustrebuildingofthe
houses.Atthedistrictandmunicipallevels,aholisticsanitationprogrammingstrategycouldaddress
issuesofthelackofcoordinationbetweenrelevantsectors(suchashousing,energy,agriculture,
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and health, aswell as public and private actors); challenges of leadership, and silo approaches
affecting collective impact, lack of district-wide or nation-wide service delivery; and lack of
opportunitiestolearnfromandcontributetoothersectorsoutsidesanitation(WilliamsandSauer
2014).Astudyofwatersystemsemphasisesintegratedapproachestoencompassallenvironmental
factorsofresources,technologiesandhumanbeings(Pahl-Wostl2007).Particularlyinthecontext
ofrecoveryprogramming,useofeffective inter-clustercoordinationapproachesandtransitional
programmingstrategiesinemergencyphasewasfoundtoenhanceresilienceinthepost-disaster
environment(King2015).
3.8ChapterSummary
This chapter reviews resilience literature and uses systems thinking to define the conceptual
framework to understand post-disaster recovery processes. The framework components are
conceptualisedaspathwaysforresilienceinWaSHduringrecovery.Thisthesisinvestigatesthefirst
pathway for resilience - learning and knowledge – through social learning and technological
interventions that complement local knowledge. These could manifest in the form of hygiene
behaviour changes and technical changes. It explores the second pathway for resilience –
institutional capacities – through representative mechanisms and policies, resource allocation
duringrecoveryanduseofinformationanddata.Theresearchstudiesthirdpathwayforresilience
–participation–intheformofcommunityparticipationandmulti-stakeholderpartnerships.The
thesis explores the last pathway for resilience – integration – by understanding approaches for
linkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopment,andmulti-sectoralintegration.
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Chapter4:Methodology
This chapter describes the exploratory strategy used for addressing the research questions and
multi-sitedcasestudies(Section4.1).Thetoolsfordatacollectionincludeparticipatorylearningand
action (PLA) tools, interviews, documents and participant observation (Section 4.2). As a
practitioner,IreflectontheactionsundertakenwithAgencyA,anddiscussthebiasesandethical
issueswhileundertakingthisresearch(section4.3).Thedataanalysisstrategyincludedmindmaps,
thematicandcontextualanalysis(Section4.4).
4.1Researchstrategy
This research adopts a qualitative strategy from an inductive, interpretative epistemology and
constructivistontologytostudyhumanbehaviourpost-disasters.Iuseanexploratorystrategyto
understandandexplainsocialphenomena,andfocusattentiononparticularissuesregardingthe
socialandnaturalworlds(May1993).Itissituatedwithinepistemologicalandontologicalaspects
tounderstandcommunityresiliencetodisasters.Epistemologyconsidersthequestionsofwhatis
regardedasknowledgeofreality,andhowwestudyit;ontologyreferstothenatureofsocialreality,
whichiseitherobjectiveorsociallyconstructed(Bryman2008).Inthisqualitativeresearch,Iadopt
amethodology that focuses on themeaning, complexity and connectivity of social phenomena
(Silverman 2006). The research involves perspectives from various stakeholders’ and the
researcher’ssocialrealitiesbasedontheirexperiences.
To studymultiple perspectives involving different actors fromgovernment andNGOofficials to
communitiesandhouseholdmembers,thisresearchusesmultiplemethodsfordatacollection,such
as focusgroupdiscussions (FGDs), interviews,actormapping,participatorychangeanalysesand
priorityrankingexercises,whereappropriate.ParticipatoryLearningandAction(PLA)toolsduring
fieldresearcharehelpfultoacquiretheclosestpossibleperspectiveofthecommunity.Chambers
(1995)warnsthatdespiteourbestefforts,anoutsidercannotgraspallthedimensionsofrurallife.
Initiallynamedrapidruralappraisal(RRA)andparticipatoryruralappraisal(PRA),thesetoolsare
defined as ‘a family of approaches andmethods to enable rural people to share, enhance, and
analysetheirknowledgeoflifeandconditions,toplanandtoact’(Chambers1994a,p.953).These
areusedtogatherinformationdirectlyfromthepeopleimpactedbydisasterstoformanintegrated
visionof their lives andneeds (Guijt andCornwall 1995). PLA tools have advantages of directly
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learningfromlocalpeople,andseekingdiversitybyfacilitatinganalysisbylocalpeople;practicing
criticalself-awarenessandresponsibility;andsharing(Chambers1994b).
Thisstudyasks ‘Howeffectivelydodifferentapproachestowaterandsanitationfacilities,and
hygienepracticesduringpost-disasterrecoverypromotecommunityresilience’?Thisquestionis
brokendownintothreesubsidiaryresearchquestions.
1. HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedtoincorporateresilience
inWaSH?Furthermore,howcanthesepoliciesbeeffectivelytranslatedintopractice?
2. Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthewindowof
opportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?
3. Howeffectivelydoagencies facilitate the integrationofemergency responsewith long-term
developmentacrossdifferentsectors?
4.1.1ResearchProcess
Theexploratoryprocessofthisresearchincludedinitialconceptualisationthroughliteraturereview
(Chapter 2), framework development and validation through expert interviews (Chapter 3) and
threestagesoffieldworkinAssamandoneinOdisha.Thereweretwomajoreventsthatinfluenced
theresearchstrategyandthechoiceofmethods:whenthefloodsrecurredinAssam,andwhenI
wasdeployedwithAgencyAinOdishaafterCyclonePhailinfor6months.InAssamIbeganfieldwork
inSolmari,whenthefloodsoccurredinJuly2012.Thiswasfollowedbytwovisitsin2013:ascoping
study,asavolunteerwithAgencyAduringJanuary-February2013,andanindependentstudyfrom
August-October2013.InSeptember2013,Morigaon,oneofmycasestudyvillages,wasflooded
again due to a breach in the embankment and communities were displaced. As a result, I
discontinuedmyresearchinMorigaon.InOdisha,CyclonePhailinhitOdishaon12thOctober2013,
andIwasdeployedbyAgencyAon19thOctoberuntil8thMarch2014inPuri(seeTable4.1).This
researchusedparticipatoryprocessesofdatacollection,duringinvolvementwithagencyAinAssam
andOdisha.Thisensuredscopeforcommunitiestoexpresstheirwillingnesstoaddresssomeofthe
problemsthataffectthem(EstrellaandGaventa1998).
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Table4.1:ResearchDesign:Timelineofactivities
ConceptualisationStageLiteraturereviewandresearchquestions October2011-May2012Conceptualframeworkandexperts’interviews August2012-May2013Designdatacollectionprotocol July2013DataCollection–CaseStudyApproachAssamfloodspreliminaryassessmentvisit June-July2012Scopingstudy–2ndfieldvisittoAssamandfieldreport January-March2013Empiricaldatacollection–3rdfieldvisittoAssamsites August-October2013DeploymentinOdishaCyclonePhailinandfloods October2013-March2014FindingsandInterpretationDatamanagement,andmindmapinterviews
May–December2014IdentifyingthemesandrecurringpatternsTriangulationandcontextanalysisPresentationofFindingsReportandanalysefindings January–April2015Revisitingconceptualframework June2015Writingupthesis June–August2015Feedbackandincorporationofsuggestions September2015Submissionofresearch December2015
The first visit to Assam in July 2012 was immediately after the floods started, as part of an
emergencyneedsassessmentteamcommissionedbyaUNagencytounderstandtheextentand
aftermathofthefloodsinvariousdistricts.IvisitedSolmarivillageinSonitpurdistricttounderstand
the impact of floods onWaSH, and the emerging needs andurgent priorities. I explored issues
relatedtoflooddamages,waterandsanitationfacilities,consequencesoffloodsforcommunities,
facilities at camps, emerging needs for women and children, government response and
preparednessmeasures.Whileundertakingtheassessment,Iwasawareofmyroleasaresearcher.
IusedthisopportunitytodocumentthecommunityneedsanddevelopAssamasacasestudyfor
furtherresearch.ThisvisitstrengthenedtheargumentthatWaSHwasapriorityinemergency,and
provided an opportunity to document the recovery processes. I undertook five FGDs at the
relocatedareasandcamps,andfourinterviewswithgovernmentofficials;alongwithphotographic
evidenceofdamagesanddisplacedlivingconditionsincamps.
DuringmysecondvisittoAssamforascopingstudyinJanuary–February2013,IvisitedSonitpur
andMorigaondistrictsasavolunteerwithAgencyA.Thepurposeofthisvisitwastobuildrapport
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withdifferentactorsinthefieldincludingcommunityleaders,panchayatleadersandNGOsworking
inthearea. Iwas introducedasaresearchertotheprojectstaffandcommunitymembers,who
were informed that I would revisit later in the year to understand community recovery and
resilience.Thecommunityfacilitatorsintheprogrammeactedaslocaltranslatorsduringmyvisits.
ThisprovidedmewithanopportunitytolearnAssameselanguage,andfamiliarisemyselfwiththe
localcultureandcontext.Duringthescopingstudy,Igatheredstaffperspectives,andinformation
onAgencyAinterventions.AgencyAprovidedlogisticssupportformyresearch,asIsupportedthem
with reportwriting and undertaking aWaSH KAP (knowledge, attitudes and practices) end line
survey.TheresultswerecomparedwiththebaselinesurveytoindicatechangesinhouseholdWaSH
practices.Iwasalsopartofthereal-timeevaluation(RTE)exerciseandworkshopwithAgencyA,
whichprovidedinsightsoncommunityfeedbackabouttheprogramme.Theinitialfindingsfromthis
visitinfluencedtheresearchasfollows:
• Iidentifiedandselectedthepanchayatsandvillagesformyfieldwork:SolmariinSonitpurand
BoramariKacharigaoninMorigaon.Thesewereselectedbasedontheextentofdamagesfaced
duringthe2012floods,closeproximitytoBrahmaputra,andagencyAinterventions.
• Thelocaltermsforfloodsandrains–banpaaniandborokhunrespectively–clearlydistinguished
betweenheavyrainsandfloods.Floodsoccurduetoheavyrains leadingtoriseinthewater
levelsofBrahmaputra,whichcausesovertoppingandbreachestheembankments.
• Iusedsemi-structured interviewswithkey informantsasuseful tools togatherdata,and in-
depth interviewswithhouseholds.Theseallowedthe intervieweestoofferwhatMay(1993)
calls their own ‘frames of reference’ (p.94). It was easier to hold relatively less structured
interviewswithhouseholdmemberstodiscussissuesthatwereclosetotheirlives,andspeak
abouthowdisasterschangedtheirpractices,theiraspirationsandplansforrecovery.
• Duringtranslation,itwasconvenientifIknewthelocaltermsforkeyconceptssuchasresilience,
recoveryandfloods.Accordingly,Ibriefedthecommunityfacilitators(whoactedastranslators)
about such concepts. This was crucial because it shaped the understanding of resilience –
bringingtogethercommunityapproaches,andhowthesefitwithinexistingliteratureandmy
researchframework.InAssamesetranslation,resilienceispurportedtobestructuralprotection
and mitigation measures, and recovery means rebuilding to previous conditions. The
programme staff explained these subtle differences to me, which helped me to refine my
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concepts colloquially, and frame them within community and stakeholders’ perceptions of
resilienceandrecovery.
• Duringmyfirsttwovisits, Ifoundthatcommunityprioritieschangedastimeprogressed;the
reported importance or need for WaSH facilities varied. It was important to record these
prioritiesandchangesexpectedfromagencyinterventions.
• Imaintaineddailyrecordsofobservedchangesandunderstandingthroughinformaldiscussions
withAgencyAstaffandcommunitymembersinafielddiaryaspartofareflectiveprocess.These
fieldnotesyieldedinsightsintodailylifeandcontextualanalysis.
• Timewasdiscussedinrelativeterms,‘before’and‘after’and‘fromtimetotime’.Whenasked
morespecifically,individualswereuncomfortabletosuggestprecisedatesofevents.
• Government of Assamwas dealingwithmultiple floodwaves across 17 districts,whichwas
followedbyincidentsofviolenceandconflictinKokrajharandChirangin2013.
• WorkingwithAgencyAandthesupportIreceivedforfieldworkwasinvaluableinaccessingthe
remote villages. My role as a volunteer provided independence to conduct research and
approachlocalactors,whomightotherwisehavebeendifficulttocontactorengage.However,
thisassociationwithAgencyAraisedexpectationswiththecommunities,soIspecifiedmyrole
andclarifiedthepurposeofthestudyduringmyintroduction.
The final fieldwork inSolmariandBoramari,Assamwasundertaken inAugust -October2013. I
foundthatfloodprotectionmeasureshadexacerbatedcommunityvulnerabilities:theembankment
dividedthevillageandexposedthecommunitiestofloodsanderosion.Theriverinecommunities
in Solmari andBoramariwere forced to relocatewhen the newembankment put themon the
‘wrong’ side of the embankment without any protection from the river. Agency A programme
operationshadendedinthesevillagesinSonitpurandMorigaoninApril2013.Duringthisvisit,I
engagedwiththecommunitytounderstandtheirstory–attemptstorecoverfromthe2012floods
–preparednessmeasures for the impending floods in2013, and changes inWaSH facilities and
practices. Ispentthreemonthsfocusingonthedisplacedcommunities inSolmariandBoramari,
whowerelivingonembankmentsandfloodplatforms.InBoramaritheentirevillagewaswashed
away, and the populations were displaced. This visit provided crucial insights into community
capabilities toovercomechallengesof relocationandrecurringdisasters.Thefieldwork involved
gatheringmultipleperspectivesusingvarioustoolsfromhouseholds,communitiesandgovernment
87
officials,localNGOsandhumanitarianagencies.InBoramari,thefieldworkhadtobestoppedwhen
thenewembankmentwasbreachedinBoramarivillageon14thOctober2013.
InOdisha,Iundertookanextendedfieldworkof6monthstodevelopasupplementarycasestudy.
CyclonePhailinandsubsequentfloodsin2013hadaffected12millionpeopledirectlyorindirectly
(Dash 2013). The study districts included Puri and Balasore. I was deployed as Agency A’s
programmeofficer/teamleaderandmyroleinvolveddecision-making,emergencykitdistribution
and implementation of WaSH programmes in Puri. I undertook a separate monitoring visit to
Balasore inMarch2014–6monthsafter floodshadaffectedthedistrict–whereAgencyAhad
supportedthelocalpartnerAgencyFforfoodandhygienekitdistribution,emergencyshelter,water
supplyandbathingspaceinstallation.AsapractitionerinOdishaIassessedcommunityneeds,and
undertookprogrammeplanningafterthecyclonethroughdiscussionswiththecommunities,local
NGOsandgovernmentofficials.Duringthefirstphaseoftheresponse(October-December2013),
the field visits took place 6 days a week. A total of 15 villages were targeted for undertaking
distributionto2000households.Ialsofacilitatedcommunitydiscussionsduringdonorandsenior
management monitoring visits. These visits were useful to understand the existing community
capacitiestorespondandrecoverfromthecyclone.
OdishawasusefultogainacriticalperspectiveonthedifferencesinWaSHpracticesandrecovery
processesacrossdifferentvillages,andtheimpactofagencysupportonrecovery.Thetoolsused
for data gathering included household interviews, observations, transect walks, focus group
discussions, village mapping, participatory change analyses, and priority ranking exercises. The
methods fordatacollection inOdishavaried fromAssam:asapractitioner itwaschallengingto
maintainaneutralstanceandacademicrigorinOdisha.Thefollowingshowshowtheexperiencein
Odishashapedthisresearch:
• ThevillagesinvolvedinPuriwerecategorisedbasedongeographicallocationdependingonease
ofaccessandprogrammeoperations.Theseincludedcoastal,islandandmainlandvillages(see
Chapter6)
• Asanagencyrepresentative,thecommunityexpectationscouldhavepotentiallyinfluencedthe
informationtheyprovidedduringassessmentsandmonitoringvisits,whichisusedinthethesis.
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• Emergency responsewarranted immediatemeasures to save lives. For quick distribution of
emergencykitsagenciesusedeitherthetargetingapproach(reachingouttomostvulnerable
and affected community groups) or adopted blanket approach (reaching out to all the
householdsinavillageirrespectiveofdamages).
• Ilearntthatcallforproposalsforrecoverybydonorswererequiredtobesubmittedwithinthe
firstfewweeksofthedisaster;AgencyAincorporatedtherecommendationsfromAssamreal-
timeevaluations(RTEs)inOdisha.AgencyAintervenedinearlyrecoveryundertheconsortium-
modelapproachinAssamandOdisha.
• Themediareportsshowedgovernmentwassuccessfulinsavinglivesduringthecyclonethrough
preparedness measures, early warning and evacuation systems. However the field reality
indicated there were gaps and delays in government relief items reaching the affected
communities.
• TheStatemachineryandhumanactorsdealtwithsecondary/multipledisastersuchascyclones
andfloodsaffectingdifferentdistrictsatthesametimeinOdisha,similartowhatIobservedin
Assamaswell–conflicts,recurringfloodsanderosion.
SomeinputsfromsecondarysourcesindicatedthefollowinginformationonOdisha:
• Theregionispronetomultiplehazardsandhasalonghistoryofmultipledisastersduetoits
geographiclocation,politicaldisturbance,andineffectivedisasterpolicies(Ray-Bennett2009a).
• StudiesfromOdishahaveexaminedtheroleofdiversityandcomplexinterplayofcaste,class
andgenderinsurvivingmultipledisasters(Ray-Bennett2009b).
• The 2011 census shows only 14.1% of rural households in Odisha have access to sanitation
facilities,and85.9%practiceopendefecation(Census2011).Odishaisoneofthestateswiththe
lowesthouseholdtoiletaccess(MommenandMore2013).
4.1.2Casestudyapproach
Thisresearchusedmulti-sitecasestudiestoexploreWaSHandcommunityresilience.Acasestudy
approach is useful depending on research objectives, clearly defined universe, and for focused
explorationof a phenomenon (George&Bennett 2005)A case is an explorationof a 'bounded
system'(boundedbyplaceandtime)tostudyaprogramme,event,activityorindividuals(Creswell
1998).Usingacasestudyapproachdifferedfromthetraditionalpositivistapproachesthatdivorced
phenomenafromcontextbyminimisingorcontrollingthecontexttoisolatetheeffectofarelatively
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smallnumberofvariables(Yin,2009).Butinthisresearchthephenomenonandthecontextwere
considered.Thisresearchadoptedcasestudiessothatit‘benefitsfromthepriordevelopmentof
theoreticalpropositionstoguidedatacollectionandanalysis’(Yin2009p.14).Thisresearchfound
casestudieshelpfulinguiding‘anempiricalinquirythatinvestigatesacontemporaryphenomenon
withinitsreallifecontext’(Yin2009,p.13).Thephenomenonincludeddisastereventsandrecovery
actionsbyhouseholds,communities,INGOs,governmentactors,andlocalinstitutions.
Thecasestudyapproachhelpedinaddressingthecomplexissuesandvariablesencounteredduring
thefieldwork;italloweduseofwiderangeofmethodsandsourcesofevidencewithoutconstraining
oneself to a pre-determined selection of tools and techniques (Yin 2009). With regard to the
misunderstandings of case study research stated by Flyvbjerg (2006), this research relied upon
theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge, and was consciously aware of the dangers of
generalisingfromthecases.5Theapproachseemedappropriatetoexploretherecoveryprocesses,
andunderstandWaSHinordertoaddresstheresearchquestions.Theresearchbenefittedfrom
casestudiesforlearningthatprovidesdepth,notbreadth,andasnarrativesintheirentiretynot
withanaimtosummariseorgeneralise(Flyvbjerg2006).
Casestudiesarecategoriseddependingonthenumberofcasesandsitesofstudy.Thisresearch
explored recovery using two case studies from India, andwithin each casemultiple siteswere
studiedtounderstandWaSHpractices.AccordingtoclassificationprovidedbyStake (1995), this
researchusescollectiveandintrinsictypesofcasestudy.Anintrinsiccasestudyhelpsingaininga
betterunderstandingofaparticularuniquecaseandacollectivecasestudyincludesanumberof
casesinordertoinquireintoaparticularphenomenon(Stake1995).TheAssamcasestudywasalso
longitudinalasitattemptedtoexplorerecoveryayearfollowingthefloodsin2012.
4.1.3Selectionofcasestudies
Toexploretheresearchquestionacrossthetwocases,datawererequiredonanumberoflevels:
household,community,NGOandgovernment(Greene2014).
5Othermisunderstandingsstatethatgeneralisationscannotbemadefromasinglecase,oracasestudyismostusefulinpilotstagestogeneratehypotheses,orcasestudiesarebiasedtowardsverificationoftheresearchers’hypothesis,andaredifficulttosummarise(Flyvbjerg2006).
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• Householdlevel:Datawerecollectedthroughinterviewsandobservationstoexplorechanges
inWaSHpracticesduringrecovery.Itincludedhouseholdperspectivesanddecisionsregarding
investmentsinWaSHpost-disasters.
• Communitylevel:WaSHcommunalfacilitieswereobservedinordertounderstandtheiruseand
maintenance, and accessibility issues. Data included community priorities and changes, and
perspectivesfromthelocalactorsandCBOs.
• NGO level: Data were collected from humanitarian NGOs regarding response and recovery
measuresinWaSHandinformationonprogrammesthroughdocuments,interviewsandnotes.
• Government level:Qualitativedataondistrict, stateandcountry leveldisastermanagement
policiesandwaterand sanitation schemeswere collected togainamacro-leveloverviewof
WaSHanddisasters.
ThesitesforfieldworkinAssamandOdishawereselectedbasedonthefollowingcriteria:
• Sincecommunitycapacitiesandchangespost-disastersweretobestudied,villagesaffectedby
floods,cycloneorerosionwereselected.
• Asthesub-researchquestioninvestigatedtheroleofinstitutions,theselectedsiteswerepart
ofAgencyAandtheirlocalpartnerNGO’sinterventionareas.
• In order to maintain uniformity across diverse community groups, similar locations were
considered,wheretheselectedgroupslivedontheruralfringes,exposedtorecurringdisasters
duetotheirgeographiclocationsandproximitytoriversandlakes.
TheinitialstudywasfundedbyanErasmusMundusExchangescholarship:theprimarycondition
wastoconducttheresearch inmynativecountry– India.Thefirstcasestudyfocusesonflood-
affectedcommunitiesinAssam.Assamhasanaverageannualrainfallof2,546millimetres,oneof
thehighestinIndia.
Table4.2:SelectioncriteriawithinAssam
Area Criteria Sitesconsidered Siteselected ReasonsState 1. Disaster-proneregion 1. CycloneAila,West
Bengal2009Assam 1. Recurrentfloods
in2012
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2. Experienceofrecentevent
3. On-goingresponsework
4. Appropriateforindependentresearcher
5. WaSHcontext
2. Maharashtra3. Assam
2. Historyoffloods3. Accesswith
AgencyA4. Initialassessment
teammember5. Rampantopen
defecationrates
Districts 1. Affectedbyfloodsin2012
2. Pastdisasterhistory3. AgencyAon-going
work
1. Lakhimpur2. Dhemaji3. Sonitpur4. Morigaon5. Bongaigaon6. Chirang
SonitpurandMorigaon
1. On-goingfloodresponse
2. RecommendedbyNGOsandGOs
3. Previousvisitsandfamiliaritywithlocalactors
4. Othersweredifficulttoaccessorconflict-affected
Villages 1. Riverinecommunities2. Floodaffected3. SimilarAgency
Interventions4. Hazardhistory5. Diversecommunity
demography
1. Solmari2. Boramari3. Maihangblock
SolmariandBoramari
1. AgencyAintervenedinshelter,WaSHandlivelihoods
2. Priorcontactsandestablishedrapport
TheBrahmaputrariverbasininAssamisextremelypronetofloods,characterisedbyregularerosion
anddevastationduringmonsoons.Assamhasahighrateofopen-defecation,asper2011census;
only59.6%oftotalhouseholdshavetoilets(GlobalSanitationFund2013).SolmariandBoramari
villagesbothAgencyA interventionareaswere selected for the research. Thehouseholdswere
randomlyselectedtoreflectthediversityincommunities.
Thesecondcasestudyfocusesoncyclone-andflood-affectedcommunities inOdisha(seeTable
4.3). Cyclone Phailin affected Ganjam and Puri districts in Odisha, while the subsequent floods
affectedBalasore.
Table4.3:SelectioncriteriainOdisha
Area Criteria Sitesconsidered Siteselected Reasons
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State 1. Disaster-proneregion2. Experienceofrecent
event3. On-goingresponse
work4. WaSHcontext
1. Odisha2. AndhraPradesh
Odisha 1. CyclonePhailinandsubsequentfloodsin2013
2. AccesswithAgencyA
3. Initialassessmentteammember
4. Rampantopendefecationrates
Districts 1. Affectedbycycloneandfloodsin2013
2. Pastdisasterhistory3. AgencyAon-going
work
1. Puri2. Ganjam3. Balasore
PuriandBalasore 1. On-goingAgencyAresponse
2. DeploymentinPuri
3. MonitoringvisitinBalasore
Villages 1. Riverine/Coastalcommunities
2. Floodaffected3. SimilarAgency
Interventions4. Hazardhistory5. Diversecommunity
demography
1. Arakhakudda2. Sanpatna3. Khirisahi4. Brahmapur5. Mahinsha6. Padanpur7. Pirosahi8. Gopinathpur9. Kanasblock10. Sahadevpur11. Chadanamkhana12. Gombhoria
Puri:Arakhakuda,Sanpatna,KhirisahiBrahmapurPadanpurPirosahiGopinathpurSahadevpurBalasore:ChadanamkhanaGombhoria
1. Puri:villageswereaccessedfortheresponseprogrammeandcategorisedascoastal,inlandandisland
2. Balasore:Affectedbyfloodsin2013,anderosion
The selection of two case studies where disasters had recently occurred provided a unique
opportunity towitness, document and study recovery as it unfolded. The higher rates of open
defecation inAssamandOdisha prior to the disaster provided the context to understandpost-
disasterchangesincommunitypracticesandapproachesusedbyagenciestopromotecommunity
resilienceduringrecovery.Floods,cycloneanderosionhadaffectedtheselectedstudysites,hence
followingthecommunitieslivingintheseareasovertimewashelpfultostudythechangesoccurring
during recovery.My previous associationwith local agencies working in Assam and interest to
understandthecontexthadledmetofollowthecasestudywhenthefloodsfirstoccurredin2012.
InOdisha,thecyclone2013wasanotherinterestingavenuetounderstandhowOdishaevacuated
andrespondedtotheneedspriortotheonsetofthecyclone.Thestatemachineryhadlearntlessons
and implemented preparedness and mitigation programmes after the previously 1999
Supercyclone,which had been instrumental in saving lives. Thismulti-disaster event suited the
researchaimstounderstandcommunityrecoveryfromamega-scaleevent.
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4.2DataCollectionMethods
Several inter-dependent methods were chosen that complemented one another to draw a
meaningfulanalysisofchanges(seeFigure4.1andTable4.4)Thisaidedexternalvalidityandbuilta
morecompletepictureofhouseholdandcommunityrecoveryandWaSHpractices.Fieldnotesand
adailyjournalweremaintainedtomanageinternalvalidityanddevelopreflexivity.
Figure4.1:Integrationofdifferentmethods
Table4.4:ResearchmethodsusedinAssamandOdisha
•Emails•Newspaperarticles•AgencyReports•Briefingnotes
•Audio-visualsandphotographs•Observation•Fieldnotes•Fielddiary
•Semi-structuredInterviews•Unstructuredhouseholdinterviews•Informalconversations
•Transectwalks•Focusgroupdiscussions•PriorityRanking•Changeanalysis
PLATools Interviews
DocumentsParticipantObservation
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Nameofthetool
Assam Odisha
Sub-ResearchQuestions
1 2 3ParticipatoryLearningandActionToolsTransectwalks 12 23 √ Participatorymappingexercises 4 20 √ Focusgroupdiscussions 23 43 √ √ √Participatorychangeanalyses 4 4 √ √Priorityranking 4 16 √ √Interviews(seeTable4.5)Keyinformantinterviews √ √Householdinterviews √ Documents(seeAnnex13) √ √Observationandphotographs √ √ √
4.2.1ParticipatoryLearningandAction(PLA)tools
Inthisresearch,participationisimportantintheconceptual,methodologicalandanalyticalaspects.
Fordatacollection,PLAtoolswereusedtogatherdataontheimpactofdisastersinWaSHsystems.
There aremyriad interpretations of participation, and challenges and criticisms levelled against
these approaches (Guijt and Cornwall 1995). Schilderman and Lyons (2011) question, ‘whose
participationinwhosedecisionsandwhoseactions?’(p.227).ThisresearchusesPLAtoolstogather
multipleperspectives,andtodocumentthelivedrealitiesofpeoplerecoveringfromdisasters.This
involved purposive sampling of respondents for community and household members. For key
informants–NGOandGOstaff,andlocalactors–detailedknowledgeandexperienceofworkingin
the region was essential. The use of PLA tools for data gathering and interactions with local
communities,asshownbyLeDeetal(2014),facesconstraintsoftimeanddistance.PLAtoolsare
lesslikelytodeliveranswerstolocalcommunities’problemsorempowerthem;theyareintended
toservetheresearch(ortheresearcherandprogramming)interests.
ThisresearchcontendsthatusingPLAtoolsinitselfcannotbringaboutpositivechange.Agencies
relyonparticipationasameanstoextractinformationfromacommunity(GuijtandCornwall1995).
Agrowingnumberofstudiesuseparticipatorymethodsinevaluation,urbanstudiesandclimate
resilience(Chambers1994a;Burke1998;EstrellaandGaventa1998;Twiggetal.2001;Moserand
Stein2011).Chambers (1994a)discussessequencingoftoolsstartingwithmapping, followedby
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priorityranking,stakeholdermappingandwealthranking.Mikkelsen(2005)groupsPLAtoolsbased
onspace,timeandrelationalparameters.Space-relatedPLAtoolssuchasmappingandmodelling
aidinexplorationofspatialdimensionsofpeople’sreality;time-relatedsuchasseasonaldiagrams,
work-activitydailyschedules,time-linesandtrendanalysistoolsenablecommunitiestousetheir
ownconceptoftimetoexploretemporaldimensions;andrelationaltoolsincludingVenndiagrams,
matrixscoring/rankingmethodsareusedtostudyrelationshipsbetweenvariousitemsoraspects
ofsameitem(Mikkelsen2005).
ThePLAtoolsusedinthisresearchincludedparticipatorymapping,transectwalks,priorityranking,
actormapping,andparticipatorychangeanalysesandfocusgroupdiscussions(FGDs)(Mikkelsen
2005p.63).DuringfieldworkIfollowedalineofinquiry(annexure7).ThePLAtoolswereusedto
assesscommunityprioritiesandallowedengagementwithcommunityparticipants,basedonthe
dataneeds,opportunitiesandlimitationsofthefieldsetting,andconstraintsoftime,logisticsand
otherresources(annexure8).SeparateFGDswereheldwithwomen,menandchildren,andwith
elderlyordisabledmembers,whereappropriateandfeasible.ThePLAtoolsusedduringfieldwork
wereintuitive,andrespectedculturalpractices(LeDeetal.2014).Duringmyengagement,Iwas
consciousofmylimitationsinusingparticipationasameanstogiveavoicetoeveryone.Thetools
forpriorityrankingandparticipatorychangeanalyseswereintendedtodrawactiveparticipationof
local communities in the production of knowledge, in how they framed their problems and
challengesthataffecttheirlives(Freire1970).LeDeetal(2014)arguethatparticipationisaprocess
andsometimesresearchprojectsarelimitedintheircapacitytoempowerlocalcommunities.Used
insuchamanner,thesetoolsarelimitedinbringingaboutsocialchange,self-reliance,orcapacity
ofnegotiationwithpowerstructures.
Transect walks: Transect walks were initiated during every field visit with a few community
members tounderstandvisiblechanges ingeographical layout,WaSH facilitiesandpractices, to
gaugedistancesbetweenhouseholdsandWaSHfacilities.Duringdisasters,transectwalkshelped
toassesstheextentofdamageinremotelocationswiththecommunitiesandunderstandissuesof
accessibilityandavailabilityofWaSHfacilities.Thesewereundertakenthroughoutthesite,while
taking notes on sanitation facilities and practices, and taking photographs. A huge amount of
information can be gathered in this way but care should be taken not to make sweeping
assumptionsbasedonlimitedobservation(Harveyetal.2002p.17).Thishigh-profilewalkdispels
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suspicionofoutsidersandinformsresearchersaboutareasthathavegreatervulnerabilitytosevere
weather(MoserandStein2011).Iwascautiousnottoadvisecommunitiesduringthewalksand
askedopen-endedquestions(Chambers1994b).
InAssam,frequentvisitswithinthesamecommunitiesledto12transectwalksintwosites,while
inOdisha,23transectwalkswereundertakenalongwithprojectparticipants.Ifacedchallengesin
accessingthevillagesdependingonthetimetotravelandavailablemeansoftransport,weather
conditions and inundation during floods. The walks allowed a snapshot of the existing WaSH
facilities,agencyinterventionsandthemannerinwhichthecommunitiesaccessedwater,sanitation
and housing facilities post-disasters. I used othermethods such as observation, interviews and
groupdiscussionsasawayoftriangulatingdata.
Participatorymapping:Thisresearchincludedparticipatorymappingexercises–villageandactor
mapping– toobtainanoverall viewof thephysical situationand relevantactors inWaSH.This
researchdevelopedalistofactorsinvolvedatthevillage/settlementlevelinWaSHserviceprovision
(Figure4.2).
Figure4.2:Listofactorsinvolvedinwater,sanitation,andhygieneservicesinSolmari
School&Anganwaditeacher
Healthworkers-ASHA,ANM(Auxiliary
Nurses/midwives)Wardmember
PanchayatPresident/Member
ofLegistaliveAssembly
AgencyAandLocalNGOB Youthfacilitators
Masonrygroups
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Actormapshavebeenusedtorecordthetypesandstrengthsofsocialnetworksexperiencedbythe
respondentsinotherstudies(Bosher2005;King2015).6Thisinvolveddevelopingroughsketchesof
site plans or schematic maps of existing WaSH facilities; key public services and institutions;
indiscriminatedisposalofexcreta,flood-proneareas,watersources,storageanddistributionpoints;
andslopes,drainageandgeologicalfeatures(Harveyetal.2002p.17).Communitymembersand/or
localstaffundertookvillagemappingtostimulatediscussionsandobtain information.Themaps
indicateequalweighttoallactors,wheninfacttheyhaddifferentroles,andfunctions.
FocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs):ThisresearchusedFGDstodeterminecommonneeds,timeframes
andprioritieswithcommunities.Thishelpedtoframethecontextandgaininsightsregardingthe
situation, followed by two other exercises, priority ranking and participatory change analyses.
FollowingtheprinciplessetbyHarveyetal(2002),thisresearchconductedfocusgroupsseparately
with women members to discuss issues of menstrual hygiene, hygiene behaviour and privacy
concernsoveruseofwaterandlatrinefacilitiesduringemergencies.Thediscussionswereheldin
anyavailableshelteredspace–schoolsorlocalcommunalareas–involving6-8informants.FGDs
canbechallenging,astheycanbedistortedbypeerpressureorbycertainparticipantswho,because
oftheirpersonality,interestorcompetenceindiscussions,maydominateagroupandothersmight
feelintimidated,hidingthedifferingviewsanddisagreementsbetweenparticipants(Goughetal.
2013).Thesedifficultieswerecounteredbyfacilitatingsubsequentsmallergroupdiscussionswith
relatively homogeneous participants (i.e. of the same sex and similar experiences), or with
household interviews. This research conducted separate FGDs following similar work to factor
differentperspectivesandvulnerabilitieswhichinfluenceaccess(Nieuwenhuys1997;Twigg2014).
For research purposes I facilitated the discussions, sometimes with the help of Agency A
managementorfieldstaff.Forprogrammingpurposes,atdifferentstagesoftheprogrammecycle,
thepurposeoftheFGDsvaried:duringassessment,informationgatheredwasspecifictoemergency
food,water,sanitationandshelterneeds;duringmonitoringvisits,FGDswereheldtodiscussthe
effectiveness and gaps in the programme; and regular FGDs were held to gather community
6TheSociogramisasurveytoolthataimstoquantifythelevelofresilienceexperiencedinacommunitybeforeandafteradisaster;toassessthetypesandstrengthofsocialnetworksexperiencedindividualswithinan‘everyday’contextandwithina‘crisisperiod’(Bosher2005;King2015).Bosher(2005)categorisedthetypes(formal/informal)andweightedthestrengthofrelationshipbetweentherespondentandthevariousinstitutionsandorganisationsaccessedinsideandoutsidetherespondent’svillage.
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feedbackandcomplaintsontheprogrammingservicesandassistance.Overall23groupdiscussions
were held in Assam over three visits in 2 sites, and 43 in Odisha across 10 sites. Due to the
longitudinalnatureofthestudy,multipleFGDswereheldinthesamesites;thegroupcomposition
variedsometimesbecauseparticipantswereabsentduetorelocation,migrationorbusywiththeir
livelihoodactivities.Wherewomenmemberswereinvolvedinthediscussions,effortsweremade
toorganisethegroupsintheirpreviouscohortsbasedonproximity.Itooknotesduringthemeeting,
orimmediatelyafterwards.TheFGDswerenotrecorded.
Priorityranking:Ineachstudyvillage,aftertheFGDspriorityrankingexerciseswereundertakenas
asequentialtask,inwhichtheparticipantslistedtheirimmediateandurgentneeds,prioritiesand
issues faced during recovery. The participantswere requested to list their urgent concerns and
accordimportancetoeachneedorprioritythroughconsensusandprioritysettingapproach.This
generatedconversationabouttheroleandimportanceofvarioussectorssuchashousingandland,
water, sanitation, livelihoods and health, encompassing future development and risk reduction
measures.Participantsprioritised,modifiedandrevisedtheiranswersastheimportanceofeach
sectoronthelistwasdiscussedanddebated.InAssamthisexercisewasundertakenduringmyfinal
visitinSeptember2013,andinOdisha,thiswasregularlyusedtodeterminedynamicchangesinthe
humanitarianneedsforprogramming.Asthegroupscontainedmixedgendergroups,avarietyof
needswerelistedanddifferentprioritieswerementioned.Thesedifferenceswerenotedinthefield
diary.Duetotimeconstraintsparticipantswereaskedtolistfiveimportantpriorities.Tocounter
challengesfacedbytheparticipantswhowerenotliterate,Iusedpictorialrepresentations,drawn
onthegroundshowingwatersource,toiletorhouseorland,livelihoodsorembankments.
Participatorychangeanalyses:Thechangeanalysisformatwasdevelopedbasedontheguidelines
forcontributingtochangemethodologypresentedinSection2.1(Fewetal.2013).Itlookedatthe
majorrecentdisastereventintheregionandtabulatedvariousaspectsrelatedtoWaSHfacilities
andpractices,shelter,population,livelihoodandmigrationpatterns,accesstohealthandpresence
ofvariousorganisationsandserviceproviders.Inthisresearchatimelineofthevillageprofilewas
producedbefore,duringorimmediatelyafterthedisaster,andduringrecovery.Sword-Danielsetal
(2015) facedchallengesofelicitingaccurate recall frompastmemories,whileusing timelines to
collectqualitativedata.Participatorychangeanalysestoolisusefultogatherrichdatatoexplore
retrospectivechangesinhouseholdlocation,WaSHpracticesandaccesstoWaSHfacilities.Instead
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ofdeterminingspecifictimescalessuchas10-12daysafterthedisasteror3or6monthsafterthe
disaster,thisexercisereferredtophases:
• t-1Priortothefloods–pre-disastercontext�
• t-2Emergencyphaseduringthedisaster�(approximately10days–2months)
• t-3Earlyrecoveryphaseduringthefirstassessmentvisit�(approx.2months–6months)
• t-4Longer–termrecoveryphasewhenthefloodsrecurred(approx.7months–1year)
InOdisha,thelastphasewasnotexploredbecausethefieldworklastedforsixmonthsafterthe
cyclone.
4.2.2Interviews
Thisresearchrelieduponinterviewmethodforgatheringdataandanalysis,asaneffectivetoolfor
descriptiveandanalyticalpurposes,andtosituatethedataintheirfullersocialandculturalcontext
(McCracken, 1988, p.9). Following McCracken (1988), this research adopts investigator (or
researcher) as an instrument (self as instrument) to understand the social phenomena. During
fieldwork,semi-structuredinterviewswereusedatthehouseholdlevelandwithkeyinformants.
Thisallowedforflexibilityandthediscoveryofmeaningoftheparticipants,andprovidedgreater
understandingofthehouseholds’pointofview(May1993,p.94).
Atthehouseholdlevel,relativelylessstructuredandguidedconversationswereheldtocollectrich
information,rangingfrom20minutestoanhourwiththehouseholdmembers,foracquiringrich
accountsabouttheirlivesafterthedisaster,WaSHpractices,post-disasterchangesandexperiences
duringrecovery.Anunstructuredformatwaspreferredoverastructuredsurvey/interviewformat,
withoutrecording.Thehouseswererandomlyselectedacrossseparateclusterswithinavillageto
getgeographicallydiverseperspectivesandpractices.InAssam,18householdsacrosstwovillages
werepurposivelysampledforinterviewbasedongender,ethnicity,age,andthoselivingalongthe
riverbanks, and on the embankments. In Odisha, 10 household interviews were held with
households.Sometimesatranslatorwaspresent;bothAssameseandOdialanguages–bothbeing
similartoHindi–wereeasiertograspandlearnforme.Thisallowedmetocommunicatewithout
aninterpreterortranslator.Inthebeginning,Iintroducedmyself,andthepurposeoftheinterview,
andtookverbalconsent fromtherespondent.The informalityandcasualnessof thediscussions
aidedtherespondentstofreelyexpress,confideanddiscussissuespertainingtotheirdailylives.
Someoftheissuesdiscussedincluded:howdodifferentvulnerablegroupssuchaselderly,children,
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womenanddisabledmembersaccesswatersources,theirdefecationandhandwashingpractices
andhowthesechangedpostdisasters(Annexure7).
Ontheotherhand,semi-structuredinterviewswereheldwithkeyinformants,involvingAgencyA
and local NGOs. In Assam 38 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with NGO staff and
experts, humanitarian and government officials using an interview guide (Annexure 9). Other
stakeholders–localleaders,governmentofficers,headsoflocalorganizations,andschoolteachers
–werealsointerviewed.InOdisha36interviewswereconductedwithkeyinformants.Iconducted
alltheinterviews,andvoice-recordedafterseekingtherespondent’spermissionandsignedconsent
allowingmetousetheinformationforresearchpurposes(Annexure6).Theintervieweehadthe
righttoremainanonymoussothattheycouldfreelyprovidetheirinputsandopinions,asperthe
UCLethicsguidelines.Theinterviewslastedbetween40minutesandonehourandinterviewees
wereaskedtoprovideanyfeedbackorcontributionsoraskquestionstowardstheend.Someofthe
scheduled interviews were cancelled or discontinued and held at a later date due to limited
availability of the interviewees and their time constraints. Sometimes due to time constraints,
intervieweesofferedtohaveinformalconversations,meetingsorSkype(Tableno4.5).Inall144
interviewswereconductedwithhouseholds,NGOofficials,governmentandotheractors.
Table4.5:Summaryofinterviewsacrosscasestudies
Interviews Assam OdishaHouseholdinterviews(A) 18 10InterviewswithStateAuthorities 2 2InterviewswithDistrictAuthorities 10 2InterviewswithBlockOfficials 2 1InterviewswithGramPanchayatmembers 3 5InterviewswithNGOs 14 3InterviewswithINGOsanddonors 1 7InterviewswithschoolteachersandCBOs 3 10Meetingswithconsortiamembers 2 5Real-timeevaluationfieldvisitsandworkshop 1 1Interviews–Total(B) 38 36Informalconversations(C) 10 12InterviewwithAgencyAstaff(D) 10GrandTotal(A+B+C+D) 144
The interviews were recorded and transferred on my computer. I had taken notes during the
interviewtomarkimportantthemes,andpointersifIwishedtoprobeanyparticularstrandthat
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mayhavebeenmissed.Alltheinformationabouteachinterviewwasincorporatedintothedatabase
inExcelandcodifiedtomaintain theanonymityof the interviewee.These interviewswerethen
playedbackformindmapping(Fearnley2011)(section4.4).
4.2.3Documents
Documentswere key sources of evidence in both the case studies. During the associationwith
Agency A, I had access to internal reports, and other documents generated after meetings,
discussionsandsitreps. IaccessedAgencyA’sandpartnerNGOs’records,accounts, institutional
missionstatements,annualreports,budgets,evaluationofprojectreports,minutesofmeetings,
internalmemoranda,policymanuals, case studies, institutional reports,official correspondence,
demographicmaterialandvarioussurveydataandreports,massmediareportsandpresentations,
anddescriptionsofprogrammedevelopmentandevaluation.Aseparatehard-drivewasmaintained
for systematicorganisationofdocuments collected, and formaintainingadatabase.A thematic
analyticalstrategywasusedtoreviewdocuments,assesstheusefulnessandrelevanceofdifferent
documents.Quiteoften,documentsserveassubstitutesforrecordsofactivitiesthattheresearcher
couldnotobservedirectly(Fearnley2011).Sincedocumentsareoftenwrittenatthetimeofthe
event or shortly after they tend to preserve knowledge and views at the time ofwritingwhile
informationisfreshinpeople’sminds(Fearnley2011).Thedocumentsgatheredfromorganisations
inAssam,andOdishawereclassifiedasgovernmentdocuments,NGOdocuments(separatefolders
forAgencyAandothers),andemailcommunications,journalandnewspaperarticles,publishedand
unpublished studies.Overall195 documentsweregatheredand reviewed fromAssam,and175
fromOdisha(seeAnnexure12).Newsarticlesweresearchedinlocalnewspaper’sonlinedatabases
–AssamTribune,andOrissaPostreferringtothespecificdisasterevents.
4.2.4 Participantobservationandphotographs
Thisresearchalsodependedonparticipantobservationsrecordedinmyfieldnotesandjournaland
in photographs to construct the complex realities and changes in a post-disaster context and
documentmyreflectionsoftheexperience.Participantobservationshelpedunderstandshort-term
accountofpost-disastercontextsandagencyinterventionsaimingtoproducearichunderstanding
of people’s experiences in a variety of contexts (Brockmann 2011). The observations included
changes in geographical layout,practices, facilities,displacementpatternsand campconditions.
Specificobservationsweremadeofpracticesonwatercollection,treatment,storageandusageand
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defecation. During the fieldwork, whilst actively participating in the programme I recordedmy
observations and interviews in field notes and separately recorded personal reflections in my
researcher’sjournalonadailybasis.Thispracticeallowedmetoconsolidatedailyexperiencesand
perspectivesgatheredduringdiscussions.Theobjectivewasnotjusttosimplyrecordanddescribe
eventsandactivitiesbutalsotoinitiatethefirstlevelofanalysisthroughmyreflections.Ireferred
toverbalandemailcommunications,non-verbalcuesobservedduringmeetingsandworkshops.I
maintained a daily log of activity description, location, date and time/duration, content of the
activityandinteractionsbetweenparticipants.Reflections,outcomesandfollowupactionswere
alsoincludedwhereverappropriate.InOdisha,Irecordedmyparticipantobservations,interactions
and discussions with staff, emails, daily updates, meeting minutes and reports. These proved
valuableandenrichingsourcesofdataonhowdecisionsweremade,whichwouldnotbeevident
from interviewsordiscussions. Fieldnoteswereuseful alternatives to voice recording, and rich
descriptionforphotographs.
Images and recorded videos provided an in-depth understanding of a particular programme
intervention,practicesandtopographicalchangespost-disasters.Photographicresearchmethods
havebeenappliedinmultiplewaysdependingontheroleofthephotographsintheresearchdesign,
thephilosophicalorientationoftheresearcherandroleofparticipantstocapturechanges(Rayand
Smith2012).Suchresearcher-driventoolsarearichsourceofinformationfordocumentingchanges
inthesitesovertimeinAssamandOdisha.Especiallyinerosion-affectedareasofAssam,thisproved
crucialtounderstandtheextentofdamages,populationdisplacementandrelocationchallenges.
Thesephotographswere included inadatabaseofpictures–300 inAssamand350 inOdisha–
organisedbasedonsitesanddatestaken.Inall23imagesfromAssamand18fromOdishawere
used,relevanttothenarrative(Chapters5and6).
4.3Roleofpractitionerinresearch
Dependingupontheaimoftheresearch,theparticularrolesadoptedbyresearchersvary,which
influencethedatagatheringprocess(May1993).Asapractitionerundertakingqualitativeresearch,
Iactivelyengagedingatheringdata,understandinglinkagesandidentifyingpatterns.Ialsoreferto
myexperienceofworkingasahumanitarianprofessionalasengagedinreflectivepractice.
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Beingareflectivepractitionerinvolvesreflection-in-action(thinkingwhatoneisdoingwhileoneis
doing it) and reflection-on-action (where a practitioner reviews their actions subsequently to
explainagaintheunderstandingsinlightoftheoutcomes)(Greenwood1998).Myresearchadopts
thereflecting-on-actionapproachforprofessionalexperiencesinAssamandOdisha. Iundertook
surveysinAssam,andwastheteamlead–responsiblefordecision-making–inPuri,Odisha.There
weretwomethodologyaspectsemergingasareflectivepractitioner,relatedtothefieldworkand
its impactoncommunities.Thefieldwork,asdescribedabove, includedassessmentsandregular
monitoringvisitsatmultiplesites,whichweretime-intensiveand involvedmanyresources.Asa
practitioner,toolsthathelpedgatherquickinformationtoserveprogrammedecisionswereused.
Theextentofcommunityparticipationduringtheimmediateaftermathofthedisasterwaslimited
toconsultationswithkey leaders for identifyingbeneficiariesandselectingappropriate sites for
quick distribution and installation ofWaSH facilities. Often, the demands for quick response in
variousaffectedvillageswashigh,buttherewereresourceconstraintsandpre-determinedtarget
for beneficiaries. In many cases the actual needs of households were ‘unheard’ in the initial
assessments.Theprogrammereportingrequiredcollectionofgender-disaggregateddata,thumb
impressionsofeachrecipient,undertakinghouseholddamageassessmentsurveysandabaseline
survey. Thedatagathering forprogrammeswas repetitive given thenumberofmonitoringand
donorfieldvisitstosamelocations,andaskingthesamequestionstocommunitiesrepeatedlyby
differentvisitorsledtoduplicationofinformation.
Personal factors influence professional experiences, driven by needs, preferences, perceptions,
emotionsandpowerandwithinorganisationalbeliefs(Reeves1994).Therewereexternalfactors
thatinfluencedprogrammingdecisionswithbudgetimplicationsandneededjustificationstothe
senior management and donor approvals based on project requirements, staff welfare and
communityaspirations.
“It ischallengingtoworkbeyondstaff'scomfort level, logistics'comfort levelduetohigh
temperaturesandhumidconditionsnearChilkhalake.Teammembersarespending8–12
hoursinthefieldand3-4hourstravellinginvehiclesandboats.Takingupislandvillagesis
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making the work expensive and time consuming. The shelter and PHE activities require
considerablebackupbythetransportationbudget.”7
Thisjournalentrydocumentsthechallengesfacedwhileworkinginmorethan40degreesCelsius
in Odisha. As a practitioner, I was concerned that the high temperatures affected programme
outputs, but from the perspective of the communities, this potentially affected their recovery,
accesstohealthandotherfacilitiesandgeneralwellbeing,aspectsthatwerenotdirectlyexplored
inthisresearch,orwithintheresponseprogramme.
4.3.1Biasesandethicsasresearcher
Imaintained conscientiousness in data collection through good documentation, being aware of
issues, and maintaining traceability of data gathered (de Weerd-Nederhof 2001 p.527). The
potential research biases include spatial, project, person, professional and diplomatic biases
(Chambers 1983 p.13). As a reflective practitioner, interacting with communities as an agency
employee,obviouslyinfluencesthedatagatheringandanalyticalprocess.Positioningmyselfasa
practitionerresearcher,thedatagatheredinsuchaway-immersedwithinthecontext-maintaining
objectivitywaschallenging.Thisresearchacknowledgestherewerebiasesinthedatacollectionand
analyticalstrategies,comingfromaconstructiviststance.Forinstance,myroleasapractitionerhas
influencedthedevelopmentofresearchquestions,andsettheresearchobjectivetoaddressgaps
inresilienceandrecoverytheoriesandWaSHpractice.Therearepersonalandprofessionalbiases
in framing this research beginningwith conceptual development and selection of case studies.
Representinganagencywhileundertakingfieldworkinfluencedthedatagatheredwithindividuals,
households, andcommunitymembers.Perhaps, the respondents’ andparticipants’ involvement
wereguidedbymypositionofpowerwithintheagencyinprogrammeimplementation.Thisclose
associationwiththeimplementingagencyalsoprovidedinsightsonorganisationalmechanismsin
learning,participationandintegration.Thiseventuallytookshapeofunderstandingandreflecting
onwhat external agencies can achieve in terms of behavioural changeswithin the programme
duration. As a practitioner-researcher, my analysis and understanding stems from them the
professionalandpersonalconcernsIdevelopedduringmypractice,andthroughthepartnership
withAgencyA.Inthisuniqueposition,therearebiasesofhavingincludedtheagencyprojectareas,
7Diaryentry:Puri,27thMarch2014
105
and region-specific findings. However, this stems from the research’s social constructivist
underpinnings.Thishasallowedmetoreflectonpracticeandunderstandimplicationsforconcepts,
theoriesandagencypractice.
This research acknowledges such biases and adheres to ethical principles of doing no harm to
researchparticipants,informedconsent,andprivacy(Bryman2008p.118).Itfollowedofficial(and
necessary)proceduresaspertheEthicalguidelinesattheUniversityCollegeLondonandcomplying
withtheDataProtectionAct1998ll.Providinginformation,gaininginformedconsentfromresearch
participants,andAgencyAandotherparticipatingorganisationswerestepsundertakenpriortothe
commencementofthefieldwork.Thisresearchwassensitivetotheethicalissuesofworkingina
disastersituation.Theresearchparticipantsweredisaster-affected,soeffortsweretakenthattheir
participation did not exacerbate their vulnerability or pose further difficulties (Patel 2011).
Consideringthattheparticipantshadsufferedfromlossesduetodisasters,andwereindespair,the
questionsrecalling theeventand its impactswere limitedto thenarrativesaspresentedbythe
participants.Theywerenotprobedforfurtherinformationordetailsiftheydidnotwishtodiscuss.
This informationwas gathered through secondary data and key informant interviews, to avoid
causingadditionalemotionaldistressofrelivingtheexperienceofcyclone,floods,lossesanddeaths.
Whenchildrenwereinvolvedduringfieldwork,priorpermissionwassoughtfromtheirparentsor
schoolteachers.
Since I belong to the southern part of India, and hail fromMumbai, I was an outsider female
researchingremoteareasinAssamandinOdisha.Igainedaccessthroughlocalleadersofself-help
groups,youthfacilitatorsandhealthworkers.Beingawoman,itwaseasiertobuildrapportwith
womenintheruralareas,whodiscussedfreelyaboutprivateconcernsrelatedtomenstrualhealth
andsecurityconcernsfacedwhilelivingincamps.Thecommunitymemberswerecuriousandasked
aboutmymarriedstatusandmycasteduringtheinitialrapportbuilding.Inordertoreflectupon
how this influenceddata gathering,my impressions, participants’ feedback and responseswere
oftenrecordedinmyjournal.Ifoundspeakinglocallanguagesverycomforting,whichturnedthe
interactionsveryfriendlyandengagingfortheparticipantsinalessformalmanner.Theparticipants
mighthaveconsideredmetobeactingonbehalfoftheNGO,andthat Icould influenceagency
decisions for providing community support. This has potentially influenced the participants’
responsestomyquestionsduringfieldwork.
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Thehouseholdinterviewdatawastriangulatedwithfocusgroups,andstakeholderinterviews.In
Odisha, privacy and confidentiality aspects were upheld by anonymising the agencies and
participants. In this thesis,namesare codified, and the researcher is solely responsible fordata
analysesatallstageswithoutanyinvolvementofexternalpeople.Thisisdonekeepinginmindthe
confidentialityaspectsoftheorganisation,theirworkandtheaffectedcommunitiesinvolvedinthe
project.WhenlocaltranslatorsfromtheNGOwereusedfortheprogrammepurposes,somebasic
measureswere taken to establish rapport building, taking informed consent to use the data to
informtheresponseprogrammeandresearchproject,andaddresslanguagebarriers.
In order to adhere to principles of privacy and confidentiality, this thesis anonymises the data
gatheredfromthetwocases.Giventhepracticalchallenges,thisstudyendeavouredtomaintain
ethicalconsiderations includingtheprinciplesof informedconsentandsensitivity inquestioning
peopleaffectedbydisasters, togetherwithrespect forpeople’s rights toanonymityandprivacy
(Fewetal.2013p.49).ThehumanitarianagenciesarereferredtoasAgencyA,B,C,D,E,FandCA,
AAinthenarrative.ThehouseholdintervieweeswereanonymisedasA1,A2,andsoforthinAssam
andO1,O2,O3andsoforthinOdisha.ThekeyinformantswerecategorisedandanonymisedasLA
(LocalAgencies),GO(GovernmentOfficials),PH(Publichealth),andExperts.
4.4AnalyticalStrategy
The conceptual framework and the research questions guide the analytical strategy. It was
challenging toanalysemultipleperspectivesgained throughmulti-methodsandmulti-sited case
studiesbutwasmanagedwiththehelpofacoherentandinductiveanalyticalstrategy.Thestrategy
involved prior processing and structuring of gathered data. The data analysiswas prompted by
LeCompte’s(2000)notionofassemblingajigsawpuzzle,throughinterpretationandunderstanding
ofthefragmentsandofthewholepicture.Thetaskofanalysis,whichmakesinterpretationpossible,
requiresresearchersfirsttodeterminehowtoorganisetheirdataanduseittoconstructanintact
portrait of the original phenomenon under study and to tell readers what that portraitmeans
(LeCompte2000p.147).
The data gathering produced a large data set, making analysis a long and iterative process
(McCracken1988).Therewasrichvalueoftheinformaldatagatheredfromthefield.Thefollowing
107
stepsweretakeninanalysis:maptheinterviewcontentusingmindmaps;codingandinterpreting
thedata;identifyingthemesandorganisingthedataintodifferentcategories;analysingtheinter-
relationships;andcross-siteanalysis(Miles1979).Ianalyseddocuments,reports,meetingminutes,
articles,emailrecords,observationsandreflectionswerecompiledinfieldnotestosupplementthe
dataobtainedfrominterviewsandPLAtools.Thiswasdonebycoding,usingquotationsandmemos
to record interpretation, factual information,processesandstages in recoveryprogrammesand
representingthedatainacoherentformtoanswertheresearchquestions.Intheend,therewasa
complexsetofdata,asdifferentquestionsposedtodifferentintervieweesbasedontheirroleand
areaofexpertiseeliciteddifferentresponsesalongvarioustangents.Theanalysisisiterative,and
did not directly compare the responses across different sites. The salience of the theme was
consideredrelevantandimportant,nothowmanyparticipantscontributedtoeachtheme(Sword-
Daniels2014).
4.4.1Mindmapping
Fortranscribinglonginterviewrecordings,mindmapsweredrawnforeachinterviewofphrases
andsentencesfromtherecordingundervariousthemesandthetimeswerenoted(Samplemind
map-annexure10).Mindmapsarediagrammaticrepresentationsofwords,ideasortasks,arranged
around a central theme. Mind mapping is used effectively in management and operations for
planning and problem-solving; but there is little literature on its practical and analytical use in
academic research (Fearnley 2011). Traditional procedures for data transcription are extremely
time-consuming;hencemindmapsareusedinthisresearchtomanagethedataandtorepresent
them visually formaking connections, interpreting concepts and perceptions.Whilewriting up,
importantcommentsorrelevantquoteswereelaboratedthroughcross-referencingwiththetaped
interviews.Fearnley(2011)foundthatusingmindmapsblurredtheboundarybetweentranscribing
and analysis. It is an untested technique, but she advocates its use for interpretative analysis,
requiring a workable combination of researcher creativity and accountability to the data. This
researchacknowledgesthatthemindmaprecords lessdetailthanactualtranscription;however
since Iwas involved throughout theprocessofdatacollectionandanalysis I couldestablish the
connectionsbetweenthebranches.
4.4.2Thematicanalysis
In this research, the conceptswere validated by their presence (or absence) in the interviews,
documents and observations, and through constant comparison for similarities, or differences
108
duringcoding(CorbinandStrauss1990).Codesaretags,namesorlabels;andtheprocessofcoding
involvestagging,namingandlabellingpiecesofdatatoattachmeaning,andindexingthemforeasy
retrieval(Punch2009).Usingopencodingthedatawerecategorisedwithdescriptivecodes(Corbin
and Strauss 1990). This generated categories that supported the analysis at different scales
followingthesub-researchquestions.Categoriesweregeneratedmanuallywiththehelpofmemos
andinventoriesofcodesandtheirrelationships.Memosweredevelopedtodescribeandkeeptrack
ofallcategories,andquestionsduringtheanalyticalprocess.Effortsweremadetolinkthedatato
WaSH during recovery practices, so the memos directed the analysis towards answering the
researchquestion.Similaritiesaswellascontradictionsweresoughtthatformedvariationswithin
an identified theme.Themeswere thenrelatedtooneanotherand linkedtobroaderstructural
conditionsthatformedtheirowncorecategory,orweregroupedintooverarchingcategoriesthat
formthecoreconceptsinthestudy,suchaslearning,knowledge,changesandparticipation.Finally,
extensivewriting and rewriting of ideas, themes and issues led to establishing the overarching
themes that emerged from the data, which go on to form the empirical chapters. There was
constant back and forth in narrating events and relationships, or describing the process and
interpretingthechangesemergingfromthedata.Thisshowsthatdatawereanalysedonanon-
goingbasis,todeveloptheoriesinductively(Kawulich2004).
4.4.3ContextAnalysis
Theanalyticalstrategyinvolvedunderstandingofthecontextualfactorsforbothcasestudies.This
exploredspatialandtemporalaspectsthroughcontextualanalysis,whichwashelpful toanalyse
linkagesbetweensequencesofeventsandactionsininterpretingchanges.Thecontextualanalysis
exploresthescenarioofthehouseholds’demographics,needs,accesstofacilities,andservices.This
analysisinterpretsmacro(regional,nationalandinternational)andmeso(stateanddistrict)policies
impactmicro(household,settlementandvillage)level.Datafromsecondarysourcesandprimary
datawereincorporatedintheanalysis.Thuscontextualanalysisprovidesuseful insights intothe
economicandsocio-political realitiesof thecommunitieswhilediscussing recoveryprocesses. It
allowedunderstandingofthemesandissuesemergingfromtheempiricalresearch,whichwerenot
originallypartoftheconceptualframeworkorthefocusofthisresearchinquiry.
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Chapter5:AssamCaseStudy
ThischapterpresentsempiricalevidencefromAssamtodescribetherecoveryafterthe2012floods
(Section5.1);householdWaSHpractices(usingdatafromhouseholdinterviewsandobservations)
(section5.2);communityrecoverypriorities(usingdatafromchangeanalysesandpriorityranking
exercises) (section 5.3). It reviews the data from semi-structured interviews and documents to
describelocalrecoveryinitiatives(section5.4),governmentresponse(section5.5),andresponseby
AgencyAandotherhumanitarianNGOs(section5.6).
5.1 Assamfloods2012-13
In 2012, Assam faced consecutive waves of floods from June-October due to breaches in
embankments:43breacheswerereportedontheriverBrahmaputraand14onitstributaries.The
firstwaveoffloodsaffected2.4millionpeoplein4,540villagesacross128revenuecirclesasshown
inFigure5.1.8BySeptember,newerareasweresubmergedacross2,174villagesunder77revenue
circlesin18districts,affecting20lakhpeople.9Thefloodsdisplaced543,088peopleandcaused126
deathswith19reportedmissing(ASDMA2012b).In2013thefloodsanderosionrecurred,which
affectedtherecoveryprocessesinpreviouslyflood-affectedareas(Table5.1).
Table5.1:Theconsecutiveflood-wavesin2012and2013(ASDMA2012b)
2012Floodwaves AffectedDistrictsFloods across the state(June-July2012)
Sonitpur, Nagaon,Morigaon, Lakhimpur, Dhemaji, Dhubri, Barpeta,NalbariJorhat,Golaghat,Sibsagar,Dibrugarh,Tinsukia,Kamrup
2ndand3rdwaves Morigaon,SonitpurBarpeta,Dhemaji,KamrupandSibsagar
Floods and erosion(2013)
Morigaon,Lakhimpur,Dhemaji,Sonitpur
8Administrativeunitunderthedistrict,comprisedofoneormoredevelopmentblocks9AssamTribune:NewsArticle,September272012
110
Figure5.1:Flood-affecteddistrictsin2012(AdaptedfromIFRC,2012)
111
SonitpurandMorigaonfacedseverelossesasindicatedinTable5.2(ASDMA2012a).
Table5.2:DisasterdamagesinSonitpurandMorigaondistricts(Source,ASDMA)
Impacts Sonitpur Morigaon
Affected developmentblocks
3–TezpurSadar,BiswanathandGohapur
3 – Mayang, Laharighat andBhurhanda
Totalvillagesaffected 251 322Totalareaaffected 2977.893hectares 58150hectaresLossofcropareas 15935hectares 39906hectaresTotallivestocklost 4160 400Totalpopulationaffected 2,24,579 80,000Totalcasualties 6 5Totaldisplacedpopulation 1,97,986 30,000Totalreliefcamps 120 258
Figure5.2:MapofaffectedareainBiswanath,Sonitpur(Source:NaduarCircleOffice,Sonitpur)
Highway
NaduarCircle
Embankment
Breach
KomoliaGP
BishwanathCircle
BrahmaputraSolmari
Bachadangi
112
The2012floodsinSonitpur–thefirstfloodsfor12yearsinSolmari–occurredduetoabreachin
theembankment(Figure5.2).Duringthe2012floodsinSolmari,thefloodwaveshaddevastated
theembankmentandravagedthepublicschoolbuilding. In2012,officialrecordsshowthatonly
300familieswerelivinginSolmari,whichwasreducedto80familiesin2013.10However,duringthe
assessmentinJuly2012,unofficialstatisticsindicatethat3000familiesintheneighbouringvillages
weredisplaced–1400inSolmari–duetotheembankmentbreachinSolmari.6500persons–2000
women,3250men,1250children300infantsand100elderly–werelivinginmakeshiftcamps.11In
Boramari,floodsanderosionwerearegularphenomenon:floodshadoccurredin1942,1950,1974,
and 1981, and annually from 2006-2013 after construction of the KaliaBhomora Bridge on the
Brahmaputra.BoramariwascalledasKacharigaon(campsettlement)asithosteddisplacedfamilies
fromotherflood-anderosion-affectedvillagesinAssam.Therewere1215peoplein142households
belongingtotheethniclocalcommunitiesandBengali-speakingMuslimmigrantfamilies.12InJuly
2012,AgencyAlaunchedemergencyresponseinSonitpurandMorigaonwithlocalNGOpartners
AgencyBandCintherespectivedistricts.Theinitialsupportincludeddistributionoffood,non-food
items (NFIs), and shelter and hygiene items. The WaSH support consisted of construction of
emergencylatrinesandbathingcubiclesincampareas,chlorinationofwater-sourcesandhygiene
promotionactivities.
The European Commission’s Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection Department (ECHO)
announced€2millioningrantsforearlyrecovery.Accordingly,thehumanitarianagencies–Agency
A,AgencyCAandAgencyAA–underaconsortiumforrecoveryprogrammetitled‘Humanitarian
assistance to vulnerable population affected by flood in Assam’were awarded € 900,000 for 6
months.Thisgrantwasforundertakingactivitiessuchas:installationofhandpumps;construction
offlushlatrinesandbathingcubicles;distributionofchlorinetabletsforwaterpurification;provision
ofhygieneandwomen's sanitary kits;wastemanagementvia cleaningofdrainage systemsand
healtheducationsessions.AgencyAcontinuedearlyrecoveryefforts inSolmariandBoramari in
WaSH,emergencyfoodsecurityandlivelihoods(EFSL)andshelterinterventions(Section5.6).
10Interview:GO-7,Solmari,16-09-1311Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia201212Interview:GO-8,Morigaon,19-09-13
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5.2HouseholdWaSH
Thissectionpresentstheemergingthemesfromobservationaldataand18householdinterviews
over several visits in Solmari and Boramari (highlighted in Figure 5.1). The household practices
varieddependingonlocation,prioraccessandnatureoffloods,asperthedatafromtheinterviews,
accountsofeventsandobservationaldata.Thesearedescribedunderpre-disasterWaSH(recallin
interviewsanddocuments),immediateimpactonWaSHfacilities(transectwalks,observationsand
secondary sources); WaSH situation in relief camps (FGDs with families in these camps);
improvementsinWaSHsituation;andrecurringdisastersandWaSH(observationandinterviews).
The information in each scenario is organised under water sources, collection, treatment,
defecationpractices,bathing,andhygienepractices,menstrualhygiene,schoolWaSH,rolesand
responsibilities,technologyandaccessibility.
5.2.1Pre-disasterWaSH
ThemajorityoftheruralpopulationdependedongroundwaterfordrinkinginAssam.13Solmariand
Boramari did not have public piped water supply scheme in the vil (PWSS). 14 The WaSH KAP
(Knowledge,AttitudesandPractice)baselinesurvey indicatedtubewellswereprimarilyused.15It
wasobservedthatIndiaMark2and‘Popular6’handpumpswereprominentlyused.TheIndiaMark
IIisahuman-poweredpumpdesignedtoliftwaterfromadepthoffiftymetresorless;PopularNo.
6 Pump is a lever operated suction pump for shallowwells, installed in collapsible tube wells,
designedforfamilyuse,andservingupto100persons.InSonitpur,thegovernmentinstalledTara
(directaction)handpumpsthroughsubsidiestofamiliesselectedonpre-determinedcriteriaevery
year.16TarahandpumpsaredesignedbyUNICEF,forliftingwaterfromborewellswithstaticwater
levelnotexceeding15m;theyaremorecost-effectivethanotherpumpsformediumlifts(upto15
m)andaresafefrombacteriologicalcontaminationsinceallundergroundpartsaremadeofnon-
corrosivematerialslikePVC(polyvinylchloride)orStainlessSteel.Thealternativewatersourcesfor
theruralhouseholdsincludedponds,riversandlakesforwashing,bathingandcleaning.
13Interview:INGO4,201414InterviewPH-2,January201315Document:AgencyAWaSHKAPsurvey,201316Document:Needsassessmentreport,2012
114
Image5.1:Kolshiatraditionalpotusedforwatercollectionandstorage(Image:Solmari,14-01-13)
Therewere 15 handpumps in Solmari, used for drinking and cooking purposes,whilemembers
depended on river for cleaning and bathing purposes. Primarily, women and young girls were
responsibleforwatercollection.Onanaverage,eachhouseholdrequired30 litresperdayfor6
members,forvariouspurposes.Womentravelledfor30minutesone-waytocollectwaterin3-4
roundtripsdaily.Thetraditionalpracticewastouselocalpotscalledkolshi(Image5.1),orbuckets
andjerrycanstocollectwater,andcarry2-3utensilsineachtrip.17
Thehouseholdsdidnotfollowanyparticularmethodsforwatertreatment;alum,acrystallinesalt
containing aluminium and potassium iswidely used in industry as a hardener and purifier. The
householdsusedalumtoremovesolidparticles,orboilingandstoringinearthenpotsforcooling.
Thehouseholdsabandonedhandpumpsiftherewasanychangeincolourofwaterortaste.18The
accesstoandavailabilityofwaterandsanitationfacilitieswaslimitedandtherewasnoprovision
forpipedwater supply scheme (PWSS) in their village. In Solmari,only500personsusedeither
public toilets (pit latrines,pour-flush latrines, flushingtoilets)or family toiletsandsharedfamily
toilets(pitlatrines,pour-flushlatrines,flushingtoiletsetc.).Althoughhouseholdshadconstructed
17FGD(women):Solmari,January2013&Boramari,September201318HouseholdInterview:A2,January2013
115
privatelatrineswithsubsidiesfromthegovernment,theycontinuedtodefecateintheopen.19Open
defecationwasstillcommonlypracticed,ashouseholdswerenotawareofhowtodealwiththe
faecalwaste,oncethesoakpitsfilledup.20
5.2.2ImmediateImpactofdisasteronWaSH
The flash floodswere caused by breach or overtopping of embankments; these destroyed and
damagedtheWaSHfacilitiesduetotheimpactofstrongwatercurrents.Householdsweredisplaced
andlivedneartheembankments.Therewerelimitedsafeandfunctionalhandpumpsinthevillages
in2012duetocontaminationanddestruction.HouseholdsfounditdifficulttoaccessWaSHfacilities
duringthemultiplefloodwavesin2012.AllthehandpumpswerecompletelydestroyedinSolmari
duetothefloods.21
Image5.2:Awomenusingthefloodwatersforhouseholdpurposes(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)
Thefloodscontaminatedopen,unprotectedwatersurfaceslikepondsandlakes.Existinglatrines
were covered with debris. The households used contaminated water sources without any
19Informalconversation:GO-1,Solmari18-01-1320Document:AgencyAWaSHKAPsurvey,201321Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia2012
116
treatment. 22 25-30 families depended on a single functional water source, causing extensive
groundwaterdepletion.23Therewereonly5functionalhandpumpsinthevillage.Theaveragetravel
distancesforcollectingwateronewayandbackincreasedupto1km,andtimerequiredwasalmost
60minuteson footduring floodsdue to inundationofnearestwater sources.24Womenhad to
queueforlongertimes(uptoanhour)tocollectwater.Theyaccessedthehandpumpsbywading
throughfloodwaters,orbyboatsdrivenbymen;sometimeswomenusedfloodwatersforcleaning
andwashinginstead(Image5.2).Thehouseholdshadalsolosttheirwatercollectionutensilsalong
withotherhouseholdassets.
The floods, resultantdisplacementandchallenges inaccessingWaSHfacilitiesduring floodshad
seriousconsequencesforwomen’shealthasillustratedinthefollowingexample:
MrsA1(35F)fromtheBodotribeinBoramariwaspregnantduringthe2012floods,andstayedina
changghar(houseonstilts)withherhusbandandsixchildrenduringthemonsoon.Lackoffood,
cleanwaterandadequatesleepresultedinMrsA1andhernewborn,bothsufferingfromanaemia
anddiarrhoeaafterthefloods.By2013,A1hadrecoveredherhealththroughfinancialsupportfrom
AgencyA.
“Ifellilllastyearwhenfloodshappenedandwouldhavelostmybabyduringthefloodsdue
toillhealth.Icouldnotreachthehospitalwhenbabywasill–itwasallsubmergedinwater.
Therewasnowatersupplyandpeopledefecatedinthefloodwaters.Welearnt laterthat
theseposeahugehealthriskofdiarrhoea,andourchildrenwereaffectedbecauseofthis.”
25
Oneof theriskyWaSHpractices involvedconsumptionofwater fromthecontaminatedsources
withoutpropertestingormicrobiological treatmentafterthefloods.Therewasnoprovisionfor
properdrainage,apronsorsoakpitsleadingtofurthercontaminationandstagnationasshownin
image5.3.Duringthefloods,peopletravelledbyboatsfordefecatinginfloodwaters.26MrsA3(40F),
belongingtotheBodotribe,movedtoBoramarieightyearsago,whentheirpreviousvillagewas
22Documents:AgencyAWaSHassessmentreportonAssamfloods2012-1323Document:(UnicefIndia&RedRIndia2012)July201224Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia201225HouseholdInterview:A1,Boramari(06-01-13,13-09-13)26Interview:PH–2,AgencyA29-01-13
117
engulfedbytheBrahmaputra.Whenthefloodsoccurredin2012theirhomesweresubmerged,and
thehouseholdhandpumpandlatrinewereinundated.Duringthefloodsthefamilylivedinchang
ghar for a month till the waters receded. They continued without access to food, safe water,
sanitationorbathing.MrsA3andherchildrendependedonthemeninthefamilytogoonaboat
duringthefloods–forwatercollectionanddefecation–inthefloodwaters.27
Image5.3:Watersourcesinthevillagesafterthefloodsin2012(Image:Morigaon,08-01-13)
The households had latrine facilities but did not use them, instead they continued with open
defecation.InSolmari,theassessmentsurveyindicatedthat1500adultsand500childrenpracticed
uncontrolledopendefecationduringthefloods,and3500adultspracticedcontrolleddefecation.
Afterthefloods,uncontrolledopendefecationwascommonduetonon-availabilityofpublictoilets,
andfunctionalhouseholdlatrines.28Asaresult,morethan50householdshadreportedlysuffered
from water-borne diseases like diarrhoea, vomiting, stomachaches and infections during the
floods.29MrA2(56M)afarmer inSolmarihadbuiltahousehold latrineandbathingunit,which
werecoveredwithdebris(Image5.4).Post-floods,thefamilycontinuedtodefecateintheopen,
27HouseholdInterview:A3,Boramari28Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia201229Document:(UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia2012)July2012
118
andbatheintheriverduetotheirculturalpreferences.Theyreportedfeelinguncomfortablewhile
defecatingwithinclosedspaces.Womenusedthelatrinesduringthenightorbeforesunrise.30
5.2.3WaSHfacilitiesinreliefcamps
Theflood-affectedfamilieswereevacuatedtoschoolsandcollegesinthetowns.InSolmari3000
displaced families were living in Biswanath public school, or makeshift camps on the
embankments.31These schoolswere runbydistrictadministrationasgovernmentcamps till the
floodwatersreceded.Intheschool,approximately12,000people(4500women,5000men,1200
children,and80elderly)werelivingintheclassroomsandpassageswithoutadequatearrangements
forlivingandbasicfacilities.32Thecampswerediscontinuedtoallowschoolstoresume,thefamilies
movedtomakeshiftcampsontheembankments,PWDroadsorhighgroundswithnoaccessto
drinkingwaterandsanitation.33
Inthemakeshiftcampsindividualfamilieslivedintentsbuiltwithsalvagedmaterialssuchasplastic
sheetsortarpaulins,aluminium/tinsheetsandwoodenpoles.34InSonitpur,500familieswereliving
inmakeshiftcampsonthebreachedBiswanath-Paanpurembankment(Figure5.2).Therewereonly
fivehandpumpsapproximately15-30minuteswalkingdistanceoneway.35Thesemakeshiftcamps
continueduntilOctober2012, as consecutive floodwavesaffectedSonitpur andMorigaon. The
frequent displacement, living under crowded conditions, open defecation near water sources,
consumptionofunsafewaterwithoutpropercontainers,ortreatmentposedahugerisktohealth
andledtodeteriorationoflivingconditions.36Around1000adultmembersand400childrenwere
reportedtopracticeopendefecation,while300adultsand100childrenhadaccesstoonly8-10
functionaltoilets.37
30Householdinterview:A2,18-01-1331Document:(UnicefIndia&RedRIndia2012)July201232Fieldnotes:July17th,Sonitpur,201233Document:(UnicefIndia&RedRIndia2012)July201234Fieldnotes:SonitpurJuly201235Fieldnotes:July201236Document:(UnicefIndia&RedRIndia2012)July201237Document:CommonDamageAssessmentForm–UnicefIndiaandRedRIndia2012
119
Image5.4:Householdlatrineswithtemporarywalls(Image:Sonitpur,11-07-12)
Image5.5:Waterstoragesystemarelockedinschoolreliefcamp(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)
Image5.6:Flood-affectedfamilieslivinginaschoolrunasreliefcamp(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)
120
The existing facilities in schools could not be accessed; they were locked up to prevent camp
residentsfromusingthesefacilitiesmeantforschoolstudentsandteachers(Images5.5and5.6).
“Theschoolmanagementcommitteesarelockinghandpumpsandlatrinestopreventusfromusing.
They say it is for the students there, not for the flood-affected populations.”38 Therefore, the
affectedpopulationinthecampswentforopendefecationduetolackoflatrinesinbothschools
andmakeshiftcamps.Inthemakeshiftcampsontheembankment,thelocalPanchayatandWard
members supported in relief distribution and installed handpumps for temporarywater supply
(Images5.7and5.8).
Only 10% of the flood-affected and displaced populations received some support by the local
leaders: foodgrains,plasticsheetsandmosquitonets.AgencyAconstructedemergency latrines
separateformenandwomen.InSolmari,theyinstalledfouremergencylatrines(Image5.9).Inthe
reliefphase,AgencyAwasresponsibleforoperationandmaintenanceandencouragedhousehold
memberstouselatrines.Thewomencontinuedtobatheintheopenriversandlakesandstruggled
withissuesofprivacyandsecurity.Thoselivinginthecampsbathednearthehandpumps.
TheschoolbuildinginSolmariwaswashedawayduringthefloodsin2012,andthisposedparticular
challengesinhygieneeducationandaccessforchildrentoWaSHfacilities.InBoramari,theschools
resumed once the floodwaters receded. However, the life of adolescent girls in schools was
challengingpost-floods.MsA4(12F)fromSolmari(Image5.10)founditdifficulttoliveanormallife
post-floods.Shehadmissedschoolduringthefloodsbecauseitwaswashedawayduringthe2012
floods,andinsteadwenttomakeshiftschoolwithoutanyfacilities.Forbathing,shewenttothe
riverornearbypondwithherfriends,orsister.Shewasshytobatheanddefecateintheopenas
passers-bylooked.Shefeltinsecureanduncomfortablesoshebathedwithherclotheson.39
38Fieldnotes:Campresident13-07-12,School/reliefcampvisit,Biswanathblock39Informalconversation:A4Solmari,23-09013
121
Image5.7:Makeshiftsheltersinthecampsettlementsonembankment(Image:Sonitpur,
13-07-12)
Image5.8:Installationofhandpumpsontheembankment(Image:Sonitpur,13-07-12)
Image5.9:Hygienemessagesdisplayedontheemergencylatrineneartheembankment(Image:
Solmari,05-01-13)
Image5.10:AyoungdisplacedgirlinSolmariusesmirrorgivenbyAgencyA(Image:Sonitpur,
23-09-13)
122
Womenandadolescentgirlsreportedthattheywentforopendefecation,andwerereluctantto
discussmenstrualhygiene.40Itemerged that theyusedanoldpieceofsareeoranyothercloth
during their menstruation, washing and reusing the same cloth each time. The women were
restricted during ‘those’ days andwere prohibited from enteringmain sections of the house –
kitchen,prayerroomssincetheywereconsideredimpureandpollutedduringmenstruation.The
adolescentgirlspreferredusingsanitarynapkins,butcouldnotaffordthem,andwereunawareof
disposalmechanisms.41Initially,thewomenwereunawareoftherisksassociatedwithchildren’s
faecesanddisposalmethodsduringfloods.42
5.2.4ImprovedWaSHsituation
From1-6monthsfollowingthefloods,AgencyAinterventionsrestoredaccesstosafewaterand
sanitation in Solmari and Boramari. Village volunteers were trained to repair and chlorinate
handpumps.43Communalhandpumpswereinstalledoverraisedmoundsforaccessduringfloods
(Image5.11)andpre-existinghandpumpsalongwithprovisionofconcreteaprons,constructionof
drainagechannelsandsoakpitstopreventseepage(Image5.12).44
AgencyAprovidedbucketsforcollectingandstoringwaterthroughhygienekitdistributiontoeach
household.Thebucketshadhandlesforcarrying,lidsforpreventingcontaminationduringtransport
andstorage,anddetachabletapstoreleasewater.However,thewomencomplainedofbackaches
andarmsprainswhilecarryingheavybuckets,whichtheywerenotusedto,sotheypreferredkolshi
forwatercollection,usedsareestocoveritandasafilter.45Womenalsopreferredusingearthen
pots,kettlesorpitchersforstorage.46
40FGD(women):Solmari,13-07-1241FGD:Younggirls16-01-1342FGD(Women):17-01-13,Solmari43Informalconversation:INGO-10,Morigaon,04-01-1344HouseholdInterview:A5,Solmari28-07-1345FGD:Women-RTE14-01-1346Fieldnotes:27-08-13,Solmari
123
Image5.11:Newlyinstalledhandpumponaraisedplatform(Image:Boramari,09-01-13)
Image5.12:Womenusingarehabilitatedhandpump(Image:Morigaon,13-09-13)
124
Forwatertreatment,householdsreceivedchlorinetabletstopurifywaterduringtheemergency
fromAgencyA.However,householdsinSolmarireportedreluctanceinusingthesetabletsbecause
theydislikedthechlorinetaste.Theydidnotpracticeanyotherwatertreatmentmethodexcept
boiling – expensive and difficult due to use of cooking fuel or wood, and unfavourable during
summerduetotheheat–anduseofclothfilters.Thepoorhouseholdsdidnotpurchasewater
treatmenttabletsbecausetheycouldnotaffordthewaterpurifiertabletsavailableinthemarkets.47
ItemergedthatforhouseholdsavailabilityofwaterwasimportantthanqualityofwaterinSolmari.48
Agency A installed four emergency bathing cubicles near the camps in the embankment, with
privacyscreensforsafetyandsecurityofwomen.Thewomenpreferredthesefacilitiesandfound
themsafeandsecureandusedthemregularly.49
When the populations returned to their original villages, the emergency latrines were
decommissioned,andmaterialswerehandedtothecommunitiesforreuse.50Forpromotinguseof
latrines and access during future floods, Agency A constructed a communal latrine complex on
raised platforms in Solmari and Boramari villages. In December 2012, three new latrines were
constructed inSolmariand four inBoramariusingcorrugatedgalvanised iron (CGI) sheets.User
groups(groupofmembersfromneighbouringhouseholdsthatshareagency-builtwatersourceor
latrine)wereprovidedwithcleaningmaterials–jhadoo(brooms),harpic(washingliquid),mugsand
buckets–forcommunaluseandmaintenanceoflatrines.51
5.2.5Recurringdisasters’impactonhouseholdWaSHsystemsduringrelocation
InApril2013,theconstructionofthenewembankmentisolatedSolmariontheriverside.During
the followingmonsoons, the landandassetswerewashedawaydue toerosion.Thehousehold
investmentsinhandpumps,shelter,latrinesandlivelihoodassetswerelostduetorecurringfloods
anderosionforcingall thehouseholds inSolmaritoabandontheir land,shelter,andrelocateto
safer areas. The households retained the shelter and emergency latrine materials, but WaSH
facilitieswereinadequateintherelocatedareas.ThefixedWaSHfacilitiesprovidedduringrecovery
couldnotbemovedwhile relocating,hencethenatureof floodinganderosion in2013andthe
47Informalconversation:GO4,Solmari29-09-1348HouseholdInterview:A5:Solmari28-07-1349Fieldnotes:27-08-13,Solmari50Informalconversation:INGO-10,Morigaon,04-01-1351Interview:LA6–Sonitpur,September2013
125
technologyposedachallengeforthehouseholdrecoveryandaccesstoWaSHfacilities.InSolmari
the ‘Popular 6’ (P6) handpumps were removed and reinstalled, and ‘Mark- II’ pumps were
abandoned.18familieslivingonplatforminSolmaridependedononehandpump.52Anengineer
claimed,
“ThePopular6modelismucheasiertotakeapartandmoveandreinstall,whereastheMark
2isaheaviermodelthatrequiresspecialisedtoolsandskillstoopenupandevenifyoudo,
one of the vital parts, the suction filter, is at the bottom of the casing which could be
anywherebetween100feetto300feetunderground-whichisapaintotakeout.”53
ThepoorhouseholdsinSolmariandBoramarilivingincloseproximitytotheriverwerewaryofthe
river’smovements during themonsoons. Theydependedon communal facilities or openwater
bodies,because installingprivatehandpumpswasexpensiveandentailedadditional costsevery
year for flood-protection – aprons and raised concrete platforms – without receiving damage
compensationof2012floods.54In2013,10householdsdependedon4self-builthouseholdlatrines,
abandoningthecommunal latrinemodels.Themajoritywentforopendefecationdueto lackof
adequate latrine facilities, and inability to afford private latrines.55In Boramari, the households
wereawareof risks involvedwithopendefecation. Somehouseholds in Solmari likeA6andA8
rebuilt private latrines when they relocated. They preferred household latrines to shared or
communallatrines.
52FGD:Solmari,28-08-1353Informalconversation:Expert–5(PublicHealthEngineer)54Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-1355FGD:Boramari,04-09-13
126
Image5.13:Usingnetsasawaterfilter(Image:Morigaon,14-01-13)
Image5.14:Kacchalatrinesself-builtbyhouseholds(Image:Morigaon,04-01-13)
These self-built latrines were constructed with reused plastic sheets (Image 5.14). Household
decisionsofinstallinglatrinesweremutuallyagreedbythehusbandandwife.Theprimitiveself-
built latrineswere dangerous because of the risk of falling and causing injury, and pit spillage.
Frequent displacement and losses led to impoverishment and inability to invest in household
latrines.Themembersreportedthattheydefecatedinthesugarcanefields,andavoideddefecating
nearwaterbodies.56
MrsA6(28F),fromSolmarihadjustaboutmanagedtorecoverfromlossesdueto2012floods.Her
problems were magnified when her newly built house fell on the wrong side of the new
embankment.ThefamilyhadtoabandontheirlandinSolmari,dismantletheshelterandrelocate
56FGD:Boramari,01-09-13
127
to a raisedmoundnear theembankment. She rebuilt a private latrineusing salvagedmaterials
becausesheprioritisedhouseholdlatrineanddependedoncommunalhandpumps.57
InBoramari10-15familiesreliedoncommunalhandpumps;andusedclothfilterstoremovesolid
particles(Image5.13).58MrsA7(42F),anAnganwaditeacherinBoramari,hadtorelocateherfamily
by herself as her husbandhadmigrated forwork. She invested in a household handpumpbut
continuedopendefecation.Sheconstructed raisedstorageunits topreventherdocumentsand
essentialfoodgrainsfromgettingsoakedduringfloods.Sheboiledthewaterbeforeconsumption,
forgoodhealthofherchildren.
“Itismucheasiernowtomanagemyhouseholdactivities,takecareofmychildrenandalso
fulfilworkintheAnganwadibecauseofthehandpumpIinstalledinthehousehold.Istillgo
to theopen fields fordefecationnear the sugarcaneplantations,but [am]always scared
whensomeonepassesby.”59
Forbathingthehouseholdsusedwaterfromthecommunalhandpumpsandopenwatersources
suchasponds(Image5.15).
Image5.15:Womenandchildrenbathinginponds(Image:Solmari,28-09-13)
57Householdinterview:A617-09-1358FGD:Boramari,04-09-1359HouseholdInterview:A7,Boramari04-09-13
128
Mrs A8 (39F) from Solmari had acquired land when she relocated on the safe side of the
embankmentin2013.Astherewasnoexternalsupport,theyinvestedinalatrineandhandpump.
Thecostofbamboowas500INR(roughly5GBP),plasticsheetforwallscost200INRand400INR
forthelabourers(roughly2and4GBPrespectively).Theybuiltalatrineusingthehusband’sincome
earnedasamistry(mason);theywereawareoftherisksassociatedwithopendefecationfortheir
children.ThisMrsA8believesinculcatessafehygienebehaviouramongsttheirchildrensuchashand
washingatcriticaltimes.60
Onlyahandfuloffamilieslivingnearthefloodplatformspreferredusingthecommunallatrines.In
Boramari,Muslim familiesweredeniedaccess to communal latrines andas aprotest, theyhad
damaged the door to open toilets. Therewere tensions between the indigenous tribes (Bodos,
Ahoms)andMuslim immigrants. InSolmari andBoramari, the facilitieswere lockedupbecause
publicusers left the facilitiesveryunclean leavingtheneighbouringusers tocleanandmaintain
thesefacilities.61InSeptember2013inSolmari,theneighbouringhouseshadlockedupthelatrines
topreventpublicuse(Image5.16).62
Image5.16:Lockeduplatrinesontheraisedplatform(Image:Solmari,28-08-13)
60Householdinterview:A8,Solmari,28-09-1361FGDSolmari,05-09-1362Householdinterviews:28-09-13,Solmari
129
Duetorecurringdisasters,householdsdidnotinvestinpermanentandfixedWaSHfacilities.They
investedleastamountofresourcesinrebuildingtheirhomesandforrecoveringlosses.Thisenabled
themtorelocateswiftlywhenthevillagegetsfloodedanderoded.TheresponsibilitiesforWaSH
recoveryandrelocationfelluponwomen,astheywereinvolvedinwatercollectionforhousehold
consumption, cooking and bathing children. The women-headed households in Solmari and
Boramariwereresponsibleforhouseholdrecovery.AstudycommissionedbyAgencyAfoundthat
outwardmigrationoftheyouthforincreasinghouseholdincomeresultedinlossofmanpowerin
agricultureandgenderimbalancespostfloods.63Themenandyouthmigratedforlabourworkin
Karnataka, leaving behind the women for running the households, fulfilling childcare
responsibilities,andearningadditionalincomethroughlivestockrearing,labourworkorproducing
local liquor. However, women did not take decisions on recovery investments because men
controlled the financesand remittancemoney. In Solmari,womenwere illiterateand therefore
lacked understanding of technical aspects of WaSH facilities – minor fixing and repairing of
handpumps,andaccesstolocalmobilesolutionsforlatrineconstruction.64
Theelderlygroupsprovidedenrichingperspectivesonfloodhistory,WaSHpracticesandattitudes.
In Boramari, they explained that floods in Morigaon became regular after the construction of
KaliaBhomoraBridge,Tezpur,whichalteredtherivercourseandcausedmorefloodsinMorigaon.
Thisresultedinfluctuatingfloodsallovertheplains.AnelderlymemberfromBoramaricommented,
‘Since2007,humanitarianandlocalNGOshavesupportedus–constructingraisedplatforms,
raised houses, raised handpumpsand latrines – unfortunately thesewere lost again and
againtofloods.However,theknowledgeandskillsremainswithusandweusethemonce
thefloodsareover’.65
Although PHP activities,monitoring changes and use of facilities can lead to change, sustaining
changesoverlong-termwhentherearenofloodsischallenging,unlessattitudesofthisgeneration
waschangedthroughwillingness,knowledgetransferandtechnicalsolutions.66
63Document:AgencyAPost-DisasterrecoveryNeedsAssessment,February201364Interview:LA-6,Sonitpur65Householdinterview:A9,Boramari24-09-1366FGD:elderlymembersBoramari18-10-13
130
Thefloodshadconsiderableimpactsonschools,andchildren’shealthandhygienepractices.During
FGDs with children in Solmari, they demonstrated their awareness of hygiene practices and
understandingoftheimportanceoftoilets.Sincetherewerenotoiletsavailableintheschool,they
practicedopendefecation.Inavillagemappingexercise,childrenhighlighteddefecationareasin
yellowandfloodedareasinblue,indicatingthatthesameareaswherepeopledefecatewerebeing
flooded.TheyaspiredforthenewschoolinSolmariwithmodernfacilitiesfordrinkingwater,toilets
and for playing. 67 The generational gap amongst children and elderly was evident in their
implementationof safepractices:elderly realise importancebutdonotchange theirbehaviour,
whilechildrenlearnandareeagertoadoptsafepracticesbutlackaccesstofacilities.
5.3CommunityPost-DisasterRecovery
This sectiondiscusses the changes at the community level, gatheredusingparticipatory change
analysesformats;andcommunityprioritiesusingdatafrompriorityrankingexercises(seesection
4.2.1).
5.3.1Changesatthecommunitylevel
Theflood-affectedcommunitiesinSolmaridemandedfornewembankmentforresilienceagainst
floods in January 2013.68In Solmari and Boramari new embankmentswere constructed inMay
2013, which forced all households to vacate their land as it fell on the wrong side of the
embankment.InMorigaon,theembankmenthadbreachedinthe2008floods,andagainin2012,
followed by a breach of the new embankment in 2013: the same year it was built. Thus
embankmentsfailedasflood-preventionmeasuresforthestudyvillages:thefrequentbreachesand
ad hoc manner of construction compounded community recovery by marginalising community
sections and forcing them to relocate. It also influenced agency programming strategies and
interventions,asAgencyAwithdrewitsoperationsfromSolmariwhenthenewembankmentwas
constructed.Thereweremixedreactionsfromthecommunitiesregardingtheembankments.One
oftheyouthinSolmariclaimed,
67FGD:Children,Solmari16-10-1368FGD(men):Solmari,28-01-13
131
“InmylifetimeitselfIhaveseenthreeembankmentsbeingwashedaway,don’tknowhow
manymyfatherandgrandfathershaveseen.Thelastonelastedfortwoyearsandonebefore
thatfor5years.”69
TheeldersinSolmarivillagerecollectthatmorethannineembankmentsmusthavebeenwashed
awayinthehistoryoftheregion,duetonon-maintenanceandfloods.ThelocalmasonsinSolmari
villagefelttheneedtousemoderntechnologiesusedinMajuliisland,Jorhat.Despiterequesting
thelocalPanchayatandwardmemberstolookintopermanentprotectionmeasuresintheregion,
theseissueshavenotbeenaddressed.Thereisastrongdemandforscientificprotectionmeasures
topreventdamagesanddestruction,andimportantlylossoflandduetofloodsanderosioninthe
future.70
TheMuslimsettlerswhostrugglewithlandentitlementsandrightfulsettlementsoftenoccupyand
cultivateincharareasorchaporis(unstableandtemporarylandformationsintheriver).71Thelocal
indigenoustribesandAssamesepeoplerefrainfromlivingincharareasandarenotabletocope
withthefast-pacederosionobserved inmanyareas inAssam.TheBangladeshisettlersthrive in
suchconditionsastheyhaveadaptedtothevagariesofrecurrentfloodsintheircountryandhave
developedstrategiesandmechanismstooccupytheshiftingislands.72
69Householdinterview:A10Solmari12-08-1370FGD(men):Solmari–14-10-1371Thesecharsareformedwhenafertilepatchoflandisgeneratedwithintheriverwhenlandislostinthemainvillage.InthelowerreachesoftheBrahmaputravalley,thesanddepositiontakesplaceatalargerextent.Thusthewideningoftherivermorphologyleadstothe‘chars’or‘saporis’thatarefertilegroundforfarming,grazingandsettinguptemporaryshelterswithdismallynobasicamenities.72Focusgroupdiscussions:Morigaon03-08-13
132
Image5.17:Communitybuiltaccessroadsduringrecovery(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)
Image5.18:Theaboveaccessroaddestroyedin2013floods(Image:Boramari,04-09-13)
133
Therecurringfloodsin2013ledtolandlossandpopulationdisplacementinBoramariastheriver
wasnowflowingwheretheoriginalvillageoncestood(Images5.17and5.18).73Thecommunity
groupsinBoramarirelocatedforsurvival.AnAgencyAofficialexplainedthat:
“PeopleofMorigaonareactuallyresilient,buttheirresiliencewillneverallowthemtogo
pastsubsistencelevels.Theirresilienceisaboutmobilityactually.Youhavetolookatmobility
aspectsbecausethesefamiliesarelandless,theyaremovingfromplacetoplace.[..]They
arestillabletouselandduringthewinterseasonformultiplecropping–rice,mustard,jute
andsugarcane.Peopleareresilientbecausetheyhaveadoptedmultiplestrategiestosurvive,
suchasfishery,rabicrops[..]Theirabilitytocopewithstressforverylongperiodsoftime
doeshaveaneffectontheirhealth,theirnutritionalstatus,butstilltheyareabletowithstand
thatstresswhichinmostcasescommunitiescan’tdo.74
Mobility and relocation as a strategy works for some aspects of resilience but creates specific
problemswithrespect toexpensiveandfixedWaSHfacilities.Theparticipatorychangeanalyses
aidedinunderstandinghowregulardisastersandfrequentdisplacementledtoresourcedeprivation
andpovertyovertime.Thechangesinwater,sanitation,hygienepractices,housingandlivelihoods
inSonitpurandMorigaonfrompre-disastertountilayearafterwhenthefloodsrecurredoverfour
timeperiodsarelistedbelowandsummarisedinTable5.3:
1. t-1Priortothefloods–pre-2012situation2. t-2Emergencyphaseduringtherecurringfloodsin20123. t-3Earlyrecoveryphasewhenthevisitwasundertakeninearly20134. t-4Longer-termrecoveryphasewhenthefloodsrecurredin2013
73Fieldnotes:Solmari,18-09-13andBoramari04-09-1374Interview:INGO-3,18-11-13
134
Table5.3:Changesinwaterandsanitationatcommunitylevel75
Aspects Before(t-1) Emergency(t-2) Earlyrecovery(t-3)
Recurrence(t-4)
Drinkingwatersources
Private handpumps
Openwatersources–riversorlakes
Emergency handpumps byagencies
1-3 Communal handpumps
Waterhandling(collectionandstorage)
Separate utensilskolshi forcollection andstorage
Lostallutensils Buckets providedby NGO, keepcontainerscovered
Kolshi, keepcontainerscovered
Watertreatment
Notreatment Govt mechanics andNGO volunteerschlorinated
NGO providedhalogentablets
No treatment,sometimes filter orboil
Sanitation Open defecation–SolmariPrivate latrines –Morigaon
Emergencylatrines Communallatrines
Open defecation,some use privatelatrines
Handwashingafterdefecation,before eating,feedingchildren, andcooking
Irregularly (withash afterdefecation, withwater beforeeating,notbeforefeeding orcooking)
Not done in camps,used soap after kitdistributionregularly
Somecouldaffordto buy soaps,others did notcontinue with thepractice of usingsoap, but usedash/soil
Onlywater,ashafterdefecation
Bathing Privatefacilities Riveror floodwaters,laterbathingcubicles
River River/communalhandpumps
These changes replicate the recovery patterns observed inWaSH and housing practices at the
householdlevel(Section5.2).ThedifferentialaccesstoWaSHfacilitiesdependedonlearning,social
capitalandknowledge,whichvariedacrossthegeographiclocations(inSolmariandBoramari,in
the reliefcampsormakeshift settlements,or theproximity to theriverandtheembankments).
Therewerechangesinaccesstodrinkingwatersources,andusageinthecommunitygroups.The
transitionfromprivateindividualhandpumpsbeforedisasterstousingopenwatersourcesduring
the floods tousingcommunalhandpumpsafterexternal interventionswasdocumented.During
relocation in 2013, the pre-installed facilities were either abandoned or washed away due to
erosion.Anotableshiftinpracticesemergedfromthefactthatcommunitygroupsdidnotrelyon
floodwatersoropensourcesfordrinkingduringfloods;insteadtheyreliedonfriendsorneighbours
or communal sources due to awareness of risks associatedwith consumption of contaminated
75Changeanalysesexercise:Solmari14-10-13andBoramari18-10-13
135
water.76Priortothefloods,thecommunitiesdidnotfollowanytechniquesforwatertreatment.77
FGDparticipants reported thatAgencyApromoted treatmentmeasures suchas chlorinationof
handpumps,orusingchlorinetabletsatpointofuse,butcommunitiesdidnotpracticethesedueto
concerns of taste, cost of tablets, and lack of knowledge on how to use them.78The preferred
methodswereboilingorfiltrationoruseofclothfiltersorjhalis(nets)toremovesedimentsfrom
thewater.79
In Solmari and Boramari, the communities had different attitudes towards sanitation despite
increasedknowledgeabouttherisksassociatedwithopendefecation.InSolmari,thegroupslacked
eagernesstoinstalltheirownlatrinesduetoeconomicconditions,whereasinBoramaritherewas
astrongdemandforlatrinesduringthe2013floods.80Thedifferenceinattitudesbetweenthetwo
communitiescouldbeattributedtothehazardhistory,priorNGOactivities,culturaldifferences,
collectivememoryandeconomicconstraintsduetoresource-deprivedconditions.81Withmaterial
and technical support from external agencies to improve their sanitary conditions, Agency A
reportedanincreaseinemergencyandcommunallatrineusage.82TheFGDparticipantsindicated
changesinhygienepracticesdependingonculturalattitudes,andtheaffordabilityandfeasibilityof
practices.Muslim communities observed the religious practice ofmaintaining cleanliness while
observingtheirdailyablutionsandprayers,butwerelesseagertowashhandspost-defecation.83
Since soap was unaffordable, communities washed hands with soil, or ash after defecation.
Availabilityofwaterduringdefecationwas important foranal-cleansingandwashinghandsand
feet.84
76FGD(Women):Solmari28-07-13andBoramari04-09-1377FGD:Solmari17-07-1378FGD(women):Solmari,28-09-13.79Fieldnotes:Solmari,29-07-1380Changeanalysesexercise:Solmari14-10-13andBoramari18-10-1381Interview:LA1:Boramari,AgencyB82Document:AgencyAKAPAnalysisreport,February201383HouseholdInterview:MsKhatum,Solmari,28-09-1384FGD(men):Solmari,28-01-13
136
Image5.19:IntermediatemobilesheltersconstructedbyAgencyA(Image:Solmari,15-01-13)
Image5.20:Sheltersconstructedonraisedplinth(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)
Image5.21:Self-builtextensionsfortheshelters(Image:Boramari,29-01-13)
137
The frequent displacement and relocation resulted in communities building mobile houses in
SolmariandBoramari. InSolmari100%housesweredestroyedduringthe2012floods.Although
temporaryshelterswereimmediatelysetup,intermediateshelterswereprovidedbyAgencyA–
madeof timber, jutemats, bamboo, CGI sheets (eitherprovidedbyAgencyAor salvaged from
ruins).Thisenabledfasterdismantlingwhilerelocationduringrepeatedfloods.Communitiesalso
builtchangghars(housesonstilts)forlivingduringfloods.
AgencyAbuilttheintermediatesheltersonaraisedmudplinthusinglocalmaterials(seeimages
5.19and5.20).Thehouseownersextendedthehousetoincludespaceforkitchenandcattle-shed
(see image 5.21). During the relocation after the 2013 floods, communities depended on their
neighboursandfamiliesforsupporttodismantlethesheltersandreusethematerialstorebuildin
saferareas.Thiswascheaperthanconcretehousesthatwerewashedawayduringerosion.85
5.3.2Communityprioritiesforrecovery
DuringpriorityrankingexercisesinSolmariandBoramari,thecommunitygroupscameupwiththe
followingissues(table5.4).86
Table5.4:CommunityprioritiesinSolmariandBoramari,2013
Priorityissues Solmari Boramari
1 Safeshelter Watersources,buckets2 Safelandforhousingandagriculture Foodsupply/ration3 Latrines Tarpaulinsheetsforshelter4 Adequatewatersources Latrines5 Electricity,protectionfromriver Protectionfromriveranderosion
Thepriorities reportedby theparticipants in FGDsevolved in thepost-disasterphase.Priorities
variedacrossSolmariandBoramaridependingontherecurrenceoffloods,impactoferosionand
household’seconomicmeansforrecovery. InSolmari,wherefloodsoccurredafter12years,the
communityparticipants prioritised safe shelter and protection from floods. Contrastingly in
Morigaon,where floodsoccurredannually, communityparticipantsprioritisedessential facilities
suchasdrinkingwater,foodandsanitation,duringtheexercisein2013.Thereweremixedreactions
85HouseholdInterview:A10,Solmari,28-01-1386Rankingexercise:Solmari14-10-13,Boramari18-10-13
138
regarding the protection provided by embankments in Solmari: inJanuary 2013, prior to its
construction FGD participants considered that an embankmentwould protect their homes and
villagesfromfuturefloods.However,inJuly2013theparticipantswereclearthattheembankments
hadfailedtoprotectfromfloodsandlimittheextentoferosioninthevillages.Theywereforcefully
displacedbecausetheirhousesfellonthewrongsideoftheembankmentandrecurringfloodsand
erosionhadwashedawaytheirhomesteadsandcroplands.
Thereweredifferencesintheprioritiesreportedbymen,womenandchildren.InbothSolmariand
Boramari,menprioritisedtangibleandproductiveassets–shelterandlivelihoodsandsecureland
tenure–thatcontributedtowardsasecurefuture.Womenwereconcernedaboutissuesofday-to-
day access to drinkingwater, secure sanitation facilities and personal needs such asmenstrual
hygiene and household assets. However, they prioritised household needs instead of personal
needsforrecovery.WhereaschildparticipantsinSolmariprioritisedsecureschoolbuildingbecause
after their schoolwaswashed away in the 2012 floods regular classeswere held inmake-shift
camps.Thechildrenlistedotherprioritiessuchasbookstostudy,spacestoplaysportsandgames
andurinalsandlatrinefacilitiesintheschool.InBoramari,landwassusceptibletoerosion,andland
priceswereincreasing,soparticipantslistedessentialfacilitiessupportfordrinkingwater,foodand
sanitation. Communities who suffered from floods for the first time prioritised embankment
protection and productive assets, while those suffering frequent flood and erosion prioritised
restoration of basic facilities.87Water supplywas prioritised over owning toilets, and adequate
quantityofwaterwasmoreimportantthansafewaterquality.88
Asisobvious,theagencies’understandingandprioritiesforrecoveryweredifferentfromthoseof
communities. This was based on what theyconsidered or perceived essential for achieving
community resilience to disasters. 89 For the government agencies focus was immediate relief
provision, restorationofdamaged infrastructureandfacilitiesandembankmentconstructionfor
floodprotection.For thehumanitarianagencies recoveryprogrammesconsistedofstandardised
food and non-food items distribution, livelihood support, WaSH and shelter interventions to
87FGD:Mixed,Solmari,14-10-1388FGD:Mixed,Boramari,18-10-13.89Interview:INGO-3,18-11-13
139
facilitate early recovery at household and community level. Agency A officials considered that
buildingofembankmentswillreducethefloodrisksfacedbythevillagers.
“In Sonitpur we (Agency A) had gone in for the first time because of the breach in
embankment.Thisiswhatthedistrictadministrationtoldus.Sonitpurwasnotaregularly
floodedarea.Weintervenedtherewhentherewasabreachintheembankmentandflood
after12years,sowedidahumanitarianresponse.Simultaneouslywegotassurancebythe
governmentthattheembankmentwillberepaired.Oncethebreachisfixed,thepeopleor
areathatwasaffectedbythefloodswouldmoreorlessgobacktonormalcy;becausethat
particularembankmentwasaffectedonlyduetothefloods.”90
Thedifferentperspectivesonwhatwasessentialtorecoveryimpactedtherecoveryprocessesand
community resilience. InMorigaon, the new embankment constructed in April 2013, breached
whenthefloodsrecurredinOctober2013,leadingtofurtherdisplacementofthecommunitiesdue
toerosion.Sincetheirbasicneedsforfood,watersupplyandsanitationwereunaddressedbythe
governmentandhumanitarianagencies,theFGDparticipantsprioritisedfood,WaSH, livelihoods
andsecurehousingsupport.
5.4LocalinstitutionsinAssam
In this section, the local recovery efforts are presented using data from secondary sources,
interviewsandmeetingswithlocalactors.Itemergedthatlocalschoolsandanganwadisadvocated
safe WaSH practices. 91 The provision of WaSH facilities in schools along with inculcating safe
practicesandawarenessoflatrineusage,handwashingandpersonalcleanlinessamongststudents
wasaprimaryresponsibilityofteachers.Thelocalgovernmentactorssuchaswardmembersand
GaonPanchayatPresidentwere involved inreliefprovision,damageassessment,compensation,
and provision of subsidies in housing, water and sanitation schemes. 92 The local Panchayat
supportedWaterResourcesDepartment(WRD)andDistrictRuralDevelopmentAuthority(DRDA)
forconstructionofembankmentinSonitpurandMorigaonundertheLandAcquisitionAct(1894)
90Interview:INGO-3,18-11-1391ActorMappingExercise:Solmari,16-10-13,Boramari:18-10-1392Circleoffice,underrevenueofficeismandatedwithreliefunderthedevelopmentblock.
140
andprovidedemploymentundertheMGNREGAscheme.93TheLandActhascomeundercriticism
forforciblyacquiringlandfordevelopmentpurposesandcausingdisplacementbypayingnominal
landacquisitionfeestothehouseholds(Chidambaram2015).94
Agency A recruited local community youthmembers through local NGO partners (Agency B in
Morigaon and C in Sonitpur) for the response programme. They were involved in supporting
emergency relief distribution, conducting household surveys and monitoring visits, hygiene
promotion,monitoringandsupervisingconstructionactivitiesatthevillagelevelandcommunity
mobilisation.95However,facilitatorsandNGOpartnershipsfunctionedonlyduringtheprogramme
–oncetheprogrammeendedthelocalfacilitatorsdidnotfunctionintheprojectlocations.Thelocal
capacitiesandactivitieslackedappropriateskillsforcommunitymobilisationandforadvocacywith
government for long-term solutions and disaster preparedness. 96 Similarly, the CBOs such as
Masons’Associations,WaSH committees anduser groups, disaster relief task forces and village
development committees were involved and trained only during the programme. They had no
formalised role in WaSH during recovery beyond the programme’s duration. 97 Agency A had
providedtraininginresilientconstructionpracticesforthecommunitymembers.98Thegrassroots
organisationslackedfinancialresources,technicalexpertiseandscientificsolutionstodealwiththe
localisedissuesinfund-raisingandcommunitymobilisation.99Thevillagedisasterpreparednesstask
forces(TFs)facedchallengesoffrequentdisplacement,lossoffacilitiesandinvestments,andlack
ofinputssuchasboats,seedsandlivelihoodsupport.100Thesechallengesaffectedtheirstructure
andfunctionsoncetheprogrammeended.TheCSOsinAssamengagedinlargermacro-issuesand
werenotdirectlyengagedinWaSHandchallengesofrecoveryfromrecurringfloods.
Thetypesoflocalactors,theirrolesandactivitiesandchallengesfacedbythemaresummarisedin
Table5.5.
93Informalconversation:GO1,Solmari18-01-13andInterview:GO-3,Sonitpur94Interview:INGO-10,AgencyA95Interview:PH–2,January201396Interview:LA-630-08-1397FGD(Men):Solmari,14-10-1398Informalconversation–INGO-1099Informalconversation–LA-7,Morigaon18-10-13100Interview–Expert-1,04-10-13
141
Table5.5:Localactors’responseinAssamandroleforlong-termrecovery
No Categories Type Actorsinvolved Activities Challenges1 Local
serviceproviders
Health ASHA, ANM,midwives
- Providehygieneinformationthroughleaflets- House-to-housevisitsduringimmunisation
- Limitedhumanresources- Difficultiesinoutreachactivitiesduringfloods
Educationserviceproviders
School andAnganwaditeachers
- Personal hygiene, and environmentalcleanliness
- Observe and disseminate awareness ofhandwashing,nailcutting,uselatrines
- Limitedresources- Expertise and skills for hygiene promotion duringemergencies
- Affectedbyfloods
2 Localactors Governmentbodies
Circle office, linedepartments andother relevantagencies, thePanchayat
- Reliefprovision,- Damageassessmentandcompensationwiththedistrictadministration
- Subsidies for housing, handpumps andlatrinesandLandforembankments
- Limitedroleandmandateforrecoverysolutions- Lack of coordination and guidelines for recoverybetweenlinedepartments
- Fundingdelaysforrestorationandlimitedresourcesforrecovery
Youthfacilitators
Agency–recruitedstaff
Trainedforprogrammeimplementation- ReliefdistributionandHygienepromotion,- Householdsurveysandmonitoring- ConstructionandFacilitationskills
- Limitedrolewithinprogramme- Organisedforprogrammepurposes- Timeboundpresence
3 Communitygroups
Community-BasedOrganisations
Masons’Associations,WaSHcommittees, taskforces
- TraininginDRRconstructiontechniques- Replicateinhousingpractices- Floodprotectionmeasures- Village disaster preparedness task forces(TFs)
- Lackofself-organisingcapabilitiesandresources- Difficultiesduringrelocation- Lackofpoliticalsupport inresettlement,andaccesstoservices,landownership
- Presencelimitedtoprogrammeduration
4 CivilSocietyOrganisations
All AssamStudents’ Union,Kisan MuktiSangram Samiti(Farmers’Groups)
Advocacyonissues:- Displacementbydams,- ScientificmeasuresforBrahmaputra,- Politicalandethnicmovements
- LimitedbytheirroleinrecoveryinWaSHsystems- Politicalsupportandexpertiseinrecovery- Centre-State relations determine funding anddevelopmentprogrammesinAssam
5 LocalNGOs Developmentandhumanitarian
AgencyBandCOtherNGOs
- Humanitarian objectives and reliefdistribution
- Partnershipsandnetworksforresponse
- Fundingforlonger-termrecoveryprogrammes- Expertise and mandate for WaSH and resilienceprogramming
142
5.5 GovernmentAgencies’response
5.5.1WaSHresponse
GuidedbytheAssamReliefManual(1976),thePublicHealthEngineeringDepartment(PHED)
tookthefollowingactionstopreventdiseaseoutbreaksafterfloods.101
“ThefloodsituationinAssamstartswithJuneandcontinuestillOctoberin3-4phases.
The low-lying places get submerged, and water-borne diseases spread after
floodwaters recede. We take extra precautions for drinking water restoration by
rigorousdisinfectionasperproceduresforring-wells,handpumpsinalltheaffected
villagesbyourtrainedstaff.”102
In June2012, thePHED in thedistrictsundertookdamageassessments: inSonitpur, 3345
latrines and 34 water facilities were damaged (Figure 5.3). 103 The PHED repaired 239
handpumpsanddisinfected1632SpotSourcesalongwithwatersampletestsanddistributed
26542chemicalpacketsand1,55,000halogentabletsforwaterpurification.104InMorigaon,
PHEDstationed5 tankerswithReverseOsmosis (RO) treatmentsystems formobilewater
treatment.105
101
AssamReliefManualpreparedin1976,isanintegratedplanforreliefadministrationforspeedcoordinationandeffectivecontrol102
Interview:GO-5,Morigaon18-09-13103
Meetingnotes:GO-12,Sonitpur12-07-12104
Meetingnotes:GO-12,Sonitpur12-07-12105
Interview:GO-5,Morigaon18-09-13
0
1000
2000
3000
Pipedwatersupplyservicesaffected
Drinkingwatersourcesaffected
Lowcostlatrinesaffected
Spotsourcestobe
restored
SONITPUR(TOTAL)
BISWANATH
143
Figure5.3:ImpactoffloodsonWaSHfacilities(Source:PHED,Sonitpur2012)
Howeverthesesporadicpost-disastermeasureswereinadequatetocounterrecurringfloods
and overlooked the remote villages. The development schemes were not functional: in
Solmarinosubsidieswereprovidedafterthe2012floodsforhouseholdlatrinesunderthe
TotalSanitationCampaign(TSC).106Theprogressratesinruralwatersupplyandlatrinewas
low,anddidnotfeatureintherecoveryplans.
The immediate government action focused on damage assessment, water supply and
treatment, but ignored remote areas, sanitation subsidies and damage compensation.
Governmentofficialsclaimedthatsituationwasundertheircontrolandtheywereprepared
for floods because floods are a regular phenomenon in the state. 107 The district
administrationsignoredthehumanitariansituationinthefloodedvillagesafterpeopleleft
thereliefcamps.108AssamChiefMinisterhadannouncedanexgratiaamountofINR1lakh
(roughlyGBP1000)eachtothenextofkinofthosekilledduetofloods.Thelinedepartments
submitted district-wise damage estimates and proposals to the Revenue and Disaster
Management (RDM) department. The RDM made budgetary relief and rehabilitation
allotmentsunderthestateannualplans.109
“Wegavepicturesandnamesofhousesdestroyed;governmentannouncedtheywill
giveINR15000[150GBP]foreachhousecompletelydamaged,butnoideawhenthis
willhappen.”110
Theaffectedhouseholdshadnotreceivedhouseholddamagecompensationmoneyeventwo
yearsafterthefloodsin2012.111Thehouseholddamageassessmentdataclassifiedaffected
houses as partially, severely or completely damaged (Table 5.6 and Annexure 11).112The
damages were assessed for kaccha (temporary and non-concrete) houses and pukka
(permanentandconcrete)houseseligibleformonetarycompensation.
106
Informalconversation:GO1,Solmari18-01-13107
Meeting:GO-6Governmentofficial108
Meeting:INGO-10:AgencyA18-07-12109
Interview:GO-2110
Informalconversation:GO1,Solmari18-01-13111
Meeting:GO-3–Governmentofficial–October2013112
Document:BiswanathRevenueCircleHouseholdAssessmentData(Annexure11)
144
Table5.6:MonetarycompensationtodamagedhouseholdsinSonitpur,Assam2012(Source:BiswanathCircleoffice,2012)
5.5.2Longer-termrecoverymeasures
GoA focused its long-term flood protection measures on embankment construction,
restorationandrehabilitationofinfrastructure,preparednessandmitigationinitiatives.Asa
preparednessmeasure, the PHED focused its pre-disaster efforts on training and hygiene
awarenesscampaigns.Themistrys(masons)andfieldLevelKhalashis(mechanics)weregiven
training for repairing WaSH systems, and disinfection. 113 PHED undertook rainwater-
harvesting systems in schools, PRI buildings and block offices. The hygiene awareness
programmesfocusedonchangingpeople’shabitsofwaterhandlingtopreventcontamination
ofwaterduringfloods.114Forresilienceagainstfloods,PHEDpromotesconstructionofaprons
aroundthewatersourcestopreventcontaminationthroughseepage,andproperdrainage
systemstotakeusedwaterfarfromthewatersource.115
Thereweredifferentdepartmentsandauthoritiesundertakingvariousrelatedprojectsfor
longer-termdevelopment.TheAssamStateDisasterManagementAuthority (ASDMA)was
mandatedwithpreparednessandcoordination,whiletheRevenueandDMDepartmentwas
responsibleforrecoveryandrehabilitation.Atthedistrict-level,coordinationmechanismsare
initiatedbyDistrictDisasterManagementAuthorities(DDMAs)withinlinedepartmentsand
local NGOs under district disaster management plans (DDMPs). 116 DM authorities have
113
Document–MorigaondisasterpreparednessnoteAgencyA,May2012114
Interview–GO-5,Morigaon18-09-13115
Interview–GO-5,Morigaon18-09-13116
Meeting:GO-11–Morigaon17-09-13
Damagedstructures Fullydamaged(INR) Severelydamaged(INR)
Partiallydamaged(INR)
Kacchahouses 35,000 6300 1900
Pukkahouses 15000 3200 1900
Huts 2500
Cattlesheds 1250
145
limitedauthorityandmandateforrecovery.Emphasisingpreparedness,anASDMAofficial
stated,
“Wehavetounderstandthatrelief,recoveryandrehabilitationareimportantparts,
and visible part of DM, therefore NGOs or agencies are more interested in these
becausethatisvisible.Howevertobreakthedisaster-povertycyclewehavetofocus
onpreparedness,buildingcapacities,andearlywarningsystems.”117
Floodmanagementinvolvedotherdepartmentsinthestate.Centralgovernmentassistance
of INR 744.90 crores was provided to the State Government for a Flood Management
Programmetobuild100floodandanti-erosionprojects;additionallyINR2.51croreswere
releasedin2013forfloodcontrol(GoI2013).TheWRDinAssamundertookembankmentand
floodwallsrepairandconstruction,rivertrainingandbankprotectionmeasures,anti-erosion
andtownprotectionworks,riverchannelization,drainageimprovementandsluices,raised
platforms, flood forecasting, warning and flood zoning. 118 DRDA implemented the
constructionworksundertheMG-NREGSforprovidingruralemploymentforhouseholdswith
jobcards.119
There have been state-level consultations for solutions on rivermanagement; and newer
technologiesinembankmentconstructionhavebeenproposed.Anongoingprojectfunded
by the Asian Development Bank and implemented by the Flood and River Erosion
ManagementAgencyofAssam(FREMAA)withintheWRDhasproposedriverbankprotection
through the construction of ‘geo-tube’ embankments, using textile bags to protect the
structure of the embankment from erosion. The projects face opposition from local
communities as theyhave to giveup their fertile lands, forcefully relocate toother areas
without resettlement support. Although the project claims that participatory discussions
wereheldandNGOswereengaged,thedelineationoftheembankmentwasfoundtobea
top-downmeasure,withlimited,ifany,consultationsatcommunitylevel.120Thisisthecase
eveninotherareasinAssamfacingregularerosionandfloods(LahiriandBorgohain2011;
117
Interview:GO-2118
Weblink:http://online.assam.gov.in/web/water/home119
FGD(men):Solmari18-08-13120
FGD(Men):Solmari,14-10-13
146
Dasetal.2009;Baruah2012;Hazarika2006).Theeffectivenessofembankmentswaslimited
by poor design overlooking local drainage, insufficient maintenance, failure due to river
erosion,andlimitedlocalparticipation.
Theresettlementofriverinehouseholdsisachallengeintermsofpolicydecisions,livelihoods
andlandissues.Theplainareasareflood-prone,whilehighlandsfallwithinprotectedareas
underforestcoverorareprivatelyownedascommercialteaestates.121Further,thegeneral
preferenceoftheriverinepeople,whodependontheriversforagricultureandfishingfor
subsistence,istocontinuelivingwithrisks.Anotherissueplaguingtheriverinepopulations
ofAssamisthemega-scalehydro-electricdamsproposedbycentralgovernmentintheupper
reachesoftheBrahmaputraanditstributariesintheneighbouringstateofArunachalPradesh
(Baruah 2012). There are issues related to the downstream impacts of the projects and
seismicriskduetotheconstructionof168hydro-electricprojectsontheBrahmaputraand
itstributaries(Baruah2012).Theresultantchangingnatureandintensityoffloodsisalarming
the scientists andpolicy-makersbut limitedaction isbeing taken forwantof appropriate
solutions.Further,thehumanitariansituationisaggravatedeachyearduetotherecurrence
offloods.
121Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13
147
5.6HumanitarianAgencies’responseThissectiondescribesAssamFloodResponseProgramme(AFRP)implementedbyAgencyA
withfundingfromECHO:theprogrammingprocessesandapproaches,institutionalcapacities
and consortium-based support. Agency A’s programme included WaSH, shelter and
livelihoodsimplementedovertwophases:theimmediateemergencyresponse(July2012–
September2012,3months)andtheearlyrecoveryprogramme(October2012–May2013,6
months).
5.6.1AgencyAWaSHResponseProgramme
TheWaSHinterventionsconsistedofhardware(PublicHealthEngineering:PHE)andsoftware
(PublicHealthPromotion:HP).
“[AgencyA] invests inhardwaresupporttobuildresilience–suchasstructuraland
publichealthengineeringandalsosupportssoftware.Therewedefinitelyseebenefits
from these interventions in locations where we have implemented because [post-
floods]WaSHandtheriskreductionmodelsaredirectlyrelated.122”
In the emergency phase, the PHE interventions consisted of emergency water supply,
chlorinationofwatersourcesandothertreatmentmeasures,provisionofemergencylatrines
and construction of bathing cubicles.123 Under the early recovery programme in Assam,
communalfacilitieswereinstalledonraisedmoundsforaccessduringfloods.Theseincluded
raised handpumps and separate latrine complexes for men and women. The existing
handpumps in the villageswere rehabilitatedwith concrete aprons, raised platforms and
drainage. Open water sources like wells, ponds and drains were chlorinated under the
programme,asthecommunitygroupsusedthesesourcesforvariouspurposes.AgencyAalso
undertook pond dewatering (cleaning and draining of pond water, recharged with fresh
groundwater),debriscleaning,drainageclearingandconstructioninthevillagesunderthe
WaSHprogramme.Theraisingofstructuresabovethefloodlevelswasacrucialelementfor
122
Interview:INGO-3,AgencyA,18-11-13123
Document:AgencyAAssamfloodresponse2012-13report,01-03-13
148
buildingresilienceofwatersystemsinthevillages.124Thewaterusergroupsreceivedtraining
andtoolkitsformaintenanceandrepairofhandpumps.125
“Rehabilitationandraisingthestructures,andconstructionofapronsaroundexisting
dugwells,handpumpsareundertaken [..]But thechallengesare the local context,
local practices and how PHP can effectively introduce safe hygiene behaviour
change.”126
AgencyAdidnotinvestinprovisionofraisedwatersourcesforthehighestflood-levelsdue
tolackoffinancialresourcestoundertakesuchaprojectintheerosion-proneregion,with
theriskoflosingtheinvestments.Financingofwatersupplyinruralareaswasachallenge
due to inefficiencies in the government development programmes, leaving the poor
household to bear the additional costs of raising and maintaining the water sources,
constructingraisedplatformwithaccessibility(steps)anddrainage.127Micro-creditsupport
for WaSH facilities was recommended through income-generating avenues, disaster
insuranceanddamagecompensationtoinfluencegreateruptakeofWaSHfacilities.128
The sanitation response in Assam involved a phased approach: during the emergency,
defecationareasweredemarcatedtocontrolspreadofdiseases,andseparateemergency
latrinesformenandwomenwereconstructedintheembankmentcamps.129AgencyAwas
responsibleforwastemanagementanddisposal,withminimalroleofcommunities.130Asthe
populationsreturnedtotheirhomesafterthefloods,orthepitswerefilledup,thesefacilities
weredecommissionedandmaterialswerehandedovertothecommunitiestoreuse.131The
longer-termsanitationmeasuresincludedconstructionofcommunallatrinesinthevillages
andlatrinecomplexesontheraisedfloodshelters.Additionally,usergroupswereprovided
withcleaningmaterials,solarlampsforbettersecurity,andlatrineswithpadlocksandkeys
124
Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13125Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant126
Interview:PH3AgencyAPHE127
Interview:INGO-3,AgencyA,18-11-13128
Interview:INGO-3,AgencyA,18-11-13129
Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13130
Interview:PH-3,AgencyAPHE131
Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13
149
forregularuseandmaintenance.132Thefollowingyear,whencommunitiesweredisplaced
again, the group members used primitive forms of self-built latrines using the materials
providedfortheemergencylatrinesin2012(Section5.2.5).
Forhygienepromotion,AgencyAundertookawarenesscampaignsforvillagemembers,and
trainingandcapacitybuildingforcommunitymembers,usergroupsandlocalfacilitators.PHP
efforts led to community mobilisation and increased ownership of the hardware.133 The
awareness programme provided hygiene messages on handwashing, household water
treatment,promotinguseoflatrines,safewaterandfoodhandlingpractices.Theseactivities
included understanding and assessment of existing practices, promoting and sustaining
behaviouralchanges.Thelocalhistory,powerrelations,andsocialvulnerabilitywerefactors
influencingprogrammetargetingandbeneficiaryselection.134
“Mostly the communities develop their understanding of the importance of
handwashing these days due to the exposure in urban areas through media and
advertisements;howevertheymaynotoftenpracticeastheydon’ttakeitseriously.
ThejobofthePHPteamismaketheselinkagesprominentandprovideinformationon
preventivemeasurestoaddressthespreadofdiseases.”135
For designing the hygiene messages, a WaSH KAP (knowledge, attitude and practices)
householdsurveywasundertakentoreviewthelocalcontextandexistinghygienepractices
atthehouseholdlevel.Thesurveyresultswereusedtoidentifykeyhealthrisksintheareas,
supplemented by the PHP team’s observations and participatory discussions with the
communities. 136 The risky hygiene practices were identified, and relevant messages on
maintaining safewater chain, handwashing, use of latrines, cleanliness and personal and
environmentalhygienewerecommunicatedtothecommunitiesduringhouseholdvisitsand
132Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant133Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13134Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant135Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant136Interview:INGO-3,AgencyA,18-11-13
150
campaigns.137Theendlinesurveywascomparedwiththebaselineforestablishingchanges
inhouseholdpracticesandtheeffectivenessofprogramme.138
Thehygieneprogrammingapproachesincludedtestinglocalwater-sourcesandsharingthe
resultswithcommunitymembersforunderstandingwater-sourcecontaminationlevels.The
PHPteamestablishedlinkagesbetweendiseasesatthehouseholdlevelandcontamination
results.139ThePHPactivitiesinvolvedfemalecommunitymembersthroughmother’sgroup
meetings, training foruser groupsandadolescentgirlmembers, streetplays, competitive
matches,sport-games,villagecampaignsandpromotionalevents.Thecommunicationmedia
includedposters,banners,visualcards,andpamphlets,allprintedinlocallanguages.Aninter-
villagevolleyballtournamentwasorganisedinMorigaon,whendifferenthygienemessages
onhandwashing,environmentalcleanlinesswererepeatedlyannouncedand IECmaterials
weredisplayedemphasisingkeyhygienemessages(Image5.22).140
Image5.22:BoramariwomenmembersengaginginfootballaspartofPHPcampaigntopromotekeyhygienemessages(Imagecourtesy:AgencyA,15-01-13)
137Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13138Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13139
Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant140
Documents:FinalAgencyAreportonAssamfloods2012-13
151
Theeconomicconditionofindividualhouseholdsinfluencedtheadoptionofnewpractices.It
was also essential to influence cultural attitudes towards WaSH during community
consultations and household visits for encouraging behaviour change.141Local alternative
solutions were recommended for poor households, who could not afford soap for
handwashing,touseash,soil,stone,vegetableskinorbananaleafash.Ayearafterthefloods,
communitiesexhibitedawarenessof risksofunhygienicpracticesduring floods in causing
diseasesthroughadoptionofhouseholdlatrines,usingclothfilters,andhandwashingusing
ashafterdefecation.142
PHP included interventions in the local schools andactivities involving school children for
hygienepromotion.InthemakeshiftschoolinSolmari,ahandpumpwasinstalledwithapron
anddrainagetopreventseepage.InBoramaritheschoolteacherswereengagedforhygiene
promotionandgames for improvinghygiene levelsamongstchildren.143Between2012-13
Agency A conducted 33 school-based events, in which 82 teachers and 3497 students
(primary and middle school) participated in Sonitpur and Morigaon.144 Personal hygiene
messagesincludedregularlycuttingthefingernails,washinghairandbathingeveryday.145
“Childreninruralareaswalkedbarefoot;makingfootweartoschoolscompulsorydid
notsolvetheproblembecausechildrenlosttheirchappals(slippers)inschool.Thepoor
householdswerenotabletoaffordtobuyforalltheirkids,thereforethePHPteam
advocatedwashingthefeetofthechildrenbeforetheywenttobed.Thishelpedto
preventthespreadofgermsthroughfeetduetowalkingbarefootinthefieldswhere
opendefecationwasprevalent.”146
AgencyAalsoprovided intermediateshelterto150households inAssamundertheECHO
recoveryprogramme. Its shelterprogrammehadtwocomponents:distributing tarpaulins,
141
Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant142
Interview:PH-2,AgencyAPHE143Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13144Documents:FinalAgencyAreportonAssamfloods2012-13145
Informalconversation:GO-7,29-08-13146
Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant
152
nylonropesandgroundsheetstoeachhouseholdforemergencyshelterduringthefloods;
and transitional shelterprovision to targetedhouseholds consistingof localmaterials like
bamboo,chotai(jute-mats),andj-hooks,corrugatedgalvanised iron(CGI)sheetsprocured
from local vendors.147In Solmari, 61 households and in Boramari 25 households received
intermediateshelters.148Thedesignprototypewasfinalisedaftercommunityconsultations
and technical expert guidance, to suit their cultural practices and acceptance. Resilience
features,buildinghousesonraisedplinths,wereincorporatedtopreventwaterinundation
during floods. The use of local materials and design enabled the houses to be easily
dismantled during displacement. 149 The houses were supported with plinth bands and
additionalprotectionfortheroofforstability,asAssamislocatedinZone4forearthquake
risks.150
AgencyAprovidedlimitednumbersoftransitionalshelterbytargetingmostvulnerableand
needy households based on selection criteria: poor, affected, women-headed, elderly,
disabled,andlandlesshouseholds.Howeverthisexcludedotherhouseholdswithinthesame
communitieswhohadsufferedlossesduringthefloodsbutdidnotreceivesheltersupport.
AgencyAencouragedownersofthehousestoengageintheconstructionprocess,facilitating
a owner-driven approach. This approach – including provision of locally available shelter
materials – was useful in resource-constrained environments where houses, land and
livelihoodassetswereregularlylosttodisasters.Therewerechallengesofestablishingland
ownershipandensuringlandisavailableforlandlesshouseholds.151InBoramari,displaced
housesthatdidnotpossesslandpapersweresupportedbasedonneedsandvulnerability
withapprovalsfromthegaonPanchayat.152
Underlivelihoodinterventions,AgencyAfocussedoncashtransferstofacilitateemergency
householdincome:anamountof₹6800eitherascashforwork(CFW)orasunconditional
cash transfers (UCT). The households were targeted at, using inclusive selection criteria
147
j-hooksareforsupport,attachabletoceilings,walls,concreteorflanges148
Documents:FinalAgencyAreportonAssamfloods2012-13149
Informalconversation:INGO10,04-09-13150
Document:ShelterConstructionandMonitoringSteps151
Document:ShelterConstructionandMonitoringSteps152
Document:ShelterJustificationNote–23November2012–MorigaonFieldOffice
153
definedduringcommunityconsultations.Thesecriteriaincludedpoorestandmostvulnerable
households,thoseaffectedbyfloodsanderosion,andthosesufferingfromlossoflivelihoods
and household assets, especially women-headed households and those with elderly or
disabled members. The CFW activities involved community development or flood-
rehabilitationprojects.153After communitydiscussions, activitieswereproposedbasedon
disaster risks, hazards and needs: these included repair/construction of access roads,
constructionofraisedplatformsforfloodsheltersandschoolplatforms.Thewagerateswere
kept at a lower rate than the market price and government wages on MGNREGA, to
encouragethosememberswhohadaccesstothemarketstooptoutoftheCFWproject.154
The project amenities at the village level included a work-shed for participants to rest,
drinkingwater,firstaidkit,crèches,biscuitsandtoysforthechildrenofwomenparticipants,
andurinalsfortheworkers.155Sincemorethan50%womenparticipated,theirdailyworkload
increased. Hence work-times were flexible to include women’s availability and school
timings.156
5.6.2Institutionalapproachesandcapacities
Thissub-sectionexplorestheextentofparticipationinWaSHhumanitarianprogrammesand
agencycapacitiestorespondthroughlearningapproachesandpartnerships.
AgencyA involvedtheVillageDevelopmentCommittees (VDC),comprisingvillage leaders,
elders, traditional leaders and community members, for emergency kit distribution and
immediate relief.157For the recovery phase, pre-existing villageWaSH committee (if non-
existent new committeewas constituted)were involved in latrine construction and hand
pumprehabilitation.Detailedguidelinesweremadeavailabletotheprogrammestaffthat
detailed thesocialprocessesandstep-by-stepproceduresbefore,duringandafter latrine
construction.158Duringtheinitialvillagemeeting,understandingofspecificneedsrelatedto
defecationandpotentiallatrinesites,materialsandvolunteers’availabilitywasdeveloped.159
153
Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13154
Document:RTEreport,January2013andWorkshopnotes:Guwahati155
FGD(mixed):Solmari,13-01-13156
Document:FinalAgencyAreportonAssamfloods2012-13157
Projectstaffmeeting:Morigaon06-01-13,Solmari09-01-13,158
Document:Socialprocessoflatrineconstruction,AgencyA159Interview:LA-6
154
Subsequently,thepit-latrinedesignandfunctionsweresharedwiththecommitteemembers
for finalisation based on previous flood levels and community preferences. These were
followedbyatechnicalsite-feasibilitystudyforwateravailabilityandpotentialgroundwater
contaminationdependingonthedistancefromwatersources,soilconditions,drainageand
seepageconditions,andthenumberofuserspertoilet.160AgencyA’stechnicalprojectstaff
supervised and trained the field staff, masons and local households on latrine design,
construction,useandmaintenanceofthelatrines.
For rehabilitating handpumps, thewater Committees and user groupswere consulted to
understand technological considerations for water supply facilities.161 During community
consultations, available sources, collection points and distances from settlements were
discussed.Communityparticipationenabledidentification,selectionandprioritisationofthe
handpumpsbasedonaccess, previous flood levels and thenumberofusers.162Technical
sanitarysurveysindicatedthedistanceofwatersourcesfromlatrines,theageoftubewells,
presenceofplatforms,andifwastewateriscollectingonthegroundaroundthesources.163
Thissurveydidnotincludethelocationandextentofthewastewatercollection.InSonitpur,
where theprogrammewasdiscontinuedsubsequentlydue to lackof funding, the toolkits
werehandedovertovillagecommitteesandusergroups.164
“Initiallyduringtheemergencyitwasverydifficulttoengagethecommunitiesbecause
of the frequent displacement and theneed to take swift action; onlywomenwere
availableforconsultations,themenwereawaylookingforlabourworkinthetowns.
We consulted women regarding decisions about beneficiary identification or site
selection.IntheMuslimcommunities,menwerethedecisionmakers,sotheyrevisited
andchangedthewomen’sdecisionssayingthatwomenareignorantofsuchissuesas
160
Interview:PH-2,AgencyAPHE161
Interview:PH-2,AgencyAPHE162
Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13(Tubewellsnotmorethan3-4yearsago(incaseofHandpumplessthan3-4years).163Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant164
Fieldnote–Morigaon,January2013
155
they were uneducated. This was a major reason for [a] lot of language problems
betweenthefieldstaffandthecommunities.”165
Theabovequote indicatesthatwomen’sparticipationandcommunity feedbackvaried: in
Muslimcommunities,theparticipationofwomen-folkislimitedduetothesystemofPurdah
– where women are restricted in their public movements by covering their faces. 166 In
Morigaon, because men had migrated to cities, women were responsible for household
decisions. 167 The programme relied on community consultations and was sensitive to
vulnerablehouseholds’needs,buttheirinclusionindecision-makingwasminimal.InSolmari
theshelterandlivelihoodsupportwasextendedtomentallydisabledcoupleinthevillageas
theirnameswerelistedduringcommunityconsultations.168
Theinstitutionalcapacitiesandabilitiestomonitorassessandinitiateimmediateresponse
afterdisasterswereinfluencedbyenhancedfinanceandlogisticalsystems,localpartnerships,
human resources and preparedness to respond to disasters. 169 The funds for initial
humanitariansupportwereself-generatedbyAgencyAanditsinternationalaffiliatepartners;
ECHO funded the early recovery programme for 6months. The disaster fund-raisingwas
specific for the emergency phase, and not for a longer duration. The agency had limited
capacitiesforfund-generationandlimitedresourcestoaddressunderlyingsocio-economic
vulnerabilities and household poverty, or issues related to frequent displacement and
recurringerosion.
Thelimitedfundingresultedinastreamlinedprogramme,whichincludedtheneediestand
marginalisedgroups.170Thepre-positionedcontingencystockswere immediatelydeployed
totheaffectedareas,andwerereplenishedwithdonormoney.171
165Interview:LA-6,AgencyB166
FGD(mixed):Solmari,13-01-13167
Interview–Expert-214-11-13168
FGDSolmariandBachadangi05-09-13169
Interview:INGO-9170
Interview:PH2171Informalconversation:INGO10,04-01-13
156
“Sonitpurwasatemporaryintervention–anassessmentpost-reliefphasewascarried
out based on which a joint proposal was submitted to DIPECHO [ECHO’s Disaster
Preparedness funding] proposal along with [Agency AA] and [Agency CA]. As the
proposalwasrejected, thework inSonitpurwasdiscontinueddueto lackofsecure
funds.”172
Thelocalpartnershipsdependeduponthelocalagency’sinterestsandcapacities,aswellas
its familiarity with local context and humanitarian background. 173 In Morigaon, partner
AgencyBhaddevelopeda localpresenceandadvocacywithgovernment foradoptionof
raised latrine models and advocated for safer land for the displaced communities.
ContrastinglyinSonitpur,partnerAgencyChadlimitedexperienceandmandateforworking
inemergencies.174As theprogrammedependedondonor funding timelines, it adopteda
non-interventionistapproachduringtherecurringfloodsin2013duetolackoffunding.The
programmewasdiscontinuedfromSonitpurandinMorigaontheon-goingDRRprogramme
wasimplementedthroughpartneragencyB.175
The programme implementation involved consultants, partner staff or fresh recruits. The
knowledgeretentiondependedontheinvolvementofthecorestaffduringtheprogramme
implementation, but there was high staff turnover in the organisation, which affected
institutionalmemory.Theteammembersrequiredtrainingongendersensitisation,logistics
andfinancialsystems,andsector-specificexpertise.176
“With response each year, the same set of consultants are part of the team, this
increasesfamiliarityandwaysofworkingawareness.Basicorientationisneededon
howtomanagefloat[cashusedfordaily/weeklyofficeandprogrammeexpenses],
maintainrecords,systemsandapprovalsetc.”177
The organisational learningmechanisms, lessons learnt and documentation captured the
172
Interview:INGO-3,18-11-13173Interview:LA-2,AgencyC174Interview:LA-5,AgencyB175Informalconversation:INGO11,04-02-14176Interview:PH-1,AgencyAPHPconsultant177Interview:PH-2,AgencyAPHE
157
emergency and recovery operations and influenced organisational learning, preparedness
andinstitutionalcapacitiestorespondtodisasterseffectively.178Duringreal-timeevaluations
(RTEs)intheprogramme,externalevaluatorsprovidedobjectivefeedbackontheprogramme
basedoncertainglobalbenchmarks.179AgencyAwasevaluatedagainstthesebenchmarksto
provide quick fix solutions, short-term gains and longer-term challenges. 180 Agency A
implementedRTErecommendationssuchasprovisionofsolarlampstoeveryhouseholdto
provide women’s safety and security in the dark. However the RTEs failed to capture
underlyingchallenges:whatsolutionswereimplementedinWaSH,howeffectiveanduseful
theywere,andhowthesesolutionssustainedovertheyears.
There were other challenges in documenting the programme experiences and lessons,
especiallyinWaSH:
“Oneofthechallengeisweakdocumentationmechanisms,anddocumentationrarely
goesbeyondthedonorrequirementsandreportingguidelines.InWaSHparticularly
therearealotofprocessesandstandardsadoptedininterventions.Whileworkingin
emergenciesquickimpactssolutionsarereadilyimplemented,whichmayhavelimited
longtermviabilitybutthesedecisionsarenotcapturedatall.”181
5.6.3Consortium-basedandcollaborativeefforts
The EuropeanUnion provided EUR 2,000,000 for humanitarian assistance to over 80,000
flood victims in Assam for a maximum duration of 6 months (ECHO 2012). Agency A
participated under a consortium headed by Agency AA with Agency CA under the
‘HumanitarianassistancetovulnerablepopulationsaffectedbyfloodsinAssam’programme.
Inthisstudy,theparticipatingmembers:AgencyAA,andCAwereinterviewedtounderstand
the experiences of working in a consortium, each with different expertise and strengths
178
Interview:INGO-1AgencyA179
Document:AgencyA:RTEBenchmarks.180
Fieldnotes:RTEworkshop,22ndFebruary2014,Puri,Odisha:TheRTEbenchmarksincluded:Speedandtimelinessoftheresponsebetterinrelationtootheractors,withconsiderationofemergencypreparednessmeasuresinplace;qualityandscaleappropriatetothecontextandcapacity,andisvaluedbytheaffectedpopulation;Effectivemanagementstructuretoprovideclarityandwell-communicateddecision-makinganddirection(includingpartners)andisappropriatelyaccountabletotheaffectedpopulation;keysupportfunctionsaresufficientlyresourcedandbeingeffectivelyrun.Risksthatarebeingtakenarebeingcalculatedanddocumented;internal(agencyaffiliates’)relationshipsareproductiveandwell-coordinated;considerations of the longer term implications and connectedness; campaigning, advocacy, media and popularcommunications,oracombinationofthesetools,appropriateforthecontextareexecutedeffectively.181
Interview:LA-2,AgencyC
158
leading specific sectors andworkingunder commonobjectives. The consortiumapproach
enabledawidercoverage,andfundingsupport.182
Thevariedcontextswithinthestatemeantagencieshadtotakedifferentapproacheswithin
theprogramme.For instanceinMishingcommunities inUpperAssamwherehouseswere
built on stilts, Agency CA and partners constructed chang ghars;while in Morigaon the
structureshadtobemobileforeasydismantlingduringfloodsanderosion.SimilarlyinWaSH,
Agency AA built raised handpumps on concrete platforms above previous flood levels to
preventinundationduringfloods,andensurecontinuousaccesstosafewater(Image5.23).
AgencyAdidnotconstructraisedhandpumpsbecauseitlocalcommunitiescouldaccessthe
raisedstructuresduringfloodsonlywiththehelpofboats,andtherewasriskoflosingthe
investments in raising WaSH facilities due to erosion. Within consortia the agencies
exchanged ideas, and mutual learning formed the basis for different strategies in
implementation.Howevertheconsortiumwaslimitedtotheprogrammeduration,anddid
notfunctionbeyondthedonorprovisions.Thereweredelaysindecision-making,ingaining
consensusasagencieshaddifferentwaysofworking.
Image5.23:RaisedhandpumpbyAgencyAA(Image:Sonitpur,17-01-13)
182
Interview:INGO-4
159
There were other forms of collaborative efforts in Assam including Inter Agency Groups
(IAGs),informaldistrictnetworksandcoordinationmechanismsthatwereactiveduringthe
monsoonseason,butdidnotextendintorecoveryefforts.183
5.7ChapterSummaryThis chapter describes post-disaster changes inWaSHpractices, availability and access to
WaSH facilities, and use of technologies in WaSH during recovery. Under learning and
knowledge pathways for resilience, the data showresultant hygiene behavioural changes
triggeredbysocialadexperientiallearning.TheWaSHpracticesevolvedbasedonmotivation,
learningfromeachotherandfromthehumanitarianagenciesandfromtheexperiencesof
recurringfloodsanderosion.Duetolackofknowledgeathouseholdandcommunitylevel,
themobilityandrelocationasacopingstrategyworkedforsomeaspectsofresiliencebut
posed challenges formoving fixedWaSH technologies during displacement. The study of
institutionalpathwaysshoweddifferentrecoveryprioritiesandperspectivesforgovernment
and humanitarian agencies. The government undertook relief measures as pernational
guidelines. It followedstatepoliciesfordisastermanagementandcontinueddevelopment
assistance through existing schemes – water supply, sanitation, housing, and rural
employment.The long-termpowergenerationprojectscontinuedthroughconstructionof
damsinupstreamBrahmaputra.Inparticipationasapathwayforresilience,therewaslimited
participation in the government decision-making. The local government undertook
embankment construction with nominal community participation. On the other hand,
humanitarianagenciesencouragedsmallnumbers fromthecommunities toparticipate in
standardrecoveryinterventions-buildinghouses,cashforwork-withoutaddressingroot
causes of vulnerability. Agencies provided communal WaSH services, which were not
equitablyaccessedbythemarginalisedsectionsofthecommunitiesinSolmari.Intermsof
integration as a pathway, humanitarian agencies ceased their programme in the affected
communities, handing over the longer-term recovery needs as the responsibility of the
government.Toachievesectoralintegration,AgencyAcoordinatedeffortsinWaSH,cashfor
workandshelterprojectsthroughvillage-levelcommunities.
183
Interview:INGO–5,02-10-2013
160
Chapter6:OdishaCaseStudy
ThischapterdescribesCyclonePhailinandsubsequentfloods(Section6.1);WaSHpractices
atthehouseholdlevel(usingdatafromPLAtools,householdinterviewsandobservations)
(section6.2);andcommunitychangesandprioritiesduringrecovery(usingdatafromchange
analysesandpriorityrankingexercises)(section6.3). Itreviewssemi-structuredinterviews
anddocumentstodescribethelocalrecoveryinitiatives(section6.4),governmentresponse
(section6.5),andtheresponsesbyAgencyAandotherhumanitarianNGOs(section6.6).
6.1CyclonePhailinandfloods,2013CyclonePhailin,categorisedasVerySevereCyclonicStorm,madeitslandfallinOdishaon12th
October2013,andaffectedGanjam,andPuri;subsequentfloodshitBalasore(IMD2013).
ThisresearchfocusesonPuriandBalasore(Figure6.1)
161
Figure6.1:MapindicatingaffecteddistrictsinOdishabycyclonePhailinandfloodsand
AgencyAinterventionareasin2013-14(AdaptedfromMapAction,28October2013)
162
The cyclone killed 44 people, damaged 256,633 homes and affected 13.2million people
(WorldBank2013). InPuri,KrushnaPrasad,BrahmagiriandKanasblockswereaffected.184
The cyclone resulted inheavy rains causing the riversBaitarani, Budhabalanga,Rusikulya,
Subarnarekhaand Jalaka tooverflowand cause floods inMayurbhanj, Balasore,Bhadrak,
Keonjhar,JajpurandGanjam.Thefloodsaffected1.2crorepeoplein16000villagesand2015
grampanchayats.InBalasore,Basta,Baliapal,BhograiandJaleshwarblockswereaffected.185
6.1.1Timelineofevents
Accurate weather forecasting, effective planning, and the dedication showed by the
administrativemachineryensuredalmost‘zerocasualty’duringthecyclone(Dash2013).The
government,humanitarianandcommunityagenciesmobilisedevacuation,earlysearchand
rescueteamsandcoordinationeffortsimmediately(Table6.1).Internationaldonors–UKAID,
ECHO,WorldBank (WB)andAsianDevelopmentBank (ADB)providedfinancialsupport in
responsetothedisaster.UKAIDprovided£2mthroughitsRapidResponseFacility(RRF)for
respondingto the immediatehumanitarianneeds for implementation from1stNovember
2013for12weeks(UKAID2013).TheEuropeanCommissionprovided€3milliontoprovide
assistancetocyclone-affectedpopulations(ECHO2013).
Table6.1:TimelineofeventsinOdisha,October2013-March2014(Source:AgencyA)
Date TimelineofeventsinOdisha09/10/2013 Cyclone Phailin warning circulated and processes of evacuation, communication
initiated11/10/2013 CyclonepreparednessmeasuresinitiatedbyGoO
12/10/2013 CyclonePhailinmadelandfallatGopalpur,Ganjamonthenightof12thOctober2013;GoogleCrisisResponseteambeganrespondingbyprovidingadisasteroneboxtousersinIndiawiththedetailsfromthenationalweatheragency,theIMD;astheofficialIMDwebsitecrashes
14/10/2013 ReportsoffloodsinBalasore,Mayurbhanjdistricts
15/10/2013 AgencyAvisitsBalasoreforNeedsAssessmentafterfloods;ECHOAssessmentmissionto Ganjam, Puri and Balasore (15 – 18 Oct); Agency E seeks support from districtauthoritiesforreliefandfoodtobedistributedtoflood-affectedfamiliesinBalasore.
19/10/2013 FooddistributioninSanpatana,PuriandGanjam,andcommunitykitchensbyAgencyEinBalasore;UKAID-assessmentmissioninGanjam-Puri–Balasore
21/10/2013 ForecastofheavyrainfallincycloneandfloodaffectedvillagesinOdisha
184
Meeting:Emergencyofficer,Puri24-10-13185
OrissapostNewsarticle15-10-2013Twindisasters
163
26/10/2013 UKAIDRRFactivationandcallforproposalsmeetinganddecisiontoformconsortia
27/10/2013 FieldvisittoBrahmapurandKhirisahiislands,duringheavyrainsandinundatedareasinlow-lyingpartsoftheislandsbytheauthor
27/10/2013 Arakhakudafooddistribution
28/10/2013 TrainingofDRRhandpumptechniciansforchlorinationandhandpumprepairinPuri- facilitated by Agency D; UK AID RRF proposal submitted by the consortia led byAgencyCA,whereAgencyAwastheLogisticslead
29/10/2013 First meeting of successful consortium members in Bhubhaneshwar win theapplication for GBP 1 million for 14100 households which was revised to 16170households
31/10/2013–7/11/2013
Islamic Relief food distribution in Puri villages – Pirosahi, Padanpur, Arakhakuda,BrahmapurandKhirisahi(andothers)
10/11/2013 48hourLivelihoodassessmentToolkittraining
12/11/2013 NFIkitdistributionstartedinSanpatana,Puri
15/11/2013 ConsortiummemberssubmitproposalforECHOprogramme14/11/2013-24/11/13
HumanitarianServicesSupportProfessionalfromGB(WaSH)visittoOdisha
24/11/2013 Director Programme and Advocacy and Regional Manager visit Arakhakuda,Sanapatna,Puri
3-4/12/2013 ECHOProjectreviewandplanningmeetinginBBSR-PuriandGanjam
6/12/2013 Ambassador to India from EuropeanUnionwith EU officials, Ambassador to India,CzechRepublic,AmbassadorofHungarytoIndia,ECHO-CommunicationandVisibilityvisitSanpatnainPuridistrict
8/12/2013 GopinathpurinlandvillagesreceivefirstUKAIDkits
25/12/2013 Firstcashdistribution-CFWandUCTbyAgencyAinPuri
15/01/2014 LivelihoodssupporttofarmersinPuri-distributionofseedsandseedlingsbyAgencyA
23/01/2014 CompletionofUKAIDsupportedNFIdistributionbyAgencyA
28/01/2014
UKAIDHighCommissionermeeting forUKAIDconsortiummembers;Orientation -Village Representatives, WaSH Team and Volunteers on Community Based WaterPurification(Puri)
4-10/02/2014 Inter-agencyneedsassessmentwithconsortiamembersinworstaffectednon-priorityGramPanchayatsinOdisha-PuriandGanjam(Sphere/ECHO/Consortium)
6/02/2014 GenderassessmentinPuribyAgencyA
5&6/02/2014 ConsortiumShelterTOTinGanjam8&9/02/2014 ConsortiumGenderinEmergencytraining
11-22/02/2014 Real-timeevaluationbyAgencyA
3-8/03/2014 BalasoreUKAID,ECHOMonitoringvisitandresearchfieldpreparationvisit.
8/03/2014 NovibDonorvisit,Sanpatna
164
Thesupportprovidedbygovernmentagenciesandhumanitarianactorsvariedaccordingto
prioritisation of villages and households affected by cyclones, floods and erosion. The
government provided 50 kg of rice, tarpaulin and INR 500 cash (50 GBP) to each of the
householdsincyclone-hitPuri,whiletheflood-affectedhouseholdsinBalasorereceived25
kgriceandINR250(25GBP).ThereweredisparitiesinAgencyA’shumanitarianresponsein
Odisha,dependingondonor funding. Theaffected villagesweredifferentiatedasper the
donors–UKAID,non-UKAIDandECHO(forrecovery)–forthedistributionofkititems,the
itemsreceivedundereachdonor,thetimeofdistribution,andrecoverysupport.Themost
affectedvillageswereprioritisedforimmediatekitdistribution,whichincludedsomeofthe
itemsshowninFigure6.2,andrecoverysupport.186Otheraffectedvillages–Gopinathpur,
BrahmapurandKhirisahi–receivedcompletepackageundertheUKAIDprojectinDecember
2013 (Figure 6.2).187The water filters and kitchen sets were targeted at women-headed
households,andwerenotprovidedtoallhouseholds.
Figure6.2HouseholdkititemsandquantityofNFIkitsprovidedbyAgencyA
186
Document:Muster rolls distribution dates Sanpatna (12/11/2013& 14/11/13), Arakhakuda (15/11/2013), Padanpur(13/11/2013),Pirosahi(14/11/2013)187
Document–AgencyAListofprojectvillages–December2013
Sl no Item Qty (number)
1 Plastic Bucket with lid - 14 Litre capacity 2
2 Plastic Mug, 1 Litre capacity 1
3 Household water filter 1
4 Fleece Blanket 200 x 200 cm 2
5
Utensils Kit- Steel Plate 4 Pcs, Steel Glass-Size-250 Ml-2 Pcs, Steel Serving Spoon - 2 Pcs, Cooking Spoon-(1) Ladle-85 Gms and (2), Almunium Kadai-2 Liter Capacity- 1 Pcs, Almunium Dekchi with Lid-7 Liter capacity, 1 Pcs, Steel Bowls-Weight each 50 Gms- 4Pcs
1 Set
6HDPE Tarpaulins, SIZE 12 X 18 Feet and 180 GSM 1
7HDPE Ground sheet 140 GSM, size 12 X 9 Feet 1
8 Nylon Rope - 6 mm thickness with length 15 meters 1
9Solar Lantern with Solar Charger, Multiple mobile charger, AC Adaptor with Battery 1
10 Bathing Soap:120 gms: Brand Medimix 8 numbers
11 Detergent cake- 100 Gms -Brand or Wheel 8 numbers
12NADCC Tablets (Brand Aquatabs .67 mg for 14 lt water storage container) 6 Strips of 10 Tabs
each
13Sanitary Cloth (4 meters of cloth-Width-40 inch with Suede Bag and with 2 meters cotton rope) 1 Pcs
14 ORS Brand-S&P- 1 litre sachet-contains 21.50 Gms 5 Pcs
15 Steel Nail cutter-Medium Size-Only for Nail cutting-Length-7 Cm 1 Pcs
16 Plastic Comb-12 Inches-Unisex 1 Pcs
17 Savlon (anti septic and Disinfectant) 100 ML 1 bottle
18 Cotton swab- 100 gms -Sterilized 1 Pcs
19 Soap case / Container for 120 Gm Soap 1 Pcs
Emergency Non- Food Assistance to Cyclone Phailin and Flood Affected Communities in Odisha (2013-14)
List of Non Food Items (NFI) Per Household
165
6.2HouseholdWaSHCyclonePhailinandthesubsequentfloodsaffectedhouseholdassetsandWaSHfacilities.This
section presents data on household impacts,WaSH damages and hygiene practices from
householdinterviews,PLAtoolsandFGDs.Thedataareorganisedintopre-disaster,during
disasterandimprovedWaSHcontextwithinthe10studyvillagesinPuriandBalasore.This
sectiondescribes–pre-disasterWaSH(interviewsandFGDs), immediate impactonWaSH
facilities (transectwalks,andobservations); theWaSHsituation in reliefcamps (FGDsand
interviews),andimprovementsintheWaSHsituation.Therecurringthemesincludeaccess
towater sources and sanitation facilities, use andmaintenanceof facilities,waterquality
measures athousehold level, roles and responsibilities, and changes inhygienepractices.
AgencyAclassifiedvillages forprogrammingascoastal, inlandand islanddependingupon
theirgeographicalcharacteristics.188
MenandyouthinOdishamigrateforworktoKerala,KarnatakaandTamilNadu–Purihasa
27%householdmigration rate (Sharmaetal2014).Odishavillagesarecharacterisedbya
complex interplay of caste, class and gendermediated by the circumstances emerging in
multipledisasters(Ray-Bennett2009p.18).Themajorityofcoastalandislandpopulationare
engagedinfishingoralliedactivitiesandbelongtotheNoliyacommunitywhohadmigrated
fromAndhraPradesh(Mohantyetal.,n.d). InSanpatna,95%ofthepopulationcomprises
Beheras.189TheBisois (2%),thepoorest fishinggroups, liveon islandsandsandbars inthe
ChilkhaLake,withoutproperaccesstoWaSH,healthandeducationfacilities.190Intheinland
villages, the households depend on dry fruit cultivation and daily wages labour (DWL).
Padanpur consists of landless labourers who depend on big farmers, landowners and
fishermenforincome.
Thesesocio-economicfactors(table6.2)influenceaccesstoWaSHfacilitiesinthevillages.
188
Meeting:RTEteamDebrief–11-02-14189
ThestatisticalinformationoffamilytitleswereinferredfromAgencyAdistributionrecords(musterrolls)190
Fooddistribution–7-11-13,Arakhakuda
166
Table6.2:TypologyofstudyvillagesinPuriandBalasore(Source:AgencyA,2014)
Typology GramPanch Village NoofHHs Watersources Profile
PuriDistrictCoastal Arakhakuda Sanpatana 300 13handpumps,3wells,1
pondFishing
Arakhakuda 1250 558handpumps,3wells FishingIsland Brahmapur Brahmapur 500 5handpumps,1pond Traders
Khirisahi 300 26handpumps,1pond FishingInland Manika Padanpur 25 3handpumps Landless
labourersArakhakuda Pirosahi 70(Muslim) 16 handpumps, 1 open
wellLabourers
Arakhakuda Sahadevpur 25 25handpumps,1well FarmersArakhakuda Gopinathpur 310 37 handpumps, 1 well
and1pondLabourers
BalasoreDistrictRiverine Basta Chadanamkhana 28 25handpumps,1well Erosion
andfloods
Raghunathpur Gombhoria 45 Public piped watersupply,1handpumpand1pond
Floods
6.2.1Pre-disasterWaSH
The ruralpopulation inPuriandBalasoredependongroundwater sources for theirdaily
householdpurposes.191InBalasore,itemergedthatriverandpondswereprimarysourcesof
waterand10%ofthepopulationhadaccesstotubewells.192AKAPbaselinesurveyindicated
that77%ofrespondentsusedtubewells,18%dependedondugwells,4%onpublicwater
supplyand1%onrivers,pondsandotheropenwatersources.193Governmentprovided58%
ofthesources;therestwereprivateandcommunalsources.
In Puri, artesian wells were common and traditionally used. 194 These are considered
unsustainable by the humanitarian agencies – the unregulated water-flow exhausts the
191
Interview:LA-8andInterview–PH-3192
Informalconversation–LA-13193
Document:KAPreportFebruary2014194
Anartesianwell issimplyawellthatdoesn’trequireapumptobringwatertothesurface;thisoccurswhenthere isenoughpressureintheaquifer.Thepressureforcesthewatertothesurfacewithoutanysortofassistance.
167
groundwater sourceandwasteswater (Image6.1).195Therewere raisedwater sources in
Puri,constructedunderthefloodrehabilitationproject in2001bytheOrissaStateBranch
(OSB)oftheIndianRedCrossSociety(IRCS)(IFRC2002).Therewereothersconstructedafter
the1999supercyclonebySpanishRedCross(seeImage6.2).However,thesefacilitieswere
notmaintained:image6.3showsawellwithoutcovertopreventdustanddebrisfromfalling
intothewatersource.TheKAPreportsuggeststherewereaccessissuesinPuri–79%ofthe
respondents reported30minutesqueuing time, and5%of the respondents claimed they
waitedforanhourtocollectwater.196
Image6.1:Artesianwells,withnon-stopwaterflow(Image:Brahmapur,27-02-14)
195
Informalconversation:LA-14196
KAPsurveyindicatesdatafromPuriandGanjamandexcludesBalasore.
168
Image6.2:Pre-existingtubewellbuiltunderSpanishRedCrossprojectasapreparednessmeasureafterthe1999supercyclone(Image:Pirosahi,08-11-13)
Image6.3:Pre-existingopenwellbyPanchayat(Image:Gopinathpur,28-10-13)
169
Image6.4:Deterioratingconditionsofthewaterpumpsintheislandvillage(Image:Khirisahi,27-10-13)
Theexistingstructuresweresusceptible todisastersdue to lackof repairormaintenance
(Image6.4).Thefacilitieshaddeterioratedovertheyearsduetolackofregularmaintenance,
resultingincracksthatledtogroundwatercontamination.Anexpertengineer,whoobserved
communitypracticesandtheimpactofthecycloneonWaSHfacilitiesinPuriduringhisvisit
toSanpatnaandBrahmapur,noted,
“Manypeoplerelyondrinkingwatertakenfromopenwellsorpartiallyopenwells.Thevery nature of these types of water supply means they are susceptible tocontaminationeitherfromthewellbecominginundatedduringafloodorfromdebrisbeingblownintothewellduringastorm.Oftentheapronaroundopenwellsisnottotallyeffective,increasingtheriskofwaterinthewellbecomingpollutedwhenthereisstandingwateraroundthewellhead.Theresultisthatthewaterqualityinpoorlymaintainedopenwellsdeterioratesduetoacyclone.”197
InOdisha,opendefecationwasrampant:only15percentofhouseholdsinOdishahadaccess
toimprovedsanitation.198TheKAPreportstatedthat58%oftherespondentsdefecatedin
197
Document:AgencyA-CommentsontheJointassessmentreport,forWaSHsector-PostPhailinResponse(22-11-13)198
Document:AgencyA,CommentsontheJointassessmentreport,forWaSHsector-PostPhailinResponse(22-11-13)
170
open fields, 25% near openwater sources and only 7% used latrines.199It emerged that
womenwentbehindthebushesfordefecationinthedarkoraftersunset,orbeforesunrise,
to avoid being seen by others.200Household latrines and latrines in the existing cyclone
shelterswereuncommon.201AlocalNGOofficialnoted,“Thereisnohouseholdtoiletinany
ofthevillagesinPuri,noteveninthehotelsontheroadsides;eventhestaffhavetourinate
intheopenduringfieldvisits.”202ThiswasaproblemthatIfacedduringmyfieldworktoo.203
Image6.5:Pre-disasterhouseholdlatrine(Image:Gombhoria03-03-15)
199
Document:AgencyAKAPbaselineReport–February2014,page.14200FGDs(women):Sanpatna02/11/2013,Khirisahi28/10/2013;Gopinathpur08/02/2014201
FGD(women):Sanpatna2/11-2013&Khirisahi28/10/13202
Informalconversation:LA-14203
Fieldnotes,Sanpatna(20-10-13),BrahmapurandKhirisahi(27/10/13)
171
Image6.6:SubmergedIndiaMark-2handpump(Image:Brahmapur,28-10-13)
In Gombhoria, 12 households had constructed latrines with the help of first instalments
received under the government – the District Water and Sanitation Mission (DWSM) –
schemesforsanitationprovisionandhadaccesstoonehoureachdaypipedwatersupply.Mr
O1(36,M)ownedalatrinein2001withfundingfor3concreteringsfromtheDWSM(Image
6.5).204InChadanamkhanatherewere25tubewellsusedforvariouspurposes.205
6.2.2ImmediateImpactofdisasteronWaSH
ThedisasterimpactsonWaSHfacilitiesdependedonthehouseholdlocationandthenature
ofthehazard(cycloneinPuriandfloodsanderosioninBalasore).Allthesedisasterimpacts
affectedhouseholdaccess toWaSH facilities. InBalasore,due toerosion, thehandpumps
werewashedaway,whilethefloodsresultedinwaterinundation.Thestormsurgeduringthe
cyclonecausedstructuraldamagestotheWaSHfacilitiesnearthecoastandtheChilkhaLake,
204
HouseholdInterview:O1,Gombhoria3-03-14205
FieldNotes:FGDs(womenandchildren)Chadanamkhana04-02-14
172
affectingthewaterquality.Thehandpumpsweresubmergedandopenwellswereinundated
bysalinewaterintheislandandcoastalvillages(Image6.6).206
“Many handpumps observed, particularly those installed by the government, lack
apronsandit isverymuchdoubtedthatsanitarysealshavebeenaddedduringthe
constructionoftheboreholes.Assuchtheriskofcontaminationfromstandingwater
duringafloodeventishigherthaniftheboreholeshavesanitarysealsandconcrete
aprons.Handpumpswhichhavebeeninundatedasaresultofthecycloneshouldbe
assumed to be contaminated and should be disinfected. At some handpumps the
salinitywasfoundtobehighbutitisnotknownifthisisconnectedwiththerecent
cycloneorthelevelsaretypicallyhigh.”207
Image6.7:Pre-existingprotectedopenwellssufferedstructuraldamageduringthecyclone
(Image:Gopinathpur,28-10-13)
206
Fieldnotes,Householdvisits–28thOctober2013,Sanpatnavillage207
Document–Commentsonthe“Jointassessmentreport,forWaSHsector-PostPhailinResponse”(22-11-13)
Damage towatersourcecaused bystormsurge
173
Image6.8:Debrisnearhandpumps(Image:Gopinathpur,24-10-13)
InKhirisahi,duetoheavyrainsandfloods,communitymembersreportedchildrensuffered
fromdiarrhoeaandvomiting;andtherewerechallengesinaccessingthehealthfacilitiesin
the mainland from the island villages. 208 Incidences of diarrhoea were also reported in
Arakhakudaduetocontaminationofwatersourcesandlackofwatertreatmentmeasures.209
AspartofAgencyA,Iundertookhouseholdvisitstounderstandthecausesoftheoutbreak
in Arakhakuda,where it emerged that handwashing after defecationwas not a common
practice; the water containers were not cleaned or covered during transportation and
storage;children’sfaecesweredisposedinthebackyardneartheChilkhalake;andgarbage
waslitteredwithoutproperdisposalmechanisms.210
Formenstrualhygiene,thehouseholdsreceivedonepieceofcloth(4meters),cottonrope
fortyinganddetergentsoap(8pcs.).Thissupportwasinadequateiftherewasmorethan
onemenstruatingmember inthefamily.211DuringFGDswithadolescentgirlsandwomen,
thedifferentmenstrualhygienepracticeswerediscussed:sanitarymaterials,changingand
208
Fieldnotes:Khirisahifieldvisit28-10-13209
Email:Diarrhoearesponsedecisions,4-11-13210
Documents:Fieldsurvey–Post–DiarrhoeaoutbreakinArakhakudacase-tracingofhouseholds–08-11-13211FGD(Women):06-02-14,Gopinathpur
174
disposalmechanismsandsocio-culturalattitudesrelatedtomenstruation.212In the fishing
households,womenusedold ragsandcotton sareesduringmenstruation,washedwitha
separate soap and reused the next month.213 In the inland villages, the adolescent girls
preferredsanitarypadsbutcouldnotaffordthem.Thegeneralpracticewastochangeonce
eachdayofthecycleandburnwithothergarbage.214
6.2.3WaSHfacilitiesinreliefcamps
Thecyclone shelters inPurihad the standing capacity for1000-1200people,with limited
access toWaSH facilities.215The uncoveredwells in the shelters were covered by debris
(Image6.9).216
Image6.9:Openwellwithdebris(Image:Sanpatna,20-10-13)
212
FGDs(women):Sanpatna,Padanpur,Pirosahi,Gopinathpur,Arakhakuda,KhirisahiandHaripurhamlets(Feb,2014)213
FGD(Women):06-02-14,Gopinathpur,Arakhakuda214
Householdinterviews:24-10-13,Gopinathpur,SanpatnaandPirosahi215
Informalconversation:LA-14&Fieldnotes,Sanpatna(20-10-13),BrahmapurandKhirisahi(27-10-13)216
Fieldvisit:Sanpatna,Arakhakuda(20-10-13)andGopinathpur(28-10-13)
175
Image6.10:Womencollectingwater(Image:Khirisahi,28-10-13)
Theopensourceswerecoveredwithdebris(Images6.7and6.8).Inmostareas,waterhad
turnedbrackish;butdespitethis,householdsusedthesourcesduetolackofalternatives.217
InPuri(Sanpatna,Padanpur,BrahmapurandKhirisahi),theexistingfunctionalwatersources
wereinadequatetoaddresstheneedsofallthehouseholds.Thelow-lyingareasintheisland
villageswereinaccessibleduetoheavyrainsandwaterlogging,even10daysafterthecyclone
(28/10/2013).InSanpatna,initiallythreethousandpeoplewereevacuatedandshelteredin
thecycloneshelterthreedayspriortothelandfall.Twentyfamiliescontinuedlivinginthe
cyclonesheltersforamonth.218ThePanchayatandlocalleadersarrangedfordrinkingwater
andcookedfoodforafewdaysduringtheemergencyperiod,buttherewerenoprovisions
forcookingandstoring food,drinkingwaterandsanitation in thecycloneshelter.219Since
217
Focusgroupdiscussion-Haripurisland–8thNovember2013218
Fieldvisit(TransectwalkandFGD):20-10-13,Sanpatnavillage219
Fieldnotes(FGD):22-10-13Gabakundadistribution
176
their homeswere destroyed, they lived in cyclone shelterswithout separate facilities for
womenandchildren.
Womenfacedchallengesofsecurityandprivacyintheshelters,andalsoduringbathingand
open defecation.220It was difficult for women tomaintain personal hygiene and change
menstrual clothes due to lack of privacy and space.Women continued to fulfil essential
household duties such as water collection, storage, cooking, and supporting livelihood
functions.Theywereresponsible forcollectingwater, in jerrycans,paintbucketsand jars
(Image6.10). InBalasore,womenandadolescentgirlscollected4bucketsofwaterduring
eachroundofwatercollection(forahouseholdconsistingof6-8members).221InBrahmapur,
therewereseparatewater facilities for lowercastehouseholds,whowerenotallowedto
batheandwash in thecommunalponds.222InPadanpur, thepoor, lowcasteand landless
familiessurvivedondailywagelabour,togetherwithpoultryandcattlerearing,whichlimited
theirfinancialcapacitiestopurchasesoap,waterpurificationtabletsorsanitarypads.
6.2.4ImprovedWaSHsituation
Agency support in Odisha led to improvements inWaSH facilities after the disaster. The
governmentdeployedmobilewatertankersforthecyclone-affectedpopulationsintheinland
villages.However,theinterior,remotevillagesandislandswereignored.AgencyAprovided
emergency WaSH support, and addressed longer-term WaSH needs by rehabilitating
handpumpsandconstructingsharedlatrines.
Inthevillagesthereweredifferencesinagencyinputs(SeeTable6.3).223
Table6.3:ImmediatewatersupplymeasuresbyAgencyA(October–December2013)
220
FGD(women)-Arakhakudafieldvisit11-02-14221
FGD(women)-Gombhoriafieldvisit03-03-14222FGDs–BrahmapurDistribution–05-11-13223
Document:ProjectMatrixupdate,28December2013(TheseareproposednumbersinthebudgetapprovedbyECHO)
177
VillageNames Chlorinationof handpumps
Dewateringofopenwells
Rehabilitationofhandpumps
Provision ofVestagaardcommunalwaterfilters
Householdwaterfilters
Sanpatna 55 1 2 3 277Arakhakuda 269 4 6 -Brahmapur 85 1 0 2 115Khirisahi 17 1 0 1 272Padanpur 3 1 2 - Pirosahi 0 0 1 Gopinathpur 12 1 3 1 5Sahadevpur 0 0 0 - Chadanamkhana 0 0 1 - 28
InBalasore,WaSHsupportwaslimitedbasedonperceivedneedsandprogrammingdecisions.
InChadanamkhana,all thepre-existingwater facilitieswere lostduetoerosion.AgencyA
installed an emergency hand pump in October 2013, which was still being used by 28
householdssixmonthsafterthefloods(Image6.11).
178
Image6.11:Solecommunalhandpumpandbathingfacilityfor28householdsprovidedbyAgencyA
(Image:Chadamankhana,03-03-14)
Image6.12:Householdcandlewaterfilters(Image:Sanpatna,28-01-14)
179
Image6.13:CommunalVestagaardfiltersinstalledimmediatelyafterthecyclone(Image:Sanpatna,15-11-13)
Image6.14:Sharedfamilylatrine(Image:Gopinathpur,05-02-14)
180
InPuri,AgencyAundertookrehabilitationofwatersourcesinGopinathpur,Arakhakudaand
Sanpatnavillages.Theartesianwellswerefittedwithregulatorstocontrolthewaterflow.
Thewatertreatmentmeasuresincludedprovisionofwaterfiltersandchlorinetablets.The
affected villages in Puri were provided with Vestagaard communal water filters, while
household candle water filters 224 were provided to targeted families in Puri and
Chadanamkhana in Balasore (Images 6.12 and 6.13). Vestagaard filterswere immediately
deployedafterthecyclonefor3months.Howevertherewerecomplaintsofslowdischarge
ofwaterduetoimpropermaintenance,damagetothefiltersandturbidwaterconditions.
Thecandlewaterfilterswerereportedasoneofthemostusefulitemsinthepost-distribution
monitoring(PDM)surveys.225
For addressing open defecation practices, agency A installed six shared family latrines in
Gopinathpur,alongwithhygienepromotionapproaches(Image6.14).Nevertheless,people
werefoundtopreferopendefecationduetoculturalattitudes,despiteawarenessgeneration
ofthebenefitsofusinglatrines.226
MrsO2(27,F)stated,
“..usingthecommunallatrineiseasy,becauseitisbehindourhome,andsharedby
our neighbours. But it is inconvenient to clean and maintain it because after use
nobody cleans, I am responsible for bringing water and flushing and cleaning the
toilet.”227
MeanwhileMrs.O3(38,F),motherof4childreninGopinathpurvillage,confessed,
“Honestly, I continue todefecatebehind thebushes, once it getsdark. The central
locationofthetoiletmakesmeuncomfortablebecausepeoplecanfindoutanditsvery
224
Waterispouredintotheupperoftwocontainerandflowsthroughacandlesituatedinthebottom.Oncethewaterhaspassedthroughthecandle,itiscollectedinthelowercontainer.Thissystembothtreatsthewaterandprovidessafestorageuntilitisused.225
FieldNotes:FGD(womenandchildren)Chadanamkhana04-02-14226
Fieldnotes:PHPtraining,Puri:28-02-14227
HouseholdInterview:O2,Gopinathpur28-01-14
181
uncomfortable,Isuggestmychildrentouseinthedarkwiththesolarlight,butIprefer
goingintheopenbecauseIamusedtoit.”228
In contrast to the improved sanitation in Puri through agency support, households in
Gombhoria continuedusing self-built latrines (Images6.15and6.16).229The latrineswere
builtwithlocallysalvagedmaterials,andtemporarypits,andwereusedduringthenightby
womenandchildren.Themenpreferredopendefecationandsuggestedthiswastoprevent
fasterfillingupofthesmallpit.230Thedamagedfacilitieswereusedwithoutproperrepairs
orrestorationduetolackofadequatefunds,orfinancialsupportbyagencies.Itwasobserved
thatthestructureswererisky,andaccident-proneforchildrenandtheelderlyordisabled.
Womenandchildrenwereopenandmotivatedtowardsusinglatrines.
MsO4(14F),fromChadanamkhanawaslivinginatemporarysheltermadeofplasticsheets
afterthefloods.Duetoerosion,herfamilyhadlosttheirland,farmsandhandpumps.She
says:
“WeusetoiletsfordoingourbusinessinschoolandIpreferthat.Latrineisbetterthan
goingintheopen.IfIgooutintheopenpeopleseemeandIdon’tfeelsafesometimes.
NobodywillfindoutifIgotolatrineinmyownhome.”231
228
HouseholdInterview:O3,Gopinathpur28-01-14229
FGD:Gombhoria,03-03-14orInterview:LA-815-02-14230
HouseholdInterview:O5Gombhoria03-03-14231
Householdinterview,-O4Chadanamkhana,03-03-14
182
Image6.15:Self-builtlatrinesinGombhoria(Image:03-03-14)
Image6.16:Self-builtlatrineinGombhoria(Image:03-03-14)
183
6.3CommunityPost-Disasterrecovery
6.3.1Changesatthecommunitylevel
Thepost-disasterrecoverychanges,particularlyinWaSHinPuriandBalasorearesummarised
inTable6.4.Thetimeperiodsarelistedbelow:
5. t-1Priortothefloods–pre-2013situation
6. t-2Emergencyphaseduringthecyclonein20137. t-3Earlyrecoveryphaseduringthe6monthsfollowingthedisaster.
AgencyAundertookrepairandrehabilitationofcommunalwatersources(Image6.17),and
trainedtheusergroupmembers(membersfrom4-5neighbouringhouseholds)forrepairand
maintenance of the facilities in Gopinathpur, Sanpatna and Arakhakuda. For structural
resilience against future floods andwater inundation, the handpumpswere raised above
previousfloodlevels,usingconcreteapronsanddrainage.
Image6.17:Rehabilitatedtubewellandbathingfacility(Image:Gopinathpur,28-02-14)
184
Table6.4:ChangesinWaSHpracticesinPuriandBalasorevillages(author’sinterpretation)
Aspects Sanpatna Brahmapur Gopinathpur Chadanamkhana Gombhoria
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3Watersupply
Tubewell
Inundatedtubewells
RaisedTW Artesianwells
Openwells
DisinfectedTW
TW,Well
DamagedTW
RaisedTW
Privatehandpump
River OnecommunalHandpump
Pondsandtubewell
CommunalTW
Raisedhandpump
Treatment None No Communaland HHwaterfilters
Cloth No Waterfilter
No No Waterfilters,chlorinetablets
No No Waterfilters
Nomeasures
No Waterfilters,chlorinetablets
Defecation Open Open Communallatrines
Open Open Communallatrine
Open Open Communallatrine
Opendefecation
Open Opendefecation
Opendefecation
Open Privatekacchalatrines
Handwashing
No No Yes No Yes,ash No No Yes,soap
No Yes Yes,withash
No No Yes,withsoap
Bathing Well No Pond Pond Ponds TW Ponds Bathingcubicles
Nearthehandpump
River Bathingspace inGopinathpur
Nearthehandpump
Pond Intermittentpipedwatersupply,ponds
185
Communitymemberscontinuedtopracticeopendefecationdespiteawarenessoftherisks.Inthe
coastalandislandvillages,thedifferentgroupswerereluctanttousesharedlatrinesduetoissues
ofmaintenanceandsanitationpractices.232Inthemainlandvillages,owingtodenselypopulated
settlements, households were keen to use agency-built latrines for privacy. 233 Agency A had
installedahandpumpnearthelatrineinGopinathpur,sothatuserswereabletocollectwaterfor
anal-cleansing.Contrastingly,inGombhoria,motivatedcommunitiesusedself-builtlatrines,inthe
absenceofexternalsupport.
Intheinlandvillages,handwashingstationsweresetup,wheresoapswerelefthanginginfishing
nets, as a visual reminder for handwashing and also lasted longer as it drained away surplus
water.234Inthecoastalvillages,thefishingcommunitiescouldnotaffordsoap,butpractisedhand
washing with ash and banana leaves.235 Ponds and lakes were frequently used for bathing. In
Gopinathpur,womenusedbathingunitsprovidedbyAgencyA.236
6.3.2Communityprioritiesforrecovery
Thissub-sectionreportsfindings from the priority rankingexercises undertakenduring FGDs
presented in Table6.5.Within the two districts the priorities for communities during recovery
variedacrossthevillagesinPuriandBalasore.Theprioritiesdependedonthedamagesincurred,
thetypeofdisaster,geographicallocationandsocio-economicconditions.Basedonthetypologyof
thevillages,Table6.5presents thepriorities listed in thecoastalvillagesalongChilkha lakeand
islandvillageswithinChilkhaandthetworiverinevillages–ChadanamkhanaandGombhoria.The
fishingvillagesalongthecoastandislandswithinChilkhalakePurihadlosttheirkulchahousesand
livelihoodassetssuchasfishingnetsandboatsduetothecyclone.Theyprioritisedrebuildingtheir
houses,butalsorestorelivelihoodassetssothatthehouseholdincomecanbeinvestedinother
recoverypriorities.
232
FGDs:Gopinathpur13-02-14andGombhoria04-03-14233
FGD:Gopinathpur,13-02-14234
Fieldnotes:Gopinathpur06-03-14,Sanpatna13-02-14andPadanpur13-02-14235
FGD:Sanpatna(13/02/2014)236
TransectWalk:Gopinathpur(28/01/2014)
186
Table6.5:CommunityprioritiesinstudyvillagesinPuriandBalasore
Coastal Island Inland Chadanamkhana GombhoriaPriority#1 Foodsecurity Repair
boats andfishingnets
Livelihoodssupport
Shelter Housing
Priority#2 Income generation– repair boats andfishingnets
Drinkingwatersupply
Drinking waterfacilities
Livelihoodsupport
Latrinefacilities
Priority#3 Housing Housing Latrinefacilities
Land Drinkingwater
Priority#4 Drinking watersupply
Healthsupport –disabilityaccess
Menstrualhealth
Stone pitching topreventerosion
Livelihoodsupport
Priority#5 Latrinefacilities Latrinefacilities
Latrinefacilities Healthsupport
Thecycloneimpactsvariedacrossthevillages:incoastalvillagesSanpatnaandArakhakuda,kaccha
(non-concrete)houseswerecompletelydestroyed,andpakka(concrete)housessufferedstructural
damages.Thefishinghouseholdsincoastalandislandvillageshadalsosuffereddamagestotheir
fishingboatsandnets.Inthesevillages,themarketsweredifficulttoaccess,sotheavailabilityof
food for the household members was limited. These households prioritised food and income
supporttorestarttheirfishing.Forthefishinghouseholdslivinginkacchahousestheprioritywas
shelterandotherbasicfacilities.IntheinlandvillagesinPuri,cyclonehadaffectedthecropsand
farmlands were rendered salinised. The farming groups prioritised seed support, and irrigation
facilities to ensure that their loss in farming income can be regained.On the other hand, in
Chadanamkhana,whichwasaffectedbyriverineerosionhouseholdsweredisplacedduetolossof
landforhomesteadsandfarming.Inthisvillagethecommunityparticipantsprioritisedlandtenure
securityand floodanderosionprotectionworks (stonepitchingor spurring topreventerosion).
Thesepriorities reflected the longer-term recoveryneeds,buthumanitarianagencieswereonly
involved in initial provision of food and non-food items, emergency shelter provision, and
installationofwatersupply.
WaSH, as a priority was also variously reported across the villages and by the community
participants.Intheinlandvillagesthehouseswererelativelylessdamaged.TheFGDparticipants
listedlivelihoodsupportandwater,sanitationandhygieneneeds.Inthecoastalvillages,thefishing
187
communitiesgaveleastprioritytolatrinesbecauseurgentprioritiesforshelterandlivelihoodassets
were unaddressed. 237 Drinking water and sanitation emerged as a priority depending upon
participants’awarenessaboutrisksassociatedwithunsafeWaSHpractices.Latrinesemergedasa
priority concern inGopinathpur andGombhoria,where the communities had learnt about safe
hygieneandsanitationpracticesduringhygienepromotioneffortsbyAgencyAandFrespectively.
TheWaSH priorities were different according to the participants' gender: women participants’
prioritised installationofWaSH facilities. They considered this could ease their access anddaily
responsibilities for water collection and defecation. While the male participants’ prioritised
productive assets such as shelter and livelihoods for recovery. In Chadanamkhana, the male
participantslistedresettlementtosafelandsforshelterandlivelihoodsasarecoverypriority.
There were differences in the community priorities and those set by the government and
humanitarian agencies. The government agencies and NGOs did not address humanitarian and
recoveryneeds in thevillagesaffectedby floodsanderosion inBalasore,aswellaslonger-term
needs such as protection and resettlement across Puri and Balasore.Agency A prioritised the
cyclone-affectedPuriandGanjamdistrictsforrecoverysupport.Ithadbudgetforconstructingonly
25 houses in cyclone-affectedOdisha under the ECHO funded programme (See Section 6.5). In
WaSH,thegovernmentagenciesdidnotcatertothemarginalisedgroupsinthecoastalandisland
villages.TheWaSHsupportwaslimitedtodisinfectionofhandpumpsandtechnicalrepairs(See
Section6.4).
6.4LocalinstitutionsinOdishaThis section describes the efforts undertaken by local actors including PRIs (Panchayati Raj
Institutions), health and education service providers, and local NGO staff (Table 6.6). Agency A
involvedschoolandanganwaditeachersthroughgamesandcompetitionsforstudentstopromote
safehygienebehaviour.Thelocalgovernmentactors–Panchayatmembers,revenuecircleofficers
and village leaders – mobilised communities during the cyclone, disseminated early warning
messages,evacuatedthemtothenearestcyclone-andflood-shelters,andorganisedemergency
237
FGDs-Sanpatna(07/03/2014)FGDsinGopinathpur(13/02/2014),Sanpatna(07/03/2014),andGombhoria(04/03/2014).
188
food andwater supplies.238In Balasore, the local NGO (Agency E)mobilisedwomen’s self-help
groups (SHGs) to run community kitchens in the relief camps.239Thepre-disaster preparedness
networksinthedistricts,whichconsistedoflocalNGOsandGROs(Grassrootsorganisations),were
activatedinpreparationforthecyclone.AgencyAandlocalpartnerNGOsdeployedrescueboats
andmobilisedcontingencystocksfromtheirwarehouses,suchastarpaulinsheetsandhygienekits.
Distributionofemergencykitsandrunningofcommunitykitchensinthecyclone-andflood-affected
villages were carried out with the help of local community facilitators, youth leaders and SHG
members.Thelocalgovernmentagencies–RDDandPRImembers-werequickinmobilisingfood,
cashandwatersuppliestotheaffectedpopulationsinPuri.
238
Informalconversation:LA-14239
Semi-structuredinterview:LA-8
189
Table6.6:Localactors’responseinOdishaandroleforlong-termrecovery
No Categories Type Actorsinvolved Activities Challenges1 Local
serviceproviders
Health ASHA, ANM,traditionalmidwives
- Involved in recovery programming- WaSHtrainingandcapacitybuilding
- Provision of chlorine tablets and preventivehealth
- Limitedhumanresources- Difficultiesinoutreachactivitiesduringdisasters
Educationserviceproviders
School andAnganwaditeachers
- ManagingSchoolWaSHcommittees- Awards for best students in cleanlinessawarenessofhandwashing,nailcutting
- Firstspaceforhygieneeducation
- Limited resources in schools affectedby disastersthemselves
- Primaryfocusisoneducation- Lackofmaintenanceofschoolfacilities
2 Localactors Governmentbodies
Circle office, linedepartments andother relevantagencies, thePanchayat
- Reliefprovision,- Damageassessmentandcompensationwiththedistrictadministration
- Subsidies for housing, handpumps andlatrines
- Landallocationforembankments
- Limitedroleandmandateforrecoverysolutions- Lack of coordination and guidelines for recoverybetweenlinedepartments
- Unclearroleinlonger-termrecovery
Youthfacilitators
Agency –recruitedlocal paid-volunteers
Trained for supporting programmeimplementation- ReliefdistributionandHygienepromotion,- Householdsurveysandmonitoring- ConstructionandFacilitationskills
- Limitedrolewithinprogramme- Lackofappropriateskillsandknowledgeofpublichealthpromotionornopriorexperienceofworkingindisasteraffectedareas
- Timeboundpresence
3 Communitygroups
Community-BasedOrganisations
Disasterpreparednessnetworks
- TraininginDRR- Search and rescue, shelter managementcommittees
- Villagetaskforces(TFs)
- Limited funding and informal organised efforts inrespondingtodisasters,noclearroleinlonger-termrecovery
4 LocalNGOs DevelopmentandDRR
AgenciesDandFinPuri,E(Balasore),G(Ganjam)
- Priorexperienceof1999supercyclone- Humanitarian objectives and reliefdistribution
- Partnershipsandnetworksforresponse
- Fundingforlonger-termrecoveryprogrammes- Expertise and mandate for WaSH and resilienceprogramming
190
6.5GovernmentAgencies’response
ThissectiondescribestheGovernmentofOdisha(GoO)WaSHresponse,reliefandrehabilitation
measuresandrecoveryprogrammes,usingdatafromagencyreports,newspaperarticles,emails
andmeetings.
6.5.1WaSHresponse
ThegovernmentdataindicatedthatCyclonePhailinhaddamaged3089pipedwatersupplyschemes
(PWSS) but no comprehensive information was available on the impact on the sanitation
infrastructure (Mommen et al. 2014). 240 Rural Development Department (RDD) organised 234
tankers,345mobilevans,29lakhwaterpouchesanddeployedgeneratorstorestartpipedwater
supply in 18 affected districts through the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS). 241 RDD
response included disinfection of 58,100 tubewells and distribution of 1,661 (25-kg) bags of
bleachingpowder.ThefinancialcostsincludedINR122.34lakhforemergencydrinkingwaterand
additional INR27.61crores for repairing3040ruralpipedwatersystemsand1,62,170damaged
tubewells.242
Despiteabovemeasures,sanitationfacilitieswerelackinginthecycloneshelters,andintheaffected
villages.ThereweregapsinoutreachmeasuresbytheRDDastheyhadlimitedcapacitiesintheface
ofmultipledisasters.Self-employedmechanics(SEMs)weredeployedforhandpumpdisinfection,
buttheycouldnotaccesstheremote,waterloggedandisolatedvillages.243Similarly,mobilewater
tankers catered to the roadside villages and ignored the farthest hamlets and island villages.244
DuringaRDDmeetingforINGOcoordinationinWaSHsupport,itemergedthatsubsequentrains
andfloodshadstretchedtheDepartment’slimitedresources,andgreaterflexibilitywasneededin
thehumanitarianWaSHresponseforthechangingconditionsandthelocalcontext.245RDDofficials
240InOdisha,drinkingwaterandsanitationfallsunderthemandateofRuralDevelopmentDepartment(RDD).TheRuralWaterSupplyandSanitation(RWSS) isthe implementingagencyunderRDDforruralwaterandsanitationsector.TheOdishaStateWaterandSanitationMission(OSWSM)wasconstitutedin2002forprovidingoverallpolicyguidanceforcommunityledandparticipatorywatersupplyandsanitationprojects.241OrissapostOct23Drinkingwatersupplyfor18districtsinstate242OrissapostOctober23rd,2013Drinkingwatersupplyfor18districtsinstate243Fieldnotes:PHPmeeting–2November2013–BrahmapurandKhirisahichallenges244FieldvisitBrahmagiriblock,February2014245Email:Minutesofmeeting24October2013Unicef
191
encouragedNGOstoundertakedisinfectionofwatersources,watertreatment,storageandtesting,
(re)constructionofwatersourcesandraisedplatforms,hygienepromotionamongcommunitiesand
schools, assessments and trainings. 246 Issues pertaining to WaSH response raised during the
meetingwere:247
- Disinfectionofwater sources: Itwasdecided that INGOs should focusondisinfectionof
privatewatersourcesandwells,whileRDDdisinfectedthegovernment-installedtubewells.
Allsources,includingponds,shouldbedisinfected,butmessagesshouldbegiventoavoid
drinkingpondwater.
- Householdversuscommunity-level focus:RDDencouragedNGOsto focusonhouseholds
whilegovernmentcouldfocusonthecommunitylevelforhygienepromotion.
- Sanitation options: The prevalent open defecation practice, near water sources, was
recognised as a major health threat; there was a need for stronger evidence for the
suitabilityandappropriatenessoftrenchtoiletsinthecontextofOdisha.Duringthemeeting,
RDD encouraged sharing of experiences by agencies on trench toilets and sanitation
promotionapproachestocontinuebeyondtheemergencies.
- Tankers, pumps and treatment units: RDD welcomed the deployment of tankers,
generators/solarpumpsbyINGOstosupportsupply,treatmentanddistributionofwater.
Thus, itemergedthattheGoOwaschallengedbythemultipledisasters,andpre-existing lackof
sanitationdevelopmentinOdisha.
6.5.2Immediatereliefandrehabilitationmeasures
GoO exhibited dedicated efforts in saving lives through preparedness during the 2013 cyclone
comparedtothe1999supercyclonethatclaimednearly10,000lives(Dash2013).TheWorldBank
applaudedthesuccessinpreparednessandevacuationmeasuresthroughCycloneandFloodShelter
ManagementandMaintenanceCommittees,betterweatherforecasting,near-accuratepredictions,
betterdisasterpreparednessandcommunications(WorldBank2013).TheOdishaStateDisaster
ManagementAuthority(OSDMA)coordinatedrelief,restoration,andreconstructionactivitiesafter
246Email:Minutesofmeeting24October2013Unicef247Email:Minutesofmeeting24October2013Unicef
192
CyclonePhailin.TheRevenueandDisasterManagementDepartment(R&DM),Odishaisin-charge
ofimplementationoftheOdishaReliefCode(ORC)duringdisasters(GovernmentofOdisha1996).
Odisha Relief Code, the only existing disaster policy document for Odisha, explicitly mentions
‘sanitaryarrangements’justonceinthecontextofrestorationactivitiespost-disasters.
TheCentralgovernmentofferedreliefassistanceofINR1000crorestothestatetodealwiththe
aftermathofthecyclone.FromthePrimeMinister’sNationalReliefFundanexgratiaamountofINR
2lakheach,tothenextofkinofdeceased,andINR50000eachfortheinjuredwasannounced.248
The line departments sent the damage reports and list of beneficiaries entitled to government
support for rehabilitation. 249 In Balasore, it emerged that the district administration faced
challengesduringhouseholddamageassessment.Duringbeneficiarylistingthereweredifferences
due to the political mandates of the sarpanch (village headman) and the ward members for
nominating households for compensation, and confusions resulting from multiple assessments
undertaken by local Panchayat and Central assessment teams. 250 There were reports of
politicisation of relief aid because the local Panchayats, who implemented the government
schemes,usedthisopportunitytogainsupportfromtheirvotebanks.251
6.5.3Recoveryandreconstructioninitiatives
TheOSDMAplayedanactiveroleduringtherehabilitationbytakingproactivemeasuresinresource
mobilisation, databasemanagement, and coordinationwith different departments and affected
districts, donors and NGOs. In Odisha, the World Bank funded and supported a $1.45 billion
programme in the cyclone-affected districts of Ganjam, Puri and Khorda for building disaster-
resilient houses, improving slums and city infrastructure, and strengthening disaster risk
managementcapacities.252Additionally,$313millionfundswerepledgedbytheWorldBankand
theAsianDevelopmentBank:$55millionforconstructionof162cycloneshelters,$152millionfor
reconstruction of damaged households within a 5 km radius of the coastline, and slum
redevelopment.253TheseproposalsdidnotfactorWaSHinterventionsintotheresettlementplans.
248NewsarticleOrissaPost:Nov9PMannouncesinterimreliefof₹1000crores249NewsarticleOrissapost:Oct28thFocusshiftstolong-termrehab250Districtofficialmeetingnotes19-02-14251Semi-structuredInterview:LA-9,19-02-14252 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/07/14/india-and-world-bank-sign-usd-153-million-agreement-for-odisha-disaster-recovery-project253OrissapostNov13,WB-ADBjointmissiondeclares$313millionaid
193
During the stakeholder consultation meetings, there were discussions about approaches for
sanitationimprovement,buttheissuewassidelined,duetothelimitedtimeavailablefordiscussion,
andthelackoftechnologicalsolutionsandpoliticalwillforimplementationduringreconstruction.254
6.6HumanitarianAgencies’response
ThissectionpresentshumanitarianandrecoveryWaSHinterventionsbyAgencyAandpartnerNGOs
afterthecyclonePhailinandfloodsinPuriandBalasore.Italsodescribestheintegratedapproaches
andconsortium-basedapproachesinOdisha.
6.6.1AgencyAResponseProgramme
Agency A had different local partners, donor support and varying programme duration in the
affecteddistricts(Table6.7).
Table6.7:AgencyACycloneandfloodresponse2013-14,Odisha
District LocalPartner Donor Programmeduration
Puri AgencyDandF UKAID,ECHO 12months
Balasore AgencyE UKAID 3months
Ganjam AgencyG UKAID,ECHO 12months
The immediateevacuation, relief supportand responsemeasureswere rapidlymobilisedas the
organisations had set up preparedness initiatives after the 1999 super cyclone. The localNGOs
participated indistrict coordinationmeetingswith thegovernment,andactivatedapre-disaster
preparednessnetwork(PDPN)ofNGOstoevacuatecommunitieslivingalongthecoastline.Agency
A deployed contingency stocks, mobilised water filters and chlorine tablets, and deployed
assessmentteamsandhumanresourcesimmediately.AgencyAalsograntedapprovalstoitslocal
partner NGOs for spending contingency funds for evacuation and purchase of food, soap, and
tarpaulinsinPuri,GanjamandBalasore.255
AgencyAanditslocalpartnersprovidedWaSHsupportintwophasesafterthecycloneandfloods
–immediateemergencywaterprovisionandtreatment,followedbyrehabilitationofwatersources
254Fieldnotes:12-11-13WorldBank,OSDMAoffice&INGOsstakeholderconsultationmeeting,Bhubhaneshwar255Briefingmeetingnotes:19-10-13,Bhubhaneshwar
194
and provision of shared sanitation facilities during the early recovery programme. Regular
assessments and technical training programmes guided the WaSH interventions. The core
programmestaffanddeployedexpertsfrominternationalaffiliatesundertooktheemergencyWaSH
needsassessmentsinPuri(7th–13thNovember).256Theassessmentfindingshighlightedstructural
damages of water sources, degradation of water quality due to the cyclone, inadequatewater
supplycausingover-relianceonexistinginundatedsources,andriskypracticesofwatercollection,
transportandstorage.
Thewatercomponentoftheprogrammewasdesignedwiththeobjectiveofprovidingsafewater
supplyandhygienemessagesonsafewaterhandling,alongwithdisinfectionofcontaminatedwater
sources andprovisionofnewcommunalwater facilities (basedonneedandprovisionofwater
filtersatthecommunalandhouseholdlevel).257AgencyAdeployedwatertankersforaweek,and
installedVestagaardfiltersforcommunalwateruseandtreatmentinPuri,alongwithformationof
user committees, demonstrations and training. 258 The filters were inappropriate to the local
conditions:turbidwateraffectedthefiltertechnology,resultingincloggingofthefiltersandslow
outputrate.259AgencyAalsodeployedteamsofhandpumpmechanicsandpublichealthpromoters
forchlorinatingandrepairingtubewells,andgeneratingawarenessontherisksofconsumptionof
contaminatedwater.260Refreshertrainingprogrammeswereundertakenonwatertreatmentand
hygienepromotioninPuri(28thOctober2013).261Subsequently,800tubewellsinPuri(25thOctober
2013–31stNovember2013)werechlorinated.262
Duringearlyrecovery,WaSHmeasuresincludedinstallationofcommunalhandpumps,tubewells,
communallatrinesandbathingcubicles,rehabilitationofpre-existingwatersourcesandcommunity
pond generation through CFWprojects in the study villages (Table 6.8). Programme support in
Balasorewasdiscontinuedaftertheemergencyphase.
256Email:Meeting-Summaryoffindings-WaSHJointAssessment-PhailinOdisha257Informalconversation–WaSHmeeting,Puri28-10-13258Document–AgencyAWatertankeringstrategypaper,19-10-13:DistributionplanwasfinalisedafterpermissionsfromtheGanjamdistrictadministrationfor30 litreswaterperdayperhouseholdforeachtargetedvillagewillbeprovidedfor7daysafterwaterqualitytests.Accordingly,18,500litresweredistributedcateringto276householdsin7villages259Fieldnotes:StaffMeeting,18-11-13,Puri260Email:MinutesWaSHINGOclustermeeting+immediateactioninthefield,22-10-13261Email:Fieldupdate26-10-13262Email:Fieldupdate26-10-13
195
Table6.8:WaSHmeasuresinOdishaason21stFebruary2014263
Village Raisedpump
Pond Rehabilitation ofpumps
Communallatrines Bathing
Sanpatna 0 1 12 Arakhakuda 2 4 Brahmapur 2 23 6Khirisahi Padanpur 1 3Pirosahi 0 Gopinathpur 1 1 1 6 4Sahadevpur Chadanamkhana 1
Based on the consortium proposal, a detailed budget activity sheet for Ganjam and Puri for
implementation (January – March 2014) included structural interventions in WaSH, health
promotion,livelihoodsandshelter.AgencyA’sproposednumbersinWaSHinterventionswereas
follows.264
1. Rehabilitationofexistingwatersourceswithapronsandsoakpits(100nos);
2. Raisingopenwellsandwellcoverandretrofitting(30nos);
3. Installationofhandpumps(Popular-VI),apronsandprivacyscreen(50nos);
4. Installationoflatrinesandbathingcomplex(100nos);
5. Distributionoftoolkitsforrepairandmaintenance(20nos),andtraining(4nos);and
6. Watertestingandchlorinationofhandpumpsandopenwells(200nos).
To contextualise Agency A’sWaSH programmewithin proposed budget and assessed needs, a
consultant engineer was deployed to undertake a detailed WaSH assessment. This included
supporting,trainingandsupervisingthePHEandPHPteamsfordevelopinganddesigningwaterand
sanitationinterventionsbasedonproposedactions.265Itwasproposedthatcertainactivitiescould
bemodifiedtoreflectthecommunitypractices:
263Document:AgencyA–ProjectMatrix–Puri,21-02-14264Document:AgencyAECHO-fundedrecoveryprogrammeBudget,January2014265Email:ExpertsupportinPHEconstruction–OdishaResponse–14-01-14
196
“Asperthebudget,thelatrineandbathingcomplexaresupposedtobeconstructedtogether.
But since people are living at their permanent dwellings, itwould be better to construct
individualtoiletssharedbytwotothreefamiliesinsteadofcommunitytoilets.Inthiscase,it
won'tbegoodtohavebathingcomplexattachedtolatrines.Thecommunityhabithereisto
takebathonthewatersource(handpumporopenwell).SoIwouldrecommendtohave
latrineandbathingspaceseparately…Theprivacyscreenaroundtheneworrehabilitated
existinghandpumpand/oropenwell,willservethepurposeofbathingspace.....recommend
somevariationslikeheightoftheplatform….thisisfloodproneareaandtheheightofthe
platformneedstobeat least2ft.Also ifweareproposingtheseplatformstobeusedas
bathingspacebyprovidingtheprivacyscreen,thenitsdimensionsshouldbe3x2m.For
otherplatformsdimensioncouldbe2x2m”266
Thefeasibilityandrequirementsofrehabilitationofwatersourcesandsharedlatrineswerestudied
in Sanpatna,Arakhakuda,Haripur, Padanpur andGopinathpur.Basedon space,water level and
durationofstayofcommunitiesintheparticularsites,retrofittingof‘Popular6’handpumps,open
wells anddugwellswas suggested forproviding raisedplatformsandaprons, soakpit andwell
cover.267 The artesian wells were fitted with regulatory valves. Sanitary and technical surveys,
databaseofthehouseholdsusingthesourceandcommunityresolutionsandapprovallettersfrom
governmentofficialswereobtained.268Sanitarysurveysandwatertestingweremandatorybefore
repairing the structures because of the high iron content in the region; water quality tests for
bacteria(+/-),fluoride(+/-)andarsenic(+/-),totaldissolvedsolids(TDS),pH(howacidic/basicwater
is),turbidity,andodourwererecommended.269Areadyreckonerforfield-staffandtechnicianswas
developed that described the procedures. 270 The international personnel and the RTE team
observedthattheWaSHfieldteamlackednecessaryexpertiseandknowledgeofsuchprocedures.
271
266Email:Fieldobservations–14-01-14267Email:WaSHupdatesfromPuri+pointsregardingPHE–25-01-14268Email:Trackingsheets:WaSHconstructions-materials,labour,GPS,HHandgendersegregateddata–25-01-14269Email-Format:Waterqualitysurveillancereportingformat-commontoall,01-03-14270Document–Photopresentation-Dugwellrehabilitation:photopresentationontheprocess.11-02-14271FieldNotes:RTEDebriefworkshop,Puri24-02-14
197
Agency A had provisions for 50 shared latrines in Puri, each of which will be shared by 3-4
households. During the study in Puri, as of 7th March 2014, 4 latrines in Gopinathpur, 18 in
Brahmapur(includingadisabled-friendlylatrinedesignedwitharamp),and8latrinesinSanpatna
wereconstructedusingbamboo,tarpaulinsheetsandplasticNagmagicsquattingslabs.TheRTE
teamsuggestedreplacingtarpaulinsheetswithbamboomatsforthelatrinesuperstructureasthe
sheetsweresusceptibletoheavywindsinthecoastalareas(Image6.18).272
The latrines were constructed after determining the feasibility of shared latrines through
community consultations, understanding the inundation levels and socio-economic factors for
sharing.Therecordsandproceduresweremaintainedfornumberofhouseholdsusinglatrines,male
andfemale,andchildrenNo-ObjectionCertificates(NOC)weretakenandcommunityresolutions
were passed on agreement on the user groups and hand over of cleaning materials – harpic
(disinfectant),jhadoo(brooms)andbucketsforstoringwaterforanal-cleansing.273Theprogramme
staffundertookconsultationwithusergroupsandregularmonitoringvisitstoinspectthefacilities,
tounderstandhouseholduseof latrinesandchallenges facedbymembers.274The latrineswere
providedwithfences,andnewhandpumpsnearthelatrines(foranal-cleansingandflushing),and
handwashingstationstoencourageuseoflatrines.275
272FieldNotes:RTEDebriefworkshop,Puri24-02-14273Email:Toiletconstruction25-01-14274Gopinathpur-Householdmonitoringvisit–04-02-14,FGDs:13-02-14,and07-03-14275Email:Distributionofcleaningmaterials+Document–Villagewisecleaningmaterial–26-01-14
198
Image6.18:Constructionofsemi-permanentfamilylatrinesinPuri(ImageSource:AgencyA)
ForPHP,AgencyAfocusedongeneratingawarenessandchanginghygienebehaviour.Themessages
revolvedaroundsolidwastemanagement,waterquality,sanitation,andhygienepractices.Under
the ECHO-funded programme, Agency A had a budget for undertakingmass campaigns, village
cleanliness drives, solidwastemanagement, printing and displaying IECmaterials, and capacity
building. The key hygiene messages related to hand washing, water handling, food handling,
menstrualhygiene,solidwastemanagementanduseofsanitationpractices.276Intheaftermathof
diarrhoealdiseasesinArakhakuda,agencyAimmediatelysetupOralRehydrationSalt(ORS)booths,
demonstratinghowtoprepareORSandpreventchildrenfromfallingsickthroughconsumptionof
safewater.Chlorinationofwatersources,settingupcommunalVestagaardfiltersandconcentrated
hygienepromotionefforts in local languagewerealsoundertaken.277Theteamorganisedvillage
276Email–printingofIEC–27-01-14277Email:DiarrhoeaoutbreaksinPuriandGanjam,4-11-13
199
meetingsandpublichealthcampaignsfordisseminatinghygienemessagesonhandwashingbefore
eating,coveringfoodandwatercontainersandmaintainingenvironmentalcleanliness.278Through
hygienepromotioneffortsinPuriandBalasore,changeswerereported,
“There was good awareness about hand-washing at critical times. 100% of respondents
sharedthattheywashhandsbeforeeating.[..]About96%washhand[s]beforecookingand
4%donotwashhandsbeforecooking.93%respondentswashtheirhandsbeforefeeding
whereas99%washtheirhandsaftertoilet.Italsocameoutthat98%respondentswashtheir
handsaftercleaningtheirinfantafterdefecation.”279
The female members in Gopinathpur found the newly installed bathing units, near the water
sources, provided them with privacy, with additional space for washing clothes and taking
wastewaterdrainageawayfromthewatersource.280Insolidwastemanagement,villagecleaning
driveswereundertakenforclearingthedebrisandgatheringallthewastegeneratedinthevillage.
Thenthehouseholdswereencouragedtoassessthegarbageandsolidwastegeneratedbyeach
household and disposal practices. This was helpful to trigger demand generation for garbage
disposal bins.281InPuri, schoolWaSHactivitieswereundertaken, throughwater, sanitationand
hygiene committees.282The students participated in activities and demonstrations, where they
wereencouragedto learnandsingsongsnarratingthe importanceofhygieneandhealth.Hand
washingafterthemiddaymealwasencouragedinschool,andonMondaysinspectionofnailswas
undertaken.283InArakhakuda,studentsparticipatedinavillagerallyoncleanlinessandchallenging
opendefecationpracticesinthevillage.
6.6.2Integratedapproachesinrecovery
AgencyAincludedshelterandlivelihoodsinterventions–cashtransfersandsupportingvulnerable
livelihoodsof farmers and fishermen in the recoveryprogramme.Cash transferswereprovided
eitherasunconditional,orinlieuofcashforwork(CFW),toselectedhouseholds.TheCFWprojects
278Stafftrainingdiscussion:12-11-13,Puri279Document:KAPbaselineReport–February2014280FGDs:07-03-14Gopinathpur281StaffMeetingnotes–PHPfeedback–Solidwastemanagement–07-02-14282RTEdiscussions,Purioffice–12-02-14283RTEdiscussions,Purioffice–12-02-14
200
at the village level were determined through participatory exercises such as hazard and social
mapping,whichprovidedscopetointegratecommunityneedsandprioritiesincludingwatersupply
(Table6.9).Ineachvillageprimaryandsecondaryactivitieswereidentifiedthatwereundertaken
within 60 days by the participants. CFW projects included pond generation, clearing and
regenerationinBrahmapur,KhirisahiandPadanpur.
Table6.9:Integratedactivitiesincashforwork(CFW)andWaSH
Villages PrimaryCFWactivity/site SecondaryCFWactivity/siteSanpatna Boatstand+Netstand RoadlayingArakhakuda Layingofroads LevellingcyclonesheltergroundsBrahmapur Newpondgeneration RaisedplatformforfloodsKhirisahi Debriscleaningnearpond LayingofroadsintheislandGopinathpur Layingroads ClearingpondPadanpur Pondregeneration AccessroadlayingPirosahi Levellingmadarasaground Layingroadabovefloodlevels
Arrangementsweremade for providingbasic facilities at thework-site includingdrinkingwater
supply(orVestagaardwaterfilter),food/biscuitsforchildren,hoesandbamboobasketsforearth
work(1hoe:3basket),work-shadeandurinals.284Attheendof60days,theparticipantsrequested
Agency A for continuing the CFW project and provide additional days for work and income
support.285Thissupportcouldnotbeconcededbyhumanitarianagencies,ascontinuingtheproject
beyondthestipulatedperiodrequiredadditionalfinancesanddonorapprovals.Theprojectswere
unabletolinkwithgovernmentschemesbecausetheschemesweredysfunctionalinthevillages.In
asurveyconductedbyAgencyAtounderstandtheruralemploymentprovidedundertheMGNREGA
scheme,itwasfoundthatnoworkhadbeenundertakeninthepast6-7yearsinPuri.286InWaSH,
efforts were taken to link WaSH with the government schemes through training and capacity
building.ThelocalpartnerAgencyDfacilitatedtrainingonNirmalBharatAbhiyan(NBA)forvillage
representatives,WaSHteamsandvolunteers,alongwithcommunitybasedwaterpurification.287
‘NirmalBharatAbhiyan’ (NBA), formerlyknownasTotalSanitationCampaign (TSC), isa flagship
284Email-Mandatoryrequirements-CFWandUCTdocumentationandWorksitefacilities,16-01-14285FGDsGopinathpur(07-02-14),Sanpatna(13-02-14),Arakhakuda(07-03-14)andPadanpur(13-02-14)286Surveydatabase:MGNREGSsurvey,February2014287Email:OnedayorientationonNirmalBharatAbhijan(NBA)
201
government scheme for sanitation and cleanliness. The programme was re-launched with the
objectiveofacceleratingthesanitationcoverageinruralareassoastocomprehensivelycoverthe
ruralcommunity.288
Howevertherewerechallengesinthefunctioningofthegovernmentschemes.Anagencyofficial
commented:
“Sometimes establishing programmes and government schemes linkages are so difficult,
becauseweassumethatpeace-timedevelopmentprogrammesandgovernmentschemes
are functional, soonce theprogrammeends,we justprovide informationongovernment
schemesandexpectthatourmodelswillbescaledupandreplicated.Weneedtoaccountfor
systeminefficienciesandfactorthemintoprogrammedesign.Ourchallengehasbeenscaling
upofourmodels,andsystematisation.”289
Therefore, the humanitarian programmes face challenges in establishing linkages with the
governmentschemesanddevelopmentactorsduringrecovery.
6.6.3Consortium-basedapproachesinOdisha
InOdisha,theinternationaldonors,UKAIDandECHO,invitedinternationalNGOsandhumanitarian
agenciestobidforfundingthroughconsortiummodels.Thereweretwoconsortiaeachforboth
donors,withatleast5participatingagenciesineach.TheUKAIDdonorassessmentstartedon19th
October2013,theRapidResponseFacility(RRF)callforproposalswasopenon26thOctober2013
(Table6.1).Theparticipatingagencieshad36hourstosubmitaunifiedproposalforbiddingforthe
funding,whilemanyagencieswerestillundertakingassessmentsandidentifyingtheneedsinthe
affectedareas.
Therewereadvantagesandchallengesofworkinginaconsortium.AgencyAofficialcommented:
288Thiswillbeachievedthroughrenewedstrategiesandsaturationapproach,withaviewtocreateNirmalGramPanchayatswiththefollowingpriorities:1)ProvisionofIHHLtobothBPLandIdentifiedAPLHHswithinaGP,2)GPwithaccesstowatertobetakenup.PriorityshouldbegiventoGPshavingfunctionalpipedwatersupply,3)ProvisionofsanitationfacilitiesinGovernmentSchoolsandAnganwadis,4)SolidandLiquidWasteManagement (SLWM)forproposedandexistingNirmalGrams,5)ExtensivecapacitybuildingofthestakeholderslikePanchayatiRajInstitutions(PRIs),6)VillageWaterandSanitationCommittees(VWSCs)andfieldfunctionariesforsustainablesanitationand7)AppropriateconvergencewithMNREGSwithunskilledman-daysandskilledman-days289Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-3
202
“Thereareprosandconsofworkinginaconsortia:Itgivesyouweightageofbringingupa
programmeatalargescale,2-3bigorganisationscometogethertoaddressneedsandcover
alargearea;sharingofskills,competencies,andleadstocross-fertilizationofskillsandideas;
donors are attracted towardsworking in consortia – in termsof outreach and enhanced
coverageandvisibility.”290
AgencyCAofficialcommented:
“Thereislotofvalueofworkinginconsortia,Iwouldrateitonapositiveside.Obviouslythere
are flip sides. Not each member may have the same enthusiasm and same spirit while
workingtogether. InAssamtherewerethreemembers,now inOdishathereare five, the
speed and interest varies. This needs to be further strengthened as a consortium. The
problemisspeedvs.accuracy,andconsensusversustheUSP[uniquesellingpoint]ofeach
organisation.”291
In the UK AID-funded consortium Agency A was the logistics lead – purchasing, warehouse
managementanddistributionforpartneragencies.AgencyCAwastheprogrammelead–ensured
adherence to timelines and qualities, and reporting. More than 21,000 households received
emergency kits. The procurement and uniform purchasing caused delays in undertaking
distribution, but there were benefits of increasing outreach, scale and financial gains in the
consortium-model.ThereweretwoconsortiaoperationalintheUKAIDandECHOprogrammesled
byAgencyCA(UKAIDleadagency),AgencyAA(ECHOleadagency)andAgencySTC(leadagencyfor
bothUKAIDandECHO).Therewerechallengesinensuringthesmoothrunningoftheprogramme
throughconsortiummembers:
“Thecomplicationsofworkinginaconsortiumarethatitisprocessheavy;transactioncosts
arehigh;decisionmakinginaconsortiaalsotakestime.Itleadstoclashesofideas,although
initiallyagenciescometogether,thewaysofworkingofeachorganisationisdifferent.The
290Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-3–November2013291Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-4–May2014
203
fastestconsortiummember’seffortsgetdraggeddownbytheslowestmemberagency in
termsofdelivery.”292
Aparticipatingagencyofficialechoedthereweredifferencesinagencieswaysofworking:
“All agencies did not have similar capacities. Some are experts and have strong core
humanitarian principles [..], while others are rights-based, and some others are child-
centric.”293
InOdisha,theconsortiumapproachprovidedspaceforcollaboration,whereagenciescouldlearn
from each other through common standards, programming approaches and advocacy. UK AID-
funded kit distributionhelped in standardising kit items acrossNGOmembers. This allowed for
agencies to include sanitary clothsandnapkins, solar lamps, cooking sets andwater filters. The
consortiummemberscametogetherforadvocacythroughregularjointreportingofachievements
andprogrammeoutputs,usingsocialnetworkingsitesandblogpoststodocumentandsharethe
memberagencies’initiatives.294Theseinitiativeswerelimitedtotheprogrammeduration,asthe
collaborationwasdonor-specific.Thefamiliarityoftheagenciesworkingtogetherwasinstrumental
infacilitatingeasiercoordinationduring2014CycloneHudhudandfloodsthatrecurredinOdisha.295
Thecontinuityandsustainabilityofsuchlearningforumsneedsfurtherinvestigation.
Decision-makinginconsortiawasatime-consumingprocess:duringworkshops,meetingsandjoint
trainingevents,timewasspentforstreamliningandinitiatingnewprocessesandformats,instead
of focusingongatheringevidence,orcommunityneeds,or longer-termapproaches.296The joint
trainingeffortsallowedagenciestobuildexpertise indifferentsectors,butagency interestsand
mandateslimitedtheextenttowhichthis learningwassystematisedandinstitutionalisedwithin
each agency. For instance, Agency CA undertook shelter programming and facilitated Shelter
‘TrainingofTrainers’(TOT)fortheparticipatingagenciesinGanjam;howeverAgencyAhadlimited
292Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-3–November2013293Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-4–May2014294https://phailincycloneresponse.wordpress.com/295https://sphereindiablog.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/situation-report-1-flood-and-heavy-rainfall-in-odisha-05th-august2014/296Fieldnotes:Bhubaneshwar,06-12-13
204
funding,mandateandcapacitytoundertakeshelterprogramming.Only25shelterswereproposed
undertheearlyrecoveryprogrammebyAgencyA.
Financial compliance and reporting were complicated procedures. Donor regulations and
mandatoryconditionsandguidelinesrequiredthatanychangesinoutputs,expensesandactivities
weretobereported,andapprovedbythedonor.Sixmonthsafterthecyclone,reportsindicated
thattherewereaffectedareasthatwerenotcoveredbyanyoftheconsortiamemberagencies.
ECHO froze the livelihood budget-line for all the partners until a justification was given. The
participatingagenciesundertookneedsassessments,andjustifiedstrategiesformeetingtheunmet
needsoftheignoredareas,whichwaslatersupportedthroughOFDA(OfficeofU.S.ForeignDisaster
Assistance)funds.Therewasgeneralconsensusduringthemeetingsthatagencieshadlimitedand
time-bound resources within the ECHO programme tomeet recovery needs in the operational
villages,sotoexpandtonewerareas6monthsafterthedisasterswasahugechallenge.ForAgency
A,thisposedfinancialconstraintsbecausethelivelihoodcomponenthadcommenced,andfarmers
hadreceivedseedsupport.
Thefinancialauditsbydonorsrequiredpapersandsignaturesforgoodsreceivedbyrecipientsand
community participants for the local projects. The spending on visibility boards and banners
displayingdonor logos in the villagesdidnotdirectly contribute toprogramme sustainabilityor
effectiveness.297Theemphasisonoutcomes, gathering sexandgenderdisaggregateddata– for
weekly/monthly/quarterlyreportingfortargetedandreachedbeneficiaries–weretime-consuming.
Theprogrammesandmonitoringdidnotadequatelyassesstheimplicationsofquickdecisionson
targeting in shorter time-periods. Under ECHO guidelines, the cash had to be delivered to the
householdswithin90daysaftertheprogrammecommenced.Thisputenormouspressureinrapidly
identifying,verifyinganddisbursementofcashforunconditionalgrants,andforCFWprojectsto
plan,design,approveandimplementcommunityprojects.298
Thepartneragencystaffsummarisedthechallengesofconsortium-basedprogrammingasfollows:
297Seehttp://www.hapinternational.org/what-we-do/hap-standard.aspxformoredetails298Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-4–May2014
205
“Welearnfromeachother;eachorganisationhastheirownexpertise,mandate,objective.
Thewayagenciesdothingsarealsodifferent.Inprincipleitcontributes,butwhenitcomes
topolicy-levelwork,itisstillnotcomingtogether,forissuesofdam,land,whicharelarger
issues.Inaddressinghumanitariancrises,wearefine,butrootcauseswehavenotdeveloped
inconsortiayet.”299
Theconsortium-basedapproachesareanewphenomenon,withcontributionsfromparticipating
agencies,buttheyneedstrengtheningtomaximisethespaceforcollaborationtoaddresslonger-
termrecoveryissues.
6.7ChapterSummary
Thischapterdescribedagencyinterventions–repairandrehabilitationofwatersources,provision
of sanitation facilities – and household and community WaSH practices. Under learning and
knowledge pathway, the chapter studies WaSH technologies deployed by agencies during
humanitarian response in conjunction with local knowledge and practices. The exchange of
knowledgeresultsinhygienebehaviorchangesandincreasedawarenessofsafepracticesinhand
washing,menstrualhygiene,safewatercollectionandstorageanduseoflatrinesfordefecation.
This was achieved through consistent promotion strategies adopted by humanitarian agencies.
AgencyAanditspartnerorganisationsadoptedparticipatoryapproachesforimplementingrecovery
programme interventions inwatersupply rehabilitation,cash forworkprojectsandprovisionof
family latrines. Studying institutional pathways showed thatgovernment and humanitarian
agenciesrecovery interventionsdidnotmatchthecommunitypriorities.Governmentundertook
immediatereliefprovision,restorationofwatersupply,buttookanon-interventionistapproachin
emergencysanitationprovision.Thisapproachwasmainlybecauseopendefecationwasrampant
inOdishapriortothecycloneandthereforeconstructionoflatrineswithoutappropriatepromotion
campaignwouldnotbeeffective.Intermsofintegration,AgencyAadoptedexitstrategiestolink
their interventionswithexistingdevelopmentprogrammes.,whichwerenothelpfulbecausethe
governmentprogrammesweredysfunctionalpriortocyclone.
299Semi-structuredInterview–INGOprofessional:INGO-1–May2014
206
Chapter7:Discussion
Thischapteranalysestheempiricalfindings(Chapters5and6)toaddresstheresearchquestions.I
discuss how WaSH and recovery policies translate into practice (Section 7.1); how learning,
knowledgeandparticipatoryapproachesinWaSHduringrecoveryledtoaction(Section7.2);and
howemergencyresponsewasintegratedintolonger-termdevelopment(Section7.3).Ialsodiscuss
thechallengesofusingtheconceptualframework(Section7.4)andthethemesemergingfromthe
data,whichwerenotincludedintheframework–WaSHtrajectories,genderedrecoveryprocesses
andcoproductionofknowledge(Section7.5).
7.1Howcantheexistingpolicies inWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedto
incorporate resilience in WaSH? Furthermore, how can these policies be
effectivelytranslatedintopractice?
Thegovernment institutions, localactorsandhumanitarianagencies inAssamandOdisha faced
numerouschallengesinimplementationofWaSHresponse.ThecentralargumenthereisthatWaSH
duringrecoveryremainsacriticalgapintheexistingpolicies,schemesandprogrammingstrategies,
and often ignores post-disaster sanitation and hygiene. I argue that an opportunity, which is
availableduringrecovery,toinstilandsustainchangesinWaSH,isoftenmissedbytheagencies.
7.1.1IssuesinWaSHmeasuresduringRecovery
TheexistingpoliciescanbestrengthenedthroughanunderstandingofWaSHrecoveryprogrammes
andtheissuesfacedbythegovernment,localandhumanitarianactorsduringimplementation.The
governmentsinAssamandOdishafocusedonshort-term,relief-centricwatersupply,ignoringthe
longer-termrecoveryneedsof thedisaster-affectedanddisplacedpopulations.Thegovernment
support in water supply and food provisioning was limited to the relief camps in Assam and
accessiblevillagesinOdisha.Itwasobservedthattheaffectedpopulationslivinginthereliefcamps,
multi-purpose shelters, and villages in Assam and Odisha had inadequate water sources and
sanitationfacilitiestoaccessduringrecovery.Thegovernmentmeasuresdidnotreachouttothe
remotevillages,whichwereworsthitbyfloodsandcyclones,wherethemostvulnerablegroups
had limitedaccess toWaSH facilities (Sections5.2.2and6.2.2). ThePHED restoredpipedwater
207
supplyschemes(PWSS)anddisinfectedspotsources(handpumpsandtubewells)alongtheroads,
andtownships(Sections5.5.1and6.5.1).TheruralareasdidnothavePWSS,andremainedunder-
served during disasters. In Assam, the line departments (PHED, Health Department and RWSS)
mobilisedhumanresources,anddistributedchlorinetablets;itemergedthathouseholdsdidnot
preferchlorinationduetotasteandodourissues.Agenciesworkinginrecoverycouldincorporate
localtechniquesoftreatingwateratthehouseholdlevel.Thesechallengedtheeffectivenessand
impactofWaSHreliefmeasures,andhygienebehaviouralchangesweredifficulttosustainwithout
committedlonger-termeffortsinaddressingtheattitudinalchanges.
Theempirical evidence indicates thatunsafeWaSHpractices–drinkingof contaminatedwater,
open defecation practice, lack of handwashing and food and water handling practices – cause
spreadofwater-bornediseasesandposesignificantpublichealthrisksduringdisasters,asfoundin
theexistingliterature(Prüss-üstünetal.2004;Brownetal.2012).Thechallengeofcontinuedopen
defecation, as a development concern,was largely unaddressed in thepost-disaster context. In
Assam,thePHEDrestoreddamagedwatersources,butsanitationwasleastprioritisedforrecovery
fromcyclicalandrecurringfloods(Section5.5).Similarly, inOdisha,sanitationprovisionwasnot
included in theOSDMA-World Bank reconstruction proposals (Section 6.5.3). The preparedness
measures focused on water, as the line departments advocated raised handpumps, undertook
stockpilingofwaterpurificationtablets,andpurchasedwatertreatmentunits.InbothAssamand
Odisha,watersourceswereraisedforaccessduringdisasters.Thereweremanygapsintheabove
measuresincluding,lackoffinancialsupporttohouseholdswhoborethecostofraisedplatforms
andlackoftechnicalknowledgeforoperationandmaintenance.TheWaSHpreparednessmeasures
also lacked a multi-hazard perspective, as different disasters had different impacts on WaSH
facilities–cyclonescausedstructuraldamages to theWaSHfacilitiesduetostormsurge; floods
resultedinsubmergenceandinundationcausinggroundwatercontamination;whileerosioncaused
WaSHfacilitiestobewashedaway.
Another critical issueemergingoutof theempirical evidence suggests lackof attention to local
actorsandwomeninWaSHduringrecovery.Thelocalactors,serviceproviders,andPanchayatiRaj
institutions(PRIs)implementingtheschemeshadlimitedcapacities,resourcesandpower(seeTable
5.5and6.6).Inordertosustainbehaviouralchangespost-disasters,theinvolvementofcommunity
208
leadersneedstobesystematisedinhygienepromotionefforts.ThePRIshavelimitedresourcesto
allocateannualsubsidiesforpost-disastertoiletconstructionandhandpumpinstallation.Thereis
potential to involve the health and education service providers in hygiene education through
outreachprogrammes.Howevertheirexistingresponsibilities insector-specificroles lackedclear
directionforhygienepromotionduringrecovery.Womenfacedprivacyandsecurityissuesdueto
lackoflatrines,difficultiesduringopendefecationandwatercollection,andproblemsinattending
to menstrual hygiene needs during disasters. Gender aspects in WaSH during recovery were
overlookedbythegovernmentactions,anaspectnotedinotherresearch(O’Reilly2010;Sommer
2011).TheempiricalevidenceshowshowwomeninAssamfaceddifficultiesinaccessingsafeWaSH
facilitiesduringdisastersandtherecoveryphases.
7.1.2PoliciesandschemesrelatedtoWaSHandRecovery
ThefollowingpoliciesandschemesinWaSHandrecoveryareexaminedforunderstandingcritical
gapsinimplementation(Table7.1):
- Watersupplyschemes:NationalRuralDrinkingwaterprogramme
- Sanitationschemes:TotalSanitationCampaign
- DisasterManagementPolicy(2009)andAct(GoI2005)andstateplansandreliefmanuals
(RevenueDepartment1976;GovernmentofOdisha1996;ASDMA2012a;OSDMA2013)
The Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, Government of India is in charge of national
programmessuchas theTotalSanitationCampaign (which includesNirmalGramPuraskar, later
renamedasNirmalBharatAbhiyan,andaddressedasSwachBharatAbhiyansinceOctober2014)
andNationalRuralDrinkingWaterProgrammeforensuringsafedrinkingwaterandsanitation.
209
Table7.1:GapAnalysisofWaSHanddisastermanagementpoliciesinIndia(Source:Author)
Policy/Scheme
Features Implementedby Institutionalandfunding ChallengesAssam Odisha
NationalRuralDrinkingwaterprogramme
Decentralisedand
Public-private
partnership
betweenGPand
PHED;Shiftthe
focusfrom
handpumpsto
PWSS,focuseson
avoidingrelianceon
singlewater
sources,whichcan
becontaminated
duringnatural
calamities,
integrateduseof
traditionalsystems
Convergencewith
TSCandMGNREGA
forponds
construction,
drainage,latrines
MinistryofDrinkingWaterandsanitation(MDWS)Watersupplyand
support
organisation
(WSSO)for
monitoring,
community
participation,
capacitybuilding
ASHAWorkersshall
bepaidanincentive
ofINR75perwater
supplyconnection.
Northeaststates
have10%funds
reservedthrough
centralsupport
APHEDmaintainsPWSS
andspotsources
(conventionalhand
tubewells,DirectAction
(Tara)pumps,IndiaM
II/MIIIpump,andRCC
ringwell.
InAssam,activitiesinclude
1.MinimumNeed
Programme(MNP)
2.AcceleratedRural
WaterSupplyProgramme
(ARWSP)
3.RuralWaterSupply
4.Swajaldharaplan
5.Jalmanischemefor
schoolwatersupply
6.Waterqualitythrough
testing
7.FormationofVillage
leveluser’scommittees
forPWSS
DepartmentofRuralDevelopment,Odisha.Fundsareunder-
utilisedandonly52.28
%habitationsarefully
covered,47.71%are
partiallycoveredand
only2.27%PWSSare
reportedtobe
managedbytherural
population.
Only2%fornatural
calamitieswith100%
allocationsbythecentral
governmentasperpolicy,
whichlimitsthefunds
availablefromthestate
toaddressruraldrinking
waterafterdisasters.
Policyemphasiseswater
securitybutlagsbehind
inimplementation;
knowledgegenerationis
top-down.
Gender-blindpolicy
approach:Nominal
representationofwomen
atvillage-level
committees;trainedand
employedasmechanics
210
Policy/Scheme
Features Implementedby Institutionalandfunding ChallengesAssam Odisha
SwachBharatMission
(SBA/SBM)
CleanIndia
Mission,2014
(Also
TSC/NBA)
Total
Sanitation
Campaign-TSC
NirmalBharat
Abhiyan)
Nationalflagship
programmeto
provideaccessto
individual
householdlatrines
(IHHL)toallrural
households,
schools,
anganwadisand
publicinstitutions
Convergencewith
MGNREGSwithINR
4,500/-forlabour,
INR4600/-NBA,
beneficiary
contributionofINR
900/-forSC/ST,
smallmarginal
farmers,landless
labourersphysically
handicapped
women-headed
families
MDWSwithtwoSub-Missions,the
SwachhBharat
Mission(Gramin)
andtheSwachh
BharatMission
(Urban)
InvolvesBDOsand
CDPOs,GP
ExecutiveOfficers
andAWWs,DWSM
throughtheir
DistrictProject
Coordinators,
DistrictlevelWSSO
Consultants,Asst.
Engineers,Block
levelJunior
Engineers,Grass
rootlevelSEMsand
fieldfunctionaries
involvedinIHHL
construction.
APHED:UnderTSConly50.20%IHHLs,64.88%
BalwadiToiletand18.48%
SanitaryComplex
constructed
Needtoaccelerate
sanitationcoverage
Componentsofnational
programmeinclude:
1.Start-upactivities
(baselinesurveys)
2.IECactivities
3.Ruralsanitarymartsand
productioncentres,
districtrevolvingfunds,
communitysanitary
complex
DepartmentofRuralDevelopment,Odisha
NBAcallsforyearlylist
generation,finalisation
throughverification,
andapprovedbyGram
SabhaandPanchayat
Samitiforeventual
approvalbyZilla
ParishadforIHHLs
Forsubsequentyearsit
shallbeplacedto
GramSabhainusual
mannerduring
preparationoflabour
budgetoftotal
MGNREGSworks.
Annualbeneficiary
identification,subsidies
provision,convergence
withMGNREGA,which
hasabysmalrecordsof
implementationinthe
statearedeterrentsin
sanitationdevelopment.
Inthecontextofdisaster
recovery,theopportunity
foradvocatingchanges
andgeneratingdemand
forsanitationismissed.
Lackofsupportfor
Households/habitations
interestedinconstructing
latrinespost-disasters
andlackofprovisionof
latrineswithinthe
disastersheltersfor
children,elderlyand
disabled
211
Policy/Scheme
Features Implementedby Institutionalandfunding ChallengesAssam Odisha
Disaster
Management
Act(2005)and
Policy(2009)
Policy refers to
reconstruction to
build disaster
resilient structures
and advocates for
speedy, owner
driven, linking with
safe development
and livelihood
restoration
Under the Disaster
Management Act,
2005 NDMA and
state and district
authorities to
overseeDM;
NationalInstituteof
Disaster
Management
(NIDM) for capacity
building
Assam Relief Manual(1976)Assamfollowsthemanual
for relief provision, does
notincluderecovery.
Line departments engage
in water supply post-
disasters besides relevant
preparednessmeasures
Odisha Relief Code(1996)Emphasises provision
of drinking water
supply, and recovery
measures by line
departments post-
disasters, however
completely missed
sanitation
1. Erosion is not
acknowledged as a
natural disaster, hence
affected families do not
receive relief or
rehabilitationsupport.
2. Lack of emphasis on
restoration of WaSH
facilities, sanitation is
missedinreliefmanuals
212
Table7.1describesthepoliciesandhighlightscriticalgapsinhumanitarianWaSHinterventionsas
follows:
a. TheexistingpoliciesemphasiseimmediateWaSHreliefmeasuresbythelinedepartments
(PHED,AssamandRDD,Odisha)–drinkingwatersupply,disinfection,repairandrestoration
ofPWSSandspotsourcespost-disasters.
b. The policies do not reflect a multi-hazard perspective in preparedness, restoration and
compensationfordamagesatthehouseholdlevelthroughtheschemes.
c. ThenationalWaSHpolicies,namelytheNationalRuralDrinkingWaterProgramme(NRWDP)
andTotalSanitationCampaign,donotfactorWaSHserviceprovisionintorecoveryandallow
fortransitionintodevelopmentschemes.Theannualprovisionofsubsidiesforhousehold
latrinesandwatersupplydidnottakeaccountofthelossesincurred,andtherearesystemic
deficienciesintheimplementationofsanitationschemesinthedevelopmentcontext.
d. Themanuals,policiesandprogrammesdonotincorporatewomen’sneedsandchallenges
facedduringdisasters,andareblindtogendersensitivitiesduringreliefdistribution.There
are no separateWaSH facilities for women, or privacy in the relief camps and cyclone
shelters.
e. Theprogrammesdonotclearlydefinetheroleoflocalactorsinrecovery,astheapproachis
fragmentedintovariousdevelopmentprojectsandschemes(Sections5.4and6.4).Thestate
government and line departments have limited funds and resources at their disposal to
addressWaSHrecoveryneeds.Thepoliciesincorporateincentivesforgrassrootsworkersfor
installationofWaSHfacilities,butthesecouldbeintensifiedpost-disaster.
f. Althoughpoliciesreflecttheneedforwaterqualityimprovement,andhygienepromotion,
theserelyonIECmaterialsastheonlyapproach,whichisoftenoutdated.Hencethereisa
needforwide-rangingapproachesthatincorporatenewerandfeasibletechnologiestoface
disasters,togenerateawarenessandtoengageinbehaviourchangecommunication.
ThisresearcharguesthatprovisionofWaSHfacilitiesduringrecoveryisacriticalgap,whichrequires
policy attention. A holistic approach to WaSH programmes will enable progress in sanitation,
improveaccesstowatersupplypost-disastersandinstilhygienebehaviourchanges.Itisarguedthat
thereisapotentialforstrengtheninglocalactors’roleinWaSHduringrecoverythroughdevolution
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of power and authority, and strengthening attention to incorporatewomen’s roles inWaSH to
reflectthedynamismofwomen’scapacitiesandneedsduringrecovery.
Thecentralfindingfromtheanalysisofgovernmentresponseisthatrecoveryisthemissinglinkin
the policy shift from a reactive response to proactive prevention approach in the Disaster
ManagementActof2005andthePolicy,2009.Thesedonotconsidererosionasanaturaldisaster,
therebypreventingthegovernmentandNGOsfromprovidingreliefandrehabilitationsupportto
erosion-affectedhouseholdsinAssamandOdisha.TheStatereliefcodesandmanualswerefound
tobeinadequateasaguidingdocumentforGovernmentrelief:theprovisionsinthecodeslaydown
theprocesstobeestablishedbefore,duringandafteradisaster,andassigndutiesbutleaveitopen
fortheDistrictadministrationonthespecificsofhowtoperformthoseduties,toprotectthebasic
rightsandentitlementsof theaffectedpopulation.The linedepartments followout-datedrelief
manualsforpost-disasteraction–theOdishaReliefCode,1980(updatedin1996)andtheAssam
ReliefManual (1976)– thatdonot reflect thecomplexitiesof recurring, ‘localised’andmultiple
disastersorprovideclear,adequateemphasisonrecoveryofWaSHandrelatedsystemsforlonger-
term,asreflectedinotherstudiesundertakeninOdisha(Ray-Bennett2009a).
Lastly,thedivisionofdisastermanagementfunctionsinthegovernment,forreliefcoordinationand
undertaking recovery, results in a fragmented approach. For instance, the SDMAs focus on
preparedness and coordination during disasters, while the Revenue and Disaster Management
Department focuson recoveryand rehabilitation.Thereweredifferencesbetween the recovery
activitiesundertakenbytheSDMAsinAssamandOdisha,whichcouldbeattributedtotheevolution
ofthestatebodiesandpoliticalacceptanceofdisastermanagementovertheyears,andavailability
ofresourcesforrecovery.InAssam,thereisagrowingmovementforconsideringtheAssamfloods
asanationalproblem,whichwillallowforcentralfundsasgrantsinsteadofthecurrentprovision
offundingasloans(Das2007).InOdisha,OSDMAdemonstratedevolutioninrecoveryplanningand
increasingcapabilitiesbyspearheadingthereconstructionprogrammeafterthecycloneinOdisha,
whereasASDMAwaslimitedinitsrecoverymandate(Section5.5.3).Recoveryprojectsandfunds
were channelled through development programmes, mainly focussing on flood control and
managementmeasures such as embankments and anti-erosionworks,which are inadequate to
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address the recurring floodinganderosion inAssam.Theprogressachievedby institutionalising
disastermanagementthroughtheAct,statepoliciesandplansaredefinitelystepstowardstheright
direction,which reflectaspectsofcommunity resiliencedespite theabovegaps in recoveryand
WaSH.
7.1.3HumanitarianWaSHprogrammingandrecovery
ThehumanitarianNGOsinAssamandOdishaundertookdifferentapproaches,whichweredifferent
fromthegovernmentresponsetoaddressemergencyWaSHneeds.InAssamandOdisha,AgencyA
demonstrated its strength in addressing WaSH needs holistically, reaching out to the farthest
affected areas andmarginalised communities, who are likely to bemissed by the government.
However, theprogrammesweredesignedon thebasisofemergencyneedsassessmentsby the
agenciesanddonors.TheUKAIDprogramme inOdishawasamassiveundertakingtodistribute
emergency relief kits to more than 21,000 affected households in Odisha. The ECHO-funded
programmes in Assam and Odisha included rehabilitation of water sources, provision of
intermediateshelters,communallatrinefacilities,andlivelihoodsupportthroughcashtransfers.
This research argues that time-bound, short-term recovery programmes are unable to address
WaSHneeds for all the affectedhouseholds andhence resort to targeting themore vulnerable
householdgroups,orproviding sharedor communal facilities. The responseprogrammes fail to
address the longer-term issues – hygiene behavioural changes and open defecation practices –
within short timeframes (6-8 months). In Assam, Agency A installed WaSH facilities that were
washedawayduringtherecurringfloodsorabandonedduringdisplacement.Communitypriorities
andneedsforprivatelatrines,sustainablelivelihoodsandsecurehousingforlonger-termrecovery
felloutsidetheexistingprogrammingstructures.TheECHOfundinginAssamwasonlyfor6months,
afterwhichtheagencywithdrewitsoperationsduetolackoffunds.In2013,anewembankment
wasconstructedthatput thevillagesonthe ‘wrong’-sideof thenewembankmentandexposed
households to recurring floods and erosion due to breach in the new embankment forcing
communitiestorelocate.ThisregressivelyimpactedtheinstalledWaSHfacilitiesandrecoveryof
householdsinAssam.
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Agencymandatesandguidingprinciples influencehumanitarian interventions.Thehumanitarian
dossier signedbyAgencyAdistinguishesdisasters into four categories,anddefines thewaysof
working with partners and international affiliate agencies for each category.300 Accordingly, in
AssamandOdishaprioritisationofdisastersoccurred:AgencyAdidnotintervenewhenfloodsand
erosion recurred in Assam. In Odisha, Agency A provided only relief support for 3 months to
communities affected by floods, overlooked erosion-affected areas in Balasore, and providedrecoverysupportfor6monthstocyclone-affecteddistricts.
The working principles for Agency A, as part of a comprehensive framework for emergencies,
include a rights-based approach, sectoral expertise, an integrated approach, a risk reduction
approach,workingwithlocalsandpartners,genderequalityandprotection,learningandimproving
its own performance, accountability to the affected communities and donors, and advocacy.301
FollowingtheseprinciplesagencyAdevelopeditsstrengthsandexpertiseinemergencyWaSHand
livelihoods, logistics and financial systems, participation and learning mechanisms. The gender
programming approaches included strengthening women’s roles through planning and
implementation, and ensuring women had direct access to humanitarian assistance and equal
300Itsetsthecriteriaandprocedures,notwithstandingtheprioritylevelofacountry,whenaspecifichumanitariancrisisbreaksoutsuchevent–togetherwithourexistingcapacityandstrategiesinthespecificcontext–isassessedandcategorisedinordertodecidehow(and if)AgencyAhas to respond.Humanitariancrisisaresortedas:Category1–high2 level,Category2–moderate level,Category3–lowlevel;Non-Category–noresponseisrequiredorpossible.301Rights-basedapproach(therighttoadecentlivelihood,toessentialservices,avoiceindecision-makingandanidentityfreefromdiscrimination),expertise(considerableinstitutionalknowledgeandcapacitytodeliverinspecificareasofemergencyresponse:foodsecurity, emergency livelihoods, emergency shelter, public health promotion and in particular the provision of safe water andsanitation),anintegratedapproach(humanitarian,developmentandcampaignworktomaximiseimpact,humanitarianworkoftenincorporates programs to rebuild livelihoods or to empower people to speak out, organise and have a voice in changing theirsituation), a risk reduction approach (reduce the future vulnerability of communities to disasters by integrating risk reductionstrategiesintoitslong-termdevelopmentworkthroughinitiativesthatbuildcommunities’resilience,includinggivingthemasayindecisionsthataffectthemandtrainingthemtobeemergencyresponders;anddisasterpreparednesswork,suchasplantingtreestoreducetheriskoffloodingandlandslides,orbuildingcycloneshelters),workingwithothers(withlocalpeopleusuallythefirsttorespondtoacrisis,localpartnerorganizationsandaffectedcommunities),genderequality(emergenciesexacerbateexistingpowerrelationshipsinfamiliesandincommunities.Duringhumanitariancrises,therearemorefemale-headedhouseholds,andwomenandgirlsaremorelikelytobethetargetofviolence),protection(allciviliansaffectedbyconflictanddisastersshouldbeprotectedfromthethreatofviolence,coercionanddeliberatedeprivation,andthattheyhavetherighttoreceivethehumanitarianassistancethey need. Civilians are increasingly targeted in armed conflicts, andwomen and children are particularly vulnerable), learning(improvingitsownperformancetodeliverbetterqualityhumanitarianassistanceandprotection,havethecredibilityandevidencebasetoinfluencetheperformanceoftheinternationalhumanitariansystemtodelivermoreandbetterprotectionandassistance),accountability (to the affected communities, as well as donors, makes its work more effective, as well as giving beneficiariesownership of the projects that affect them. This entails involving disaster-affected people in the design, implementation andevaluationofprograms,consultingthemondecisionsthataffectthemandprovidingcomplaintsmechanisms),influencingothers(influencetheperformanceofothers,includingnationalgovernmentsandtheUNsystem,toprovidegreaterassistanceandbetterprotectionforpeopleaffectedbynaturaldisastersandconflict),
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control over essential resources. Theseworkingprinciples influencedprogramming strategies in
WaSHduringrecovery,andwillbereferredtoagain(Section7.2-7.3)
7.2 How can learning, knowledge, and participatory approaches help in
translatingthewindowofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?
The empirical evidence provides understanding of the three approaches used in WaSH during
recovery–learning,knowledgeandparticipation–tofacilitatechangesinWaSHsystems.
7.2.1LearningapproachesinWaSHduringrecovery
The empirical evidence suggests learning during recovery occurred through twomechanisms –
socialandorganisationallearning–basedonexperientiallearningandlearningfromeachother.It
isarguedthatalthoughlearningapproachescouldpotentiallyfacilitatechangesinWaSHsystems
andpractices,thereareconstraintsintheexistingmechanisms.
FollowingPellingandHigh(2005),Pelling(2011)andManyena(2009),thisresearchunderstands
social learning as a process that enables communities to survive disasters through changes in
behaviour, and developed on the basis of trust and relationships (Section 3.4.1). The empirical
research indicates social learning in WaSH occurring throughWaSH coping strategies, WaSH
preparednessmeasures, and hygiene behavioural changes.Wisner et al (2004) describe coping
strategies as urgent actions undertakenwith the objective of survival in the face of a potential
disaster. This research refers toWaSH coping strategies as practices that progressively enable
households and communities to meet their survival WaSH needs after disasters. WaSH
preparednessmeasures refertohouseholdandcommunityactionsundertakenpriortodisasters
based on the experiences of previous disasters. The objective is tominimise damages incurred
duringdisasterstoWaSHfacilitiesandensureaccessduringdisasters.Hygienebehaviouralchanges
refertosustainedimprovements inexistingknowledge,attitudesandpracticesovertime.These
three forms of learning help to understand how social learningmechanisms inWaSH can help
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translatethewindowofopportunityavailableduringrecovery,alsopartoftheemergingthemeson
WaSHtrajectories(discussedindetailinsection7.5.1).
AsWaSH coping strategies, household and community membersadopted new and safeWaSH
practices based on information provided by agencies on safe hygiene practices and prior
experiences.TheWaSHpracticespriortodisastersposedhealthrisksaswomen,childrenandthe
elderly fell sickduringdisastersdue towater-bornediseases (Section5.2). These includedpost-
disastercorrectivemeasurestomeetimmediatewatersupply,insteadofrelyingoncontaminated
floodwaters,submergedhandpumpsandopenwatersources.Tocorrectopendefecationpractices,
areas for opendefecationweredemarcated away from thewater sources, and emergency and
communal latrineswerebuiltandusedby themembers.Another strategywas to relyonsocial
networks,mainlyneighbours,friendsandfamilymembersforWaSHsupport.InAssam,households
had adopted strategies such as sharecropping, shared homesteads, and use of communal
handpumpstodistributethefinancialburdenandriskoflossesamongstagroupofhouseholds.
HouseholdsandcommunitiesundertookWaSHpreparednessmeasuresinareasaffectedbyregular
disasters,sometimeswiththesupportofPHEDandhumanitarianagencies.Raisedhandpumpswere
installedabovepreviousfloodlevels,basedonhazardhistoryandcommunityknowledgeofliving
withdisasters.InAssam,agenciesprovidedhandpumpsandlatrinefacilitiesonraisedfloodmounds
foraccessduringfloods.InOdisha,agenciesinstalledraisedwatersources,whichwereusedduring
the2013CyclonePhailin.Duringrecovery,AgencyAconstructedraisedplatformsforhandpumps,
and provided them with privacy screens as preparedness measures. Communities regenerated
pondsandlakes,andinstalledregulatorsinartesianwellstoregulatetheflowasalternativewater
sources.
Hygiene behavioural changesdepended on enhanced awareness of safe hygiene practices, and
understandingofrisksassociatedwithunhygienicpractices.Thesechangesreflectedtheintangible
aspectsoflearninginWaSHsuchasattitudinalchangesandactivitiesarisinginresponsetoanon-
going experience. Pelling and High (2005) consider that behaviour includes internal and tacit
activities such as conscious or unconscious cognition, emotional affect or the formation and
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operationofpersonalrelationships.Thehouseholdsadoptedlow-costwaterpurificationmeasures
suchasuseofclothfilters,alumandchlorinetablets,andboiling.InAssam,householdmembers
washedtheirhandsusinglocalmaterialssuchasash,bananaskinorsoil.Thechangeswerebrought
aboutbyhygienepromotionactivities,andexistingguidelinesadvocateforlearningandbehavioural
changes with the help of not just IEC materials but through participatory or learner-centred
approaches(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).
However, social learning mechanisms face certain constraints that limit how the window of
opportunityavailableduringrecoveryistranslatedintoaction.Firstly,thesemechanismsaddress
immediatepost-disasterWaSH,but longer-termsustainablechangesare ignored.Social learning
failstotranscendintorecoverywherecommunitiesfacecyclicalandrecurringdisasters.Secondly,
the social networks are not effective to fulfil long-term WaSH needs because households get
displacedduringdisasters,andlocalpowerdynamicsinfluencesocialcohesivenessandsharingof
resources.InAssamthereweretensionsbetweentheindigenousgroupsandimmigrantsi.e.Bodos
and Ahoms and BangladeshiMuslims. This led to differential access to existingWaSH facilities
(Section5.2.5).Lastly,thefinancialcostsofconstructionandmaintenanceofraisedwatersources
werebornebyhouseholds.Thetechnicalknowledgeofoperationandmaintenanceoffacilitieswas
important–theraisedstructureswereatriskofcontaminationduringdisastersiftherewerecracks
intheconcreteaprons,orduetobrokensanitaryseals.Thesefindingsaresimilartotheexisting
understandingofemergencyWaSHinterventions,whichshowthatthesustainability,feasibilityand
safemaintenanceof theWaSH infrastructure remainsanareaof challenge inemergencyWaSH
(Smith2009).
Thesecondmechanismoflearningoccurredatorganisationalsites–governments,humanitarian
NGOs,andacrossNGOsinaconsortium.Asisobvious,therearedifferencesinhowagencieslearn
andinstitutionalisechangesintheirapproachesthroughindividuallearning,priorexperiencesand
learningfromeachotherandfromcommunities.Duringrecoverythegovernmentactionsfocused
onlyonfloodprotectioninAssam,andcyclonemitigationandrehabilitationinOdisha(Section7.1).
Thedifferentapproachesby thegovernmentsofAssamandOdishadependedon thenatureof
disasters, prior experiences,mandates and capacities of disastermanagement institutions, and
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willingnesstolearnandimplementchanges.Afterthe1999supercycloneinOdisha,theGoOand
OSDMAhaddevelopeda‘cultureofpreparedness’,whichhelpedpreventcasualtiesduringthe2013
cyclone.Thiswasachievedthroughsearchandrescueteams,evacuationandearlywarningsystems,
andspeedyreliefmobilisationforaffectedhouseholds(Dash2013).OSDMAplannedandproposed
areconstructionprogrammewithWorldBank-AsianDevelopmentBankfundingforconstruction
ofcyclone-shelters,housing,andslumredevelopment(Section6.5).
Contrastingly, inAssam, thegovernmentdealtwith recurring floods.Government learning from
previous floodexperienceswas limited, as theunderlying issues – recurring floodsanderosion,
rehabilitation and resettlement – remained unaddressed. Moreover, learning from previous
responseswasnotdocumentedtostrengthenfutureactions.Evidentlythestatefloodmanagement
andanti-erosionworksdemonstratedthis lackof learningeffortbythegovernment.Since1954,
structural measures such as construction of embankments, dykes and river training had been
adopted toprevent floods (Das2007).Theadhocconstructionofembankmentsafter the2012
floodsfailedtocheckerosionandrivermovement,andtheembankmentswerebreachedduring
subsequentmonsoonsin2013.Itisarguedthatthecommunitieslivingintheregion,withtraditional
knowledgetodealwiththefloods,werenotinvolvedindecision-makinginthegovernmentflood
management programmes. The riverine populations were alienated and forcefully relocated
withoutresettlementsupport.Theexchangeoflocaltraditionalknowledgeandscientifictechnical
expertisewasmissinginthegovernmentaction.
Learninginhumanitarianagenciesoccurredthroughinstitutionalmechanismsandcollaborations
with other actors – local NGOs, other agencies in a consortium and communities. Agency A
institutionalised monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEAL) mechanisms in the response
programmes in Assam and Odisha (Section 5.6.2 and 6.6.1). This research argues that the
mechanismssupporttransferoflearningfromoneprogrammetoanother,butoverlookunderlying
structural issueswithineachcontext. For theagency, learningwas specific toprogrammes,and
hencesimilartoolswereusedacrossallprogrammes–tounderstandWaSHneeds,AgencyAused
sectoral assessments, real-time evaluations (RTEs), andWaSH knowledge, attitude and practice
(KAP) surveys (sections 5.6.2). These tools were applied within the pre-designed humanitarian
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response programmes. Expert consultants were hired for WaSH sectoral assessments to
recommendtoiletdesign,bathingfacilities,andwatersourcerehabilitationplans(Section5.6.2).
Sincetheprogrammeoutcomesandbudgetweredeterminedbeforetheassessmentwascarried
out,theexpertswerenotmandatedtosuggestcorrectivemeasurestoaddressopendefecationin
shorttimeframes.
AgencyAreliedonRTEsforprogrammaticlearningincludingshort-term,mid-courseprogrammatic
changesaswellaslonger-termprogrammaticandstrategicrecommendations.InOdisha,theRTE
teamsuggesteduseofcontext-appropriate latrinematerials thatwouldallowventilation;hence
tarpaulinsheetswerereplacedwithbamboomatsforthelatrinewalls(Section6.6.1).InAssamand
Odisha, transferrable lessonswereadopted,whichshows that learning fromoneprogrammeto
another responseoccurs,mainly because similar interventionswereundertakenwithin the two
programmes.Theselessonsincludeddistributionofsanitarycloth,alongwithdemonstrationsby
the public health volunteers on how to use sanitary pads and cloths. In Assam, the RTE team
recommended distribution of solar lights for security and privacy of female members during
defecationandbathing,whichwasreplicatedinOdisha.However,criticalanalysisandreflectionof
organisational mandates and systems was beyond the remit of these evaluations and learning
mechanisms.Iftheagencydidnotintervene,RTEsdidnotevaluatenon-interventionistapproaches
or thenon-inclusionof longer-term issuesof resettlement, sustainable livelihoodsandwomen’s
empowermentwithinrecoveryprogrammes.
TheagenciesundertookWaSHKAPsurveystounderstandhouseholdchangeswithabaselineatthe
beginningoftheprogrammefordesigningthehygienepromotionstrategy.Theresultsoftheend
linesurvey,attheendoftheprogramme,arecomparedwiththebaselinetounderstandtheimpact
andchangesinitiatedbytheprogrammesinhouseholdWaSHpractices.Howeverempiricalfindings
showthatKAPsurveyfindingsweremerelyusedforreportingpurposes,andnot fordeveloping
sustainable changes inWaSH practices. The hygiene promotion strategies were based on field
assessmentsandstaffperceptionsinsteadofKAPfindings,becausetheKAPbaselineisundertaken
after the programme proposals are designed, submitted to donors and finalised. Despite the
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potential for assessing changes and learning from KAP surveys, agencies failed to capture the
processesinvolvedinWaSHimplementation.
AgencyAalso learnt aspartof the consortiummodel inAssamandOdisha (Section5.6.3). The
consortiummodelwas adopted in recent disasters in India; pushed by donors for its value for
money,programmeoutreach, scaleandvisibility. This researchargues that consortia canact as
spacesforcollaborationwithjointeffortsatdocumentationofbestpracticesandadvocacy.These
spaces,Wenger (2000) argues, allow for contestation of ideas. However, since they are donor-
driven, consortia last only for the programme’s duration. Different NGOs participating in the
consortiumadoptflexibleanddiverseapproaches,usefulforadvocacyandinfluencingpolicies.The
consortium, inwhichAgencyAparticipated inAssamandOdisha,adopteddiverseprogramming
approaches through consultations with local NGOs and communities based on contextual
understanding(Section5.6.3).InOdishatheconsortiummodelworkedasacollaborativeplatform
forknowledgemanagement,whichdocumentedtheprogrammeobjectivesandoutcomesthrough
regularnewsletters,meetings,workshopsanddigitalplatforms.302Thesewere supportedby the
internationaldonors,andlimitedtothefundedprogrammes.Besides,therewereagencynetworks
andInterAgencyGroups(IAG)inbothstatesareinvolvedincoordinationduringdisasters,andjoint
needsassessments,buthavelimitedrolesinrecovery(Section5.6.3and6.6.3).Thisresearchargues
thatexistingconsortiaapproacheshavepotentialbutfailtosustaineffectivelearningapproaches
thattransformorganisationalpoliciesandpractices.
Learningapproachescanhelpintranslatingthewindowofopportunityavailableduringrecovery
intoaction,ifthelearningfrominterventionsistranslatedintothedailylivesofaffectedpopulations
andnotlimitedtoprogramming.Thisechoesthefindingsfromstudiesonlearningforresilienceand
recovery(Manyena2009;King2015).Reflectingontheoriesoflearning(Section3.4),theempirical
research shows that learning occurred through step-by-step correctivemeasures in Assam and
Odisha.Usingtheoriesonlearningfrom(small)disasters(VossandWagner2010),thelearningat
302http://www.sphereindia.org.in/Download/03.11.2014%20Sphere%20Newsletter_November%202014%20Issue%20No%205.pdfandhttps://phailincycloneresponse.wordpress.com/
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variouslevels–households,communitiesandgovernmentorganisations–occurswithinasingle-
loop.Suchlearningfocusesonfirst-orderchanges,whicharedirectconsequencesofexperiencesof
disasters.AgencyAdemonstratedcapacitiestoengageinsecond-looplearning,whichacknowledge
prevailingbehaviourpatternsandallownewproblem-solvingtechniques.Thelearningisspecificto
theprogrammeinterventionswithinspecificcontextsandcorrectionofmistakeswithintheexisting
guidelinesandbenchmarks.Thushumanitarianactorsengagedin‘learningforimprovement’,the
double-loop-learning, where the focus is to examine current interventions, enhance existing
capacities,andincorporatesuggestionsforimprovementofinterventions,processesandoperating
procedures.However, theopportunityprovidedduring recovery ismissedbecause thirdkindof
learning – deutero-learning – does not occur. This learning engages the actors in critically
questioning and addressing underlying issues of open defecation, menstrual hygiene, erosion
impacts,landentitlementsandrelocationsupport.Learningtomeetsuchobjectivesrarelyoccurs
becausethestakeholders’focusremainsononlyonelevel.Thisresearchcontendsthat‘learningto
understand’basedonpastfailures;participationofallstakeholdersandaddressingstructuralissues
isabsentintheexistinglearningmechanisms.Theorganisationsshouldengageindeutero-learning
asdiscussedbyVossandWagner (2010), inwhichagenciesgobeyondsimpleerrorcorrections,
questionunderlyingcausesandtriggeradditionallearning.
7.2.2Knowledgeapproaches
Theknowledgeaspectofagencyapproachesisexaminedthroughtechnologicalinterventionsand
documentation (Section 3.4.2). The humanitarian WaSH interventions provided technological
solutions in water supply, treatment and sanitation facilities. The humanitarian agencies
rehabilitatedtheexistingwatersources,alongwithconcreteaprons,drainageandsoak-pitstoavoid
contaminationofgroundwaterthroughseepagefromthecracks.Theempiricalevidencesuggests
that the suitability and appropriateness of the technologieswas essential to address theWaSH
needs during recovery. The in-house expertise within agencies was limited; programme
implementationwasundertakenbyexpertconsultants,whohadlimitedtimetounderstandlocal
knowledge,andinformationonavailableandappropriatetechnologicalsolutionsinWaSHthatare
relevant to the context and nature of disasters. The proposed solutions were constrained by
budgets.InAssam,thelatrineswerebuiltusingtinsheets,whichweretoohottouseduringthe
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summerseason. InOdisha theshared latrinesweresemi-permanentas thewallsweremadeof
tarpaulinsheets,whichcouldbeeasilydamagedbycyclonewindsinthecoastalareas.Oneofthe
biggestchallenges faced inrecoveryWaSHandavailabletechnologieswasthepre-existingopen
defecationpractices.Althoughagenciesprovidedemergencycommunallatrines,andsharedfamily
latrinesduringrecovery,thehouseholdspreferredprivatelatrinesorcontinuedopendefecation.
Fortheagencies,themobilityofhouseholdsandfrequentrelocationasacopingstrategy,worked
forsomeaspectsofresiliencebutcreatedspecificproblemswithrespecttoexpensive,fixedWaSH.
Mobilesanitationtechnologiesusinglocalmaterialswererequiredinflood-anderosion-affected
areas inAssam insteadof communal fixed latrines. The agency-built, fixedWaSH facilitieswere
abandoned when communities relocated in 2013. Similarly, in Odisha the mobile, communal
Vestagaardwater-filterswereunsuitabledue to turbidwaterconditions.These required regular
repairs,knowledgeandfamiliarityoftheusersforproperuseandmaintenance.Suchtechnologies
needpriortestingandpiloting;market-basedsolutionsandcheaperalternativesshouldbeexplored
withlocalmanufacturers.Therewasaknowledgegapofwhatappropriatesanitationtechnologies
wouldworkinthegivenhazardandgeographicalcontextofcoastalOdisha(Section6.5).
Thisresearchfoundchallengesindocumentingknowledge:theexistingsurveys,formatsandtools
wereusedtocapture,manageandreportdatafordonorsandfundraising,buttheprogramming
decisionsandimplementingprocesseswerenotcapturedorretainedininstitutionalmemory.This
aspectofknowledgegenerationinNGOshasbeencriticisedinexistingliterature(TwiggandSteiner
2002).SinceconsultantsandlocalpartnerNGOstaffimplementedWaSHtechnologies,theylearnt
throughtrialanderror.Theknowledgeretentiondependedontheinvolvementofthecorestaff(on
institutionalpayrolls)withtheprogrammeduringimplementation.On-the-jobexperienceofwhat
technologies worked within each specific context remained with the individuals and was not
retainedasinstitutionalmemory.Tacitknowledgeofcontext-specificapproachesandprocessesin
programmeimplementationwasnotcapturedintheinstitutionalmemoryeither.Existingstudies
arguetheneedfordocumentingwhattechnologiesandapproachesworkindifferentemergency
contexts(Brownetal.2012),whichremainsagapasobservedinOdisha.Strengtheningknowledge
approaches–arangeoftechnologicalsolutions,market-supportforWaSH,capturingprogramming
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processesandoutcomesofexistingapproaches–willhelpintranslatingtheopportunityavailable
duringrecoveryintoaction.
7.2.3Participatoryapproaches
Communityparticipation isconsideredasderigueur fordevelopment interventions inthewater
supplyandsanitationsector (O’Reilly2010).This researchexamined theextentandoutcomeof
participatoryapproachesinrecoveryprogrammesinAssamandOdishaandfoundthatpost-disaster
agenciesusedparticipationasaphasedapproach.Thisthesisarguesthatagenciesshouldfactor
whenthecommunitiesareincludedindecision-makingprocess,andwhataretheremitsoftheir
influence over agency decision-making. Initially during the relief phase, there were limited
opportunitiesforparticipationwithinshorttimeframes(0-3months),soagenciesundertookblanket
distributionwhereallthehouseholdswereprovidedwithemergencykits.Thevillagedevelopment
committeemembers– local leaders,traditional leaders, localelectedrepresentativesandhealth
workers – were consulted for developing household lists of beneficiaries in the most-affected
villages.Emergencywatersupply,sourcerepairandchlorination,andconstructionofemergency
latrinesandbathingcubicleswereundertakenafterconsultationwithlocalleaders.Theagencies
used participatory tools during assessments to gather data and decide programme objectives,
insteadofinvolvingcommunitiesattheprogrammedesigningandplanningstages.
The lackof participation in the initial phase is problematicbecauseprogrammaticdecisions are
takenatthisstage;proposalsaresubmittedbyagenciestodonors.InOdishatheUKAIDandECHO
proposalsweresubmittedwithin lessthanamonthofthedisaster(Table6.1).Thecommunities
werelimitedtoprovidinginformationatthisstage,andhadnopoweroverkeydecisions.Therefore
programmesdidnotappropriatelyreflectthecommunityrecoveryprioritiesandlonger-termneeds.
Thedynamichouseholdandcommunitychanges–displacement,migration,andWaSHtrajectories
–duringrecoverywerenotfactoredintohumanitarianprogrammes.InAssam,themultipleflood
wavesledtofrequentdisplacementofaffectedpopulations,whichposedchallengestotheWaSH
programmeteamsastheWaSHfacilitiesatthereliefcampsinschoolsoronembankmentswere
abandonedandnewfacilitieshadtobereinstalledintherelocatedareas.
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TheempiricalevidenceindicatesthatlocalcommunitiesweregraduallyinvolvedinWaSHprojects.
Later, agencies constituted and consulted village committees and task forces for beneficiary
targeting, designing community projects and site selection (Section 5.6.2). Sector-specific
committeeswereconstitutedforCFW,livelihoods,andwaterandsanitationprojectsatthevillage
level.TheWaSHcommitteerepresentativeswereconsultedfordecisionsonbeneficiarytargeting
and sitingofWaSH facilities. Theywereprovidedwith informationabout government schemes,
trainingondisinfectionandrepairofwatersources,andprovidedwithtoolkitsforoperationand
maintenanceofWaSHfacilities.However,therolesandresponsibilitiesofthecommitteemembers
and their functions beyond the programme duration were unclear. These committees were
functional as long the programmes operated – when the project staff visited the areas for
implementingormonitoringtheyengagedwiththecommitteerepresentatives.InAssamafterthe
programmes ended, the committees became dysfunctional and did notmeet regularly because
members had relocated ormigrated. This finding is similar to previous research on community
participation in post-disaster housing and reconstruction (Davidson et al. 2007). That study
illustratedthatthepointatwhichthecommunitiesareinvolvedindecision-makingdeterminesthe
result of the recovery programmes (ibid). This research suggests that community participation
shouldbeintegratedintheprogrammedesignasearlyaspossibleby includingbeneficiariesup-
front at the design stage, and by providing definite roles for communities, who are the key
stakeholdersbuthavetheleastpower.
Theempiricalevidencedemonstratesthatparticipationwaslimitedinscopeintheprogrammesas
agenciesfollowedroutineandconventionalapproaches,ledbytheguided-participation(Twigget
al.2001),orexploitativeparticipation(Pelling2007)model.Thereweretensionsbetweenefficiency
(controlling labour and time costs) and inclusiveness (expanding participation) in the recovery
programmes.Theprogrammesfailedtoaddresstherootcausesofinequalities,andrespondedto
the‘community’asahomogenousentity–withsimilarneedsandvoices.Thisresearcharguesthat
merelyadoptingcommunityparticipatoryprocessesdoesnotenablethecommunitiestotransform
themselves.Itisimportanttounderstandwhoareincludedwithintherecoveryprogrammesfrom
thecommunities.Theempiricalresearchdemonstratedthatafterthedisastersthehumanitarian
agenciesreachedouttothevulnerableandmarginalisedgroups,wholivedintheruralfringesand
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inaccessibleareasinAssamandOdisha.However,theycouldnotaddressdiverseidentities,multiple
needs,capacitiesandpracticesduetoshorttimeframesandbudgetaryconstraints.Theinclusionof
vulnerable groups was crucial to ensure that community consultation processes were truly
representative. The humanitarian agencies particularly targeted vulnerable households for the
WaSH interventions based on specific inclusion criteria: women-headed households, elderly,
disabledandpooraffectedhouseholds.
Acrucialaspectofinclusioninhumanitarianprogrammeswasrelatedtowomen’sparticipationin
thevillagecommitteesandbeneficiarytargeting.Forwomentoparticipateindecision-makingat
thehouseholdandcommunityitisnecessarytoaddresstheunderlyinghouseholdandcommunity
power dynamics. Agency A demonstrated a gendered approach in their recovery programming
throughgender-sensitiveplanning,which included femalemembers inasproject staff, inWaSH
committeesandWaSH facilities’usergroups.AgencyA includedwomen-headedhouseholds for
WaSH, livelihoods and shelter support. The agency understood that women’s participation in
communityprojectsenhancedtheircapacities,developedtheirunderstandingandincreasedsocial
cohesion.InAssam,theRTEteamcommendedtheirsensitivitytowardswomen’sneeds,household
prioritiesandresponsibilitiesbyadoptingflexibletimingstoencouragegenderparticipationinCFW
projects, hygiene campaigns and village meetings. Despite these approaches, the recovery
programme in Assam faced challenges due to the power dynamics and underlying social
relationships in the households and communities.The male members objectedto women’s
involvementincommunityprojectsinbothAssamandOdisha.Theygavereasonssuchaswomen’s
securityconcerns,perceivedcriticismbyvillagers,andthepurdahsysteminMuslimcommunities
(Section 5.6.2.4). In Assam, male members revisited decisions on site selection and targeting,
arguingthatthesedecisionsweremisguided,aswomenwerelessawareduetoilliteracyandlacking
requisiteinformation.303
Theevidenceshowsthatwomen’sabilityandfreedomforaccessingWaSHfacilitiesisagendered
problem,notonethatcanbesolvedby‘women’sparticipation’alone(O’Reilly2010).Thisresearch
303Semi-structuredinterview:LA-6September2013,Solmari,Assam
227
suggests that thorough analysis and regular discussions with household groups, community
consultations,andparticipationofbothmenandwomeninchoosingsitesforWaSHfacilitieswill
helpresolvetheseaspects.Suchmeasuresbringtotheforefronttheunderlyingcomplexrelations
ofpowerthatenableordisablewomen’sparticipationinWaSHprogrammes,decisionsaboutsiting,
and their usage of water sources, bathing spaces and latrines. As Sultana (2010) argues,
understanding the gendered dynamics of both disasters and the interventions is necessary for
comprehensiveandrobustpoliciesandprojects.
7.3 How effectively do agencies facilitate the integration of emergency
responsewithlong-termdevelopmentacrossdifferentsectors?
This research explores integration across NGOs and government actions over time, and within
differentsectorsduringrecovery.Theempiricalevidencesuggestsagenciescanaddresstemporal
integrationthroughLRRDandpreparednessmeasures,andaddresssectoralintegrationbyplanning
andimplementingcomprehensiveinterventionsduringrecovery.
7.3.1LRRDapproachandpreparedness
RecoveryisoftenthemissinglinkinLRRDapproach,thoughitiskeyforeffectivetransitionfrom
relief to development. Thehumanitarian agencies’ programming strategies to achieve temporal
integration did not explicitly mention LRRD approaches. The empirical research found two
programmingstrategies–exit strategiesandpreparednessmeasures–areusedbyagencies for
temporalintegration.Theexitstrategiesincludedcommunitycapacitybuilding,generatingdemand
forsafeWaSHfacilitiesandlinkingthemtogovernmentprogrammesthroughadvocacy.TheWaSH
facilitiesandcommunityassetswerehandedovertotheusergroupsandlocalcommunities.The
latrineuser groupswere trainedon cleanliness, operationandmaintenance, andprovidedwith
cleaning materials for latrines. The WaSH committee representatives and water user group
membersreceivedtrainingonoperationandmaintenanceandwereprovidedwithtoolkitstoopen,
repairandmaintainthehandpumps.Thelistoftrainedlocalfacilitatorswassharedwiththelocal
leaders, PRIs, anddistrict governmentbodies. The typical exit strategywas to link the recovery
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projects with government rural employment, housing, sanitation, and water provision
programmes. 304 Accordingly communities received training and information about existing
governmentschemesforWaSH.
The systematic linking with development programmes was challenging because government
programmes were dysfunctional in Assam and Odisha. 305 In Odisha, Agency A, as part of a
consortium,undertooksurveystounderstandtheimplementationofthegovernmentschemes.In
Puri,theworkundertheMGNREGSwasundertakenonlyfor60daysinthepastsixyears.Inthe
ECHO-funded consortium programme in Odisha, agencies were responsible for engaging in
advocacywiththegovernment.Aconsortiummemberreflects:
“Ourexperienceofworkinginrecoveryhasbeenverymixed,because[of]thewaythingshave been designed and perceived by donors, with recovery limited to early recovery –meeting the immediate needs maybe for 3-6 months. Not necessarily all recovery[interventions] leadstorehabilitationorbuildbackbetter.Practicallyyouneedprocesses,betterknowledgetopreparefordisasters.”306
Thisresearcharguesthatdespitetheexitstrategies–communitycapacitybuilding,handingoverof
WaSH assets to communities, and linking and advocacy with the government – there were
institutionalbarriersthatposedchallengesduringthetransitionfromrelieftodevelopment.The
humanitarian agencies faced challenges not only from the inefficiencies in government
programmes,but alsoorganisationalbarriers suchas lackof fundsand commitment to address
longer-termrecoveryobjectives.InAgencyAparticularly,afterthehumanitarianteamexited,joint
proposalsweresubmittedalongwithregionalofficesforlonger-termprogrammes.Thisindicates
thattherewerestrongdivisionsbetweenrelief,recoveryanddevelopmentobjectivesasperceived
by the actors, donors and governments, which were further constrained by time and resource
allocation.
304NREGA,IndiraAwazYojana,TSCandNRDWP305SurveyResults:AgencyA,February2014,Puri,Odisha306INGOprofessional,Interview:INGO-4
229
Temporalintegrationwasachievedthroughpreparednessmeasures,initiatedbythegovernment
andhumanitarianagencies.Tothisend,agenciesprovidedemergencycash,andconstructedshared
latrinesandcommunalhandpumps,whichpreparedcommunitiesagainstfuturedisasters.During
disasters, preparednessmeasures saved lives and ensured access toWaSH facilities. An official
stated:
Thekeysynergyinreliefandrecoveryisactuallypreparedness.Justoneword–beprepared.Soourworkispreparingpeople,systemsandinfrastructuretofaceashockintheformofrescueboats,orraisedhandpumps,raisedstorage,orwhetheritispreparingourselvestodoimmediate cash transfers to provide people with cash in hand for food support afterdisaster.307”
Agency A and partner NGOs enabled communities to prepare through construction of raised
mounds,andrehabilitationofdamagedwatersources,withWaSHfacilitiesandothercommunity
assets. Preparedness allowed for recovery immediately after the disaster struck. This research
argues that existing programming strategies inWaSH are unable to facilitate the integration of
emergency responsewith long-termdevelopment because the exit strategies lack guidelines to
operationaliseLRRD,andstruggletolinkwithgovernmentprogrammesduetosysteminefficiencies.
7.3.2Inter-sectorintegration
Integrationacrosssectors,althoughcrucialforrecovery,isnoteffectivelyaddressedintheexisting
recoveryapproaches. Theempirical research shows sectoral integrationoccurringat two levels:
between WaSH and other sectors (shelter, livelihoods and others), and within WaSH (water,
sanitation, hygiene and menstrual hygiene). The empirical evidence suggests that within time-
boundprogrammessectoralintegrationisoftenoverlooked;thefragmentedapproachestovarious
sectors limit thepotential for holistic changesduring recovery. Theexisting sectoral integration
approaches do not fit the households’ and communities’ recovery priorities (Sections 5.2.2 and
6.2.2).ThereweredifferentprioritiesacrossvariouscommunitiesinAssamandOdishathatincluded
longer-termchallenges–landandfoodsecurity,livelihoodsupportandprotectionmeasuressuch
asembankments(Tables5.4and6.8).Theseprioritieschangedovertime,anddifferedaccordingto
307INGOprofessional,Interview:INGO-3
230
gender, age,mobility, and socio-economic conditions of the householdmembers. The erosion-
affected community groups prioritised longer-term issues like security of land tenure, assured
incomegenerationthroughlivelihoodrecovery,andprotectionfromtheriver,whilethecyclone-
affected groups prioritised essential services such as water supply and livelihood and shelter
rebuilding.Thehumanitarianprogrammesandtop-downgovernmentapproachesdidnotreflect
these variations within recovery priorities, or community visions for longer-term recovery. The
communitiesperceived resilienceasnot justphysical recoveryof lost assetsbutalsoaspired to
escapethevicioustrapofpovertyandrecurringdisasters.
InOdisha, the humanitarian agencies integratedCFWwithWaSHneeds by building community
assetssuchasponds,watertankconstruction,andpondanddebriscleaning.Thisintegrationwas
achievedatthecommunitylevelbecausecommunitieswereinvolvedinidentificationofprojects
andimplementation.Theprioritiesweresetbycommunitiestoincludewatersupplyandstorage,
whichwasintegraltotheirholisticrecoveryalongwithshelter,saferaisedland,andprotectionof
assets from floods and cyclone (Section 6.3.2). The resultant integration in the recovery
programmeswasadhoc,andoftenaby-productofcommunityparticipation;itwasnottheprimary
focusof theprogrammes. Theprogramming strategies for sectoral integrationwereunclear, as
sectorswereprioritisedbasedonfundsandexpertise.Overallthefocuswasonshelterandcash
transfers,whileWaSHreceivednominalattention.Shelterconstructionwasprioritisedbasedon
visibilityandcoverage,whilehygienepromotionalactivitieswereintangible.Cashtransfersreceived
more attention, enabling households to purchase their essential items depending on functional
markets,andwere faster to implement if thesystemsare inplace.308Ontheotherhand,WaSH
investmentsandhygienepromotionrequire longer-termcommitmentandextendedpresenceof
thehumanitarianagencieswiththecommunities.
Thisresearcharguesforintegrationnotjustwithinsectors,butalsowithinWaSHprogrammes.The
evidence suggests there are disparities in funding and interventions for sanitation and hygiene
promotion,particularlymenstrualhygiene.Thewatercomponentisprioritisedintermsofcoverage
308INGOprofessional,Interview:INGO-3
231
andoperationcosts.Fromasystemsperspective,agenciesincorporatedredundancywithinWaSH
systems by setting up alternatewater supply sources, and alternate sanitationmechanisms for
controllingopendefecation.WithinWaSH,communitygroupsprioritisedaccesstoadequateand
safewatersupplyhigherthansanitation(tables5.4and6.8).Thisdependedontheirperceptions
andattitudestowardssanitation,pre-existingpractices,awarenessofrisksassociatedwithopen
defecationandcontaminationofwatersources.Thisawarenessandknowledgeabouttheriskscan
be enhanced through public health promotion activities and financial and technical support in
constructionoflatrinesbyhumanitarianagencies.AgencyAfocusedmoreonconstructinglatrines,
bathingcubiclesandrehabilitatingwatersources,whichwerevisibleaspectsofWaSH,whilethe
intangiblechangesinhygienepracticesandmenstrualhygieneweredifficulttocapture.Thefocus
was on outputs such as the number of hygiene campaigns, training programmes and village
meetings, and changes identified from KAP surveys, but these did not reflect the outcomes of
hygiene behavioural changes that occur over the longer term. Similarlymenstrual hygienewas
ignored,sincediscussingmenstruationwasconsideredataboo;womenwereculturallyprohibited
toopenlydiscusstheirprivateneedsandconcerns.Therefore,thisresearcharguesthatintegration
isanessentialcomponentwithinWaSH,andacrossWaSHandothersectorsthatareessentialfor
recovery, inorder that the changesover timeare transformational innaturewhere community
recoveryprioritiesareholisticallyaddressedtofacilitatecommunityresilience.
7.4Reflectingontheresearchframeworkandquestions
Inthissection, I reflectontheconceptual frameworkonresilience inWaSH(Chapter3)andthe
researchquestions inthe lightoftheanalysisofempiricalevidence(SeeFigure7.1). Initiallythe
conceptualframeworkwasdevelopedtoexploreWaSHsystemsduringrecoverywiththehelpof
identifiedthemes–learning,participation,institutionalcapacitiesandintegration.However,there
were certain contextual, scalar, temporal and methodological challenges while using the
framework,whichemergedduringthefieldworkandanalyticalstages.
232
Figure7.1:CommunityResilience:ConceptualframeworkforWaSHduringrecovery
Contextualaspects:Theforemostchallengeofusingatwo-dimensionalframeworkwasthatitdid
not incorporateanycontext.Using thesame framework in twodifferentcontexts inAssamand
Odisha showed differences in the stakeholder capacities and interests, the nature, impact and
frequency of disasters in each context. TheWaSH development scenario and the communities’
responseandchangesafterthedisastersweredifferentinbothcasestudies.Hence,includingthe
context of the recovery and resilience processes – recurring nature of disasters, one-off mega
disasters like cyclones, and pre-disaster socio-economic development context – helps in
understandinghowrecoveryisdifferentineachcontextandwhatfactorsdeterminethechangesin
WaSHpracticesandaccesstoWaSHfacilities.Thecontext-specificWaSHpracticesanddevelopment
progress in sanitation and improved access to water supply can help analysewhat transitional
LearningandKnowledge
Institutionalcapacities
Participation Integration
How can learning, knowledge, andparticipatory approaches help intranslating the window of opportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?
How can the existing policies inWaSHand recovery be strengthened toincorporate resilience in WaSH?Furthermore,howcanthesepoliciesbeeffectivelytranslatedintopractice?
How effectively do agencies facilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewith long-term development acrossdifferentsectors?
How can learning, knowledge, andparticipatory approaches help intranslating the window of opportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?
233
approachescanbeusedtolinkrelief,recoveryanddevelopment.Acentralargumentofthisthesis
–thatinstitutionsareunabletoaddresstheunderlyingstructuralissues,whichcausedisastersin
thefirstplace–canbereflectedintheframeworkbyincludingcontextualaspects.
Scalaraspects:Theconceptualframeworkdidnotdepictthescalarperspective–theactorsand
stakeholdersinvolvedinWaSHandrecovery–foranalysingrecoveryandresilience.Referringto
themulti-scalarperspectiveintheframeworkwillhelptointerpretactionsandresponsebyvarious
actorsandunderstandthedifferenceswithineachresponse.Itemergedduringthemainfieldwork
in2013,thatvaluesandpoweraspectswereabsentintheframeworkbecausemultipleactorsand
theirresponseswerenotpartoftheframework.Theempiricalresearchshowedthateachactor
interpretsresiliencedifferently.Hence,cleardepictionofscaleintheframeworkenablesthereader
topositionthemselvesforbetterunderstandingandinterpretation.Includingthescalaraspectsof
recoveryhelpsinestablishinglinkagesbetweentheactors,andthepowerdynamicsbetweenthe
actors.
Temporalaspects:Theempiricalevidenceshowedthatcyclicalandrecurringdisastersinfluenced
recovery processes; hence learning, participation and institutional capacities can be studied at
variouspointsintimetounderstandhowrecoveryisimpacted.Thisresearcharguesthattemporal
aspectsareimportantastherecoveryprocessunfoldsovertime,whileorganisationalinterventions
are over shorter timeframes and consider recovery nearer to the time of the disaster. Existing
studieshavehighlightedtheneedforlongitudinalandretrospectivestudiestoidentify,understand
andsustainchangesstimulatedbydisasters.ThisresearchdemonstratedthatWaSHpracticesand
access to facilities changed over time; hence acknowledging the temporal aspects within the
frameworkwillidentifyapproachestoestablishandsustainWaSHbehaviouralchanges.
Methodologicalaspects:Theframeworkwasdevelopedtounderstandcommunityresilienceand
howagencies can facilitate recoveryusingdifferent approaches.However, during the courseof
subsequentfieldworkandanalysistheagencyperspectivechangedgradually.Themicroscopicfocus
on households and communities (see section 7.5.1) helped to develop an understanding of the
inherentdynamiclinkagesandinteractionspost-disasters.Includingmethodologicalaspectsinthe
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framework can specifically guide agencies to implement WaSH during recovery focussing on
emerging WaSH trajectories, and dynamic recovery processes. This will inform the sampling
strategy,theselectionofvillagesdependingontheNGOinterventions.Therefore,Ibelievethatthe
methodological approach, had it been focused entirely on developing a framework to guide
humanitarianactors,orgovernmentinstitutions,wouldhaveemphasiseddifferentaspectsduring
recovery.Thisisadirectionforfutureresearch,whichcouldproducerichinsights.
Developingatoolforpractitionersforunderstandingrecoverycouldincludehowthedataforeach
indicatorisgatheredandranked(Annexure3).Thiscanguideagencyinterventionsduringrecovery.
Thisisareflectionstemmingfrommydualroleinthefieldasapractitionerandresearcher,onhow
agenciesdesignandimplementtheirrecoveryprogrammes.Asareflectivepractitioner,Ifoundthat
theagenciesusedparticipatorytoolstogatherinformation,nottofulfiltheemancipatoryobjectives
ofparticipation(LeDeetal.2014).Ratheragenciesusedparticipatorytoolsmerelytoguideand
inform the programmes. Hence developing a tool for practitioners could describe themethods
involvedfordatagatheringandanalysis.
Similarly, in lightof theempirical dataanalysis andwith thehindsightofhaving conducted this
research,Irevisittheoriginalresearchquestions.Thisoffersanopportunitytoreflectonwhether
thesequestionswereappropriatetobeginwith,andhowcantheybeposeddifferently.Themain
researchquestion"Howeffectivelydodifferentapproachestowaterandsanitationfacilities,and
hygienepractices,duringpost-disasterrecoverypromotecommunityresiliencetodisasters?”was
theguidingframeworkofthisresearch.Anymodificationinthisquestionwouldhavealteredthe
theoretical foundation of the research. The focus on community resilience provided a different
perspectiveandvaluetothisresearch.Perhapsadifferentstartingpointwouldhaveenabledmeto
understand degrees of changes in WaSH practices by households, and interventions by both
governmentandNGOs.Inhindsight,itemergesthatthesubresearchquestionscouldhavebeen
framed in such a way to provide a clearer perspective to understand changes at household,
communityandpolicylevels.Astrongerfocusintheresearchquestiontounderstandwhattriggers
and sustain changes in WaSH behaviour could have helped identify learning approaches and
235
strategies thatagencies couldadopt touse thewindowofopportunityprovidedbydisasters to
makelastingchanges.
Lastly, Ibelievethatposinganadditionalquestioncouldhavehelpedmetogather,analyseand
present empirical data in a richermanner“How do households affected by disasters learn and
changetheirpracticesrelatedtoWaSHduringrecovery;andwhatdoesthistellusabouthowdo
communitiescopewithrecurringdisasters?”Sucharesearchprojectcouldhaveprovidedtangible
insightsonhowexistingpoliciesareorarenotworking,insteadofacommentaryonhowWaSH
policiesarecurrentlybeingimplemented.Thisresearchprojectofcourse,wouldhaverequireda
completelydifferentsetofmethodologicalapproaches,andwouldbeafarmoreambitiousproject.
7.5Emergingthemesfromtheempiricalevidence
The aspects of context and scale helped to analyse agency approaches to promote community
resilience.Thissectiondescribesnewemergingthemes,whichwerenotoriginallyreflectedwithin
the frameworkandresearchquestions.Thesemicroscopicandcontext-specificaspectsofWaSH
and recovery processes help to study how households’ and communities’ WaSH systems are
impacted by disasters and how they recover over time. The analysis of gender and household
perspectives, and intra-household power dynamics, helps to understand how these influence
household recoveryprocessesandaccess toWaSH facilities. Theseaspectswere ignoredwithin
standardisedhumanitarianprogrammingandtop-downgovernmentaction.Thissectionmarksthe
transitionofthinkinginthisresearch,wheretheinitialunderstandingofWaSHfromasystemsand
technological outlookmoved to a viewpoint of agency response and recovery programmes, to
graduallyacknowledgingthatthesocio-economicandculturalaspectsofWaSHduringrecoveryare
alsocritical todevelopanadvancedunderstandingof resilience.Theemergingthemes fromthe
empirical evidence, on WaSH trajectories in recovery, gendered processes of recovery and
coproductionoflearningaredescribedindetail.
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7.5.1WaSHTrajectoriesduringRecovery
This sectiondiscusses emerging findings at thehousehold and community level, using the term
‘trajectories’tounderstanddifferentscenarios,asdescribedintheempiricalchapters(Section5.2
and6.2).Theevolutionofrecoveryalongacontinuumisfundamentaltothenotionoftrajectories
inthisresearch.Trajectorieshavebeenpreviouslyused instudiesoncomplexadaptivesystems,
and socio-ecological systems tounderstand changesover time (Holling1973;Ramalingamet al.
2008;Guijt2007;Broto2015),andinresiliencestudies(Mayunga2007).Therecoverytrajectories
after disaster have been the focus of discussion for many years (Moser 2008, p.6), indicating
differences inhazardexposure anddisaster impactsbetweendifferent sites (Chhotray and Few
2012).TrajectorieshelpinunderstandingtheWaSHrecoveryprocessesinAssamandOdisha,which
emergefromthesameevent,andevolveovertime,andindifferentlocations.Thearrowsindicate
thesetrajectories,representingdynamichouseholdtrajectoriesinacontinuumandpossibilitiesof
multiplerealitiesbasedonexperiences,andvariationsandcontext-specificmanifestations(Figure
7.2).
237
Figure7.2:HouseholdTrajectoriesinWaSHduringrecovery
238
Figure7.2representsamicro-level,disaggregateddepiction,shapedby(andshapes)thefollowing
threeelements,asrecoveryunfolds.Theseare:
A) Household characteristics (such as socio-economic conditions, cultural attitudes and
motivation,location,technology,prioraccessandavailabilityofWaSHfacilities)
B) Contributingfactors(natureofdisastersandexternalsupport)
C) Trajectoriesfeatures(learning,copingstrategies,preparedness,hygienebehaviourchanges
andpost-disasteraccesstoWaSH)
Thehouseholdcharacteristicsarelinkedwiththecontributingfactors–natureofthedisasterfaced
bythehouseholds,andtheavailabilityofexternalsupportthroughgovernmentorhumanitarian
actors. The resulting trajectory featuresdependon these characteristicsand factors,working in
conjunctionwith each other. Thus, the trajectories are path-dependent, influenced by a set of
factors and their presence or absence. The factors, in a loosely bounded box, indicate porous
boundaries,whichareinfluencedbylargersocio-politicalprocesses.Theseprocessesincludemacro-
level policies related to resettlement support, forced relocation, migration or flood protection
measureslikeembankments,orissuesrelatedtolandownership,livelihoodsandhousing.
Socio-economicfactors:ThehouseholdsdisplayedvariationsintheirWaSHpracticesandrecovery
investmentsdependingona complex interplayof socio-economic factors suchasgender, caste,
tribes, religion, immigrants, class and economic conditions. The empirical evidence shows
differencesinthecommunities’accesstoWaSHfacilitiesandknowledgeofsafehygienepractices
dependingonsocio-economicfactors(Section5.2and6.2).InAssam,thepoorhouseholdslivedin
temporarysettlementsforthefivemonthsofthemonsoon,withlimitedabilitiestoinvestinprivate
handpumpsorlatrines.Thosehouseholds,whohadasecuremeansofincomethroughremittances,
orbusinessesinthetownships,wereabletoinvestinlatrinespost-disastersinAssam,orrepairthe
water-sources.InOdishatoo,thefishinghouseholdslivedonahand-to-mouthexistenceanddid
notinvestinorprioritiseindividualwatersourcesorlatrines.
Culturalattitudesandmotivation:Cultureinfluencedthelocalknowledgeandmotivationinfluenced
changes inWaSHpracticespost-disasters. InAssam,women traditionally usedkolshis forwater
239
collection, and used clothes or alum for filtering water. In Assam and Odisha, these practices
reiteratedover time,andplayedout in relationtoagency interventions,suchasuseofchlorine
tablets or candle water filters for water filtration. The cultural attitudes and generational
perceptionsdeterredmanyhouseholdmembersfromusinglatrines–mencontinueddefecatingin
theopenalthoughhouseholdlatrinesexistedandinsistedwomenuselatrinesfortheirsecurityand
safetyafterdark(Section6.2.4). InAssam,childrendemandedforschool latrines(Section5.2.5),
while the elderly members preferred to defecate in the open. This difference was due to
generationalattitudes(Section5.2.5),becausetheelderlyareconditionedtouselatrinesfromthe
previousgenerations–theirattitudesaredifficulttochange,afindingsimilartoastudyconducted
by Coffey et al (2014) in a non-emergency context in India. The individual motivation of men,
women, children, andelderly, aswell as inter-householdpowerdynamics influencedhousehold
decisionsonWaSHinvestmentsduringrecovery.
Prior WaSH accessibility and availability: The prior access 309 to WaSH influenced household
trajectoriesdependingonhouseholdandagencyinvestmentsinWaSH.InAssam,womentravelled
1-2kilometresandwaitedformorethananhourforcollectingwater(SeeSection5.2.2).During
disasterswomenhadtotravelfartherusingboatstocollectwaterfromdistantwatersources,orby
wadingthroughdeepfloodwaters.Theavailabilityofsafedrinkingwaterwasconstraineddueto
damages to theexisting sources,andextensiveuseby thedisplacedhouseholds.AsperCensus
2011, Assam has coverage of 59.6% of household toilets. During disasters, in both Assam and
Odisha,memberscontinuedtodefecateintheopen–nearbushes,floodwatersorontheroadside.
Thepre-disasterlackoftoiletscouldbeattributedtoeconomicreasons,culturalattitudes,socio-
economicreasons,lackofawarenessabouttheintrinsicandextrinsicbenefitsofaccessingtoilets
withinthehousehold,andtheappropriatetechnologiesasexplainedfurther.StudiesinAssamhave
identified lack of cost-effective solutions for latrines and low priorities accorded to latrines as
deterrentsinhouseholdinvestmentsinlatrines(GlobalSanitationFund2013).
309Accesstodrinkingwatermeansthatthesourceislessthan1kilometerawayfromitsplaceofuseandthatitispossibletoreliablyobtainatleast20litrespermemberofahouseholdperday(WHO/UN-Water2012)
240
Technology: Technology influenced the availability of WaSH facilities in the rural areas. The
households lacked technical knowledge of operation, repair, and maintenance of handpumps
(Section 5.2.5). InOdisha, the raised handpumps fell into disrepair due to lack ofmaintenance
(Section6.2.1).Theartesianwells inOdisha indiscriminatelyexhaustedthegroundwater,dueto
unregulated flow.Dependingon thenatureof thedisasterandsubsequentactions,appropriate
technologiessuitabletothecontextwereessential.Thefrequentdisplacementofhouseholdswas
challenging for suitableWaSH technologies used in the region.Mobility as a strategy of flood-
affectedhouseholdsinAssamaffectedfixedWaSHfacilities,asitdisruptedhouseholdaccess,and
riskedWaSH investmentsbeingwashedawaydue to erosion (Section5.2.5). InAssam,Mark-2,
Popular -6 and Tara direct action pumpswere in use,whichwere raised for protection against
floods,butwhencommunitiesweredisplacedduetoerosiontheyhadtoabandonthesefacilities.
For addressing these concerns in WaSH it was necessary to develop suitable and appropriate
cheaper alternatives for post-disasterWaSH interventions. For sanitation, an evidence base for
technological solutions in the coastal areas inOdishawasmissing (Section6.5.1). This deterred
investmentsinlatrinesinOdishabythehousehold,community,governmentorNGOs.Asargued
earlier, this research found that local solutions for latrines were essential depending upon the
geographicallocationsandnatureofdisasters.
Geographical Location: As one would expect, there are underlying tacit connections between
householdlocationandsocio-economicstatusesindeterminingaccesstoWaSHfacilities.Table6.2
indicatesthedifferentialavailabilityofwatersupplyfacilitiesinOdishaacrossthedifferentvillages.
InOdisha,thehouseholdsincoastalandislandlocationsdependedoncommunalwatersources,
while in the inland villages, the households owned individual handpumps. The topographical
aspects,livinginhazardouslocationsandfrequentdisplacementduetodisastershaveaninfluence
onexistingWaSH infrastructure. Thehousehold locationemergesas thebackgroundwhere the
relationshipsbetweenhouseholds,theirsocialnetworksandaccesstotheWaSHfacilitiesplayout
atanygivenpointintime.Thetopographyinfluencedhouseholdwaterandsanitationtechnologies.
Inregionssufferingfromregularflooding,raisedWaSHfacilitieswerebuilt;inareas,sufferingfrom
erosion therewas a need formobilewater supply, treatment and sanitation technologies. The
householdslivinginhazardousareas–incloseproximitytorivers,coastalareas,islandsandchars
241
weresusceptibletodisasters,andtheWaSHsystemshadapropensitytosufferdamagesduring
disasters. In coastalOdisha, cyclone and flood shelters for refugeduringdisasters lackedWaSH
facilities.InAssam,ingovernmentschoolsrunasreliefcamps,affectedpopulationsweredenied
access to school WaSH facilities (Section 5.2.2). When households on the ‘wrong’ side of the
embankment, unprotectedby the river relocated, theyabandonedWaSH facilities in 2013. This
indicatesthatgeographicallocationinfluencestheWaSHtrajectoriesinconjunctionwiththenature
ofdisasters.
Natureofdisasters:ThisresearchfoundthattheimpactonWaSHsystemsdependedonthedisaster
types – cyclones, floods or erosion. The recovery processes depended on the impacts, and the
agencysupport.Incyclone-affectedareasinOdisha,thestormsurgecausedstructuraldamagesto
theWaSHfacilitiesinthecoastalandislandvillagesleadingtogroundwatercontamination(Section
6.2.3).Whileintheerosion-affectedareasinAssamandOdisha,theWaSHfacilitieswerecompletely
washedaway,sohouseholdsresortedtoopenwatersources.Inflood-affectedareas,thenatureof
floodinghaddifferentconsequencesfortheWaSHsystems:overtoppingorbreachofembankments
destroyedexistingWaSH infrastructure,water inundation ledtosubmergenceofWaSHfacilities
and groundwater contamination affecting water quality. The empirical evidence indicated how
theseinfluencedthehouseholdtrajectoriesinWaSH:householdsadoptedstructuralmeasuresthat
suitedthehazardcontext.InareasofsubmergencetheWaSHfacilitieswereconstructedonraised
platforms, or on stilts, while in areas where erosion was a regular phenomenon, households
investedtheleastamountofresourcesinWaSHfacilitiesormobilestructuresthatcouldbeeasily
dismantled. For instance,householdsused self-built primitive latrines, and installedhandpumps
thatwereeasytoremoveandreinstallduringrelocation.
External support: The presence, absence and quality of external agency support influenced the
WaSH trajectories. In thepresenceofhumanitarianandgovernmentagency support, therewas
improvement in WaSH facilities and practices. Agencies provided raised water sources and
sanitationfacilities,andinstalledcommunaltoiletsforeasyaccessibilityduringdisastersonaraised
mound(Section5.2.2and6.2.3).InAssam,agenciesusedlocallyavailablematerialsforemergency
latrines and raisedwater sources. In addition, the humanitarian actors held hygiene promotion
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campaignsandcommunityawarenessprogrammesforenhancingWaSHknowledge,attitudesand
practices. In instanceswhen external agencies did not give support during recovery, theWaSH
trajectoriesdependedontheprioraccesstofacilities,experientiallearning,motivationandsocio-
economicfactors.Forinstance,householdsbuiltprimitivelatrinesafterthe2013floodsinAssam,
and Odisha, which were financially cheap, but not technically improved sanitation facilities.
Therefore,itwasimportantthathouseholdshadfinancialandtechnicalinputstomaketheWaSH
facilitiessafer,mobile,cheaperandresilienttodisasters.
Theinfluencesofhouseholdcharacteristicsandcontributingfactorsintherecoveryandresilience
process result in various household trajectory features. The WaSH trajectories vary between
households, and each household may exhibit one or many of the trajectory features: coping
strategies,learning,hygienebehaviouralchanges,preparednessandimprovementsinpost-disaster
accesstoWaSHfacilities,someofwhichwerepresentedearlierinthischapter.Theoutcomesof
learning,coping,hygienebehaviourchangesandpreparednesswerediscussedinSection7.2.1.The
improvementinpost-disasteraccesstoWaSHemergedasasignificantandtangiblefeatureofthe
WaSHtrajectories.Therewasanimprovementinknowledgeandpracticesduringrecovery,because
households relied upon the communal handpumps and latrines. The households had access
toVestagaardfiltersandcandlewaterfiltersthathelpedimprovewaterquality.Duringrecovery,
householdshadaccesstoimprovedWaSHfacilitiesinthevillages,andWaSHfacilitieswereprovided
atthereliefcamps,embankmentsandschools.TheseimprovedaccesstoWaSHduringrecurring
disasters. The improved access is indicated through increase in the number of available water
sources,thesmallerdistancesfromhouseholdsandsettlementstoaccessWaSHfacilities,andlower
numberofpeoplesharingthefacilities,andtheresultantdecreaseinthequeuingtimeatthewater
sources.Throughexternalinterventions,rehabilitationofdamagedfacilitiesallowedforimproved
accesstoWaSHsources(Section5.2.2).
7.5.2GenderedrecoveryprocessesinWaSH
The empirical evidence draws attention to the intra-household power dynamics and underlying
socialfactorsdefininggenderedrolesandresponsibilitiesinWaSH(Section5.2and6.2).Aswomen
areresponsibleforwatercollectionandstorage,cookingandchildcare,theirroleisimplicitwithin
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theWaSHtrajectories.Itbecomeschallengingduringfloodsandcyclonesbecausethenearestwater
sourcesaredamaged,sowomenaccessdistantsourcesbywading throughneck-deepwater,or
dependonmen forboats to travel in floodwaters to fetchwater. Ithasbeenargued inexisting
studiesthatalthoughmenparticipateinagenderedactivity,thisisnotatruereversalofgender
roles, but a temporary role (Sultana 2010). This research indicates that the entrenched gender
normsandsensitivitiesmakeitdifficultforwomentorecover,astheyareconstrainedinaddressing
theirpersonalneedsregardingmenstrualhygieneanddefecationduringdisasters.Womengofor
opendefecationearlyinthemorningorafterdusktoavoidbeingseen,forissuesrelatedtoprivacy
anddignity.Theissuesrelatedtomenstrualpracticesandmaintainingpersonalhygieneareoften
overlookedinpost-disasterpriorities.Women’sneedforprivacywasmoreasociallydictatednorm,
for inappropriatenessofmengazingatthem,whilebathing,defecatingorurinating.Thisechoes
findings from a non-emergency context in rural Rajasthan (O’Reilly 2010). Menstrual hygiene
emergedasthe‘silent’need,whichwasleastexpressedordiscussedbutwasessentialforwomen’s
dignity, privacy, health and wellbeing. During emergencies, due to lack of latrine facilities and
sanitarymaterials,womenfaceddifficulties inwashing,changinganddryingtheusedmenstrual
clothes (Section 5.2.3). The use of sanitary pads had cost implications, whenwomen had little
controlover thehousehold finances, andwereunawareof theproperdisposalmechanisms for
sanitarypads(Section6.2.3).Theculturalnormsisolatedandsecludedmenstruatingwomenand
adolescentgirls,whofacedmobilityordietaryrestrictions.Thislackofawarenessandknowledge
of hygienic practices and related cultural norms were generational, impacting women’s
participation in daily activities and chores, and school attendance during menstruation for
adolescentgirls.
Thesegenderedrecoveryprocessesformthesecondemergingthemeofthisthesisthatwomenare
burdened by their ‘triple roles’ - productive, reproductive and community in the post-disaster
situation (Ray-Bennett 2009b). This empirical research highlights that within the household
trajectoriesduringrecovery,themen,andwomen(childrenandelderlyordisabled)havedifferent
needsanddifferentaccesstoWaSHfacilitiespost-disasters.Insteadofcallingthesewomen’sneeds
orpriorities,thisresearchrecommendsagenciesusegenderedapproachestoshowthatalthough
thedifferentialimpactsonwomencanbesingularlyaddressed,itisequallyimportanttobesensitive
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tomen’sperceptionsandattitudestowardswomen’sneeds,rolesandresponsibilitiesrelatedto
WaSH during disasters. Ignoring or overlooking gender priorities or unmet needs affected daily
householdactivities,healthandwellbeingduringdisasters(Section5.2.2).InAssam,menoverruled
decisionstakenbywomenregardingsitingoffacilities(Section5.6.2).
AlthoughitisacknowledgedthatwomeninitiatechangesatthehouseholdlevelinWaSHthrough
handwashing, use of latrines, and safe water handling practices, the decision on household
investmentsinlatrinesisoftentakenbymentoprotectwomenandchildrenfromassaultduring
opendefecationinthedark.Theseintra-householdpowerdynamicsandpowerimbalanceswithin
the community influenced control of resources and investments inWaSH, livelihoods or house
repairs during recovery. Social processes in regular lives were exacerbated on interaction with
naturaldisasterprocessestoproducethedifferentiatedvulnerabilitiesandsufferingsthatensue,
whichhavegenderedimplications.
Thegenderedrecoveryprocessesalsooccurredduetoout-migrationofmenandyouthsinAssam
andOdishatoearnincomeinthetownsandcities,leavingbehindthewomen,childrenandelderly.
Thewomenwereresponsibleforrelocatingandrebuildingpost-disasters,whilethecontrolover
money – in the formof remittances, resources and land ownership – remainedwithmen. This
limited women’s choices in household investments in leasing land, paying masons, purchasing
essential items, or installing handpumps or latrines. Therewere gender differences in recovery
priorities:womenprioritisedWaSHbasedontheirunderstandingofthepreventivebenefitsofsafe
hygienepractices,andthedifficultiestheyfacedinaccessingWaSHfacilitiesduringdisasters.The
menprioritisedproductiveassetssuchaslivelihoods,shelterandlandsecurityduringrecoverywhile
womenprioritisedwatersupply,sanitationandeducationasrecoveryobjectives (Section5.3.2).
Theseprioritieswerenegotiated, contestedandactedupondifferentlyby themenandwomen
withinthehouseholdsdependingupontheintra-householdpowerdynamics(casesA6-A8insection
5.2.5).
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7.5.3Coproductionofknowledge
Theanalysisofempiricaldatahighlightedanewemergingtheme–coproductionofknowledgeby
affectedhouseholds,communities, localactors,governmentandNGOs.This involvedgenerating
knowledgeofsafeWaSHpractices,anduseoflocaltraditionalknowledgeforpromotingcommunity
resiliencethroughWaSHwithexternalsupport.InAssamandOdisha,householdsparticipatedin
therecoveryprogrammingwheretheywerejointlyinvolvedincommunityprojectswiththeagency
A in WaSH knowledge generation and asset building. This was undertaken through enhanced
awarenessof safeWaSHpractices,constructionofWaSHfacilities,andsharedunderstandingof
localconstructionpracticesandhazardcontext.Thisjointproductionofknowledgeistermedhere
ascoproductionofknowledge(Armitageetal.2009;Heggeretal.2012).Thehouseholdsalongwith
otherstakeholdersplayakeyroleinthecoproductionofknowledge(Edelenbosetal.2011).
This research found instances of coproduction of knowledge in WaSH, where community
participation and agency support led to changes in newly installed WaSH infrastructure post-
disasters.Theparticipatoryprocessesweredirectedtowardsdevelopingcommunityparticipants'
technical expertise in repair and maintenance of handpumps, and mobile latrine construction
throughtrainingworkshopsanddemonstration.InAssam,agenciesbuiltontraditionalpracticesof
chang ghars (houses on raised stilts) along with handpumps and latrines in Assam, and raised
handpumps inflood-proneareas. InOdisha,agency-built latrinesweremodifiedtosuitthe local
context throughcommunity feedbackandparticipation in the constructionprocess (See section
6.5).InCFW,communitymembersparticipatedintheconstructionofraisedmoundswithWaSH
facilities for access during disasters, pond generation, and debris cleaning post-disasters. This
coproductionmechanismenabledhouseholdsandcommunitiestohaveaccesstoWaSH,whereby
theinstitutionsprovidedtechnicalknowledgeandexpertisefordealingwithregulardisasters.
Thischapterearlierdescribedthechallengesinlearning,knowledgeandparticipatoryapproaches,
whichlimitedtheextentofcoproductionofknowledgeasunderstoodinthisresearch(Section7.2).
Theagencieshadlimitedunderstandingofindigenouspractices,andshortprogrammedurations
hinderedtheextentofparticipationandlearningacrossagencies,householdsandcommunities.
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Chapter8:Conclusions
Thischapterpresentstheconclusionsoftheresearchonbuildingcommunityresilience inWaSH
during ongoing recovery processes. It answers the research questions and provides
recommendations(Section8.1),discussestheoreticalimplicationsofthisresearch(Section8.2)and
presentsitsconceptualandmethodologicalcontributions(Section8.3).Italsosuggestsdirections
forfutureresearch(Section8.4).
8.1AnsweringtheResearchQuestions
Inthissection,Ianswertheresearchquestionsandproviderecommendations.Thesub-research
questionsare:
1. How can the existing policies in WaSH and recovery be strengthened to incorporate
resilience in WaSH? Furthermore, how can these policies be effectively translated into
practice?
2. Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthewindow
ofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?
3. Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewithlong-term
developmentacrossdifferentsectors?
Lastly, I answer the main research question and draw upon recommendations for policy and
practice.Thequestiondrivingthisresearchis:Howeffectivelydodifferentapproachestowaterand
sanitation facilities, and hygiene practices, during post-disaster recovery promote community
resiliencetodisasters?
8.1.1HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthenedtoincorporate
resilience inWaSH?Furthermore,howcan thesepoliciesbeeffectively translated into
practice?
Chapter 7 presented the existing policies, discussed the lack of agency WaSH support during
recovery,andreflectedonthegapsinthepoliciesemergingfromtheempiricalevidence.Although
post-disasterrecoverypresentedopportunitiestoimprovepracticesandupgradeexistingaccessto
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WaSH facilities, there were contextual and programmatic challenges that were difficult to
overcome. The agencies’ – government, local actors and humanitarian NGO – policies and
programmesfocusedonreliefandresponsemeasures,overlookingWaSHneedsduringrecovery.
Governmentsupport–householdsubsidiesunderwatersupplyandsanitationschemes,disaster
damage compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement support – was missing in the recovery
phase. The response focused on immediate reliefmeasures,whichwas inadequate in terms of
coverageinwatersupply.Thegovernmentplanningandeffortsoverlookedsanitationprovisionand
hygienepromotion.This limitedthescopeforchangesinWaSHpracticesandaccesstosafeand
improvedWaSHfacilities.
Theanalysisofnationalandstategovernmentpoliciesandhumanitarianagencyprogrammesshows
thatWaSHduringrecoveryremainsacriticalgap.Thenationaldisastermanagementpolicylacks
clear guidelines for addressing recovery objectives; government schemes in water supply,
sanitation, and state disaster relief manuals overlook provision of holistic WaSH – sanitation,
hygieneandmenstrualhygiene–supportpost-disasters. Inordertostrengthenthegovernment
policies in recovery andWaSH it is essential to shift the focus from a short-term relief centric
approach,whichislimitedtowatersupplyonly,andmovetowardslonger-termtransitionfocusing
on holistic WaSH, including sanitation, hygiene and menstrual hygiene needs. The state relief
manualsshouldbeupdatedinordertoaddresstheincreasingneeds,complexitiesandchallenges
ofrecurringdisasters(whichmaybeofamulti-hazardnature),andvulnerabilitiesofthepopulations
living intheat-riskareas.Thenationaldisastermanagementpolicyshouldconsidererosionasa
naturaldisasterandundertakemeasuresformitigatingthelossesduetoerosion,andplanrecovery
andrehabilitationsupportforaffectedcommunities.
The recoverymeasures should includestrategies toaddressandovercomeexistingchallenges–
prevalent open defecation practices, inadequate access to water sources, recurring disasters,
insecurelandandtenureaspects–forbuildingcommunityresilience.Thisresearchcontendsthat
WaSHshouldbeaddressedholisticallyinthepost-disasterefforts,alongwithprovisionofadequate
WaSHinfrastructureinreliefcampsandmulti-purposereliefshelters,andstrongercommitmentfor
improvingprogressinsanitationdevelopmentduringrecovery.Thepost-disastermeasuresshould
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addressdisaster impactsonexistingWaSHfacilities throughfinancial supportandrisk reduction
withindevelopmentschemesinruralwatersupplyandsanitation.Itissuggestedthatpoliciesdefine
stronger roles and build capacities of state authorities for disaster management and local
government actors to address longer-term recovery – through identifying needs, proposing
participatory recoveryplans, and strengthening the local serviceproviders includinghealth, and
educationforoutreacheffortsinhealthandhygienetotacklethechallengeofopendefecationby
generatingdemand.
The humanitarian actors addressed theWaSH needs of the poor, marginalised and vulnerable
groups, including water supply, sanitation, hygiene and menstrual hygiene. The recovery
programmes specifically addressed gender needs in the affected communities and supported
household recoveryby includingwomen in their interventions.However, theprogrammeswere
time-boundandshorter-term;hence,theyfounditdifficulttosustainhygienebehaviouralchanges,
andaddressopendefecation,andstructuralissuesrelatedtoriverineerosion,resettlement,failure
ofembankmentsandlandtenuresecurity.Agenciesprioritiseddisastersbasedonavailablefunding,
disaster impacts and attention, which meant that erosion, recurring floods were ignored, and
recoverymeasureswereundertakenonly aftermajordisasters suchas cyclonesand large-scale
floods.Itisrecommendedthathumanitarianagenciesclearlydefinetheirrecoverymandates,and
influencedonorpoliciesforlonger-termintervention.Agenciesshouldincludecapacitybuildingof
local agencies and communities to address recoveryobjectivesusingparticipatory and inclusive
approaches.Thisapproachwillenablecommunitiestotackleattitudesandpracticesrelatedtoopen
defecation,anddevelopstrategiestoaddresslarger-levelissuesrelatedtofloodprotection,damage
compensationandresettlementofcommunitieslivinginflood-anderosion-affectedareas.
8.1.2Howcanlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproacheshelpintranslatingthe
windowofopportunityavailableduringrecoveryintoaction?
Section7.2exploredandanalysedlearning,knowledge,andparticipatoryapproaches.Thesocial
learningmechanismsinWaSHfocusedonimmediateWaSHneeds,overlookinglonger-termissues
ofaccessandchangesinWaSHsystems.Householdsandcommunitiescontinuedopendefecation
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andunsafewaterhandlingpracticeswithouteffortstoincreaseawareness,financialsupportand
changes in attitudes. Government agencies differed in their approaches to initiate recovery
processes,andinthisway,theylearntfromexperiences.Thepost-disasterinterventionsfocused
ontop-downprotectionmeasureswithoutengaging,consultingandempoweringthecommunities.
The empirical evidence suggests that ad hoc embankment construction further exacerbated
community vulnerabilities, forcing them to relocate in the event of recurring disasters. Analysis
showed that social learning mechanisms focused on corrective measures, and humanitarian
organisations engaged in learning for improvement, without bringing about radical changes in
agencyprogrammingstrategiesandimplementation.
Thisresearchconcludesthatparticipationofaffectedcommunitiesshouldbeinitiatedinthedesign
phaseoftheprogrammes,insteadofa‘phasedapproach’whereparticipationgraduallyincreases
in the responseprogramme. The sustainability ofWaSH committees and their capacity building
were important to factor during implementation of recovery programmes. Agencies adopted
inclusiveapproachesforrepresentationinthevillages,buildinguponexistingvillagedevelopment
committees.Forstrengtheningandsustainingtheseorganisationsitisimportanttoclearlydefine
the roles of themembers during and after theprogrammeshave ended. Encouragingwomen’s
participation in recoveryprogrammesand targeting femalemembersduringhygienepromotion
efforts were effective in enhancing awareness and improving household WaSH practices. The
emerging findings on gendered recovery processes show thatWaSH during recovery should be
addressedbyinvolvingbothmenandwomenduringcommunityparticipationtodiscussissuesfaced
by women in WaSH and in general during recovery. Participatory approaches should include
decision-makingonhouseholdinvestments,andchallengesfacedbywomenforaccessingdistant
WaSH facilities, lack of privacy and secure spaces for bathing, and attending to theirmenstrual
needs: these are culturally ingrained and depend on power dynamics at the household and
communitylevel.
Chapter7showsthatthewindowofopportunityavailableduringrecovery isnottranslatedinto
action.Hence,thereisaneedforstrengtheninginstitutionalcapacitiestoadoptlearning,knowledge
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andparticipatoryapproachestomeettheaffectedcommunities’recoveryneeds.Theseapproaches
canbemaximisedtotranslatetheopportunityintoaction,byaddressingunderlyingvulnerabilities
of communities living in hazardous locations, resource-constrained environments, and facing
recurringdisastersandnot justprovisionofWaSHfacilitiespost-disasters.Theemergingthemes
discussedinSection7.5.3indicatesthepotentialforcoproductionofknowledgeofsafeWaSHassets
andpractices to informandsustainhygienebehaviouralchangesand increasedaccess toWaSH
facilitiesduringrecovery.
Withthisperspective,institutionalcapacitiescanbestrengthenedduringrecoverytopreventand
mitigate impacts of disasters, and encourage people-centred development programmes.
Developing an evidence-base for technologies in different disaster contexts, local practices and
indigenousknowledgealongwithrapidlydeployablemarket-basedsolutionsandtechnologiesasa
preparedness activity will help improve humanitarian capacities for WaSH during recovery.
Humanitarian agencies’ monitoring, evaluation and learning mechanisms need to incorporate
lessons learnt and critically reflect on programmemandates and contextual needs rather than
proposing quick fixes and transferrable solutions. It is suggested that enhancing roles and
responsibilities of different actors and stakeholders in coproductionof knowledge inWaSHand
disasters by institutionalising consortia as space for collaboration and cross-learning can help
translate thiswindowofopportunityduring recovery through focusedactionsand commitment
fromallstakeholders.
8.1.3Howeffectivelydoagenciesfacilitatetheintegrationofemergencyresponsewith
long-termdevelopmentacrossdifferentsectors?
Section 7.3 explored the integration across time and sectors during recovery programmes.
Humanitarianagencies’programmingstrategiesdidnotexplicitlyincludealinkingreliefrecovery
anddevelopmentapproach(LRRD):instead,exitstrategiesreliedonlinkingprogrammeactivities
with the government’s development schemes. Integration across sectors – WaSH, shelter and
livelihoods–throughhumanitarianprogrammingwasachievedtocertainextent,whileintegration
withinWaSH–watersupply,treatment,sanitation,menstrualhygiene,andhygienepractices–was
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limited. The standard programme components, designed immediately after the disaster, were
basedonagencycapacitiesandexpertise.
To sustain post-disaster changes in WaSH behaviour it was necessary to provide institutional,
financialandtechnicalassistancetohouseholdsduringrecovery.Thehouseholdsandcommunities
hadtorecoverthemselvesfromcyclicalfloodsanderosion,whilestrugglingwithpoverty,insecurity
in food, livelihoods and land tenure, and deal with the failure of embankments as protection
measures.Thisresearcharguesthatintegrationacrosstimeandvarioussectorscanhelpcommunity
recovery processes, preparedness towards future disasters and building inherent capacities for
resilience.Presently,agencyapproachestowardsintegrationarelimitedtofulfillingtheirsurvival
WaSHneeds,andrestoringlivelihoodsandintermediateshelter.Theresearchconcludesthatlack
of integration adversely affects recovery processes, and results in forced displacement and
outmigrationduetohostileandresource-constrainedenvironmentsandrecurringdisasters.
8.1.4 How effectively do different approaches to water and sanitation facilities, and
hygiene practices, during post-disaster recovery promote community resilience to
disasters?
Theexistingpoliciesandpracticefailtoaddressholisticandlonger-termrecoveryofhouseholdsand
communitiesaffectedbyfloods,cycloneanderosion.Therecurringdisastersposesignificantthreats
totheWaSHsystemsandtheirunsafepracticesposehealthhazardsintheemergency.Thiscanbe
addressed through learningandknowledgeapproaches,ashouseholdandcommunitymembers
becomeincreasinglyawareofsafeWaSHpractices.Learningandknowledgeisimportanttoimprove
and transform their existingpractices of opendefecation, unsafewater supply,women’s needs
relatedtomenstrualhygiene,handwashingandwatertreatment.Thecoproductionofknowledge,
resultingfromconsultativeprocesses,motivatescommunitiestoadopthouseholdlatrinesduring
recovery in the absence of agency support. Agencies can support sustained changes in WaSH
systemsbyprovidingappropriatetechnologyandlocalcheaperalternativesinWaSH–suitableto
thecontextandresilienttomultipledisastersintheregion–alongwithtechnicalknowledgeand
expertise.Forimprovingorganisationallearningmechanisms,thisresearchsuggestsparticipatory
approachesanddevelopinganevidencebaseforcontext-appropriatetechnologicalsolutions.
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Humanitarian agencies adopted participatory approaches during the implementation stages of
recovery programmes, whereas the government programmes lacked a consultative and
participatory approach in their longer-term projects. Humanitarian agencies used inclusive
approaches by targeting women-headed households, and involved women in their hygiene
promotionactivities.However,thisresearchconcludesthatagenciesshouldgobeyondtemporary
quickfixapproachesandsupporttransformationalchangesatthecommunity level,byanalysing
andaddressinghouseholdpowerdynamicsandgenderedrecoveryprocesses.
The institutional capacities to plan, design and implement recovery programmes depended on
agencymandatesandability togenerateresources for longer-termprogrammes.ForLRRD,pre-
existingpracticesandattitudes–towardsopendefecation,consumptionofcontaminatedwater
during disasters – should be changed. Agencies should prepare households and communities
towardsfuturedisasters,andsupportlonger-termrecoveryobjectivesduringthetransitionalphase.
Thedemandforimprovingefficiencyofgovernmentprogrammeimplementationinthevillagesis
crucialforeffectiveintegrationofhumanitarian,recoveryanddevelopmentaspects.Thisresearch
concludes thatpost-disasterhouseholdsandcommunitiesneed tobe supported, consultedand
informedfordesigninganddevelopinglonger-termplans.Thishelpsinreducinganxiety,frustration,
lossesanduncertaintyduetorecurringdisastersinresource-constrainedenvironments.
Throughtheanalysisofemergingthemes,andtheseapproachesatdifferentscales–household,
communities, local actors, government institutions and humanitarian agencies – this research
provides a new perspective on the initial conceptual framework components as pathways for
resilience.Thesepathwaysallowforsituating thecentral findingsof this researchaswellas the
emergingthemesofWaSHtrajectoriesandgenderedrecoveryprocesses.ChangesinWaSHduring
recoverygraduallyunfoldovertimeandvaryaccordingtospace,influencedbyrecurringdisasters,
pre-disasterWaSHcontextand institutional support. The learningandknowledge,participation,
institutional capacities and integration pathways for resilience facilitate recovery and resilience
frommultipleandrecurringdisasters.Withinthesepathways,therolesandcapacitiesofvarious
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actors, the post-disaster and dynamic interactions between stakeholders can be analysed and
strengthened.
8.2TheoreticalImplications
This research set out tounderstand thedynamicsbetweenWaSH systemsandpracticesduring
recoveryfromdisasters.TheunderexploredthemesofrecoveryandWaSH(Chapter2),wasstudied
using systems thinking to understand actions across scales, roles of multiple actors and their
approachestobuildcommunityresiliencetodisasters(Chapter3).Theempiricalfindingsanddata
analysis discuss factors influencing WaSH systems by improving access to WaSH facilities and
facilitatinghygienebehaviouralchangesduringrecovery(Chapters5,6and7).Thesefindingsand
analysesaddtoexistingknowledgeofhowWaSHsystemsandpracticesareimpactedbydisasters,
andhowagencysupportcanpromotecommunityresilience.Therearetheoreticalimplicationsfor
theexistingliteratureonrecovery,WaSH,andresilience.TherecoveryprocessesinWaSHatvarious
levels–households,communities,governmentandhumanitarianNGOs–fromtheresponseand
longer-termactivitiesareanalysed.
Theempiricalevidenceisreviewedtounderstandexistingrecoveryapproaches–BBB(BuildBack
Better),LRRDandwindowofopportunity(Chapter2).Whenaffectedbymultipledisasters,agencies
prioritiseddisasterbasedon thescaleofdisastersandexisting institutionalcapacities.Thenon-
inclinationof agencies to respond to regulardisasters likeerosionand recurring floods calls for
larger-levelpolicyactionstorecogniseerosionasadisaster.Thenon-interventionistapproachfails
tosupporthouseholdandcommunityrecoveryprocesses.Hence,theempiricalevidencesuggests
that recovery did not enable the building back better of disaster-affected households and
communities.TheLRRDapproachhasnotgainedcurrencywiththehumanitarianactorsexplicitly
studiedinAssamandOdisha.Agenciesattainedtransitionfromresponsetodevelopmentthrough
preparednessmeasuresandbybuildingstructurally resilientWaSHsystemstopreventdamages
duringsubsequentdisasters.
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This research provides empirical evidence for participation inWaSH recovery programmes, and
factors influencing implementation of technological solutions in different contexts. It is also
important that communities are involved and participate in programmes that influence their
recovery,developmentandoverallwellbeing.Thishasimplicationsforthetop-downprogrammes
undertaken by the government and guided participatory approaches adopted by NGOs which
consider communities as a homogeneous entity, capable of envisioning inclusive recovery and
resilience processes. There are intrinsic and extrinsic factors for sustaining hygiene behavioural
changes andpost-disaster access toWaSH facilities. The intrinsic factors – financial capabilities,
technicalknowledgeforconstructionandmaintenance,andmotivationforusingsafeandimproved
water sources and latrines – liewithin control of thehousehold and communitymembers. The
extrinsic factors – disaster impacts, institutional support in coproduction of WaSH assets – lie
beyondthecontrolofcommunities.Thesefactorshaveimplicationsforbuildbacksaferrecovery
theories:duetoinadequacyofsafeandimprovedcommunalwatersourcesandlatrinesinstalled
post-disasters, householdmembers used self-built primitive latrines, and consumedwater from
unsafehandpumpsduringrecovery,whichcouldnotbecategorisedas‘improved’WaSHsources.
The findingsalsoaddress thequestions raised in the literature review:whomdowebuildback
better for? (Section 2.1.3) In practice, the poor and vulnerable groups are identified through
participatoryapproachesinitiatedbythehumanitarianagencies.However,chapter7demonstrated
that it is unadvisable to restore pre-existing conditions that lacked access toWaSH facilities or
knowledgeofsafeWaSHpractices.Thisresearchquestionsthefeasibilityofbuildbackbetterasan
approach;insteaditadoptsresiliencethinkinginrecoverytoconsiderhouseholdandcommunity
needs,priorities,aspirationsandtheirvisionforfuture.Thisperspectiveshouldsupportagenciesto
linkprogrammesfrompre-topost-disasterandbeyond.
Thisresearchprovidesanalternativeperspectiveofresilience,asacontinualprocessof learning
andknowledge,andparticipationofcommunitiesand institutions.Forachievingresilience, time
and space are important aspects influencing the resilience processes to transform
household/communitycapacities.This shows thatactors,unitsand institutions,atagiven level,
recoverdifferentlybasedonpriorconditions.Throughsystemsthinkingthisresearchhighlightsthe
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inter-connections and dynamics between actors at different scales. In this research, resilience
thinkingisusedtoexplaindifferentialaccesstoWaSHfacilities,institutionalcapacitiestosupport
recovery,householdrelianceonsocialcapital.ResilienceinWaSHsystemsduringrecoverycanbe
promoted when hygiene behavioural changes are achieved through experiential learning,
coproduction of assets based on local practices, hazard contexts and appropriate technologies
provided by the institutions. Transformational changes are possible when underlying socio-
economicissuesandpre-existingpracticesareaddressedthroughparticipationofthehouseholds,
communityandlocalactorsinlearning,planningandimplementation.Therefore,resilienceisnot
anend-objectiveorstaticconcept,butunderstoodasaprocessthatconsistsofvariousbuilding
blocks – response, recovery or preparedness actions – influenced by dynamic interconnections
between actors, communities and the environment. The foundation for building community
resilience, in WaSH during recovery, lies in integration of institutional efforts with recovery
trajectoriesandcommunitypriorities,overtimeandacrossallsectors.
8.3Contributiontoknowledge
Thisthesiscontributestomethodological,practicalandpolicyspheres.AsindicatedinChapter2,
therearefewstudiesthatlookatNGOpracticesofWaSHduringrecovery,andfewerstillthatrelate
to resilience, hence this research develops an understanding of how changes occur in WaSH
practices.Theempiricalcasestudiesexploredrecoveryacrossdifferentdisasters–cyclonesand
recurringfloodsanderosion–describingthecontext,actorsandtheiractionswithinagivenpolicy
environment(Chapters5and6).
This research is original in its use of reflective practitioner methodology for gaining empirical
evidence of changes in WaSH systems and practices through recovery programmes. This
methodologyprovides insights intodecision-making,processesandapproachesdeployedduring
recovery, and systems and mechanisms within organisations. The empirical evidence gathered
throughaninsider’sperspectiveisausefulguideforagenciesinvolvedinplanningandimplementing
recoveryWaSHprogrammes.Thepositionofareflectivepractitioneralsoalloweduniqueaccessto
256
community perspectives, expectations and resultant changes as part of a humanitarian
organisation.
Thepracticalimplicationsofthisresearchhelptranslatethewindowofopportunityduringrecovery,
by improving access to WaSH facilities, and facilitating changes in sanitation preferences and
hygienepractices.Thecontributionofthisresearchtothepolicycontextlaysstrongemphasison
studyandanalysisofrecurringdisasters–floodsanderosion–andtheir impactsoncommunity
resilience. Transformational changes in thepolicy sphere can incorporate longer-term roles and
actionby institutions,governments,humanitarianandlocalNGOs,andcommunityorganisations
duringrecovery.
8.4Keyrecommendations
TherearekeyrecommendationsforhumanitarianagenciesworkinginWaSHduringrecoverybased
onthisresearch,whichincludefivecriticalaspectsthatwillfacilitateholisticrecoveryprogramming:
1) SupportingsociallearningmechanismstoaddressrecoveryandincludingalternativeWaSH
facilitiesforaccessduringdisasters;
2) Prioritising and triggering additional learning beyond corrective actions, improving
programme implementation and facilitating coproduction of knowledge along with
households,communities,andgovernmentagencies;
3) Testing,assessingandevaluatingtechnologicalsolutions forwatersupply, treatmentand
sanitationalongwiththehouseholdandcommunitypreferences;
4) Ensuring that inclusiveandparticipatoryapproachesareadopted in thebeginningof the
response programmes, where communities have a larger role to plan and design
programmesthataffecttheirrecovery,initiateandorganisetransformationalchangesover
thelonger-termrecovery;and
5) Adopting an LRRD approach and integrate sectors in response and recovery in order to
holistically address community needs. By adopting an LRRD approach, the pre-disaster
developmentalchallengesofunimprovedwaterfacilitiesandprevalenceofopendefecation
aretackledthrougheffectivegovernmentschemesandNGOactionduringrecovery.
257
Basedonempiricalevidence,thisresearchcommentsontheexistingpoliciesinAssam,Odishaand
nationallyondisastermanagementandWaSHschemes.InAssam,policyfocusonthechallenges
faced by communities displaced due to regular floods and erosion was missing. The futility of
embankmentsasfloodprotectionmechanismsandresultantdisplacementofcommunitiesexposed
tofloodrisksshouldclearlyreflectinthefloodmanagementpolicies.Thiswillleadtoalternative
measures for floodprotectionusingscientificaswellas traditionalmechanisms fordealingwith
floods.TheexistingAssamReliefManual,whichguidesthegovernmentbodiesintheeventofany
emergency,shouldbeupdatedto includeholisticapproachtoreliefandrecovery.Anintegrated
response should identify community needs during recovery, including water, sanitation and
hygiene,alongwithshelterandhousingoptions.Theexistingschemescanaddressrecoveryneeds
bycompensatingdamages incurred inhousehold toiletsand/orproviding incentives topromote
latrines after disasters. This approachwill help to engage communities proactively to endopen
defecationandreducehealthrisks.
InOdisha, theexistinggovernancemechanism focusedondisasterpreparednessandmitigation
measures.Intheaftermathofthecycloneandsubsequentfloods,itemergedthatamulti-hazard
approach to disaster management will be crucial in building resilience to future disasters. The
longer-termrecoveryplansandimplementationofreconstructionprogrammesfailtomaximisethe
opportunity to address pre-existing challenges and rebuild communities in a holistic manner.
Sanitation emerged as the least prioritised aspect of the government response; existing policy
mechanismsandschemes shouldaddress sanitationneeds.Existingwater supplyandsanitation
schemesshouldstronglyfocusonhygienepromotion.
The existing policies on disaster management andWaSH are blind to gendered approaches to
recovery.Thiswillreflectgenderedaspectsinthepoliciesinaholisticmanner,focussingonhow
water collection, transport of water and storage, defecation are undertaken by women and
adolescent girls. This is also crucial to understand they bear the impacts and responsibilities of
householdrecoveryintheabsenceofmenwhomigrateforwork.
258
8.5Issuesforfurtherresearch
ThisresearchprimarilyfocusedonWaSHduringrecovery;itdidnotexploreshelter,livelihoods,and
smallbusinessesduringrecovery.Althoughasystemsperspectivewouldhaveenabledscrutinyof
these sectors, it fell beyond the scope of this research. The emerging themes can be further
unpacked in future research: recovery processes are characterised by different community
priorities,WaSHtrajectories,genderedrecoveryprocessesandpathwaysforresilience.Suchastudy
couldexplaincausalityandinterrelationshipsbetweenfactorsidentifiedintheWaSHtrajectories
acrossdifferentscales,contextsandtime.Forinstance,thedynamicsbetweencommunities,and
localorganisations–governmentbodies,communitybasedorganisations,androleofcivilsocieties
–canbeanalysedwithparticularemphasisondevelopmentofWaSHsystemsinvariouscontexts.
Future research could either use a quantitative approach using development statistics to
understandnationalgovernmentprogrammeoutcomesduringrecovery,orunderstandbehavioural
changesusingethnographic,anthropologicalperspectiveonsocialrecovery.Futureresearchcould
bealongitudinalstudyofrecurringdisasterstoinfluenceexistingpoliciesthatwillreflectrealities
oferosionandflood-affectedpopulations.A longitudinalstudyofreconstructionprogrammes in
OdishaaftertheCyclone,orcomparativeanalysiswiththe1999supercyclone,couldstudyhow
transformativechangesoccurover10,15oreven20yearsfollowingthedisaster.
This study explored approaches used by institutions to effect changes in WaSH systems and
behaviour during recovery, characterised by ideas of ‘learning’, ‘community participation’, and
involving institutions. Future studies could use systems’ thinking for designing the research,
identifyingboundariesandanalysingconsequencesandchangestoprovideausefulfoundationfor
resiliencethinking.Thisapproachisfeasibletoexploreandexplaincomplexsystemsdealingwith
changesovertime.
Future studies can specifically explore the socio-political context ofWaSH programmes using a
political-economyapproachforresilience.InAssam,certainaspectsofWaSHsystemswereguided
byideasofcitizenship,legalownershipoflandandotherassets,rightsandentitlements.Further
researchcanexplorehowpoliticalidentitiesinfluencedresilienceinWaSH.Theunderstandingof
risks,perceivedbycommunitiesandhouseholdsintheseareas,andthemanifestationofhazards
259
across complex systems over time, and each context can provide enriching avenues for further
research. This will help go beyond contextual uniqueness and generalise using in-depth,
interdisciplinaryresearchforimprovingknowledgeofrecoveryandcommunityresilience.
260
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Walker,B.&Salt,D.,2006.ResilienceThinking:SustainingEcosystemsandPeople inaChangingWorld,WashingtonDC:IslandPress.
Walker,G.etal.,2006.AddressingEnvironmentalInequalities :FloodRisk,Bristol,UK.
Wenger,E.,2000.CommunitiesofPracticeandSocialLearningSystems.Organization,7,pp.225–246.
Whatley,B.,2013.ImprovedlearningforgreatereffectivenessindevelopmentNGOs.DevelopmentinPractice,23(8),pp.963–976.
Whittall, J., Philips, M. & Hofman, M., 2014. Opinion and Debate: Building resilience bydeconstructing humanitarian aid. Available at: http://www.msf.org.uk/article/opinion-and-debate-building-resilience-deconstructing-humanitarian-aid[AccessedAugust14,2015].
WHO/UN-Water,2012.UN-WaterGlobalAnalysisandAssessmentofSanitationandDrinking-Water(GLAAS):2012ReportThechallengeofextendingandsustainingservices.
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Wisner,B.etal.,2004.AtRisk:NaturalHazards,People’sVulnerability,andDisasters2nded.,NewYork:Routledge.
Wisner, B., 2009. Local Knowledge and Disaster Risk Reduction. In SideMeeting on IndigenousKnowledge,GlobalPlatformforDisasterReduction.Geneva,pp.1–7.
Wisner,B.&Adams,J.,2002.WaterSupply.InB.Wisner&J.Adams,eds.Environmentalhealthinemergenciesanddisasters:apracticalguide.Geneva:WorldHealthOrganization,pp.92–126.
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Yin,R.,2009.Casestudyresearch:DesignandmethodsFourth.,London:SagePublications.
279
Annexures
Annexure1:StateofartofWaSHprogrammingandevidence:Activitiesundertakenundervarious
WaSHinterventionspostdisasters
No WaSHIntervention
Typesofactivitiesundertaken
1. Watersupply • Water supply at the community level, household provision and provision ofstoragefacilities(JohnHopkinsandIFRCn.d.).
• Repairing ofwater distribution networks, repair of leakages in the distributionsystems(Smith,2009;Parkinson,2009).
• Phasedapproach:Protectionofwells,diggingofnewboreholesatthecommunallevel,anddistributionofwaterthroughpublictapstandsincampareas;recoveryefforts began the housing and emergency water treatment and distribution;followedbyprolongedphasedestroyedandcontaminatedwatersystems,wellsandboreholeswererestored,rebuiltorreplaced(ClasenandSmith2005)
• Hardwareinstallationssuchashandpumps(McGarry1980).
2. Watersafety • Treatmentatthesourceoratthepointofconsumption• Testingformicrobiologicalorchemicalcontamination• Provisionofbucketswithlidtoavoidcontaminationduringtransportofwater• Householdlevelwatertreatmentpractices,safewaterhandlingpracticeswillhelpreducetheriskoftransmissionorcontamination(ClasenandSmith,2005).
• Mobilewater treatment purification plants like desalination plants or portablecoagulation/disinfectionsystems
• Promotion of household level water treatment including boiling, chlorination,solardisinfection, filtrationandcombinedflocculationordisinfection (Clasenetal.,2007).
3 Sanitation • Setting up safe excreta disposalmechanism is the first line of defense againstfaeco-oralpathologicaltransmission(Brownetal.2012)
• Promotionofuseoftoilets• Excretaremoval,treatmentanddisposal(WHO/UN-Water2012).• Improvinghouseholdtoiletusage• Promotionofsafedisposalmeasuresforchildren’sfaeces.• Provisionoftoiletcleaningmaterialsandmaintenancetoolkits
4. HygienePromotion
• Promotemessagestargetingpracticesrelatedtopersonalhygiene,waterhygiene,domestichygieneandenvironmentalhygiene(IFRC,n.d.)
• Promotionofhandwashingatcriticaltimestopreventfaeco-oraltransmissionofdiseases
• Provisionofsoapsandwaterstoragefacilitiesthroughhouseholddistribution• Undertakepromotionactivitieswithchildreninschools• Menstrualhygienemanagementwithadolescentandwomengroups• Promotion of water treatment practices at household level like chlorination,boiling,andsanitationpracticessuchasuseoftoilets,cleanlinessandmaintenanceoffacilities
280
Annexure2:DefinitionsofResilience
No Definition AuthorandYear1 Resilienceasphysical,biological,personality,social,andculturalsystems'
capabilitytoeffectivelyabsorb,respond,andrecoverfromaninternallyorexternallyinducedsetofextraordinarydemands.
Aguirre(2006)
2 “Systemorcommunityresiliencecanbeunderstoodasacapacitytoabsorbstressordestructive forces through resistanceoradaptation; capacity tomanage, or maintain certain basic functions and structures, duringdisastrousevents (andthe)capacity to recoveror ‘bounceback’afteranevent”
(Twigg,2007.p.6)
3 “...theabilityofasocialsystemtorespondandrecoverfromdisastersandincludesthoseinherentconditionsthatallowthesystemtoabsorbimpactsand cope with an event, as well as post-event, adaptive processes thatfacilitatetheabilityofthesocialsystemtore-organise,changeandlearninresponsetoathreat”
(Cutter et al., 2008,p.599)
4 b.“Thecapacityofasystem,communityorsocietypotentiallyexposedtohazardstoadapt,byresistingorchanginginordertoreachandmaintainanacceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by thedegreetowhichthesocialsystemiscapableoforganizingitselftoincreasethis capacity for learning frompastdisasters forbetter futureprotectionandtoimproveriskreductionmeasures.”
(UNISDR,2005)
5 •theamountofdisturbanceasystemcanabsorbandstillremainwithinthesame state or domain of attraction;• the degree to which the system is capable of self- organisation;•thedegreetowhichthesystemcanbuildandincreasethecapacityforlearningandadaptation.
Carpenter
6 Resilience describes an active process of self-righting, learnedresourcefulness and growth ± the ability to function psychologically at alevel far greater than expected given the individual's capabilities andpreviousexperiences.
Paton, Smith andViolanti,2000)
7 Resilience is the capacity to copewith unanticipated dangers after theyhavebecomemanifest,learningtobounceback.
Wildavsky,1991
8 Itisthebuffercapacityortheabilityofasystemtoabsorbperturbation,orthe magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a systemchangesitsstructurebychangingthevariables.
Hollingetal.,1995
9 Resilienceisafundamentalqualityofindividuals,groupsandorganisations,andsystemsasawholetorespondproductivelytosignificantchangethatdisruptstheexpectedpatternofeventswithoutengaginginanextendedperiodofregressivebehaviour.
HorneandOrr,1998
281
10 Resilience is the ability of an individual or organisation to expeditiouslydesign and implement positive adaptive behaviours matched to theimmediatesituation,whileenduringminimalstress.
Mallak,1998
11 Local resiliency with regard to disasters means that a locale is able towithstandanextremenaturaleventwithoutsufferingdevastating losses,damage,diminishedproductivity,orqualityoflifewithoutalargeamountofassistancefromoutsidethecommunity.
Miletti,1999
12 The capacity to adapt existing resources and skills to new systems andoperatingconditions.
Comfort,1999
13 Theabilitytorespondtosingularoruniqueevents. Kendra andWachtendorf,2003
14 Thecapacityofthedamagedecosystemorcommunitytoabsorbnegativeimpactsandrecoverfromthese.
Cardona,2003
15 Theabilityofanactortocopewithoradapttohazardstress. Pelling,2003
16 Ecosystemresilienceisthecapacityofanecosystemtotoleratedisturbancewithoutcollapsingintoaqualitativelydifferentstatethatiscontrolledbyadifferentsetofprocesses.Aresilientecosystemcanwithstandshocksandrebuild itselfwhennecessary.Resilience in social systemshas theaddedcapacityofhumanstoanticipateandplanforthefuture.
ResilienceAlliance,2005
18 Itequates resiliencewith theability tousedisturbancesasoccasions fordoing‘newthings,forinnovationandfordevelopment’
(Folke2006:253).
19 resilience is conceptualised as the ability of a system to adapt toenvironmental shocks and continue functioning without there being achangeinitsfundamentalcharacteristics
(Manyena2006).
20 Thisunderstandingofcommunity resilience todisasterssprings fromthesustainableliveli-hoodsapproachwheresocial,economic,human,physicaland natural capital are seen asthedeterminantsofresilience
(Mayunga2007).
21 Social resilience is composed of components such as economic growth,stability and distributionofincome,degreeofdependencyonnaturalresources,anddiversityinthekindofactivities/functionsbeingperformedwithinsystems
(Adger2000).
22 This conceptualisation defines resilience in terms of sustainability, itselfdeterminedbytheabilityofusers(e.g.fishermen)withinasystemtoself-organiseandreorganisetosustainablymanageresources
(Ostrom2009).
23 Resilienceresultsfrom:Anindividual,organisationorsystemhavingahighdegreeofflexibilityinrespondingtoclimatechange,whenthereislargevarietyintheskillsetscontainedwithinthesystem;Asubstantialdegreeofredundancy‘...ofprocesses,capacities,andresponsepathwayswithin
(Rockefeller Foundation2009)
282
aninstitution,community,orsystem,toallowforpartialfailurewithinasystemorinstitutionwithoutcompletecollapse’(ibid.:2);Substantialplanninginthepreparationofidentifiedimpacts(itisacknowledgedthataccuratelyplanningforfutureimpactsofclimatechangeisnotusefulbutitnonethelessleadstolearningandbuildsskills);Ahighdegreeofdiversityofresponseandrecoveryoptionsandahighlevelofdecentralisation;Existenceofplansforfailuresothat‘break-downshappengracefully,notcatastrophically’(ibid.:2);andAnumberofdifferentsectorscometogethertoplan,executeandrecoverfromclimate-relatedimpacts.
24 Itprovidestwocomplementaryformsofresilience.Preparationresilienceis formed of assessment and readiness and performance resilience isformedofresponseandrecovery.
(Foster2006).
25 Resilience is the ability of communities to absorb external changes andstresseswhilemaintainingthesustainabilityoftheirlivelihoods
Adger2002
283
Annexure3:MethodologyMatrixbasedonconceptualframework
ResearchQuestion
Sub-researchQuestions
Components CharacteristicsPotentialIndicators
Description
How
effectivelydodifferen
tap
proa
chestowaterand
san
itation
facilities,and
hygiene
practicesduringpo
st-disasterrecovery
prom
otecommun
ityresilience?
Howcanlearning,
knowledge,and
participatoryapproacheshelpin
translatingthewindow
ofopportunityavailableduring
recoveryintoaction?
LearningandKnowledge
SocialLearning
SafeHygieneBehaviour
Promotionandofsafehygienebehaviourthroughprogramme
interventions,hygienemessages,activities,campaignsin
schoolsandwithincommunitiesconductedbygovernment
departments,externalorganizationsandthesubsequent
changesinhygienebehaviouradoptedbycommunities.
Socio-Culturalpracticesandattitudes
Socialandculturalaspectsrelevanttohealthandhygiene;
specificattitudes,beliefsandpracticesthatenablecommunities
topreventhealthoutbreakspostfloods:e.g.Handwashing
practices,safewaterusage,treatmentandstoragepractices,
defecationpractices,safefoodhandling
TechnologicalInnovationandLocalKnowledge
Adoptionoftechnologicalinterventionscomplementing
localknowledge
Theoutcomesofcommunitycapacitybuildingefforts,whereby
communitymembersandinformalusergroupssuchas
households,localyouth,masonsandbuildersaretrainedon
constructionofhazard-resilientmeasuresforprotectingwater
supplies,theiroperationandmaintenanceandsafehygiene
practicesbuildingupontheindigenousknowledgewithinthe
communities.
Documentation
Documentationmechanismstounderstand,identifyand
promotebestpracticesstemmingfromindigenousknowledge,
appropriateuseoftechnology,localadaptationandcopingand
copingstrategiesonwatersupply,treatmentandsafeexcreta
disposalmechanismswithinthecommunities
284
HowcantheexistingpoliciesinWaSHandrecoverybestrengthened
toincorporateresilienceinWaSH?
Furthermore,howcanthese
policiesbeeffectivelytranslated
intopractice?
InstitutionalCapacities
MechanismsandPolicies
Representativemechanisms
Representativemechanismsincommunitygroups,CBOs,local
governingbodies;andpoliciestoguideproperallocationof
rolesandresponsibilitiesforinformeddecision-makingandwell-
definedprogrammeobjectivesandtheiroutcomes.
Organizationalmandateandcapacities
Well-definedinstitutionalmandatesfordisasterrecovery,clear
visionforresilienceandpresenceoftechnicalknowledgeand
expertisewithenhancedinstitutionalcapacitiestointervene
andstrengthencommunities'resiliencetofuturedisasters
FacilitiesandInfrastructure
Resourceallocationand
use
Human,technical,materialandfinancialresourcesforrecovery
adequatetomeettheinstitutionalrolesandresponsibilities,
suchasbudgetaryallocationforrecoveryatnationalandlocal
level
Informationanddata
Availabilityofbaselineinformationwithorganizations,dataon
existingandnewlyestablishedfacilitiesandstructures,
informationofhazards,vulnerabilitiesandrisksfacedbythe
communities.
Howcanlearning,
knowledge,and
participatoryapproacheshelpin
translatingthewindow
Participation
CommunityParticipation
Inclusionandrepresentation
Communityledprocessesinstitutedfordisasterrecoveryand
WaSHinterventions;Inclusionandrepresentationofvulnerable
groupsindecision-makingwithinformalandinformal
institutions,specificallyaddressingissuesofgender,elderly,less
abledandchildren
Multi-StakeholderPartnerships
Localandexternal
collaborations
Localstakeholdersparticipateandcollaboratewithexternal
organizationsandagreeforstablepartnershipssuchasIAGs,
technicalsupportagencies,externalagenciesforrecovery
efforts
285
ofopportunityavailableduring
recoveryintoaction?
Monitoringandevaluation
ParticipatoryM&Esystemstoassessandrevieweffectivenessof
variousreliefandrecoveryoperations
HoweffectivelydoagencyapproachesinWaSH
facilitatetheintegration
ofemergencyresponsewithlong-
termdevelopment
acrossdifferentsectors?
Integration
Linkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopment
Programmetimelinesandoutcomesofinterventions
Programmatictimelinesandinvolvementbyagenciesin
responseandrecoveryeffortsofrecentfloodsindevelopment
activitiesandhowtheseledtochanges
IntersectoralLinkages
286
Annexure4:Interviewguideforexpertfeedback
InterviewSchedule
(Hello, thankyou foragreeing to takepart in this interview. Iwill begin the interviewwithyour
introduction,followedbyabriefdescriptionaboutmyresearchandtheframework.ThenIwillask
youradviseoneachcomponentandtheindicatorsthatIhavechosenforthisstudy.)
Nameoftheinterviewee
TimeandDate
Designation
Organization(ifapplicable)
Expertise-Sector(WaSH/Other)/Recovery
Durationoftheinterview
Skypeorfacetoface
1. A. Please tell me briefly about your experience in this sector, how long you have been
involved?
B.Whatarethedifferentagencies/institutionsthatyouhaveworkedwith,inwhatcapacity
andinwhichcountries?
2. A.Doyouuse‘resilience’aspartofyourworkorinyourorganization’swork?
B.Ifso,howdoyouuseresilienceandwhatisimpliedbytheuseofthisterm?
3. Whatdoyouthinkaretheessentialinterventionsandactivitiesfollowingadisasterinthe
recoveryphase,specificallyinWaSH?
4. Doagenciesadoptdifferentapproachestowater,sanitation,andhygieneprogrammingin
post-disasterrecovery?Ifso,whataretheyandhowdotheydifferfromeachother?
5. HowcanWaSHeffortsbeimprovedtoenhancetheresilienceofthecommunitiesandthe
systemstofuturedisasters?
(Now,incaseyouhavehadthechanceofgoingthroughtheframeworkIsentyou,Iwouldliketo
gothrougheachcomponentandthecorrespondingindicatorchosenforthepurposeofthisstudy.If
notletmebrieflygiveyouanoverviewoftheframework)
287
A. LearningandKnowledge
Would you consider learning and knowledgeofWaSH practices to be significant in promoting
resiliencewithinthecommunities?Ifso,whyaretheysignificant?
1. Howdoyouthinkcansociallearningpromoteresiliencewithinthecommunities?
A. Howsignificant arehygieneeducation campaigns andcultural attitudes toWaSHas
relevantindicatorsforsociallearning?
B. Howcantheimpactofhygienecampaignsandculturalattitudesbemeasured?
C. Doyouhaveexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceandrelevanceoftheindicatorsor
waysofmeasuringthem?
D. Are there any other indicators for social learning that should be considered in this
framework?
2. HowcantechnicalinnovationsinWaSHcomplementlocalknowledgetopromoteresilience
withincommunities?
A. Howsignificantarecommunity trainingsorworkshops inWaSHanddocumentationmechanismsasrelevantindicatorsfortechnicalandlocalknowledgeinWaSH?
B. Howcantheimpactofcommunitytrainingsanddocumentationbemeasured?
C. Doyouknowofanyexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceandrelevanceof these
indicatorsorwaystomeasurethem?
D. Are there any other indicators for technical and local knowledge that should be
consideredinthisframework?
B. Institutionalcapacities
WouldyouconsidercapacitiesofinstitutionsengagedinWaSHtobeasignificantfactortopromote
resiliencewithinthecommunities?Ifso,whyaretheysignificant?
1. Howdoyouthinkcaninstitutionalpoliciesandmechanismspromoteresiliencewithinthe
communities?
A. How significant are representative mechanisms, organizational mandates andcapacities relatedtoWaSHasrelevant indicatorsof institutionalcapacity topromote
resiliencewithincommunities?
B. Howcantheimpactofsuchmechanismsandpoliciesbemeasured?
C. Doyouhaveexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceorrelevanceoftheindicatorsor
waysofmeasuringthem?
D. Arethereanyotherindicatorsformechanismsandpoliciesthatshouldbeconsideredinthisframework?
288
2. How can facilities and infrastructure within institutions engaged in WaSH promote
resiliencewithincommunities?
A. Howsignificantareresourceallocationanduse,and(availabilityof-)informationanddataasrelevantindicatorsoftechnicalandlocalknowledgeinWaSH?
B. Howcantheimpactofresourceallocation,useandinformationanddatabemeasured?
C. Doyouknowofanyexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceandrelevanceof these
indicatorsorwaystomeasurethem?
D. Arethereanyother indicators for facilitiesand infrastructurewithin institutionsthatshouldbeconsideredinthisframework?
C. Participation
WouldyouconsiderparticipatoryapproachesinWaSHprogrammestobesignificantinpromoting
resiliencewithinthecommunities?Ifso,whyaretheysignificant?
1. Howdoyouthinkcancommunityparticipationpromoteresilience?
A. How significant are inclusion and representation (of vulnerable groups) in WaSH
programmingasrelevantindicatorsforpromotingresilience?
B. Howcantheimpactofinclusionandrepresentationbemeasured?
C. Doyouhaveexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceandrelevanceoftheindicatorsor
waysofmeasuringthem?
D. Arethereanyotherindicatorsforcommunityparticipationthatshouldbeconsideredinthisframework?
2. How can multi-stakeholder partnerships during recovery promote resilience within
communities?
A. Howsignificantarelocalandexternalcollaborationsandparticipatorymonitoringandevaluationmechanismsasrelevantindicatorsformulti-stakeholderpartnerships?
B. Howcantheimpactoftheaboveindicatorsbemeasured?
C. Doyouknowofanyexamplesshowingeitherthesignificanceandrelevanceof these
indicatorsorwaystomeasurethem?
D. Are there any other indicators for multi-stakeholder partnerships that should beconsideredinthisframework?
D. Integration
Wouldyouconsider integration (acrossdifferentphasesandvarious sectors) tobea significantfactorforpromotingresiliencewithincommunities?Ifso,why?
289
A. Howsignificantarelinkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopmentandintersectorallinkagesasrelevantindicatorsforintegrationtoachieveresilience?
B. Howcantheimpactoflinkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopmentandintersectorallinkages
bemeasured?
C. Do you know of any examples showing either the significance and relevance of these
indicatorsorwaystomeasurethem?D. Arethereanyotherindicatorsforintegrationthatshouldbeconsideredinthisframework?
Finally, what other factors do you think are essential for building resilience through WaSHprogrammingduringrecovery?
290
Annexure5:Summaryreportoftheexpertinterviews–16/05/2013
ThepurposeofinterviewingexpertsintheareasofWaSHanddisasterrecoverywastounderstand
howeffectivelydifferentapproachestoWaSHfacilitiesandpracticesinrecoverypromotedisaster
resilience. Itwas regarding the conceptual framework forpromoting resilience,whichhasbeen
developedaspartofmyresearch.Thisexpertadvicewassoughttohelpvalidatetheframeworkand
theindicatorschosenforitsmaincomponents(learning,participation,institutionalcapacitiesand
integration).Practitioner’s inputsontheframeworkanditsfeasibilitywerehelpful indeveloping
theresearchmethodologyforgatheringempiricalevidence.
Aspartofthisactivityaround30expertswerecontactedthroughemailseekingtheirparticipation
over Skypeor in person. These includedpractitioners from the various fields of public health –
engineersandhygienepromoters,resilienceandDRRpractitionersandacademiaandalsorecovery
experts.Ofthese15replied,2refusedandsomealsoprovidedcontactdetailsofotherrelevant
experts.
Atablesummarizingtheprofileofthoseinterviewedhasbeenincluded.
No Name Duration Expertise Skype/Facetoface
1 DA 45mins DM Facetoface
2 VM 75mins WaSH,Accountability Facetoface
3 CK 50mins DM Skype
4 AB 1.14hrs WaSH Facetoface
5 VW 15mins MonitoringExpert Facetoface–Brief
6 AB 20mins- Resilience Facetoface–Brief
7 DL 47mins Water-Academic Skype
8 RL 41mins WaSHPractitioner Skype
9 PA 27+1+2 WaSHPractitioner Skype
10 JA 55mins WaSHPractitioner Facetoface
11 PS 1.09hrs+32 WaSHPractitioner Skype
12 PB 12+55mins WaSHPractitioner Skype
291
Outofthe12experts,6wereinterviewedoverSkypeand6inperson(2providedbrieffeedback).
Thesewererecordedandtranscribedlaterwiththehelpofmindmaps.Mindmapswerefoundto
beveryquickandeasywaytodepictthestructureoftheframeworkandrepresentkeyconcepts
thatwerediscussedandrecordthetime. Itallows foreasyretrievalandto identify themesand
correlatethem.
Thegeneralcommentswere:
1. Theframeworkseemstobehighlyrelevant,butthereisaneedtodefinetheargumentthatbuildingcommunityresiliencethroughWaSHisdifferentthanbuildingresilientWaSHinfrastructure.
2. Regardingtheframework–Someoftheexampleschosentodescribetheindicatorsareveryspecifictoaparticulartypeofhazardsuchasfloods.Theframeworkignoresmulti-hazardapproachmajorly.Andshouldincludeexamplesonurban/ruralresilienceaswell.
3. Theframeworkincludesmostlydevelopmentindicatorsnothinginittomentionthatitisaresilienceapproach.Theysuggestthatthefocusisontheinfrastructureandwhatisthethresholdforthesesystemstoabsorbshocks.
4. Needtoeitherincluderightsbasedapproachwithintheframework.
292
Annexure6:InformedConsentFormforParticipantsinResearchStudies
WaSHinPost-DisasterRecoveryandResilience
If you have any questions about the Information Sheet or the explanation already given to
you, please ask me before you consent to participate in this research. You will be given a
copy of this Consent Form to keep for your reference.
Participant’s Statement: Please tick the following that apply:
□ I agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my
satisfaction, I have read the information sheet, and I agree to take part in this study.
□ I understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this
research, I can notify Sneha Krishnan and withdraw immediately.
□ I understand that my participation in this research will be kept anonymous.
□ I understand that the information I provide can be quoted in my name in the
research under my name, position and affiliation
□ I choose that only the name of my organization be refered to for the purposes of this
research
□ I am happy for this interview to be recorded and am aware of and consent to, any
use Sneha Krishnan intends to make of the recordings during and after the
research.
□ I understand that information I have submitted will be included in a report and I will
be sent a copy. I wish to remain anonymous and reference will only be made to my
organisation.
□ I agree that the information I provide may be used by others for future research.
□ I want Sneha Krishnan to seek my approval before publishing any information I
provide, in order to prevent misquotations and misunderstandings.
Name (please print): ___________________________
Signature: ____________________________________ Date: ________________
Researcher’s signature: _______________________ Date: ________________
293
Annexure7:Lineofinquiry
Visit1
Rapportbuilding
MeetAgencyA/localvolunteers.NGOstaffwherepossible.
Purpose–Togetageneraloverviewoftheareasandvillagelayouts
Establishdistanceandaccessroutes/travelandcostimplications
Observepeople’srelocation,damagesduetofloods,cropping.
Visit2-5
TransectWalk
Identifyvolunteersfromthecommunitieswhowillagreetoshowustheirvillage.
Theyshouldknowtheroads.CanitbetheAgencyAvolunteers?
Couldinclude2or3women,childrenwhenpossibleandmen(couldbedifficultbecausemenare
onthefields/laborwork)
Thequestionstobeaskedwiththeparticipantsduringthewalkcouldincludethefollowing:
1. Numberoffamiliesinthesettlement2. TheirLivelihoods3. Thecropsandtypes4. Topographyoftheregion5. Landholdingpatterns6. Sheltertypes7. Waterfacilities8. Defecationareas9. Vulnerablezones10. Safeplaces11. Houseswithlatrines12. Bathingfacilities
Visit6
SocialMapping
Stepstobefollowed:
1. Identifyandenlistparticipantsforthemappingexercise.2. Explainwhymapsareimportant?3. Whowilldraw?4. Whoisawareofthevillagelayoutandwillhelpdraw?
294
5. Pleasedrawamapofthecommunitysettlement?6. Whatarethekeylandmarks?7. Whichareasareaffected?8. Canyoulistthefollowinginthesettlements,iftheyexist?
a. Roadsb. Riversc. Pondsd. Canalse. Schoolsf. Healthcentresg. Handpumpsh. Mosques/Temples/Churchi. Postofficej. Panchayatofficek. OtherGovtofficesl. Fields/Farmsm. Forestareasn. Vulnerableareas
Visit7
a. Timeline
Year Disasterevent Damagesdescription
b. Participatorychangeanalysisa. Useflipchartsandexplaintheformatusing images(hand-drawn)anddescribedin
locallanguageb. Discussandlistdownwhateachofthemputforwardintoseparatecolumns
No Description Beforethefloods During the
floods
Postfloods
1 Nameofthevillage
2 Typeofshelter
3 Sourceofdrinkingwater
4 Placefordefecation
295
5 Bleachingofhandpump
6 Waterstorage
7 Handwashing at critical
times
8 Garbagedisposal
9 Bathing
10 Possessionoftheland
11 Diseases
12 Accesstohealthcare
13 Organizationalpresence
14 Otherchanges
Visit8
Householdinterviews(10)
Themes
1. Watera. Sourceofdrinkingwaterb. Watercollectionpracticesc. Waterstoragepracticesd. Watercontainere. Watertreatmentpracticesf. Watertransportg. Costofbuyingwater(ifapplicable)h. Waterhandlingpracticesi. Watersourceforotherpurposesj. Accesstowaterpointsk. Timeconsumed/travelledl. Whocollects?Genderm. Ownershipn. Serviceproviders/Agenciesinvolvedo. Alternatesources(redundancy)
2. Sanitationa. Defecationpractices–open/controlledorcommunal/private/govttoiletsb. Toiletfacilitiesc. Structureoftoiletsd. Raisedlevele. Costoffacilitiesf. Expertiseforconstruction
296
g. Laborinvolvedh. Accesstotoiletsi. Ownershipoftoiletsj. Govtschemesk. Locationl. Culturalattitudestodefecationm. Genderaspectsn. Agenciesinvolvedinsanitation
3. Hygienepracticesa. Wateratpointofusetreatmentb. Handwashingatcriticaltimesc. Handwashingfacilitiesd. Changeinpracticese. Socialconstraintsf. Culturalattitudestohygienebehaviourg. Healthpromotionactivitiesh. Keymessagesandlearningi. IECmaterials
4. SchoolWaSHpractices–facilitiesavailableandhygienepromotion5. SocialLearning
a. Raisedhandpumps/structuralresilience–trainingandawarenessb. Trainingonlatrineconstruction/raisedlatrinesc. Localmechanismstocontrolspreadofdiseasesorreducefloodimpactsd. Floodprotectionstrategiese. Newtechnologicalinputsf. Changeinpracticesattributabletofloodsg. Learningfrompeers,neighbours,relatives,organizationsh. Documentation–identifybestpractices-??i. Otheraspects
6. Institutionsa. Listoforganizationsb. Areasofwork/assistancereceived
i. Livelihoodsii. Shelteriii. Healthiv. WaSH
c. Schoolsd. Healthcentres
7. Participationa. RedressalofissuesatthePanchayatlevel/Blocklevelb. Participateinanotherorganizationc. Voiceofvulnerablegroupsd. Decision-makinginthevillagee. Women’s/Youthgroupsf. Dependenton–friends/relatives/others
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g. Socialnetworksh. Whatassistance?Land/Shelter/Utensils/Money/Foodi. Compensationoftheassistance
8. Integrationa. Linkingrelief,recoveryanddevelopment
i. Fluctuatingpopulationsii. Changingneedsiii. Howaretheymet?iv. Howcantheybesustainable?v. Availability/accessanduseofresourcesvi. Managementofwatersourcevii. Latrineoperationandmaintenance
b. Sectoralintegrationi. Othermajorneedscurrentlyii. Howcantheybeintegrated?
9. Migration10. Relocation/resettlement11. Shelter
Visit9
Actormapping
Visit10
Groupdiscussions–Problemidentificationandpriorities
Stepstobefollowed
1. Explainthepurposeofthisexerciseandwhatcanbeachieved2. Discusstheproblemsanddescribetheirimpactsduringpostdisasterrecovery3. Listoutallthepriorities4. Askthemtoprioritizewhichonesareimportantbasedontheirorderofsignificance5. Discussthefollowingwiththecommunitymembers:
a. Howhasthesituationchangedfromthetimesbeforethe2012floods,andhastherebeenanimprovementorbecomeworse?
b. Howwouldyouensurethatwecouldbecomemoreresilienttofuturefloods?c. Howcouldwe strengthenourwater sourcesand sheltersand latrines tobecome
moreresilient?
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Otherofficialstobemet:
No Description Sonitpur Morigaon
1 Districtcollector 1 1
2 LocalNGOchieffunctionaries 4 4
3 Otherorganizationalstaff 5 5
4 Blockdevelopmentofficer 1 1
5 PublicHealthEngineer 1 1
6 Publichealthdept 1 1
7 Ruraldrinkingwater 1 1
8 Healthcentres 3 3
9 EducationDept 2 2
10 BlockEducationOfficer 1 1
11 Schoolteachers/Headmasters 5 5
12 Anganwadiworkers/Auxillarynurse
midwives/ Multiple Purpose
workers
5 5
Total 30 30
Questionsforaboveactors:
1. DistrictCollector/BlockDevelopmentofficera. Introductionb. Whatisthenatureofhazardsprevalentinthedistrict?c. Can you please describe the process of recovery in the district andwhat are the
challenges?d. Whatmeasuresareundertakentodevelopresilienceofthepeopleandsystemsto
therecurrentnatureoffloodsanderosion?e. Whatarethevariousneedsthatemergeduringdisasterrecoveryinsuchasituation?f. What are the challenges faced inWaSH during post disaster recovery given the
situation?g. Whatarethepoliciestodirectfinancialandotherallocationofresources?h. Arethereanymechanismsinplacetoincreaselearningwithintheadministration?If
sowhatarethey?i. Whatisthescopeforincreasedparticipationtoincreaseresilience?j. How can we encourage various organizational involvements and increase their
capacitiestobeinvolvedinrecoveryandrehabilitation?k. Howcanweintegratetherecoveryprocessacrosstimeanddifferentneedsthento
achieveresilience?
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l. Whatinyourperspectiveneedstobedonetoimproveandincreaseresilienceofthepeopleinthedistrict?
PointersforPhoto-documentation
Photographsshowing
1. Watersource–openorhandpumps(raisedorsunkenordamaged)2. Sheltertypes(AgencyAorself-built/pukkaorkaccha)3. Latrine(ifpresent–private/communalorAgencyprovidedmaterials)4. Bathingfacilities(ifpresent)5. Opendefecatedareas6. Sewage7. Waterstorage8. Handwashingobservationalbehaviorathouseholdorschools9. IECmaterials
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Annexure8:ToolsusedinAssamandOdisha(Source:Manyena,2009)
Name of the
tool
Purpose Risks Opportunities
Sitevisits Getafirsthandimpressionofimpactsandscale
ofdestruction,providesachancetointeractwith
the communities, observe and document the
experiences. This is the primary and most
importantsteptoaccessandfamiliarisewiththe
villages. Visit local offices, schools, health
centrestogetoverallpictureofhazards,health
andhygienestatus
Transaction and time costs involved are
huge,logisticsofreachingthevillagehad
to be arranged. Depending on public
transportandthenwalkingaffectedtime
allottedtofieldwork.Visitingthevillages
during floods also a challenge as most
areas remain waterlogged/washed away
duetoerosion
Provides theaccuratepictureof the
village and establishes a connection
with frequentvisits.Visually see the
impact and magnitude of the
disastersandlivingconditionsofthe
people
Rapport
building
Make local connections and identify key
informants from the communities. To get a
general overview of the areas and village
layouts; Establish distance and access routes/
travelandcostimplications
Observe people’s relocation, damages due to
floods,cropping.
Access to communities through agencies
influences the role of the researcher
affecting the objectivity and impartial of
datagathered
Communities get to know the
researcher better, understand the
backgroundandtrustingrelationship
isformedeventually
Transectwalk Walkwith the local volunteers and community
members-women,childrenandmen.Observe
Due to size of the villages, covering all
settlementsandexploringthelengthand
Whenaccompaniedbylocalsthistool
proves useful to discuss various
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their village, and discuss with them about the
geographical layout, hazard impact and scale,
demographics, water points, defecation areas
and safe spaces.Also lookout for houseswith
latrines and bathing facilities, and overall
hygienepractices
breadth of the village becomes difficult.
Sometimeserodedvillagesmeansthereis
populationdisplacement.
issues they face and observe their
practices
Village
mapping
Map the general layout with local population
identifying the settlements, water sources,
important buildings and vulnerable areas. Also
note the defecation areas and drinking water
sourcessuchashandpumps.
Pre-planning the activity so that
researchercancarrynecessaryaids,may
notbetheaccuratescaleofdepiction
Whendonebychildren,canfindout
about what is the practice at their
household level and gives real
picture,theyhavefunwhiledrawing
aswell
Problem
ranking
Listthecurrentneedsandproblemsfacedbythe
community.Describehowtheseproblemsaffect
the community members, and list the priority
urgentneedsamongstall.Thecommunitythen
prioritisesbasedontheorderofsignificanceand
requirements such as shelter, drinking water,
sanitationfacilities,livelihoodopportunitiesetc.
Often difficult to get a consensus on
different perspectives based on income,
genderandaccesstoresources
Veryusefulandinformativeexercise.
To understand at what stage of
recovery the community is at the
presentstage,whataretheircurrent
needs and priorities? Should be
ideally undertaken with
representative groups – men,
women,andchildren.
Focus group
discussions
Mostfieldvisitswouldculminateinfocusgroup
discussionsorcommunityconsultations,where
Pre-determined protocol for discussions
restrictsthescopeforusefulandvaluable
Besttooltogetawiderconsensuson
issues faced by the community at
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themembers–menorwomenwouldgatherto
providemewith information I am looking for.
The common areas that I would discuss them
wouldincludedifferentaspectsofrecovery,the
assistance they received, how has floods
changed/transformed their day-to day lives,
WaSH, infrastructure and other development
concerns, how do they perceive resilience and
whatstepscanbeundertaken.
discussion, best to keep it free-flowing
and let the community members voice
their feedback. Always leads to
expectationofsomekindofhelpbutdue
to lackofadequateresources tosupport
asactionresearchwasahugeriskofusing
thistool
large, often came up with solutions
thattheywantedtobeimplemented,
the challenges they faced and how
these could be overcome. Issues of
menstrual hygiene, hygiene
behaviourandprivacyconcernsover
use of water and latrine facilities
werediscussedwithwomengroups.
Children provided inputs as well on
WaSH practices and facilities in
schoolsandhouseholds.
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Annexure9:InterviewGuide–Organizations
(Hello,thankyouforagreeingtotakepartinthisinterview.MynameisSnehaKrishnanandIam
undertakingresearchonbuildingcommunityresilienceduringpostdisasterrecoveryspecificallyin
water,sanitationandhygieneinAssam.HenceIwouldliketoknowmoreaboutyourorganization
andtheworkundertaken.Kindlyfeelfreetoaskforanyclarificationorelaborationofanyquestions
thatImayaskyou)
1. Nameoftheinterviewee
2. TimeandDateoftheinterview
3. Durationoftheinterview
4. Organization
5. Designation
A}OrganizationOverview
1. a)Pleasetellmebrieflytheorganization’sexperienceofworkinginthisregion.
b)Howlonghastheagencybeenworkinghere?
c)Whatarethedifferentdisasterresponsesthattheagencyhasbeeninvolvedinsofar?
d)Whatdisasterphasesdoestheorganizationworkin?Isdisasterrecoveryapriority?
e)Howwastheorganizationinvolvedduringthe2012floodsinAssam?Whatsectorswere
addressedwithintheresponse?
B}VisionandMandate
2. Whatistheorganizationalvisionfordisasterresilience?
3. Howdoestheworkdonebytheorganizationcontributetocommunityresilience?
4. Whatisthemandateofworkinginhumanitariansector,particularlyindisasterrecoveryand
rehabilitation?
5. Howdoyouthinkwastheemergencyresponseworkdonebytheagencyusefulinaddressing
needsofthecommunitiesforlong-termsustainability?
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C}SpecificExpertiseandCapacities
6. Whatisyourexperienceofworkinginwater,sanitationandhygienepracticesinthepost-
disasterphaseinAssam?
7. Whatisthetechnicalexpertiseheldwithintheorganizationintermsofhumanresources
andexperiencein
a) Disasterrecoveryand
b) WaSH?
8. Whatkindoftrainingandskill-buildingexercisesspecifictodisastersandsectorsdothestaff
receive?Whatdoyouthinkarethegapsinbuildingtheircapacities?
D}LearningandKnowledge
9. HowwouldyoudescribethelocalattitudesandcommunitypracticestoWaSH,whichare
prevalentintheseareas?
10. Didyourorganizationundertakeinterventionstopromotesafewater,safesanitationand
hygienepractices?Whatwerethey
11. How effective were these interventions in leading behaviour change and/or building
systems’resilience?Whatwerethechallengesfacedineffectingthisbehaviourchange?
12. ParticularlyinWaSHsector,areyouawareofinstanceswheretechnologicalinterventions
complementinglocalindigenousknowledgewereusefulintheregionsofAssamforbuilding
disasterresilience?
13. Hastheorganizationundertakeneffortstoreviewandlearnfromthepreviousexperiences
inpostdisasterwork?Ifso,whataretheyandhowhavetheybeenincorporated?
14. Are there instances where local collective action in WaSH was formalised into the
institutionalpoliciesforfutureprogrammes?
15. Howcansuchlocallevelcopingandadaptivestrategiesbeformally/informallydocumented
forunderstandingcommunityresilience?
E}InstitutionalCapacitiesandParticipation
16. Generally,whatisthemale/femaleratioofyourstaffing?
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17. Whatisthescopeforlocalrepresentationwithinyourorganization?
18. Howaretherolesandresponsibilitiesdelineatedwithintheorganizations?Aretheyflexible?
19. Howdoestheworkdonebytheorganizationpresentlocalactiontothepolicymakers?
20. Whatroledoesadvocacyplayintheorganization’swork?
21. Howdoestheagencyplanandallocateresourcestoworkinrecoveryandreconstruction?
22. Howimportantiscommunityparticipationasacomponentoftheorganization’sprojectsat
variousphases?
a) Duringdesignphase
b) Planningandoperationalphase
c) Monitoringandevaluationphase
23. Whatarethechallengesthattheorganizationhasfacedinensuringequalparticipationand
howdidyouovercomethese?
F}InformationmanagementandCollaborations
24. Whatsystemsofinformationcollectionanddissemination,arebeingusedwhileengaging
withcommunities?
25. Istheorganizationpartofanetwork/consortiumofNGOs?
26. Do you partner with NGOs, government agencies, for-profits for your projects at
district/stateornationallevel?
27. Howwouldyoudescribetheeffortsundertakenbysuchnetworksascontributingtodisaster
resilienceobjectives?
G}Integration
28. Before concluding, could youplease describe how can recovery objectives be addressed
duringthevariousstagesoftheorganization’swork?
29. What according to you are the most important aspects to build resilience within the
communities?
30. WithregardstoWaSH,whatmeasurescanbeundertakentoachievedisasterresiliencein
thesystemsandcommunities?
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31. Howcanobjectivesofsafewaterandsanitation,andhygienepracticesbeintegratedwith
theworkthatyourorganizationisundertakinginothersectors?Whatarethepotentialsfor
achievingtheseandchallenges?
Thankyouforyourtime.Pleasefeelfreetogivemeanyfeedback.
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Annexure10:SampleofaMindmap
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Annexure11:BiswanathRevenueCircleHouseholdAssessmentData(Source:CircleOffice,BiswanathChariali)
Listofhousesdamagebyflood,2012District:SonitpurforFinancialYear2012-13(1stWave)BiswanathRev.Circle
NameoftheVillage
Classofland(PP/AP/Govt)
FullydamagedPuccahouses@35000INRperhouse
Fullydamagedkutchahouses@15000INRper
house
Severelydamagedpuccahouses@6300INRperhouse
Severelydamaged
kutchahouses@3200INRper
house
Partiallydamagedpucca/kutchahouses@1900INRperhouse
Hutsdamage/destroyed(both
puccaandkutcha)@2500INRperhouse
CatleShed
Damage@1250INRperShed
GrandTotal(inINR)
No. Amt No. Amount No. Amount No. AmountNo.
amount No. Amountpucca kutcha total
Solmari AP Nil Nil 1 15000 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 15000
Do AP Nil Nil 2 30000 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 30000
Do GOVT Nil Nil 2 30000 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 30000
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Annexure12:Listofdocumentsused
Typeofdocuments Assam Odisha
Governmentdocuments 30 40
AgencyAdocuments 25 45
AgencyAemailcommunications 10 30
OtherNGOdocuments 15 10
Journalarticles 50 25
Newspaperarticles 200 180
Publishedreports/studies 50 15
Unpublishedreports 15 10
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Annexure13:DistrictMaps
Figure1:DistrictmapofSonitpur,Assam(MapsofIndia2007)
311
312
Figure2:DistrictmapofMorigaon,Assam(MapsofIndia2012)
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Figure3:DistrictmapofPuri,Odisha(MapsofIndia2013b)
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Figure4:DistrictmapofBalasore,Odisha(MapsofIndia2013a)
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