buddhapalitavritti chapters 1 and 2

Buddhapālita’s Commentary to the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way by Ācarya Buddhapālita Translated and edited by Ian Coghlan © Ian James Coghlan 2010

Buddhapālita’s Commentary to the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way 2


Contents Translator’s Introduction 4

Preliminary 6

1. The meaning of the title 6 2. The homage of the translators 6 3. The meaning of the text 6

1. Praise of the Master who taught dependent origination to be free of extremes 6

Chapter 1. Investigation of Conditions

2. How the commentary explains dependent origination to be free of the eight extremes 19

1. Teaching dependent origination to be inherently empty

1. Actual presentation

1. Brief presentation of both selflessnesses

1. Refuting dharmas are inherently existent through investigating the action and agent of cause and result

1. Refuting generation is inherently existent in terms of results

1. Refuting generation from the four extremes [1/1] 19

2. Eliminating (the doubt) that the refutation of other contradicts scripture 21

1. Dispute [1/2] 21

2. Reply [1/3] 22

2. Refuting conditions are inherently existent as generators 24

1. Refuting conditions are inherently existent collectively

1. Refutation that investigates conditions in terms of the agent (byed pa) 25

1. Refutation that investigates conditions that establish the act of generation [1/4]

25

2. Refutation that investigates conditions that generate a result [1/5] 29

2. Refutation that investigates conditions in terms of the object [1/6] 30

2. Refuting conditions are inherently existent individually 33

1. Refuting the defining characteristics of causal conditions [1/7] 33

2. Refuting the defining characteristics of focal conditions [1/8] 34

3. Refuting the defining characteristics of immediate conditions [1/9] 37

4. Refuting the defining characteristics of empowering conditions [1/10] 40

3. Teaching alternate ways of refuting them individually [1/11-14] 41


Chapter 2. Investigation of Coming and Going

2. Refuting persons are inherently existent through investigating the action and agent of going and coming

47

1. Extensive explanation

1. Individually refuting action in terms of its object and agent

1. Refuting (action) through investigating objects (las)

1. General refutation of action on the three paths [2/1] 47

2. Specific refutation of action where one currently walks 49

1. Dispute [2/2] 49

2. Reply 49

1. If either the term demonstrating the object (las tshig) or the term demonstrating action (bya tshig) are meaningful, the other is meaningless. [2/3]

50

2. If both possess meaning then it would be absurd [2/5-6] 51

2. Refuting (action) through investigating the agent [2/7-11] 53

3. Refuting the proof that action exists [2/11] 58

1. Refuting the initial beginning (of action) [2/12-13] 58

2. Refuting the path of going [2/14] 61

3. Refuting the opposite of going [2/15-16] 62

4. Refuting the final stopping [2/17ab] 64

5. Refuting the proof of abidance [2/17cd] 65

4. Refuting (action) through investigating action 66

1. Refuting (action) through investigating whether it is the same or different [2/18-21]

66

2. Refuting (action) through investigating the existence and non-existence of the two actions [2/22-23]

70

2. Collectively refuting action in terms of its object and agent [2/24-25ab] 72

2. Brief conclusion [2/25cd] 72


Translator’s Introduction

Buddhapālita (470-540) was a great master and exponent of the Prāsaṅgika system of Mahāyāna Buddhism. A native of Hamsakrida, South India, he took a deep interest in Buddhist teachings from an early age—taking novice and full ordination. Then after entering Nālanda monastery, he studied under ācarya Saṅgharakṣita—a disciple of Nāgamitra—and quickly mastered the teachings of Nāgārjuna. Later while resident at Dantapuri monastery in South India he composed many commentaries to the works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, but only the Buddhapālitavṛtti—a commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Mulāmadhyamakakārikā) or more briefly Fundamental Wisdom (Prājñamūla)—survives.

This is a work of great clarity and insight and a true Prāsaṅgika treatise since it extensively utilizes consequences to counter misconceptions about the ultimate nature of reality. His younger contemporary Bhāvaviveka also composed a commentary to Nāgārjuna’s work called Lamp of Wisdom (Prajñāpradīpa) which criticizes Buddhapālita’s position. It is the way that Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita that belies Bhāvaviveka's belief in autonomous inference (svatantranumana; rang rgyud rjes dpag) for he asserted that stating consequences was insufficient to generate the valid conception of emptiness—one must also state autonomously established syllogisms (rang rgyud gyi rtags). Candrakīrti (7th Century CE) —a great exponent of Madhyamaka and abbot of Nālanda—composed Clear Words (Prasannpada) as a commentary to Fundamental Wisdom based in part on Buddhapālita’s treatise. In his work Candrakīrti defends Buddhāpalita’s position and refutes Bhāvaviveka’s assertion of autonomous syllogisms.

Since Bhāvaviveka was the first person to clearly distinguish the Svātantrika view from Prāsaṅgika view he is regarded as the founder of the Svātantrika system. Similarly since Candrakīrti was the first person to clearly distinguish Prāsañgika view from the Svātantrika he is regarded by Tibetan scholars as the founder or path breaker (shing rta rsol ‘byed) of the Prāsaṅgika system. Tibetans recognize that Candrakīrti’s explanation arises within the commentarial lineage of Buddhapālita and for this reason some assert Buddhapālita was the actual founder of Prāsaṅgika. However, though Nāgārjuna and Buddhapālita clearly taught the Prāsaṅgika view, in general neither are regarded as the founder or pathbreaker of the Prāsaṅgika system since they did not clearly set forth this view in contradistinction to the Svātantrika view.

This work has been highly praised as a commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom. In particular it emphasizes dependent origination and how emptiness establishes the truth of dependent origination—a theme developed by later Indian and Tibetan scholars. Buddhapālitavṛtti’s presentation of emptiness is flawless, and this is confirmed by Candrakīrti who defended this work against the criticism of Bhavaviveka. Further, this work may be relied on as an authentic means for generating realization of emptiness—just as Jé Tsongkhapa reputedly realized emptiness while reading the eighteenth chapter. It is at times a difficult work, briefer and arguably less accessable than Candrakīrti’s Clear Words (Prasannapada), but a unique and invaluable presentation of emptiness.


Notes on the Translation This translation is based on the Derge edition (Derge 3842, mdo 'grel, tsa 158b1-281a4) translated by Jñanagarbha and Chokro Lu’i Gyaltsen (cog ro klu'i rgyal mtshan) in the eighth century. This team also translated Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa and the extensive commentary to it by Avalokitavrata. Candrakīrti’s Prasannapada was translated in the eleventh century by Tilakakalaśa and Patsap Nyimadrak (pa tshab nyi ma grags). Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom―that embedded in the Buddhapālitavṛtti as well as that embedded in the Prasannapada―constitute earlier and later translations of the root text and frequently differ. Depending on context, commentators sometimes followed the earlier translation and sometimes the later translation, and due to this, certain passages of Nāgārjuna’s root text have been presented differently in Tibetan even though there may be no difference in the original Sanskrit. A critical edition of Buddhapālitavṛtti was prepared by Max Welleser and first published in 1914 and compared the Peking, Derge, and Nartang editions of the text.

Buddhapalita’s work is for the most part a word commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom. For the benefit of the reader I have provisionally added the outlines from the commentary to Nāgārjuna’s text by the First Dalai Lama―Gyalwa Gendün Drup―called the Jewel Garland (dbu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi don bshad pa rin po che’i phreng ba zhes bya ba bzhugs so). Also I have added Gendün Drub’s word commentary to the root verses as footnotes, for comparison to Buddhapālita’s commentary.


Buddhapālita’s Commentary to the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way

Preliminary There are four outlines: 1. The meaning of the title 2. The homage of the translators 3. The meaning of the text 4. The conclusion 1. The meaning of the title

,î-C_-ˇN-Oÿ, T“t-RÓ-`…-K-U ê-`-U-É-U-@-yœQ≥, TÈN-ˇN-Oÿ, NT“-U-˛-T]Ã-]u‰`-R-T“t-RÓ- …̀-K, In Sanskrit this work is called Buddhapālita Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti In Tibetan it is called Dbu ma rtsa ba’i ‘grel pa Buddhapālita1 2. The homage of the translators

TU-RÈ-NE-RÈ, N@ÈP-UGÈC-Cc“U-`-pC-]W`-`È, ,]HU-NR`-CZÈP-Q÷_-nŸ_-R-`-pC-]W`-`È, ,ÜÈT-NRÈP-]SCc-R-Å‡-±„T-`-pC-]W`-`È, ,ÜÈT-NRÈP-TV“P-R-T“N-}-RÓ-`…-K-`-pC-]W`-`È, The first section: I pay homage to the three Jewels. I pay homage to youthful Mañjuśrī. I pay homage to ācarya ārya Nāgārjuna. I pay homage to ācarya venerable Buddhapālita.2 3. The meaning of the text. It has three outlines:

1. Praise of the Master who taught dependent origination to be free of extremes 2. How the commentary explains dependent origination to be free of the eight extremes 3. Paying homage to the Master through recalling his kindness

1. Praise of the Master who taught dependent origination to be free of extremes

,]N…-õ_-ÜÈT-NRÈP-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-T-ä‰c-c“-§ÈP-R_-TZ‰N-Rc, å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_- ]qŸE-T]Ã-\T-UÈ-I…N-^E-NC-R-H…-õ-T-TZ…P-Oÿ-C\…Cc-Rc-EÈ-UW_-Oÿ-nŸ_-R]Ã-M—Cc-NE-úP-R, 1 Walleser also gives the title as:‘grel pa bud dha pa’ li ta slob dpon sangs rgyas bskyangs kyis mdzas pa bshugs so 2 In Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise the object of homage of the translators is Mañjuśrī alone, and this format is followed by the translators in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapada. In this work the translators have added three other objects of homage: the three Jewels, Nāgārjuna, and Buddhapālita.


NN-R-`c-qŸE-T]Ã-UG…-U-Ns⁄C-F‰c-UXN-R]Ã-≠P-UE]-T, ˇ‡]Ã-ß‡-\…E-Z‰c-UXN-R-NE-úP-Rc- M`-UÈ-Æ_-T-NT“_-TZC-§‰, N‰-TZ…P-Ca‰Cc-R-éUc-P…-GÈc-l…-ˇ‡]È-Z‰c-NÈP-NU-R-§ÈP-R]Ã-WÀCc-c“-TFN-R-]N…-TäÈN-Rc-UOÿP-Oÿ-]OÿC R-NE-]x-T_-TZC-Pc, N‰-TZ…P-Ca‰Cc-R-É-U-NU-R-`, Ācarya (Nāgārjuna) correctly saw the profound nature of dependent origination and subsequently proclaimed it to others. Due to possessing this amazing and exalted realization, his divine vision is affected by tears of faith, and his body clothed in goose pimples. He joins his palms and places them at his crown and proclaims the following verses to the Tathāgata—the pure guru as if he were here before him—that express the ultimate teaching that tathāgatas are the dharmakāya:

CE-C…c-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-, ,]CC-R-U‰N-R-´‰-U‰N-R, ,GN-R-U‰N-R-åC-U‰N-R, ,]ÈE-T-U‰N-R-]uÈ-U‰N-R, ,M-NN-NÈP-U…P-NÈP-CF…C-U…P, ,≥Èc-R-I‰_-Z…-Z…-T§P-R, ,íÈCc-R]Ã-cEc-îc-µ-éUc-l…, ,NU-R-N‰-`-pC-]W`-`È, I pay homage to the complete Buddha Who is supreme among teachers Who taught dependent origination That neither ceases nor is generated, Neither is annihilated nor permanent, Neither comes nor goes, Neither is distinct nor is identical That is the peace that fully pacifies all proliferation.

,Z‰c-î‡-¢-P-^ÈN-R]Ã-pC-TZ‰c-R-UXN-N‰, CE-C…c-NTE-pŸC-NE-Oÿc-NE-çfl`-zP-NE-_E-TZ…P- NE-EÈ-TÈ-I…N-`-cÈCc-R_-µ-T-≥Èc-R-M…Tc-RÈ_-]mUc-R]Ã-]H…C-å‰P-`, å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-T_- ]qŸE-T-Z‰c-q-T-NÈP-NU-R]Ã-TN‰P-R-UGÈC-Lfi-\T-R, ]CC-R-U‰N-R-´‰-T-U‰N-R, GN-R-U‰N-R- åC-R-U‰N-R, ]ÈE-T-U‰N-R-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R-NÈP-M-NN-U-^…P-R, NÈP-CF…C-U-^…P-R, ≥Èc-R-MUc-FN-I‰-T_-Z…-T-r-EP-`c-]Nc-R]Ã-uÈE-m‰_-Oÿ-]uÈ-T, Z…-T-`U-xE-RÈ-]N…-T§P-R, ^E-NC-R_- íÈCc-R]Ã-cEc-îc-µ-T-éUc-l…-NU-R-N‰-`-pC-]W`-`È, ,Z‰c-q-T-^…P-PÈ, I pay homage to the perfect complete Buddha who is supreme among teachers and who taught this supremely profound ultimate truth called dependent origination to those in the world who wander in the dense proliferation of theories regarding Iśvara, time, atoms, inherent essence, nature and so on due to their adherence to the existence of a prior cause.3 It neither ceases nor is generated, neither is annihilated nor is permanent, neither comes nor goes, neither is distinct nor identical and constitutes the straight path of peace that

3 “Prior cause” implies a “first cause” or a creator being.


fully pacifies all proliferation and procedes to the city of nirvāṇa.4 ,TFÈU-úP-]Nc-l…c-p…-_È`-R-Sc-l…-àÈ`-T-MUc-FN-q…c-T-É-T-]x-T_-M—Cc-c“-G”N-Pc-]uÈ- T-`ÈE-T-`C-PÈU-q‰N-R-õ-T“-[159a]`-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-T-T§P-R_-ÜÈT-NRÈP-n…c-Ê- NC-R_-C\…Cc-Rc-µ-T-éUc-l…-NU-R-Z‰c-Cc“Ec-cÈ, ,]CC-R-U‰N-R-Z‰c-q-T-P…-]N…-`-]CC-R-^ÈN-R-U-^…P-R]È, ,WÀC-üC-U-éUc-`-Ê-N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-Æ_-T_-q]È, ,WÀCc-c“-TFN-R-N‰-P…-UNÈ-õ-T“-§‰, T§P-TFÈc-üC-Uc-N‰-éU-R_-TaN-R-q‰N-R_-]nŸ_-_È, ,N‰-Ê-TäÈN-R-`-UEÈP-R_- Z‰P-R]Ã-NTE-C…c-°È-N‰-NE-N‰c-q‰N-R_-]nŸ_-n…-CÈ-_…Uc-H…-õ-T-TZ…P-Oÿ-P…-U…-q‰N-NÈ, The Bhagavan fully comprehends all tīrthikas5 who oppose (perfect view) to be similar to clamorous children, and he teaches dependent origination to such blind reincarnating beings who grope (in the darkness). Ācarya (Nāgārjuna) calls you “supreme among teachers” since you see perfectly. He states that it “does not cease”―which means that it has no cessation―and this should be applied to the remaining terms in the same way. These verses are like sūtra, and the rest (of Nāgārjuna’s) treatise explains these verses. Moreover, he has provided various doors of entry [to the meaning] according to how the subject matter is conceived, but their order should not (necessarily) be assumed in the manner stated.6 ,F…-§‰-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-T-ä‰c-c“-T§P-R-`-NCÈc-R-F…-^ÈN-F‰-P, Question: What need is there to repeatedly teach dependent origination? TaN-R, ÜÈT-NRÈP-M—Cc-ä‰]Ã-TNC-I…N-FP-n…c-c‰Uc-FP-éUc-•‡C-T¢`-¶-WÍCc-l…c-I‰P-R_- C\…Cc-Pc-N‰-NC-éU-R_-uÈ`-T_-q-T]Ã-p…_-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-Ê-NC-R-H…-õ-T-I…N-_T-Lfi- T§P-R_-TZ‰N-Rc-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-T-ä‰c-c“-T§P-R-T˛Uc-K‰, ,Ê-NC-U-^…P-UMÈE-

4 These two verses directly teach the purpose and subject matter of the text and indirectly teach the inner purpose and the relationship of the subject matter, purpose and inner purpose. The purpose of the text is to assist the reader to comprehend dependent origination, the subject matter of the text. Candrakīrti states: “The subject matter of all the master’s treatises are revealed for a purpose. (These verses) express the greatness of this being [the Buddha], for he teaches without distortion, and he is a pure guru who maintains that [emptiness] is not distinct from the nature of [dependent origination. Nāgārjuna] pays causal homage to the tathāgatas in order to compose this treatise...” (slob dpon rang nyid 'chad par 'gyur ba'i bstan bcos mtha' dag gi brjod par bya ba'i don dgos pa dang bcas pa ston zhing, de phyin ci ma log par ston par mdzad pa nyid kyi sgo nas che ba'i bdag nyid brjod nas de'i ngo bo dang tha mi dad par bzhugs pa'i bla ma dam pa, de bzhin gshegs pa la bstan bcos rtzom pa'i rgyu can gyi phyag mdzad (02b) pa...) 5 Non-Buddhist philosophers. 6 A teacher (smra ba; vādin) is one who propounds, advocates, or disseminates a particular doctrine. The Buddha is a teacher since he presents or declares the philosophic view of dependent origination and he is supreme (dam pa) among teachers since he clearly sees the nature of dependent origination. Further, dependent origination cannot be faulted for it accurately describes the nature of reality as it is, since it reveals the eight characteristics of existent entities: (1) they do not inherently cease, (2) they are not inherently generated, (3) they are not inherently annihilated, (4) they are not inherently permanent, (5) they do not inherently come, (6) they do not inherently go, (7) they are not inherently distinct, (8) they are not inherently identical. This presentation also accords with how dependent origination is explained in sūtra. The final sentence suggests that the twenty-seven chapters of Nāgārjuna’s work were composed to refute the different ways objects may be conceived to inherently exist, but an individual may contemplate the meaning of the chapters differently than the order given in his text.


T-]G…E-, ,Ê-NC-UMÈE-T-éU-R_-uÈ`, ,Z‰c-Cc“Ec-R]Ã-p…_-_È, Response: The compassionate master (Nāgārjuna) saw that sentient beings are harassed by various types of suffering, and in order to liberate them he declared that the perfect state of phenomena should be properly taught exactly as it is. He subsequently composed these teachings on dependent origination, stating:

Imperfect seeing is bondage. Perfect seeing is liberation.

,NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-Ê-NC-R-H…-õ-T-TZ…P-I…N-CE-^…P, Question: What is the perfect state of phenomena exactly as it is? TaN-R, EÈ-TÈ-I…N-U‰N-R-I…N-N‰, U…-UBc-R-CK…-U—C-C…-U—P-Rc-ÉÈ-uÈc-l…-U…C-T±…Tc-R-P…-NEÈc-RÈ- éUc-`-EÈ-TÈ-I…N-Oÿ-éU-R_-åÈC-P-N‰-NC-`-]NÈN-GCc-NE-Z‰-•E-NC-´‰N-R_-q‰N-NÈ,,CE-C…-WÂ- å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-T-a‰c-R]Ã-¶E-Tc-CK…-U—C-C…-U—P-R-Tc`-F…E-, a‰c-_T-l…-U…C-C…c- NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-EÈ-TÈ-I…N-U‰N-R-I…N-UMÈE-T-N‰]Ã-WÂ-P-CPc-U‰N-R-`-N‰]Ã-]NÈN-GCc-NE-Z‰-•E- NC-U…-´‰]È, Response: It is the non-existence of an intrinsic nature.7 But for those who are untrained, the eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion. If phenomena are conceived to possess an inherent nature, this gives rise to attachment or hatred toward them. But whenever dependent origination appears to the mind, the darkness of delusion is eliminated and the eye of wisdom sees that phenomena lack an inherent nature. At that time attachment and hatred are not generated for (objects) do not (inherently) abide.8 ,]N…-õ-§‰-NR‰_-P-`-`-Z…C-C\“Cc-TãP-n…-T“N-U‰N-`-T“N-U‰N-NÈ-£U-R]Ã-ÉÈ-uÈc-´‰c-Pc-AÿP-Lfi- ]NÈN-GCc-´‰N-N‰-N‰-NE-]{‰`-T]Ã-^…N-l…c-N‰-`-éU-R_-åÈC-R_-q‰N-NÈ, ,CE-C…-WÂ-Ê-NC-R-H…-õ-T-TZ…P-Oÿ-åÈCc-R-N‰]Ã-WÂ-P-T“N-U‰N-l…-ÉÈ-uÈc-U‰N-R_-nŸ_-F…E-]NÈN-GCc-NE-{`-Pc-a…P-Lfi-EÈ-W-T-´‰c-K‰, _E-n…-c‰Uc-CPc-U‰N-R-`-]NÈN-GCc-´‰-T-`-]p-T-N‰-NE-]x-§‰-N‰-õ_-TFÈU- úP-]Nc-l…c-lE-NC‰-ÜÈE-NC-T“N-U‰N-`-PE-C…-T“N-U‰N-l…-NTE-RÈ-Ê-NC-R_-[159b]ä‰c-c“-U…- UMÈE-§‰, NC‰-ÜÈE-NC-C`-K‰-T“N-U‰N-^…P-P-PE-C…-T“N-U‰N-l…-NTE-RÈ-Ê-NC-R_-ä‰c-c“-U…- UMÈE-EÈ, ,Z‰c-î-G‰_-T@]-™`-KÈ,

7 Intrinsic nature (ngo bo nyid; svabhāvatā). This refers to the assertion that any existent entity possesses a truly established essence. 8 Attachment and hatred cease when the objects of the mind are seen to lack inherent existence.


Thus for example, when the thought arises that the reflection of a woman “is a woman”, you generate continuous attachment since the mind related to that (attachment) actively conceives (a woman). But when you comprehend the perfect state9 exactly as it is, the thought of a woman ceases and such freedom from attachment is an extremely amazing state. This is similar to undermining the generation of attachment through seeing your mind does not (inherently) abide.10 The Bhagavan stated on many occasions: “Monks, do not view the internal female faculty in a female as perfect. Monks, do not view the internal female faculty as perfect.”11 ,N‰]Ã-p…_-ÜÈT-NRÈP-]SCc-R-üc-lE-, ~…N-R]Ã-c-TÈP-éU-a‰c-K‰, ,^“`-éUc-N‰-^…-≠ÈN-^“`-`È, ,^“`-`-TNC-U‰N-UMÈE-P-P…, ,~…N-R]Ã-c-TÈP-]CC-R_-]nŸ_, ,Z‰c-Cc“Ec-cÈ, ,N‰-õ-Tc-P-ÜÈT- NRÈP-n…c-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-EÈ-TÈ-I…N-U‰N-R-I…N-_T-Lfi-T§P-R]Ã-p…_-]N…-T˛Uc-cÈ, Because of that ācarya Āryadeva also stated:

The seeds of existence (exist within) consciousness. Its objects are its utilized objects. When objects are seen to be selfless the seeds of existence cease.12

Ācarya (Nāgārjuna) composed this treatise in order to fully demonstrate the non-existence of any (inherent) nature of phenomena.

,]N…_-µc-R, CE-C…-WÂ-N‰-TZ…P-Ca‰Cc-R-MUc-FN-Um‰P-R-MUc-FN-C\…Cc-R-M—Cc-ä‰-G‰P-RÈ- UE]-T-I…N-l…c-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-T-N‰-NE-N‰_-N‰-õ-N‰-õ_-TaN-F…E-_T-Lfi-T§P-\…P-P, ^E-N‰-ä‰c-c“-_T-Lfi-T§P-R-`-NCÈc-R-F…-^ÈN, Here someone may assert: If tathāgatas who know everything, see everything, and possess great compassion—have already explained and clearly presented dependent origination to various beings in various ways—what need is there to repeat their clear presentation? TaN-R, N‰-TZ…P-Ca‰Cc-R-I…N-l…c-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-T-TaN-F…E-_T-Lfi-T§P-R-TN‰P- UÈN-l…, ]ÈP-lE-]H…C-å‰P-n…-M-£N-l…-NTE-C…c-´‰-T-`-cÈCc-R]Ã-TäÈN-R-NC-C…c-TaN-F…E-_T-

9 The perfect state (yang dag pa) refers to emptiness. 10 Walleser has “rang bzhin gyi sems gnas pa la” while the Derge edition has “rang gi sems gnas med pa la”. This sentence restates the meaning of the previous sentence which explains that when emptiness is realized attachment is not generated. 11 Attachment and hatred cease when the mind is seen to lack inherent existence. In general a female body is the object of attachment for the male and the male body is an object of attachment for the female. The internal female faculty and male faculty comprise two of the twenty-two faculties (dbang po; indriya) listed in Abhidharma. The female faculty empowers the development of specific female features in a female—and the male faculty empowers the development of male features. Both the male and female faculty are not to be viewed as perfect since they are contaminated (zag bcas) relative truths. 12 Āryadeva, Four Hundred Stanzas, Tengyur, dbu ma, vol. tsa, 16a.


Lfi-T§P-Rc, N‰-`-N‰-õ_-I…N-lE-TäÈN-R-VU-`-UEÈP-R_-Z‰P-R]Ã-ÉÈ-FP-B-F…C-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`- R_-]qŸE-T-UGÈC-Lfi-\T-R-U-åÈCc-R-P, NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-P…-^ÈN-R-BÈ-P-^…P-K‰, CE-C…-p…_-N‰-NC-C…-´‰-T-NE-]CC-R-NE-]uÈ-T-NE-]ÈE-T-NC-TäÈN-R]Ã-p…_-_È, Response: Indeed it is true that tathāgatas have already explained and clearly presented dependent origination; but due to the power of worldly terminology that describes and presents terms such as “generation” and so on, (worldly beings) conceive that these mere expressions exist (inherently). Those who possess such minds do not comprehend the supremely profound state of dependent origination since for them phenomena intrinsically exist, because they are described as states that are generated and cease, or that come and go. ,CE-CZ…-^ÈN-R-`c-åC-R-NE-GN-R-NE-N‰-I…N-NE-CZP-I…N-Oÿ-c‰Uc-R-NC-q‰N-l…, _…-TÈE-C…-¿- `-cÈCc-R-U‰N-R-NC-`-N‰-NC-U…-]qŸE-EÈ-£U-Oÿ-c‰Uc-R-N‰-NC-`-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-T]Ã- EÈ-TÈ-I…N-_T-Lfi-T§P-R]Ã-p…_-ÜÈT-NRÈP-n…c-_…Cc-R-NE-`“E-¢ÈP-Oÿ-TKE-T-]N…-T˛Uc-cÈ, There are those who think that existent bases are permanent, annihilated, absolutely identical, or absolutely distinct. There are those who think that they do not occur, and are nonexistent like the horns of a rabbit and so on. Ācarya (Nāgārjuna) has composed this work reliant on logic and scripture for them—in order to clearly present the nature of dependent origination. ,CZP-^E-CE-BÈ-P]Ã-p…_-N‰-TZ…P-Ca‰Cc-Rc-å‰P-F…E-]{‰`-R_-]qŸE-T-TaN-F…E-_T-Lfi-T§P-R-N‰-BÈ-P]Ã-p…_-ÜÈT-NRÈP-n…c-ä‰c-c“-_T-Lfi-T§P-R_-]MN-l…, U-TaN-F…E-_T-Lfi-U-T§P-R_- ä‰c-c“-_T-Lfi-§ÈP-R_-]Èc-R-N‰-CE-Z…C-^…P, ]N…-õ_-]H…C-å‰P-R]Ã-T§P-TFÈc-NC-lE-¢ÈP-n…- ÜÈT-NRÈP-éUc-l…c-TaN-F…E-_T-Lfi-T§P-Rc-N-õ_-I…N-lE-N‰-éUc-l…-ÜÈT-U-NC-ä‰c-c“-µ- T_-q‰N-NÈ, ,N‰]Ã-p…_-ÜÈT-NRÈP-n…c-[160a] ä‰c-c“-_T-Lfi-T§P-R_-_…Cc-cÈ, Again, because tathāgatas address what alone exists, they have explained and clearly presented dependent origination. Because that alone exists, it is appropriate that ācarya (Nāgārjuna) clearly presents it again. How could it be suitable for him to later clearly present that which was not (earlier) explained nor clearly presented? So too, just as former masters have explained and clearly presented worldly treatises, now their students again teach such treatises. Therefore it is logical that ācarya (Nāgārjuna) again clearly presents this. ,]N…_-µc-R, F…]Ã-p…_-]CC-R-`-cÈCc-R-TîN-RÈ-N‰-NC-]CÈC-R_-q‰N, ]CC-R-U‰N-R-´‰-U‰N-R, ,GN-R-U‰N-R-åC-U‰N-R, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-VU-Z…C-qc-Rc-U…-GÈC-CU, Here someone may assert: Why do you negate all eight terms such as “ceases”? Isn’t it appropriate to merely state: “Neither ceases nor is generated, neither is annihilated nor


permanent”? TaN-R, NEÈc-RÈ]Ã-EÈ-TÈ-I…N-µ-T-NC-S`-G‰_-M-£N-l…-NTE-C…c-T§P-R-]CC-R-`-cÈCc-R- TäÈN-R-TîN-RÈ-N‰-NC-C…c-NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-R-I…N-Oÿ-§ÈP-R_-q‰N-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-]CC-R-`-cÈCc-R- TîN-RÈ-N‰-NC-I…N-NCC-R-UXN-NÈ, ,N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-N‰-BÈ-P-c‰Uc-R_-q‰N-R]U, ]n‰N-R-˛ÈU-R_-q‰N-R-CE-NC-F…-^E-_“E-T-N‰-NC-lE-]CC-R-`-cÈCc-R]Ã-NÈP-N‰-NC-`-Tå‰P-Pc-c‰Uc-R-NE-˛ÈU-R_-q‰N-NÈ, Response: In general those who advocate an inherent nature of phenomena hold that the eight terms such as “ceases” and so on—that arise by the power of convention—refer to phenomena that intrinsically exist. Because of that, the eight terms such as “ceases” and so on should be negated. So too, those who are capable of contemplating or differentiating that state alone,13 should begin to contemplate it in reliance on the meaning of such terms as “ceases” and so on. Different assertions about the nature of the eight characteristics14

]N…-õ-§‰, _‰-Z…C-B-F…C-P-_‰-NEÈc-RÈ-MUc-FN-P…-´‰-T-NE-]CC-R]Ã-GÈc-FP-ˇN-F…C-U-§‰-î‡P- n…c-î‡P-Oÿ-]qŸE-EÈ, ,Z‰c-\‰_-_È, ,CZP-NC-P-_‰-c-`-cÈCc-R-íc-NDÿ-RÈ-NC-åC-F‰c-\‰_-_È, ,^E-CZP-NC-P…-GÈc-NE-GÈc-U-^…P-R-NE-, CE-\C-PU-UB]-NE-, Oÿc-NE-CE-\C-NE-~ÈC- F‰c-q-T-íc-x⁄C-RÈ-NC-åC-F‰c-TäÈN-NÈ, In this regard some say: All phenomena that possess the properties of generation and cessation are momentary because they arise continuously within a continuum. Others say: The nine substances―such as earth and so on―are permanent. Again others say: Dharma and non-Dharma, persons and space, time and person, and the six substances such as life-force, are permanent. ,N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-S`-G‰_-~ÈC-NE-`“c-CI…c, U‰-NE-T“N-a…E-CI…c, î‡-NE-]{c-T“-CI…c, ^ÈP-KP-NE- ^ÈP-FP-CI…c, ^P-`C-NE-^P-`C-FP-CI…c-P…-N‰-I…N-NE-CZP-I…N-F‰c-q-T-]n‰N-R_-q‰N-NÈ, So too (some say:) in general both life-force and the body, both fire and wood, both cause and result, both qualities and those possessing qualities, both branches and those possessing

13 Thatness or reality (de kho na, tattva) refers to emptiness. 14 In this section Buddhapālita examines different assertions about the nature of the eight characteristics of existent entities (1) they cease, (2) they are generated, (3) they are annihilated, (4) they are permanent, (5) they come, (6) they go, (7) they are distinct, and (8) they are identical.


branches, are differentiated as “identical” or “distinct”. ,N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-B-F…C-P-_‰-^ÈP-KP-q-T-NE-úP-R-éUc-NE-åCc-]BÈ_-`È-Z‰c-\‰_-_È, ,CZP-NC-P-_‰-çfl`-zP-NE-^…N-CI…c-P…-U…-]uÈ]È-Z‰c-\‰_-_È, ,CZP-NC-P…-~ÈC-NE-CE-\C-CI…c-]uÈ-T-NE- úP-Z‰c-TäÈN-NÈ, ,u⁄T-Pc-CE-Oÿ-]uÈ-T_-^E-]NÈN-NÈ, ,N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-BÈ-P-c‰Uc-R-NE-]n‰N-R-˛ÈU-R]Ã-NTE-C…c-]CC-R-`-cÈCc-R-TîN-RÈ-NCC-R_-UXN-NÈ, So too there are those who say: Those who possess qualities bear the sign of the wheel.15 Others say: Neither atoms nor mind go (anywhere). Others assert: Both life-force and persons possess (the act of) going. Once they are established they can go anywhere.16 Therefore the eight (terms) such as “ceases” and so on are refuted by the power of contemplating and differentiating thatness. The order in which the eight characteristics are stated

,]N…_-µc-R, ]È-P-F…]Ã-p…_-]CC-R-¢_-T@C-R, ´‰-T-p…c-T@C ,´‰-T-U‰N-R-¢_-TäÈN-R_-q- T]Ã-_…Cc-£U-P, Here someone may assert: Why is cessation negated first and generation negated later? Isn’t it more appropriate to state: “neither is generated nor ceases...”.17 ,TaN-R, N‰-P…-ÅP-@_-U…-_“E-§‰, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ^…-C‰-`-UBc-R-éUc-P…-T•‡-T-`-ÆÈ_-T-õC- ]ÈC-E‰c-R-^ÈN-l…, CZP-`-P…-E‰c-R-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-_È, Response: The (original order) should not be faulted. Why? Because those skilled in language ascertain how priority is applied according to grammatical rules, but others do not ascertain this. ,]N…_-µc-R, N‰-õ-P-^E-[160b] ´‰-T-^ÈN-P-]CC-R_-]nŸ_-n…-U‰N-P-U…-]nŸ_-Tc-CÈ-_…Uc-TZ…P-Oÿ-¢_-´‰-T-U‰N-R-Z‰c-TäÈN-R_-q-T-BÈ-P_-]nŸ_-_È, 15 Here the meaning of two characteristics―identical and distinct―are examined. This links with the previous statement “both qualities and those possessing qualities...are differentiated as absolutely identical or absolutely distinct.” For instance the sign of the dharma wheel (rtags ‘khor lo) is displayed on the outer robe of a monk of the Sarvāstivādin sect. The sign of the dharma wheel signifies one who possesses the quality of virtue. 16 These two assertions relate to the characteristics of coming and going. 17 Someone asserts that the order of the first two characteristics should be reversed. Therefore instead of stating: “that neither ceases nor is generated”, it should read “that is neither generated or ceases”.


Someone may here assert: If something is generated (or born) it comes to cease, but if it does not exist it does not come (to cease). Therefore in accordance with the stages of generation “neither generated” should necessarily be stated first.18 ,TaN-R, uÈCc-RÈ-]N…-õ_-´‰-T-¢-`-]CC-R-]p…]È, ,Z‰c-q-T_-CE-C…c-BÈ-TÈ-FC-^…N-G‰c-R_- ]nŸ_-T]Ã-NR‰-]C]-Z…C-H‰-n…c-a…C Response: Friend, what would give us conviction in the assertion: “Generation (or birth) is first and cessation later”? Present some examples. µc-R-MUc-FN-lE-NR‰-^…P-K‰, H…-õ_-Z‰-P, _‰-Z…C-´‰-]N…-NÈP-U‰N-CE-p…_-´‰-T-^ÈN-P-à-a…-NE-, ,PN-NE-•‡C-T¢`-TcN-NE-TF…E-`-cÈCc-R]Ã-Nu-NC-^ÈN, ,F‰c-q-T-TZ…P-PÈ, He asserts: Anything could be an example. How? For instance some say that birth is without purpose. Why? Because when birth exists then there is aging and death, illness and suffering, and enemies who kill and bind us and so on.19 ,TaN-R, CE-`-]G…-T-^ÈN-R]Ã-´‰-T-CE-^…P-R-N‰-`-Ê-]G…-T-¢ÈP-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-BÈ-P-^…P-R-£U, C`-K‰-N‰-]G…-T-¢ÈP-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-U-^…P-P-P…-]BÈ_-T-`-MÈC-U-^ÈN-R_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-Tc, N‰-Ê-U…- ]NÈN-N‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-]BÈ_-T-`-MÈC-U-NE-M-U-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-´‰-T-¢-`-]G…-T-]p…-T-]U-]G…-T-¢-`-´‰-T-]p…]È-Z‰c-q-T_-TäÈN-R_-U…-Q÷c-cÈ, ,]ÈC-Pc-lE-, ,C`-K‰-´‰-T-¢-nŸ_-`, ,à-a…-]p…-T-^…P-P-P…, ,à-a…-U‰N-R_-´‰-T-NE-, ,U-a…-T_-Ê-´‰-T_-]nŸ_, ,Z‰c-]qŸE-EÈ, Response: Some think that wherever death occurs, birth must surely precede it. If it does not precede death then it would absurdly follow that saṁsāra would have a beginning, but this is unacceptable. Therefore—because saṁsāra has no beginning or end—it cannot be stated that birth is first and death follows; or death is first and birth follows. Also it is stated below: “If birth came first and then there is aging and death, there would be birth without aging and death. And also without death there would be birth” [11/13]. ,µc-R-]È-P, C`-K‰-]H…Cc-UE-´‰-T-U‰N-P-NÈP-U‰N-N‰-U…-]qŸE-, ,a…E-´‰c-U‰N-P-PCc-U‰-Ö‡E-C…c- ´‰`-T_-U…-]nŸ_-TZ…P, ,Z‰c-q-T-]N…c-P…-NR‰-CZP-^…P-PÈ, He asserts: But if there were no birth with many such fears, then birth would be purposeless and such a thing does not occur. Just as if trees were not generated, the forest would not be

18 Another opponent reasserts the need to reverse the order of the first two characteristics―so that generation precedes cessation―since this reflects the actual order they come into existence. 19 The opponent presents birth and death as an example of generation that occurs first and cessation that occurs later. Birth and death are held by many to be meaningless since the causes of the suffering that manifests between birth and death are obscure.


harmed by fire or wind. This is another example.20 ,TaN-R, ]N…-`-mN-R_-F…-^ÈN, Response: What is the difference?21 µc-R, mN-R_-P…-]N…-^…P-K‰, CE-C…-p…_-]N…-`-]CC-R-¢ÈP-Oÿ-]uÈ-T]Ã-´‰-T-U‰N-N‰, ,]N…-õ_-a…E- `ÈP-R-CZP-Oÿ-]CCc-`-]N…_-´‰c-R-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-_È, He asserts: There is a difference. For what reason does generation that is preceded by cessation not exist? That is because a living tree22 that ceases elsewhere is not generated here.23 , TaN-R, ,]N…-`-Ê-c-TÈP-]CC-R-¢ÈP-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-`c-´‰-Tc-N‰-Ê-]CC-R-¢ÈP-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-BÈ-P- `c-´‰-T-^…P-PÈ, Response: In this regard—since (a sprout) is generated after the prior cessation of the seed—it is generated only due to the prior cessation (of the seed).24 ,]N…_-µc-R, N‰-P…-U…-]x-§‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, CZP-BÈ-P-]CCc-`-CZP-BÈ-P-´‰-T]Ã-p…_-K‰, ]N…- õ_-]N…-`-c-TÈP-]CCc-`-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰]Ã-rŸ-Dÿ-I…N-]CCc-`-rŸ-Dÿ-I…N-U…-´‰-Tc-N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-P…-U…- ]x]È, Here someone may assert: This is not similar. Why? Because when one ceases, another is generated. Thus, when the seed ceases the sprout is generated. But since the sprout is not generated when the sprout ceases, it is not similar.25 ,TaN-R, N‰-P…-]x-T-BÈ-P-§‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ]N…-õ_-´‰-T-NE-]G…-T-CI…c-lE-CE-BÈ-P-a…-T-N‰- I…N-´‰-T-U-^…P-R]Ã-p…_-K‰, C`-K‰-CE-BÈ-P-]G…-T-N‰-I…N-´‰-T_-]nŸ_-P-P…-N‰-õ-P-åC-R]Ã-´ÈP-Oÿ-M`-T_-[161a]]nŸ_-K‰, ü-CE-^…P-R-N‰-Ê-ü-BÈ-P_-]nŸ_-`, OÿN-]uÈ-CE-^…P-R-N‰-Ê-OÿN-]uÈ-

20 The view that generation must precede cessation is again asserted. In other words, destruction must follow generation for a forest can only be destroyed after it has been generated. 21 The author asserts that the example of a tree is not different from the previous example of the birth, suffering, and death of a person. Neither is capable of proving that birth or generation necessarily precedes death or cessation. 22 Walleser has “green tree” or “living tree” (shing ljon pa; vṛkṣa) while the Derge edition has “shing lon pa”. 23 The opponent asserts that the examples are different: a person may be reborn elsewhere after death but a tree cannot. 24 The author continues to argue that cessation may precede generation by examining the relationship between the seed and sprout―for the generation of the sprout depends on the prior destruction of the seed. 25 The opponent asserts that the author’s example of the seed and sprout is not similar to rebirth since the cessation of the sprout does not precede the generation of the sprout while the death of a person precedes the birth of a person.


BÈ-P_-]nŸ_-_È, ,N‰-õ-^…P-P-`c-NE-IÈP-UÈEc-Rc-qc-R]Ã-´‰-T-NE-]uÈ-T-]t‹`-R-U‰N-R_- ]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-Ê-U…-]NÈN-N‰, N‰-Pc-CE-BÈ-P-]G…-T-N‰-I…N-´‰-T_-]nŸ_-_È, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-TäÈN-R_-U…-Q÷c-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰]Ã-]x-T-BÈ-P]È, Response: That is entirely similar. Why? Because both birth and death also (exist) in that way, and just that which dies is not born. If just that which dies were to be born then in consequence it would erroneously be permanent—whoever is a god would remain a god and whoever is an animal would remain an animal. But since birth and reincarnation activated by karma and affliction are unmistaken, (you) cannot assert this. Thus―since you cannot state “just that which dies is born”―it is entirely similar to that.26 ,]N…-`-CZP-BÈ-P-]CC , CZP-BÈ-P-´‰]È-Z‰c-R-CE-^…P-R-N‰-Ê-U…-_…Cc-K‰, C`-K‰-c-TÈP-NE-rŸ-Dÿ-CI…c-CZP-I…N-^…P-R_-nŸ_-P-N‰-CI…c-`-î‡-NE-]{c-T“]Ã-M-£N-lE-U‰N-R_-]nŸ_-T-Z…C-P- M-£N-^ÈN-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-CI…c-CZP-I…N-U-^…P-PÈ, Also here it is illogical to state: “Just the one that ceases is the one that is generated”. If both the seed and sprout were absolutely separate, the two would not exist as cause and result even nominally. But since they exist nominally (as cause and result), therefore both are not absolutely separate. ,CZP-Ê-]N…-P-µ-T-RÈ-NC-c-TÈP-TKT-Pc-TNC-C…c-a…E-öÈP-R-]N…-TV“Cc, TNC-C…c-T“-]N…- T´‰N-N‰, a…E-öÈP-R-]N…-P…-TNC-C…]È, ,T“-]N…-P…-TNC-C…]È-Z‰c-\‰_-_È, ,N‰-`-C`-K‰-c-TÈP-NE-a…E-öÈP-R-NE-T“-NC-CZP-I…N-^…P-R_-nŸ_-P-]H…C-å‰P-n…-M-£N-N‰-NC-U…-~…N-R_-]nŸ_-T-Z…C-P- ~…N-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-c-TÈP-NE-rŸ-Dÿ-CI…c-CZP-I…N-Oÿ-TäÈN-R_-U…-Q÷c-K‰, ]ÈC-Pc-lE-, CZP-P…- CZP-`c-Tå‰P-K‰-CZP, ,CZP-U‰N-CZP-`c-CZP-U…-]nŸ_, ,CE-`c-Tå‰P-K‰-CE-^…P-R, ,N‰-P…-N‰-`c-CZP-U…-]MN, ,F…c-]qŸE-EÈ, Again, in this (context) someone may assert: “By planting a seed I have planted a tree―this tree is mine; I have given birth to a son―this son is mine.” (Response:) If the seed and tree—and (the father) and son—were absolutely different such worldly conventions would be impossible. But since these (conventions) are possible it cannot be stated that both the seed and tree are absolutely different. It is stated below: “If a different thing were different from something different, then it could not be different without that different thing. However without something different, it cannot be different. Therefore it

26 The author asserts that it is similar since cessation preceding generation should be applied to the continuum in which that generation and cessation occur. That which ceases in that continuum is not that which is then generated in that continuum and that which is generated in that continuum is not that which ceases.


does not exist.” [14/6] ,]N…_-µc-R, N‰-õ-P-Ê-c-TÈP-^ÈN-R-I…N-^…P-P-]CC-R_-]nŸ_-n…c-U‰N-P-U…-]nŸ_-Tc-]N…- Ê-´‰-T-¢-`-]CC-R-]p…-T_-]nŸ_-_È, Here someone may assert: If a seed were to intrinsically exist, it would not become non-existent through ceasing. Therefore generation is earlier and cessation later. ,TaN-R, ]N…-õ_-c-TÈP-N‰-`-Ê-c-TÈP-]CC-R-¢ÈP-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-I…N-^ÈN-N‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ]N…-õ_-rŸ-Dÿ-`c-lE-a…E-öÈP-R-CZP-U-^…P-`-a…E-öÈP-R-`c-lE-c-TÈP-CZP-U-^…P-R]Ã-p…_-c-TÈP- ]CC-R-¢ÈP-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-`c-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰-`, c-TÈP-Ê-c-TÈP-]CC-R-¢ÈP-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-`c-´‰-§‰. N‰-õ_- ÜÈT-NRÈP-]SCc-R-üc-lE-, ,c-TÈP-NR‰-P…-H…-õ-T_, ,N‰-`-MÈC-U-^ÈN-U-^…P, ,N‰-õ_-î‡-NE-U…- úP-`c, ,´‰-T]E-~…N-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, ,Z‰c-Cc“Ec-cÈ, Response: Thus that seed exists prior to the cessation of the seed. Why? Because the tree is not other than the sprout; and the seed is not other than the tree. The sprout is generated from the seed prior to its cessation; even the seed is generated from the seed prior to its cessation. Thus ācarya Āryadeva stated:

Taking the seed as an example, just as it does not have a beginning so too its generation from a causeless state is not possible.27

,N‰]Ã-p…_-´‰-T-NE-]CC-R-CI…c-`-¢-p…]Ã-éU-R_-TZC-R-U‰N-Rc-F…]Ã-p…_-[161b] ]CC-R-¢_- T@C-`-´‰-T-p…c-T@C-F‰c-q-T-N‰-ÅP-@_-U…-_“E-EÈ, ,N‰-CI…c-`-¢-p…]Ã-éU-R_-TZC-R-U‰N-R-N‰-I…N-_T-Lfi-T§P-R]Ã-p…_-ÜÈT-NRÈP-n…c-]N…_-]CC-R-¢_-C\“E-T-UXN-`-´‰-T-p…c-TåCc- cÈ, Therefore—since both generation and cessation cannot be posited as earlier and later—why then is it unsuitable to criticize the statement: “cessation ceases before; generation ceases later”? Because it is clearly taught that those two cannot be posited as earlier and later—the ācarya here declares: “Investigate here whether cessation should be held to exist earlier and generation later.”

27 Four Hundred Stanzas, 10a. This version gives: ji ltar sa bon mtha' mthong zhing; de la thog ma yod min ltar; de bzhin rgyu ni ma tsang phyir; skye ba'ang 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro.


Chapter 1. Investigation of Conditions 2. How the commentary explains dependent origination to be free of the eight extremes. This has three outlines:

1. Teaching dependent origination to be inherently empty 2. How saṁsāra is entered or exited through not comprehending or comprehending that 3. How evil view is stopped through comprehending dependent origination

1. Teaching dependent origination to be inherently empty. This has two outlines:

1. Actual presentation 2. Eliminating dispute

1. Actual presentation. This has two outlines:

1. Brief presentation of both selflessnesses 2. Extensive explanation

1. Brief presentation of both selflessnesses. This has two outlines: 1. Refuting dharmas are inherently existent through investigating the action and agent of cause and result 2. Refuting persons are inherently existent through investigating the action and agent of going and coming

1. Refuting dharmas are inherently existent through investigating the action and agent of cause and result. This has two outlines:

1. Refuting generation is inherently existent in terms of results 2. Refuting conditions are inherently existent as generators

1. Refuting generation is inherently existent in terms of results

1. Refuting generation from the four extremes 2. Eliminating (the doubt) that the refutation of other contradicts scripture

1. Refuting generation from the four extremes ,]N…_-µc-R, _‰-Z…C-H…-õ_-´‰-T_-TäÈN-R-M-£N-VU-^…P-R-N‰-õ_-_T-Lfi-§ÈP-F…C Here someone may assert: First how is the term “generation” merely imputed? Clearly explain how this is so. , TaN-R-NE-RÈ_-T§P-R_-q]È, Response: I will explain this first.

,TNC-`c-U-^…P-CZP-`c-U…P, ,CI…c-`c-U-^…P-î‡-U‰N-U…P, ,NEÈc-RÈ-CE-NC-CE-P-^E-, ,´‰-T-PU-^E-^ÈN-U-^…P, No phenomenon anywhere, Is ever generated From itself, from other, From both, or without cause. [1/1]

,]N…-`-C`-K‰-NEÈc-RÈ-]C]-Z…C-´‰-T_-nŸ_-P, NEÈc-RÈ-N‰]Ã-´‰-T-N‰-TNC-`c-cU, CZP-`c-cU,


TNC-NE-CZP-CI…c-`c-cU, î‡-U‰N-R-`c-]nŸ_-uE-P, TåCc-P-éU-R-MUc-FN-`c-U…- ]MN-NÈ, ,H…-õ_-Z‰-P, TNC-`c-Z‰c-q-T-P…-TNC-I…N-`c-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-M-WÀC-CÈ-, ,N‰-`-_‰-Z…C-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-TNC-C…-TNC-I…N-`c-´‰-T-U‰N-N‰, N‰-NC-C…-´‰-T-NÈP-U‰N-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-NE-, ´‰-T-M—C-R-U‰N-R_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-_È, ,]N…-õ_-NEÈc-RÈ-TNC-C…-TNC-I…N-Oÿ-^ÈN-R-éUc-`-Ê-´‰- T-NCÈc-R-U‰N-NÈ, ,C`-K‰-^ÈN-lE-Ê-´‰-P-PU-Ê-U…-´‰-T_-U…-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-Ê-U…-]NÈN-N‰, N‰]Ã- p…_-_‰-Z…C-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-TNC-`c-´‰-T-U‰N-NÈ, Here, if some phenomenon were to be generated, it may be asked: “Is the generation of that phenomenon from itself, or from other, or from both self and other, or without cause?” If analyzed, then it is not tenable in any of these ways. Why? The term “from itself” refers to the equivalent term “from its own state”. First a phenomenon is not generated from its own state because its generation would be meaningless; and its generation would be endless. As such, phenomena which exist in and of themselves do not require repeated generation. If something exists―yet still (requires) repeated generation―then it would never not (require) generation. Therefore (generation from itself) is untenable; and because of that no phenomenon is generated from itself.28 ,CZP-`c-lE-´‰-T-U‰N-NÈ, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, MUc-FN-`c-MUc-FN-´‰-T_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-_È, ,TNC-NE-CZP-CI…c-`c-lE-´‰-T-U‰N-N‰. CI…-C]Ã-´ÈP-Oÿ-M`-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-_È, ,î‡-U‰N-R-`c-lE-´‰-T-U‰N-N‰, åC-Lfi-MUc-FN-`c-MUc-FN-´‰-T_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-NE-, ˛ÈU-R-MUc-FN-NÈP-U‰N-R-I…N-l…-´ÈP-Oÿ-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-_È, ,N‰-õ_-CE-C…-p…_-NEÈc-RÈ-´‰-T-éU-R-MUc-FN-Oÿ-U…-]MN-R]Ã-N‰]Ã-p…_-´‰-T-U‰N-Rc-´‰-T_-TäÈN-R-P…-M-£N-VU-^…P-PÈ, Also there is no generation from other. Why? Because it would follow that everything would be generated from everything.29 Generation from both itself and other does not exist because it follows that the errors of both would occur.30 Also generation without a cause does not exist because it would follow that everything would continuously be generated from everything; and because it would follow erroneously that the entire creative process would be meaningless.31 Thus because the generation of phenomena is not tenable in any of (these) ways—the term “generation” is merely imputed, since there is no generation.

28 Gendün Drup explains 1a as follows [3a]: “Take any phenomenon whether internal and external, it is never generated from itself in any place, at any time, or according to any tenet system because repeated generation would be meaningless and endless.” 29 Gendün Drup explains 1b as follows [3a]: “Take that subject, it is never generated from other in any place, at any time, or according to any tenet system because it would follow that everything would be generated from everything.” 30 Gendün Drup explains 1c as follows [3a]: “Take that subject, it is never generated from both self and other in any place, at any time, or according to any tenet system because generation from self and other has already been disproved (bkeg).” 31 Gendün Drup explains 1d as follows [3a]: “Take that subject, it is never generated without a cause because all creative action would be meaningless.”


2. Eliminating (the doubt) that the refutation of other contradicts scripture. There are two outlines: 1. Dispute 2. Reply

1. Dispute

,µc-R, NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-TNC-`c-´‰-T-U‰N-N‰, ]N…-õ_-rŸ-Dÿ-N‰-I…N-`c-H…-õ_-´‰-Z‰c-TaN-R-CE-^…P-R-NE-, TNC-`c-´‰-T-U‰N-P-TNC-NE-CZP-CI…c-`c-´‰-T-N‰-^E-U…-_…Cc-K‰, [162a] pÈCc- CF…C-IUc-R]Ã-p…_-_È-Z‰c-q-T-NE-, ]N…-õ_-î‡-U‰N-R-`c-´‰]È-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-pÈCc-N‰-P…-M-GN-^…P-Rc-N‰-NC-P…-_‰-Z…C-Bc-U…-`‰P-KÈ, ,NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-CZP-`c-´‰-T-U‰N-R-BÈ-P]È, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-E‰c- R_-C\“E-§‰-TaN-R-CE-^…P-R-N‰-`-µ-T_-q-§‰, There are those who state “Phenomena are not generated from themselves so how could a sprout be generated from itself?”; and “If there is no generation from itself then also generation from both itself and other would be illogical since one part (of the thesis) has failed”; and “Since the position ‘generated without a cause’ is an absurd (proposition), it cannot be accepted”. But there are some who definitely maintain that “There are no phenomena generated from other at all”. How can this (position) be explained? 32

ì‰P-éUc-TZ…-§‰-î‡-NE-P…, ,NU…Cc-R-NE-P…-N‰-U-MC ,TNC-RÈ-^E-P…-N‰-TZ…P-K‰, ,ì‰P-ò-R-P…-^ÈN-U-^…P, The four conditions are the causal condition, Focal condition, immediate condition, And the empowering condition. A fifth condition does not exist. [1/2]

,ò-R-^ÈN-R-U-^…P-Z‰c-q-Tc-P…-ÜÈT-NRÈP-B-F…C-C…c-ì‰P-TZ…-RÈ-]N…-`c-CZP-CE-NC-M-£N-Oÿ- TäÈN-R-N‰-MUc-FN-lE-ì‰P-TZ…-RÈ-]N…-NC-Lfi-]Oÿc-cÈ, ,Z‰c-E‰c-R_-]XÀP-R_-q‰N-NÈ, ,N‰-_T-Lfi- T§P-R]Ã-p…_-î‡-`-cÈCc-R-ì‰P-TZ…-RÈ-N‰-NC-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-´‰N-R]Ã-ì‰P-Oÿ-T§P-K‰, ì‰P-TZ…-RÈ-N‰- NC-`c-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-´‰-T_-]nŸ_-_È, Since it is stated that “a fifth does not exist”, some scholars strictly maintain that all states conventionally described as “other than the four conditions”, are to be subsumed in the four conditions. In order to clearly demonstrate this, these four conditions such as the causal (condition) and so on are taught to be conditions producing phenomena—for phenomena are generated from the four conditions. 32 Gendün Drup explains the context of the dispute [3b]: “Exponents of Buddhist view who assert truly existent phenomena say: Since generation from itself does not exist, generation from both is illogical and since generation without a cause is absurd it is indeed illogical. It is not acceptable that the words ‘Not from other’ refute generation from other because the Bhagavan stated that there was generation from four conditions that are themselves inherently established.”


,CE-C…-p…_-ì‰P-TZ…-RÈ-CZP-Oÿ-nŸ_-R-N‰-NC-`c-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-´‰-T_-]nŸ_-T-N‰]Ã-p…_-NEÈc-RÈ- éUc-CZP-`c-´‰-T-U‰N-R-BÈ-P]È, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-T\E-RÈ-U-^…P-PÈ, (Opponent:) Because the four conditions are “other”―and phenomena are generated from them―it is incorrect to state “There are surely no phenomena that are generated from other.” ,TaN-R, C`-K‰-mÈN-l…c-î‡-`-cÈCc-R-ì‰P-TZ…-RÈ-CE-NC-CZP-^…P-R_-M-£N-TKCc-R-N‰-NC- NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-`c-CZP-^…P-R_-nŸ_-P-P…-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-CZP-`c-´‰-T_-^E-]nŸ_-T-Z…C-P, N‰-NC-P…-CZP-^…P-R_-U…-]MN-NÈ, ,H…-õ_-Z‰-P, Response: If you designate any of the four conditions such as the causal (condition) and so on as “other”—and if they were something other than phenomena—then phenomena would be generated from other. But it is untenable that they are “other”. How? 2. Reply

NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-_E-TZ…P-P…, ,ì‰P-`-cÈCc-`-^ÈN-U-^…P, ,TNC-C…-NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-U…P-P, ,CZP-n…-NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-U-^…P, An inherent essence of phenomena Does not exist in its conditions and so on. If its own state does not exist Other states would not exist. [1/3]

]N…-`-NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-R-éUc-CF…C-`-CF…C-TõÈc-Pc-CZP-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_-T-P…-NR‰_-P-VË-v-`c- DÿT-K-CZP-Oÿ-]nŸ_-`, DÿT-K-`c-lE-VË-v-CZP-Oÿ-]nŸ_-T-õ-T“-^…P-P, CPc-ˇTc-CE-P-c- TÈP-`-cÈCc-ì‰P-éUc-^ÈN-R]Ã-CPc-ˇTc-N‰-P-rŸ-Dÿ-`-cÈCc-R-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-^ÈN-R-U-^…P-K‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-î‡-`-cÈCc-R-ì‰P-éUc-^ÈN-R-P-rŸ-Dÿ-`-cÈCc-R-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-_E-TZ…P-^ÈN-R-U- ^…P-PÈ, ,N‰-éUc-l…-TNC-C…-NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-R-U-^…P-P-î‡-`-cÈCc-R-NC-H…-õ_-CZP-Oÿ-]nŸ_-_È, N‰-õ-Tc-P-î‡-`-cÈCc-[162b] R-ì‰P-éUc-rŸ-Dÿ-`-cÈCc-R-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-`c-CZP-I…N-^…P-R_-U…- ]MN-NÈ, It may be said that existent phenomena that rely on each other are “other”—just as for example Gupta is other than Caitra and Caitra is other than Gupta. But when conditions―such as seeds and so on―exist, then phenomena―such as sprouts and so on―do not exist. Therefore when conditions―such as the causal (condition) and so on―exist, then


an inherent essence of phenomena―such as sprouts and so on―does not exist. If its own state (bdag gi dngos po) does not exist, then how do causal (conditions) and so on―that are states other (than it― exist)? That being so it is untenable that conditions―such as causal (conditions) and so on―are other than phenomena such as sprouts. 33 ,N‰]Ã-p…_-CZP-n…-NEÈc-RÈ-U‰N-R-BÈ-P]Ã-p…_-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-CZP-`c-´‰]È, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-]MN-R-U-^…P-PÈ, ,ì‰P-`-cÈCc-`, Z‰c-q-T-`-cÈCc-R-©Èc-R-P…-CZP-n…-C[÷E-`“Cc-lE-E‰c-R_-C\“E- T]Ã-p…_-K‰, N‰c-P-CZP-n…-C[÷E-`“Cc-NC-`-Ê-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-´‰-T-U…-]MN-R_-_T-Lfi-T§P-R-^…P-PÈ, Therefore it is untenable to state: “Phenomena are generated from other” because other states (gzhan gyi dngos po) are solely nonexistent. Even though the textual systems of others definitely affirm the statement “conditions and so on...” [1/3b], it is clearly taught in the textual systems of others that it is untenable that phenomena are generated. ,]N…_-µc-R, C\“Cc-`-cÈCc-R-ì‰P-éUc-^ÈN-P-éU-R_-a‰c-R-´‰-T-U-^…P-PU, Here someone may assert: If conditions such as form and so on exist, do they generate consciousness or not? TaN-R, U-^…P-K‰-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-´‰-T-]N…-TåC-R_-q]È, Response: That is not so. We should investigate the generation of phenomena. ,mÈN-éU-R_-a‰c-R-U-´‰c-R-ì‰P-CZP-Oÿ-nŸ_-R-NC-`c-´‰-T_-]NÈN-P, éU-R_-a‰c-R-U-´‰c-R-`-TNC-C…-NEÈc-RÈ-C-`-^ÈN, TNC-C…-NEÈc-RÈ-U‰N-P-CZP-n…-NEÈc-RÈ-Ê-C-`-^ÈN, CZP-n…-NEÈc-RÈ-U‰N-P-N‰-rŸ-Dÿ-`-cÈCc-R-NE-UW”Ec-R-^…P-PÈ, ,Ê-P-]N…-P…-NÈP-CZP-^…P-K‰, NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-_E-TZ…P-P…-ì‰P-éUc-`-Ê-^ÈN-R-U-^…P, ì‰P-éUc-`c-CZP-R-`-^ÈN-R-U-^…P, CI…-C-`-Ê-^ÈN-R-U-^…P-PÈ, If you assert that consciousness that has not been generated―is generated from conditions that are other (than it)―then how could consciousness that has not been generated possess its

33 Gendün Drup explains verse 3 as follows [3b]: “Take the essence of phenomena, it follows it does not exist in (its) conditions and so on when it is not yet generated, because (if it existed) at that time it should be visible but it is not observed. If so, it follows that arising from another is not inherently existent because its own state (bdag gi dngos po) does not exist at (the time of its) conditions and so on, when it is not yet generated. Again take that subject, it follows that conditions and so on do not exist when they have not yet become conditions because if they existed at that (time) they would be causeless. If so, it follows other states that are inherently (established) from conditions do not exist because when conditions do not manifest its own state does not exist. Therefore the refutation of generation from other is not harmed by scripture but generation from other is harmed by logic.”


own state?34 If its own state does not exist, how could states other than it exist? If other states do not exist, then sprouts and so on (would not exist since) they are similar. Again, there is an alternate meaning: an inherent essence of phenomena does not exist in its conditions; it does not exist in those that are other than (its) conditions; also it does not exist in both. ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ´‰-T]Ã-ì‰P-Oÿ-TåCc-R-NÈP-U‰N-R-I…N-l…-´ÈP-Oÿ-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-K‰, ]N…-õ_-C`-K‰- NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-_E-TZ…P-ì‰P-éUc-`-]U-ì‰P-éUc-`c-CZP-R-`-]U, CI…-C-`-^ÈN-R_-nŸ_-P, ^ÈN-R-`-´‰-T-F…-Z…C-q-§‰, NEÈc-RÈ-_E-TZ…P-n…c-^ÈN-R-éUc-`-^E-´‰-T_-TåCc-R-NÈP-U‰N-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_-_È, ,^ÈN-R-`-ì‰P-éUc-l…c-lE-F…-Z…C-q-§‰, ì‰P-Oÿ-TåCc-R-^E-NÈP-U‰N-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_-_È, Why? Because considering (other states) to be conditions for generating (this state) is meaningless. Thus, if an inherent essence of a phenomenon were to exist in its conditions, or in those other than its conditions, or in both—then how would they act to generate an existent entity? It is meaningless to consider that inherently existent phenomena are generated. How would conditions act on an existent entity? Also considering them to be conditions would be meaningless. ,N‰-õ-Tc-P, ,NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-_E-TZ…P-P…, ,ì‰P-`-cÈCc-`-^ÈN-U-^…P, ,CE-ì‰P-`-cÈCc-R-`- ^ÈN-R-U-^…P-R-N‰-P…-TNC-C…-NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-R-U-^…P-R-§‰, N‰-NC-`c-CZP-Oÿ-^ÈEc-c“-åC-Lfi-U‰N- R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,TNC-C…-NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-U…P-P, ,CZP-n…-NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-U-^…P, ,TNC-C……c-NEÈc-RÈ-U‰N-P-c“-Z…C-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-CZP-`c-´‰-T]È-Z‰c-µ-T_-_…Cc, Therefore it is stated: “An inherent essence of phenomena does not exist in its conditions and so on” [1/3ab]. That which does not exist in its conditions and so on does not exist in its own state because it has absolutely never existed in states other than those. Since it is stated: “If its own state does not exist, other states do not exist” [1/3cd] it would be logical to ask “If its own state does not exist, then what phenomena are generated from other states?” 2. Refuting conditions are inherently existent as generators. This has three outlines:

1. Refuting conditions are inherently existent collectively 2. Refuting conditions are inherently existent individually 3. Teaching alternate ways of refuting them individually

1. Refuting conditions are inherently existent collectively. This has two outlines:

1. Refutation that investigates conditions in terms of the agent 2. Refutation that investigates conditions in terms of the object [1/6]

34 In other words if states which are other than it―such as its conditions and so on―do not exist, then “other” cannot exist, and therefore “self” or “its own state” cannot exist.


1. Refutation that investigates conditions in terms of the agent. This has two outlines: 1. Refutation that investigates conditions that establish the action of generation [1/4) 2. Refutation that investigates conditions that generate the result [1/5]

1. Refutation that investigates conditions that establish the action of generation ]N…_-µc-R, F…-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-[163a] TNC-NE-CZP-`-cÈCc-R-`c-´‰]È-Z‰c-q-T-]N…c-BÈ-TÈ- FC-`-F…-q-§‰, ]N…-õ_-U…C-`-cÈCc-R-P…-éU-R_-a‰c-R-´‰-T_-q-T]Ã-ì‰P-^…P-PÈ, ,N‰-^E-H…-õ_-Z‰-P, ]N…-`-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-P…-T´‰N-R-NE-´‰-T-NE-]qŸE-T-§‰-CVÍ-G‰_-éU-R_-a‰c-R-`-]H“C-CÈ-, ,éU-R_-a‰c-R-P…-´‰-T-^…P-PÈ, ,]N…-õ_-U…C-`-cÈCc-R-P…-éU-R_-a‰c-R-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-N‰-±„T-R_-q‰N-R-^…P-K‰, ±„T-R_-q‰N-R-^…P-R]Ã-p…_-ì‰P-^…P-PÈ, ,NR‰_-P-CVÍ-T]Ã-q-T-P…-]WÂN-R-NE-TVÂN-R-§‰-CVÍ-G‰_-]{c-GP-`-]H“C F…E. ]{c-GP-P…-TVÍ-T-^…P-`, U…-NE-¶ÈN-NE-G”-NE-U‰-NE-MT-`-cÈCc-R-_E-_E-C…-q-T-q‰N-R-NC-P…-CVÍ-T]Ã-q-T-N‰-±„T-R_-q‰N-R]Ã-ì‰P-NC-^…P-R_-UMÈE- T-TZ…P-PÈ, Here someone may assert: What use is it for you to ask “What phenomena are generated from self, or other, and so on?”—for the eyes and so forth are conditions of consciousness―the object generated. Again, why is that? Here “the action of generating”―that is, “producing”, “generating”, and “creating”―primarily refers to consciousness. Consciousness is generated; for the eyes and so on accomplish the action of generating consciousness. They are conditions because they establish something. For example, the action of cooking—that is, boiling and baking—primarily refers to rice gruel. Rice gruel is the main (result); and those (conditions) which accomplish specific functions—such as the human (cook), the vessels, water, fire, stoves and so on—are seen to be the conditions which establish it. ,]N…_-TaN-R,

q-T-ì‰P-NE-úP-U-^…P, Here the response is:

Action does not possess conditions [1/4a]

]N…-`-m‰N-P-_‰-U…C-`-cÈCc-R-P…-éU-R_-a‰c-R-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-±„T-R_-q‰N-R-^…P-R]Ã-p…_-éU-R_-a‰c-R]Ã-ì‰P-^…P-`, N‰-I…N-lE-éU-R_-a‰c-R-`-]H“C-CÈ-Z‰c-\‰_-T-P…-q-T-TåCc-P-U…-]MN- Rc-U…C-`-cÈCc-R-NC-N‰-±„T-R_-q‰N-R-^…P-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, C`-K‰-H…-õ_-Z‰-P, N‰]Ã-p…_-TaN- R-]N…-`-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-P…-éU-R_-a‰c-R-U-´‰c-R-]U-´‰c-R-`-]H“C-R_-]nŸ_-uE-P, Regarding this you say: Because the eyes and so on accomplish the action of generating


consciousness, they are conditions of consciousness; they also refer to consciousness.35 (In response I say:) But if action is analyzed this is untenable, for how could the eyes and so on establish (consciousness)? Why? Because it may be asked whether—in your explanation—the action of generating (consciousness) refers to (1) consciousness that has been generated or (2) consciousness that has not been generated? N‰-`-_‰-Z…C-U-´‰c-R-`-P…-U…-]H“C-§‰, CPc-R-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,]N…-õ_-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-P…-éU-R_- a‰c-R]Ã-CPc-`-]H“C-C…-, CPc-U‰N-R-`-U…-]H“C-Rc-éU-R_-a‰c-R-U-´‰c-R-N‰-Ê-U‰N-R-^…P-`, N‰-U‰N-P-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-N‰-`-CPc-R-^ÈN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, éU-R_-a‰c-R-´‰c-R-`-Ê-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-U…-]H“C-§‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, éU-R_-a‰c-R-´‰c-\…P-R]Ã-p…_-K‰, ]N…-õ_-´‰c-\…P-R-`-P…-Ê-´‰-T-U‰N-NÈ, ,N‰-`-]N…-£U-Oÿ-éU-R_-a‰c-R-´‰-TZ…P-R-`-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-^ÈN-R_-c‰Uc-P, N‰-Ê-U…-_“E-§‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ´‰c-R-NE-U-´‰c-R-U-CKÈCc-R_-´‰-TZ…P-R-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-_È, (1) It does not refer to consciousness that has not been generated because that is not an existent state. The action of generating here refers to an existent state of consciousness―and not a nonexistent state―for consciousness that has not been generated does not exist. If it does not exist, then how could the action of generating (consciousness) be an existent state? (2) Also the action of generating (consciousness) does not refer to consciousness that has been generated. Why? Because such consciousness has already been generated, and that already generated does not require repeated generation. If after considering this you think that the action of generating (consciousness) exists for consciousness that is now being generated, then that is also not plausible. Why? Because―not only is (consciousness) that has been generated and that which has not been generated, nonexistent― (consciousness) now being generated does not exist. ,´‰-T-NE-U-´‰c-R-CI…c-`-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-U…-]H“C-R_-P…-T§P-[163b] \…P-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-U‰N-NÈ, ,]N…c-TVÍ-T]Ã-q-T-Ê-Tc`-K‰, N‰-õ-Tc-P-q-T-ì‰P-NE-úP-R-U…-]MN-NÈ, ,N‰-`-]N…-£U-Oÿ-ì‰P-NE-U…-úP-R]Ã-q-T-^ÈN-R_-c‰Uc-P, Since it has already been demonstrated that the action of generating does not refer to that which is being generated―or that which has not been generated―the action of generating does not exist. This (logic) also refutes the action of cooking. Thus it is not tenable that action possesses conditions.36 In considering this—if you think that there is action that does not possess conditions—then: 35 In the sense that consciousness generated by the eyes is called eye consciousness and so on. 36 Gendün Drup explains 4a as follows [4a]: “A grammarian says: Due to the process of establishing actions by conditions, consciousness is directly generated. Response: It follows that a truly established action does not possess conditions because truly established actions do not exist.”


TaN-R,

ì‰P-NE-U…-úP-q-T-U‰N, Response:

There is no action that does not possess conditions. [1/4b]

,]N…-õ_-ì‰P-NE-U…-úP-R]Ã-q-T-U‰N-NÈ, ,C`-K‰-^ÈN-R_-nŸ_-P-åC-Lfi-MUc-FN-`c-MUc-FN-´‰-T_-]nŸ_-_È, ,N‰-õ-^…P-P-˛ÈU-R-MUc-FN-NÈP-U‰N-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-^E-U…-]NÈN-N‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-ì‰P-NE-U…-úP-R]Ã-q-T-^E-U…-]MN-NÈ, Thus there is no action that does not possess conditions.37 If it were to exist then everything would continuously be generated from everything. If that were so the entire creative process would be meaningless; therefore this (assertion) is not accepted. Because of that, action not possessing conditions is untenable. ,]N…_-µc-R, _‰-Z…C-ì‰P-éUc-P…-^ÈN-NÈ, ,N‰-NC-^ÈN-Rc-NEÈc-RÈ-]u⁄T-TÈ, ,N‰-u⁄T-Rc-´‰-T-]u⁄T-TÈ, Here one may assert: At times conditions exist, and phenomena are established since they exist. Since they are established, generation is established. ,TaN-R,

q-T-U…-úP-ì‰P-U-^…P, Response:

Those which do not possess action are not conditions. [1/4c] ,CE-NC-`-q-T-U‰N-R-N‰-NC-P…-ì‰P-U-^…P-PÈ, ,H…-õ_-Z‰-P, U…C-`-cÈCc-R-P…-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-±„T- R_-q‰N-Rc-éU-R_-a‰c-R]Ã-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_-P, ´‰-T]Ã-q-T-N‰-U…-]MN-R_-P…-¢_-_T-Lfi-T§P-\…P- KÈ, ,N‰-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-N‰-±„T-R_-q‰N-R-^ÈN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, N‰-±„T-R_-q‰N-R-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-U…C-`- cÈCc-R-´‰-T_-q-T]Ã-ì‰P-U-^…P-PÈ, Anything which does not possess action is not a condition. How? If the eyes and so on are conditions of consciousness—since they establish the action of generating (consciousness)—then it has already been clearly demonstrated that the action of generating (consciousness) is not tenable. Because it does not exist, how could that which establishes it exist? Because that

37 Gendün Drup explains 4b as follows [4a]: “It follows there is no action that does not possess conditions because it would thus follow that results would arise without causes. Therefore truly established actions do not generate consciousness.”


which establishes it does not exist, the eyes and so on are not conditions of that to be generated. ,´‰-T_-q-T]Ã-ì‰P-U-^…P-P-H…-õ_-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_, F…-§‰-]nŸ_-P-P…-MUc-FN-lE-MUc-FN-l…-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_-_È, ,N‰-õ-^…P-P-MUc-FN-`c-MUc-FN-´‰-T_-]nŸ_-T-Z…C-P, N‰-õ_-^E-U…-]nŸ_-K‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-q-T-NE-U…-úP-R-éUc-ì‰P-U-^…P-PÈ, If it is not a condition of that to be generated, how could it be a condition? But if it were, then anything would be a condition of anything. If that were so, then everything would be generated from everything. But that cannot be so because those which do not possess action are not conditions.38 ,µc-R, F…-BÈ-TÈ-ì‰P-éUc-q-T-NE-U…-úP-PÈ-Z‰c-µ-]U, ]N…-õ_-ì‰P-éUc-P…-q-T-NE-úP-R-BÈ- P-^…P-PÈ, Someone may assert: Why do you advocate that conditions do not possess action, for conditions solely possess action? ,TaN-R,

q-T-úP-PU-]ÈP-K‰-P Response

How could they possess action? [1/4d] U-^…P-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-ˇTc-N‰-NE-Æ_-K‰-ì‰P-éUc-q-T-NE-úP-R-U-^…P-PÈ, ,q-T-ì‰P-NE-úP-R-U- ^…P-R-NE-ì‰P-NE-U…-úP-R-U‰N-R-N‰-P…-¢_-_T-Lfi-T§P-R-BÈ-P-^…P-PÈ, ,q-T-U‰N-P-H…-õ_-ì‰P- éUc-q-T-NE-úP-R_-]nŸ_, N‰-õ_-P-CE-C…-p…_-q-T-NE-U…-úP-R]Ã-ì‰P-lE-U…-]MN-`, q-T- NE-úP-R-^E-U‰N-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-ì‰P-Oÿ-éU-R_-TåC-R-P…-NÈP-U‰N-R-I…N-NÈ, This is applied in the context of stating “not”, for conditions do not possess action. Now it has already been clearly demonstrated that “Action does not possess conditions” [1/4a] and “There is no action that does not possess conditions” [1/4b]. But if there is no action how could conditions come to possess action?39 Because of that, conditions that do not possess action are untenable. And since (conditions) that possess action also do not exist, therefore considering them to be conditions is meaningless.

38 Gendün Drup explains 4c as follows [4a]: “Take the eyes and so on, it follows that ultimately they are not conditions because they do not possess action.” 39 Gendün Drup explains 4d as follows [4a]: “How could they ultimately possess action? It follows that they do not ultimately possess action because actions do not exist ultimately.”


,]N…_-µc-R, F…]Ã-ì‰P-éUc-q-T-NE-U…-úP-PÈ-Z‰-]U, q-T-NE- [164a] úP-PÈ-Z‰c-q-T-U…-NCÈc-R- TcU-R-]N…c-F…-q, CE-C…-p…_-éU-R-MUc-FN-Oÿ-î‡-`-cÈCc-R]Ã-ì‰P-TZ…-RÈ-N‰-NC-`-Tå‰P-Pc- NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-´‰-Tc-N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-NC-NEÈc-RÈ]Ã-ì‰P-^…P-PÈ, Here someone may assert: Why do you think that it is unnecessary to state: “What conditions do not possess action?” or “What conditions possess action”? Since in every case phenomena are generated in dependence on the four conditions such as the causal (condition), therefore these are the conditions of phenomena. ,TaN-R, F…-mÈN-PU-UB]-`-B‘-W”_-NC-C…c-Tç‰C-CU, CE-C…-WÂ-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-U‰N-R-BÈ-P-§‰-N‰-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-ì‰P-éUc-U…-]MN-NÈ-Z‰c-¢_-T§P-R]Ã-WÂ-N‰-NC-`-Tå‰P-Pc-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-´‰-T-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-H…-õ_-µ-T_-]MN, Response: How can you support space with your fists?40 It was previously demonstrated that when the action of generating does not exist in any way, conditions are untenable because they do not exist. At that time how could it be tenable to state: “Phenomena are generated in dependence on those (conditions)”? 2. Refutation that investigates conditions that generate a result [1/5]

Ê-CZP-Ê-,

]N…-NC-`-Tå‰P-´‰-Tc-P, ,N‰-p…_-]N…-NC-ì‰P-Z‰c-uCc, ,H…-~…N-U…-´‰-N‰-~…N-Oÿ, ,]N…-NC-ì‰P-U…P-H…-õ_-U…P,

Again: Since (phenomena) are generated in dependence on them, They are called conditions. For as long as (phenomena) are not generated, For that long why aren’t they nonconditions? [1/5]

,C`-K‰-]N…-NC-`-Tå‰P-Pc-´‰-Tc-ì‰P-^…P-PÈ-Z‰c-N‰-õ_-åÈC-P, H…-~…N-Oÿ-U…-´‰-T-N‰-~…N-Oÿ-ì‰P-U-^…P-PÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-Ê-F…]Ã-p…_-U…-TåC ,F…-§‰-¢_-ì‰P-Oÿ-U-nŸ_-R-p…c-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_-T_-c‰Uc-P, N‰-Ê-U…-]MN-N‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, MUc-FN-l…-ì‰P-Oÿ-M`-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-N‰-Ê-U…-]NÈN-NÈ, ,F…- §‰-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-NC-lE-CZP-]C]-Z…C-`-õÈc-Pc-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_-K‰, N‰c-P-MUc-FN-l…-ì‰P-Oÿ-

40 In other words: Why do you assert what is impossible?


MUc-FN-M`-T_-U…-]nŸ_-T_-c‰Uc-P, N‰-`-Ê-N‰-I…N-NÈ. If you assert that they are called conditions since (phenomena) are generated in dependence on them then why not also assert for as long as (phenomena) are not generated, for that long they are nonconditions?41 If you think that they were not conditions before but became conditions later, that is untenable. Why? Because in consequence they would then become the conditions of everything, and this also is unacceptable. But if you think that even those states which were not conditions become conditions in reliance on other circumstances―and therefore it does not follow that everything becomes the condition of everything—then this error again applies. ,CE-Ê-_“E-T-`-TõÈc-Pc-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-Ê-ì‰P-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_-P, ì‰P-I…N-N‰-`-Ê-ì‰P-^ÈN-R_-]nŸ_-Z…E-, N‰-`-Ê-N‰-õ_-TcU-NCÈc-cÈ, ,M—C-R-U‰N-R]Ã-´ÈP-Oÿ-Ê-]nŸ_-KÈ, C`-K‰-CZP-Ê-CZP-]C]-Z…C-`-õÈc-Pc-ì‰P-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_-P. N‰-Ê-CZP-`-õÈc-`-N‰-Ê-CZP-`-õÈc-Rc- M—C-R-U‰N-R_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-Ê-U…-]NÈN-NÈ, ,N‰]Ã-p…_-ì‰P-éUc-U…-]MN-R-BÈ-P]È, When something that is not a condition becomes a condition in reliance on other states, then just that condition would also have conditions, and one must admit that those also would have (conditions). Thus the error of infinite regress would arise. Again if something became a condition in reliance on other states—then since that which relies on other states would itself rely on other states―there would be an infinite regress and that cannot be accepted. Therefore conditions are solely untenable. 2. Refutation that investigates conditions in terms of the object

Ê-CZP-Ê-,

U‰N-NU-^ÈN-R]Ã-NÈP-`-Ê-, ,ì‰P-P…-_“E-T-U-^…P-PÈ, ,U‰N-P-CE-C…-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_, ,^ÈN-P-ì‰P-n…c-F…-Z…C-q,

Again: For nonexistent and existent entities Conditions are implausible. If nonexistent they would be the conditions of what? If existent what would its conditions do? [1/6]

,]N…-`-Tå‰P-Pc-]N…-´‰]È-Z‰c-R]Ã-]{‰`-R-]N…c-NÈP-]N…]Ã-ì‰P-]N…]È-Z‰c-\‰_-P, ]N…]È-]N…]È-Z‰c- 41 Gendün Drup explains verse 5 as follows [4a]: “What use is it to analyze what actions possess or not? If consciousness is generated in dependence on these eyes and so on, then the eyes and so on are called conditions. Take these eyes and so on; it follows that as long as consciousness is not generated, for that long how could they not be nonconditions, because they are posited as conditions due to possessing the action of generating consciousness?


q-T]Ã-]{‰`-R-N‰-^E-NÈP-U‰N-R]U-^ÈN-R]Ã-ì‰P-I…N-Oÿ-TåC-uE-P, NÈP-U‰N-R-NE-^ÈN-R]Ã-ì‰P- ]N…]È-Z‰c-q-T_-U…-_“E-EÈ-, [164b] ,H…-õ_-Z‰-P, U‰N-P-CE-C…-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_, ,^ÈN-P-ì‰P-n…c-F…-Z…C-q, ,NEÈc-RÈ-U‰N-R]Ã-ì‰P-Oÿ-TåC-P-ì‰P-]N…-CE-C…-Z‰c-\‰_-T-`-H…-ˇN-TäÈN-R_-q, ]N…-õ_-¶U-T“-U‰N-R]Ã-ì‰P-î‡-ß‡P-NC-^…P-PÈ-Z‰c-T§P-R_-U…-_…Cc-cÈ, (Someone may say:) The relationship expressed in the words “this is generated in dependence on this” indicates “this is the condition of this”. (Our response:) If the relationship expressed in the words: “It is this! It is this!” is analyzed, then it may be asked: “Is this a condition of a nonexistent or existent entity?” But it would be implausible to state “this is a condition of a nonexistent or existent entity”. Why? If nonexistent they would be the conditions of what? If existent what would its conditions do? 42 If you consider it to be the condition of a nonexistent phenomenon, then why was it stated: “this would be the condition of what...”? Thus, it is illogical to advocate “the condition of nonexistent cloth is thread”. ,µc-R, î‡-ß‡P-NC-`c-¶U-T“-]qŸE-Tc-p…c-]qŸE-T]Ã-W”`-n…c-î‡-ß‡P-NC-¶U-T“]Ã-ì‰P-^…P-R_-T§P-Oÿ-_“E-EÈ, Someone may assert: Since cloth arises from causal thread, it may be demonstrated that causal thread is a condition of cloth due to (the cloth) arising after (the thread). ,TaN-R, F…-mÈN-T“U-]qŸE-T]Ã-PÈ_-n…c-T“]Ã-U-B-xEc-R_-]NÈN-NU, NEÈc-RÈ-U‰N-R]Ã-ì‰P-U…- ]MN-NÈ-Z‰c-µc-K‰, ì‰P-U…-]MN-Rc-NEÈc-RÈ-´‰-T-T@C-TZ…P-Oÿ-mÈN-U-]ÈEc-R]Ã-NEÈc-RÈ-´‰-Tc- ì‰P-I…N-T±„T-R_-]NÈN-NÈ, ,CE-C…-WÂ-CE-Oÿ-Oÿc-`-`_-^E-, NEÈc-RÈ-´‰-T-U‰N-R-`, ,U‰N-P-CE- C…-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_, ,Z‰c-q-T-]N…-I‰-T_-CPc-R-N‰]Ã-WÂ-NEÈc-RÈ-p…c-´‰-T_-]nŸ_-T-N‰-`-õÈc-Pc-m‰N-l…-ì‰P-]u⁄T-R_-]nŸ_-T-C-`-^ÈN, N‰-õ-Tc-P-N‰-P…-n…-P]È, Response: Do you assert that you care for the mother of your son with (your) unborn son’s wealth, or is the condition of a nonexistent phenomena untenable? Since (such) conditions are untenable you (must) assert that the condition is established when the generation of a phenomenon ceases due to that future phenomenon being generated. Since the generation of phenomena never exists at any place or specific time it is said: “If nonexistent they would be the conditions of what?” [1/6c]. Whenever (a condition) comes to exist then a phenomenon will be subsequently generated, but how are its conditions established in reliance on it?

42 Gendün Drup explains verse 6 as follows [4a]: “Opponent: The seed is the condition of the sprout because in dependence on the seed the sprout is generated. Response: Conditions are inappropriate for those entities that are nonexistent at the time of their cause―and for those that are inherently established―because if nonexistent they would be the condition of what, since [at that time a conditioned entity] does not exist. Also conditions are not suitable for objects that exist at the time of its cause, because if existent at the time of its cause, what would its condition do? They would be meaningless!”


Therefore this is flawed (logic). ,N‰-`-]N…-£U-Oÿ-^ÈN-R]Ã-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_-c‰Uc-P, In reflecting on this you may think that it will become a condition of that which exists. TaN-R, ^ÈN-P-ì‰P-n…c-F…-Z…C-q, ,NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-R-`-ì‰P-U…-]MN-NÈ, ,]N…-õ_-^ÈN-R-`-Ê-ì‰P- n…c-F…-Z…C-q-§‰, ¶U-T“-u⁄T-F…E-^ÈN-R]Ã-ì‰P-î‡-ß‡P-NC-^…P-PÈ, ,Z‰c-T§P-R_-U…-_…Cc-cÈ, Response: If existent what would its conditions do? [1/6d] Conditions are untenable for phenomena that exist. Therefore how do conditions act on existent entities? It is illogical to advocate that “causal thread is a condition of cloth that is already established and exists.” ,µc-R, BÈ-TÈ-´‰c-R-`-Ê-ì‰P-n…-q-T-^ÈN-NÈ-Z‰c-U…-µ-§‰-]ÈP-lE-¶U-T“-^ÈN-R]Ã-ì‰P-î‡-ß‡P-^…P-R_-M-£N-]NÈCc-R_-q‰N-Rc-¶U-T“-N‰]Ã-ì‰P-î‡-ß‡P-NC-^…P-PÈ, He may assert: I do not say: “the action of a condition exists for that which has been generated”,43 but causal thread is a condition of cloth since causal thread is imputed to be a condition of cloth that exists. ,TaN-R, F…-mÈN-_E-C…-G”E-U-U-ÉEc-R_-T“]Ã-G”E-U-ÇE-T_-c‰Uc-cU, NEÈc-RÈ-^ÈN-R-´‰-T]Ã- ì‰P-U…-]MN-N‰-U…-]MN-Rc-NEÈc-RÈ-´‰-T-T@C-TZ…P-Oÿ-mÈN-¶U-T“-´‰c-R]Ã-ì‰P-§ÈP-R_-q‰N-]NÈN-CÈ-, Response: Do you think that before you take a wife, your son’s wife exists? Or is a condition that generates an existent phenomenon untenable? Since that is untenable, do you assert that when the generation of a phenomenon ceases, the condition that has generated the cloth is revealed? ]È-P-P…-NEÈc-RÈ-´‰-T-±„T-R]Ã-p…_-H‰-±…Uc-a…C-NE-N‰]Ã-]ÈC-Lfi-]N…]Ã-ì‰P-]N…]È, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰- ]MN-R_-]nŸ_-_È, (He states:) But, it would be tenable to state: “Because it establishes the generation of a phenomenon, one becomes increasingly aware afterwards that this is the condition of that.” ,N‰-õ-Tc-P-N‰-Ê-n…-P]È, (Response:) But this also is flawed (logic). 43 Or a condition acts on that which is generated


,]N…_-µc-R, ]N…-`-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-P…-UWP-I…N-`c-]u⁄T-`, î‡-P…-±„T-R_-q‰N-R]È, ,Z‰c-î‡]Ã- UWP-I…N-lE-T§P-Rc-N‰-õ_-UWP-I…N-^ÈN-R]Ã-î‡-^ÈN-NÈ, Someone may assert: Phenomena are established from characteristics, and the cause is “that which establishes (phenomena)”. This teaches the defining characteristics of cause. Therefore “cause” exists since its characteristics exist. 2. Refuting conditions are inherently existent individually. This has four outlines:

1. Refuting the defining characteristics of causal conditions [1/7] 2. Refuting the defining characteristics of focal conditions [1/8] 3. Refuting the defining characteristics of immediate conditions [1/9] 4. Refuting the defining characteristics of empowering conditions [1/10]

1. Refuting the defining characteristics of causal conditions [1/7]

TaN-R,

CE-WÂ-GÈc-P…-^ÈN-R-NE-, U‰N-NE-^ÈN-U‰N-U…-]u⁄T-Rc,44 ,H…-õ_-±„T-q‰N-î‡-Z‰c-q, ,N‰-õ_-^…P-P-U…-_…Cc-cÈ,

Response: When entities are not established As existent, nonexistent, or neither existent and nonexistent, How could there be something which establishes them called “a cause”? If that were so it would be illogical. [1/7]

,]N…-`-GÈc-CE-î‡c-±„T-R_-nŸ_-P-N‰-^ÈN-R]U-U‰N-R]U-^ÈN-U‰N-F…C-±„T-R_-]nŸ_-uE-P, éU-R-MUc-FN-U…-]MN-NÈ, ,N‰-`-_‰-Z…C-^ÈN-R-P…-±„T-R_-U…-q‰N-N‰, ´‰c-\…P-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,]N…-õ_-´‰c-R-`-Ê-´‰-Tc-F…-q-§‰, F…-§‰-^ÈN-lE-Ê-´‰-T-P…-PU-Ê-U…-´‰-T_-U…-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-Ê-U…- ]NÈN-NÈ, ,î‡_-T§P-Oÿ-Ê-U…-]MN-N‰, ]N…-õ_-^ÈN-R-`-î‡c-F…-q, ]N…-õ_-_‰-Z…C-^ÈN-R-P…-±„T- R_-U…-q‰N-NÈ, ,N-P…-U‰N-R-Ê-±„T-R_-U…-q‰N-N‰-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,F…-§‰-U‰N-lE-´‰-P-P…-_…-TÈE-C…-¿-Ê-´‰-T_-]nŸ_-_È, It may be asked: “When any entity comes to be established by its cause, is it established as existent, nonexistent, or existent and nonexistent? But this is completely untenable. First those that exist do not need to be established because they have already been generated. Thus why repeatedly generate those (phenomena) that have been generated? If something that already exists (requires) repeated generation then it would never not (require) generation, but this is unacceptable. It is also untenable to teach them to be a cause,45 for if (the result) exists what would a cause do? Thus those (phenomena) that now exist do not need to be 44 Walleser states: mi ‘grub pa instead of mi ‘grub pas 45 Or have a cause


established. Also those which now do not exist do not need to be established because they are nonexistent. If though nonexistent they were generated—then even the horns of a rabbit would be generated.46 ,C`-K‰-NEÈc-RÈ-P…-î‡-`c-´‰]È-Z‰-P, U…-_“E-§‰, î‡-U…-]MN-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,]N…-õ_-NEÈc-RÈ-U‰N-P-CE-C…-î‡_-F…-]nŸ_, Ê-P-F…-Z…C qc-P-î‡]Ã-î‡-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_, ]N…-õ_-MUc-FN-Oÿ-NEÈc-RÈ-U‰N, N‰-`- ]N…-P…-î‡]È, ,]N…-P…-U-^…P-PÈ-Z‰c-q‰-{C-T§P-R-N‰-^ÈN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, N‰-õ-Tc-P-U‰N-R-Ê-±„T-R_-U…-q‰N-NÈ, ,N-P…-^ÈN-U‰N-lE-±„T-R_-U…-q‰N-N‰, ^ÈN-R-NE-U‰N-R-CI…c-üP-F…C-]qŸE-T-]C`-T]Ã-p…_-NE-, ´ÈP-¢-U_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-_È, ,N‰-õ_-P-^ÈN-U‰N-lE-±„T-R_-U…-q‰N-NÈ, If you were to say: “Phenomena are generated from a cause”, then this would be implausible because (their) cause is untenable. If a phenomenon were nonexistent then what would act as the cause of what? Again, what would be the point of there being a cause of the cause? Thus, phenomena do not exist in any respect. (Though) it is specifically said that “this is a cause of that, this is not a cause of that”, how could a cause exist? So too they also do not establish non-existent entities. They do not establish existent and nonexistent entities because it would be contradictory for both existent and nonexistent states to arise together―and it would follow that the former error would obtain.47 Thus, they do not establish existent and nonexistent entities. ,N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-õ_-TåCc-P-CE-C…-WÂ-NEÈc-RÈ-u⁄T-R-H…-õ_-Ê-U…-]MN-R-N‰]Ã-WÂ, H…-õ_-±„T-q‰N- î‡-Z‰c-q, ,N‰-õ_-^…P-P-U…-_…Cc-cÈ, ,N‰-õ_-^…P-P-±„T-R_-q‰N-î‡-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-U…-_…Cc-cÈ, Therefore, when analysed in that way, it is untenable that phenomena are established by any means. At that time how could there be something which establishes them called “a cause”? If that were so it would be illogical.48 Therefore it is illogical that there is something which establishes them called “a cause”. 2. Refuting the defining characteristics of focal conditions

,]N…_-µc-R, NU…Cc-R-P…-^ÈN-N‰, éU-R_-a‰c-R-`-cÈCc-R]Ã-CPc-c“-nŸ_-R]Ã-p…_-_È, Here someone may assert: The focal object exists because it is the domain of consciousness and so on. 46 The critical edition states: Though nonexistent, a condition would also generate the horns of a rabbit. 47 The former error is that nonexistent entities arise from a cause. 48 Gendün Drup explains verse 7 as follows [4b]: “Opponent: The causal condition is inherently existent because its definition exists, because “that which establishes a result” is the definition of causal condition. How could it be said that “that which establishes a result” which is the definition of the causal condition, be inherently established? It follows it is not because when—at the time of their causes—resultant entites are not inherently established as existent, nonexistent, or neither existent nor nonexistent. If that assertion were so—that the causal condition were inherently established by reason that the defining characteristics of the causal condition are established inherently—then it would be illogical.”


,TaN-R,

^…P-R]Ã-GÈc-P…-NU…Cc-R-P…, U‰N-R-BÈ-P_-I‰-T_-T§P, , Response:

You clearly demonstrate that existent states Do not have any focal object [1/8ab]

]N…-`-NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R_-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-WÀC-C…-üC-U]È, ,^…P-R]Ã-GÈc-]N…-NU…Cc-R-BÈ-P-`c- NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R_-I‰-T_-T§P-KÈ, ,^…P-R]Ã-GÈc-]N…-NU…Cc-R-U‰N-R-BÈ-P-`c-mÈN-l…c-_E-C…-ÉÈc-NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R-Z‰c-TäÈN-NÈ, ,H…-õ-Z‰-[165b] P-]N…-`-NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R-Z‰c-q- T-P…-NU…Cc-R-^ÈN-R-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-M-WÀC-CÈ, ,GÈc-^ÈN-R-P…-NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R_-]nŸ_-n…-U‰N-R- P…-U…-]nŸ_-_È, ,NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R]Ã-¢ÈP-_È`-P-NU…Cc-R-U‰N-Rc-N‰-P…-NU…Cc-R-U‰N-R-^…P-PÈ, Here the term “possesses a focal object” has a supplementary meaning. It clearly demonstrates that existent states49 possess focal objects, as distinct from merely being focal objects. You declare that existent states “possess focal objects” due to the mind, as distinct from not having any focal objects. Why? For the statement “possesses a focal object” refers to the definitive term “has a focal object”. Existent states possess focal objects and nonexistent states do not (possess focal objects). Since they have no focal object prior to possessing a focal object, their focal object does not exist. ,]N…-õ-§‰, NR‰_-P-PÈ_-^ÈN-R-P…-PÈ_-NE-TFc-R-§‰-PÈ_-FP-Z‰c-q]È, ,]C]-Z…C-^ÈN-P-PÈ_-NE- TFc-R_-]nŸ_-n…, U‰N-P-U…-]nŸ_-_È, ,PÈ_-NE-TFc-R]Ã-¢ÈP-_È`-P-PÈ_-U‰N-Rc-N‰-P…-PÈ_-U‰N-R-^…P-R-TZ…P-PÈ, ,N‰]Ã-p…_-NU…Cc-R-U‰N-R-BÈ-P-^…P-R]Ã-GÈc-]N…-`-m‰N-_E-C…-éU-R_-åÈC-Rc- NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R_-åÈC-R_-q‰N-NÈ, Thus for example, having wealth is possessing wealth and (such a person) is called “wealthy”. If he has some (wealth), he possesses wealth. If not, he does not. Prior to possessing wealth he has no wealth since (for him) wealth does not exist. But you conceive that existent states―which do not have any focal object―possess focal objects. ,N‰-`-BÈ-TÈc-TaN-R_-q-§‰,

N‰-õ_-GÈc-P…-NU…Cc-U‰N-P, ,NU…Cc-R-^ÈN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_,

49 Or conscious states (rnam shes chos).


I will explain this: Thus if (an existent) state does not have a focal object How could its focal object exist? [1/8cd]

,N‰-õ_-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-±-P…-x…-T]È, ,C-`-]nŸ_-Z‰c-q-T-CKP-WÀCc-T§P-R-§‰, N‰-õ_-GÈc-NU…Cc- R-U‰N-R_-u⁄T-P-F…]Ã-p…_-NÈP-U‰N-R]Ã-NU…Cc-R-`-åÈC-R_-q‰N, The term “thus” indicates the question (or thesis) and “how could” delineates the proof. Thus if (existent) states are established as not having focal objects, why do you conceive that which lacks an object (to have) a focal object? µc-R, mÈN-I…N-C[÷E-`“Cc-BÈE-Oÿ-U-G”N-R-BÈ-Pc-`ÈC-R_-åÈC-C…-,BÈ-TÈ-P…-NU…Cc-R-^ÈN-R-P…- NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R-§‰-PÈ_-NE-TFc-R-TZ…P-PÈ-Z‰c-U…-µ]È, ,N‰]Ã-NÈP-P…-]N…-^…P-K‰-GÈc-u⁄T-R-P…-CZ…-CE-C…c-±„T-R_-q‰N-R-N‰-P…-N‰]Ã-NU…Cc-R-^…P-K‰, N‰c-P-N‰-NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R-Z‰c-I‰-T_-§ÈP-K‰, Someone may assert: You wrongly conceive this through not understanding (our) textual system. We do not say that which has a focal object possesses a focal object—like possessing wealth. But the meaning is that an established (existent) state is established by a basis, and that is its focal object. Therefore this clearly demonstrates that that it possesses a focal object. ,TaN-R, N‰-U…-]MN-N‰, N‰-`-Ê-TaN-R_-q]È, Response: That is untenable and that also will be explained. ,N‰-õ_-GÈc-P…-NU…Cc-U‰N-P, ,NU…Cc-R-^ÈN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, ,N‰-õ_-GÈc-NU…Cc-R-U‰N-N‰-^ÈN-R- U-^…P-Z…E-UEÈP-R_-U-u⁄T-P-NU…Cc-R-^ÈN-R_-]MN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, GÈc-l…-NU…Cc-R-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-Ê-UEÈP-R_-U-u⁄T-R-BÈ-P]È, ,UEÈP-R_-U-u⁄T-F…E-U‰N-R-N‰-`-NU…Cc-R-^ÈN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, NU…Cc-R-U‰N-P-H…-õ_-NU…Cc-Rc-GÈc-±„T-R_-q‰N, N‰]Ã-p…_-NU…Cc-R-Ê-^ÈN-R-U-^…P-`, GÈc-lE-NU…Cc-R-NE-TFc-R-U-^…P-R-BÈ-P]È, Thus if (an existent) state does not have a focal object, how could its focal object exist?50 Thus (existent) states do not have focal objects and they do not exist. If they were established 50 Gendün Drup explains verse 8 as follows [4b]: “Opponent: The focal condition inherently exists because it is the objective field (gnas) which generates consciousness. Response: Investigate the focal object in terms of whether consciousness (1) exists or (2) does not exist, prior to focusing on the focal object. (1) According to the first (possibility) take the state (chos) of consciousness; it is clearly demonstrated that it does not have any focal object because it exists prior to focusing on its focal object. (2) According to the second—take that state of consciousness; how could its focal object inherently exist because its focal object does not exist prior to focusing on it.”


how could it be tenable that focal objects exist? Also the term “focal objects of (existent) states” would never be actually established. How could that which is not actually established and therefore nonexistent—be an existent focal object? If focal objects do not exist—how could a (conscious) state be established by focal objects. Because of that focal objects do not exist—and (conscious) states also never possess focal objects. 3. Refuting the defining characteristics of immediate conditions

,]N…_-µc-R, NEÈc-RÈ-CZP-]CCc-U-MC-R-P…-NEÈc-RÈ-CZP-´‰-T]Ã-ì‰P-^…P-PÈ, ,N‰-P…-N‰-U- MC-R-Z‰c-q-T-[166a]§‰-N‰-^ÈN-NÈ, Here someone may assert: A phenomenon that has just ceased is the condition generating another phenomenon. This is called the “immediate condition” and that exists. ,TaN-R,

GÈc-éUc-´‰c-R-U-^…P-P, ,]CC-R-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, ,N‰-p…_-N‰-U-MC-U…-_…Cc, ,]CCc-P-ì‰P-Ê-CE-Z…C-^…P,

Response:

When entities are not generated, it is untenable that they cease. Because of that the immediate (condition) is illogical. If it has ceased how could it be a condition? [1/9]

,N‰-`-˛-T-]ÈC-U-CI…c, ,]CCc-P-ì‰P-Ê-CE-Z…C-^…P, ,N‰-p…_-N‰-U-MC-U…-_…Cc, ,Z‰c-T¶È_- T_-Tõ-T_-q]È, ,lE-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-±-P…-]N…_-U-´‰c-R-`-õÈc-R_-Tõ-T_-q]È, ,N‰-Ê-U-´‰c- R]Ã-±-`-õÈc-Pc, ]CCc-P-ì‰P-Ê-CE-Z…C-^…P, ,U-´‰c-R]Ã-ì‰P-CE-Z…C-^…P, ,Z‰c-q-T_- Æ_-_È, ,N‰-CI…c-P…-WÀCc-c“-TFN-R-Æ_-T]Ã-p…_-CÈ-_…Uc-TZ…P-U-qc-cÈ, ,NEÈc-RÈ-CZP-]CC-U-MC-R-P…-NEÈc-RÈ-CZP-´‰-T]Ã-ì‰P-^…P-PÈ-Z‰c-µc-R-CE-^…P-R-N‰-U…-]MN-NÈ, These two lines of root verse below should be viewed in reverse order as: “If it has ceased how could it also be a condition? Because of that the immediate (condition) is illogical.” The term “also” should be viewed in this context as referring to “not generated”. Further in reference to the term “not generated”—it should be applied to: “If it has ceased how could it also be a condition?”[1/9d] so that it reads: “If it is not generated how could it also be a condition?” Because these two are applied to the (other) verses, they are not to be taken in that order. And the statement: “Phenomena that have just ceased are the conditions of other phenomena” is not tenable.


,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ]N…-õ_, GÈc-éUc-´‰c-R-U-^…P-P, ,]CC-R-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, ,]CCc-P- ì‰P-Ê-CE-Z…C-^…P, ,]CC-R-Z‰c-q-T-P…-U‰N-R-§‰, N‰-`-C`-K‰-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰-T]Ã-¢ÈP-_È`-Oÿ-c-TÈP- ]CC-R_-]nŸ_-P-P…-c-TÈP-]CCc-K‰-U‰N-P-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰-T_-]nŸ_-T-CE-^…P-R-N‰]Ã-ì‰P-Ê-CE-Z…C-^…P, Ê-P-c-TÈP-]CC-R]Ã-ì‰P-Ê-CE-Z…C-^…P, c-TÈP-]CCc-K‰-U‰N-R-Ê-H…-õ_-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰- T]Ã-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_, rŸ-Dÿ-U-´‰c-R]Ã-ì‰P-Oÿ-c-TÈP-]CC-R-H…-õ_-]nŸ_, N‰-õ-Tc-P-c-TÈP-]CCc- Pc-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰-T_-åÈC-P-N‰-CI…-C-î‡-U‰N-R_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-K‰, î‡-U‰N-R_-P…-U…-]NÈN-NÈ, Why? When entities are not generated, it is untenable that they cease. If they had ceased how could they be conditions? “That which has ceased” does not exist. If the seed were to cease prior to the generation of a sprout—and if the seed were nonexistent since it had ceased—how could that (seed) which generates the sprout be the condition of that (sprout)? Again what type of condition is a seed that has ceased? How could a seed that has ceased―that is also nonexistent—act as a condition that generates a sprout? How could a seed that has ceased be a condition of a sprout that is not yet generated? That being so—if you conceive that a sprout is generated after the seed has ceased—then it would follow in consequence that both (states) would be causeless. But being causeless is not acceptable. ,µc-R, C`-K‰-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰c-U-MC-Lfi-c-TÈP-]CC-R_-]nŸ_-P, N‰-õ-P-Ê-N‰-U-MC-]u⁄T-§‰, ]N…- õ_-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰c-U-MC-Lfi-c-TÈP-]CC-R]Ã-ì‰P-Oÿ-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-_È, Someone may assert: If the seed were to cease immediately before the sprout were generated, then it would thus be established immediately before because immediately before the sprout was generated, it would act as the condition for the seed ceasing. ,TaN-R, N‰-Ê-U…-]MN-N‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ´‰c-P]E-ì‰P-Oÿ-H…-õ_-]nŸ_-K‰, C`-K‰-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰-Z…E-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰-T]Ã-q-T-UM_-M—C-R]Ã-WÂ-c-TÈP-]CC-R_-]nŸ_-P-]CC-R-N‰]Ã-ì‰P-Ê-CE-Z…C-^…P-R_- ]nŸ_, rŸ-Dÿ-´‰-T]Ã-ì‰P-Ê-CE-Z…C-^…P-R_-]nŸ_-K‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-õ-P-Ê-N‰-CI…-C-¢-U-TZ…P-Oÿ-î‡-U‰N-R_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-_È, Response: That is also untenable. Why? Even if it were generated how would it act as a condition? If the sprout were generated, and if the seed ceased at the completion of the act of generating the sprout, then what would be the condition of that cessation? Also how would it be a condition of generating the sprout. Therefore—as before—it would follow that both would be causeless. ,F…-§‰-c-TÈP-]CC-TZ…P-R-P-rŸ-Dÿ-´‰-Tc-N‰c-P-î‡-U‰N-[166b] R]Ã-ì‰P-Oÿ-U…-]nŸ_-T_-c‰Uc-P, N‰-


Ê-U…-_…Cc-K‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, CE-]CC-R-NE-CE-´‰-T-N‰-CI…-C-Ê-^ÈN-R-U-^…P-K‰, U-]CC- R]Ã-p…_-NE-, ´‰c-\…P-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,NEÈc-RÈ-CI…c-^ÈN-P, N‰-U-MC-R]Ã-ì‰P-I…N-Oÿ-H…-õ_-]nŸ_, ´‰-T-NE-]CC-R-CI…c-Oÿc-CF…C-Lfi-åÈC-P-Ê-N‰-U-MC-R-U…-]MN-N‰, Oÿc-UIU-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,N‰]Ã- p…_-N‰-U-MC-U…-_…Cc, N‰-õ_-CE-C…-p…_-éU-R-MUc-FN-Oÿ-TåCc-P-N‰-U-MC-R-U…-]MN-N‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-U-MC-R]Ã-ì‰P-^ÈN-NÈ-Z‰c-µc-R-CE-^…P-R-N‰-U…-]MN-NÈ, But if one thinks that the sprout is generated at the time the seed ceases—and therefore (the seed) is not a causeless condition—then this is illogical. Why? Both that which has ceased and that which is generated do not exist because (the seed) has not ceased—and because (the sprout) has already been generated. If both phenomena exist—how would (the seed) be an immediate condition? If you conceive that both generation and cessation are simultaneous—then (the seed) immediately preceding (the sprout) would be untenable because they are concurrent. Because of that the immediate (condition) is illogical. Thus because the immediate (condition) is untenable—when analyzed from any perspective—it is untenable to state “the immediate condition exists”. ,Ê-P-]N…-P…-NÈP-CZP-^…P-K‰, ]N…-`-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-U-´‰c-R-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-P…-¢_-T±„Tc-\…P-K‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-´‰-T-U‰N-R-N‰-u⁄T-R_-qc-Pc, Again, there is an alternative meaning. The statement: “phenomena are not generated” has been established previously, therefore it has been established that the generation of phenomena does not exist. ,TaN-R, GÈc-éUc-´‰c-R-U-^…P-P, ,]CC-R-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, ,NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-´‰c-R-U-^…P-Z…E-U‰N-P-]CC-R-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-K‰, U‰N-R-`-F…-Z…C-]CC-R_-]nŸ_, N‰-p…_-N‰-U-MC-U…- _…Cc, ,N‰-õ_-CE-C…-p…_-NEÈc-RÈ-]CC-R-I…N-U…-]MN-R-N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-U-MC-R-U…-_…Cc-cÈ, ,N‰-P…- ]CC-R_-åÈC-P-Ê-N‰-U-MC-R-U…-_…Cc-K‰, H…-õ_-Z‰-P, ]CCc-P-ì‰P-Ê-CE-Z…C-^…P, ´‰c- P]E-ì‰P-Oÿ-H…-õ_-]nŸ_-K‰, N‰]Ã-NÈP-P…-¢_-éU-R_-TaN-\…P-KÈ, Response: When entities are not generated, it is untenable that they cease [1/9ab]. Phenomena are not generated and if nonexistent (their) cessation is untenable. How could nonexistent entities come to cease? Because of that the immediate (condition) is illogical. [1/9c] Thus because the cessation of phenomena is not tenable—therefore the immediate (condition) is illogical. If you conceive something to have ceased, then it is illogical it is an immediate (condition). Why? If it has ceased how can it be a condition? [1/9d].51 Also if it is generated 51 Gendün Drup explains verse 9 as follows [4b]: “Opponent: The immediate condition is inherently existent because it is the immediate condition of the sprout immediately after the seed ceases. It follows it is illogical for the seed which has just ceased to be the immediate condition of the sprout because earlier when those sprouts are dharmas that are not generated, it is untenable that the seed has ceased. If it has ceased then how could the immediate condition of the sprout exist?”


how would it become a condition? The meaning of this has been previously explained. 4. Refuting the defining characteristics of empowering conditions

,]N…_-µc-R, TNC-RÈ-I…N-P…-^ÈN-NÈ, ,TNC-RÈ]Ã-NEÈc-RÈ-P…-TNC-RÈ-I…N-N‰, N‰-^E-UNÈ_-T•‡-P-CE-^ÈN-P-CE-]qŸE-T-NE-, CE-U‰N-P-CE-U…-]qŸE-T-N‰-P…-N‰]Ã-TNC-RÈ-I…N-NÈ, Here someone may assert: The empowering (condition) exists. A phenomenon that is an empowering condition is just that which empowers. Further, in brief whatever exists and whatever arises—whatever does not exist and whatever does not arise—is an empowering (condition). ,TaN-R,

NEÈc-RÈ-_E-TZ…P-U‰N-éUc-l…, ,^ÈN-R-CE-p…_-^ÈN-U…P-P, ,]N…-^ÈN-Rc-P-]N…-]qŸE-Z‰c, ,q-T-N‰-P…-]MN-U-^…P,

Response:

Because there is no existence Of phememena that have no inherent essence, The statement “this occurs Since that exists” is not tenable. [1/10]

]N…-`-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-l…-_E-TZ…P-U‰N-R-I…N-P…-¢_-^E-AÿP-Lfi-T§P-F…E-p…c-lE-î-G‰_-§ÈP-KÈ. ,N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-_T-Lfi-u⁄T-R_-qc-Pc-NEÈc-RÈ-_E-TZ…P-U‰N-R-éUc-l…c-Z‰c-q-T-Cc“Ec-cÈ, ,H…- õ_-CE-C…-p…_-NEÈc-RÈ-_E-TZ…P-U‰N-R-éUc-l…-^ÈN-R-Z‰c-q-T-^ÈN-R]Ã-NEÈc-RÈ-U…-]MN-R-N‰]Ã-p…_-CE-^ÈN-P-]N…-^ÈN-Rc-Z‰c-TäÈN-R_-Q÷c-R]Ã-NEÈc-[167a] RÈ-N‰-I…N-U‰N-NÈ, ,]N…-^ÈN-Rc-Z‰c- q-T-]N…-`-U‰N-P-]N…-]qŸE-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-]MN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, ]N…-^ÈN-Rc-]N…-]qŸE-Z‰c-q-T- ]N…-`-U…-]MN-P-CE-C…-TNC-RÈ-I…N-Oÿ-H…-Z…C-]nŸ_, N‰]Ã-p…_-TNC-RÈ-I…N-lE-U…-]MN-NÈ, It was first pervasively taught and later extensively demonstrated that an inherent essence of phenomena does not exist. Therefore having clearly established that, it is therefore stated: “due to phenomena that are not inherently existent...”. How? Because phenomena whose existence is described as “the existence of phenomena that have no inherent essence” are not tenable, therefore there are no phenomena capable of being described as “if that exists, this exsts”. If the state (described) in the statement “since this exists” does not exist, how could those described in the statement “this occurs” be tenable? Since the state described as “this” in the statement “this occurs, since this exists” is not tenable, then what state would


arise, and in what manner? Therefore an empowering (condition) is untenable.52 ,]N…_-µc-R, ì‰P-n…-NEÈc-RÈ-éUc-]N…-õ_-u⁄T-R_-q‰N-NÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-µ-T_-U…-Q÷c-UÈN-l…, ]ÈP- lE-ì‰P-éUc-P…-^ÈN-R-BÈ-P-^…P-PÈ, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, N‰-NC-`c-]{c-T“-´‰-T]Ã-p…_-K‰, ]N…-P-c-TÈP-`-cÈCc-R-ì‰P-éUc-`c-rŸ-Dÿ-`-cÈCc-R-]{c-T“-´‰-T_-UMÈE-§‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-NC-`c-]{c-T“-´‰-T_-UMÈE-Pc-]{c-T“]Ã-ì‰P-P…-]N…-NC-CÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-a‰c-cÈ, Here someone may assert: Indeed we cannot advocate that “phenomena which are conditions are established in this way”. However, conditions exist. Why? Because results are generated from them, since we see that results such as sprouts are generated from conditions such as seeds and so on. Because of that, we understand that they are conditions (generating) results since results are seen to be generated from them. 3. Teaching alternate ways of refuting them individually

,TaN-R,

ì‰P-éUc-cÈ-cÈ-]Oÿc-R-`c, ,]{c-T“-N‰-P…-U‰N-R-I…N, ,ì‰P-éUc-`-P…-CE-U‰N-R, ,N‰-P…-ì‰P-`c-H…-õ_-´‰,

Response: The result does not exist from Those individual or assembled conditions. How could anything that does not exist In those conditions, be generated from them. [1/11]

,I…N-F‰c-q-T]Ã-±-P…-BÈ-P-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-NÈP-KÈ, ,cÈ-cÈ-T-NC-`-Ê-U‰N-R-BÈ-P-^…P-`, ]Oÿc-R-NC-`-Ê-U‰N-R-BÈ-P]È-Z‰c-q]È, ,mÈN-l…c-ì‰P-_T-Lfi-T±„T-R]Ã-p…_-]{c-T“-´‰-T_-T§P-R-CE-^…P-R-N‰-I…N-U…-]MN-P, ì‰P-]u⁄T-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, H…-õ_-Z‰-P, CE-C…-p…_-ì‰P-éUc-cÈ-cÈ-T-NE-]Oÿc-R-`-]{c-T“-N‰-U‰N-R-I…N-^…P-R]Ã-p…_-K‰, ì‰P-éUc-cÈ-cÈ-T-NE-]Oÿc-R-`-U‰N-R-I…N-CE-^…P-R-N‰- H…-õ_-N‰-NC-`c-´‰-T_-]nŸ_, ]{c-T“-´‰-T-U‰N-P-mÈN-l…-ì‰P-]u⁄T-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, N‰-`-]N…- £U-Oÿ-ì‰P-éUc-`-]{c-T“-^ÈN-R-BÈ-P_-c‰Uc-P, N‰-õ-P-Ê-ì‰P-]MN-R-U-^…P-K‰, ]N…-õ_-^ÈN-R-`-ì‰P-n…c-q-T-U‰N-N‰-´‰c-\…P-R-Ê-´‰N-U…-NCÈc-R]Ã-p…_-_È, The term “itself” means “solely”. As such, individual states are solely nonexistent; also

52 Gendün Drup explains verse 10 as follows [4b]: Opponent: The empowering condition inherently exists because any cause that gives rise to a result is an empowering condition. Response: Take phenomena; the statement that “this result occurs since that cause exists” is not tenable in terms of an inherent essence because their existence is not that of having an inherent essence—because they are not inherently existent.


assembled states are solely nonexistent. If it is untenable for you to teach in any way that results are generated because (their) conditions are fully established, then how could conditions be established? Why? Because the result does not exist in those individual or assembled conditions. How could anything that does not exist in those individual and assembled conditions be generated from them? 53 If there is no generation of the result how could its conditions be established? If after reflecting on this, you think that results only exist in those conditions54 then conditions are untenable because if those (results) exist then action by those conditions would not exist. That is because those (results) are already generated and their repeated generation is not necessary. ,Ê-CZP-Ê-C`-K‰-ì‰P-éUc-`-]{c-T“-N‰-^ÈN-R_-nŸ_-P, ì‰P-Oÿ-U]Ã-]{c-T“-CE-^…P-R-N‰- ì‰P-_‰-_‰-`-^ÈEc-c“-íÈCc-R_-^ÈN-R]U, G-ac-F…C-^ÈN-R_-]nŸ_-uE-P, N‰-`-_‰-Z…C-C`-K‰-_‰-_‰-`-^ÈEc-c“-íÈCc-R-^ÈN-R_-TåCc-P-P…-ì‰P-Oÿ-U_-U…-]nŸ_-K‰, _‰-_‰-`-Ê-^ÈN-R]Ã-p…_-U…- õÈc-R_-_‰-_‰-`c-lE-]{c-T“-´‰-T_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-_È, ,F…-§‰-ì‰P-éUc-`-[167b]]{c-T“]Ã-G- ac-^ÈN-R_-TåCc-P-P…, N‰-õ-P-Ê-U…-õÈc-R_-_‰-_‰-`c-]{c-T“]Ã-G-ac-´‰-T_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-Ê-U…-]NÈN-N‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-ì‰P-éUc-cÈ-cÈ-T-NE-]Oÿc-R-`-]{c-T“-N‰-^ÈN-R_-U…-]MN-NÈ, Again, if those conditions produce a result, it may be asked: “Does the result of multiple conditions exist in its final complete state in each condition—or does it exist in part?” First (1) if (the result) is considered to exist in its final complete state in each (condition)—then there would not be many conditions. Also because (the result) would exist in each (condition)—then it would follow that the result would be generated from each without reliance (on others). However (2) —if it is considered that parts of the result exist in the conditions—then it would follow that parts of the result would be generated from each without reliance (on others) and this is unacceptable. Because of that, it is untenable that a result exists in conditions that are either individual or assembled. ,F…-§‰-ì‰P-éUc-`-]{c-T“-U‰N-lE-ì‰P-éUc-`c-´‰-§‰, ]{c-T“-´‰-T-`c-TõÈc-Pc-BÈ-TÈ]Ã-ì‰P-_T-Lfi-]u⁄T-TÈ-£U-Oÿ-c‰Uc-P, But if you think that though conditions have no result—(results) are generated from conditions—then such conditions would be fully established in reliance on generating results. N‰-`-TaN-R_-q-§‰, 53 Gendün Drup explains verse 11 as follows [5a]: “Opponent: Conditions inherently exist because cloth is seen to be generated from threads (snal ma). Response: Take that cloth as the result; how could that be inherently generated from the threads that are its conditions? It follows it is not generated because it does not exist in those threads that are its conditions—because it does not exist in those threads that are its individual or assembled conditions.” 54 rkyen rnams las (or la) ‘bras bu yod na results only arise from those conditions


F…-§‰-N‰-P…-U‰N-R_-^E-, ,ì‰P-N‰-NC-`c-´‰-]nŸ_-P, ,ì‰P-U…P-`c-lE-]{c-T“-P…, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P-´‰-U…-]nŸ_,

In response it is said: But if that is generated from those conditions When they do not exist, Then why isn’t it also not generated From those which are not conditions. [1/12]

,]N…-`-]{c-T“-^ÈN-R-`c-ì‰P-NE-ì‰P-U-^…P-R]Ã-q‰-{C-Lfi-]nŸ_-P, ]{c-T“-N‰-^E-ì‰P-NE-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-NC-`-U‰N-NÈ, ,N‰-NC-`-U‰N-TZ…P-Oÿ-C`-K‰-ì‰P-éUc-`c-]{c-T“-´‰-P-P…-ì‰P-U-^…P-R- éUc-`c-lE-F…]Ã-p…_-U…-´‰-§‰, ]N…-õ_-ì‰P-NE-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-éUc-`-]{c-T“-U‰N-R_-UW”Ec-R-`c, ì‰P-éUc-`c-P…-]{c-T“-´‰-`-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-éUc-`c-P…-U…-´‰-T-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-P…-^…N-`- TcUc-R-VU-Oÿ-\N-NÈ, ,N‰]Ã-p…_-]{c-T“-´‰-T-U…-]MN-N‰, ]{c-T“-´‰-T-U‰N-P-ì‰P-]u⁄T-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, If something is specified as either a condition or noncondition from having a result, then also that result would not exist in its conditions or nonconditions. But if the result is generated from those conditions when they do not exist, then why is it not also generated from those which are not conditions? 55 As the result is similar in not existing in its conditions or nonconditions one may reflect: “A result is generated from conditions but is not generated from nonconditions”. Because of that the generation of results is untenable for if the generation of the result does not exist, how could its conditions be established? ]N…_-µc-R, ì‰P-éUc-`-]{c-T“-^ÈN-R-NE-U‰N-R]Ã-ì‰P-éUc-`c-´‰]È, ,Z‰c-P…-U…-µ]È, ,]{c-T“-P…-ì‰P-éUc-`c-nŸ_-R]Ã-ì‰P-n…-TNC-I…N-ì‰P-`c-qŸE-T-^…P-PÈ, ,Z‰c-µ]È, ,N‰-õ-^…P-P…-¶U-T“-P…-î‡-ß‡P-n…-TNC-I…N-`c-qŸE-T-^…P-Rc, î‡-ß‡P-NC-P…-¶U-T“]Ã-ì‰P-^…P-PÈ, Here he may assert: Regarding the conditions, I do not say that the result is generated from existent and nonexistent conditions. I do say that the result arises from conditions, where the intrinsic nature of a condition arises from a condition. Thus causal thread is the condition of cloth, since cloth arises from the intrinsic nature of causal thread. ,TaN-R,

]{c-T“-ì‰P-`c-qŸE-^…P-P, ,ì‰P-éUc-_E-`c-qŸE-U-^…P,

55 Gendün Drup explains verse 12 as follows [5a]: “Opponent: But that result is inherently generated from those conditions even when those conditions do not exist. Response: Take that subject; why isn’t it also not generated from those which are not conditions?”


,_E-qŸE-U…P-`c-]{c-T“-CE-, ,N‰-P…-H…-õ_-ì‰P-`c-qŸE-, Response:

If the result arises from its conditions, Conditions do not arise from themselves. If it arises from (conditions) that do not arise from themselves How could they arise from conditions? [1/13]

,]{c-T“-ì‰P-`c-nŸ_-R-ì‰P-n…-TNC-I…N-`c-qŸE-T-^…P-R_-TåCc-P, ì‰P-N‰-éUc-P…-_E- `c-nŸ_-R-U-^…P, _E-I…N-_T-Lfi-u⁄T-R-U-^…P, _E-I…N-TNC-I…N-U-^…P, _E-`c-qŸE-T-U-^…P-K‰-EÈ-TÈ-I…N-U‰N-R-^…P-PÈ, ,ì‰P-_E-`c-nŸ_-R-U-^…P-R, _E-I…N-_T-Lfi-u⁄T-R-U-^…P-R, _E-C…-TNC-I…N-U-^…P-R, _E-`c-qŸE-T-U-^…P-R-EÈ-TÈ-I…N-U‰N-R-N‰-NC [168a] `c-]{c-T“-qŸE-T_-åÈC-P-H…-õ_-ì‰P-`c-qŸE-T_-I‰-T_-TåCc-P, ]N…-õ_-C`-K‰-î‡-ß‡P-NC-_E-I…N-_T-Lfi-u⁄T-P-P…-_E- `c-qŸE-T_-Ê-]nŸ_-Tc, N‰c-P-¶U-T“-î‡-ß‡P-NC-`c-qŸE-T-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-Ê-]MN-R_-]nŸ_- T-Z…C-P, CE-C…-WÂ-î‡-NC-_E-I…N-_T-Lfi-U-u⁄T-R-_E-`c-qŸE-T-U-^…P-R-EÈ-TÈ-I…N-U‰N-R-§‰, î‡- NC-`c-nŸ_-R-î‡-NC-C…-TNC-I…N-î‡-`c-qŸE-T-^…P-R-N‰]Ã-WÂ, ¶U-T“-î‡-ß‡P-NC-`c-qŸE-EÈ, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-H…-õ_-]MN-R_-]nŸ_, If you investigate whether the result that arises from conditions, arises from the intrinsic nature of its conditions, then conditions do not arise from themselves―they are not fully established in themselves, they have no intrinsic nature, they are not derived from themselves—because they have no nature. If you investigate how the result arises from conditions that do not arise from themselves―that are not fully established in themselves, that have no intrinsic nature, that do not arise from themselves, and have not nature—then how could they arise from conditions? 56 If this is clearly investigated—and if causal thread is fully established in itself—then since it would arise from itself, to say cloth arises from causal thread would not be tenable. When causes are not fully established in themselves—do not arise from themselves, and have no nature, and (results) arise from causes that are the essential state of causes that emerge from causes—then at that time how could it be tenable to state “cloth is derived from causal thread”? ÜÈT-NRÈP-]SCc-R-üc-lE-, ,¶U-T“-î‡-`c-u⁄T-^…P-P, ,î‡-Ê-CZP-`c-u⁄T-R-^…P, ,CE-`- 56 Nyimadrak’s translation of Verse 13 reads: ‘bras bu rkyen gyi rang bzhin na / rkyen rnams bdag gi rang bzhin min / bdag dngos min las ‘bras bu gang / de ni ji ltar rkyen rang bzhin // Gendün Drup explains this version of verse 13 as follows [5a]: “Opponent: If the result and its conditions were different (gzhan) then that would be true, but there is no error since the result is the essence of its conditions. Response: Take conditions, it follows they do not have their own essence because they are posited to be imputed on their many parts. If so, take the result; how could the essence of the condition not be established by its nature, because conditions do not inherently exist in their own state.”


_E-`c-u⁄T-U‰N-R, ,N‰-^…c-CZP-P…-H…-õ_-T´‰N, ,F‰c-Cc“Ec-cÈ, ,N‰-õ_-CE-C…-p…_-ì‰P-éUc- _E-I…N-_T-Lfi-U-u⁄T-_E-`c-qŸE-T-U-^…P-Z…E-EÈ-TÈ-I…N-U‰N-R, Āryadeva states:

Cloth is established from causes and causes also are established from other (causes). When something is not established from itself how could it generate another? [xiv:13]

Thus for the reason that conditions are not fully established from themselves—they are not derived from themselves and have no nature.

N‰]Ã-p…_-ì‰P-qŸE-U-^…P, Because of that, (results) do not arise (from) conditions [1/14a]

]{c-T“-ì‰P-`c-qŸE-T-U-^…P-PÈ, ,N‰-`-]N…-£U-Oÿ-]{c-T“-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-`c-qŸE-T_-c‰Uc-P, Results do not arise from conditions. In thinking that, you may consider that results arise from nonconditions. TaN-R,

ì‰P-U…P-`c-qŸE-]{c-T“-P…, ,^ÈN-U…P, Response:

Results arising from nonconditions Do not exist...[1/14bc]

CE-C…-WÂ-¶U-T“-î‡-ß‡P-`c-qŸE-T_-U…-]MN-R-N‰]Ã-WÂ-¶U-T“-˛…-ìE-`c-qŸE-EÈ, ,Z‰c-q-T-]H…C- å‰P-NE-]C`-T-]N…-H…-õ_-]MN-R_-]nŸ_, N‰]Ã-p…_-]{c-T“-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-`c-qŸE-T-^E-U‰N-NÈ,If it is untenable that cloth arises from causal thread, then to state “cloth arises from abstract speculation alone” would contradict the (view of the) world. How could this be tenable? Because of that results arising from nonconditions also do not exist.57 ,µc-R, ì‰P-éUc-P…-^ÈN-R-BÈ-P-^…P-K‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ì‰P-NE-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-E‰c-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,]N…-

57 Nyimadrak’s translation of Verse 14 reads: de phyir rkyen gyi rang bzhin min / rkyen min rang bzhin ‘bras bu ni / yod min ‘bras bu med pas na / rkyen min rkyen du ga la ‘gyur // Gendün Drup explains this version of verse 14 as follows [5a]: “Opponent: The result is the essence of nonconditions. Response: Take the result; it follows it does not exist as the essence of its nonconditions due to not being the essence of its conditions because that which is not the essence of the thread is not necessarily the essence of the cloth.


P-ì‰P-NE-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-E‰c-R-UMÈE-§‰, ]{⁄-NC `c-]{⁄-U_-BÈ-P-]qŸE-C…-U_-U…-]qŸE-EÈ, ,ZÈ- `c-P…-U_-BÈ-P-]qŸE-C…-]{⁄-U_-U…-]qŸE-EÈ, ,q‰-U-NC-`c-P…-N‰-CI…-C-U…-]qŸE-EÈ, ,]N…-õ_-CE-C…-p…_-]N…-NC-P…-]N…]Ã-ì‰P-^…P-PÈ, ,]N…-NC-P…-]N…]Ã-ì‰P-U-^…P-PÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-^ÈN-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_- ì‰P-]u⁄T-RÈ. An opponent asserts: Conditions alone exist. Why? Because there are definitely (either) conditions or nonconditions. Seeing that there are definitely (only) conditions or nonconditions, (therefore) grain oil is only derived from grain—butter is not. Butter is derived from curd alone—grain oil is not. And neither is derived from sand. Thus for the reason that it is stated: “These are conditions of those. These are not conditions of those”, therefore conditions are established. ,TaN-R,

]{c-T“-U‰N-Rc-P, ,ì‰P-U…P-ì‰P-Oÿ-C-`-]nŸ_, Response:

Since they have no result, How could nonconditions be conditions? [1/14cd]

,]N…-`-mÈN-l…c-]{⁄-U_-`-cÈCc-R-]{c-T“-]qŸE-T-NE-, U…-]qŸE-T-ì‰P-NE-ì‰P-U-^…P-R_-E‰c-R]Ã-î‡_-µc-R-P…-]{c-T“-´‰-T-U…-]MN-NÈ-Z‰c-¢_-T§P-\…P-K‰, ]{c-T“-N‰-U‰N-P-[168b]]N…-NC-P…-]N…]Ã-ì‰P-U-^…P-PÈ, ,]N…-NC-P…-]N…]Ã-ì‰P-^…P-PÈ, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-]MN-R_-C -`-]nŸ_, ]{c-T“-`- õÈc-Pc-N‰-CI…c-c“-]nŸ_-P-]{c-T“-N‰-^E-U‰N-NÈ, ,]{c-T“-U‰N-Rc-P-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-NE-ì‰P-Oÿ-C-`-]nŸ_, N‰-õ_-Tc-P-]{c-T“-^E-U…-]MN-`-ì‰P-NE-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-NC-lE-U‰N-NÈ, ,]{c-T“-NE-ì‰P-NE-ì‰P-U-^…P-R-NC-U‰N-Rc-´‰-T_-TäÈN-R-P…-M-£N-VU-Oÿ-u⁄T-RÈ, ,ì‰P-TåC-R-Z‰c-q-T-§‰-_T-Lfi-q‰N-R-NE-RÈ]È,, You state that results such as grain oil arising and not arising definitely (establishes the existence of) conditions and nonconditions. But it has been taught previously that the generation of results is untenable. If this result does not exist—then how could it be tenable to state: “these are not the conditions of this, they are the conditions of that”? They arise in reliance on (their) result but their result does not exist. Since they have no result—how could nonconditions be conditions? Thus since their result is not tenable, conditions and nonconditions do not exist. Since results, conditions, and nonconditions do not exist—the term “generation” is established as mere impution. This completes the first chapter called the investigation of conditions.


Chapter 2. Investigation of Coming and Going 2. Refuting persons are inherently existent through investigating the action and agent of going and coming. This has three outlines:

1. Extensive explanation 2. Brief concluding remarks [2/25cd]

1. Extensive explanation. This has two outlines:

1. Individually refuting action in terms of its object and agent 2. Collectively refuting action in terms of its object and agent [2/24-25ab]

1. Individually refuting action in terms of its object and agent. This has four outlines:

1. Refuting (action) through investigating objects (las) [2/1-6] 2. Refuting (action) through investigating the agent [2/7-11] 3. Refuting the proof that action exists [2/12-17] 4. Refuting (action) through investigating action [2/18-23]

1. Refuting (action) through investigating objects (las). This has two outlines:

1. General refutation of action on the three paths [2/1] 2. Specific refutation of action where one currently walks [2/2-6]

1. General refutation of action on the three paths58

,,µc-R, m‰N-l…c-´‰-T-U‰N-R]Ã-_…Cc-R-]N…-ä‰c-c“-_T-Lfi-T§P-Rc-BÈ-TÈ]Ã-^…N-§ÈE-R-I…N-IP-R- `-EÈ-UW_-£…E-RÈ-FP-Oÿ-qc-l…c, H…-õ_-]H…C-å‰P-n…c-UEÈP-c“U-n…-]uÈ-T-NE-]ÈE-T-U…-]MN-R-N‰-H‰-µÈc-a…C Someone asserts: Since you clearly present the logic (establishing) there is no generation, my mind experiences heartfelt amazement as I listen to (this explanation of) emptiness. But how could the world’s perception of coming and going be untenable? ,TaN-R,

_‰-Z…C-cÈE-`-]uÈ-U‰N-N‰, ,U-cÈE-T-`]E-]uÈ-T-U‰N, Response:

First there is no going where one has gone. Also there is no going where one has not gone. [2/1ab]

,]N…-`-C`-K‰-]uÈ-T-Z…C-^ÈN-R_-nŸ_-P, N‰-cÈE-T-`-]U, U-cÈE-R-`-^ÈN-R_-]nŸ_-uE-P, N‰-`-_‰-Z…C-cÈE-T-`-P…-]uÈ-T-U‰N-NÈ, ,]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-]Nc-\…P-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,U-cÈE-T-`-^E-]uÈ-T-U‰N-

58 The three paths are: (1) the path where one has previously gone (sngar song ba’i lam) {115}; (2) the path where one has not yet gone (da dung ma song ba’i lam) {115}; (3) the path where one walks (bgom pa’i lam)


N‰, ]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-U-T˛Uc-R]Ã-p…_-_È, If going exists, one may ask: “Does it exist where one has gone or where one has not gone?” First there is no going where one has gone because the action of going has already past. There is no going where one has not gone because the action of going has not yet commenced.59 ,µc-R, N‰-P…-N‰-TZ…P-K‰, cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-`-]uÈ-T-U‰N-UÈN-l…, ]ÈP-lE-TCÈU-R-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NÈ,He asserts: It is just so, indeed going does not exist where one has gone and where one has not gone. However going exists where one walks. ,TaN-R,

,cÈE-NE-U-cÈE-U-CKÈCc-R_, ,TCÈU-R-a‰c-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, Response:

Apart from where one has gone and where one has not gone, Where one walks is not observed. [2/1cd]

cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-U-CKÈCc-R_-TCÈU-R-F…-Z…C-^ÈN-N‰, ,a‰c-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, ,H…-õ_-Z‰-P, ]N…- õ_, a‰c-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, ,Z‰c-q-T-P…, C\“E-Oÿ-U‰N-Rc-K‰-U…-]MN-NÈ-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-M-WÀC-CÈ-, ,N‰-õ_-CE-C…-p…_-cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-U-CKÈCc-R_-T°ÈU-C\“E-Oÿ-U‰N-R-BÈ-P-§‰-U…-]MN-R-N‰]Ã-p…_-U‰N-R-BÈ-P-^…P-Rc-]uÈ-T-U‰N-NÈ, Apart from where one has gone and where one has not gone, how can where one walks exist? It is not observed.60 Why? Stating: “it is not observed” is tantamount to stating “it is untenable since it is not apprehended”. Thus apart from where one has gone and where one has not gone, because “where one walks” is not apprehended at all and is untenable, therefore going does not exist since (where one walks) does not exist in the least.

59 Gendün Drup explains verse 1ab as follows [5b]: “Opponent: Indeed if “generation” is refuted then “cessation” and so on would be established as non-existent, but there is a need to teach the specific logic refuting going and coming in terms of dependent origination. Response: If the action of going were inherently existent then since it must exist on any of the three paths, first there is no going on the path where one has gone because the action of going is current and the action of going on a path where one has already gone is refuted. Also there is no action of going on the path where one has not gone because the action of going is current and the action of going on a path where one has not yet gone, has not yet been generated.” 60 Gendün Drup explains 1cd as follows [5b-6a]: “The action of going on the path where one currently walks is not inherently existent, because apart from where one has gone and where one has not gone, the current path where one walks is not observed to be inherently (existent).”


2. Specific refutation of action where one currently walks. This has two outlines: 1. Dispute [2/2] 2. Reply

1. Dispute

,µc-R, TCÈU-R-BÈ-P-^…P-K‰, N‰-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NÈ, ,H…-õ_-Z‰-P, Someone asserts: (If going exists) it is surely where one walks, because going there exists. How?

CE-P-C^È-T-N‰-P-]uÈ, ,N‰-Ê-CE-C…-TCÈU-R-`, ,C^È-T-cÈE-U…P-U-cÈE-U…P, ,N‰-p…_-TCÈU-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN, Moving anywhere is going there. Further, any movement (exists) where one walks, And it does not exist where one has gone or not gone. Therefore going exists where one walks. [2/2]

]N…-`-mÈN-l…-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R]Ã-CKP-WÀCc-c“-]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-]Nc-\…P-R-NE-U-T˛Uc-R-T§P-R- N‰]Ã-p…_, ,CE-[169a] P-C^È-T-N‰-P-]uÈ, ,Z‰c-q-T-]N…-]qŸE-T_-]nŸ_-K‰, N‰-Ê-CE-C…-TCÈU-R-`- C^È-T-N‰-NU…Cc-R-P]È, ,CE-C…-Z‰c-q-T-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ]Ã-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-M-WÀC-CÈ, ,N‰-õ_-CE-C…-p…_- C^È-T-P…-cÈE-T-`-U‰N, U-cÈE-T-`-Ê-U‰N-l…-TCÈU-R-`-^ÈN-R-N‰]Ã-p…_-CE-P-C^È-T-^ÈN-R-N‰-P-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NÈ, ,N‰-õ_-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-Rc-TCÈU-R-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NÈ, (An opponent says:) In your proof―(establishing) the nonexistence of going―(you) demonstrated that the action of going is already past or not yet commenced. Therefore I would make the statement “moving anywhere is going there”. Further, any movement is observed where one walks. “Any” is an exact term for “the agent who goes”. Thus, because there is no movement where one has gone―and also there is none where one has not gone―therefore it exists where one walks. If there is movement toward a specific place then going there exists. Thus going exists where one walks since going exists in just that way.61 2. Reply. This has two outlines:

1. If either the term demonstrating the object (las tshig) or the term demonstrating action (bya tshig) are meaningful, the other is meaningless. [2/3-4]

2. If both possess meaning then it would be absurd [2/5]

61 Gendün Drup explains verse 2 as follows [6a]: “An opponent says: Going exists where one currently walks because moving to any place by raising and placing one’s feet is going there. Further any movement exists where one currently walks, but it does not exist where one has gone, and it does not exist where one has not gone.”


1. If either the term demonstrating the object or the term demonstrating action are meaningful, the other is meaningless

,TaN-R,

TCÈU-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-R_-P…, ,H…-õ-T“_-P-]MN-R_-]nŸ_, CE-WÂ-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R-^…, TCÈU-R-]MN-R-U‰N-p…_-_È,

Response: How could it be tenable for there to be Going where one walks? When there is no going, Where one walks is not tenable. [2/3]

,]N…-`-mÈN-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-Rc-TCÈU-R_-]NÈN-`-N‰-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NÈ-Z‰c-\‰_-P-]N…-`-]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-P…-CF…C-Lfi-\N-`, N‰-P…-TCÈU-R-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-`-I‰-T_-Æ_-Tc-N‰]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-P…-]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-NE-{`-Tc-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-_È, ,N‰-Ê-U…-]MN-N‰, ]N…-õ_-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R_-H…-õ_-]uÈ-T_-]nŸ_, N‰-`-CE-C…-WÂ-]uÈ-T-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-NE-{`-Tc-U…-]MN-Rc-N‰]Ã-WÂ-TCÈU-R-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-R_-H…-õ_-]MN-R_-]nŸ_, Response: You assert one who possesses going (goes) where one walks, and therefore going there exists. But the action of going there constitutes a single state. Since (you) clearly connect the action of going with “where one walks”, therefore it would absurdly follow there is no going, since (you) don’t link “going” to the action of going. But that is also untenable, for how could going be going when it does not exist? When that called “going” is not linked to the action of going, (going) is untenable. At that time how could it be tenable for there to be going where one walks.62 Ê-CZP-Ê-, TaN-R,

CE-C…-TCÈU-`-]uÈ-^ÈN-R, ,N‰-^…-TCÈU-`-]uÈ-U‰N-R_, ,M`-T_-]nŸ_-K‰-CE-C…-p…_, ,TCÈU-R-BÈE-Oÿ-G”N-p…_-_È,

Again a further response: For any for whom there is going where one walks, It would absurdly follow there is no going Where one walks. Because of that One should understand where one walks. [2/4]

62 Gendün Drup explains verse 3 as follows [6a]: “How could an inherently existent action of going where one currently walks, be tenable? It follows it is not tenable because when there is only (gcig las med) the action of going, that alone is the meaning of the term “where one walks”; and (when) going does not exist, where one walks is untenable.”


,CE-C…-ÉÈ-`-´ÈP-N‰_-nŸ_-P-U…-_“E-EÈ-£U-Rc-]uÈ-T-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-Rc-]uÈ-T_- c‰Uc-R-N‰]Ã-Ê-]uÈ-T-]uÈ-T-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-`-I‰-T_-Æ_-T-qc-Rc-TCÈU-R-P…-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R-]uÈ-T-NE-{`-T-uÈE-NE-uÈE-m‰_-õ-T“_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-K‰, NR‰_-P-uÈE-]uÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-TCÈU-R-Ê-M`-T_-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-Ê-U…-]NÈN-N‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-TCÈU-R-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NÈ, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-H…-õ_- Ê-U…-]MN-NÈ, ,F…-§‰-´ÈP-N‰_-nŸ_-P-U…-_“E-EÈ-£U-Rc-]uÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-NE-TCÈU-R-Z‰c-q-T-N‰- CI…c-@-Ê-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-R_-c‰Uc-P, N‰-`-´ÈP-]N…-^ÈN-N‰, You may think it is implausible for such an error to arise in anyone’s mind. But since (for you) “going” refers to one who possesses going, and the going that is the intention to go clearly refers to “going”, it would absurdly follow there is no going where one walks and it is not linked to going, like (going to) a town or city. For example, it would absurdly follow that the statement “going to town” would also refer to “(going) where one walks”, but this is unacceptable. Because of that, the statement “there is going where one walks”―however it is construed―is also untenable. But if you think “it is implausible for such an error to arise”, yet think that the terms “going” and “where one walks” both possess going, then this error arises.63 2. If both possess meaning then it would be absurd

TaN-R,

,TCÈU-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-P-P…, ,]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-]nŸ_-K‰, ,CE-C…c-TCÈU-R-N‰-NE-P…, ,N‰-`-]uÈ-T-CE-^…P-R]È, If going were where one walks It would follows that going would be twofold: That (person who goes) where he walks and Any going on that (path). [2/5]

,TCÈU-R-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-[169b] R-`-]uÈ-T_-TåCc-P, ]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-K‰, ]uÈ-T- NE-úP-Rc-TCÈU-R-Z‰c-q-T_-]nŸ_-T-NE-, N‰-`-]uÈ-T-Z‰c-q-T]Ã-]uÈ-T-CI…c-R_-TåC-R]È, ,]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-P…-U…-]NÈN-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-Ê-U…-]MN-NÈ, ,N‰-`-´ÈP-CZP-]N…-Ê-^ÈN-NÈ, 63 Nyimadrak’s version of Verse 4 reads: gang gi bgom pa pa ‘gro ba / de yi bgom pa la ‘gro med par / thal bar ‘gyur te gang gi phyir / bgom pa ‘gro ba yin phyir ro // Gendün Drup explains this version of verse 4 as follows [6a]: “Opponent: The action of going is the meaning of the first term “going”. Response: Take the system that asserts that for any for whom the action of going is the meaning of the first term in “going where one walks”; it follows that there is no action of going where one walks. Why? Because the action of going alone exists (gcig las med), and that alone (gcig po de) is the meaning of first term in “going where one walks”. In the compound “going where one walks” (bgom pa la ‘gro ba) the first term (tshigs phyi ma) is “going” and the second term (tshigs snga ma) is “where one walks”.


If you consider going were where one walks―since it is that which possesses going―it would follow that going would be twofold: for it would be considered to be that (person) possessing going (who goes) “where he walks”, and going that is “going on that (path)”.64 But since going cannot be asserted to be twofold―therefore this also is untenable. There is a further fault: ,TaN-R,

,]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-]nŸ_-P, ,]uÈ-T-RÈ-Ê-CI…c-c“-]nŸ_, ,CE-p…_-]uÈ-RÈ-U‰N-R_-P…, ,]uÈ-T-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-p…_,

Response: If it follows that going was twofold Then the goer also would be twofold. Why? Because going is not tenable When there is no goer. [2/6]

,]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Ê-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-K‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, CE-p…_- ]uÈ-RÈ-U‰N-R_-P…, ,]uÈ-T-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-p…_, ,CE-C…-p…_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^ÈN-P-]uÈ-T-Ê-^ÈN-l…, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-ßEc-P-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R-N‰]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Ê-CI…c-c“- M`-T_-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-Ê-U…-]NÈN-N‰, N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-õ_-´ÈP-Oÿ-U-^ÈN-Rc-TCÈU-R-`-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R-I…N-NÈ, ,CE-C…-p…_-cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-NE-TCÈU-R-`-]uÈ-T-U…-]MN-R-N‰]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R-BÈ-P]È, If it follows that going is twofold then it would follow that the goer also would be twofold. Why? Because going is not tenable when there is no goer.65 Because if the goer exists going also exists―and if the goer is removed going would not exist―therefore “if it follows that going is twofold, it would follow that the goer is also twofold”. But that also is unacceptable. Therefore since many faults would arise, there is no going where one walks. Because it is untenable for going where one has gone, where one has not gone, and where one walks―therefore going surely does not exist. ,]N…_-µc-R, cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-NE-TCÈU-R-`-]uÈ-T-U…-]MN-Oÿ-\…P-lE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-`-Tå‰P- 64 Gendün Drup explains verse 5 as follows [6a]: “Regarding the meaning of both the first and second terms in the statement “going where one walks”, if the action of going were inherently existent, then take Devadatta with two feet; it follows there would be two simultaneous substantially distinct actions of going in placing the right foot (on the path) because there would be both that placed on that path where he walks, and the action of going that is any going on that path, and they are inherently existent.” 65 Gendün Drup explains verse 6 as follows [6b]: The goer also would be twofold because it follows that the right foot of a person with two feet would have two substantially distinct actions of going. That is logically necessary. Why? Because going is not tenable when there is no goer.


R]Ã-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-R-I…N-N‰, ]N…-õ_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-`-]uÈ-T-NU…Cc-R]Ã-p…_-_È, Here someone may assert: Though it is untenable that going is where one has gone, where one has not gone, or where one walks, still going that is dependent on the goer exists because such going is observed in relation to the goer. 2. Refuting (action) through investigating the agent ,TaN-R,

C`-K‰-]uÈ-RÈ-U‰N-nŸ_-P, ,]uÈ-T-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-K‰, If there were no goer Going would not be tenable [2/7ab]

,]uÈ-RÈ-U‰N-R_-nŸ_-P-]uÈ-T-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-T_-P…-¢_-T§P-\…P-KÈ, ,C`-K‰-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U‰N-R_-nŸ_-P-]uÈ-T-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-P-CE-]uÈ-T-RÈ-`-Tå‰P-F…E-]uÈ-T-RÈ-`-]H“C-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-N‰-CE-^…P, It has already been demonstrated that if there were no goer, going would be untenable. But if going were not tenable since there were no goer, what going would depend on the goer and what going would engage the goer? µc-R, CE-]uÈ-T-RÈ-`-]H“C-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-CZP-]uÈ-T-RÈ-`c-M-NN-Oÿ-nŸ_-R-^ÈN-NÈ-Z‰c-P…-U…-µ]È, ,]N…-õ_-]uÈ-T-CE-NE-úP-Rc-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-]nŸ_-T-N‰-^ÈN-NÈ-Z‰c-µ]È, He may assert: We do not say that there is another going that engages the goer that is distinct from that goer. Thus those who possess going are called “goers”, and they exist. ,]N…_-TFaN-R,

,]uÈ-T-U‰N-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ, ,^ÈN-R-I…N-Oÿ-C-`-]nŸ_, Here it is explained:

If there is no going How could there be a goer? [2/7cd]

C`-K‰-å‰P-F“E-\N-lE-U‰N-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-Z…C-_T-Lfi-u⁄T-R_-nŸ_-P-P…-N‰-NE-]uÈ-T-RÈ]U, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-úP-R_-^E-]nŸ_-uE-P, M-NN-R_-nŸ_-T-å‰P-U‰N-R]Ã-[170a] ,]uÈ-T-P…-]C]-^E-U‰N- N‰, N‰c-P-M-NN-R_-u⁄T-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R_-mÈN-l…c-]uÈ-T-úP-Rc-]uÈ-T-RÈ_-]nŸ_-T-^ÈN-R-I…N-


Oÿ-C-`-]nŸ_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U‰N-P-^E-c“-^…-]uÈ-T_-]nŸ_-K‰, N‰-Tc-P-]uÈ-T-U‰N-NÈ, If going without any (agent as) basis were to be actually established, then it may be asked: “Would that (going) possess a goer or nongoer?” Going that lacks a distinct (agent as its) basis does not exist at all. Therefore if there is no going that is established as distinct (from the goer), how could you who possess going, come to be a goer?66 Also if a goer does not exist, then whose going is it? Therefore going does not exist. ,µc-R, ≥Èc-R-]N…c-F…-q, CE-`-õÈc-Pc-]uÈ]È, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-]uÈ-T-^…P-PÈ, Someone may assert: Going is described in the statement: “What use is this speculation? Going relies on where (one goes)”. ,]N…_-TaN-R, C`-K‰-]uÈ-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-I…N-_T-Lfi-u⁄T-R_-nŸ_-P-P…-N‰c-P-]uÈ-T-^E-_T-Lfi- ]u⁄T-R_-]nŸ_-uE-P, N‰-_T-Lfi-U…-]u⁄T-Rc-]uÈ-T-_T-Lfi-]u⁄T-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, H…-õ_-Z‰-P, ]N…-`-]uÈ-T-Z…C-^ÈN-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ-]U, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-]uÈ-uE-P, Response: If the goer were actually established, then going would also be actually established. But since (the goer) is not actually established, how could going be actually established? Why? It may be asked: “If going there exists, would the goer or nongoer go? ]N…_-TaN-R,

_‰-Z…C-]uÈ-RÈ-U…-]uÈ-§‰, ,]uÈ-T-RÈ-U…P-]uÈ-RÈ-U…P, ,]uÈ-RÈ-]uÈ-RÈ-U…P-`c-CZP, ,Cc“U-R-CE-Z…C-]uÈ-T_-]nŸ_,

Response to this:

Now the goer does not go And the nongoer does not go. What third (possibility) other than A goer or nongoer, goes? [2/8]

,N‰-Tc-P-]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-I…N-U…-]u⁄T-RÈ, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, U…-]MN-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,H…-õ_-Z‰-P. Therefore, “he goes” is not established. Why? Because it is untenable.67 How?

66 Gendün explains verse 7 as follows [6b]: “If the action of going were inherently existent because the goer―who is the basis (rten)―were inherently existent, then how could the basis of going―the goer―be inherently existent, because there is no going substantially distinct from the goer. If that were to exist, then the action of going would necessarily not rely on the goer because if there were no goer going would not be tenable.” 67 Gendün Drup explains verse 8 as follows [6b]: “First take the goer, he does not inherently go because that would be harmed by the logic below. Take the nongoer, he does not go because he lacks the action of going. What third possibility other than a goer (’gro ba) and nongoer goes? That does not follow because it is impossible.”


_‰-Z…C-]uÈ-RÈ-]uÈ]È-Z‰c, ,H…-õ_-]MN-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_, ,]uÈ-T-U‰N-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ, ,PU-Ê-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, Now how could it be tenable To say “the goer goes”? When going does not exist The goer is not tenable at all. [2/9]

,]N…-`-]uÈ-T-RÈ-]uÈ]È, ,Z‰c-q-T-`, ]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-CF…C-R“-Z…C-^ÈN-R-N‰-P…-]uÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-`-I‰- T_-Æ_-Tc-N‰c-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ-P…-]uÈ-T-NE-{`-K‰, DÿT-K-NE-VË-v-TZ…P-Oÿ-U…E-VU-Oÿ-nŸ_-R_-M`- T_-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-Ê-U…-]NÈN-NÈ, ,N‰]Ã-WÂ-CE-C…-WÂ-]uÈ-T-U‰N-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ-PU-Ê-]MN-R_-U…- ]nŸ_-T-N‰]Ã-WÂ-]uÈ-T-RÈ-]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-H…-õ_-]MN-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_, The statement “the goer goes” expresses the existence of a single action of going. Since (the action of going) clearly refers to the word “goes”, the agent is not linked to going. It would thus follow that they merely exist nominally, like Gupta and Caitra. At that time when going does not exist, the goer is not tenable at all. At that time how could it be tenable to say “the goer goes”? 68

Ê-CZP-Ê-TaN-R,

CE-C…-pÈCc-`-]uÈ-T-RÈ, ,]uÈ-T-N‰-`-]uÈ-U‰N-R]Ã, ,]uÈ-RÈ-^…P-R_-M`-]nŸ_-K‰, ,]uÈ-RÈ-]uÈ-T_-]NÈN-p…_-_È, For any who take the position that The goer goes, it would absurdly follow He is a goer without going Because you assert the goer goes. [2/10]

,CE-C…-pÈCc-`-´ÈP-N‰_-nŸ_-P-U…-_“E-EÈ-£U-Rc-]uÈ-T-RÈ-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-Rc-]uÈ-RÈ-£U-R-N‰-`-Ê-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-I‰-T_-Æ_-T-qc-Rc-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R_- M`-T_-]nŸ_-T-§‰, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-]uÈ-T_-]NÈN-R]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-U‰N-R_-]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-N‰_-M`-T_-]nŸ_-_È, ,Z‰c-q-T]Ã-M-WÀC-CÈ, ,N‰-P…-U…-]MN-N‰, ]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-N‰, ]uÈ-T-U‰N-R_-H…-õ_-]nŸ_-_È, ,F…-§‰-[170b] ´ÈP-N‰_-nŸ_-P-U…-_“E-EÈ-£U-Rc-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T-NE-, ]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-CI…-C- 68 Nyimadrak’s version of Verse 9 reads: gang tshe ‘gro po med par ni / ‘gro po ‘thad par mi ‘gyur na / re zhig ‘gro po ‘gro’o zhes / ji ltar ‘thad pa nyid du ‘gyur // Gendün Drup explains verse 9 as follows [6b]: “Opponent: Though the other two do not go, the goer inherently goes? Response: How could it be tenable to now say “the goer inherently goes”? When the action of going does not exist, the goer is not tenable.”


Ê-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-PÈ-Z‰-P, N‰-`-Ê-´ÈP-]N…-^ÈN-N‰, You may think it is implausible for such a fault to arise for any who take this position,69 and you may think a goer goes since he possesses going. But since (the term) “goer” clearly refers to the action of going, it would absurdly follow he is a goer without going.70 And because (you) assert the goer goes it would absurdly follow that he “goes without going”.71 These are exact terms. But this is untenable for how could one who “goes” be without going? But if you think it is implausible for such a fault to arise yet assert that both “the goer” and “goes” possess going, then this error arises. TaN-R,

C`-K‰-]uÈ-RÈ-]uÈ-]nŸ_-P, ,]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-]nŸ_-K‰, ,CE-C…c-]uÈ-RÈ_-UEÈP-R-NE-, ,]uÈ-RÈ_-nŸ_-Pc-CE-]uÈ-T]È, If the goer were going It would follow that going would be twofold: That by which he actually becomes a goer And that which goes having become a goer. [2/11]

,]uÈ-T-RÈ-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-R-`-]uÈ-T_-TåCc-P-]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-K‰, ]uÈ-T-CE-NC-úP-Rc-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-UEÈP-R-NE-, N‰-]uÈ-T-CE-`-õÈc-Pc-]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T_-]nŸ_-T]È, ,]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-P…-U…-]MN-N‰, ]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-nŸ_-P-¢-U-TZ…P-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Ê-CI…c-c“- M`-T_-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-Ê-U…-]NÈN-N‰-N‰-õ-Tc-]uÈ-T-RÈ-]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-U…-]MN-NÈ, If the goer―who possesses going―were considered to be going, then it follows that going would be twofold: the going by which when possessed he actually becomes a goer and that which is called “goes” in reliance on that which goes.72 (But) it is untenable that going is twofold. If it followed that going were twofold, then as before it would also follow that the goer would be twofold. Since that it also unacceptable, it is thus untenable to say “the goer goes”. ,N-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-Ê-U…-]uÈ-§‰, CE-C…-WÂ-]uÈ-T-RÈ-]uÈ-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-U…-]MN-R-N‰-WÂ-]uÈ-T-

69 That is, that “goer” refers to “the action of going”. 70 Since one who takes this position asserts that ‘goer’ refers to one who possesses going, and not the action of going. 71 Gendün Drup explains verse 10 as follows [6b]: “Opponent: The term “goer” means the action of going. Response: Take the system (lugs) of any who take the position that asserts that the term “goer” means “the action of going”; it follows that the goer who is devoid of “the action of going”―the meaning of “going”―goes, because you assert that the goer goes since he does not exist apart from (gcig las med) the action of going (’gro ba’i bya ba), and the meaning of the term “goer” is a single state (gcig po)” 72 Gendün Drup explains verse 11 as follows [7a]: “If the meaning of the two terms “goer” and “going” were “the action of going”, then take Devadatta who possesses two feet. It would follow there are two substantially distinct actions of going through placing his right foot (and so on) because there is both (1) the action by which he actually becomes a goer and (2) the action of going having become a goer.”


RÈ-U-^…P-R-]uÈ-T-NE-{`-T]E-]uÈ-T]È, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-H…-õ_-]MN-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_, N‰-õ-Tc-P- ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-Ê-U…-]uÈ]È, ,N‰-`-]N…-£U-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-]uÈ-T_- c‰Uc-P, But also the nongoer does not go. When it is said that “the goer goes”, that is untenable, since at that time how could it be tenable to state “the nongoer who also is devoid of going, goes!” That being so, the nongoer also does not go. In considering this, if you think that the goer and the nongoer goes, then: TaN-R, ]uÈ-RÈ-]uÈ-RÈ-U…P-`c-CZP, ,Cc“U-RÈ-CE-Z…C ]uÈ-T_-]nŸ_, ,]uÈ-T-RÈ-NE-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-`c-CZP-R-Cc“U-R, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-CE-]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T_-]MN-R-Z…C-CE-Z…C-^…P, N‰-õ-Tc-P-U‰N-R]Ã-BÈ-P]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-Ê-U…- ]uÈ]È, Response: It is said: “What third (possibility) other than a goer or nongoer, goes?”[2/8cd]. Therefore how could it be tenable that a third (possibility)―other than the goer or nongoer, or (both) a goer or nongoer―goes? That being so, the goer and nongoer also do not go because they are solely nonexistent. ,N‰-õ_-CE-C…-p…_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-]uÈ]È, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-U…-]MN-R-N‰]Ã-p…_, ]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-_T-Lfi-U…-]u⁄T-TÈ, ,]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-U‰N-P-]uÈ-T-_T-Lfi-]u⁄T-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, Thus because of that, the statement “the goer, the nongoer, the goer and the nongoer, go” is untenable. Therefore that called “going” is not actually established. If that called “goes” does not exist, how could going be actually established? ]N…_-µc-R, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-NE. ]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-]uÈ]È, ,Z‰c-q-T-U…-]MN-Oÿ- \…P-lE-, DÿT-K-]uÈ]È, ,VË-v-]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-`-]uÈ]È-Z‰c-q-T-]MN-NÈ, Here someone may assert: Though it has been (established) that to state “the goer, that which is the goer, and that which is not the goer” is untenable, it is tenable to state “he goes” for it is said: “Gupta goes”, “Caitra goes”. ,TaN-R, N‰c-P…-F…-Ê-µc-R-U-^…P-K‰, DÿT-K-`-Tå‰P-P-F…-DÿT-K-]uÈ-T-RÈ_-nŸ_-Pc-]uÈ]U, [171a] ]ÈP-K‰-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-]uÈ]U, ]ÈP-K‰-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-Z…C-]uÈ-Z‰c-


q-T-]N…-Cc`-T-U-qc-cU, N‰-õ-Tc-P-]N…-P…-n…-P]È, Response: This does not explain anything. What can be said in relation to Gupta? To state “Gupta becomes a goer and goes; or does not become a goer and goes; or becomes (both) a goer and a nongoer and goes” does not clarify this. Or if it does it is flawed (logic). ,]N…_-µc-R, ]uÈ-T-P…-^ÈN-R-BÈ-P]È, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-˛ÈU-R-^ÈN-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,]N…-`-cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-NE-TCÈU-R-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NÈ, ,Z‰c-q-T-N‰-TäÈN-R_-U…-Q÷c-c“-\…P-lE-, CE-C…-WÂ-•ÈN-R-`c-]uÈ-T-N‰]Ã-WÂ-P-•ÈN-R]Ã-qc-R-]Nc-U-MC-Lfi-]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-]H“C-R_-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰-õ-Tc-P-q-T-˛ÈU-R-^ÈN-Rc-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-R-BÈ-P]È, Here someone may assert: Going alone exists. Why? Because the beginning of the action of going exists. Going exists where one has gone, where one has not gone, and where one walks. Though it has already (been established) that this cannot be said, when one goes after staying, at that time one starts the action of going immediately after the action of staying. Thus, that being so, going exists since the beginning of the action (of going) exists. ,TaN-R, F…-mÈN-U…E-CZP-Oÿ-T¨„_-Tc-c‰Uc-êÈEc-Pc-_E-C…-T“-EÈ-U…-a‰c-cU, mÈN-NÈP-N‰-I…N-`-ÉÈ-p…-Uc-TäÈN-R-CZP-n…c-TäÈN-@È-]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-˛ÈU-R-^ÈN-R_-^ÈEc-c“-TåC-R-CE-^…P-R-N‰- ^E-cÈE-T-]U-U-cÈE-T-]U, TCÈU-R-`-^ÈN-uE-P, N‰-`-CKP-WÀCc-¢_-T§P-R-NC-I…N-l…c- TaN-R, Response: Even though your mind is confused by juggling names, wouldn’t you recognize your own son? Or through subsequently discerning the meaning of this, do you now express it in different terms? Any thorough investigation of the beginning of the action of going, should examine: “What exists where one has gone, where one has not gone, and where one walks?” But this has been explained by those proofs previously taught. 3. Refuting the proof that action exists. This has five outlines:

1. Refuting the initial beginning (of action) [2/12-13] 2. Refuting the path of going [2/14] 3. Refuting the opposite of going [2/15-16] 4. Refuting the final stopping [2/17ab] 5. Refuting the proof of abidance [2/17cd]

1. Refuting the initial beginning (of action)

cÈE-`-]uÈ-T]Ã-˛ÈU-U‰N-N‰, There is no beginning of going where one has gone [2/12a]


,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-]Nc-\…P-R]Ã-p…_-_È, Why is that? That is because the action of going is already past.

,U-cÈE-T-`]E-]uÈ-˛ÈU-U‰N, Also there is no beginning of going where one has not gone [2/12b]

,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-U-T˛Uc-R]Ã-p…_-_È, Why is that? That is because he action of going has not yet begun.

,TCÈU-`-˛ÈU-R-^ÈN-U…P-P, There is no beginning (of going) where one walks. [2/12c]

,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, TCÈU-R-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-NE-, ]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ- CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-_È, Why is that? That is because where one walks does not exist, because it follows going would be twofold, and because goers would be twofold.

,CE-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-˛ÈU-R_-q‰N, Where does going begin? [2/12d]

,F‰c-q-T]Ã-`P-N‰-N-µÈc-a…C ,N‰-õ-Tc-P-]uÈ-T]Ã-˛ÈU-R-U‰N-NÈ, ,˛ÈU-R-U‰N-P-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, This answer is now expressed. That being so, there is no beginning of going. If there is no beginning (of going) how could going exist?73 ]N…_-µc-R, ]uÈ-T-P…-^ÈN-R-BÈ-P]È, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, TCÈU-R-NE-cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-^ÈN-R]Ã-p…_-K‰, CE-C…-p…_-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-R]Ã-p…_-TCÈU-R-Z‰c-q-T-^…P-`, ]uÈ-T-UM_-p…P-R-P…-cÈE-T-Z‰c- q-T-^…P, ]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-U-cÈE-T-`-õÈc-Pc-U-cÈE-T-Z‰c-q-T-^…P-Rc-P-N‰-õ-Tc-P-TCÈU-R-NE-cÈE-T-NE-, U-cÈE-T-^ÈN-R]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NÈ,

73 Gendün Drup explains verse 12 as follows [5b]: “Opponent: ‘going exists because going begins when staying is relinquished’. Response: It follows that path where going begins is inherently existent because there is no beginning of going on a path where one has gone, also there is no beginning of going where one has not gone, because there is no inherently existent beginning of going where one currently walks.”


Here someone may assert: Going surely exists. Why? Because where one walks, where one has gone, and where one has not gone, exist. Therefore because (someone) possesses going, it is called “where one walks”. Going that has been completed is called “where one has gone”. The action of going is called “where one has not gone” in reliance on having not gone over (that path). Therefore going exists, because where one walks, where one has gone, and where one has not gone, exist! ,TaN-R, F…-m‰N-PU-UB]-]N…-`-úE-T_-T´ÈN-NU, Response: Why do you attempt to rise into the sky?74

,]uÈ-T-˛ÈU-R]Ã-¢-_È`-P, ,CE-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-˛ÈU-]nŸ_-T, [171b] ,TCÈU-R-U‰N-F…E-cÈE-T-U‰N, Before the beginning of going There is no beginning of going Where one walks nor where one has gone. [2/13abc]

CE-C…-WÂ, ,]N…-`-]uÈ-T-˛ÈU-R]Ã-¢-_È`-•ÈN-R_-nŸ_-R-P-CE-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-˛ÈU-R_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-TCÈU-R-Ê-U‰N-F…E-, cÈE-T-Ê-U‰N-NÈ, ,]uÈ-T-˛ÈU-R-U‰N-P-TCÈU-R-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, ]uÈ-T-NE-úP-R-U‰N-P-]uÈ-T-UM_-p…P-R-^ÈN-R_-Ê-C-`-]nŸ_, At that time while abiding before the beginning of going there, there is no beginning of going where one walks, nor also where one has gone. If there is no beginning of going, how could there be one who possesses going where one walks? If one who possesses going does not exist, how could there be going that has been completed? ]N…_-µc-R, U-cÈE-T-P…-^ÈN-N‰, N‰_-]uÈ-T-˛ÈU-R_-]nŸ_-_È, Here someone may assert: Where one has not gone exists, for there is a beginning of going there. ,TaN-R,

U-cÈE-]uÈ-T-C-`-^ÈN, How could there be going where one has not gone? [2/13d]

,]N…-`-•ÈN-F…E-U…-T´ÈN-R-CE-^…P-R-N‰-P…-U-cÈE-T-§‰, N‰-`-P…-˛ÈU-R-U‰N-NÈ, ,CE-C…-WÂ-´ÈN-R_-

74 In other words, why do you make absurd claims.


q‰N-R-N‰]Ã-WÂ-P-P…-CÈ-ˇTc-CE-Oÿ-´ÈN-R_-q‰N-R-N‰-U-cÈE-T-U-^…P-PÈ, ,N‰]Ã-WÂ-U-cÈE-T]Ã-CÈ-ˇTc- CE-^…P-R-N‰-`-P…-T´ÈN-R-U‰N-NÈ, ,N‰-õ-Tc-P-U-cÈE-T-`-]uÈ-T]Ã-˛ÈU-R-CE-`-^ÈN, ,N‰-õ_- TåCc-P, While staying and not yet moving there, then it is where one has not yet gone for the beginning (of going) there does not yet exist. When one moves, then at that time when one (begins to) move there, it is no longer where one has not yet gone. At that time, when it is not where one has not gone, there is no movement there. That being so, how could there be a beginning of going where one has not gone? 75 If we investigate this in that way: 2. Refuting the path of going

]uÈ-˛ÈU-éU-R-MUc-FN-Oÿ, ,¶E-T-U‰N-R-I…N-^…P-P, ,cÈE-T-F…-Z…C-TCÈU-R-P…. ,U-cÈE-F…-Z‰c-éU-R_-TåC, When the beginning of going Does not appear in any way, Investigate where one has gone, Where one walks, and where one has not gone. [2/14]

,CE-C…-WÂ-N‰-õ_-éU-R-MUc-FN-l…c-éU-R_-TåC-R-P-]uÈ-T]Ã-˛ÈU-R-¶E-T-U‰N-R-I…N-^…P-R-N‰]Ã-WÂ-mÈN-l…-cÈE-T-Ê-F…, TCÈU-R-Ê-F…, U-cÈE-T-N‰-Ê-F…, Z‰c-éU-R_-TåC When that is investigated, the beginning of going does not appear in any way, at that time you should also investigate where one has gone, where one walks, also where one has not gone.76

,µc-R, _‰-Z…C-U-cÈE-T-P…-^ÈN-NÈ, Someone may assert: First that not gone over exists. ,TaN-R, F…-mÈN-T“-U-TVc-R_-]G…-T]Ã-r-EP-q‰N-NU, mÈN-cÈE-T-U‰N-R_-U-cÈE-T-`-åÈC-CÈ, ,]N…-õ_-cÈE-T]Ã-CI‰P-RÈ-P…-U-cÈE-T-^…P-P, N‰-`-C`-K‰-cÈE-T-I…N-U‰N-P-mÈN-l…-U-cÈE-T-^ÈN-R_-C-`-]nŸ_, 75 Gendün Drup explains verse 13 as follows [7a]: “The path where going begins does not inherently exist, because while abiding before the beginning of going on the path, there is no beginning of going where one walks nor where one has gone, so how could there be going on a path where one has not gone? It does not exist.” 76 Gendün Drup explains verse 14 as follows [7a]: “Opponent: Though there is no beginning of going on the three paths, the three paths exist. Response: When one investigates where one has gone, where one walks, and where one has not gone, they do not inherently exist because the beginning of going on the three paths that are inherently existent does not appear in any way.”


Response: Does your unborn son attain nirvāṇa at death? Or do you consider the nonexistence of where one has gone to be where one has not gone? Here if the opposite of where one has gone is where one has not gone, then if where one has gone does not exist, how could where one has not gone exist? µc-R, C`-K‰-CI‰P-RÈ-U‰N-Rc-cÈE-T-U‰N-P-]È-P, ]uÈ-T-]u⁄T-RÈ, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, U…-UM—P-R]Ã-^ÈN-R]Ã-p…_-K‰, ]N…-õ_-]uÈ-T]Ã-U…-UM—P-R-•ÈN-R-^ÈN-N‰, N‰-Tc-P-U…-UM—P-R-^ÈN-R]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-R-BÈ-P]È, Someone may assert: If where one has gone does not exist since its opposite does not exist, therefore going is established. Why? Because a state incompatible (with it) exists. Thus staying―which is incompatible with going―exists. Therefore because that incompatible (with it) exists, going exists! ,TaN-R, C`-K‰-•ÈN-R-^ÈN-P-P…-]uÈ-T-^E-^ÈN-R_-]nŸ_-uE-P, •ÈN-R-U…-]MN-Rc-]uÈ-T-^ÈN- R_-C-`-]nŸ_, H…-õ_-Z‰-P, ]N…-`-C`-K‰-•ÈN-R-^ÈN-R_-nŸ_-P, ]uÈ-T-RÈ]Ã-]U, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R]Ã-^…P-uE-P, N‰-`, Response: If staying exists, also going would exist. But since staying is untenable, how could going exist? Why? If staying were to exist, it may be asked: Is it the goer or nongoer (that stays)? 3. Refuting the opposite of going

_‰-Z…C-]uÈ-RÈ-U…-•ÈN-N‰, ,]uÈ-T-RÈ-U…P-•ÈN-R-U…P, ,]uÈ-RÈ-]uÈ-RÈ-U…P-`c-CZP, ,Cc“U-R-CE-[172a] Z…C-•ÈN-R_-]nŸ_, First the goer does not stay. The nongoer does not stay. How could a third (alternative), Other than the goer or nongoer, stay? [2/15]

N‰-õ-Tc-P-•ÈN-R-P…-U‰N-R-BÈ-P]È, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, U…-]MN-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,H…-õ_-Z‰-P, Thus, staying is surely nonexistent.77 Why? Because it is untenable. How? TaN-R, 77 Gendün Drup explains verse 15 as follows [7a-7b]: “Opponent: Going exists because staying―which is its opposite―exists. Response: Staying does not inherently exist because first the goer does not stay, the nongoer does not inherently stay, and how could the third alternative―one who is other than the goer or nongoer―stay? That is impossible.”


_‰-Z…C-]uÈ-RÈ-•ÈN-NÈ-Z‰c, ,H…-õ_-]MN-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_, ,]uÈ-T-U‰N-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ, ,PU-Ê-]MN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, , Now how could the statement: “The goer stays” be tenable? When there is no going The goer is not tenable. [2/16]

]N…-`-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-Rc-]uÈ-T-RÈ_-]nŸ_-Tc-]uÈ-T-U‰N-P, ]uÈ-T-RÈ_-U…-]MN-R-I…N-NÈ, ,]uÈ-T-`ÈC-R-P…-•ÈN-R-Z‰c-q-T-P-]uÈ-T-NE-•ÈN-R-U…-UM—P-R-N‰-CI…c-CF…C-P-üP-F…C-]OÿC-R-U‰N-NÈ, ,N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-õ_-_‰-Z…C-]uÈ-T-RÈ-•ÈN-NÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-H…-õ_-]MN-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_, N‰-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U- ^…P-R-Ê-U…-•ÈN-N‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ]uÈ-T-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-_È, Since he becomes a goer by possessing (the action of) going, when there is no going the goer is not tenable. If the stopping of going is called “staying”, then going and staying are incompatible, and these two do not abide together as one. Because of that, now how could the statement: “the goer stays” be tenable?78 The nongoer also does not stay. Why? Because going does not exist. ,]N…-`-]uÈ-T-`ÈC-R-P…-•ÈN-R-Z‰c-q-T-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-P…-]uÈ-T-NE-{`-T]Ã-p…_-•ÈN-R-I…N-^…P-Rc-N‰-`-Ê-•ÈN-Rc-F…-Z…C-q, •ÈN-R-N‰-`-Ê-•ÈN-R_-TåC-P, •ÈN-R-CI…c-c“-M`-T_- ]nŸ_-T-NE-, •ÈN-R-RÈ-Ê-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-Ê-U…-•ÈN-NÈ, If stopping going is called staying, then the nongoer would stay because he is devoid of going. But how does he stay? If the staying (of the nongoer) were also considered to be staying, it would follow that staying would be twofold. Also it would follow that the stayer would be twofold. Therefore, because of that, the nongoer also does not stay. ,N‰-`-]N…-£U-Oÿ-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-•ÈN-R_-c‰Uc-P, In contemplating this, you may think that the goer and nongoer, stay. TaN-R, ]uÈ-RÈ-]uÈ-RÈ-U…P-`c-CZP, ,Cc“U-R-CE-Z…C •ÈN-R_-]nŸ_, ]uÈ-TÈ-NE-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U- ^…P-R-`c-CZP-R-Cc“U-R-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-CE-•ÈN-NÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-TåCc-R-N‰-CE-Z…C-^…P, N‰-õ-Tc-P-U‰N-R-BÈ-P]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-Ê-U…- 78 Nyimadrak’s version of Verse 16 reads: gang tshe ‘gro po med par ni / ‘gro po ‘thad par mi ‘gyur na / re zhig ‘gro po sdod do zhes / ji ltar ‘thad pa nyid du ‘gyur // Gendün Drup explains verse 16 as follows [7b]: “Opponent: The first reason is not established. Response: Now how could the statement: “the goer inherently stays” be tenable? It follows it is not because when there is no going, the goer is not tenable―and both the action of going and staying do not co-exist (’du) on the same basis.”


•ÈN-NÈ, Response: It was said “How could a third (alternative), other than the goer or nongoer, stay?” [2/15cd]. Having investigated what goer or nongoer as a third (alternative)―other than the goer or nongoer―stays, then what could that be? Thus―because it is not existent―neither the goer nor nongoer stay. ,Ê-CZP-Ê-, ]uÈ-T-`ÈC-R-P…-•ÈN-R-Z‰c-q-T, úÈC-R-N‰-Ê-TCÈU-R-`c-cU, cÈE-T-`c-cU-U-cÈE-T-`c-úÈC-R_-]nŸ_-uE-P, N‰-`, Again, that which stops going is called staying. Regarding stopping, it may be asked: Does stopping arise from walking, from having gone, or from having not gone? 4. Refuting the final stopping

TCÈU-`c-úÈC-R_-U…-]nŸ_-K‰, cÈE-NE-U-cÈE-`c-lE-U…P, Stopping does not arise from walking. Also it does not arise from having gone or not having gone. [2/17ab]

TCÈU-R-`c-•ÈN-R-U…-]nŸ_-K‰, F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, ]N…-õ_-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-R]Ã-p…_-TCÈU-R-^…P-`, ]uÈ-T-`ÈC-R-P…-•ÈN-R-^…P-Rc-•ÈN-R-NE-]uÈ-T-U…-UM—P-R-N‰-CI…c-F…C-P-U…-~…N-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-_‰-Z…C-TCÈU-R-`c-úÈC-R_-U…-]nŸ_-K‰, N‰-P…-cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-`c-lE-•ÈN-R_-U…-]nŸ_-K‰, F…]Ã- p…_-Z‰-P, ]uÈ-T-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_- [172b] _È. ,]N…-õ_-]uÈ-T-`ÈC-R-P…-•ÈN-R-^…P-P, ]uÈ-T-P…-cÈE-T- NE-U-cÈE-T-`-U‰N-N‰, ]uÈ-T-U‰N-P-]uÈ-T-úÈC-R-C-`-^ÈN, ]uÈ-T-úÈC-R-U‰N-P-•ÈN-R-C-`-^ÈN, N‰-õ-Tc-P-cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-`c-lE-úÈC-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È, Staying does arise from walking. Why? Walking is established because it possesses going. Since stopping going is staying, staying and going are incompatible, and it is impossible that those two are the same. Therefore, because of that, first stopping does not arise from walking and also staying does not arise from having gone and not having gone.79 Why? Because going does not exist. Thus if stopping going is staying―and going does not exist where one has gone and not gone―then how could stopping exist, if going did not exist? How could staying exist if stopping going did not exist? That being so, staying does not arise from having gone or not having gone.

79 Gendün Drup explains 17ab as follows [7b]: “Opponent: Going exists because stopping going exists. Response: It follows stopping does not inherently arise from walking because walking does not inherently exist. Also stopping does not arise from having gone and not having gone because those two do not possess the action of going. Therefore stopping has no inherent nature.”


5. Refuting the proof of abidance

,]uÈ-T-NE-P…-]H“C-R-NE-, úÈC-R-Ê-P…-]uÈ-NE-UW”Ec, Going and starting, and Also stopping is similar. [2/17cd]

H…-õ_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U…-•ÈN-N‰, •ÈN-R-NE-, ]uÈ-T-CI…c-U…-UM—P-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,Z‰c-TaN-R-N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ- •ÈN-R-RÈ-Ê-U…-]uÈ-§‰, •ÈN-R-NE-]uÈ-T-CI…c-U…-UM—P-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,H…-õ_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-U…-•ÈN-N‰, •ÈN-R-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-_È-Z‰c-TaN-R-N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-•ÈN-R-RÈ-U-^…P-R-Ê-U…-]uÈ-§‰, ]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-M`-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-p…_-_È, For what reason does the goer not stay? It is because both staying and going are incompatible. Similarly for what reason does the stayer not go? It is because both staying and going are incompatible. For what reason does the nongoer not stay? It is because it would absurdly follow that staying would be twofold. Similarly for what reason does the nonstayer also not go? It is because it would absurdly follow that going would be twofold. ,H…-õ_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-, H…-õ_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-U…-•ÈN-N‰, U…-~…N-R]Ã-p…_-_È-Z‰c-TaN-R-N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-•ÈN-R-RÈ-^…P-R-NE. •ÈN-R-RÈ-U-^…P-R-Ê-U…-]uÈ-§‰, U…-~…N-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,N‰-õ_-_‰-Z…C- ]uÈ-T-RÈ]Ã-•ÈN-R-NE-, •ÈN-R-RÈ]Ã-]uÈ-T-UW”Ec-R-^…P-PÈ, ,N-P…-H…-õ_-]uÈ-T]Ã-˛ÈU-R-cÈE-T-NE-, U-cÈE-T-NE-, TCÈU-R-`-U…-]MN-NÈ-Z‰c-TaN-R-N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-•ÈN-R]Ã-]H“C-R-Ê-T•N-R-NE-U-T•N-R-NE-, •ÈN-R-`-U…-]MN-N‰, N‰-õ_-P-]uÈ-T]Ã-˛ÈU-R-NE-•ÈN-R]Ã-]H“C-R-UW”Ec-R-^…P-PÈ, For what reason does the goer and the nongoer not stay? It has already been explained “because it is impossible”. Similarly for what reason does the stayer and the nonstayer not go? It is because it is impossible. Thus first the staying of the goer and the going of the stayer are similar. Now, just as it is stated that it is not tenable for there to be a beginning of going where one has gone, where one has not gone, and where one walks, so too the starting of staying is untenable on where one has stayed, where one has not stayed, and where one is staying. Thus the beginning of going, and the starting of staying are similar. ,N-P…-H…-õ_-]uÈ-T]Ã-úÈC-R-cÈE-T-NE-, U-cÈE-T-NE-, TCÈU-R-`c-úÈC-R_-U…-]nŸ_-Z‰c-TaN-R-N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-•ÈN-R]Ã-úÈC-R-Ê-CE-Oÿ-T•N-R-N‰-Pc-U…-]uÈ-§‰, ]uÈ-T-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,CE-Oÿ-U- T•N-R-N‰-Pc-lE-U…-]uÈ-§‰, ]uÈ-T-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,CE-Oÿ-T•N-R-N‰-Pc-lE-U…-]uÈ-§‰, •ÈN-R- NE-]uÈ-T-CI…c-U…-UM—P-R]Ã-p…_-_È, ,N‰-õ_-P-]uÈ-T]Ã-úÈC-R-NE-, •ÈN-R]Ã-úÈC-R-UW”Ec-R-


^…P-PÈ. Now just as it is stated that stopping going is not stopping where one has gone, where one has not gone, and where one is walking; so too stopping staying is not going from where one is staying because going does not exist. It is also not going from where one is not staying because going does not exist. It is also not going from where one is staying because staying and going are not compatible. Thus stopping going and stopping staying are similar.80 ,]N…_-µc-R, ]uÈ-T-NE-]H“C-R-NE-, úÈC-R-cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-NE-, TCÈU-R-`-^ÈN-NÈ-Z‰]U- ]uÈ-T-RÈ-NE-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R-NE-, N‰-`c-CZP-R-`-^ÈN-NÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-`-TäÈN-R_-U…-Q÷c-c“- \…P-lE-, VË-v]Ã-CÈU-R-]NÈ_-T-UMÈE-Pc, VË-v]Ã-]uÈ-[173a] T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-]nŸ_-Tc-N‰]Ã-p…_- ]uÈ-T-RÈ-NE-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NÈ, Here an opponent theorizes: Though it cannot be said that “going, starting, and stopping, exists where one has gone, where one has not gone, and where one walks”; or that “the goer, the nongoer, and that other than those, exists”; Caitra is called “a goer” through seeing the stride of Caitra, therefore for that reason the goer and going exist. ,TaN-R, _‰-Z…C-TäÈN-R_-U…-Q÷c-c“-\…P-lE-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-P…-SÈEc-R]Ã-WÀC-^…P-PÈ, ,]ÈP-lE-CE- UMÈE-Pc-VË-v-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-c‰Uc-R-VË-v]Ã-CÈU-R-]NÈ_-T-CE-^…P-R-]NÈ_, CÈU-R-]NÈ_- T-N‰-NE-VË-v-CF…C-R-I…N-NU-CZP-R-I…N-Oÿ-]nŸ_-uE-P, N‰-`, Response: first, that cannot be stated for this is destitute rhetoric. But thinking Caitra can be called a goer through seeing that, then it may be asked: What stride of Caitra strides? Are the stride, and Caitra himself, the same or different? 4. Refuting (action) through investigating action. This has two outlines:

1. Refuting (action) through investigating whether they are identical or distinct [2/18-21] 2. Refuting (action) through investigating the existence and nonexistence of the two actions [2/22-23]

1. Refuting (action) through investigating whether they are identical or distinct

]uÈ-T-N‰-NE-]uÈ-T-RÈ, ,N‰-I…N-F‰c-lE-q_-U…-_“E-, ,]uÈ-T-NE-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ, ,CZP-I…N-F‰c-lE-q_-U…-_“E-, Stating that going and goer Are the same is implausible. Stating that going and goer

80 Gendün Drup explains17cd as follows [7b]: “Opponent: Abiding exists due to its inherent nature because the opposite of abiding is going, because the starting of abiding exists, and because stopping abiding exists. Response: Take going, and the starting of abiding, and also stopping after abiding; they are not proofs of abiding existing by its own inherent nature, because in the proof that going exists by its inherent nature: the fault in stating “abiding, the beginning of going, and stopping after going” is similar.


Are different is implausible. [2/18]

,H…-õ_-Z‰-P, How? 81

C`-K‰-]uÈ-T-CE-^…P-R, ,N‰-I…N-]uÈ-RÈ-^…P-nŸ_-P, ,q‰N-R-RÈ-NE-`c-I…N-lE. CF…C-R-I…N-Oÿ-M`-T_-]nŸ_, If that which is going Were to be the goer Then it would absurdly follow that the agent And also the action would be the same. [2/19]

,C`-K‰-]uÈ-T-CE-^…P-R-N‰-I…N-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R_-nŸ_-P, N‰-õ-P-q‰N-R-RÈ-NE-q-T-^E-CF…C-R- I…N-Oÿ-M`-T_-]nŸ_-_È, ,N‰-P…-U…-]MN-NÈ, q‰N-R-RÈ-CE-^…P-R-N‰-I…N-q-T-^…P-R_-H…-õ_-]nŸ_, F…-§‰-´ÈP-N‰_-nŸ_-P-U…-_“E-EÈ. ,£U-Rc-q‰N-R-RÈ-NE-q-T-CI…c-CZP-R-I…N-^…P-PÈ-Z‰-P, N‰-`-TaN-R_-q-§‰, If that which is going were the goer, then it would absurdly follow that the agent and also the action would be the same.82 This is untenable. How could that which is the agent be the action? But you may think that such an error is implausible, for both the agent and the action are different. This will now be explained:

C`-K‰-]uÈ-NE-]uÈ-T-RÈ, ,CZP-R-I…N-Oÿ-éU-TåCc-P, ,]uÈ-RÈ-U‰N-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-NE-, ,]uÈ-T-U‰N-R]Ã-]uÈ-RÈ_-]nŸ_, If you consider going and The goer to be different There would be going without a goer And a goer with going. [2/20]

,C`-K‰-q‰N-R-RÈ-NE-, q-T-CI…c-CF…C R-I…N-l…-´ÈP-UMÈE-Tc-]uÈ-T-RÈ-NE-, ,]uÈ-T-CZP-R-I…N-Oÿ-éU-R_-TåCc-P, N‰-õ-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ-`c-M-NN-R_-nŸ_-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-CZ…-U‰N-R-_E-`c-_T-Lfi- u⁄T-R_-]nŸ_-T-NE-, ]uÈ-T-CZ…-U‰N-R-_E-`c-_T-Lfi-u⁄T-R_-nŸ_-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^E-]uÈ-T-NE-

81 Gendün Drup explains verse 18 as follows [7b]: “Opponent: Going and the goer are inherently existent because the stride of Devadatta is seen. Response: Stating that an inherent going and goer are the same is implausible and stating that an inherent going and goer are different is implausible. 82 Gendün Drup explains verse 19 as follows [7b]: “Opponent: How is this implausible? Response: It would absurdly follow that the agent and also the action (las) would be the same because that which is going were the goer.”


{`-T-U…-õÈc-R-_E-`c-_T-Lfi-u⁄T-R_-]nŸ_-T-Z…C-P, N‰-CI…c-CE-Ê-U…-]MN-N‰-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U‰N-R_-]uÈ-T-NE-, ]uÈ-T-U‰N-R_-]uÈ-T-RÈ_-H…-õ_-]nŸ_, If you see the error in both the agent and action being the same and consider the goer and going to be different then going that is distinct from the goer would be without a basis, and completely established from itself. If going were without a basis and completely established from itself, then the goer also would be devoid of―and not reliant on―going, and completely established from itself. But those two (alternatives) are completely untenable. How could there be a goer without going and going without a goer? 83

]N…_-µc-R, F…-m‰N-CcÈN-R-RÈ-I…N-`-NTE-]X“Cc-cU, BÈ-TÈ-P…-q‰N-R-RÈ-NE-q-T-CI…c-M-NN-R_- ]nŸ_-u⁄T-R-U‰N-R]Ã-p…_, CZP-R-I…N-Oÿ-Ê-U…-]NÈN-`, q‰N-R-RÈ-M-NN-R]Ã-p…_-CF…C-R-I…N-Oÿ- Ê-U…-]NÈN-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-CI…-C-U‰N-R_-Ê-N‰-CI…c-u⁄T-RÈ, Here he may assert: How would you exercise control over (or restrain)84 a killer (before he kills)? That is because both he and the action are not established as distinct. Also you do not assert them to be different. You do not assert them to be the same because (the action) is distinct from the agent. Therefore, because of that, (for you) both are established even though neither exists!’ ,TaN-R, BÈ-TÈ-P…-CcÈN-R-RÈ-I…N-`-NTE-U…-]X“Cc-l…, mÈN-I…N-`C-R-TìE-§‰-WÀCc-[173b] G‰P- RÈ_-C^ÈT-F…E-BÈE-R-NT“Cc-l…c-TíEc-TZ…P-Oÿ-©…C-î‡]Ã-G”-`-ì`-T_-q‰N-NU, mÈN-N‰-I…N-NE- CZP-U-CKÈCc-R-U‰N-R]Ã-pÈCc-`-^ÈN-R]Ã-ÉÈc-CPc-R_-q‰N-@È, Response: For me control cannot be exercised over a killer (before he kills). Would you extend your hands, and frantically beckon (others) while expelling your final breath and act as if swimming in illusory water (to prevent the killing). Or would you maintain in your mind the position that nothing exists apart from that (the agent) and the other (the object)?

,CE-NC-NEÈc-RÈ-CF…C-R-NE-, ,NEÈc-RÈ-CZP-R-I…N-Oÿ-P…, ,u⁄T-R_-nŸ_-T-^ÈN-U…P-P,, N‰-CI… c-u⁄T-R-H…-õ_-^ÈN, If they are not established as The same phenomenon Or different phenomena How could these two be established? [2/21]

83 Gendün Drup explains verse 20 as follows [8a]: “It follows there would be going without a goer and a goer without going because you consider going and the goer to be inherently different (gzhan).” 84 Or witness (dpang ‘dzugs) a killer. The Derge edition here states “to be a witness” (dpang ‘dzugs) in this paragraph and “excercise control over” (dbang ‘dzugs) in the next paragraph. Walleser states “exercise control over”(dbang ‘dzugs) both in this and the following paragraph of the commentary.


,C`-K‰-q‰N-R-RÈ-NE-q-T-CI…c-CF…C-R-I…N-NE-CZP-R-I…N-Oÿ-u⁄T-R-U‰N-N‰-CI…c-U-CKÈCc-R_-éU-R-CZP-CE-C…c-N‰-CI…c-u⁄T-R-^ÈN-R-N‰-H‰-µÈc-a…C ,N‰-õ-Tc-P-N‰-P…-TåCc-R-VU-Oÿ-\N-NÈ, If both the agent and action are not established as the same (phenomenon) or different (phenomena), how could these two be established by something other than those two.85 Thus they are merely imputed. ,]N…_-µc-R, ]H…C-å‰P-UEÈP-c“U-n…-NÈP-]N…-CT-CT-l…c-CPÈP-R_-H…-õ_-Q÷c, ^ÈN-P…-CE-U‰N- Rc-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-PÈ, ,Z‰c-q-T-NE-, CE-`-õÈc-Pc-]N…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-PÈ-Z‰c-q-T-N‰-P…-]uÈ-T- ^…P-`, N‰-Ê-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q]È, Here someone may assert: How could this object of mundane worldly perception be concealed? The statements “that which exists is not the goer since it does not exist in any way” and “that which relies on that is the goer” refer to going, and that also is called the goer. ,TaN-R, F…-mÈN-T“-]NÈN-`-U-P…E-`-≠ÈN-NU, mÈN-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U‰N-R-`-]uÈ-T-RÈ_-åÈC-CÈ, ,]N…-õ_- TuÈN-R_-q-T-Z…C-^ÈN-P-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ_-TåC-Lfi-Ê-_“E-uE-P, CE-C…-WÂ-]uÈ-T-RÈ_-TåCc-lE-TuÈN-R_-q-T-U…-]MN-R-N‰]Ã-WÂ-F…-Ê-U…-SP-R-^ÈEc-c“-TåCc-R-]N…c-F…-Z…C-q, TuÈN-R_-q- T-H…-õ_-U…-]MN-F‰-P, N‰-P…-cÈE-T-Ê-U-^…P-U-cÈE-T-Ê-U-^…P-`, TCÈU-R-P…-a‰c-R_-U…-]nŸ_-_È-Z‰c-T§P-\…P-K‰, ,N‰-NC-VU-Oÿ-N‰-]uÈ-Tc-]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-uE-P, N‰-P…-U…-]uÈ-Tc-N‰]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T- RÈ_-TåCc-R-P…-NÈP-U‰N-R-^…P-PÈ, Response: In desiring a son do you behave like a neuter? Or do you consider the nonexistence of a goer to be a goer? Thus it may be asked: “If the destination of travel exists then is it plausible to also consider that to be the goer?” If that is considered to be the goer, the destination of travel would not be tenable. At that time considering it (to be the goer) brings no benefit whatsoever, why do it? He may ask: “How could the destination of travel be untenable?” (Response:) It has already been demonatrated that it is not where one has gone nor where one has not gone; and where one walks are not observed. But if it is stated: “Since he goes in just those (ways), he is the goer”, then since he does not go, therefore considering him to be the goer is meaningless!

85 Gendün Drup explains verse 21 as follows [8a]: “Take both going and the goer; how could they be inherently established? It follows they are not because they are not established as the same inherently (existent) phenomenon nor different inherently (existent) phenomena.”


,]N…_-µc-R, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-Rc-]uÈ-T-I…N-]uÈ-§‰, NR‰_-P-µ-RÈ-NC-P-_‰-WÀC-µ]È, ,q-T-q‰N-NÈ- Z‰c-\‰_-T-TZ…P-PÈ, Here someone may assert: The going goes since it is the goer. For example, it is like exponents (of views) who state: “I speak words, I engage in action”. ,TaN-R, ]uÈ-T-RÈ]Ã-]uÈ-T-`-TåC-P-^E-]uÈ-T-CE-C…c-N‰]Ã-]uÈ-T-RÈ_-UEÈP-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-N‰-I…N-NU, N‰-`c-CZP-TZ…C-]uÈ-uE-P, CI…-C-^E-U…-UMÈE-EÈ, ,H…-õ_-Z‰-P, Response: If you consider the going of the goer, then what going actually goes as the goer of that? Or what goer is there other than those? Neither are seen. In what way? 2. Refuting (action) through investigating the existence and nonexistence of the two actions

]uÈ-T-CE-C…-]uÈ-RÈ_-UEÈP, ,]uÈ-T-N‰-P…-N‰-]uÈ-U…P, By going he becomes a goer. That going is not the going of that (goer) [2/22ab]

]uÈ-T-CE-NE-úP-P, VË-v-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-UEÈP-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-N‰-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-N‰-]uÈ-T_-q‰N-R- U-^…P-PÈ, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, In possessing going, Caitra becomes a goer, but that going is not the going of that goer. Why?

CE-p…_-]uÈ-T]Ã-¢-_È`-U‰N, ,CE-Z…C-CE-Oÿ-]uÈ-T_-]nŸ_, For reason that prior to someone Going somewhere, there is no (goer) [2/22cd]

,CE-C…-p…_-]uÈ-T- [174a] CE-C…c-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-UEÈP-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-]N…-¢-_È`-P…-]uÈ-T]Ã-¢-_È`-K‰-N‰]Ã-¢-_È`-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ-U‰N-NÈ, ,N‰-NE-úP-R-BÈ-P]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-TäÈN-R-^…P-K‰, CE- Z…C-CE-Oÿ-NR‰_-P-uÈE-NE-uÈE-m‰_-õ-T“-M-NN-R_-nŸ_-Rc-]uÈ-T_-]nŸ_-T-^…P-P-]uÈ-T-RÈ_- nŸ_-Pc-CE-]uÈ-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-]uÈ-T-N‰-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-`c-uÈE-NE-uÈE-m‰_-õ-T“_-M-NN-R_-nŸ_- R-U‰N-NÈ, For reason that he becomes a goer by that going, then prior to this going―that is prior to


going―there is no goer who is prior to this. Because (the goer) alone possesses that (going) he is called a goer. If someone were to go somewhere like a town or city, then they would be distinct. Therefore if going occurs, the goer occurs, and going there occurs. But going that is distinct from the goer, like the town and city, does not exist.86 ,N‰-õ_-_‰-Z…C-]uÈ-T-CE-C…c-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-UEÈP-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-N‰-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-]uÈ-T_-q‰N-R-U-^…P-PÈ, ,N‰-`-]N…-£U-Oÿ-N‰-`c-CZP-R-Z…C-]uÈ-T_-c‰Uc-P, Thus first by (the action of) going he becomes a goer. But that going is not the going of the goer. If you think this―and you think that something other than that goes―then: TaN-R,

]uÈ-T-CE-C…c-]uÈ-RÈ_-UEÈP, ,N‰-`c-CZP-R-N‰-]uÈ-U…P, He becomes a goer by that going But (a goer) different from that does not go [2/23ab]

,]uÈ-T-CE-NE-úP-P-VË-v-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-UEÈP-R-N‰-`c-CZP-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-Ê-]uÈ-T-RÈ-N‰- ]uÈ-T_-q‰N-R-U-^…P-PÈ, ,F…]Ã-p…_-Z‰-P, Caitra becomes a goer by possessing that going, but a going or goer different from that does not go. Why?

CE-p…_-]uÈ-RÈ-CF…C-R“-`, ,]uÈ-T-CI…c-c“-U…-]MN-NÈ, For reason that two goings Are untenable for a single goer. [2/23cd]

,CE-C…-p…_-]uÈ-T-RÈ-CF…C-R“-`-CE-C…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-Z‰c-q-T_-UEÈP-R-NE-]uÈ-RÈ_-nŸ_-Pc-CE- ]uÈ-T_-]nŸ_-T]Ã-]uÈ-T-CI…c-U…-]MN-R-N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-`c-CZP-R]Ã-]uÈ-T-Ê-]uÈ-T-RÈ-]uÈ-T_-q‰N-R-U-^…P-PÈ,, N‰c-P-WÀC-µ]È, ,q-T-q‰N-NÈ-Z‰c-q-T-Ê-`P-TKT-R-^…P-PÈ, For reason that two goings―that by which one becomes “a goer” and that which comes to go having become a goer―are untenable for a single goer.87 Therefore, a going other than those is also not a goer that engages in going. Thus these words are stated. Also this answer 86 Gendün Drup explains verse 22 as follows [8a]: “Opponent: The former error does not exist because going is posited due to the action of positing the goer. Response: By (that action of) going he becomes a goer. That going is not the going of that goer for the reason that―prior to the action of someone (like) Devadatta going somewhere (such as) that place―there is no goer.” 87 Gendün Drup explains verse 23 as follows [8a]: “That goer who becomes a goer by that (action of) going, but one different from that, does not engage in going, because for reason that two goings are untenable for a single goer.


may be applied to “one who engages in action”. ,]N…_-µc-R, ]uÈ-T-RÈ]Ã-TuÈN-R_-q-T-uÈE-NE-uÈE-m‰_-`-cÈCc-R-^ÈN-R-U-^…P-PU, Here someone may assert: Doesn’t the destination of travel of the goer―such as a town or city―exist? TaN-R, N‰-`-P…-`P-TKT-\…P-K‰, uÈE-NE-uÈE-m‰_-`-Tå‰P-Pc, F…-N‰-uÈE-Oÿ-cÈE-T-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN- NU-U-cÈE-T-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-NU-TCÈU-R-`-]uÈ-T-^ÈN-F‰c-TcUc-\…P-Rc-N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-P…-n…-P]È, Response: The answer has already been given to this. But in relation to the town―what going exists where one has gone, what going exists where one has not gone, what going exists where one walks―has already been considered. Therefore, because of that, (your question is based on) flawed logic. 2. Collectively refuting action in terms of its object and agent

,Ê-CZP-Ê-,

]uÈ-RÈ-^…P-R_-nŸ_-R-P…, ,]uÈ-éU-Cc“U-Oÿ-]uÈ-U…-q‰N, ,U-^…P-R_-P…-nŸ_-N‰-Ê-, ,]uÈ-éU-Cc“U-Oÿ-]uÈ-U…-q‰N, , …̂P-NE-U-^…P-nŸ_-R-Ê-, ,]uÈ-éU-Cc“U-Oÿ-]uÈ-U…-q‰N, ,N‰-p…_-]uÈ-NE-]uÈ-RÈ-NE-, ,TuÈN-R_-q-T]E-^ÈN-U-^…P, That which is the goer Does not go in any of the three ways of going. That which is not the goer Does not go in any of the three ways of going. [2/24] That which is and is not (the goer) Does not go in any of the three ways of going.

2. Brief conclusion

Because of that going, the goer, and also The destination of travel does not exist. [2/25]

,]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R_-nŸ_-T-Z‰c-q-T-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-CE-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-R]È, ,N‰-U-^…P-R_-nŸ_-R-Ê- Z‰c-q-T-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-CE-]uÈ-T-NE-{`-T]È, ,^…P-R- [174b] NE-U-^…P-R_-nŸ_-R-Ê-Z‰c-q-T-P…-]uÈ-T-RÈ-CE-]uÈ-T-NE-úP-R-Ê-^…P-`-]uÈ-T-NE-{`-T-Ê-^…P-R]È, ,]uÈ-Z‰c-q-T-P…-TuÈN-R_-q-T]Ã-M-WÀC-CÈ, ,éU-Cc“U-Oÿ-Z‰c-q-T-P…-cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T-NE-TCÈU-R_-_È,


In stating “that which is the goer” what goer possesses going? In stating “that which is the nongoer” what goer lacks going? In stating “that which is the goer and nongoer” what goer possesses going as well as lacks going? “Going” is an equivalent term to “the destination of travel”. “In three ways” refers to where one has gone, where one has not gone, and where one walks. ,N‰]Ã-p…_-N‰-õ_-Ê-NC-R]Ã-ä‰-c“-]{E-T]Ã-ÉÈc-^ÈEc-c“-TåCc-P, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R_-nŸ_-R-P…- TuÈN-R_-q-T-éU-R-Cc“U-Oÿ-]uÈ-T_-U…-q‰N-`, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-U-^…P-R_-nŸ_-R-Ê-TuÈN-R_-q-T- éU-R-Cc“U-Oÿ-]uÈ-T_-U…-q‰N-F…E-, ]uÈ-T-RÈ-^…P-R-NE-U-^…P-R_-nŸ_-T-Ê-TuÈN-R_-q-T-éU-R-Cc“U-Oÿ-]uÈ-T_-U…-q‰N-R-N‰]Ã-p…_-]uÈ-T-NE-]uÈ-T-RÈ-NE-TuÈN-R_-q-T-U‰N-NÈ, Therefore, in that way, if one thoroughly investigates this with a mind pursuing the correct description, that which is the goer does not go in any of the three ways of travel. That which is the not the goer does not go in any of the three ways of travel.88 That which is the goer and nongoer does not go in any of the three ways of travel. Because of that there is no going, goer, nor destination of travel.89 ,q-T-éUc-l…-PE-P-]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-CVÍ-TÈ-^…P-Rc, ]uÈ-T]Ã-q-T-^ÈEc-c“-TåCc-K‰, H…-õ_-]uÈ-T-U…-]MN-R_-_T-Lfi-±„T-R-N‰-TZ…P-Oÿ-q-T-MUc-FN-lE-U…-]MN-R_-u⁄T-TÈ, ,cÈE-T-NE-U-cÈE-T- NE-TCÈU-R-TåC-R-Z‰c-q-T-§‰-_T-Lfi-q‰N-R-CI…c-R]È,, From among actions, since the act of going is the main one, the act of going should be fully investigated. Just as going is fully established as untenable, so too all other actions are established as untenable. This is the second chapter called the Investigation of Coming and Going.

88 Gendün Drup explains verse 24 as follows [8a]: “Take that which is the goer; it does not inherently go because it does not inherently go in any of the three ways of the path of going. Take that which is not the goer; it does not go because it does not go in any of the three ways of the path of going.” 89 Gendün Drup explains verse 25 as follows [8a]: “Also that which is and is not a goer does not go in any of the three ways of path of going because that is impossible. Take going, the goer, and also the destination of travel; they do not inherently exist because if analyzed, they are not found.

buddhapalitavritti chapters 1 and 2

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