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Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist? Doctrinal Tensions in the rml Stra: An Early

Tathgatagarbha TextAuthor(s): Richard KingSource: Numen, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-20Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3270277Accessed: 23/02/2009 14:09

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IS "BUDDHA-NATURE" BUDDHIST?DOCTRINAL TENSIONS IN THE SRIMALA SUTRA-

AN EARLY TATHAGATAGARBHA TEXTRICHARDKING

SummaryRecent controversies in Japanese Buddhist scholarship have focused upon theMahayana notion of a "Buddha nature" within all sentient beings and whetheror not the concept is compatible with traditional Buddhist teachings such as andt-

man (no-abiding-self). This controversy is not only relevant to Far Eastern Bud-dhism, for which the notion of a Buddha-nature is a central doctrinal theme, butalso for the roots of this tradition in those Indian Mahayana sutras which utilisedthe notion of tathagatagarbha Buddha-embryo or Buddha womb). One of theearliest Buddhist texts to discuss this notion is the Queen Srimald Sutra(Srimdladevlsttra), which appears to display a transitional and revisionist attitudetowards traditional Mahayana doctrines such as emptiness (su-nyatd) and no-abiding-self (anatman). These and related issues are examined as they occur in theSrimald Sutra and as they might relate to the issue of the place of Buddha-naturethought within the Buddhist tradition. Finally some concluding remarks are madeabout the quest for "true" Buddhism.Introduction

In a recent article in NUMEN Paul Swanson has outlined someof the contemporary academic issues surrounding the status of theZen tradition within Buddhism as a whole.' Many of these issuesfocus upon the question of whether Zen and its understanding of"Buddha-nature" is in fact compatible with basic Buddhist ideassuch as andtman(no-abiding-self). The roots of this controversy, ofcourse, go much further back than even the Zen tradition itself andcan be discerned (at least implicitly) in those Indian Mahayanatexts which utilise the notion of a tathagatagarbha.2 he issue of thestatus of this teaching within the Buddhist tradition never reallyattained significant prominence in this relatively early period of theMahayana's history mainly because what might loosely be calledthe "tathdgatagarbha" trand of Indian Buddhism did not developalong scholastic lines, being, on the whole, assimilated by thedeveloping Yogacara system of thought. Despite this, there remainsclear evidence of a tension in Indian Mahayana with regard to theNUMEN, Vol. 42 (1995) ? E.J. Brill, Leiden


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RichardKingimplications of the tathagatagarbhadea for basic Buddhist teachings.In this paper I intend to examine such tensions in the light of thetext known as the "Lion 's Roar of Queen Srzmdlad(Srzmdlddevisirmhanddd-suitra),ne of the earliest sources for the con-cept of "Buddha-nature" in Indian Mahayana.As is well known, the term tathagatagarbhaas a double meaning.It can either denote the "Buddha-seed," or "Buddha-embryo" orcan be rendered as "Buddha-womb". The term 'garbha' (fromgrabh:'to conceive') originally seems to have denoted a 'womb,' butit soon came to refer to the interior of anything. The term was alsoused to denote a 'foetus' or 'embryo'.3 As such the compound'tathagatagarbha' as generally been translated as 'embryo', 'seed','womb', or 'matrix' of the Tathagata.4 Jikido Takasaki5 favoursthe translation 'matrix of the Tathagata', but has been criticised byBrian Brown6 who finds the implications of a 'container'misleading, preferring those translations which emphasise thetathagatagarbhas an embryonic seed. Note, however, that in one ofthe earliest texts to utilise the term, the Srimdld Sutra, that thetathagatagarbhas said to be not empty (asuinya) n so far as "it con-tains inconceivable Dharmas more numerous then the sands of theGanges."7 This suggests that the tathagatagarbha ould in fact beused to denote a container of pure buddha-dharmas.Earlier in thesame text, however, we find the statement that the dharmakdyaf theTathagata is "free from the shell of defilements" (avinir-muktaklesakosa).This is a clear indication that it was the defilementsthat were seen as impure "shells" (kosa) essentially separate frombut containing the innumerable buddha-dharmas,which either con-stituted the tathagatagarbhatself or were themselves 'contained'within it.8 Generally speaking, however, it seems that the under-standing of tathagatagarbhas a "Buddha-womb" only really cameto the fore in the East Asian Buddhist context. Nevertheless, theIndian texts do exploit the ambiguity of the term when it suits theirpurposes.The SrmadldSutraremains one of the primary Indian sources oftathagatagarbhahought.9 Although dating the text is problematic,the Srimdlapresupposes the doctrine of the two bodies of the Bud-dha (riupa-kdya nd dharma-kdya),as found in the Astasdhasrikdandother early Prajfiaparamita sztras, and so, as Wayman suggests,

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Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist?probably cannot be placed earlier than the second century CE. Thetext shows no awareness of the AvatamsakaSutra's (c. 200-400) doc-trine of the three bodies of the Buddha, and must pre-date (at leastsections of) the Lankdvatdra utrawhich quotes the Srzmdld.The firstChinese translation of the Sutra(now lost) was carried out by Dhar-maksema in the early part of the fourth century CE. Wayman andWayman draw attention to the text's continual reference to the"good sons and daughters" of the congregation, implyingpatronage by men and women of high social rank. This leads themto "tentatively place the composition of the Srimdld within theIkshvaku rule of the third century A.D." They also suggest that thetext may derive from the Mahasafighikas of Southern India.10The Srzmdld uitras in many respects a remarkable text, the mostimmediately striking feature being its dynamic conception of thetathdgatagarbha.t is the position of the Srimdld hat the tathdgatagarbhais the base (asraya, nisraya), support (adhara) and foundation(pratistha)of all constructed phenomena (samskrta)."1As such, it isunborn and undying, and excludes the "constructed realm" fromitself. It is permanent (anitya), steadfast (dharma), and eternal(sasvata) and yet is not to be mistaken for a personal self.

World-Honored One, the Tathagata-embryo is not a self, a personal identity,a being, or a life. The Tathagata-embryo is not in the domain of sentientbeings who believe in a real self, whose thinking is confused, or who clingto the view of emptiness.12

The Srzmdld learly wishes to align itself with the traditional Bud-dhist emphasis upon no-abiding-self (andtman), however, the textalso attributes qualites such as permanence and eternality to thetathagatagarbha.Thus Srimdldcontinues that

If a sentient being, out of faith in the Tathagata, regards the Tathagata aspermanent, joyous, pure, and possessing a self, he does not see [theTathagata] wrongly; he sees him correctly. Why? Because the Dharma-Body(dharmakdya)of the Tathagata is the perfection (pdramitd)of permanence, theperfection of joy, the perfection of self, and the perfection of purity.13How are we to reconcile this statement with the traditional Bud-

dhist emphasis upon unsatisfactoriness (duhkha), impermanence(anitya) and no-abiding-self (andtman,) as the three marks ofexistence (trilaksana)? To attempt to answer this question it isnecessary to consider the general orientation of the Srimdld Suttratowards the Buddhist tradition as a whole.

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RichardKingThe Importanceof Faith in the SrzmalaSzitra

According to the Srimala, the tathdgatagarbhas profound and sub-tle and in order to explain it the Buddha taught the four nobletruths. This immediately establishes the concept of tathdgatagarbhasthecentral teaching of Buddhism. The profundity of the concept of'Buddha-nature' (which I shall use as a rough synonym for'tathdgatagarbha'hroughout this paper) entails that a correct under-standing of the import of the noble truths and of the tathagatagarbhais only possible for a fully enlightened being since both teachingsare "beyond the scope (visaya) of the 'disciples' (srdvakas)and the'solitary-buddhas' (pratyekabuddhas),"i.e. the non-Mahayana Bud-dhists). Both the four noble truths and the tathdgatagarbha re"beyond the realm of thought and speculation, and transcend thecredence of the world." 14 Thus the Srfmaldmaintains that "thetathdgatagarbha as never been seen or realized by any SravakaorPratyekabuddha. 5

According to the Srimald,all unenlightened followers of the Bud-dha must accept the existence of the tathdgatagarbhan faith (sraddhd)alone, true knowledge being reserved for the truly enlightened.'6The exhortation to accept tathdgatagarbhaoctrines on faith aloneamounts to a rejection of the very possibility of 'proving' thetathdgatagarbhahrough logical arguments, (the tathdgatagarbhaeing"beyond logic").17 This attitude alone may have been responsiblefor the fact that the tathdgatagarbhatrand within Indian Mahayananever developed into a distinctive philosophical school of its own,nor drew much attention from scholastic texts which clearly post-date it.18 Such a conception of the Mahayana path is itself an off-shoot of the Prajfiaparamita texts where one finds a constantsubversion of the very possibility of philosophical speculation inanything other than a purely conventional and pragmatic sense.Nevertheless, the exclusive emphasis upon faith would have beenunsatisfactory to the Abhidharma scholasts for whom philosophicalexposition and the discrimination of dharmas(dharma-pravicaya) erethe means for establishing wisdom (prajad)and a fundamental pre-requisite for the salvation of all beings. The Mahayana scholasts,whilst not accepting the efficacy of the Abhidharma taxonomy,nevertheless saw enlightenment in terms of a non-discursive insight

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Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist?(prajad) into the selflessness of those same dharmas. From thisperspective, faith (sraddhd) s not enough, being only a preliminarystage on the path. The final goal was the 'perfection of wisdom'(prajndpdramitd)19

The Srfmdld'sReformulationof the Four Noble TruthsThe perpetuation of samsdra s explained in the Sramdldn termsof a two-tier system of defilements. Firstly, we have the activedefilements, which correspond to lust, hatred and confusion. Theseare momentary and arise in association with the conscious mind

(i.e. we are consciously aware of them). Secondly, there is a moredeeply entrenched layer of essentially static defilements whichunderlie the manifestation of the active defilements. This deeperlevel of defilement is classified into four sub-categories by theSrimdld,each corresponding to one of the fourfold division of grasp-ping (updddna),the ninth member of the pratZtyasamutpddacheme,as understood by the Abhidharma schools.20 These four subdivi-sions are:(1) d.sti-updddna:ttachment to any of the sixty-two views outlined in the Brahma-jala Sutra,(2) kdma-updddna:ttachment to pleasure (i.e., the five sense-objects),(3) silavrata-updddna:ttachment to useless vows and rules, (in the Srzmdla, ow-ever, (3) has been substituted by rupa-updddna,ttachment to form),(4) dtmabhdva-upddana:ttachment to existence.

Nevertheless, these four defilements are the underlying basis forthe arising of the active defilements of lust, hatred and confusion.These active defilements are associated with consciousness to con-trast them with the underlying static defilements which are clearlytheir unconscious, conditioning factors. In fact the Srimdlddeclaresthat all defilements (both active and static) are based upon anunderlying defilement of ignorance, which "never arises in associa-tion with the conscious mind from beginningless time."21 Thus,ignorance is a latent factor in our experience and one of which weare not consciously aware. It is the fundamental defilement in thatall other defilements are causally dependent upon it.22The purpose of the Srfmdld'sanalysis is to point to ignorance asthe underlying defilement which obscures the dharmakdyaand

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RichardKingperpetuates our continued rebirth (samsara). This is reminiscent ofthe earlier statement that the tathagatagarbhas the support of sam-sara. However, the question of the relationship between thetathadgatagarbhas the seed of future enlightenment, and ignoranceas the seed of future samsaric activity is never properly addressedin the Srfndld. The important point to note is that theunenlightened srdvakasand pratyekabuddhasnly eliminate the fourunderlying roots of attachment (updddna)and so are still under thesway of the underlying defilement of ignorance, which can only beeradicated by a Tathagata.23The inferior vehicles of the srdvakaand the prateyekabuddha,y vir-tue of their status as such, can only attain a partial nirvana.24 Thisis because they are "directed toward the nirvdnarealm"25 since theycontinue to meditate upon suffering, its source, its cessation, andthe means to that cessation, (i.e. the four noble truths), rather thanrealizing nirvadnatself. Here we seem to find evidence of a move-ment away from the traditional Buddhist emphasis upon duhkha.Instark contrast,

Those who search all suffering, who eliminate all sources of suffering, whorealize directly the cessation of suffering, and who cultivate all the pathsleading to the cessation of suffering attain the permanent, calm and cooledNirvana in the world destroyed by impermanence and ever sick, and becomethe protection and refuge of the world in a world without protection and with-out refuge.26

The Srimdldre-works the traditional scheme of the Four NobleTruths within a new framework which allows for two levels ofunderstanding their import. These levels are described as the con-structed (krta) and the unconstructed (akrta) explanations of theNoble Truths. Aligned with this there are also said to be two levelsof samsaric and nirvanic attainment: the constructed (samskrta) am-sara and nirvana and the unconstructed (asamskrta)samsara andnirvana.

According to this scheme, the srdvakasand pratyekabuddhasim fora refuge nirvana, while the truly enlightened being needs no refugesince "the refuge [itself] does not seek a refuge."27 Of course, itbecomes a central theme of the Mahayana that the bodhisattva doesnot reside in a quiescent nirvanabut in fact remains active withinsamsdra.Thus, one could say that the bodhisattva is in samsarawith-

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Is "Buddha-Nature"Buddhist?out being a part of it. Perhaps the development of a theory of twotypes of bondage and liberation was inspired by attempts to dif-ferentiate between enlightened and unenlightened experiences ofsamsara and nirvana. Thus a fully enlightened being, rather thanrenouncing the world of suffering and entering a nirvanaof refuge,would remain active and unsupported in the nirvana of no fixedabode (apratistha nirvana). The Mahdydnasamgrdhadescribes suchattainment in the following manner:

When one had produced the knowledge of the identity (samatdjinna) of samsdraand nirvdna, then, for this reason samsara becomes nirvadna.Consequently, oneneither abandons (tyajati) nor maintains sarmsara,one neither obtains (prdpt-notl) nor fails [to obtain] nirvana.28The Srimald s close to this position since it also declares that nirvanais attained by those "whose knowledge is equal."29As we have seen, according to the Srimdldthe scheme of the fournoble truths was taught by the Buddha in order to explain the pro-found subtlety of the tathdgatagarbhaoctrine. The constructed (krta)noble truths present the exoteric and superficial meaning of thescheme, being taught for the srdvakas and pratyekabuddhaswhose

understanding is of a limited sense because of their dependenceupon another.30 In direct contrast to this, however, theunconstructed understanding of the noble truths is taught withoutany limitations since it does not presuppose the need for a refuge.This, maintains the Srimald,is the only way to truly understand anderadicate suffering since it is not dependent upon another and is thetrue meaning of the noble truths scheme. In effect, the Srimaldexpounds a theory of eight noble truths, four constructed andlimited and four unconstructed and definitive.31

The Srimdld further declares that "cessation of suffering" (i.e.the third noble truth) does not in actual fact entail the destructionof anything since it is only a name for the dharmakayaof theTathagata. Thus it has

no beginning, no action, no origination, and no end; it is ever abiding,immovable, intrinsically pure and free from the shell (kosa) ofdefilements...when this Dharma-body (dharmakdya) is not apart fromdefilements, it is called the tathdgatagarbha.32This is the closest the Srzmdld comes to identifying the

Tathagata's dharmakayawith the tathdgatagarbha.However, the

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RichardKingprecise relationship between the two is never clearly specified in thistext. As we have seen, the text denies that the tathdgatagarbhas a selfand yet accepts the description of the dharmakdyas the 'perfectionof self' (atmaparamitd). The matter is left open for later works(namely the Ratnagotravibhagasastran particular) to discuss morefully. One should note however what appears to be a tacit accept-ance of the validity of dtmanterminology with regard to the dhar-makdya.This in itself seems to herald a radical departure given thephilosophical, historical and symbolical importance of the notion ofno-abiding-self (andtman)within Indian Buddhism in general.The Srimdldcontinues with the remarkable statement that, of thefour noble truths, only the truth of cessation is true in the ultimatesense.

Lord, of those four noble truths, three truths are impermanent, and onetruth is permanent. Why? The three truths [of suffering, the cause of suffer-ing, and the path leading to the cessation of suffering] belong to the realmof conditioned dharmas. What is conditioned is impermanent, and what isimpermanent is destructible. What is destructible is not true, not permanent,and not a refuge. Therefore, in the ultimate sense, the three noble truths arenot true, not permanent, and not a refuge.World-Honored One, the noble truth of the cessation of suffering isbeyond the realm of conditioned dharmas. What is beyond the realm of condi-tioned dharmas is ever abiding by nature. What is ever abiding by nature isindestructible. What is indestructible is true, permanent, and a refuge. Forthis reason World-Honored One, the noble truth of the cessation of sufferingis in the ultimate sense true, permanent, and a refuge.World-Honored One, this noble truth of the cessation of suffering isinconceivable.33

Given that the Srimdldhas already identified the "truth of cessa-tion" with the dharmakdya, his amounts to a declaration of the solereality of the dharmakdyaof the Tathagata. All other factors(dharmas) are compounded (samskrta) and thus, according to theSrimdld's arguments, ultimately unreal. This is a remarkabledeclaration for a Buddhist text to make for its appears to fly in theface of all empirical attempts to classify and analyse the contents ofexperience, an endeavour carried out with some vigour by theAbhidharma schools and continued to a larse extent by"mainstream" Mahayana. The implication of the Srimdldanalysisappears to be a denial of the reality of all constructed phenomena(samskrtadharma),a position which clearly distinguishes it from boththe Abhidharma and the Mahayana philosophical schools. The Sar-

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Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist?vastivada Abhidharma, for instance, postulated the real existenceof such dharmas, whilst in the Mahayana schools all dharmasareempty, not just samskrtadharmas.34Nevertheless, undeterred by the apparent philosophical conse-quences of this position, the Srimdldmaintains that the tathdgatagar-bha is the base (asraya, nisraya), support (adhdra) and foundation(pratistha)of all constructed natures (samskrta),a substrative positionreminiscent of the Vedanta schools.35 This view is propoundeddespite the fact that on the Srimdld'sown premises the constructedelements (samskrta)do not ultimately exist. Perhaps this explains theSrimdld's assertion that the tathdgatagarbhas unborn and undying,and in fact excludes the "constructed realm" from itself. Never-theless, one hardly need mention the similarity between this modeof expression and the absolutism of the Advaita Vedanta school. Inboth cases the subjacent ground (tathdgatagarbha: Brahman) sup-ports a constructed realm which in actual fact does not ultimatelyexist. Such a position, whilst more amenable to the Yogacarasystem of thought (which postulates the alayavij'nna as the base ofexperience),36 does not fit easily with the "mainstream" Buddhistrejection of a subjacent ground of existence. Indeed, whether asubstrative metaphysics can be maintained, given the unreality ofthat which is supported, is a moot point philosophically!DoctrinalInnovation n the SrimaldStutra:TheReformulation f MahayanaTeachings

The denial of the ultimate reality of the constructed when con-joined with an assertion of the ultimate reality of the unconstructed(asamskrta,i.e. the dharmakdya)s a clear movement away from theMadhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (su-nyatd-vdda),which points tothe lack of an abiding-self of all dharmas (dharma-nairdtmya).Thatthe Srimalddoes not understand emptiness and no-abiding-self inthe same manner as the Madhyamaka can be gleaned from thefollowing qualification:

Lord, the tathagatagarbhas void of all the defilement stores, which are discreteand knowing as not liberated [or 'apart from knowledge that does not leadto liberation'].37 Lord, the tathagatagarbha s not void of the Buddhadharmaswhich are nondiscrete, inconceivable, more numerous than the sands of theGanges, and knowing as liberated.38

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RichardKingEmptiness is understood here in a more characteristically

Yogacaran sense as the emptiness of one thing within another (i.e.of the form 'x is empty of y' rather than in the Madhyamaka senseof 'x is empty of x-ness'). Thus the tathdgatagarbha, s support orsubstratum for the manifestation of samskrtadharmas, is devoid ofthem. Of course this must necessarily be the case if the tathdgatagar-bha is real and the samskrtadharmasare not. Nevertheless, one muststill resist the temptation of ascribing self-hood to the tathdgatagar-bha, argues the text, for this is an extreme view as are the views of"those who cling to the view of emptiness."39

Lord, this tathdgatagarbha s the embryo [Chang: 'store'] of the IllustriousDharmadhdtu, the embryo of the dharmakdya, the embryo of supramundanedharma, the embryo of the intrinsic pure dharma.40The tathdgatagarbhaeems to be a dynamic and developmental

reality in the Srzmdldand thus cannot constitute a persisting or per-sonal self. It is intrinsically pure (being the embryo of the dhar-makdya), but is nevertheless contaminated by adventitiousdefilements (agantuka klesa). For this reason it is described as thebase, support and foundation of enlightenment wisdom and of theconstructed dharmasof the samsaric world. Presumably the adven-titious defilements correspond to a large extent to the constructeddharmas,which are manifested with the tathdgatagarbhas their basis(asraya) and yet remain separate from and extrinsic (agantuka)to it.As such these defilements are ultimately unreal and so cannot con-taminate the intrinsically pure mind. The Srzmdld,however, seemsunaware of this way out of the problem and defends innate purityon the basis of the argument it elucidated earlier in the text viz. thatthe mind, as a momentary and fluctuating continuum, cannot becontaminated by defilements since it does not persist for longenough to come into contact with them. According to the Srzmdld,the momentary mind cannot 'hold' experiences and so thetathdgatagarbhas needed to account for the aversion to suffering andthe aspiration to liberation.

TextualAmbiguitiesand DoctrinalAmbivalence n the SrzmdldSutraPhilosophical ambiguities and ambivalence towards certain

traditional Buddhist doctrines and practices reflect the transitional

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Is "Buddha-Nature"Buddhist?nature of the Srmadla nd the fact that the author of the Siitra seemsunaware or perhaps unwilling to draw certain philosophical conse-quences from the text's basic position. Notably, there is no develop-ment of the Srzmdld'snotion that what is constructed (samskrta)doesnot really exist. Perhaps this stems from the possibility that theinitial impetus behind the tathdgatagarbha trand within IndianMahayana may have been a dissatisfaction with the Madhyamakaexplanation of the truth of suffering in terms of the universality ofemptiness. If everything lacks inherent existence what then is thestatus of the first noble truth? This is a question posed and thendismissed by Nagarjuna in chapter 24 of his Muila-Madhyamaka-kdrikd, yet the question seems to have remained amongst thoseMahayanists who remained unhappy about the apparentlynihilistic implications of sunyata as understood by theMadhyamikas. In the Srzmdldwe can discern an attempt to qualifythe universality of emptiness. However, as we have seen, thisqualification still seems to amount to a denial of the reality of theconstructed. This too might easily be taken to lead to the unfor-tunate conclusion that suffering is not a reality.What the Srzmdldencounters here is what might be called the'problem of soteriology'. Theodicy is any attempt to account for theexistence of evil and suffering in a world created by a benevolentgod. Conversely the 'problem of soteriology' is one of accountingfor the need for liberation given that there is in fact no real suffer-ing. This problem develops because of the Srzmdld's nsistence thatthe factors of the constructed realm (specifically the first, secondand fourth noble truths) do not ultimately exist because they areimpermanent (anitya) and lacking in self (andtman).Gunabhadra's recension of the text (Taisho 353, p. 222) declaresthat the view that "all constructions are impermanent'41 is theextreme view of nihilism while the view that nirvana is permanentis the extreme of eternalism. This appears to contradict the positionstated earlier in the Srzmald hat 'what is constructed is imperma-nent, and what is impermanent is illusory' and the conclusionsdrawn from that position, namely that the truths of suffering, thecause of suffering, and the path leading to its cessation are in factthemselves impermanent and illusory.42

Three possibilities remain. Firstly, Gunabhadra or some earlier

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RichardKingredactor may simply have misunderstood the section involved oredited it so as to conform to a certain doctrinal position. That thisis likely is shown by the fact that other translations of the text intoChinese differ as to the precise nature of the two extreme views.Thus, according to Chang's translation, based not uponGunabhadra's edition but on Bodhiruci's, the text states that:

World-Honored One, if one sees samsdra as impermanent and nirvanaas per-manent, his view is neither nihilistic nor eternalistic, but is the right view.43However, Chang notes that "Gunabhadra's version seems deeperin meaning".44 This may be so, but it also appears to be moreincomprehensible when related to the general position of the text.Secondly, the problem may reflect the fact that the author(s) ofthe Srimdldwere unaware of the apparent contradictions within thetext, or that she or he45 was unwilling to draw certain conclusionsabout the unreality of suffering and samsaric existence from itsbasic premises. This would explain the denigration of what appearto be the text's own position as an extreme view, perhaps in anattempt to deflect criticism deriving from Buddhist scholasts. Onecould also argue that the inconsistency is intended to be a paradoxbased upon the idea that the tathdgatagarbhas unthinkable andbeyond logic (atarka).46This interpretation would fit in with theSrimald'sbasic emphasis upon the layperson and the importance offaith rather than the philosophical exercise of scholastic precision.In fact the SrzmaldSztra concludes with the Buddha praising the layQueen Srimala and declaring that:

Srimala, there are two things difficult to understand. What are the two?First, the intrinsically pure mind; second, the contamination of this mindwith defilements. Only you and those Bodhisattvas who have already accom-plished the great Dharma can accept these two things upon hearing of them.The sravakas can understand them only through faith.47Finally, it may be the case that the author of the Srimaldis farmore philosophically subtle than we have been giving her(?) creditfor, and that she is aware of the discrepancy between the declara-tion of the impermanence of the constructed and the subsequentdenial of this view as extreme. If such is the case, the original inten-tion behind the establishment of an unconstructed samsdraand a

constructed nirvanamay have been to allow for the existence of an(unconstructed) samsara, having denied the reality of the con-

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Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist?structed. Perhaps this was felt to be the only way that the text couldmaintain the reality of suffering, given its denial of all but the thirdnoble truth as final. Thus, whereas the construction, of the con-structed samsdraare impermanent, the statement that the construc-tions of the UNCONSTRUCTED samsaraare impermanent wouldbe an extreme view. Likewise, whereas the unconstructed nirvana spermanent, it would be wrong to state that the constructed nirvanawere equally so. However, it is by no means clear that this cir-cumvents the problem and the omission of the constructed-unconstructed qualification of these extreme views makes the posi-tion appear incomprehensible in its present form.

However we attempt to reconstruct the original intention of theauthor the establishment of an unconstructed samsara and a con-structed nirvanaflies in the face of the accepted Buddhist scholastictradition, inherited from the Abhidharma, for which samsarais therealm of impermanent and constructed dharmas(samskrtadharmas,with the exception, in the case of the Vaibhasikas, of dkdsawhichis asamskrta)and nirvanais a permanent and unconstructed dharma(an asamskrtadharma, and in the case of the Theravada, the onlyasamskrtadharma).As we have seen, the Srimdil left certain fundamental questionsabout the nature of the tathdgatagarbhaargely unanswered. The textis unsure as to how one is to reconcile the notion of an intrinsicallypure mind with the existence of defilements. The text is also unableto deal with the problem of the relationship between the tathdgatagar-bha's twin functions as the store of the pure buddha-dharmasn theone hand and as the support of the constructed world on the other;nor is its relationship with ignorance ever clarified, both being des-cribed as the source of the world's manifestation.

Such problems were new philosophical obstacles for the IndianMahayanists to deal with and highlight the fundamental paradigmshift that was occuring within certain Mahayana circles. For theMadhyamaka and classical Yogacara schools the question of therelationship between the mind and the factors which defiled it wassomething of a pseudo-problem since both consciousness (vijn'na)and defilement (kleda)were fundamentally empty and so ultimatelywithout basis. The problem arose, however, with the acceptance ofthe notion of the tathdgatagarbhand its association with the notion

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RichardKingof a luminous (and intrinsically undefiled) mind. Since the Srnmaladoes not seem to have accepted either the mainstreamMadhyamaka conception of universal emptiness nor the Yogacaraposition that the mind (citta) and its concomitant factors (caittas)were basically one and the same phenomenon (i.e., just-mind, citta-mdtra),the problem of the relationship between an undefiled mindand its apparent defilement remains to be resolved.For the author of the Srfmaldthe reality of an intrinsically puremind was a basic presupposition, grounded as it was in a firm beliefin the possibility of salvation and a religious orientation toward thespiritual catharsis of (apparently) defiled consciousness. As such themajor philosophical concern of the text is the attempt to delineatethe relationship between an ultimate reality (viz, the intrinsicallypure mind or dharmakdya)and a conventional reality (the con-structed factors or samskrtadharmasand the adventitious defilementsor dgantukaklesa).What is surprising, however, is that the Srzmalddoes not fall backupon the two truth schemes to reduce the question of the relation-ship between the pure mind and its defilements to that of a pseudo-problem. The Srmadld ould have argued that the two can never betruly related, being 'existent' in fundamentally different senses.Perhaps this reflects the fact that the Srimald is a relatively earlytathdgatagarbhaext and as such is either unaware or unwilling tocome to terms with some of the trickier philosophical aspects of itsbasic position (or perhaps it reflects the possibility that the Srnmadlddid not wholeheartedly endorse the notion of an 'intrinsically puremind' in quite the manner that we have been suggesting.)

The TransitionalNature of MahajydnaDoctrines in the SrimaldSzitraThe emphasis upon the tathdgatagarbha s an embryonic and

"processive" factor, (not to be mistaken for a personal self despiteits permanent and indestructible nature,) when combined with thetext's recourse to the doctrine of the momentariness of con-sciousness, suggests that the Srfmaldwas unwilling to move in thedirection of a fully blown absolutism based upon the sole reality ofthe dharmakdya.This can be contrasted with the more straight-forwardly revisionist use of the term dtman to refer to the

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Is "Buddha-Nature"Buddhist?tathdgatagarbha n the MahdparinirvanaSuitra. Paul Williams forinstance has suggested that,

The Mahdparinirvadna utra teaches a really existing, permanent element(Tibetan: yang dag khams) in sentient beings. It is this element which enablessentient beings to become Buddhas. It is beyond egoistic self-grasping-indeed the very opposite of self-grasping-but it otherwise fulfils several ofthe requirements of a Self in the Indian tradition. Whether this is called theReal, True Transcendental Self or not is immaterial, but what is historicallyinteresting is that this sitra in particular (although joined by some otherTathagatagarbha suitras)s prepared to use the word 'Self (atman) for this ele-ment. However one looks at it the Mahdparinirvana Satra is quite self-consciously modifying or criticising the no-Self traditions of Buddhism.48

The Srznmaldztra, however, appears to be more of a transitionaltext than the Mahdparinirvana utra, displaying many of the featureswhich were to become more explicit in later Buddhist works.Notable, however, is a shift in perspective away from the univer-sality of emptiness as expounded in the Madhyamaka and classicalYogacara schools. This transitional position, however, leaves cer-tain doctrinal aspects of the text unresolved. The SrTmalduggeststhat the impermanent is illusory but then declares that the mind ismomentary and thus cannot be touched by defilements. Are we totake it that the tathdgatagarbhas something other than the intrin-sically pure mind? If not how is the tathdgatagarbhao remain thesupport (asraya), the holder (adhdra)and the foundation (pratistha)ofa world that it does not come into contact with?The Place of the Buddha-NatureDoctrine in Buddhism

In the debate concerning the meaning of the concept of Buddha-nature and its consequent status within the Buddhist tradition as awhole, emphasis has been placed upon the apparent postulation ofa permanent and abiding essence (svabhdva)within sentient beings.As Paul Swanson shows in his recent article in NUMEN (40: 115-149), this and related notions, in particular the Japanese notionthat all beings are "inherently enlightened" (Hongaku shiso,) havebeen criticised by a number ofJapanese scholars as "un-Buddhist"in that they appear to contradict basic Buddhist teachings such asthe universality of emptiness (sunyata), and the doctrines of no-abiding-self (andtman)and impermanence (anitya). As we have seen,doctrinal ambivalence with regard to the concept of 'Buddha-

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RichardKingnature' can be discerned in the earlier Indian Mahayana traditions.Within the Tibetan Mahayana context there is a comparabledispute surrounding the status of gzhan stong pa (other-emptiness),a doctrine upheld by the Jo naii pas, which has a number ofsimilarities to, and is to some degree dependent upon, the Srimdldconception of emptiness.49 Certainly the Sr?mdld isplays a numberof views which seem to reflect a major paradigm shift within earlyIndian Mahayana. The implications of this shift for Eastern Bud-dhism are enormous since the tathagatagarbha nd related notionsbecame increasingly important notions once Mahayana migratedbeyond its original Indian context.

To conclude, a number of related questions continue to puzzleme about the entire debate about the allegedly "un-Buddhist"status of the 'Buddha-nature' concept and other apparently 'new'teachings within Buddhism. What criteria are we to use in definingthe doctrinal parameters of a religious tradition? If the criterion iswhat the Buddha taught then this presents enormous problems inreconstructing so-called "original" Buddhism. This no doubtwould end up with the exclusion of much of what goes by the nameof Buddhism in all traditions. One suspects that much of this debateis labouring under the aegis of what Paul Williams has aptly calledthe "essentialist fallacy," that is the false belief that for a term like"Buddhism" to be meaningfully used one must be able to discernsome central feature, some universally accepted kernel of doctrineor practice which unites all Buddhist traditions together.50 As wehave seen, even if one restricts "true Buddhism" to those doctrinespresent in its original Indian context (a parochial tendency occa-sionally present in the work of scholars of Indian Buddhism andbeyond!), one still finds texts like the Srzmdld Sutra and theMahdparinirvdna itra, which use "un-Buddhist" terms like dtmantorefer to the Buddha-potential in all sentient-beings. Where do wedraw the line of demarcation which distinguishes the "Buddhist"from the "un-Buddhist"? Should we expect the diversity offollowers of a multifarious tradition such as Buddhism to expounda univocal position with regard to the nature of their religion?

"Buddhism," I suggest, is a polythetic concept, which, inWittgensteinian terms, denotes "a complicated network ofsimilarities overlapping and criss-crossing."51 Thus, attempts to

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Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist?define some essential core or central feature to "Buddhism" willinevitably result in narrowness and exclusion. Nevertheless, thisdoes not prevent the scholar from describing the various Buddhistmovements, beliefs and practices, even if a fixed definition of thesubject-matter is, strictly speaking, impossible. Indeed, if one isprepared to admit it, it would not be surprising to find that themajority of the world's Buddhists do not understand, let aloneuphold, 'cardinal' Buddhist beliefs such as the philosophical doc-trines of no-abiding-self (andtman) and dependent-co-origination(pratftyasamutpada)In essence (if you pardon the pun), I suppose my position is this.We may have some, albeit fragmentary, idea about the nature ofBuddhist doctrine in its origins, but do we have any right, insofaras we are speaking as scholars of Buddhism, to limit the scope ofdoctrinal innovation within a religion on the grounds that it cannotbe easily reconciled with what has gone before? Where is the locusof "true Buddhism"? Does it make sense to talk of "true" Bud-dhism? Is it even "unBuddhist" to talk in terms of a Buddhistorthodoxy?52 And finally, to quote the concluding question ofRichard Gombrich's PreceptandPractice,"voxpopuli vox Buddhae?"53Department of Religious Studies RICHARDKINGUniversity of StirlingStirling. Scotland. FK9 4LAUnited Kingdom

Paul L. Swanson (1993), "Zen is not Buddhism: Recent Japanese Critiquesof Buddha-Nature" in NUMEN 40: 115-149.2 Many interesting issues related to this notion in Indian and Eastern Bud-

dhism are discussed in Paul Griffiths and John P. Keenan (ed.), (1990), BuddhaNature:A Festschrift n HonorofMinoru Kiyota (Buddhist Books International, Tokyo,Japan).3 See Monier-Williams (1988), Sanskrit-English Dictionary, (Clarendon Press,Oxford), p. 349.4 For the various connotations of the term 'tathagatagarbha'see Ruegg (1969),La Theoriedu tathdgatagarbha t du Gotra, (Paris), pp. 499-513.5 See Takasaki (1966), A Study of the Ratnagotravibhdga.6 Brian Edward Brown (1991), The Buddha Nature: A Study of the 'Tathdgatagar-bha'and CAlayavijidna', (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), pp. 44-45.7 Translation in Chang (1983) (ed.), A TreasuryofMahdydna Sutras:SelectionsfromtheMaharatnakuta-SzitraPennsylvania State University Press), p. 378; cf. Wayman

and Wayman, The Lion's Roar of QueenSrimala, p. 99.

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18 RichardKing8 Clearly there is some confusion as to the precise meaning of the statement thatthe tathdgatagarbhas not empty of the buddha-dharmas.On the one hand this maymean that the tathagatagarbhas in fact identical to these buddha-dharmas,or alter-

natively it may mean that the tathdgatagarbhas 'not empty' in the sense that it con-tains those same buddha-dharmaswithin itself. The problem perhaps reflects thedesire of the authors of these texts to utilise aspects of both the 'container' and the'contained' notions of tathagatagarbha and their appropriate analogies), coupledwith an awareness that the tathagatagarbhas essentially beyond the limits of logicand rational discourse.9 Translation in Chang (1983), p. 378; cf. Wayman and Wayman, The Lion'sRoar of QueenSrnmdld,p. 99.10 See Wayman and Wayman, ibid., p. 2.1 Chang (1983), p. 380, and Wayman and Wayman, ibid., pp. 104-105.12 C. Chang (1983), p. 380, cf. Wayman and Wayman, p. 106.3 Trans. Chang (1983), p. 379; cf. Wayman and Wayman, p. 102.14 Chang (1983), p. 377; Wayman and Wayman, p. 96.5 Chang (1983), p. 379, cf. Wayman, p. 99.16 The appeal to faith is a great leveller since it effectively places the monasticscholar and the layperson in the same fundamental position of not knowing thetruth. Thus we find a stress upon the importance of the "good sons and daughtersof the true Dharma", many of whom, no doubt, were lay practitioners and anemphasis upon the unity of the Buddhist community via the doctrine of the onevehicle (ekayana). The srdvakaydnaand the pratyekabuddhayana re included withinthe Mahayana, which is said to be the 'Vehicle of the Buddha' (buddhaydna)."Thisbeing the case the three vehicles are one." (Chang [1983], p. 375, cf. Waymanand Wayman, p. 92.]17 This conclusion, drawing as it does from the Prajfinparamita attack uponlogical categories, is somewhat reminiscent of Tertullian's argument that Chris-tianity must be believed precisely because it is so unbelievable.

18 The idea that all Buddhists cannot know the truth (not being Buddhas) andtherefore should have faith in the authority of the Buddha's words reduces thescholastic exercise to little more than scriptural exegesis. While it is true to say thatBuddhist philosophers generally considered themselves to be disciples of the Bud-dha(s) rather than philosophical innovators, it is clear that this attitude is not con-sonant with the development of a philosophical system or school because itexcludes the very possibility of involvement in a logical or theoretical debate.19 David Seyfort Ruegg seems to suggest that the tathdgatagarbhaexts also acceptfaith as a preliminary. See chapter one of David Seyfort Ruegg (1989), Buddha-nature,Mind and the Problemof Gradualism n a ComparativePerspective:On the Transmis-sion and Receptionof Buddhism in India and Tibet.20 See Abhidharmakosa hapter III.21 See Wayman and Wayman, ibid., p. 84.22 At this point the Srzmald refers explicitly to the dependent-originationscheme, having already implicitly referred to it in its references to the four subdivi-sions of 'grasping' (upddana), the ninth member of the scheme. Thus dependentupon the arising of ignorance the defilements of attachment occur and dependingupon these attachments further ignorance arises, thus perpetuating the cycle.23 See Chang (1983), p. 373 and Wayman and Wayman, p. 85.24 The form of liberation attained by the arhats and pratyekabuddhass "nirvanawith a remainder" (i.e. the cessation of impurities (klesa,) while the five skandhas


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Is "Buddha-Nature" Buddhist?remain). This is described as the "supreme nirvana stage of the arrested breath"and, according to Wayman, is a reference to the attainment of the fourth dhydnaby the drhat and the prateyekabudha Wayman and Wayman, p. 91). That theyattain this stage of quiescence is due to the inclusion of the srdvakaand pratyekabud-dha 'vehicles' in the One-Great-Vehicle, the eka-mahd-ydna.25 Translation by Wayman and Wayman, p. 86.26 Translation by Wayman and Wayman, p. 86-87.27 Wayman and Wayman, ibid., p. 80.28 Mahdyana-samgrdha X.3.29 Wayman and Wayman, p. 87.30 The inferiority of the constructed meaning of the four noble truths is due tothe fact that "when one depends on another person, one does not seek out all suf-fering, eliminate all sources of suffering, directly realize the cessation of all suffer-ing, cultivate all the path leading to the cessation." (Translation by Wayman andWayman, p. 97.)

31 Only the Tathagata can understand the unconstructed noble truths sincenirvana is not to be realized by any dharma,whether superior or inferior, whether,low, middle or high." (Translation in Chang (1983), p. 378; cf. Wayman andWayman, p. 97.)32 Chang (1983), p. 378; cf. Wayman and Wayman, p. 98.33 Trans. Chang (1983), ibid., p. 378-379; cf. Wayman and Wayman, p. 100.34 See for instance, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka-Kdrika7.33.35 See Chang (1983), p. 380, and Wayman and Wayman, ibid., p. 104-105.For a full discussion of the tathdgatagarbha octrine and parallels with the AdvaitaVedanta position see R. King, Early Advaita Vedantaand Buddhism: The MahdydnaContextof the Gau.dapddiya-Karikd,SUNY Press) forthcoming.36 The Srimaldargues that if there were no tathdgatagarbhahere could be no aver-sion to suffering and no corresponding aspiration for liberation from it. Thereason for this is that the six sense-consciousnesses (that is the five sense-consciousnesses plus the mano-vijnana)and the seventh mental consciousness (klistamanas?) are momentary and so cannot retain the experience of suffering. Thus, thenecessity of positing the tathagatagarbha as the beginningless and endless'repository' of experiences. This explanation of the raison d'etre of the tathagatagar-bha places the notion in a similar explanatory position to that held by the dlayavi-jndna in the Yogacara school. However, the emphasis here is upon the tathdgatagar-bha as a store or collection of pure buddha-dharmas,whereas in the Yogacara,alayavijidna stores both pure and impure seeds and is essentially phenomenal. Inlater texts, for example the LankdvatdraSutra, the syncretism of tathagatagarbha nd

Yogacara ideas is carried out by means of just such a conflation of terms.37 Chang (1983), p. 378.38 Wayman and Wayman, p. 99.39 Chang (1983), ibid., p. 380.40 Translation by Wayman and Wayman, p. 106; cf. Chang (1983), ibid., p.380.41 Translation by Wayman and Wayman, p. 101.42 Chang (1983), p. 378-379; Wayman and Wayman, p. 100.43 Translation Chang (1983), p. 379.44 See Chang (1983), ibid., footnote (26) om p. 385.45 The 'feminist' aspects of the Srimald Sutra suggests the possibility of a femaleauthor.

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20 RichardKing46 Wayman and Wayman, p. 96.47 Translation by Chang, p. 381; cf. Wayman and Wayman, p. 106-7.48 Paul Williams (1989), Mahdydna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations

(Routledge), p. 99.49 The most recent work to discuss this issue is S. K. Hookham (1991), The Bud-dha Within: TathagatagarbhaDoctrineAccordingto the Shengtong nterpretation f the Rat-nagotravibhdga SUNY Press).50 Williams, ibid., p. 2.

51 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1976), PhilosophicalInvestigations English translation byG. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford, Basil Blackwell), paragraph 66.52 Admittedly, this is an odd question to ask. To argue that it is "unBuddhist"to have a category of "unBuddhist" appears paradoxical, and some might arguethat it is downright contradictory, since it excludes the possibility of exclusion, yetthere is a substantive point behind such a question, namely, is it appropriate toplace the burden of Buddhist identity on the construction of an orthodoxy? Giventhe Asian context of Buddhism, would orthopraxy not serve us better?53 Richard Gombrich (1971), Preceptand Practice(Clarendon Press, Oxford), p.327.

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