brugman review 12-29-05

Moral Failing

A Review of

Moral Development and Reality: Beyond the Theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman, by John C. Gibbs, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003. 299 pp. ISBN 0-7619-2389-6.

Reviewed by

Daniel Brugman

Moral evaluation must be distinguished from moral reform. Although moral evaluation (by the considerations of the right and the good) can be valid, moral reform does not necessarily follow. In some cases, intervening might only make things worse. (Gibbs, 2003, p. 14, note 3)

Professor Gibbs is probably best known for his research on moral reasoning in delinquent adolescents and the construction for that purpose of group-administrable production and recognition measures. Less well-known, but even more useful, is his multicomponent treatment program EQUIP, designed to equip antisocial young people to think and act responsibly through a peer-helping approach. EQUIP has been favorably received by practitioners and the effects that were found when the program was implemented in the Netherlands are promising. If Gibbs' theoretical contributions elicited less response than his instrumental ones, this book offers a well-timed opportunity for correction. Gibbs takes a fresh look at all the major themes to which he has committed himself over the years. His scholarship and broad perspective make the book a very rich, stimulating and first-rate introduction to moral development for advanced undergraduate and graduate students.

The book presents a revision of Kohlberg's stage sequence in which the number of stages is reduced to four. The immature level consists of stages 1 and 2, while the mature level comprises stages 3 and 4. Stage 5 and 6 are not regarded as truly developmental stages, and are transformed into an existential phase. Kohlberg's distinction between Type A and B is maintained and elaborated. Stage mixture is accepted and stages are described from an information processing viewpoint. Gibbs emphasizes the individual's construction of progressively mature moral stages and accounts for moral motivation in terms of a decentration process, which generates prescriptions of equality and ideal reciprocity. Violations of these prescriptions prompt a primarily cognitive motive to right the wrong (p. 17).

Hoffman's theory on the development of empathy emphasizes society's transmission of moral norms through internalization, and views empathic affect and related emotions as the basis for moral motivation. Gibbs views Kohlberg's and Hoffman's theories as complementary and this results in his proposal for coprimacy of justice (ideal reciprocity) and care (empathy) in moral motivation. While justice governs the domain of the right, empathy governs the domain of the good. Both are needed for a comprehensive understanding of morality.

Individual differences in moral development (in particular moral reasoning) are related to pro- and antisocial behavior. Depending on the type of behavior new concepts are introduced: for example, in

PsycCRITIQUES 2004 by the American Psychological AssociationDecember 29, 2004 Vol. 49, Supplement 14 For personal use only--not for distribution.

Page 1 of 4PsycCRITIQUES - Moral Failing

6/24/2005http://www.psycinfo.com/psyccritiques/display/?uid=2004-22078-001

relation to prosocial behavior moral self-relevance and in relation to antisocial behavior cognitive distortions. Affect regulation in both prosocial and antisocial behavior is served by ego-strength. His successful treatment program (EQUIP) is discussed in detail. The graphical presentation of a model linking moral reasoning and empathy to behavior could have been helpful.

Going beyond the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman, Gibbs speculates on a deeper reality, wherein the whole of nature' is an interconnected web of creation' of which we are interdependent strands'(p. 225). His case studies of the near-death experience are an original contribution to the moral development literature concerning the cosmic perspective of the metaphorical stage 7.

Gibbs could have presented these themes as a series of loosely connected topics of study that inspired him over the years: the moral reasoning process itself, moral reasoning and empathy, moral reasoning and pro-social behavior, moral reasoning and antisocial behavior, and finally, moral reasoning and the near-death experience. Such a presentation would be perfectly comprehensible, the common ground in these presentations being Gibbs' revision of Kohlberg's theory. Developmental and individual differences issues over the life span can be explored from this theory. He could even have shown that the views of Piaget, Kohlberg, Hoffman, and the theory of information processing that are discussed in these themes are incompatible with each other (Korthals, 1994). However, Gibbs seeks a comprehensive understanding and his theory of coprimacy shows the same integrative spirit as his multicomponent treatment program, EQUIP.

Kohlberg and other cognitive developmentalists insist on the cognitive structuring of affect and consequently see moral reasoning as primary and affect as secondary. Blasi (1999) argues that emotions are not intentional, are not under the control of the individual experiencing them, and as such cannot form the basis for moral behavior. Hoffman, moral intuitionists (Haidt, 2001), and others see affect as the primary impulse to behavior with a minimum of cognition. Moral reasoning is seen as secondary, a post hoc justification of behavior. Haidt (2001) believes that there is affective primacy in everyday moral situations, while there is cognitive primacy in difficult hypothetical moral dilemmas. Gibbs gives lucid analyses of real-life cases from which he deduces his theory of coprimacy. Most moral situations can be viewed either from the right (cognitive primacy) or from the good (affective primacy). Nevertheless, empirical evidence is lacking concerning when justice is triggered and when care is triggered, while in each case different psycho-social processes are involved. The educational conditions that foster each of them differ. In addition, one must realize that although the right and the good often go together, important cases are discussed in the literature where they conflict. For example, Korthals (1994) points to the theme of the movie The Bridge on the River Kwai: Prisoners of war have escaped from the Japanese and return in order to prevent the bridge being built. They have to fire at their former comrades. Here, universal justice is awarded higher priority than empathy. How are such cases processed?

My comments are directed to the relationship between moral reasoning and delinquency, more in particular failing to attain the moral point of view. In studying this relationship it does not make a difference whether one argues for a 4, 5, 6, or 7 stage model of moral reasoning. According to Gibbs and others, the problem lies in the development from stage 2 to stage 3, from concrete to ideal reciprocity. In my view, Gibbs presents an overly individualistic account of this relationship and neglects the moral atmosphere of the social context in which one finds oneself (but cf. p. 160-161). At the same time Gibbs focuses on outstanding (im)moral behavior, while the behavior of the not-so-moral majority is underrepresented.

The best illustrations of the difference between the stages 2 and 3 are given in the domain of pro-social behavior. In an everyday moral situation that arose on holiday at a camping Gibbs did not have the moral courage to intervene in an instance of bullying to which he was an unwilling observer. His



explanation is the following: I feared sinking from anonymity into downright unpopular (p. 10). This statement probably would qualify as a mixture of stage 2 and 3 type of moral reasoning. Later in the book, Gibbs extensively analyses the case of a white youth who rescued an African American youth from an attack by his racist friends (p. 112). He demonstrates that the white adolescent showed mature moral reasoning (stage 3), while he assumes that the racist friends were still mostly immature in their moral reasoning (mixture stage 2 and 3). The adolescent displaying his exemplary moral behavior was not a bystander like the author in the first example, but part of the group and this makes it even more difficult to intervene. In addition, the victim belonged to another racial and cultural group. So, why intervene? According to Gibbs the boy took a universalizable point of view (stage 3B).

Although Gibbs refers to several intermediate processes between moral reasoning as assessed in hypothetical moral dilemmas and moral behavior in real life, he does not differentiate between moral reasoning in hypothetical and real-life moral dilemmas. This differentiation is important because generally, moral reasoning in real-life dilemmas (performance) is lower than in hypothetical dilemmas (competence). Social pressure, self-interest, particular relationships or personal projects can make it difficult to attain the moral point of view in real-life situations. According to Higgins, Power and Kohlberg (1984, p. 75) an individual's moral or immoral acts are often a function of group norms and processes: For example, in the massacre at My Lai during the Vietnam War, individual American soldiers murdered noncombatant women and children. They did so not primarily because,. .. as individuals, they were sick' in some sense; they did so because they participated in what was essentially a group action taken on the basis of group norms. What happened in Vietnam yesterday, is happening today in Iraq and elsewhere. What other moral theory than Kohlberg's theory on group moral atmosphere would have predicted that a young, seemingly normal female soldier would within a couple of months become a delinquent in Iraq? She and her colleagues probably had a mature moral reasoning level. According to Gibbs only Type B persons are capable of prosocial nonconformist behavior and this type seems scarce.

The group process is not only operative in the army, but also in business, at camping sites, or in a gang. Most delinquent acts perpetrated by adolescents occur in the context of a group. During adolescence, acceptance by the peer group is of the utmost importance. Several studies have shown that adolescents' perception of the moral atmosphere (in school) is a much better predictor of norm-transgressive behavior than their moral reasoning (Brugman et al., 2003). This perception reflects personal as well as environmental characteristics. Moreover, norms may be perceived as belonging to the conventional or personal domain instead of the moral domain when a transgression takes place. Although these differences in moral perception could be the result of cognitive distortions (p. 142), we would like to trace the effects of these distortions in the moral domain (Leenders & Brugman, 2004).

The difference in moral reasoning between delinquents and nondelinquents is only one third of a stage on production measures, while no difference is found on recognition measures. Moral reasoning is not a powerful predictor of antisocial behavior in nondelinquents. In addition, gains in moral reasoning of one third of a stage through participation in specific interventions did not result in gains in moral behavior. Finally, delinquents' behavior was positively stimulated by EQUIP, but no gains in moral reasoning were found (p. 189).

In sum, I believe that moral failing and most juvenile delinquent behavior is more a function of group norms and group processes than of low moral reasoning competence. I would even hypothesize that it may depend on group norms and group processes whether there is cognitive or affective primacy (in Haidt's sense). To experience social pressure is no invitation to reflection. Gibbs' analysis suggests that the Type A/B distinction is developmentally oriented, but no evidence for this is presented. How can we stimulate individuals to become Type B? A near-death experience seems to have such an effect (p. 219), but that is hard to implement (p. 224) and I am not convinced that EQUIP would have a similar



effect. I would suggest investigating the effects of EQUIP on group moral atmosphere rather than on Type B moral reasoning development.

References

Blasi, A. (1999). Emotions and moral motivation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 29, 1-19. Brugman, D., Podolskij, A. I., Heymans, P. G., Boom, J., Karabanova, O., & Idobaeva, O. (2003). Perception of moral atmosphere in school and norm- transgressive behavior in adolescents: An intervention study. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 27, 289-300. Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814-834. Higgins, A., Power, C., & Kohlberg, L. (1984). The relationship of moral atmosphere to judgments of responsibility. In W. L. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior and moral development (pp. 74-106). New York: Wiley. Korthals, M. (1994). Over de rol van emoties bij het moreel redeneren. Gibbs' mislukte poging tot integratie van de theorie van Kohlberg met die van Hoffman. Comenius, 14, 38-49. [The role of emotions in moral reasoning Gibbs's failed attempt to integrate the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman].Leenders, I., & Brugman, D.. The moral/non-moral domain shift in relation to delinquent behavior in adolescents. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, , . in press



brugman review 12-29-05

Documents