STORYTELLING AS A MODE OF MORAL ARGUMENT:A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FISHER

Bruce E. GronbeckThe Umvarsitv of Iowa

Allow ma one additional prefatory comment: When Professor Fishersent me his paper, he asked that I "be kind to the Old Man " As afaithful and successful alumnus of the graduate program in which Iteach. Professor Fisher assuredly is deserving of kindness. And so,following the Biblical injunctions which are a part of my upbringing asa pietistic Norwegian Lutheran, I will be as kind as I can and in theonly way I know how--by offering gentle but firm corrections. Anyoneraised on as much Old Testament literature as I was knows that correc-tion IS an ultimate expression of kindness and love. And so. ProfessorFisher, rest assured that what follows is not meant as rebuff, but asmoral and intellectual guidance.

Lat me begin, then, with a bald statement of two positions I am tak-ing on issues raised by Professor Fisher's paper: I will concede--andindeed, vigorously support--the notion that narrative is perhaps th«most important (and, to me, even the most interesting) form of humancommunication. But, with equal vigor, I will deny that narrative is aparadigm--or even, more simply, a form--of moral argument. To expli-cate these two propositions, I will start where Professor Fisher stai-ts,with some ontological and epistemological concerns. Such philosophicalstatements will set up what 1 still consider to be some important distinc-tions between narrative and argumentative discourse.

ONTOLOGICAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS

In support of the analysis of narrative and argumentation I wish toput forth today, I mutt begin with an ontological consideration differentfrom-'but inclusive of--the one articulated by Professor Fisher. WithErnst Caiiirer and Kenneth Burke, ' I take the notion of animal lymbo*llcum as the first principle of humanity. That is, I take the aistin-guishing characteristic of human beings to b« their symbol-using abili-ties. As a corollary to this proposition, further, I take all otherontological descriptors of human beings-* homo itbmr. homo soclologut,homo dramatit, and yes, even homo ratlon«lli and homo narr«nt —asdescriptors subsumed by or derived from the central notion erf animaltynAKilkum. Thus, I would argue that:

As homo fab«r, my constructive actions have meaningonly because of the symbolic interpretations attached to themby myself and others.

At homo sociologui, my relationships with others ar»

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governed and made meaningful only because our roles andrules for their execution have been formulated m a culturalsymbolicum.

As homo dramatis, my lines of conduct are meaningfulto others only because scripts-for-life tre p re-given m thesociety into which I was born.

As homo rationalis, my inferences are found valid ornot according to logical rules articulated in particular arenasor situations by significant others.

And, as homo narrens, my understanding of narrativestructures is derived from socialization--from having beentaught how to tell and interpret stories.'

Were I not animal symbolicum, I would have none of the capacities- sug-gested by the second-level descriptors. If you do not believe that, tryconvincing your dog (a) that its action of defecating on the floor ismorally corrupt; (b) that your master-sUve relationship with it is justi-fied by the social order; (c) that Lassie Com* Home provides it with »mythic depiction of an ideal life for dogs; (d) that .it logically, no mat-ter how much it wishes to, cannot be both in and outside the housesimultaneously; and (e) that Benji* is a literary artifact which violatedthe classical unities of time and space.

It may seem that I am asserting the obvious when urging that weunderstand the human being to be animal symbolicum, but the pointmust be made explicitly if we are going to conceptualize properly therelationships between narrative and argumentative discourse If bothhomo rationalit and homo narrens are understood to be second-leveldescriptors of human characteristics, then we can be rather sure thatthey operate in comparatively discrete realms of human activity, andthat they serve separable functions in human life- More specifically, Iwill argue shortly, homo rationalis and homo narrens bear different andseparable relationships to the collective process of moral decision-mak-ing.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE

tion. With more time, I would defend the following notions:

(11 That which counts as "knowledge" in any society is acquiredbut partially through personal interaction with the world of sensoryexperience. Our most useful and important kinds of knowledge aregained in interaction with "significant others"--family meniben, acquain-tances, and institutional representatives--in our lives.

(2) We, therefore, tre born into a pre-existing cultural symbolicum,a world or web of meaning which comes to us individually as pre-formu-lated social knowledge.

(3) We acquire that social knowledge in myriad ways, but primarilythrough admonition, imitation, and technical instruction.'

(4) Narratives are especially important vehicles by which culturalrepresentatives pass on social knowledge to new member* of societies,(a) Because a narrative discourse of necessity must position its mes-sages in time and space--that is, in the fundamental orientational per-

spectives of exiitence itself--narratives make strong demands upon ourinnata perceptual processes. (b) Because the essence of narrativediscourse is "storytelling," such discourses are centered on pecsonaeand their actions, and hence are imitative of human life.^ (c) Becausenarrative discourses structure characters and their actions, theybecome primary vehicles for admonition, including moral admonitions,(d) But, because narratives create and populate a universe in someways familiar to but in an important sense separable from their readersor spectators, those admonitions usually are only implied.' (e) Hence,while narrative discourse is preeminently useful m inculcating socialcreatures, narratives themselves do not 'argue" as such; one only canargue from narratives, not within them.

My last assumption--4e--is beginning to move us into some distinc-tions between narrative and argumentative discourse, and hence Ishould stop for a comment. The epistemological assumptions I have justarticulated, of course, may not be universally acceded to, yet theyhave strong support from a large and growing intellectual community,including scholars from anthropology, political science, mythic studies,literary criticism, social theory and sociology, rhetorical studies, andeven psychology. In variant forms, these assumptions collectively pro-vide the base for the many types of "social constructionism" theory,"social constructivism," and most other branches of symbolic interaction-ism in twentieth-century thought.*

NARRATIVE, ARGUMENT. AND MORAL OILEMMAS

Having advanced some basic, abstract philosophical propositions, Inow am ready to plunge into the question governing Professor Fisher'spaper: Via what means do social beings put their knowledge intoaction, especially in situations characterized by moral diiemmas? Or,phrased in a slightly different manner, in what forms is social know-ledge made relevant to the processes of moral decision making?

Within the Aristotelian tradition of practical discourse, the answer tothese (questions is clear: rhetorical and dialectical discourse. To Aris-totle. ' rhetoric" was understood as a systematic method of inquiry intothe world of contingent human affairs: the result of that inquiry wasthe persuasive discourse, a discourse capable of generating assent tomoral/advisory propositions put to one's culturemates. And. "dialectic"was understood as a parallel systematic method of inquiry into the prin-ciples governing those human affairs; the result of that inquiry was thephilosophical discourse, a dtscourse capable of generating assent toontological, epistemological, teleological, and matacri tical propositionsput to one s intellectual peers in the academy. Both "rhetoric" and'dialectic" were presumed to operate argumentatively--bilaterally, justi-

ficatorily, and verbally.*

sitive to the demands ot narrative proDaDiiity »na narracive fidelity.He supports that argument both theoretically and practically, i.e. bydiscussing both characteristics of narrative discourse and attributes ofpopular audiences who are presumed incapable of following eNpert rhe-torical discourse in a technological age. If I may suggest an implicaticincf Professor Fisher's position vis-a-vis Aristotle's, it seems that he isleaving intact dialogical inquiry as a tool for the intelligentsia, but. infollowing arguments similar to some advanced by Bitter,* he distrusts'ordinary" citizens' abilities to make moral judgments when confronted

by conflicting rhetorical or popular argumentative discourses. In otherwords. Professor Fisher presumably accepts an Aristotelian notion ofdialectic, and is only out to replace rhetorical inquiry as a precursor topersuasive discourse treating moral dilemmas.

Given assumptions I already have laid out, you probably can guessthat I am adhering to a neo-Aristotelian position on matters relative tonarrative, rhetoric, and moral dilemmas. Hence I would offer the fol-lowing kind corrections to Professor Fisher:

{}) I certainly agree that narrative discourse can be and ought tobe thought of as a premiere comniunication paradigm. If nothing else,the work of Havelock on the classical Greeks as well that of most of themythicists demonstrate narrative s ancient heritage, and, of course,contemporary narrative theory is rich in such implications.*

(2) I agree that a doctrine of "good reasons" and its logic are cen-tral to an understanding of moral decision-making processes, but--andhere I begin my correction of Professor Fisher--I deny that the narra-tive paradigm is adequate as a logic. Interestingly, Professor Fisherbegins his present paper with a reference to his award-winning 1976essay, "Toward a Logic of Good Reasons."** I say "interestingly"because I chaired the SCA Committee on Awards that gave him a prizefor that essay. I therefore know the essay well, but even now as Ireread it I find no implication whatsoever for a narrative paradigm ofmoral decision making. While he certainly does suggest, in the Toul-min-like model of argumentation he constructs therein, that the sourcesof valuative warrants for arguments are varied, he is very clear in say-ing that the source of argumentative logic-of the inferential processper se--is Aristotelian. To quote the 1978 Fisher on the matter of ade-quate reasoning criteria: "(Judgmental criteria must] be infused withthe tests of different types of reasoning: example, analogy, sign,cause, definition, and authority."' ^

(3) t deny the adequacy of the narrative paradigm as an argumen-tative frame because "storytelling" is grounded in mimetic rather thanenthymematic psychological activity. That is, a "story" is adjudgedadequate or inadequate on the bases of its verisimilitude—its similarityto human experience and its internal consistency--while an enthymematicargument is adjudged adequate or inadequate on the bases of its con-formity to culture-specific rules of reasoning. As I noted earlier, Ibelieve one cartnot argue within, but only from, a story. I accept orthis point a position taken by Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann:

As long as I live in fantasy worlds, I cannot 'produce,' in thesense of an act which gears into the external world and alters it.As long as I tarry in the world of fantasy I cannot accomplishanything, save just to engage in fantasy. However, under certaincircumstances, I can sketch out in advance the course of fantasyas such (I will imagine the fairy gives me three wishes), and I canthen fulfill the project. It is still uncertain whether this fallsunder a broadly conceived definition of the concept action.' It isimportant that fantasy ing remains secluded by itself, that theintention to act is absent--in contrast to the plan of an act in theeveryday life-world which (strictly as a plan) is also in a certainsense 'merely thinking.' . . . In fantasy's finite province ofmeaning only factual, not logical, incompatibilities can be over-come. "•

In a similar argument likewise quoting Schutz and Luckmann s analysis,my colleague Michael McGee concludes that "Stories as such functioncntologically, establishing the grounds for accepting such-and-such

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interpretations as 'factual.'"' * Again, tfien, stories can define, caneven reinforce social criteria for legitimating thus-and-so at factual,even as valued, but thay cannot argu*. In the language of facultypsychology, stories can control perception, to be sure, but they cannotserve as inferences. Narratives can only be interiorized, not exterior-ized.

(4) In general, than, I still would maintain that "argumentation"and "narrative" comprehend disparate mental operations. More specifi-cally, (a] argumentation depends upon reasoning facilities, and narra-tive, upon abilities of listeners to comprehend fictive or non-fictivesymbolic universes; (b) argumentation works by representation, whilenarratives work by presentation; (c) argumentation becomes a matter ofintellection, while narrative force lies in the power of depiction; and(d) adequate argumentation relies upon inference, while adequate narra-tives rely upon characterological enactment.

PARTING THOUGHTS

On several key points, then, it might appear that I am taking Prof-essor Fisher to task with some little severltysomething I promised notto do. Actually, I do not think I am, for when alj the dust clears Ireally am calling only for one adjustment of his position. His analysisof the narrative paradigm, its mechanisms, and its force can stand if hequits his attempt to describe it as a paradigm of argumentation, that is,if he more simply recognizes that human beings argue front and notwithin such structures. With that adjustment, his discussions of narra-tion and perception, of "conceptual incommensurability," of the enginesof narratives, and of narratives' relationships to audiences will makegenerally good sense. With that adjustment, he will be helping uiunderstand the importance of narratives as the sources of social know-ledge--knowledge advocates can bring to bear even on issues as compli-cated, twisted, and sociopolitically important as nuclear war.

In keynoting this conference four years ago, I discussed the crisisin the study of argumentation and rationality. I tajked about the new"-isms" ana "-ologies" which have been challenging the traditionalaisumptioni of validity as standards of argumentative rationality--pri-marily, the substitution of community-based "rules" for mathefnaticalconstructs. I concluded from a review of recent research that the"thaory of argunwntation over the last fIftMn yaars has baen viawed bytha naw prophats ai a poatic rather than a logical antarprisa." *^ Theessentially poetic stress U|>on argumentative actors and upon the scriptsthey employ in their interaction with others, to my mind then and now,i> not something to be denigrated or feared, however. That stress isto be applaudea, for it allows us to conceptualize and analyze argumen-tative discourse contextually, in situ. And, insofar as we come tounderstand the situational demands which govern decision making,and—with Professor Fisher—the role of narratives in orienting argumen-tative actors* fundamental perceptions of the world, we will be advanc-ing significantly our abilitfy to both characterize and rasolva our cul-ture's moral dilemmas. And, I would add, insofar as we seek toanalyze tha rols of cultural conditioning in the "ordinary" citizen sttrugglei to maka moral decision* in tha faca aven of technical argu-ments, we need not fear this citizen's irrationality, for we will havacome to understand popular reasoning as it can --rather than should--operate in human affairs.

Prafeisor Fisher, then, for his contributions to a fundamental char-acterization of narrative procedures, is to be applauded--with all thekindnass I can muster.

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Notas

Most of Cassirer's writings deal in one way or another with thenotion of animal symbohcum. See, e.g. , his Language and Myth(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1953] and His An Essay onMan (New York: BanUm Books, 1970). Cf. David Bidney, "Onthe Philosophical Anthropology of Ernst Cassirer and Its Relationto the History of Anthropological Thought, ' in Tha Philosophy ofErnst Cassirar, ed. Paul Schiipp (La Salle, I I I . : Open CourtPublishing Co., 1956), pp. 502ff. Perhaps Kenneth Burkesclearest statement on this ontological question comes in his "Defi-nition of Man," in his Language as Symbolic Action: Essays onLifa, Litaratura, and Method (1966; rpt. Berkeley: Univ. ofCalif. Press, 1973), pp. 3-24.

I develop most of these ideas in "Dramaturgical Theory and Crit i-cism: The State of the Art (or Science?)," Western Journal ofSpeech Convnunicatlon, 44 (Fall 1980), 315-330; "On Classes ofInferences and Force," in Explorations In Rhatoric: Studies inHonor of Douglas Ehningar, ad. Ray E. McKerrow (Glenview, Ml.:Scott, Foresman and Co., 1982), pp. 85-106: and "SocioculturalNotions of Argument Fields: A Primer,'* in Dimansions of Argu-ment: Proceedings of the Second Summer Confaranca on Argu-mantatlon, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale,Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 1-20.

These three routes to learning Edward Hall termi "formal,"'^informal," and "technical' learning. See his still-useful ThaSilent Languaga [1959; rpt. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publica-tions, Inc., 1966), The Major Triad," pp. 63-92.

This, of course, is the whole point of Aristotle's definition of"tragedy" in the Poatics (1449b). Because drama (poetic litera-ture] is "an imitation of an action," action (mythos) is its primaryelement, and character (athos) is a close second in importance.As well, thought (dianola) is the third element in the Aristotelianmodel; his discussion of 'thought" (1456a-1456b) could well havabeen written by a scholar interested in "the social construction ofreality." One further point: Aristotle's discussion of dianoia iscomparatively short, because, as he tells his readers (1456a), theconcept is well developed in the Rhatorlc. Hence, intriguingly,he essentially collapses the distinction between poetic and rhetori-cal works on tha question of social knowledge. There is at leasta suggestion, therefore, that pre-given, culture-specific rolerequirements and rules-for-living are foundational to all processesof meaning-assrgnation. Even in Aristotle, thus, does the humanbeing come off as animal symbolfcum. I treat this idea more fullyin Bruce E. Gronbeck, Narrative, E d T l i i

P i " Sh ShE beck, Nar

Programming," Southern Spa(Spring 19^) , 229-243.

I treat ths fy, Enactment, and TelevisionCommunication Journal, 48

5.If poetic discourses actually state admonitions, we usually wouldidentify them with such rhetorical-generic labels as 'didactic" or"propagandistic" literature. That is because any admonitionoffered in a narrative discourse is assumed to apply to the char-acters within the dramatic or poetic universe, not the "rsal

world." and because, at noted earlier, the notion of "imitation"implies a separation (nonnally called "aesthetic distance") betweenthe narrative and the "real' worlds. Tho relationships existing

hence, are highly cooiplex, given that both "identification" andyet "separation" are essential to understanding those relation-ships. This, I suspect, is why Kenneth Burke makes so much ofthe idea of 'representative anecdote" as the connective constructbetween fictive and factual life in his A Grammar of Motives (NewYork: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1945), esp. pp. 59-61, and his Lan-guage as Symbolic Action, "Form and Persecution in the Orest-eia, ' pp. 125-138.

I sketch my understanding of these intellectual moves more fullyin Gronbeck, "Dramaturgical . . . ," and my "Qualitative Comniu-nication Theory and Rhetorical Studies in the 19&0s," CentralStates Spexh Journal, 32 (Winter 19B1), 243-253. I would add,for good measure, that I think most of these assumptions wouldpass muster among many continental scholars writing in the neo-MarKist traditions of England, France, and Germany, although ofcourse they would more fully analyze perceptual processes withinthe phenofflenological frame governing much of their work, andwould make more of the ways in which class structures controlour dealings with and understanding of the material world.

For dilations of my understanding of Aristotle on these matters,see Richard McKeon, ed and intro., The Basic Works of Aristotle(New York: Random House, 1941), pp. iiiivi-«x«ii, and James HMcBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory,"Speech [Coniinunlcatlon| Monographs, 3 (1936), 49-74.

Lloyd F. Bitier. "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge."Philosophy, and Literature: An Explanation, ed, Don _M^ Burks(West Lafayette,67-93.

Rhetoric,M. B

Purdue University Press, 1978).

The centrality of narrative forms to the very formation of Greekculture--and, by implication, of all cuitures--is demonstrated bril-liantly by Eric A. Havelock in his Preface to Plato, Belknap Press(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963)--a bookalmost universally quoted by narrative and oral scholars. I shallnot, here, reproduce in support of this proposition a completebibliography on myth and society. Suffice it to say that themythic catalogues produced by Fraser and Bullfinch, the multi-vo-lumed analyses of ancient myths offered by Joseph Campbell, thecontemporary structuralist studies of myth prepared by ClaudeLevi-Strauss and Roland Barthes, the political analyses of MurrayEdelman, the sociological work of Orrin Klapp, and the anthropo-logical-structuralist work of Victor Turner all document thisclaim. Finally, I would urge the reader to follow Professor Fish-er s lead in examining the Fall 1980 number of Critical Inquiry(now available in bookform at On Narrative) for numerous articlesoutlining current understandings of narrative theory.

Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (December 1978), 376-384.

Fisher, p. 380.

Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann

13.See his "1984: Some Issues in the Rhetorical Study of PoliticalCommunication," forthcoming in the Political Communication Year-book, to be published by Sage Publishing Co. and edited byKeith Sanders.

Bruce E. Gronbeck, "From Argument to Ar|^umentation: FifteenYears of Identity Crises," in Proceedings of^the Sunmr Confer-ence on Argunwntation, ed. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell(Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1979). p.10.