The Social Media Effect:

The Impact of Social Media on the Political Transitions in Egypt and Libya

By

Brittany Noppe

A research essay submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for PAPM4908 as credit

towards the degree of Bachelor of Public Affairs and Policy Management [Honours]

Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

April 2014

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Table of Contents

Introduction……………………………………………………………….1

Research Question ……………………………………………........2

Literature Review …………………………………………………....2 – 8

Thesis Statement…………………………………………………...8

Theoretical Framework ……………………………………………….8 -10

Pluralism Theory……………………………………………………8

Social Movement Theory…………………………………...............9

Democratic Transition Theory……………………………………9-10

Methodology …………………………………………………………….10-13

Introduction to Case Studies: Egypt & Libya ……………………11-13

Conceptualization ………………………………………………………….14

Definition of Key Concepts ………………………………………......14

Operationalization ……………………………………………………..........15

Dynamics of Social Movements and Revolutions………………………16-18

Comparison to Iranian Revolution of 1979……………………......19-22

Case Analysis………………………………………………………………22-37

Relevant Commonalities between Egypt & Libya…………………22-28

Evident Differences found in Egypt & Libya……………………….28-34

Commentary on the Post-Revolution Situation in Both Cases……..34-37

Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………….37-39

Appendix ……………………………………………………………………40-44

Bibliography………………………………………………………………...45-47

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Introduction

Globalization has resulted in the incorporation of the media and most recently,

social media into politics and public policy. Social media has begun to influence politics

and policy agendas across the political map allowing for influential political leverage of

interest groups. Most recently, the political demonstrations and demand to end oppressive

regimes, deemed the ‘Arab Spring,’ displayed how truly powerful social and global media

can be because of its ability to mobilize individuals and generate widespread support. In a

time where one can learn nearly everything about a person by searching their Facebook

profile, reading their Twitter account or watching YouTube blogs, it is only natural that

social media would begin to dominate politics and foreign affairs.

This was apparent throughout the course of the Arab Spring, specifically in Egypt

and Libya. Each uprising was characterized by the presence of a large cohort of educated

youth who were able to materialize and mobilize their movement through the usage of

social media to lobby their respective governments and gain international recognition.

Social media was used as a political tool to give the movement a voice and political

leverage. Social media contributed to the decision for international intervention. For

example, in Libya the international community implemented a no fly zone to disarm the

Gaddafi regime. However, given recent developments within the Arab world it is becoming

apparent that although the spring resulted in regime changes in both countries, it has not

been sufficient to produce stable democratic governments in either state.

The research significance of further examining the role of social media in the

democratic transition throughout the Arab Spring is important because of the increasing

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level of accessibility individuals have to news and global issues. Additionally, how

effortless it is to quickly share a news article, video, or picture on a Facebook page, Twitter

or blog to multiple friends and individuals on the Internet. This has great implications on

areas of the world that have experienced censored media, press and speech, as seen during

the Arab Spring. Social media has been used as a revolutionary tool to spread the message

of the movement, and to become ascertained across the world.

The Arab Spring is a good example of the policy implications the dominance of

media and social media can have. Through the tool of social media individuals are able to

share real-time footage of the revolution that generates global media coverage. This allows

for a plurality of actors to participate in the transition to democracy. The research on the

influence of media on policy can lead to more meticulous foreign policy, specifically during

military intervention, supplying of weaponry or foreign aid because of the ability for the

media to objectively cover or distort what is going on abroad. The increasing role of social

media causes governments to be more transparent throughout their programs, policies and

public purses.

Research Question

What role did social media play in the democratic transition in each case?

Literature Review

The literature examined suggests that political science researchers have been

studying the media's overarching influence on politics and policy extensively given the

emergence of the Internet and globalization. The literature and research available on the

topic has been increasing along with the predominance of news and social media. This is

because of the increasing accessibility of global information and the formulation of large

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social movements.

One of the common factors that the accumulated research has determined has been

that the media does have an emerging factor on the development and perception of policy,

specifically international policy. As well, the media has aided in the mobilization of

individuals and creation of social movements to change policy. However, the magnitude of

that influence is still undetermined.

Additionally, the paradigm of social movements has gained a broader magnitude of

effectiveness during revolutions democratic transitions because of the emergence of

communication technologies. According to Samuel Huntington, a revolution is the “broad

rapid, violent expansion of political participation outside the existing structure of

institutions” and is an aspect of modernization (Huntington 1968, 274). Therefore,

revolutions are a form of political development and procedures of strengthening the

political sphere because of its capacity to change political culture and institutions

(Huntington 1968, 315). However, he notes that the differences in background, perspective

and purpose between elites and lower class cause revolutions unlikely in the absence of an

additional trigger produced by a catalyst (Huntington 1968, 304). This idea opens a

research opportunity to further explore if social media can operate as a catalyst in order to

bridge the social gap between these groups and mobilize them as one to develop common

goals.

Recent democratic transitions have offered new opportunities for social movements

to build alliances with elite actors and join broad coalitions to incorporate their demands

and gain access to decision-making centres (Houtzager 2007, 60). Social media has become

an influential tool throughout social movements because it has given social movements the

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ability to broaden their scope. This has allowed for social movements to further generate

support for their demands but also mobilize individuals to solidify that support. This has

improved social movements overall effectiveness during democratic transitions because the

major constraint they face is attributed to losing their raison d’être (Houtzager 2000,60).

That the Therefore, additional research can be fulfilled to further examine the close

relationship between social movements, social media and democratic transitions. The

predominant appearance of the usage of social media along with the recent events with the

Arab Spring has opened a window for new research to be conducted on the powerful

influence that media can have over foreign policy and enforcing regime change.

The phenomenon of the “CNN Effect” is discussed extensively within various

research done on the media's ability to exert influence and provoke policy change. The

CNN Effect is specifically how real-time technology such like CNN Live news coverage

“could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global

elites” (Robinson 1999, 301). Essentially, this allows for the media to invoke influence on

government policy, particularly when policy uncertainties exist. This can generate social

capital especially within a non-democratic society because it creates space for critical

discourse surrounding the present government, spark conversations between non-state

sponsored individuals which in turn, translate into associations or social movements

(Paxton 2002, 257).

The media activates that gap by framing the coverage to advocate for a particular

course of action. The permission of the 'CNN Effect' to occur allows for the media to draw

attention to specific global events or commentary that support the presented course of

action (Robinson 1999, 308). Robinson's idea of the 'CNN Effect' is a valid phenomenon

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supported by the evidence of media influence within global events and policy. However, it

is slowly becoming out-dated and replaced with the ‘social media effect,’ where individuals

connect to personal posts, footage or tweets influencing public opinion towards policy

perception. Therefore, identifying a research gap where more examination can be done on

the contemporary idea of the ‘social media effect’ and it’s increasing role in politics and

policy.

Similarly, this idea is framed around the 'Policy-Media Interaction Model' that

suggests “news media coverage might actually take sides in the elite debate by adopting the

reference frames of one side of an elite debate” (Robinson 2001, 13). This can occur

through the media's ability to either influence public opinion through negative media

coverage or the highlight of 'policy uncertainties.' Ultimately, this results in media functions

overarching to influence direction of government policy (Robinson 2001, 14).

Further expansion on this theoretical framework has been the determinacy of the

'Political Contest Model', which identifies “the conditions under which news media cover

comes to play an active role in the formulation of policy” (Robinson 2001,16). Specifically,

how news media coverage can also influence social and political change achieved by non-

elite groups, not just elite or policy-makers. These two theories, in conjunction with one

another, offer a theoretical basis that supports the notion that media coverage can support

non-elite groups, similar to the Arab Spring, in agenda setting and successful political or

regime change.

Agenda setting within the policy sphere has been noted as the predominant area

where media can exert the most influence. Through the emergence of media dominance in a

more globalized society, agenda-setting has reached a “second-level” which “suggests that

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the attributes linked to newsmakers influence the attributes members of the public link to

the newsmakers” (Robinson 2001, 4). Ultimately, second-level agenda-setting suggests that

media coverage influences how the public sphere thinks (Wanta & Golan & Lee 2004, 5).

Therefore, the perception of a country or a foreign policy initiative through the media can

directly impact whether the public views that country or policy negatively.

Throughout the research of Wanta, Golan and Lee, suggests that with the increasing

dominance and role of the media in global affairs and democratic transitions can become an

active policy actor or entrepreneur. More specifically, the role of the media in democratic

transitions is apparent through the organization of social movements and framing processes

to generate collective action. Collective action frames are developed as a part of the

movement to generate a shared understanding of a problematic condition like an

authoritarian government and articulating an alternative such as democracy (Benford &

Snow 2000, 615). In turn, this core-framing task generates consensus mobilization and

fosters action (Benford & Snow 2000, 615). The connections determined by Wanta, Golan

and Lee in their research on agenda-setting and media influence, in conjunction with

Benford & Snow’s research on framing and social movements opens opportunities for

increasing research to be done given recent developments with the implications of the

media's role in the Arab Spring.

The examination of the role of social media as a catalyst for policy or regime

change is an instance that is becoming more widely explored, particularly with the leading

events of the Arab Spring. Activists were able to mobilize through social media because of

“the dissatisfaction with the status-quo, the generational aspiration for political change to

propel change in the region” (Ekwo 2012, 5). The emergence of the dominating role of

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social media is beginning to change political discourse especially in complicated areas like

in the Middle East. The ability for social media to alter political discourse in regions that

experience subdued freedoms generates a wider range of effectiveness for mobilization and

the creation of social movements. More specifically, because social media has become a

modern tool for issue framing used within social movements to generate social support and

mobilization because of its ability to readily and easily highlight remedies or alterations to

problematic solutions (Benford & Snow 2000, 616). This is reflective in the growing

population of the younger generation within the region's connection to media convergence

as a tool for democratic transitions.

However, as noted in the concluding remarks of Ekwo's research, that in order to

sustain change in the political sphere, there must be a simultaneous cooperative relationship

between media institutions and politics, especially since “journalists are the midwives of

democracy” (Ekwo 2012, 25). This leads to research gaps surrounding how media

institutions can gain political influence by acting as a policy entrepreneur.

However, although it is noted that the social media and news media dominance

aided in regime changes throughout the Arab Spring, one must be critical that this

revolutionary style is normally not as effective in state-reform or government rebuilding

(Stepanova 2011, 6). But rather operates as a social motivator to activate change but cannot

actually be able to hold political legitimacy or democratic longevity (Stepanova 2011, 6).

This could lead to a conflicting realization that although the media is a powerful tool it may

not be as effective in the policy spectrum in regards to the Arab Spring. Ultimately, this

leads to the opportunity for further research given the recent and constantly changing

events within the Middle East in relation to the role of media convergence in the area and

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on the influence of policy.

The research examined on the role of the media's convergence on politics, policy

and foreign policy suggests that there is a definite strong influence. However, research gaps

exist when examining contemporary issues such as the Arab Spring and the emergence of

the power of social media. More specifically, there needs to be a further examination of the

causal relationship between social movements, social media and democratic transitions.

Additionally, further research must be done in order to thoroughly examine the magnitude

of the role of social media as a policy catalyst and if it can be a legitimate tool in state

reform. The situation within the Middle East is a perfect contemporary example to be the

foundation of this research.

Thesis Statement

The implication of social media in political change is contextual.

Theoretical Framework

Pluralism Theory

Pluralism is the theoretical view that recognizes “society as divided by multiple

lines of political cleavage” (Smith 2007, 170). Society is made up of different individuals

and groups that have a diverse set of interest and preferences that formulate the way they

participate in civil society to influence government (Smith 2007, 170). These groups can be

classified as ‘interest groups’ or ‘pressure groups.’ Therefore, public policy is a reflection of

the struggle between groups because of the many political cleavages in complex societies

(Smith 2007, 170).

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Social Movement Theory

Interest groups or pressure groups mobilize individuals and their interests through

group and movement organizations. These organizations “allow for the articulation of

political opinions that are much more specific than those that can be expressed through

voting periodically” (Smith 2007, 169). More specifically, social movements allow for

individuals to engage in mass protests and demonstrations that generate a culture of

transformative politics (Smith 2007, 173). A broad definition of social movements can be

characterized as a “purposive collective actions whose outcome, in victory as in defeat,

transforms the values and institutions of society” (Smith 2007, 173). Therefore, social

movements are a distinctive form of contentious politics (Tilly 2004, 7). Social movements

can be easily initiated when an authoritarian regime has engaged in some processes of

liberalization. This creates a window of opportunity for interest groups to mobilize to

facilitate political change.

Democratic Transition Theory

The process of democratic transitions within Egypt and Libya illustrated the use of

social movements and interests groups to transforms the values and institutions in the state.

To further examine the transformations within Egypt and Libya the democratic transition

theory in collaboration with the pluralist theory will be useful. The democratic transition

theory examines the significance of institutional strength and the state’s ability to be

resilient to social violence to gage democratic transitions (Mansfield & Snyder 2012, 727).

The democratic transition theory recognizes that popular social movements and strong

institutions have generally moved farther in a democratic direction in a more peaceful

manner than states with weaker institutions (Mansfield & Snyder 2012, 727).

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For example, Egypt has exemplified its ability to entrench administrative

institutions such as a judiciary but is still strongly controlled by the military. In Egypt there

was relatively peaceful demonstrations that lead to President Mubarak’s resignation.

However, in Libya there was ethnic and political marginalization that was translated into

weak state institutions (Mansfield & Snyder 2012, 730). These divisions made it difficult

for state institutions to peacefully mitigate violence resulting in the outbreak of a violent

civil war. These cleavages within society have complicated the process of promoting

democracy within the state (Mansfield & Snyder 730). More specifically, armed violence

has occurred because of the state’s inability to manage popular political mobilization

(Mansfield & Snyder 2012, 730). Therefore, states that “lack institutional capacity to

regulate pluralistic political concentration, suffer from serious ethnic divisions or face

conflict-prone regional dynamics” (Mansfield & Snyder 2012, 730).

Methodology

The cases that will be furthered examined for the research will be a comparative

analysis between two countries, Egypt and Libya. Each country is an ideal selection for

cases because they have each recently been a part of the uprisings of the Arab Spring and

experienced regime changes. Egypt and Libya will each be the units of analysis because

they are the focal actors in the research. The population will be the civil society that

participated within the revolutions and the demand for regime change.

The research design will be a comparative study between two active countries

within the Arab Spring in order to horizontally examine the role the media played in each

regime change. The uses of case studies are significant to qualitative research because they

allow for a “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test

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historical explanation that may be generalizable to other events” (George & Bennett 2005,

5). Case studies can be used in single case analysis along with comparisons of small

number of cases. This is significant because it allows for the opportunity to draw the

strongest inferences from the use of case analysis in combination with cross-case

comparisons (George & Bennett 2005, 18).

This is particularly important with the cases of Egypt and Libya because the

mobilization of individuals were used in both instances but the level of institutional

capacity within each state influenced the level of violence experienced in the regime

change. The strength in use case studies as a main form of research analysis is seen through

conceptual validity where it allows for the research to identify or measure the indicators

that best represent the theoretical concepts (George & Bennett 2005, 19). Subsequently, this

allows for new hypotheses to be derived because case studies can easily illustrate deviant or

outlier cases (George & Bennett 2005, 20). The apparent difference between the cases of

Egypt and Libya allows for the research to be more dynamic and overall improves accuracy

because it is easier to measure the variables from different cases.

Introduction to Case Studies: Egypt & Libya

In the last three years the Arab world and Middle East has witnessed a critical shift

in political, social and economic dynamics within the region. A wave of aggressive protests

began in 2010 after Tunisian, Mohamed Bouazizi, immolated himself within the local

market in protest of the poor economic conditions that had resulted in high-unemployment

and dire living conditions throughout the state (Clancy-Smith 2013, 16). This act sparked

political protests and outrage throughout the Middle East as more and more citizens became

dissatisfied with their political regimes, economic conditions, high rates of unemployment,

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ethnic tensions and suppressed freedom of speech.

In particular, Egypt saw a mass protest by educated but unemployed youth

revolting against the oppressive authoritarian regime of President Hosni Mubarak and the

harsh absence of civil rights within the state. The government attempted to limit the

country’s Internet access to try to diminish the ability for protestors to use social media for

political resistance, but failed when the protesters occupied Tahrir Square in Cairo until the

government fell (Rutherford 2013, 37). After the overthrow of the Mubarak regime in

February 2011, it was not until May 2012 when Egypt held its first presidential election,

resulting in the democratically chosen Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi

(Rutherford 2013, 39).

The political and economic dissatisfaction that had been mounting throughout the

Egyptian Spring began to trickle through other Arab countries, particularly within Libya.

Libyans had been subjected to a harsh dictator for the last 40 years named, Colonel

Muammar Gaddafi. The civilians demonstrated against his oppressive military regime

demanding democracy and civil rights, resulting in a full-fledged civil war lead by the

opposition party, the National Transitional Council (NTC) (Deeb 2013 , 70).

Afterwards, the situation in Libya became extremely dire. The international

community determined it to be a humanitarian crisis and the UN sanctioned a humanitarian

intervention as according to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The intervention was led

by NATO troops to support the NTC and overthrow the Gaddafi regime. After 9 long

months of civil war and aggressive revolt, the NTC killed Gaddafi on October 20, 2011

(Deeb 2013, 72). Since the overthrow of the regime and the killing of Gaddafi, Libya has

been in a state of political and social transition because of its lack of state formation.

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The 2010/2011 'Arab Spring' displayed common parallels to the colonial uprisings

that occurred in the region in the 19th Century. The only particular difference was that the

colonial hegemon was replaced with an autocratic dictator with a personal political agenda

(Goldstone 2011, 9). Typically, these 'new age' dictators did not appeal to a specific

ideology but driven by maintaining personal authority (Goldstone 2011, 9). This was

extremely evident within the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt and the Muammar al-

Qaddafi's regime in Libya. Similarly, both leaders acted in ways to perceive a false form of

democracy with controlled elections and promoted economic industrialization but funnelled

most of the wealth that resulted from foreign investment, to themselves and other elites

(Goldstone 2011, 9). This developed a hierarchal social structure dominated by social

forces where wealth and power was concentrated at the top of weak institutions.

This form of dictatorship regime can appear to be very resilient because of the

longstanding power throughout many generations. However, evidently it is becoming more

vulnerable to a rising educated liberal generation of youth. A majority of the uprisings

shared a common motive of a younger generation demanding accountability from their

government in the form of democratic elections, increase in wages, employment insurance,

economic prosperity and freedom of speech. These clear objectives outlined by the majority

of protestors allowed for the gain of popular support because they were not ideological

demands but common for all citizens. These demands were articulated through social media

outlets such as Facebook and Twitter, which allowed for individuals to interact with their

government easier (“The Arab World Online,” Dubai School of Government) 1. This

1 The Dubai School of Government orchestrated a study to measure the online trends in the Arab Spring. The

study determined that many respondents used the internet and social media as a source for current events. As

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allowed for democratic discourse to develop throughout society.

Conceptualization

The key concepts that will be further examined throughout this research will be:

global media, social media, Arab Spring, regime change, legitimacy, institutional capacity,

democracy and global recognition. For the purpose of this research and paper each concept

will be characterized with a clear definition.

Global media will be defined as international media such as television,

newspapers, op-eds and radio reporting on and giving opinions on the events of the Arab

Spring. As well as media present within the region during the spring. Social media will be

defined as social portals like Facebook, Twitter, Youtube used to mobilize the spring. Arab

Spring will specifically be the comparative discussion of the uprisings within Egypt and

Libya. Regime change will refer to the political dimension of change. Democracy will be

defined as a system involving multi-party elections, representative government and

freedom of speech. Legitimacy will be defined as the popular acceptance of an authority or

government. Institutional capacity will be defined as the pre-existing institutions and their

ability to provide public services to the population through administrative abilities like tax

collection. Global recognition will be characterized as international support given from

states in the form of aid or military supplies and public support through social media

well, many respondents believed social media allowed for their interaction with their government easier.

Finally, many respondents indicated that social media and the internet have improved social activity. This

data can be attributed to the broader examination of the impact of social media on social movement activity

and democratic transitions because it indicates how social media is changing the way individuals interact with

their government and each other. This is directly relevant to the development of political discourse in

authoritarian societies.

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Operationalization

The operationalization of these concepts will be done in order to effectively

measure them to determine an answer to the research question. The concept Global Media

will be operationalized into the indicators of media presence within the region, freedom of

press and censorship reports; Along with media reports, commentary and opinions on the

events. For the concept of Social Media, the indicators measured will be the amount of

Facebook, Twitter and Youtube activity discussing the Arab Spring. Specifically, Facebook

posts, shares or comments on the Arab Spring or media discussing it; as well as, the amount

of views or shares of real-time footage on Facebook and Youtube. Finally, trending Twitter

‘hash-tags’ used during the spring to gain media recognition.

The Arab Spring will be measured through a comparative analysis of the uprisings

in Egypt and Libya. The concept of Regime Change will be measured through the analysis

of the success of the uprising obtaining a change in government. The concept of democracy

will be measured through the analysis of the elections and the interim government’s

policies, such as fair and free elections with competition and the establishment of state

institutions. The concept of legitimacy will be operationalized through an analysis of

popular acceptance of the interim government by examining if there were further protests

or uprisings after the regime change, and more specifically voter participation in the

elections. The concept of Institutional Capacity will be assessed through the data provided

by Worldwide Governance Indicators. Finally, the indicator of Global Recognition will

measured by the amount of international support given to the revolutionaries such as aid

and military support.

The aforementioned indicators will be used as qualitative measures because of the

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lack of quantitative indicators available.

The Dynamics of Social Movements & Revolutions

Social movements are a distinctive form of contentious politics that seek to facilitate

political change or disruption (Tilly 2004, 3). Tilly defines social movements as a

“particular, connected, evolving, historical set of political interactions and practices” (Tilly

2004, 7)2. The institutionalization of social movements is an exercise of democracy because

it attempts to facilitate political change3. Social movements may emerge in authoritarian

regimes that have recently liberalised because there is a window opportunity for citizen

organizations to develop (Pickvance 1999,359)4. This is imperative in democratization

because social movements promote democracy by activating civil society groups through

social mobilization. Social mobilization is attributed to social movements through the

common goal to facilitate political change.5 Therefore, modernization is attributed to the

reasons why people mobilize because they are drawn to group’s objectives for social

2According to Charles Tilly, social movements are a combination of three elements: 1) campaigns of

collective claims on target authorities; 2) an array of claim-making performances including special-purpose

associations, public meetings, media statements and demonstrations; 3) public representations of the cause’s

worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment” (2004,7). This classification is important in the analysis of the

social movements that were experienced in Egypt and Libya because it highlights the organizational

legitimacy of the movements through representativeness, program and identity. 3 Social movements allow for people to respond to top down processes with a bottom up approach that creates

new relations with centers of power (Tilly 2013,102). This has become an imperative aspect of social

movements given the changing context of globalization because it engages civil society in government

processes, particularly in states where authoritarianism is employed. 4 Authoritarian regimes that are undergoing liberalization are likely to experience social movements because

citizen organizations are permitted. This allows for non-political groups to exploit the ambiguity about what is

tolerated (Pickvance 1999, 359). 5 Social movements are the mobilization of groups that advocate ideas and demands, which challenge existing

norms and policies (Pickvance 1999, 354).

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change6. This is typically expressed through civil society groups not necessarily a political

party (Pickvance 1999, 354).

Social movement organizations rely on the recruitment of people to communicate

their message to governments and audiences by drawing on local or regional culture to

create symbols or slogans relevant to the movement to give it a multi-dimensional meaning

(Tilly 2013,51). According to Tilly, communication in social movement organization

combines program, identity and standing (Tilly 2004, 12). The program is the objectives of

the movement such as the support or opposition to actual or proposed actions by the

government. Identity is the distinctiveness of the movement that is clear through unity,

numbers and overall commitment of members. Standing asserts how the movement is

related to other political actors such as minorities (Tilly 2004, 12). These elements of

communication in social media organizations are imperative to the movement’s ability to

recruit supporters in order to create legitimacy.

The advancement of technologies has forced social movement organizers to adapt to

the newly available media (Tilly 2013, 98). This has generated changes in the organization

of members, mobilization and accessing the international sphere. In the past, the

organization of social movements relied heavily on word of mouth or spreading

information through pre-existing cultural and social interaction like the connections created

by religious or educational institutions. Social networks provided an organizational

foundation that gave organizers access to like-minded individuals.

The shift in political, social or economic contexts is in imperative in social

6 The process of social mobilization can be defined as rapid social change that can lead to dislocation,

normative disturbance or disorientation (Parsa 1988, 49).

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movement organization because it determines the interaction between the organizers,

participants and the movement (Tilly 2013, 98). In the past, social movements typically

needed to use trans-national networks (TANs) in order to pursue domestic goals. The

movement had to generate international support by well-funded organizations, typically in

the West in order to pursue domestic objectives. This posed challenges for social

movements because there is an apparent hierarchy among organizations and movements.

Trans-national actors typically are drawn to support movements or local organizations that

are highly glamorized in order to generate international recognition. This often results in

oversimplifying or belittling the movement, which is detrimental to its legitimacy and

domestic objectives.

Globalization has changed the context for social movements through the

introduction of a broader scope of communications technologies. In new social movements,

these new elements of communication have been translated throughout the Internet and

social media sites and converted into ‘hashtags’ or Facebook pages. This advancement in

communication technologies has the capacity to generate even more meaning and

mobilization for the movement and organization because it increases global integration7.

This provides local organizations and movements access to the international system without

the support of a Western or trans-national network. This allows for the movement to go

global while staying local through the element of global integration that accompanies

communication technologies. However, the advancement of new communication

7However, it is important to acknowledge that the further advancement of communication technologies can

facilitate a specific set of social relations that continue to exclude those who don’t have access to such

technologies. But, the institutionalization of social movements have the capacity to mitigate these inequalities

through the ability to further engage individuals by linking communities in new ways.

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technologies throughout contentious politics has increased inequalities because there are

still limitations on access to these technologies. Therefore, it is imperative to further

analyze cases where a social movement developed but was not supplemented by advanced

communication technologies like the Internet or social media.

A Comparison to the Iranian Revolution of 1979

The duration of the Iranian revolution was from 1977 until 1979. Through

demonstrations and strikes the protesters eventually were able to exile the Shah in 1979.

The opposition of the Shah’s policies of modernization initiated the revolution in Iran8.

Urban communities were the basis of the political resistance because shopkeepers and

bazaar workers were the centre of urban life9. In the mid 1970s, it was apparent that the

Shah’s policies were to regulate merchants to try to extend state involvement in retail trade.

This allowed for autonomous and solidary collective resistance to be possible.

Islamic religious groups and the clergy drove the organizational capacity of the

revolution10. The clerical leaders in Iran were able to mobilize mass followings through

already established social and economic networks. This was imperative in the success of

8 The Shah’s modernization policies included strengthening the military, ensuring oil supplies to the

West and following the political cues of the United States (274). This caused social discontent because of the

lack of attention paid to the demands of indigenous Iranian people.

9 Theda Skocpol aligns her argument with Charles Tilly and stresses “that the mass, lower class participants

in revolution cannot turn discontent into effective political action without autonomous collective organization

and resources to sustain their efforts” (Skocpol 1982, 266). 10 In the case of Iran, the social discontent and disruption that the rapid modernization caused was not the

factor that gave people the collective organizational capacities and the autonomous resources to sustain

political resistance. The clergy provided these components that gave the movement legitimacy and

coordination (Skocpol 1982, 272).

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the revolution because the Shah was posing organizational challenges to the clergy11. This

highlights the significance pre-existing social institutions have on social mobilization.

Although the Shah imposed policies to limit the clergy’s role in society, the clergy still had

a significant following of students and shopkeepers.

The organizational foundation of the revolution was established through cultural

and religious forms that were thoroughly embedded in the urban community. This allowed

for solidarity and autonomy to develop within the social group. The symbol of Shi’a Islam

and Iranian nationalism were salient throughout the revolution because it provided

sustainability. The religious foundations of the revolution provided “symbolic resources to

justify resistance against unjust authority and to legitimate leaders as competitors of the

state” (Skocpol 1982, 273). The clergy provided the revolution with the symbolic and

economic resources needed to sustain the movement.

The political paradigm present throughout the Iranian revolution is significant

because it highlights the role a social institution can play in mobilizing individuals. The

clergy and its followers were able to establish cultural and political hegemony through

religious ideals (Skocpol 1982, 276)12. The clergy was able to establish nationalist Islamic

discourse throughout the political model in Iran. This translated into an identity for the

movement that was focused on the support for nationalist Islamism. This is contrasting to

the political context in Egypt and Libya that generated democratic and secular discourse.

11 In the 1970s the Shah used state power and programs of modernization to attack the clergy. More

specifically, through land reform policies that affected the clergy’s ties to the landed upper class. The clergy

was challenged in social functions such as education and welfare by the state that implemented reforms to

create modern, professional, state employment competitors (Skocpol 1982, 274). 12 The cultural and political hegemony the clergy was able to establish was contrary to the desires of the West

(Skocpol 1982, 276). This was imperative to the movement because it displayed the cohesion and political

consolidation of the clergy as a leader.

21

The clergy had the capacity to mobilize groups of people such as students and

shopkeepers because of the social networks established through mosques and religious

occasions (Skocpol 1982, 278)13. This was critical to the clergy’s ability to mobilize mass

groups because of the class marginalization that had resulted from the Shah’s

modernization policies to further state involvement in retail trade. This was imperative to

sustaining the political resistance. The clergy had access to the annual calendar of collective

rituals, weekly public prayer meetings and the prescriptions for public funerals processions

(Skocpol 1982, 274). These occasions were significant because they provided the clergy

with forums to channel simultaneous mass political action. Therefore, although the Shah

was trying to eliminate the clergy’s power in society, the institution of religion was able to

sustain itself, which allowed for greater organizational capacity.

The significance of the Iranian Revolution has to the situations being examined in

Egypt and Libya is the political context that was present. Throughout the Iranian

Revolution the clergy was able to generate organizational capacity for the movement

through its access to social and economic resources. This was significant to the movement’s

cohesion and legitimacy resulting in an overthrow of the government. The clergy was

successful in operating as the mobilizer of the movement because it represented the

political paradigm of 1979, nationalist Islamism.

The pre-existing cultural norms in 1979 Iranian were significant to the movement

because it reflected the collective identity of Islamism. The clergy was able to continue

popular demonstrations even after the Shah’s regime was replaced. Afterwards, the

13 The clergy had access to the majority of poorer Iranians such as shopkeepers, merchants, unemployed and

rural groups because of the social networks developed through mosques. This was significant because the

mosque did not represent a hierarchal class system that was apparent throughout the Shah’s policies.

22

demonstrations were directed at US imperialism that reflected the social discontent against

domestic political forces led by secular elites (Skocpol 1982, 278). This was significant to

the legitimacy of the clergy because it represented the influence of clerical leadership on

the political context in 1979 Iran. Furthermore, the broad theme of Iranian nationalism

supported by the clergy, established long-standing support from lower-middle class Iranians

who expressed social discontent against secular elites.

In contrast, the political situation in the Egyptian and Libyan cases highlighted the

shift in the political paradigm and cultural norms from Islamism to secular democracy. This

was translated through an institution, social media that is often associated with democratic

norms such as freedom of speech, expression and freedom of the press. Therefore, the use

of social media as the mobilizing element in the Egyptian and Libyan revolutions reflected

the collective political identity. Furthermore, the Iranian Revolution relied on the religious

institution to provide the organizational foundation because it imitated the cultural norms

and political identity of the Iranian people in 1979.

The parallels between the Iranian Revolution and the revolutions in Egypt and

Libya are relevant because of the implication of social networks during political transitions.

The Iranian Revolution compared to the cases of Egypt and Libya reflects how cultural and

social institutions can affect the organization of social movements. Therefore, the

mobilizing factor of the movement was able to formulate the movement’s collective

political identity.

Case Analysis: Relevant Commonalities between Egypt & Libya

The cases of Egypt and Libya exemplify the contextual nature of the use of social

media in democratic transitions and social movements. More specifically, how the political,

23

social and economic situations in each case are relevant in the democratic transitions

experienced and how social media played a role in this. As well, how the political, social

and economic situation of the state allowed for a social movement to develop so vigorously.

Consequently, this allowed for social media to provide the movements in Egypt and Libya

new capacities and imposed new constraints on political actors that impacted the

democratic transition in each case. Therefore, the variance in political, social and economic

contexts resulted in a different application of social media in each case during the process

of regime change14. However, it is important to examine the similarities experienced in

each case.

In each case, a false sense of democracy was established by the regime. The regime

implemented controlled aspects of liberalization such as opening up their markets, allowing

monitored Internet access and labour unions. This was intended to keep masses

depoliticized and unorganized. However, this was exemplified through controlled elections

and the promotion of economic liberalization that resulted in further marginalizing social

groups in the state 15. This allowed for large-scale corruption to develop throughout both

state apparatuses. The institutionalization of corrupt practices throughout the leadership and

the bureaucracy allowed for corruption to become the norm that resulted in dissatisfaction

between the public and the state. This translated into high rates of inflation, unemployment

14 Regime change refers to the process of altering the political dimension within a state (Pickvance 1999,

355). 15 In Libya, the economic situation was rapidly improving because of foreign investment and development of

Libyan infrastructure. However, the social situation became unsettling when young educated people

dissatisfied with economic gain that was only benefitting the top, while the rest of the country was forced to

live frugally (Deeb 2013, 69). In Egypt, economic liberalization was taking place but allies close to the

Mubarak regime were experiencing economic prosperity resulting in the institutionalization of corruption

throughout the public and educational sector (Rutherford 2013, 38). This resulted in high levels of inflation

and poverty.

24

levels and social injustices between the public and police.

The frustration with the economic situation and social injustices generated

legitimacy for political entrepreneurs who opposed the regime to mobilize dissatisfaction

among citizens (Tilly 2004, 113). The economic crisis combined with the social injustices

provided a specific context for the movements to develop. This was significant because

mobilization was not developed based on political ideology or affiliation but overall

dissatisfaction with the regime and the current situation. This allowed for the movement to

develop under broad objectives that allowed for support across social groups. This was

solidified throughout the use of social media because it allowed citizens to mobilize

without being bound to a formal organization. Furthermore, the implication of social media

was used to amplify the dissatisfaction and spread the message to observers. This supported

the idea that civil society is responsible for holding the government and leaders accountable

for their actions16.

The access to social media provided the youth in each case access to valuable

information and knowledge about aspects of democracies in other parts of the world. This

was apparent throughout 2010 and 2011 where the amount of Internet users doubled in the

span of four years 17. The increase in accessibility to communication technologies made it

more difficult for the government to hide security crackdowns, to pretend that elections

were legitimate, hide corruption or censor criticism. Consequently, this provided groups a

tool for mobilization because they were aware of the ills of the state and social media was a

16 Civil society can be understood as the dimension of voluntary societal association that exists below and

across state boundaries (Ford 2003, 128). 17 The data shown on the graphs in Appendix 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate how in Egypt in 2011 40/100 people were

using the internet, compared to only 20/100 back in 2008. Similarly, in Libya in 2011 35/100 people were

using the Internet compared to a mere 18/100 in 2008.

25

tool to express these ills18. Therefore, social media generated a sense of connectedness and

community that did not previously exist.

This reflects how aspects of liberalization by the regime allowed for the movement

to develop and experience broader mobilization because of the expansion of political space.

Social media provided alternative political space that extended throughout the state

(Hellman 1990, 1). This allowed for individuals to turn public dissent into a structured

movement. This was particularly significant aspect in both cases because of the apparent

social and geographical segmentation that otherwise would have hindered the overall

legitimacy of the movements. More specifically, in Libya there were societal fractured

along regional and tribal lines. In Egypt, these fractures were existent within social classes

because there was marginalization between the elite class and the poor lower class. Social

media allowed for social capital to develop across social lines and regions that normally did

not have access to one another (Howard & Hussain 2011, 36). This translated in the

organization of political action quickly and on a scale that was unprecedented.

Additionally, the state fragmentation that existed in both cases allowed for the

movement to infiltrate throughout different classes and social groupings. This can be

attributed to the increasing access to Internet bandwidth. In Egypt, just over 1800 bits per

second were being used per person. In Libya, just over 1400 bits per second being used per

person19. The large increase in access to Internet bandwidth over the last 4 years is

significant because it allowed for the movement to gain access to different avenues of

18 However, it is important to note that although advanced communication technologies and social media has

the capacity to broaden access to information and individuals, it does further exaggerates categorical

inequalities (Tilly 2013, 102). 19 The graph for ‘International Internet Bandwidth in Egypt & Libya’ can be found in Appendix 2.1.

26

communication. This was particularly significant in the movement gaining international

attention. The increase in Internet access provided the movement with a non-violent tool to

use against the regime. Activists could easily depict the brutalities of the regime on the

Internet. This was particularly significant where the disengagement between the regime and

the military resulted in the military supporting the protestors. The military was aware of its

social connections to protestors and knew the protestors could easily document and

broadcast violence. Therefore, Internet access and social media provided a non-violent tool

for deterrence.

In the case of Libya, there was evident detachment between the regime and the

military because the Gaddafi regime had undermined the national military to ensure it was

institutionally weak. More specifically, through the lack of funding to pay soldiers and to

purchase weapons. As well through the implementation of conscription, which filled the

military with conscripts who had no allegiance to the military (Deeb 2013, 71). In Egypt,

corruption was so prominent throughout the military and the state security apparatus that

the institution lost its legitimacy. Additionally, the military held monopolies in sectors like

water, oil, hotels, cement and construction (Tilly 2013, 110). Therefore, it did not support

privatization and the new reality that Mubarak was limiting the military’s power but

strengthening his own.

The societal gaps created by the regime allowed for political dissatisfaction to

augment throughout civil society. Therefore, in each case social media created an online

community for citizens to express their anger and hope for change. This was imperative in

initializing mobilization and ensuring that the movement had legitimacy and longevity.

Social media created a link between public politics and youth that otherwise would have

27

been fragmented.

The shift in the social and political paradigm was apparent throughout each case.

The impact of social media in each case allowed for a new political framework to develop

because it offered political space for democratic discourse to develop. For example, in each

case social media offered spaces where women could debate on an equal basis as men

(Howard & Hussain 2011, 43). Social media was able to translate the change in political

and social paradigm in each case by empowering local women. Consequently, this

delegitimized Islamic policies or norms that consider women subordinate to men. Social

media offered a democratic channel for policy alternatives to be determined. This was

significant because it generated legitimacy for the movement. This signified a political

opportunity for democratic discourse to be brought to the forefront.

In both cases, there was an apparent shift from radical Islamism to liberal

secularism (Deeb 2013, 68). The younger generation of Arab and Muslims in both cases

realized that the Islamist paradigm was detrimental to their identity because it constructed a

radical and violent distinction. Therefore, this generated a loss of appeal to radical Islamism

and the new political paradigm of a “secular, democratic, non-violent, non-ideological

society with citizens that are nationalist while maintaining their Arab and Muslim

identities” (Deeb 2013, 68). The shift in the social and political paradigm illustrated how

Islamism had begun to lose its support in Egypt and Libya. The erosion of the legitimacy of

radical Islamism was solidified through the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran because

of the government’s inability to deliver to its citizens20. Consequently, the support for

20 The overthrow of the Iranian Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 and the

institutionalization of sharia law illustrated the political paradigm of Islamism (Deeb 2013, 67). After 1979,

28

radical Islamism has deteriorated among the younger generation of Arab and Muslims, as a

result the younger generation has demanded a democratic, secular, accountable

government. The influence of communication technologies in the social movements

witnessed in Egypt and Libya was mediated by pre-existing cultures, practices and

competencies users (Tilly 2013, 108). This is apparent through the generational differences

in each case because there is a large cohort of younger individuals. Therefore, the change in

political context in each case illustrates a correlation between the younger generation and

the emergence of social media as a dominant tool.

Evident Differences Found in Egypt and Libya

Although the cases shared many commonalities there are apparent differences in

circumstances that have attributed to the application of social media. The discussion of the

differences between the two cases is important because it indicates the contextual nature of

social media. Therefore the differences between Egypt and Libya will be furthered

examined.

The political context in each case is significant to political transitions because it

reflects the institutional strength of the state. As previously mentioned, Egypt and Libya

both experienced a political and social paradigm shift that was imperative to the political

transition because it allowed for democratic discourse to immerse throughout the political

context in each state. However, the strength of each state’s pre-exiting institutions was

detrimental to the course of the revolution.

Islamism spread throughout the Muslim world but its support began to deteriorate throughout the mid-2000s,

most notably when Osama bin Laden was killed. This illustrated how the younger generation did not identify

with Islamism (moderate or radical) but rather believed in democratic, secularism where their cultural and

religious identity remained as Arab or Muslim. But their government and rule of law remained secular.

29

The institutional capacity is relevant to a state’s ability to mitigate social violence

and maintain long-term peace21. Social violence is attributed to rapid social change and the

rapid mobilization of new groups into politics combined with the slow development of

political institutions (Huntington 1968, 4). Institutional capacity emphasizes the strength of

state agencies and the states ability to remain accountable to its population. Political

stability is a precondition for political liberty because the state must be able to reconcile

political grievances non-violently through state institutions (Paris 2004, 186). Therefore,

there is a correlation between states with popular movements and strong institutions

moving farther in a democratic direction compared to movements that operate in states that

have weak institutions. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) provided substantial

quantitative indicators to measure the level of governance in states 22.

Prior to the revolution, Egypt has established institutional preconditions such as

administrative institutions, voter interest in elections and the military. This is apparent

through the permission of certain non-ruling parties to hold certain number of seats in

parliament as well as a legal system and a large number of civil groups. Although, Egypt

has entrenched administrative institutions, the military still has significant political control

because of its institutional position (Mansfield & Snyder 2012, 728). According to the WGI

the control of corruption was significantly low during the Mubarak regime from 2008 and

21 Self-sustaining peace largely depends on a state’s capacity to deal with social grievances in a non-violent

manner. This reflects the state’s commitment and internalization of peace because of its ability to deal with

issues of inequality or ethnic tensions non-violently. 22 “The WGI reports six aggregate governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the

period of 1996-2012, covering i) Voice & Accountability, ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence, iii)

Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of Law and vi) Control of Corruption. The line

graphs on each page show the country’s percentile rank on each of the six governance indicators. Percentile

ranks indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country, so that higher

values indicate better governance scores” (WGI Report).

30

2011 (Worldwide Governance Indicators, Egypt)23. The corruption apparent in Egypt has

impeded on the institutions ability to foster democracy. However, the state formation is

visible and through increased levels of corruption control further democratization is

possible (Mansfield & Snyder 2012, 728).

Political institutions have moral and structural dimensions that are reflective of the

society. A society with weak institutions lacks the ability to restrict the excesses of elite

desires (Huntington 1968, 24). Therefore, institutional capacity is an imperative factor in

the assimilation of social forces through the consolidation of peace and conflict resolution

mechanisms into the state’s institutions. This is translated through civic nationalism that

promotes loyalty to institutions rather than a distinctive culture (Mansfield & Snyder 2012,

728). Throughout the revolution in Egypt this has been apparent through the domestic

interest in improving Egypt and an active civil society. This has translated in a decrease in

political stability and an increase in political violence, where only 5% of countries in the

WGI measure lower than Egypt (WGI Report)24. This indicator is important because it

specifies that although there is an active civil society present in Egypt, the political

institutions are not strong enough to channel civil dissent into non-violent avenues.

Therefore, this has resulted in a significant decrease in political stability resulting in high

levels of political violence.

In the last 8 years, Egypt has experienced a variety of protests such as labour rights,

minimum wage, the need for price controls and the elimination of police brutality (Tilly

2013, 111). The civil society in Egypt has highlighted the demand for democratic

23 Graph can be found in Appendix 3.2 24 This graph can be found in Appendix 3.4.

31

institutions that are accountable based on a secular and non-ideological political

framework. The long duration of social movement activity was able to lay the groundwork

for the mobilizations experienced in January 2011. This was pertinent because it depicted

the tensions between the current political institutions and social forces in the state that

generated the revolution25. The WGI report clearly indicates that the Egyptian

government’s accountability has been on the decline since 2006 until 2011. This indicator

specifies that only 10% of countries measured in the report have experienced lower levels

of government accountability26. This is solidified through the indicator of government

effectiveness that specifies that the Egyptian government’s effectiveness has been on the

decline since 2009 and is continuing to deteriorate (WGI Report)27. These indicators are

important to better understand the political situation in Egypt and the context in which the

movement developed. Therefore, civil society engaged in demonstrations that intended to

generate a culture of transformative politics. Social media was able to give the

demonstrations increased political leverage and organizational capacity. However, social

media’s effectiveness was contingent on the fact that a civil society was already present in

Egypt. Furthermore, this reflects the institutional pre-conditions in Egypt that could sustain

democracy.

Social media provided a platform for like-minded individuals to find solidarity

through social networks. This resulted in unprecedented numbers of individuals

participating in street protests. Social media engaged individuals that normally were not

25 The cause of revolutions is attributed to the interaction between political institutions and social forces

because these institutions are incapable of providing channels for the participation of new social forces in

politics (Huntington 1968, 274). 26 This graph can be found in Appendix 3.1. 27 This graph can be found in Appendix 3.3.

32

politically active because of its broad range of accessibility. This provided a sense of

legitimacy for the movement in Egypt because it helped turn individualized or localized

dissent into a structured movement with a collective consciousness of shared difficulties

and opportunities for action. The political context in Egypt is relevant to the application of

social media because of the pre-existing institutions. The fundamentals of civil society were

already present throughout the state that allowed for social media to be more effective.

Social media attributed to the assimilation of social forces in state institutions through the

ousting of Mubarak and the implementation of a democratic political process.

In contrast, Libya has not exemplified the institutional pre-conditions. This is

evident in the statistic that the Libyan government has had the lowest levels of

accountability since 1996 (WGI Report)28. This is significant because it illustrates the lack

of accountability the Gaddafi regime had to the public for the entire duration in power.

Libya has been in the bottom fifth percentile in the accountability indicator since 2000

(WGI Report). The lack of government accountability in Libya has directly affected the

level of government effectiveness. Government effectiveness has been in the bottom tenth

percentile since 2006, with only a brief period of higher levels of effectiveness because of

privatization and bilateral aid agreements29. This further illustrates that Libyan institutions

have been intentionally left weak in order to maintain a political status quo.

Libya has shown that it lacks the institutional capacity to regulate pluralistic

political contestation through the engagement in a civil war and heightened political

violence. The weak institutions have been supported through the ethnic and geographic

28 This graph can be found in Appendix 4.1. 29 This graph can be found in Appendix 4.3.

33

fragmentations apparent throughout Libyan society. Gaddafi utilized these divisions to

maintain power and ward off any potential opposition (Mansfield & Snyder 2012, 730).

This is apparent through the WG indicator of control of corruption, which illustrates that

corruption has been augmenting in Libya since 2008. In 2012, the level of corruption was

unprecedented where only 2% of other countries measured had higher levels of corruption

than Libya (WGI Report)30. The high levels of corruption were solidified through national

institutions such as the military where it was fragmented along tribal lines in order to

ensure the institution was weak. Therefore, this signified the context for a violent

revolution because of absence of any state formation.

The regional and tribal divisions have attributed to the absence of the rudiments of

strong institutions and civil society. This has created a heighten security dilemma across

tribal lines31. The presence of the security dilemma makes it seemingly difficult for ethnic

groups to reach consensus on power-sharing techniques within the state, hindering on the

ability to establish strong state institutions because of fear and uncertainty. This was

apparent in Libya during the peaceful national election in 2012 where the choice of a

moderate power-sharing coalition did not substantially challenge local power bases

(Mansfield & Snyder 2012, 729). Additionally, this is apparent through the WG indicator of

political stability and absence of violence, which specifies that political stability has been

decreasing since 2009 causing political violence to increase (WGI Report). The lack of

political stability and heightened political violence has reached an all time high in 2012

30 This graph can be found in Appendix 4.2. 31 A security dilemma is created when two groups are seeking to enhance one’s own security, which in turns

causes reactions from the opposing group making the other less secure (Byman 2012, 14). This creates a

security circle where each group is continuing to feel insecure and vulnerable.

34

where only 5% of other countries measured have higher levels (WGI Report)32. This

indicates the degradation of the capacity of state institutions that has resulted in a civil war.

The fragmentation of the state structure has hindered the institutions capacity to assimilate

social forces. Therefore, these divisions have severely complicated efforts to promote

democracy.

The political context in Libya is relevant to the application of social media because

the societal fragmentation based upon ethnic lines were beyond the capacity of social

media. Social media could only act as an organizational factor for Libyans that had

experienced tribal divisions. It could not fulfil the institutional gaps that existed throughout

the state structure. As well, social media could not be used as a replacement for civil

society. The fundamentals of civil society must previously exist in order for social media to

supplement and further civil society’s range. Therefore, the application of social media was

limited in Libya because of the political context in the state. The lack of state structure

supported by weak institutions resulted in a civil war. Social media could only be used as a

tool to depict the realities of the civil war and generate international support.

Commentary on the Post Revolution Situation in Both Cases

After the fall of Gaddafi’s regime, the NTC in Libya took on the role as the interim

government in order to stabilize the post-revolution state. However, the NTC has been

experiencing difficulty in proving itself as an effective level of authority. Multiple news

reports have stated that “the economy has not recovered from the fighting, and government

officials have not been paid for months. Despite repeated pledges by Libya’s transitional

government...” (Deeb 2013,73). The NTC was able to organize individuals together to

32 This graph can be found in Appendix 4.4.

35

participate in the toppling of the regime, but it has acted as a decentralized entity unfit to

govern a recovering state (Alaaldin 2012, 35). Although the transitional government has

taken steps to increase accountability within the state by constructing a draft constitution,

restoring the judiciary by re-opening courts and judges; the de-centralized level of power

between the state and military make it nearly impossible to implement (Deeb 2013, 74).

The political and state institutions of the Gaddafi regime were dissolved of their power

resulting in the immediate need for quick re-structure (Dunne 2012, 370). This posed

challenges for the interim government’s ability to gain accountability because of the need

to completely rebuild the state and its institutions. The interim government did not have the

capacity to construct the state because it did not have a system of political alliances or

associations to build upon. Therefore, the lack of state cohesion solidified through the

Gaddafi regime has impeded on state formation, which consequently poses challenges for

democratization.

Most recently, the fragile institutions within Libya were highlighted during a mob-

like attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi. The incident escalated quickly resulting in

violent raid of the consulate and immolated destruction. The attack led to the killing of US

envoy to Libya, Christopher Stevens and three other American staffers (“US Envoy Dies in

Benghazi Consulate Attack” – Aljazeera). The attack on the consulate resulted in a severe

outcome because of the disorganization among the Libyan military and police force and

their inability to respond in an orderly fashion. The attack then led to a large violent riot

and illuminated the ideological instability that still exists within the state even post-

revolution. These evident and detrimental gaps that exist within Libya discouraged

lawfulness and order and condones “clashes between armed groups and militias” (Alaadlin

36

2012, 36). This highlights that peace has not been consolidated within the state. The

consolidation peace in a post-conflict society has direct relation to the ability to restructure

the institutions of the state. The elimination of violence and establishment of order allows

for state institutions to expand because of the institutionalization of peace. In Libya, the

institutions have become progressively weaker especially because of Gaddafi’s

undermining of the military (Deeb 2013, 75). The fragmentation between the state and

security apparatus has allowed violence to infiltrate throughout the state causing instability.

Therefore, the need for stable state institutions, specifically a centralized security

foundation in the form of an established non-corrupt military and police force that work

cooperatively, is essential for Libya’s transition to democracy.

The riots in Libya echoed throughout the Arab World, specifically in Egypt where

violence erupted in the streets of Cairo outside of the US Embassy. Protestors scaled the

concrete walls of the high-security embassy and replaced the American flag with a solid

black flag (“US Envoy Dies in Benghazi Consulate Attack” – Aljazeera). Although the riots

did not result to such extreme measures as that in Libya, the protests showed parallels to the

political structure of the Mubarak regime. This depicted that corruption is still evident

throughout the Egyptian military and its inability to act as a fundamental security apparatus

rather than an elitist entity (Rutherford 2013, 58). Therefore, this has limited the

effectiveness of Egyptian institutions because small-scale violence is still present. Further

democratization can translate the consolidation of peace and conflict resolution

mechanisms into the state’s institutions. This is apparent through the establishment of order

and justice, a government that is accountable and an active civil society. Furthermore, this

is solidified through the legitimacy of state’s consolidated national military, police force

37

and domestic courts

The Morsi regime has been unable to receive political accountability for its citizens

because of the continuing influence that the previous regime still has throughout Egypt. The

new government has attempted to establish a new Constitution but similar autocratic

tendencies began to become apparent when Morsi succeeded himself above the state giving

him unlimited powers over the judiciary. Additionally, there is continuing evidence that

military officials and appointees from the Mubarak regime are still appearing in throughout

the state such as ministries, the tax authority and the education system (Rutherford 58). The

democratic transition of Egypt will continue to be tainted while the military and political

appointees of the old regime are still influencing the political structure and policies within

Egypt (Rutherford 2013, 58). Therefore, it is apparent that the military dominance and the

lasting remnants of the Mubarak regime have de-legitimized the Morsi government’s

ability to gain accountability. This resulted in the ousting of Morsi in July 2013.

The protests against the Morsi regime highlighted that the Muslim Brotherhood was

elected because it was the party with the most legitimacy because of its organizational

capacity, not because it embodied the objectives of the social movement. This is important

because it emphasizes civil society’s exercise of democratic rights by holding the

government accountable to the public. Therefore, it is important that Egypt moves toward a

democratic regime rather than a military or autocratic regime.

Concluding Remarks

The cases of Egypt and Libya have illustrated the impact social media can have on

political transitions in liberalized autocratic regimes. The impact of social media is

contingent on the political context in the state because political mobilization is attributed to

38

modernization. Social mobilization is likely to occur in societies that have experienced

some social and economic development but limited political modernization. Therefore,

further democratization can downplay social movement activity because civil society is

absorbed into political institutions. Civil society is given new democratic avenues to voice

their opinions and concerns. Consequently, this decreases social mobilization activity or

revolutions because political institutions are more effective.

In Libya, it will be imperative to establish the foundations of a civil society in order

to further democratize. The incorporation of civil society groups in political institutions will

allow for regional and tribal tensions to lessen. Consequently, this will diminish the security

dilemma that is currently present in Libya because it will eliminate uncertainty between

groups. State formation is fundamental in Libya in order to experience democracy. This will

include establishing a government that is accountable to civil society, a judiciary that can

mitigate corruption and a security apparatus to enforce law and order.

In Egypt, it will be essential for the interim government to refine and restructure

institutions to ensure that they are not riddled with corruption from past regimes. This will

have to include restructuring the judiciary and the bureaucracy to eliminate corruption.

Additionally, the state must realign the military by downgrading its power and strength.

This will ensure that the military is aligned to the state by providing it with the proper

security forces necessary.

The political transitions in Egypt and Libya have displayed that social media is a

beneficial political tool. However, its application is limited because the political context of

the state is relevant to its transition. Therefore, social media can supplement political

movements by helping the movement access broader levels of mobilization. But, social

39

media cannot establish or strengthen state institutions. Social media can only provide an

alternative channel for political or democratic discourse to emerge when all others are

being controlled by the state.

Further research can be conducted on the aforementioned cases to analyze the

process of democratization and development. Additional research will be imperative to

measure and analyze the state’s institutions as both cases try to formulate new

governments. As well, further research on the impact of social media in democratizing or

transitioning states will be beneficial to social mobilization literature and research. This

will be valuable because social media has changed the formulation of revolutions causing

more rapid social mobilization.

Additional research on the phenomenon of social media will be advantageous to the

field of political science and communication because social media has changed the way

civil society can interact with political institutions. Social media has transformed the way in

which civil society can hold non-democratic accountable to their action. Finally, social

media has changed the way people can communicate on a global and local level.

40

Appendix

Appendix 1.1

Egypt: 2000-2011

Source: Africa Development Indicators, World Bank

Appendix 1.2

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

CELLULARSUBSCRIPTIONS (PER100 PEOPLE)

INTERNET USERS(PER 100 PEOPLE)

41

Libya : 2000-2011

Source: Africa Development Indicators, World Bank

Appendix 2.1

Egypt & Libya: 2000-2011

International Internet Bandwidth (bits per second/person)

Source: Africa Development Indicators, World Bank

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

CELLULARSUBSCRIPTIONS (PER100 PEOPLE)

INTERNET USERS(PER 100 PEOPLE)

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

20002001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 20072008 2009 2010 2011

EGYPT

LIBYA

42

Worldwide Governance Indicators: Egypt

Appendix 3.1

Appendix 3.2

Appendix 3.3

43

Appendix 3.4

Worldwide Governance Indicators: Libya

Appendix 4.1

Appendix 4.2

44

Appendix 4.3

Appendix 4.4

45

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